LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN P. EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000800130006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 30, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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STAT
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'? Cnifcb Zfafcz Zenafe
November 30, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Executive Registry
84- 9842
As some of your most dedicated supporters, we strongly agree with your
alarming statement published in The Washington Times on November 29, 1984:
...We are determined that we're not going to let them (i.e. the Soviets)
maintain or enlarge their superiority in weapons... we're determined to
not let them maintain or continue that lead...
This is at least the third time that as President you have publicly acknowledged
Soviet strategic superiority, but it contradicts campaign rhetoric that the U.S.
is now able to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength. For
budgetary reasons, your Administration has already cancelled the only U.S.
strategic weapons being produced for deployment (Trident I SLBM and ALCM-B),
unilaterally deactivated 292 missiles and bombers carrying over 500 warheads,
and substantially reduced the planned deployment levels for the MX, B-1B, ALCM,
and Trident submarine.
Secretary of State Shultz stated on May 14, 1984: "Arms control simply will
not survive in conditions of inequality." This is because the U.S. legally
established objective in arms control is "equal levels of intercontinental forces,"
according to the Jackson Amendment to SALT I. The Soviets have repeatedly rejected
U.S. arms control proposals aimed at U.S.-Soviet equality. Hence arms control will
not solve our problems, although we should continue negotiations.
In Fiscal Year 1981 and 1982, Congress authorized and appropriated funds to
deploy 100 stockpiled Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs to replace Minuteman II ICBMs in
existing silos. This deployment would only have cost about 50 million dollars,
which would have made it the cheapest U.S. strategic deployment in our history by
far. It would have added to U.S. ICBM survivability and capability by about 15%.
In military terms, this Congressionally mandated deployment is precisely the same
as deploying the planned 100 MX ICBMs in existing Minuteman III silos.
The only difference is the fact that deployment of the stockpiled Minuteman
IIIs in existing silos would violate the SALT II ceiling of 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and
SLBMs. For this reason only, your administration cancelled the highly cost-
effective deployment of the stockpiled Minuteman IIIs mandated by Congress.
An additional SALT II constraint on our ICBM modernization program is the fact
that even the range of the MX ICBM itself has been reduced. This was done in order
to comply with the unratified SALT II Treaty's throw-weight limit for the one
allowed new-type ICBM. Thus it is clear that U.S. unilateral compliance with the
proposed, unratified SALT II Treaty has already greatly reduced the U.S.. dete> nt`
capability.
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T'he rr' sccn,
';;-vember K, 1984
page' Two
We believe that the optimal U.S. ICBM force structure would be:
400 MX ICBMs deployed in the 400 deepest Minuteman III silos already
existing.
550 Minuteman IIIs redeployed in existing Minuteman silos.
50 Stockpiled Minuteman Ills deployed to replace Minuteman Its in
existing Minuteman silos.
Total: 1000 MIRVed ICBMs carrying 5,800 warheads. (Consideration could also
be given to rapidly replacing the 450 displaced single warhead Minuteman II ICBMs
in a garrison-mobile mode. The 5,800 U.S. ICBM warheads is justified because the
Soviets already have more than 8,000 ICBM warheads aimed at our country.
This ICBM force structure would of course violate the SALT II limits of 820
MIRVed ICBMs and 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, but it would be optimal militarily,
and it would be extremely cost-effective. It would strongly bolster our deterrent
capability, especially if some sort of local defense for each silo such as gattling
guns, or conventional ABM hard site defenses were provided.
We have been informed that you sent a letter to Defense Secretary Weinberger
on November 27, 1984, expressing your renewed strong support for deploying 100
MXs in existing silos. We applaud your action in this regard. But we have also
been informed that your Administration is planning to begin dismantling in June,
1985 six perfectly serviceable and highly survivable Poseidon submarines carrying
96 MIRVed SLBMs. This Poseidon dismantling is intended to comply with the SALT
II ceiling of 1200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, as Trident submarines enter sea trials.
But SALT II is a proposed, still unratified Treaty, and it is in any case
due to expire at the end of 1985. You yourself certified to Congress on January
23, 1984 that the Soviet Union is already violating SALT in at least four ways.
Three of these Soviet SALT II violations are supported by conclusive evidence.
There are many more Soviet SALT violations yet to be reported to Congress.
