THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
31 May 1984
The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Mr. McFarlane:
The DDCI wanted you to be aware that
we have sent the attached unclassified
extracts from his recent testimony before
the SSCI to the Committee at its request.
John wanted you to be aware of this in
case the Senate goes public with it.
Sincerely,
STAT
Executive Assistant
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
The Illicit Narcotics Threat
The scope of the narcotics problem we face is enormous. According to DEA
and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, more than 40 million people in the
United States are expected to spend up to $80 billion this year to consume
some 4 tons of heroin, as much as 61 tons of cocaine, and about 14,000 tons of
marijuana. Nearly all of these drugs come from crops grown in foreign
countries.
Latin America continues to produce most of the marijuana, all of the
cocaine, and about a third of the heroin imported into the United States. In
spite of heightened US interdiction activity, key segments of-the drug
industry have found alternate routes around these increased control efforts.
Colombia's cocaine and marijuana traffickers dominate the US market.
Last year Colombia produced between 13,000 and 16,000 tons of marijuana and
increased domestic coca cultivation to supply the equivalent of 20 percent of
the cocaine consumed annually in the United States.
The results of two recent Colombian National Police operations against
cocaine processing complexes in Southeast Colombia are unprecedented. The
operation conducted 10-12 March in Caqueta Department resulted in the largest
cocaine seizure ever, about 10,000 kilograms (with a retail value of more than
$1 billion in the United States), and the destruction of 10 laboratories. On
6 May, the National Police raided a cocaine processing complex in Vaupes
Department and seized three kilograms of coca paste and a large quantity of
precursor chemicals, including 94 containers of hydrochloric acid and 105
drums of ether.
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Other antinarcotics initiatives by the Colombian Government are also
encouraging. As you know, the assassination earlier this month of Justice
Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla has prompted an unprecedented crackdown on
traffickers, but it remains to be seen if the crackdown will last only a few
months or continue as a serious effort.
Opium output in Mexico was about 17 tons in 1983, and total 1984 opium
production could be substantially more. Mexico's ability to keep up with
increasing poppy cultivation has been limited by problems in the eradication
program, particularly in the deployment of spray helicopters.
The Jamaican Government's recent crackdown on marijuana smuggling has
stalled, in part because the constabulary lacks the manpower and resources to
conduct sustained large-scale interdiction operations. Without an effective
narcotics control program, marijuana shipments from Jamaica in 1984 could be
substantially higher than the 1,750 tons shipped in 1983.
Bolivia and Peru continue to be the primary source countries for coca.
The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates that 70 to
80 tons of cocaine are produced each year from coca grown in Peru and
Bolivia. Although Peru is still a minor exporter of cocaine compared to
Colombia and Bolivia, cocaine is now being refined in Peru and smuggled via
ship and aircraft to the United States, western Europe, and perhaps Asia and
Australia.
In Belize, Prime Minister Price recently suspended a spray eradication
program that destroyed 95 percent of last fall's marijuana crop. According to
DEA, some 600 hectares of marijuana are currently under cultivation. If spray
eradication is not resumed, Belize could overtake Jamaica--which DEA estimates
produced about 1,750 tons in 1983--asthe second largest supplier to the
United States.
2
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Southwest Asia's Golden Crescent, which includes Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Iran, currently accounts for about half the heroin reaching the United
States (Southeast Asia supplies about 20 percent and Mexico about 30
percent). Steady reductions in opium production in the Golden Crescent until
this year were largely the result of an estimated drop in Pakistan from 530 to
800 tons in 1979 to 45 to 60 tons in 1983. President Zia's ban on opium
production in 1979, adverse weather in 1980 and 1981, and a price drop largely
due to oversupply contributed to the decline. Iran remains a net importer of
opium for local consumption, but increased opium output during the past two
years in Afghanistan has enabled traffickers to offset Pakistan's reduction.
This will probably result in a net increase this year in regional production.
This year's opium harvest from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, where
Thailand, Burma, and Laos meet, is expected to be larger than the 600 tons
produced in the region last year, perhaps as much as 700 tons. Refineries
that convert this opium to heroin are concentrated along the Thai-Burmese
border.
