SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN THEATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001000010025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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61 SECRET I
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #04435-84
1 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Counci
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy in the Southern Theater
1. With great apologies for its tardiness, I send the attached paper
conveying my views on Soviet strategy toward the Greater Middle East and
South Asian region. You may recall you met with Graham Fuller and me
shortly after your return from Europe in May and asked for a survey of
Soviet policy toward several of the region's "targets", including Pakistan,
Baluchistan, Lebanon and Egypt. Some preliminary research and then the
drafting of SNIE 11-9 (Soviet Policy Toward the US in 1984) delayed things.
2. This paper has benefited from inputs by Graham Fuller and
discussions with a number of analysts. I also sought comments from several
Agency components, the most important of which are attached at Tabs. Rather
than compromise differences, I thought a think piece of this sort would be
more stimulating on its own, side by side with the objections it has drawn.
After considering those objections, I'll stand by my
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE "SOUTHERN THEATER"
The future of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the East-West power
balance, and the chance of a. major US Soviet conflict in the next two
decades are likely to be determined, more than anywhere else, in the region
south of Soviet borders stretching from India to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Does the USSR have a coherent strategy in this theater? There is no
question that the men in the Kremlin today, as did their predecessors, have
keen ambitions to dominate this region. It presents them with compelling
vulnerabilities as well as obstacles; they are clearly active or trying to
be active throughout it. Their strategy in the region is in some ways
analogous to their military doctrine. Pressing on a broad front, they seek
to "break through" on key "axes of advance" which can be turned to decisive
advantage throughout the theater. Simultaneously applying several
operational tools, they are tactically oportunistic and will try to
reinforce success as it comes.
The Strategic Importance of the Southern Theater.
This region is potentially the key to overturning the East-West
geopolitical balance that has emerged since 1945. Its strategic importance
to the USSR is vastly understated by defining it as access to warm water
ports. The single most important element in the region is its oil, which
promises to be vital to the health of West European and Japanese societies,
as well as to many LDCs, for the rest of this century and beyond. The
region is also the heart of the Islamic world, potentially able to exert a
cultural and spiritual influence which, like European civilization, may come
to undermine essential parts of the Soviet system at home if the Soviets do
not eventually control it.
The geography of the region is itself of strategic importance. Soviet
dominance of all or additional parts of it would greatly ease the ability of
the USSR to project power in Africa and Southeast Asia. No doubt Soviet
controlled port facilities on the Arabian Sea, especially if linked by
secure land routes to Soviet territory would be of great military value. By
the time the Soviets were able to create such facilities, however, the
political effects of the process would have long since revolutionized the
whole environment.
The Southern Theater is by far the most important major region of the
Third World to the Soviets, rivaling the strategic status of East Asia and
even Europe in some ways. This is because its dominance, or the high
likelihood of its dominance, by the USSR would help extend Soviet influence
in the other Eurasian regions.
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Despite several decades of persistent effort, the Soviets have not
expanded their influence in the Southern Theater steadily or with ease.
Barriers of-culture, countervailing Western and local power, tactical
clumsiness on the Soviet part, and the shere unpredictability of the region
have all posed obstacles.
Nevertheless, several "megatrends" in the region on balance favor the
long-term expansion of Soviet influence. Political volatility within and
among the region's states continues to afford penetration opportunities.
The Soviet military buildup has made the USSR the strongest military
actor in the region, greatly outweighing with its regional forces on Soviet
territory any combination of quickly available local and Western forces and
also undermining the ability of the US to offer credible strategic
guarantees. A key task for Soviet regional strategy is to turn this
military preponderance "in being" into an effective geopolitical lever at
acceptable risk. As elsewhere, the USSR has lacked the political, economic,
and cultural appeal that could ease this task.
The political and economic development of the Islamic countries of the
region could strengthen over time the obstacles to lasting Soviet
penetration. But development is equally likely to produce social turmoil
that encourages it. Soviet military forces are not capable of simply
walking over the regions to the south; its distances and terrain are more
difficult than Europe. The US may try to put in place forward military
capability to deter Soviet power projection, such as bases and small
deployments. Yet theater equivalence between Soviet military power and that
of the West and its partners is even less likely in Southwest Asia than in
Europe.
Among the "megatrends" which could eventually attenuate the pressure of
Soviet power on the Southern Theater, perhaps the most important in the long
run is the development of the Soviet system itself. Before the region
witnesses a decisive expansion of Soviet power, it is possible that stresses
within Soviet society combined with Soviet failures in international affairs
could lead to a turning inward of Soviet policy which reduces the
challenge. This is an exceedingly long shot prospect. It cannot be taken
for granted. It depends on sustained and coherent resistance to Soviet
power by the US, by its allies, and by local states. It will depend
crucially on the outcome of the war in Afghanistan.