As you know, we have always supported deployment of both the stockpiled
Minuteman IIIs and the MX in existing silos. But we have always opposed the unequal,
fatally flawed SALT II Treaty, which the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded
was "not in the national security interest of the United States." In the face of the
unilateral U.S. reductions noted above, the Soviets have added over 3,850 nuclear
warheads to their forces since SALT II was signed in 1979. We remind you that in a
test vote we sponsored on November 2, 1983, more than one-third (37%) of the
Senators present and voting opposed SALT II, and last June 21, 1984, 99 Senators
voted unanimously that the U.S. should not comply with SALT II if the Soviets were
violating it.
In sum, we do not believe that it is rational on either military or cost-
effectiveness grounds, to deploy 100 relatively non-survivable MX ICBMs, when at
the same time you are planning to dismantle 96 highly survivable Poseidon SLBMs, in
order to comply with an unratified, unequal Treaty which you have confirmed that
the Soviets are violating.
Over 18 billion dollars are already invested in these 6 still perfectly
serviceable Poseidon submarines, and hundreds of millions of dollars more would
be required to dismantle them according to SALT proceedures. In contrast, about
21 billion dollars are planned to fund the proposed MX deployment. But deploying
100 non-survivable MX ICBMs while simultaneously scrapping an equivalent number of
highly survivable Poseidon SLBMs is ridiculous. Not only is this unsound defense
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The rresident
November 30, 1984
Page-Three
budgeting, but it is another good example of how arms control has repeatedly
resulted in U.S. unilateral disarmament. As Assistant Defense Secretary Richard
Perle testified to the U.S. Senate on March 14, 1984, almost 9 months ago:
Arms control without Soviet compliance is nothing more than an exercise in
unilateral disarmament...the consequences of Soviet noncompliance and
continuing U.S. compliance mean in effect that the assumption of obligations
under the Treaty is unilateral, or unilateral disarmament... We are now
having unilateral disarmament inflicted upon us...a treaty that is not
verifiable and where the Soviets fail to comply becomes in effect, if we
are in compliance, unilateral disarmament.
Unilateral disarmament in the face of Soviet violations can only be described
as U.S. appeasement of the Soviets, and this appeasement is already widely perceived
around the world.
Accordingly, Mr. President, our support for the MX, when it is voted upon in
mid-March, 1985, may be contingent upon your Administration taking all the
following actions:
1. Sending to us the long-delayed State Department unclassified answers to
our questions on the Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of
1962. The Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement are the most
serious threats to U.S. national security, because the Soviets today have
about two-times more nuclear delivery capability in Cuba than they had in
1962. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment requiring this report.)
2. Sending to Congress comprehensive, timely, and honest unclassified reports
on Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations on February 1, 1985
and February 15, 1985.
3. Sending to Congress an unclassified assessment of each of the 17 Soviet
arms control violations presented in the "GAC Report" of October 10, 1984.
(Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment requiring this report.)
4. Sending to Congress with your FY 1986 Budget Request in January, 1985, a
complete unclassified analysis of the military and budgetary implications
of all the Soviet SALT violations. (Otherwise, we may have to propose an
amendment requiring this report. You can see how the tardiness in your
Administration's reporting to Congress on Soviet arms control violations will
already result in unnecessary budgetary disputes in your FY 1986 request.)
5. Sending to the Senate your Presidential request that the unequal, fatally
flawed SALT II Treaty be withdrawn from the Senate before March 1, 1985.
(Before this can be done, you will have to accelerate your June 1, 1985 report
on the interim restraint policy. Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment.)
6. Sending to Congress an unclassified study of the budgetary and deterrent
bolstering merits of deploying 400 MXs, redeploying 550 Minuteman IIIs, and
deploying 50 stockpiled Minuteman IIIs in existing silos by March 1, 1985.
(Otherwise, we may have to propose an amendment. This study should include
the merits and costs of a conventional hard-site ABM defense of each silo,.
and also the costs of accelerating Trident II D-5 deployment.)
7. Sending to Congress by March 1, 1985 an unclassified report on the status
of your Strategic Defense Initiative, and whether the program is being directed
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The P;-'esiden
'vavember 30, 1984
Page' Four
toward urgent deployment of defenses in the near-term (within five years).
(Otherwise, we may be forced to propose a series of amendments requiring
programmatic changes.)