Thailand has increased its use of military force during the past two and
one-half years against the groups that refine nearly all of the heroin
produced in the Golden Triangle. These Thai military initiatives have had an
impact on narcotics trafficking in the region: new trafficking routes through
India and Burma have been reported, and trafficking groups have begun to
relocate refineries deeper inside Burma. Thai actions in the region have had
a limited effect on opium production, however, and the continued resiliency of
narcotics traffickers will keep Southeast Asia a major supplier of heroin to
world markets.
3
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Thailand's limited crop-substitution program continues to be poorly
enforced, and Bangkok has been slow to promote wider participation among
farmers who find alternate crops financially attractive only when opium prices
are severely depressed. Until recently, Thai eradication efforts have been
limited, but a small-scale eradication campaign instituted earlier this year
may signal a softening of attitudes on this issue.
Burma is estimated to grow more than 80 percent of the opium produced in
Southeast Asia. Burma's narcotics control programs, such as its manual crop
eradication projects, have had little impact to date; and its plans to expand
narcotics control efforts have encountered problems such as high-level
government and military corruption. During 1983, Bo Ni, the Minister of Home
and Religious Affairs--who was responsible for narcotics suppression programs-
-and Brigadier General Tin 00 were both convicted of corruption and sentenced
to life in prison.
Outlook for the Future--The outlook for the future is troublesome.
Although our crop estimates may not be precise, we are confident that
worldwide production of opium, coca, and marijuana will increase in 1984 and
that large, long-term declines in drug crop harvests are unlikely in most of
the key producing countries in the foreseeable future. This will result in a
continued increase in the quantity of drugs available for export to the United
States. We cannot, however, project the precise impact of these increases on
the availability, price, or purity of drugs in the United States.
4
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO for Narcotics
FROM: EA/DDCI
Dave,
Executive Registry
84-Z3G
The attached are fine with John. FYI, we are
sending a copy of the unclassified version of the
threat to the NSC so they will not be blind-sided
if Congress goes public with it.
STAT
semis" 101 vacs
- Mom
Date 31 May 1984
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
The Illicit Narcotics Threat
The scope of the narcotics problem we face is enormous. According to DEA
and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, more than 40 million people in the
United States are expected to spend up to $80 billion this year to consume
some 4 tons of heroin, is much as 61 tons of cocaine, and about 14,000 tons of
marijuana. Nearly all of these drugs come from crops grown in foreign
countries.
Latin America continues to produce most of the marijuana, all of the
cocaine, and about a third of the heroin imported into the United States. In
spite of heightened US interdiction activity, key segments of-the drug
industry have found alternate routes around these increased control efforts.
Colombia's cocaine and marijuana traffickers dominate the US market.
Last year Colombia produced between 13,000 and 16,000 tons of marijuana and
increased domestic coca cultivation to supply the equival.nt of 20 percent of
the cocaine consumed annually in the United States.
The results of two recent Colombian National Police operations against
cocaine processing complexes in Southeast Colombia are unprecedented. The
operation conducted 10-12 March in Caqueta Department resulted in the largest
cocaine seizure ever, about 10,000 kilograms (with a retail value of more than
$1 billion in the United States), and the destruction of 10 laboratories. On
6 May, the National Police raided a cocaine processing complex in Vaupes
Department and seized three kilograms of coca paste and a large quantity of
precursor chemicals, including 94 containers of hydrochloric acid and 105
drums of ether.
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Other antinarcotics initiatives by the Colombian Government are also
encouraging. As you know, the assassination earlier this month of Justice
Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla has prompted an unprecedented crackdown on
traffickers, but it remains to be seen if the crackdown will last only a few
months or continue as a serious effort.
Opium output in Mexico was about 17 tons In 1983,,and total 1984 opium
production could be substantially more. Mexico's ability to keep up with
increasing poppy cultivation has been limited by problems in the eradication
program, particularly in the deployment of spray helicopters.
The Jamaican Government's recent crackdown on marijuana smuggling has
stalled, in part because the constabulary lacks the manpower and resources to
conduct sustained large-scale interdiction operations. Without an effective
narcotics control program, marijuana shipments from Jamaica in 1984 could be
substantially higher than the 1,750 tons shipped in 1983.
Bolivia and Peru continue to be the primary source countries for coca.
