SOVIET UNION AND EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 5, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010017-5
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
11 SEP
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
The attached typescript examines the reasons
behind the warming trend in relations between the
two Germanys that we have'witnessed in recent
months. It also addresses the Soviet reaction to
that trend and estimates what we might expect
from that triangular relationship for the rest of
the year.
In response to the points you made about the
East German economy in your memo of 5 September,
I am also including two of our latest studies
plus a recent briefing paper on that subject.
obert,f1. tes
DeputJ Director `fcfrntel l i gence
Briefing Paper
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
DDCI
T6 SA/IA'._
17. ACS/DCI'
Remarks
1s]'NIO/EUR
"SUSPENSE..
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
014- 8066
Ex2 uti',? f c,ryic ry
1
5 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet.Union and East Germany
47T 12
1. There is a strain of difference in what we have been hearing over
the last several days regarding what is of n in Moscow. There was the
NSC representative at citing the continuing conflict 25X1
between hard-liners and soft-liners in Moscow as a Soviet deception intended
to influence Western policy in the direction of strengthening the supposed
soft-liners. Then there was the discussion at the NIC meeting yesterday
resulting in something of a consensus that, in the struggle for succession
in Moscow, all elements are careful to stay with the traditional or "hard"
line. Then I read in the article this morning that East Germany 25X1
apparently judged that the influence of hard-liners in Moscow was too great
to proceed with the Honecker visit. It may be that the opposition was too
teat
full of hard-liner an so -finer eory. er aps some frameworkrforJexamining
this in depth and some form of defining conflicting views on this score and
getting this thrashed out or at least articulated might be worthwhile.
2. Also, Soviet economic measures
on East Germany particularly illuminating in light of the Honecker decision
not to visit. An analysis of this and follow-on economic.measures, how it
might.ha:ve been perceived to be.offs-etable by improved economic relations
with East Germany, and how the economic future now looks for East Germany
and what it means for a relationship between the two Germanys and between
Germany and the Soviet Union might be a useful-and relevant piece of analysis
now. Perhaps it should be done briefly in the context of what George Kolt
undertook to do at yesterday's NIC meeting, to be followed by a longer and
deeper exploration.
. Casey
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
, Jt(.Kt I
The East*German Question Revisited
Summary
The German question is back, but with a new twist.
When it was last at center stage in the early 1970s, the
East Germans had to be forced by the Soviets to negotiate
a treaty with West Germany. The roles are now
reversed. For the past year East Berlin has been eager
to engage in a dialogue with Bonn at a time when Moscow--
still smarting from its failure to prevent INF
deployments--has emphasized confrontation with the West,
and particularly the basing countries, for agreeing to
deploy.
East German party leader Honecker clearly has a
different view. He favors "limiting the damage" caused
by the deployment and his tactics have paid dividends.
Two large credits guaranteed by Bonn have helped
strengthen the East German economy at a time when Soviet
support has begun to tail off. The concessions Honecker
has made--relaxed travel arrangements for West German
visitors and a dramatic increase in East German
emigration--entail some risks but are popular measures
which provide Honecker some political capital
domestically.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
s SECRET
accrue to East Germany add up to a net advantage for the
Warsaw Pact. True, closer ties with the West make East
Germany less of an economic burden for the Soviet Union
and might even provide access to advanced technology.
There is also a chance that German togetherness would
reduce Bonn's commitment to NATO. But at least some
Soviet leaders appear more concerned that closer intra-
German ties could not only threaten the internal
situation in East Germany, but also encourage elements in
West Germany, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that want
to change the post World War II status quo.
These Soviet concerns apparently were the primary
reason for Honecker's postponement on 4 September of what
would have been the first trip to West Germany by an East
German leader. Both Germanys will probably pause now to
reassess and consolidate, but we would have expected-such
a slowdown even if the trip had occurred. Moscow, having
asserted its prerogative to determine the pace of intra-
German relations, may be willing to let Bonn and East
Berlin resume their dialogue, possibly later this year,
but perhaps focusing at first on narrow economic and
technical issues. Moscow's enthusiasm for intra-German
relations may increase if Honecker is able to entice the-'
Kohl government with broader discussions of security
issues.