8. Prompt and accurate reports to the Senate on all new U.S. arms control
proposals, as is required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.
If all of these actions to safeguard our national security are not achieved,
then we may be unable to vote for MX in its current configuration, because it
would be a wasteful, non-survivable weapon deployed in the context of U.S.
unilateral disarmament and outright appeasement of the Soviet Union.
With warmest personal regards,
Si ncerely,
United States Sen or
United States Senator
Copies to:
National Security Advisor
to the President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
~' Director, CIA
Chairman, JCS
Director, ACDA
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UNI I EU SLATES NA1E 1,;
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
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STAT
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STEVE SYMM}
IDAHO
lKnff e i .cif of ez Zer>raf e
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
July 25, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
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We are your stalwart supporters and always will be. As you know, earlier
this month, we reluctantly stated..our view that the conduct of Administration
officials had bound the United States at international law to an unauthorized
Executive Agreement concerning the unapproved SALT II Treaty, and that the
agreement was disadvantageous to the United States in that it permitted the
Soviet Union to exceed ceilings specified in the SALT II Treaty which itself
you had characterized as "fatally flawed." We still. agree with your October
30, 1980 debate statement that "SALT II is illegal."
We now understand that the Administration asserts that there is no such
Agreement involving SALT II, and although we believe there is a substantial
basis for determining otherwise, we are gratified that the present position
of the Administration is that no such agreement exists. Since our recent
letter, various statements have appeared in the press from spokesmen for
the Administration, denying that any Executive Agreement involving SALT II
exists.
The statements from the spokesmen further confuse the difference between
a "treaty" and an "Executive Agreement." For example, the New York Times
of July 7, 1984, stated that "An Administration official said it was absurd to
call the decision to comply with the Treaty an Executive Agreement with the
Soviet Union." Further, Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes stated on July
11, 1984, that there was "no secret Executive Agreement...it did not exist."
It is ironic, however, that in denying the existence of a SALT II
Executive Agreement, Larry Speakes went on to reaffirm the U.S. "interim
restraint policy for existing strategic arms Agreements," including the SALT
II Treaty. If there is no Existing Agreement, then how can we have a restraint
policy based on Existing Agreements?
Unfortunately, the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment to the Defense Authorization
Bill also refers repeatedly to the "SALT II Agreement" described in our letter.
The Bumpers-Leahy Amendment would, therefore, if enacted into law, tend to
give legislative authority for an Agreement which your Administration now
insists was never made. Accordingly, we very respectfully urge you to take
whatever steps may be appropriate to ensure that the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment
is not enacted, since it would codify an international Agreement which under
the analysis of your Administration was never consummated.
Even though, Mr. President, we still are of the firm belief that there
is substantial evidence that there was a meeting of the minds between the
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The President
July 25, 1984
Page Two
Soviet Union and the U.S. concerning the applicability and non-applicability
of the provisions of SALT II, we, of course, defer to your better knowledge of
the surrounding circumstances of those discussions with the Soviet Union. We
feel that in view of the present position of the Administration it is imperative
that any legislation giving a contrary interpretation to those events, such as
.the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment, be vetoed if necessary, to prevent-an erroneous
statement of fact in the laws of the United States.
Further, in our judgement, such action on your part would be particularly
necessary to preserve the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The
Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, when reviewing in 1982 a reso-
lution similar in content to the Bumpers-Leahy Amendment,-found that Congres-
sional action affirming an Executive.Agreement based on a pending treaty would
be "an unconstitutional exercise in Congressional power.." The 1982 resolution,
S.J. Res. 212, also referred to a "SALT II Agreement."
Moreover, we also urge that in clarifying the non-existence of any Executive
Agreement involving the SALT II Treaty, you should direct Administration officials
to cease referring to the proposed treaty in official communication as an
"Agreement." We are enclosing as an example a copy of a cable sent by Secretary
of State Shultz-to all U.S. embassies worldwide in which such "agreement" is
referenced as extant.
In sum, the original recommendation of the earlier letter concerning this
matter still seems to us to be the best course of action to clarify fully the
actual current status of the proposed SALT II Treaty. Since you have notified
the Soviet Union that the Executive Branch will not ratify the Treaty, even if
given consent to ratification by the Senate, the proper course now would be to
request the return of the Treaty papers since continued consideration in the
Senate is moot.