The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates that 70 to
80 tons of cocaine are produced each year from coca grown in Peru and
Bolivia. Although Peru is still a minor exporter of cocaine compared to
Colombia and Bolivia, cocaine is now being refined in Peru and smuggled via
ship and aircraft to the United States, western Europe, and perhaps Asia and
Australia.
In Belize, Prime Minister Price recently suspended a spray eradication
program that destroyed 95 percent of last fall's marijuana crop. According to
DEA, some 600 hectares of marijuana are currently under cultivation. If spray
eradication is not resumed, Belize could overtake Jamaica--which DEA estimates
produced about 1,750 tons in 1983--as the second largest supplier to the
United States.
2
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Southwest Asia's Golden Crescent, which includes Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Iran, currently accounts for about half the heroin reaching the-United
States (Southeast Asia supplies about 20 percent and Mexico about 30
percent). Steady reductions in opium production in the Golden Crescent until
this year were largely the result of an estimated drop in Pakistan from 530 to
800 tons in 1979 to 45 to 60 tons in 1983. President Zia's ban on opium
production in 1979, adverse weather in 1980 and 1981, and a price drop largely
due to oversupply contributed to the decline. Iran remains a net importer of
opium for local consumption, but increased opium output during the past two
years in Afghanistan has enabled traffickers to offset Pakistan's reduction.
This will probably result in a net increase this year in regional production.
This year's opium harvest from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, where
Thailand, Burma, and Laos meet, is expected to be larger than the 600 tons
produced in the region last year, perhaps as much as 700 tons. Refineries
that convert this opium to heroin are concentrated along the Thai-Burmese
border.
Thailand has increased its use of military force during the past two and
one-half years against the groups that refine nearly all of the heroin
produced in the Golden Triangle. These Thai military initiatives have had an
impact on narcotics trafficking in the region: new trafficking routes through
India and Burma have been reported, and trafficking groups have begun to
relocate refineries deeper inside Burma. Thai actions in the region have had
a limited effect on opium production, however, and the continued resiliency of
narcotics traffickers will keep Southeast Asia a major supplier of heroin to
world markets.
3
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
UNCLASSIFIED
Thailand's limited crop-substitution program continues to be poorly
enforced, and Bangkok has been slow to promote wider participation among
farmers who find alternate crops financially attractive only when opium prices
are severely depressed. Until recently, Thai eradication efforts have been
limited, but a small-scale eradication campaign instituted earlier this year
may signal a softening of attitudes on this issue.
Burma is estimated to grow more than 80 percent of the opium produced in
Southeast Asia. Burma's narcotics control programs, such as itg'manual crop
eradication projects, have had little impact to date; and its plans to expand
narcotics control efforts have encountered problems such as high-level
government and military corruption. During 1983, Bo Ni, the Minister of Home
and Religious Affairs--who was responsible for narcotics suppression programs-
-and Brigadier General Tin 00 were both convicted of corruption and sentenced
to life in prison.
Outlook for the Future--The outlook for the future is troublesome.
Although our crop estimates may not be precise, we are confident that
worldwide production of opium, coca, and marijuana will increase in 1984 and
that large, long-term declines in drug crop harvests are unlikely in most of
the key producing countries in the foreseeable future. This will result in a
continued increase in the quantity of drugs available for export to the United
States. We cannot, however, project the precise impact of these increases on
the availability, price, or purity of drugs in the United States.
4
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET 25X1
The Soviet Drug Problem
The Soviet Union does not have drug abuse or trafficking problems as
severe as those found in more open societies in the West. Although still
insignificant in comparison to alcoholism, narcotic abuse is nevertheless
becoming a growing social problem. And as long as the Soviets maintain their
heavy involvement in Afghanistan--a large drug producer--curtailing drug
involvement will be a difficult task for the Soviet government..
Implicit official acknowledgment of a Soviet national level drug problem
occurred in 1982, when a high level conference on combating narcotics was
convened under the chairmanship of the USSR Procurator. Although no hard data
exist, scattered reporting indicates that drug trafficking and abuse In the
USSR takes three principal forms:
-- Manufacturing and consumption of a variety of products derived from
legal pharmaceuticals, a form of abuse more common in urban areas.