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRET
Background
Last October in a letter to Chancellor Kohl, East German
party leader Honecker threatened a "new ice age" in relations
between the GDR and the FRG if INF deployments went ahead. Such
rhetoric was consistent with the total support East Berlin had
given to the Soviet campaign on this issue. Two weeks after the
letter was published, a similar threat appeared in the communique
from the Gromyko-Honecker talks in East Germany. It warned of
"serious losses" for West Germany's Ostpolitik and claimed INF
deployments would endanger the normalization of intra-German
relations achieved in the treaties signed in the early 1970s.
It is now obvious that Honecker--acutely aware of the
substantial financial advantages provided in recent years by East
Germany's special relationship with Bonn--had no intention of
carrying out these threats. 7
This latter priority was dramatically
reinforced in a speech by Honecker on 24 November, two days after
the Bundestag voted to approve INF deployment.
Honecker told a party plenum at that time that, although
deployment had caused "serious damage" in relations with West
25X1
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRET
Germany, he was "in favor of limiting the damage as much as
possible." He added it was vitally important to continue the
political dialogue and, departing completely from the notion of
an ice age, said he favored "every opportunity for
negotiations." He dutifully supported the Soviet decision on
counterdeployments, but tempered his support by stating the
decision to station missiles in East Germany had "caused no joy
in our country."
In any case intra-German relations--which had already
received a significant boost from the DM one billion West German
credit guarantee in June 1983--continued to move ahead as if the
INF controversy did not exist.
-- Agreement was reached for improving postal and
telecommunication services.
-- After years of contentious negotiations, the East
Germans agreed to transfer control of a West Berlin
commuter rail system to the West Berlin government.
-- A number of West German politicians began making
official or personal visits to East Germany.
-- East Germany eased emigration restrictions; at least
33,000 have left for West Germany so far this year
compared to the normal 8-10,000 annual average. Unlike
past years this group contained large numbers of young,
even well-trained East Germans.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRETI
The amount of money West German pensioners were required
to exchange when visiting East Germany was reduced.
Other travel restrictions were eased including an
increase in the numbers of days West Germans were
allowed to spend in East Germany from 45 to 60.
The East Germans have slowly been dismantling the
automatic "shooting devices" along the intra-German
border.
The second "jumbo loan" guaranteed by Bonn amounting to
DM 950 million was announced on 25 July.
Tentative agreement was reached on scheduling of
Honecker's first visit to the FRG.
Private and public commentary during the period shows the
Soviets were indeed getting increasingly uneasy about the course
of intra-German relations. In meetings.with US and Allied
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRET I
officials, Soviet diplomats criticized both West and East Germans
for their proliferation of contacts. Press coverage criticized
centrifugal tendencies in the Warsaw Pact, warned against Western
efforts to divide the Pact, and expressed Soviet concern over the
development of "European" rather than East Bloc attitudes on the
part of some East European states.
On 21 July, four days before agreement was announced on the
new West German credit to East Germany, Pravda warned that
"linkage" between West German credits and East German concessions
on human contacts "risks overstepping the mark and going too
far." Two days after the agreement was announced, Pravda weighed
in again, accusing Bonn of using "economic levers and political
contacts" to solicit concessions on matters of principle.
Nevertheless, East Berlin implemented the humanitarian
concessions associated with the credit agreement on 1 August as
scheduled. The next day Pravda followed up on the attacks laid
out on 27 July and again charged Bonn with wanting to undermine
socialism in the GDR. At the beginning of September renewed
Soviet press attacks against Bonn's alleged revanchism were
followed quickly by the postponement of Honecker's visit.
The sharp Soviet reaction to the July agreement--compared to
Moscow's reaction to similar arrangements made between the two
Germanys in 1983--can be attributed, at least in part, to the
obvious linkage between the humanitarian concessions and the
credits. Last year East Berlin had a grace period of several
-6-
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
Jtl:Kt I
months before it made any humanitarian concessions. This delay
created political problems for Chancellor Kohl. This year, as
noted above, the concessions were implemented almost immediately
by East Germany while Bonn made a public announcement connecting
the new credits with a list of 11 concessions.
GDR Motivation
East Germany is not in the habit of getting out of step with
Soviet policies. Why then did its intra-German policy exceed the
bounds? Why did it deliberately risk Soviet displeasure by
cultivating West Germany? The economic advantages for East
Berlin are important, although the present condition of the East
German economy is not desperate enough for it to be the sole
reason Honecker risks alienating Moscow.