Moreover, we again renew our request for all. aides memoire, memoranda of
conversation, or other documents or records pertaining to commitments by the
United States to abide by provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty. We
point out, in that connection, that these materials could be of far greater
significance than they might appear, since they might reflect the incorporation
reference of complex terms and procedures. embodied in SALT II even though
the materials themselves may be brief and appear to lack formality.
Finally, we point out that the 1984 Democratic Party Platform states
that:
a Democratic*President will pursue deep, stabilizing reductions in
nuclear arsenals within the framework of SALT II, observing in the
meantime the SALT II limits ourselves and insisting that the Soviets
do likewise.
This provision is the same demagogic language that appears in the Bumpers-
Leahy Amendment. .
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The President
July 25, 1984
Page 3
We hope that you will not support enacting as law the key Democratic
Platform provision, which is. based on wholly false premises. It is flawed
in four respects:
1) The Soviet Union refuses to reduce nuclear weapons and daily adds
new nuclear forces;
2) According to your spokesmen there-is neither a SALT II Agreement,
nor a Treaty intended for ratification, which in any event would be
unequal and contrary to the national security interests of the
United States;
3) The United States has already scrapped 5 still serviceable missile
submarines, deactivated 5 more, and even plans to scrap 2 perfectly
operational Poseidon submarines in order to comply with the expired
SALT I Interim Agreement and the nonexistent SALT II Treaty, while
the Soviets have a still growing 50% strategic submarine superiority
over the U.S. and are illegally converting some of.their equivalent
submarines into even more lethal missile carriers; and
4) The Soviet Union is in blatant violation of the terms of every
major arms control treaty, is not observing SALT II, and no amount
of U.S. insistence will cause Russia to act otherwise.
After all, former President Carter-portrayed the 1980 election as a
national referendum on'his SALT II Treaty, and he lost.
We consider this issue of such criticality, both in a narrow political
sense, and more importantly in terms of our viability as a free country in
the future, that we urgently request a meeting with you as soon as possible
to outline face to face why we believe these questions must be resolved
without any further delay.
With very best personal regards,
We remain,
John East
United States Senator
cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
JCS Chairman
CIA Director
ACDA Director
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Attorney General of the United States
Very respectfully,
Steve Symms
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SUSJECI: U.S. POLICY ON SALT 111111115 RESTR:INT
INIERAGEECY CLiA-ZE0 CUiD:NCE ON U.S. POLICY 0.1 SALT
IH1IFIn I S1PLI11T FOLLOWS. TNE CEPLR1r.EN1 RELEASED TNE
F IFS1 A 0:1 n&aCH T!, THE SECOND ON MARCH 30.
0. vrn WILL CC1.T1t1UEO TRIDENT SJBa&RInE CONSTRUCTION PUT
THE US 163VE IKE SALT 11 11IRV SUi-CEILING OF-1203
ta.uuCH[FS! Js--N VILL IKE TRIDENT tPOGR;.M CAUSE US TO
EXCEED TNE SALT I Ii;IIRIn AGREEMt11T L IMIiST WHAT IS THE
US P0S111Cn ON COIITINUII.G 10 OtSEFYE IVESE LIrITST t::EN
VDVLD THEY I:-VI EXPIRED KID SALT II EEEN RATIFIED?
A. US FOE ICY ON INTERIM RESIPAINT WAS SET BY THE
PRESIDENT IN 17;2, WHEN ME STATED THAT, -AS FOR EXISTING
STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEnENT$, VE VILL REFRAIN Fw0:1 ACTIONS
WHICH UNCiRCUT THEM SO tONG AS THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS
EOULL FESIRSINT.- THE US IS CONTINUING 70 CARRY OUT ITS
C-ot11CLiIOkS AND C0..1ITntN1S UNDER RELEVANT AGFEEIIENTS.
IN_LU]IG: OUT NO UNDERCUT POLICY On EXISTING ARni CONTIOL
AGCEEMEAIS. IN AEEPING V17M TP.!S PM :Cy. :G:IPEHSLTING
DISMASILEnZIITS FCR NEW TRIDENT (L;n:MEFS IN EXCESS O; SALT
'I IRTEZIr. ISRIL:IENT LIMITS HAVE BEER CC JLETED DR ARE
PFO;St:L.iD U:111; POLLCiS AND TITAN 11 STRATEGIC BALLISTIC
P.ISSI1E LLUJCMERS THAT HAVE EEEn DEACTIVATED, AND VE HAVE
PaOCRRr:Eo S0:(ICIEP.7 1119i:ET 1HROJGK THE END C: FISCAL TEAR
1111 Fo; M111l:neD OlSnrliLLEbi.IT OF TNESL LAUHCAEP.S LN
ACCOeD:NC: V1TM SALT I PP.OC(DUF.(S.