-- Consumption of marijuana or hashish, both of which are available in
Soviet cities. Usage evidently is more prevalent, however, in
provinces adjacent to Southwest Asian hashish-producing countries and
in areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia where small scale cannabis
culture, a traditional activity, continues in defiance of an official
ban.
-- Production and consumption by natives of Central Asia and
Transcaucasia of a wide variety of other drugs--including
hallucinogens and opiates--derived from local plants.
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
25X1
SECRET
The access of Soviet citizens to drugs has been increased by troop
involvement in Afghanistan, where both cannabis (largely hashish) and opiates
are widely available on the open market. A variety of sources indicate that
hashish smoking is prevalent among Soviet enlisted personnel who, unlike their
officers, are denied alcohol. Consumption of opiates may also be a problem.
Reportedly Afghans routinely carry drugs to bribe Soviet soldiers at
roadblocks and checkpoints. There Is also evidence that individuals-
-
peripheral to the insurgent forces distribute narcotics to Soviet troops in
the hope of degrading their competence. So far we have insufficient
information to assess the impact of drug consumption on Soviet military
performance in Afghanistan.
Soviet troops rotating out of Afghanistan may also be contributing to an
increased drug abuse problem throughout the Soviet Bloc. They are'known to
take small quantities of drugs with them into the USSR, and the Hungarians
have accused recently transfered Soviet troops of contributing to a local
upsurge in hashish consumption.
In all other respects, the USSR appears to have remained isolated from
the international trafficking of illicit drugs. Drug trafficking by foreign
nationals to the Soviet market apparently does not occur; and the only
evidence that the USSR is being used as a trafficking corridor is DEA
reporting that Afghans may be moving drugs across the Soviet border and into
Iran to avoid increased security along the Afghan-Iranian border. Although
Soviet border security is also tight, press reporting indicates that
insurgents have carried out cross-border raids against Soviet customs
installations. Consequently, it is possible that smugglers are indeed
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
crossing the Soviet border on their way to Iran. There also have been some
instances of_ Southeast Asian heroin smuggling to Europe on Aeroflot flights,
but such cases probably are no more frequent than drug smuggling on other
international flights.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Interagency Narcotics Committees and Working Groups
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee Narcotics Working Group
Purpose: To prepare a study assessing the adequacy of intelligence
support to the US international narcotics control effort
and to propose recommendations necessary to improve this
support.
Members: CIA, State/INR, State/INM, NSA, FBI, Treasury, DIA, DEA,
Customs, Coast Guard, INS and the military services
Subgroups: In preparing its report, "International Narcotics
Coordination and Collection Study," the Narcotics Working
Group formed the following subgroups which were disbanded
when the report was published in February 1984:
crop production
host government attitudes
trafficking organizations
enforcement capabilities
financial flows
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
A separate subgroup of the Narcotics Working Group was
formed to address security policies and legal issues
involved in the utilization of intelligence by the Law
Enforcement Community. This group has also concluded work
and its report is now being drafted. Counsel for CIA, NSA
and DOD continue to meet with Justice Department officials
to discuss issues regarding the dissemination of
intelligence to law enforcement agencies.
Note: As the DDCI noted in his 16 May testimony before the'SSCI, the
Narcotics Working Group will submit a final report to the DCI in
September 1984 on four outstanding issues and the results of
implementing recommendations in its February 1984 study.
NIO/Narcotics Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
Purpose: To bring together working level analysts and managers to
share information on current narcotics developments and
production matters as well as to identify collection gaps
and forecast future trends. Issues considered are of
interest to the Intelligence and Enforcement Communities as
well as to policymakers.
SEGPRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Attendees: CIA, NSA, State/INR, DEA, DIA, Coast Guard, FBI, Treasury,
Customs and the White House
NIO/Narcotics Monthly Core Group Meetings
Purpose: To ensure that interagency senior managers meet regularly
to share information, solicit ideas for analytical
initiatives, identify potential interagency problems and
needs, and to coordinate ongoing research and other
narcotics-related activities.
Attendees: CIA, NSA, DEA, Coast Guard and Customs
STATE DEPARTMENT
State/INM Bi-weekly Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Meeting
Purpose: To discuss intelligence on narcotics issues related to US
foreign policy initiatives.
Attendees: State, CIA, and NSA
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Bureau and Interagency Monthly Coordination Meeting
Purpose: To promote information sharing concerning current policy
issues regarding international narcotics.