West German assistance, however, has played an important
role in helping East Berlin to deal with serious financial
problems that threatened its solvency and could have forced it to
make an embarrassing request for debt relief from Western
governments and banks. In trying to cope with mounting debt
servicing problems, East Berlin in 1982 implemented a drastic
adjustment program that allowed it to run trade surpluses, but at
the cost of slower growth and declining living standards. East
Berlin's special ties with West Germany helped cushion the impact
of the adjustment program since it was able to increase imports
from West Germany--by use of clearing account facilities and West
25X1
-7-
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtGKt 1
German trade credits--to help compensate for cutbacks in imports
from other Western countries. Moreover, in June 1983 and July
1984, East Berlin received large hard currency loans guaranteed
by Bonn that provided direct assistance and also helped to
restore bankers' confidence.
As a result of adjustment measures and West German support,
the East German economy has successfully.weathered its serious
financial crisis and shows signs of recovery. Last year East
Germany ran a $1.3 billion hard currency trade surplus, reduced
its debt by over $1.7.billion, and increased its reserves. While
our data on the East German economy are incomplete, official data
and other evidence indicate that retail sales have been up and
that the growth rate of real GNP rebounded to 2 percent in 1983,
after stagnating in 1982. The West German credit guarantees have
helped restore bank confidence in the GDR and, in response,
interest charges are falling and the East Germans are able to
borrow again.
But serious problems remain. The GDR's debt is still high
and a serious deterioration of East-West relations could cause
liquidity problems. The economy is inefficient and technology-
poor by Western standards. In addition, coincident with East
Germany's financial problems, the Soviet Union has become less
supportive. Since 1981, Moscow has been unwilling to increase
deliveries of raw materials, including oil, and has insisted that
the bilateral terms of trade be turned sharply in its favor. ?A
-8-
SECRET F_ -1 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRET
Under these circumstances, it makes sense for East
Berlin to turn to its second biggest trading partner, West
The concerns of East German leaders about the disenchanted
populace they rule are closely associated with the economic
imperatives that drive East Berlin closer to Bonn. In the
absence of political linkage between the citizenry and the
government, legitimacy of rule depends almost entirely on the
results achieved by those in charge. A society--already
discontent because it is not as free as it would like--can become
explosive if the system imposed without its consent reduces
rather than enhances its prosperity. Most East Germans can
compare their circumstances with their Western counterparts by
watching West German television. 25X1
The East German leadership has continued to assign a high
priority, therefore, to improving the standard of living. East
German statistics and a large volume of anecdotal evidence
indicate that an improvement has occurred in the past year,
following the downturn brought on by serious financial
problems. The West German "jumbo" credits this summer and last,
plus the other advantages East Germany enjoys from intra-German
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtLKt 1
Allowing average citizens increased opportunities to travel
between West and East Germany also helps promote a general sense
of well-being in East Germany. It is generally appreciated that
the Soviet Union is against this freedom of movement, and
Honecker gains a certain amount of popular respect for standing
up to Moscow on this and other issues connected with the warming
trend between the two Germanys. At the same time the
unprecedented level of emigration permitted in the first half of
1984 gave the regime the opportunity to expel its most persistent
agitators.
In sum, it would appear that East German leaders allow West
Germans more access to the East German people, despite Soviet
misgivings, because they believe that a reasonably content
population is one that is more easily controlled. We do not have
a good sense for just how restless the East German populace was a
year ago or how much pacifying is required. We are confident,
however, that the regime is keenly aware that a delicate balance
exists between the level of contacts that provide for a more
satisfied population, and that unknown point at which the cross-
border cultural and political influences that derive from these
contacts spawn pluralistic political trends that threaten the
regime's, control.
East Berlin also has a political agenda of its own to pursue
with Bonn. It includes the following demands for greater formal
recognition from Bonn:
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
Jtl.Kt I I I
recognition of, or possibly only "respect" for East
German citizenship;
elevation of the two countries' diplomatic missions to
actual embassies;
realignment of the intra-German border from the east
shore to the center of the Elbe River; and
abolition of the Salzgitter data center--which
coordinates the monitoring of East German human rights
abuse (particularly in connection with border control)
as if they were subject to West German criminal law.