THE SALT II(5j)AS WRITTEN WOULD RAVE EXPIRED IN
? DECEMEER 1] , HAD It BEEN RATIFIED. 11 IS THE SEYENTN
TRIDINiTHAT Vitt BRING INTD Pt AT THE POSSIBLE
L?hICLS1E11 CI tOTN SLIT 1 AND SALT II 1t151IS N0:'cY[R,
SEA TTIA;S FC: iP.E SEVENTH TRIDENT SUSr.L?INE ARE NOT
SCH(D'Jti iC EE4!11 UNTIL LATE 193%, It, DURING FT 16.
THUS, A3 CECIS!_h NEED EE 1A1(N AT THIS TIME REGARDING
CCt.P(ASL110': iOT TAE SEYENTN 1FICENT. THE US VILL
CLFEFUtt, [YAIUAUE 10111 IKE IKT1RNC1IDMAL SITUAiION AND
CUR GY: N:IIO';A SECURITY RIDJIREMSNiS IN REACHING SJ:H R
C!CIS1aN.
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U11UE_H3ai rI to UUIUUIfl(i
De1~C11-tillent o.f'State TELEGRAM
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G. Is IT TRUE THAT THE U.S. IS CON:ID[RIiIG FEYDRIMG ITS
-110 UGD[PCUI' POLICY FOR SALT 111
A. -- THE PRESIDENT'S PouICT ON i1I(R115 FESTRaINT RAS
NOT CHAIICEO. VE ARE COIIT11ZUIING TO Ih?I[MEu$ THIS POLICY
WITH P.ESPECT 0 THE SAE: lUTERJr ACREEISENT Alto TIE
UNTATIFIEO ALT 11 AGREEMEN , AND WE LAI PROCEEDING TO
IMPLEMENT THE r1ESIDE11 ATICIC MJDERn12ATION PROG2415,
AS THE PRESIDEIIT STATED Olt JAiIVARY 23, -IRE UNITED
STATES IS C0111IHUING 10 CARRY OUT-ITS OVH OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMENTS UNDER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS.-
----,
-- SEA TRIALS FOx THE SEVENTH TRIDENT SUBMARInE AXE PDT
SCHEDULED 10 BEGIN UNTIL LATE 193S, THAT IS, IN FISCAL
YEAR 25C6. IKE ISSUES THIS EVENT RAISES REGARDING THE
SALT I AND SALT II AGREEMENTS VILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE
APPROPRIATE 11 ME.
-- IT WOULD BE MISLEAD111C TO INFER ?NAT THE ABSENCE OF
A DLCISI III 6EFOP.E ONE IS REQUIRED IMPLIES AtIYIN111G ABOUT
VNAT COURSE of AC E ION VILL EVZNTOAIIT BE TAKEN,
-- WEN TEE T1ME COMES FOR A DECISION IT WILL,
OSVIOUSLY,?BE TAKEN III THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY REOJIREMEnTS. A1ONG
011;ER THI1tGS,.oUR ASSESSmEHj OF TNE SOVIET COMIT15ENT TO A
COXRESPOND[I;G POI ICY VIII if ft(VANT TO OJR
CONSIOERATIOtIS. SHULTZ
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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ROUTING AND TRANSMflTAL SUP
(Name. office symbol, room number.
bulldiry. ,nW-/Pos't'
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
`; Chairman, JCS
Director. CIA
5/11/84
nw
Note and Return
For Clearance
Per Con ersation
For Correction
Prepare Re*
Iata
For Your Information
See M.
s! nature
justify
nce~es. disposals.
e
DO NOT use this form ~s,as EC RD of wr actions
FROM: (Name. org. symbol. Agency/Post)
Thomas Graham, Jr. - ACDA/GC
5041-102
*U.% (A-0 197K-o-2?.1-647 33:.3
Room No.-Bldg.
5534A State
Phone NO.