Attendees: CIA, DEA, NIIDA, HHS, DOD, Coast Guard, NNBIS and the White
House
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Group
Purpose: To draft State's annual International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report to Congress.
Members: State/INM, Justice, Defense, Treasury, HHS, AID and DEA
NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION: SYSTEM (NNBIS)
The Executive Board
Purpose: Responsible for overall management of NNBIS under the
direction of the Vice President. The Board meets every few
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
months to review progress reports from NNBIS Regional
Centers and to consider goals and policy objectives.
Members: Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense and Transportation,
the Attorney General, the Counselor to the President, the
DCI and the Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy
Office
The Coordinating Board
Purpose: Meets irregularly to coordinate interagency support to
NNBIS, to address operational and administrative problems
and perform ad hoc tasks as directed by the Vice President
or the Executive Board.
Members: Senior representatives of Executive Board members and their
subordinate agencies and offices
Joint Surveillance Committee (JSC)
Purpose: As an interagency working group of the Coordinating Board,
the JSC is preparing a report for the Vice President on the
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
national capability to detect and interdict narcotics
trafficking to the US and steps that can be taken to
improve that capability. Its work should be complete by
30 June when the report is due.
Members: NNBIS, OMB, State/INM, CIA, White House, Coast Guard, DEA,
Customs, FBI, INS, DOD, Treasury, and the FAA
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Cabinet Council on Legal Policy Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction
Purpose: Initially conceived as an interagency forum to promote
cooperation, examine resource allocations, and make
recommendations to the Cabinet Council. The Working
Group's current task is to draft the 1983 Drug Law
Enforcement Report to the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy.
The report, which will probably be published next month,
provides an overview of the Federal narcotics effort. The
status of the Working Group, once the report is published,
is unclear. The following task forces were formed under
the working group to help draft the report:
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Interagency Investigations
Interdiction
Federal/State/Local Cooperation
Diplomatic Initiatives
Legislative Initiatives
Members: Customs, DEA, IRS, Coast Guard, DOD, CIA, FBI, INS,
Treasury, FAA, Agriculture, State/INM, Commerce, Interior,
FCC, OMB, NSA, FDA, NIDA, EPA, HHS, IRS, and FLETC
Cabinet Council on Human Resources Working Group on Drug Abuse Health
Issues
Purpose: To discuss drug-related national-level health issues.
Members: White House, DEA, DOD, DOE, NIDA, FDA, Alcohol Drug Abuse
and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, National Institute of Mental
Health, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, OSHA, USIA, VA, ACTION, and State/INM
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Drug Abuse Policy Office Oversight Working Group
Purpose: To review federal policies and issues relative to drug
abuse.
Members: The White House, DEA, FBI, Customs, Coast Guard, ATF,
State/INM, NIDA, NIAAA, FDA, USIA, and ACTION
Interagency Committee for Drug Control
Purpose: To discuss drug-related regulatory issues common to all
members.
Members: State/INM, DEA, NIDA, and FDA
National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NIIC)
Purpose: To coordinate foreign and domestic collection, analysis,
dissemination and evaluation of drug-related intelligence.
Members: DEA, State/INM, Coast Guard, Customs, DOD, FBI, INS, IRS,
NIDA, Treasury, CIA, and the White House
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 . Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Subcommittee on Estimates
Purpose: Provides an interagency forum under the NIIC to review crop
production estimates and to determine how they can be
declassified for public dissemination.
Members: State/INM, CIA, and DEA
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Advisory Board
Purpose: To advise EPIC's member organizations on operational and
policy issues and to solicit their contributions on these
matters.
Members: DEA, INS, Coast Guard, FAA, Customs, FBI, IRS, US Marshal's
Service, and ATF
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Working Group
Purpose: To coordinate the Federal effort against drug trafficking
by organized crime.
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
Members: DEA, Justice, FBI, Customs, IRS, Coast Guard, US Marshal's
Service, and ATF
National Organized Crime Planning Council
Purpose: To review and assess the progress of federal efforts to
dismantle established and emerging organized crime groups.