East Germany's decision to pursue closer relations with Bonn
in the last 20 months, despite Soviet anxieties, probably was
encouraged by the unsettled leadership situation in Moscow.
Honecker may have calculated that his margin for maneuver would
be greater during a period when the Soviet hierarchy was
preoccupied with internal politics.
the East Germans may have been receiving
mixed signals from Moscow. Honecker may have convinced some
elements of the Soviet leadership that better relations between
Bonn and East Berlin served Moscow's interest by driving wedges
between NATO allies and by gaining access to hard currency and
advanced technology. Whatever Honecker's strategy, it is now
clear he underestimated underlying Soviet opposition to his
plans.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JCI.KC 1
Elsewhere in the Bloc- 1
Like East Germany most of the other East European states are
concerned that Moscow's' intransigence on European security issues
will undermine any hope for improvement in East-West economic
relations. Help from the West is needed now more than ever
because Moscow is conducting bilateral economic relations with
its CEMA allies on much tougher terms than it has in the past.
For these reasons the East European states were relieved when the
CEMA summit in June seemed to confirm the acceptance of continued
trade with the West.
The relief was brief. The 21, 27 July and 2 August Pravda
articles criticizing the latest German agreements reopened the
issue. Hungary, which has closer economic ties to the West than
any other East European state, came to East Berlin's defense with
three major press articles (28 July, 2 and 5 August) applauding
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JCI.KC 11 1
the constructive cooperation between the two Germanys. This
remarkable exchange was brought to a halt and replaced by what we
judge must have been a Moscow-coordinated Warsaw Pact media
campaign, including articles in the Hungarian press and an
interview of Honecker on 17 August, denouncing the evils of West
German revanchism.
Although the Honecker interview largely represented a
faithful rendition of the Soviet position on a host of issues, it
also had passages that reflected the continuing differences
between East Berlin and Moscow. Several times during the
interview Honecker stressed the need for a political dialogue on
disarmament issues and reminded his audience that East Germany is
striving to "limit the damage" between the two German states
caused by the stationing of missiles in the FRG. These remarks
were omitted from the Pravda replay of the interview, on 20
August. Indeed, Honecker's "limiting the damage" theme has not
played well in Moscow since it was first aired last November.
The Pravda piece on 2 August, for example, took particular
exception to the idea that the two Germanys have a particular
mission to "limit the damage" caused by INF deployments.
We expect the East Europeans to continue to assert
themselves, particularly when they see an opportunity to increase
economic ties with the West. Like Honecker, Bulgaria's Zhivkov
has postponed his September visit to West Germany, but Romania's
Ceausescu intends to visit Bonn in October as scheduled.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtLKt I
Hungarian party chief Kadar--who hosted Chancellor Kohl in June--
will travel- to Paris in October. Arrangements have also been
made for a visit by West German Foreign Minister Genscher to
Poland in November. All of this enthusiasm for high level East-
West contact detracts from the atmosphere of heightened tension
in Europe that Moscow has tried to foster since INF deployment.
The View From Moscow
The Soviets are well aware that the lack of unity in their
alliance presents opportunities to the West, in the words of a
Central Committee official, "to estrange and wrench the socialist
states away from the USSR and to try and change their
socioeconomic system." Moscow appears especially concerned about
differentiated Western policies that base rewards to East
European countries on the degree to which their foreign policy is
autonomous and independent of Moscow. Soviet officials have also
expressed displeasure over the tendency of some East European
states to express common "European" interests in dialogue and
cooperation that differ from those of both the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Soviet anxiety over West German efforts to gain influence in
Eastern Europe is greatest where East Germany is concerned.
Despite a.pervasive system of internal controls and a massive
Soviet troop presence, Moscow has always held lingering doubts
-17-
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtLKt II
about what really happens when East and West Germany get
together. Such doubts can only have been heightened by East
Germany's open defense of its cooperation with Bonn and the
expressions by both Kohl and Honecker regarding a "community of
responsibility." From Moscow's perspective, a special
relationship between the two German states would not only allow
for a more independent East German policy, but could also form
the basis of a central European community of interests that would
include those East European states (Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Romanis) which for historical reasons have less to fear from
German revanchism.