O:=nWK ipy FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
R (41 CFRI 101-11.206
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GENERAL COUNSEL
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMEN I AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451
Agency Liaison
Room 91
The White House
May 9, 1984
Attention: Ms. Sally Kelly
Director of Agency Liaison
Presidential Correspondence
Dear Ms. Kelly:
As you requested, enclosed is a draft response
to Senator Symms regarding the verifiability of arms
control agreements. It has not been cleared with other
agencies, but we have sent copies of this draft to those
agencies that received copies of the incoming letter
from Senator Symms.
Sincerely,
Thomas Graham, Jr.
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Dear Senator Symms:
It continues to be the policy of this Administration that
all arms control agreements to which the U.S. becomes party
must be effectively verifiable.
As was demonstrated in the President's January 23, 1984
Report to Congress, "Soviet Non-Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements," with regard to several arms control agreements
the Soviet Union was found to be in violation, or probable
violation, of legal obligations or political commitments.
We continue to analyze these and other possible violations
in an effort to get the best possible understanding of the
scope of Soviet non-compliance related actions and to make
the best possible judgments as to appropriate U.S. responses.
We will, as appropriate, transmit the results of further
analyses of Soviet actions to the Congress.
In parallel with analyses of Soviet actions, we are carefully
studying how arms control agreements can be drafted to
maximize the clarity of obligations and minimize potential
ambiguity.
These analyses are part of a continuing process and we will
be submitting reports in the future under Section 37 of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as appropriate.
Sincerely,
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ft.
APRIL 26, 1984
TO: U.S'* ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ATTN: THOMAS GRAHAM
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID: 213320
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 11, 1984
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: THE HONORABLE STEVE SYMMS
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC 20510
SUBJECT: EXPRESS SERIOUS CONCERN THAT THE SALT II
TREATY MAY NOT BE VERIFIABLE FOR A NUMBER OF
REASONS INCLUDING THE DEGRADATION OF U.S.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.
ADD THAT IF VERIFIABILITY OF INF AND START
MAY BE COMPARABLE TO SALT II, A STUDY SHOULD
BE CONDUCTED TO ASCERTAIN THIS. INDICATE
THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN
REPORTED TO CONGRESS AND REQUEST A SCHEDULE
OF REPORTS
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
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'Wnife J ,$fafez ,senate
April 11, 1984
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
,x
Dear Mr. President:
On September 16, 1982, we received a letter from the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which contained two
alarming revelations. First, the letter stated:
"The most recent analysis of the verifiability of the
SALT II Treaty ... is a 1979 verification study. There
are no current plans to carry out a systematic review
and updating of these analyses."
We believe that it was a serious misjudgment for ACDA not to have
restudied the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty, which even you
yourself have stated is unverifiable.
Second, the letter also said:
"With regard to U.S. capabilities to verify Soviet
compliance with arms control agreements ..-. the U.S.
has experienced some degradation in the past, however
specific programs designed to enhance current
capabilities and offset such degradation have been
instituted."
This too is a shocking admission. In view of reports th4t the
huge Abalakovo ABM radar had been under construction for over two
years before it was finally discovered last July, something must
be seriously wrong with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT
verification. We seek reassurance that corrective measures are
currently effective.
Senior Administration officials have told us that any potential
new START or INF treaties are likely to be as verifiable as SALT
II. Hence you can understand our concern when we read in the
September 16, 1982 letter the third alarming revelation, that:
"The Administration is currently engaged in an intensive
study of the verification provisions which will be
required for the START and INF proposals on the table in
Geneva."
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The President
April 11, 1984
Page 2
Thus the ACDA has admitted that the U.S. has already proposed
negotiating provisions without first establishing if they are
verifiable.
Now we read in The Washington Post of January 19, 1984 that:
"Senior Administration officials [have concluded that]
future arias agreements must be simpler than in the
past, because monitoring of earlier pacts has turned
out to be much more difficult than anticipated"
It is reasonable to conclude from this ACDA letter that the
unratified SALT II Treaty may not be verifiable due to Soviet
concealment measures, the imprecision of many provisions, and the
degradation of U.S. National Technical Means of verification.
Further, if the verifiability of INF. and START may be comparable
to SALT II, we believe that a study should be done to ascertain
this.