Members: DEA, FBI, Customs, Secret Service, IRS, US Postal Service
and ATF
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRETI
Kintex Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking
Since at least the mid-1960s, Bulgarian officials have condoned and
presumably encouraged the use of Bulgaria as a transshipping center for
contraband including cigarettes, whiskey, arms, and narcotics. The
multi-purpose state enterprise, Kintex, now appears to be the central
coordinator for smuggling activities, for which it earns hard currency for the
state. Smuggling operations have the active support of the Bulgarian
government, but evidence about official support of narcotics trafficking is
inconclusive. Narcotics smuggling, therefore, may reflect high level
corruption rather than official policy.
Kintex is officially described as a state-owned Foreign Trade
Organization (FTO) engaged in a variety of legitimate commercial activities.
In fact, the Bulgarian state security service controls most of its
operations. In its clandestine capacity, Kintex's charter includes directives
-- collect items of science and technology interest in the West
-- conduct discrete government-to-government military sales (this
presumably includes sales to national liberation movements which are
supported by the Bulgarian regime)
-- control and profit from international smuggling through the Balkans by
selling contraband to Arab and Turkish traffickers as well as
providing a safehaven and other services to facilitate these smuggling
ventures
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
Kintex reportedly began supporting narcotics smugglers transiting
Bulgaria around 1971. It levies transit fees and fines on smugglers who are
not associated with it and resells drugs confiscated by Bulgarian Customs to
smugglers who are associated with Kintex.
Bulgaria differentiates between smugglers working with Kintex and those
attempting to work outside the system. Kintex associates may reside in and
operate from Sofia or work outside Bulgaria and, for a hard currency fee, may
transit the country without the usual customs search. Indeed, these
traffickers reportedly are met at the border by Kintex representatives to
ensure the smooth passage of their cargo.
When selling contraband, Kintex apparently works directly with only a few
highly trusted individuals--perhaps as few as three or four. These brokers
supply a network of an estimated 30 or 40 traffickers based in Sofia who in
turn support loosely structured networks outside of the country. In return,
the traffickers provide intelligence to their Bulgarian contacts on activities
of couriers moving contraband through Bulgaria without Kintex approval.
Narcotics traffickers, in particular, benefit from links with Kintex to ensure
smooth operations.
While reporting strongly indicates that Kintex's role in the smuggling of
arms, whiskey, and cigarettes is sanctioned by the Bulgarian government, we
lack conclusive evidence that the top officials endorse the narcotics
trafficking. Because there is no conclusive evidence of official sponsorship,
narcotics trafficking may reflect personal or even bureaucratic corruption--
albeit at very high levels--rather than officially endorsed government
policy. However, the significant quantity of indirect evidence, the elaborate
structure of Kintex, and the high level support of Kintex's other commercial
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
SECRET
endeavors strongly suggest an awareness and probable complicity of at least
some of the ruling elite in Kintex's narcotics operations.
The official Bulgarian policy on drug trafficking appears to be one of
denying that it exists while permitting it to continue. On several occasions,
US officials have provided the Bulgarian Government with names of known
traffickers in Bulgaria, but Sofia either denies their presence or insists on
more evidence.
Bulgaria's cooperation in sharing information on narcotics trafficking
over the last 10 years has also been unsatisfactory. Bulgaria provides data
only belatedly, and information usually is not specific enough to be of use in
followup investigations. Bulgarian officials claim that bureaucratic
obstacles make it awkward to share information without a formal customs
agreement.
The massive publicity given to Bulgaria's role in international smuggling
in the last two years and US demarches have brought the issue to the direct
attention of Bulgaria's most senior officials including Party Leader Todor
Zhivkiv. Concerned about its poor international image, Bulgaria is now trying
to avoid further embarrassment and dispell charges that it provides a haven
for international smugglers. According to several sources, there has been a
noticeable decline in the most blatant activities of Sofia-based smugglers as
many have moved their operations from Sofia and other Bulgarian resorts to
more remote locales or even outside Bulgaria. We believe that Bulgarian
authorities have ordered the smugglers residing in Sofia to restrain their
operations at least until the international focus on the "Bulgarian
connection" subsides. Kintex in particular has reportedly tried to maintain a
low profile, probably dealing only with well established, trusted customers.
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3
We believe Kintex will resume normal activities if international pressure on
the Bulgarian government eases.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/24: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800010012-3