In addition to these concerns, some Soviet leaders also
apparently believe that Honecker's cooperative attitude toward
Bonn is undermining their efforts to portray East-West relations
as having deteriorated dangerously, primarily as a result of
NATO's INF deployments. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 25X1
made clear last fall
that he thought Honecker's warnings of an "ice age" in intra-
German relations if Bonn continued to support US INF policy was
the proper approach.
While the Soviet leadership undoubtedly is united on the
basic outline of policy toward Eastern Europe, there is
considerable evidence that it has been divided over how to handle
Honecker's planned visit to West Germany.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 ? = Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5 25X1
Jtl.Kt 1
Despite critical media commentaries in late July and
early August, Soviet press play in the weeks prior to
the cancellation of the Honecker visit seemingly
fluctuated between harsher and more moderate treatment
of intra-German developments .
Preparations for the visit, including negotiations on a
joint communique, continued in Bonn and East Berlin
until the end of August.
Moscow's apparent uncertainty over the broader questions of
closer intra-German cooperation may, in part, be attributable to
differing bureaucratic and institutional perspectives among
Soviet officials concerned with intra-German and East-West
issues. for example, have noted
differences between Soviet officials with economic
responsibilities who seemingly support a pragmatic policy of
cooperation with the West, and more orthodox political hardliners
;f' Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtLKt I
who appear to want more limited economic contacts in order to
convince the West of the seriousness of the confrontational
atmosphere created by INF deployments. A West German
parliamentary delegation that visited Moscow in June, reported
that Soviet behavior ranged from accusations of German revanchism
to "a more open, reasonable tone in separate sessions on economic
subjects." There also appear to be differences between political
officials primarily concerned with Bloc relations, who tend to
give precedence to Bloc discipline and cohesion, and those
officials whose main responsibility is'Soviet relations with
Western Europe.2
These variances appear to reflect the bias of middle level
officials charged with different resposibilities rather than a
serious disagreement at the top. Still the persistence of
apparently contradictory signals prior to Honecker's postponement
seems to indicate indecisiveness at the top that will add to the
uncertainty among Soviet and East European officials.
Outlook
2 Articles by Deputy Central Committee Chairman for Bloc
relations Rakhmanin, for example, warn about the dangers of ties
to the West while comments by West European specialists like
Portugalov and Davydov often support East-West cooperation.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
SECRET
metaphor. There was an unmistakeable "enough is enough" tone to
the public scolding Moscow gave in July and early September, to
all those involved in promoting intra-German relations. Although
Honecker had to revise his judgment of how far was too far, he
probabaly retains some freedom of action.
Even before the postponement, we did not expect any major
evolution in intra-German affairs during the remainder of 1984.
The Honecker visit to West Germany would have been projected and
perceived more as a historical first than a substantive visit.
Moscow clearly is not in a mood for additional humanitarian
concessions, and East Berlin has no pressing need for another
credit guarantee. Although the two sides may still sign later
this year a low-level environmental accord, both Germanys
probably will be content to consolidate and implement agreements
already signed. In the meantime, Honecker will seek to preserve
his room for maneuver vis-a-vis Moscow by drawing the West
Germans into discussions of security issues--or at least
increasing domestic pressure on Kohl to acquiesce in such
discussions in the future.
Another credit for humanitarian concessions agreement
comparable to the 1983 and 1984 agreements seems unlikely in the
near future unless the signals from Moscow change. Even then,
Moscow may demand that Bonn be more accommodating on issues
relating to East German sovereignty. The West German
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5
JtLKtI
constitution prohibits the government from endorsing any
agreement that confers recognition of East German sovereignty.
Some, but not all, of these issues can be finessed, but even
these would require protracted bargaining.
East Germany, meanwhile, will continue to search for areas
of accommodation with Bonn within whatever margins Moscow will
tolerate. East Berlin may also continue to pursue its national
priorities--while remaining a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact--in
less sensitive areas than intra-German relations. The
concurrence of views that exists in East Berlin, Budapest,
Bucharest, and Sofia may still give them the courage to lobby, as
they have in the past year, for changes they believe are
necessary for the vitality of the Bloc as a whole. If the
Soviets are completely insensitive to alternative views within
their alliance, it could add to the tensions within the Pact and
make the management of that alliance more difficult.
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01000010017-5