Several possible failures to comply with Section 37 of the Arms
Control And Disarmament Act may be involved in these acknowledged
verification difficulties. First+the verifiability of SALT II
should have been restudied by the Reagan Administration and
reported to Congress. Second,'any degradations in U.S. National
Technical Means of SALT verification should have been reported to
Congress, and promptly corrected. Third, the verifiability of
the U.S. START and INF proposals should have been studied prior
to their submission to the Soviets, and reports should have been
made to Congress. Section 37 states:
"It is the sense of the Congress that adequate
verification of compliance should be an indispensable
part of any international arms control agreement. in
recognition of such policy and in order to assure that
arms control proposals made or accepted by the United
States can be adequately verified, the Director [i.e.
of ACDA] shall report to the Congress, on a timely
basis ... in the case of each element of any
significant arms control proposal made to a foreign
country by the United States ... [i.e. and] in the case
of any arms control agreement or treaty that has
entered into force, any significant degradation or
alteration in the capacity of the United States to
verify the various components of such agreement or
treaty ..." (Emphasis added.)
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The President
April 11, 1984
Page 3
Please advise us of a schedule of reports on?these problems under
section 37 of the Arms Control Act.
With warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,
CC: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA
Chairman, JCS
Director, CIA
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DDI - 00387/84
ACIS - 028/84
17 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
1. Action Requested: None; this is simply for your information.
2. Background: A few days ago, you received a copy (opposite) of a
letter to the President from Senator Symms (R, ID). This letter is the latest
i n a long se ri es of correspondence to the P res i dent from Senator Symms, among
others in the Congress, about compliance activities. The letter has nearly
thirty attachments (as indicated on page 4 of the letter). I have kept the
attachments in my office to save space and xerox paper. The attachments are
available if you desire to see them.
3. Over the 1 ast week or so, I have read all of this materi al and am
struck by two major points:
-- The basic ideas of Senator Symms' letter are damaged by the voluminous
citations of Soviet cheating, some of which is correct, sane of which
is partly wrong, and some of which is hopelessly confused.
-- The Administration is doing same of what Senator Symms' seeks (e.g.,
Congressional briefings) but will not do others (e. g., produce an
unclassified report; rather, an unclassified "fact sheet" will be
produced--it is being created).
4. Action Requested: None, but please be sure to read Senator Symms'
Enclosure:
As stated
VC i -x'71
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S'i EVE SYMMS
,.^. AHO
' iCnif cb Zf ctf cz ,Senate
January 4, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Executive Registry
84- 11-1
Recent press reports have quoted several Reagan Administration
officials as confirming that your Administration is preparing to
deliver an unclassified report on Soviet SALT violations to Congress
in January. I therefore respectfully wish to congratulate you on
your deliberate, careful, and statesmanlike leadership in dealing
with the very difficult problem of trying to enforce Soviet compliance
with existing arms control treaties. As you well appreciate, this is
an extremely complex problem, and its solution will have far-reaching
global consequences. A public Presidential accusation of Soviet SALT
violations is only the first step in a larger process of dealing with
the national security threat posed by the Soviet violations.
I would respectfully like to offer three suggestions on how to
proceed with this report. First, I suggest that the Administration
conduct a special closed session of the full Senate first, to brief
all Senators simultaneously on the classified evidence of Soviet SALT
violations. Second, I suggest that the Administration release the
unclassified report on Soviet SALT violations immediately following
the classified briefing of the full Senate. Third, I strongly suggest
that both the classified and the unclassified reports deal with all
the important compliance issues that have been raised by Senators over
the past three years, including some especially serious recent Soviet
SALT violations.
As you know, Senator Jim McClure wrote to you and to Majority
Leader Baker on August 1, 1983, requesting an urgent, special briefing
of the entire Senate in closed session on Soviet SALT violations.
In view of the seriousness of both the old and newly reported Soviet
SALT violations, Senators Jim McClure and Jesse Helms (who are in
their home states working) have both asked me to renew their urgent
request that you arrange a special classified briefing for the entire
Senate in closed session as soon as the Senate reconvenes on January
23, 1984.
There are several compelling reasons for a classified briefing
of the full Senate to precede the unclassified report. First, the
Senate needs to be made aware as a body of the full range of Soviet
non-compliance cases and the persuasiveness of the intelligence
evidence in each case. Second, this closed briefing will lend greater
credibility and impact to the public report. Third, such a briefing
will help to preclude Senatorial confusion, and the possibility of
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The President
January 4, 1984
Page Two
distortion or feigned ignorance, because all Senators will have
the same information at the same time. Finally, the Senate needs
to be told the urgent national security implications of the
Soviet-SALT violations, and your intended course of action in
dealing with these grave Soviet threats to U.S. national security.
