BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS: FOLLOW-UP TO DEMARCHE OF APRIL 12

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000700030041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: April 17, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2009/04/03: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700030041-0
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TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
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INFO RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
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S E C R E T STATE 111326
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EAIR, PGOV, PREL, BZ, BOG, UR, GE
SUBJECT: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS: FOLLOW-UP TO DEMARCHE OF
APRIL 12
1. DAS NILES CHAIRED AN INTERAGENCY MEETING APRIL 13 IN
WHICH THE DIPLOMATIC STATE OF PLAY WAS DISCUSSED AND
VARIOUS OPTIONS WERE EXAMINED. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON
POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP IN THE BASC TO DOBRYNIN'S COMMENTS TO
UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION
OF OTHER OPTIONS TAILORED TO THE POLITICAL ANDCORRIDOR
SITUATIONS, SHOULD CONDITIONS IN THE CORRIDORS NOT RETURN
TO A SATISFACTORY STATE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF
TIME. CONSIDERATION OF THESE OPTIONS WILL CONTINUE. BUT
WE BELIEVE THAT FOR THE MOMENT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON
DIPLOMATIC FOLLOW-UP.
2. NILES POINTED OUT THAT DOBRYNIN HAD SUGGESTED
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO "ORIGINAL" PROCEDURES AND TO
ENGGE IN TALKS TO RESOLVE CURRENT PROBLEMS. THIS
SUGGESTED POSSIBLE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO -RETURN TO THE
SITUATION AS IT EXISTED BEFORE FEBRUARY 20. NILES -
INDICATED THAT PROPER NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE -ALLIES
IN BASC TO LNGAGE SOVIET CONTROLLERS IN DISCUSSION IN
ORDER TO TEST SOVIET INTENTIONS ON THIS POINT.
3. COMMENT: DOBRYNIN'S COMMENTS PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME
OPENING FOR FURTHER EFFORTS TO REVERSE RECENT SOVIET
MEASURES. THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED QUESTION IS THE
DEFINITION OF THE "ORIGINAL PROCEDURES" REFERRED TO IN
THE SOVIET RESPONSE. IN OUR VIEW, THESE PROCEDURES NEED
e
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NOT INCLUDE CO;PLETE CESSATION OF SOVIET RESERVATIONS.
OUR MAJOR GOAL SHOULD BE REVERSAL OF SOVIET CLAIMS OF
UNILATERAL RIGHTS TO DETERMINE USE OF AIR SPACE, TO
AUTHORIZE FLIGHTS AND TO DETERMINE WHEN THEIR SAFETY IS
OR IS NOT ENDANGERED. IN PRACTICE THIS WOULD MEAN THAT
THE SOVIETS WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WARNING OF EXPECTED
RESERVATIONS AND WOULD LISTEN TO ALLIED OBJECTIONS IF
PROBLEMS WERE TO BE EXPECTED. ADDRESSEES MAY RECALL THAT
A SIMILAR CONCEPT WAS CONSIDERED BY THE BASC CONTROLLERS
IN THE SPRING OF 1981. THIS IDEA INCLUDED AN INFORMAL
"REQUEST" FORM SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIETS BEFORE EACH
RESERVATION. THE ALLIES "APPROVED" SOVIETS "REQUESTS`
FOR USE OF AIR SPACE AND REMINDED THE SOVIETS OF THEIR
CONTINUED RIGHT OF UNIMPEDED ACCESS THROUGH THE
CORRIDORS.
4. THE NEXT IMPORTANT QUESTION IS HOW TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE
ALLIED DEMARCHES. DOBRYNIN'S COMMENTS WERE THE MOST
EXTENSIVE OF THE THREE AND DID OFFER SOME HOPE FOR
PROGRESS. DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD
AWAIT A FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE BEFORE PURSUING THE ISSUE
AGAIN IN BERLIN. OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO BEGIN WORKING
LEVEL APPROACHES IN THE BASC WITH THE GOAL OF TESTING
SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. WE WOULD VISUALIZE
SUCH A PROCESS AS FOLLOWS:
A. ALLIED MISSIONS SHOULD CONSIDER BEST MEANS OF TESTING
SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BASC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
DOBRYNIN REMARKS. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO AWAIT NEXT
SOVIET RESERVATION. ANOTHER MIGHT BE OFFERED IN THE
CALIBRATION FLIGHTS MENTIONED IN USBERLIN 1166.
B. IN THE DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET CONTROLLER, THE
CHAIRMAN ALLIED CONTROLLER MIGHT REFER TO OUR DESIRE TO
HANDLE THE ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION ACCORDING TO "ORIGINAL
PROCEDURES."
C. IF QUERIED FOR A DEFINITION OF "ORIGINAL PROCEDURES"
CHAIRMAN CONTROLLER SHOULD NOTE THAT THE AIR CORRIDORS
HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN MANAGED ON A JOINT BASIS AND THAT
UNILATERAL SOVIET DECLARATIONS OF RESERVATIONS WHICH
IMPINGE ON ALLIED INTERESTS DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THIS
MUTUAL SPIRIT. THE GOAL OF ALL FOUR MEMBERS OF THE BASC
SHOULD BE TO WORK OUT MATTERS JOINTLY.
D. IF THE SOVIETS ASK FOR MORE DETAILS, THE ALLIES SHOULD
DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE SOVIET RESERVATIONS,
INCLUDING SHORT NOTICE GIVEN, CLOSURE OF ENTIRE CORRIDORS
ETC. THEY SHOULD ALSO REFER TO UNILATERAL SOVIET CHANGES
IN PROCEDURES SUCH AS INCIDENT ON APRIL 8 WITH AMERICAN
BUSINESS AIRCRAFT.
E. IF THIS APPROACH CONTINUES TO ELICIT SOVIET INTEREST,
BASC CONTROLLER MIGHT REFER TO POSSIBILITY OF INFORMAL
WRITTEN REQUESTS ON THE ORDER OF THOSE USED IN 198L.
5. THE GOAL OF SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE TO TEST SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT THE
ALLIES ARE WILLING TO ENTER INTO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS
ABOUT THE CORRIDOR REGIME. IF THE SOVIET CONTROLLER MADE
UNACCEPTABLE COMMENTS OR REPEATED RECENT THREATS AT ANY
POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, THE ALLIED CONTROLLER WOULD
SUSPE( THE DISCUSSION AND REPEAT OUR INSISTENCE ON
UNIMPEDED ACCESS. GIVEN APPARENTLY SLOW COMMUNICATIONS
3ETWEEN SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, WE
WOULD WISH TO RETURN TO THE POINTS ONE OR TWO MORE TIMES
AFTER A FIRST REBUFF TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET CONTROLLER
WAS IN FACT ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS.
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6. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY BONN AND MISSION ARE
RLOUESTED TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS WITH ALLIES AND FORMULATE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION. GIVEN CONTINUED
ANNOYANCE OF AIR CORRIDOR PROOLEMS. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES
THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT LET MUCH TIME PASS BEFORE FOLLOWING
UP THIS WEEK'S DEMARCHES WITH EFFORTS TO TEST SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. SHULT2
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