There are several equally compelling reasons for the unclas-
sified report following the briefing. The most important is the
simple fact that the American people have a clear right to be
informed about Soviet SALT violations which gravely threaten our
national security. A second factor is the strong likelihood that
the unclassified report would pre-empt any selective disclosures.
A third factor is the fact that since as early as May 12, ?1981,
Senators have been writing to you about their concerns over Soviet
SALT violations. Indeed, at least 24 such letters have been sent,
signed by well over one-third of the Senate (38 Senators), repre-
senting a bipartisan group including the majority of Republicans.
None of these letters was ever answered in substance, even though
one is identical to a letter which even the Carter Administration
answered. This group of Senators has the potential voting power
to block Senate advice and consent for the ratification of any
new arms control treaty. A list of these letters, a list of the
signing Senators, together with copies of the letters themselves,
are attached. Moreover, 93 Senators voted unanimously on a
McClure, Helms, Symms amendment to request a report on Soviet SALT
violations, and the legislative history shows clearly that the
Senate intended this report to be public. And then, of course,
there is another law, Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, the "Derwinski Amendment," which requires violations reports
to Congress. Even the Carter Administration issued a public report
on Soviet SALT compliance in February, 1978.
Finally, I believe that both the classified briefing and the
public report should include analysis of all the significant Soviet
SALT violations, instead of only the 7 or 17 Soviet violations which
the press reports are under study. My own studies show that there
are:
---over 12 serious Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty.
You and several of your top officials have come very close
to accusing the Soviets of violating SALT 11 already;
---over 10 serious Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
A former Republican Secretary of State has already conceded
one of these Soviet ABM Treaty violations;
---over 10 serious Soviet violations of the SALT I Interim
Agreement. A former Republican Secretary of Defense has
already made several of these accusations;
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The President
January 4, 1984
Page Three
---over 6 Soviet violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
Agreement which you are already on public record
twice accusing the Soviets of violating;
---over 50 Soviet treaty and non-aggression pact
violations since 1917 according to official U.S.
government documentation;
---over 14 cases of Soviet SALT negotiating deception;
---and, according to official U.S. government documen-
tation, over 120 cases of Soviet diplomatic forgeries.
I believe that.your classified and unclassified reports
should analyze all of these violations. Such extensive and
thorough analysis would make it impossible for the Soviets?
or your other critics to attack any single violation, or
short list of cases, or to offer a credible apologia. Moreover,
if you do not deal with all the violations now, you will have to
deal with them later, because the facts of history will not go
away.
In addition, I hope that the Administration will include
in both of its reports several completely new and quite signifi-
cant Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty, which have been
reported recently in the press:
---production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year;
---Arctic staging of Backfire bombers;
---a new head submarine-launched ballistic missile,
the SS-NX-23;
---early Soviet deployment of 100 SS-X-24 intercontinental
ballistic missiles carrying multiple-independently tar-
getable re-entry vehicles, in single warhead SS-11 silos;
---Soviet official admission of their violations of the
3 SALT II ceilings on MIRVs;
---the seriously increased and now widespread pattern of
Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception.
These reported new Soviet SALT II violations are quite
serious enough to deserve urgent attention, especially in view
of the fact that both the Washington Post and the New York Times
of August 31, 1979 quoted the late Soviet Premier Kosygin as
stating to visiting U.S. Senators in Moscow:
...if we build more than 30 (i.e. Backfire bombers) we
violate it (i.e. the SALT II Treaty), and we understand
that you will react. (articles attached)
UnderSecretary of Defense DeLauer has already testified twice to
Congress that the Soviets are producing Backfires at the rate of
36 per year.
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The President
January 4, 1984
Page Four
On behalf of Senators McClure and Helms, I am also
again making the same request for an urgent classified briefing
of the full Senate in closed session of Majority Leader Baker.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Stevd Symms
SS/dsc
1) List of letters
2) List of Senators signing
3) Copies of letters
4) Copies of articles
5) Copy of letter to Majority Leader Baker
cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, CIA
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