Soviet strategy in the Southern Theater can best be addressed in terms
of Soviet policy toward several sub-regional problems or relationships, each
of which links to others, often in contradictory ways. The one which weighs
most heavily on the Soviet leadership today is the war in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan
As of today, the USSR aims to win the war. Its strategy is to keep at
bay and grind down the resistance, to isolate it from the mass of the
population or drive larger numbers out of the country, and to slowly build
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up a civil-military infrastructure through training, indoctrination, and
cooption. We do not know how long the Soviets believe this strategy will
take. Its composition suggests a 5-10 year time horizon.
In the meantime, although the Soviets may believe that vast national
power and proximity guarantee their ultimate success, they cannot point to
impressive progress on the ground. On-the contrary, numerous reports
suggest a mood of mounting anxiety and frustration about the war in the
Soviet leadership, especially within the Soviet military leadership. They
have the physical strength, but they may doubt that they have the time and
political staying power to make their protracted strategy victorious. The
low morale of Soviet troops clearly has adverse operational consequences;
and we see more evidence of Soviet popular and elite discontent about the
war than in past years.
If the Soviets do win in Afghanistan, or are seen to be on the road to
ultimate victory at costs they can easily bear, the political and strategic
impact on the region will be considerable. The countries of the region will
increasingly be persuaded that Soviet power must be accommodated; and the
Soviets will gradually assemble new assets for intruding upon the region,
such as military bases and points of local political-economic contact. It
is unlikely that a gradual Soviet victory will itself galvanize regional
resistance since the drama of the original invasion did not do so.
To the extent the Soviets face a "no-win" situation, however, there are
two possibilities. They may be persuaded to escalate their military
campaign and forces inside Afghanistan and also to increase significantly
their pressure on Pakistan. Evidence of Soviet frustration in Afghanistan,
reporting of Soviet pressures on Pakistan, and evidence of Soviet efforts to
stimulate Indian initiatives against Pakistan all raise the near-term
probability of this development to a very dangerous level.
If neither patience nor escalation get the Soviets out of a "no-win"
predicament in Afghanistan, the longer term implications could be in the
opposite direction. Prosecution of the war could increasingly distract the
Soviet leadership from other initiatives in the region, as it seems to have
in recent years. And, most important, popular -- and especially
professional military -- displeasure with the war could join other internal
problems to pose more serious challenges to the regime's policy priorities
and, ultimately, to its stability.
Because Soviet power is so heavily engaged, the war in Afghanistan is
today the keystone of future Soviet power in the region. Failing some
dramatic and easily exploited new opportunity elsewhere, such as a
pro-Soviet regime emerging "naturally" in Iran following Khomeini, the
Soviets must win, rapidly or slowly, but steadily, in Afghanistan to
progress elsewhere. Alternatively, unless a phalanx of strong US-supported
states, including Iran, arises to oppose them, the Soviets must lose in
Afghanistan if the long-term expansion of their power in the region is to be
prevented. The outcome is still in question.
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India and Pakistan
Size and prominence in the Third World give India an importance to
Soviet foreign policy quite apart from regional considerations. Although to
a much lesser extent, Pakistan is also important in its own right to
Moscow. India is the model of a real alliance relationship between the USSR
and a major noncommunist (some Soviet -documents say capitalist) Third World
country.
India has long been a part of Soviet strategy for the containment of
China. Now India is increasingly a part of Soviet strategy toward Southwest
Asia because of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war.
The Soviets can never be completely at ease about their relationship
with India, Afghanistan implications aside. Indian domestic politics are
not controllable or easily influenced by the Soviets. India could well
intensify its efforts to improve relations with China. It can always turn
more to Western sources for high quality military systems. India's
tolerance toward the Soviet position in Afghanistan is grounded primarily in
its aims to dominate Pakistan. its anti-US attitudes, and its need for the
Soviet alliance. But India does not give unequivocal applause to Soviet
expansionism in South Asia.
The critical question here is whether the Soviets can make India party
to a decisive squeeze play against Pakistan which substantially alters the
geopolitics of the region and gives the Soviets the possibility of winning
the Afghan war quickly by cutting off the resistance and thoroughly
discrediting the US as a regional ally. The Soviets very much want
Pakistan's support of the Mujahedin to be stopped. They appreciate that
saber rattling and an occasional bombing of a border village will not change
Zia's policy. Direct Soviet military threats on the border are most likely
to bring in additional US support and conceivably US military presence.
Getting Pakistan out of the Afghan war equation requires internal
destabilization or an Indo-Pakistan war or both to bring down Zia, change
his policies, or, in the extreme, dismember Pakistan.
India would rather dominate than dismember Pakistan. It is not so clear
that India would rather tolerate an independent Pakistan than see it
dismembered. The Soviets would prefer a unified but friendly Pakistan, and
would tolerate Indian domination if that is required to achieve the desired
result. There is limited but convincing evidence that the Soviets would
prefer Pakistan's dismemberment to a hostile, unified Pakistan allied with
the US, even though the latter serves Soviet-Indian ties.
Could Soviet need to win the Afghan war quickly and Indian desires to
dominate Pakistan, and specifically to terminate the Pak nuclear program,
lead to concerted Indo-Soviet action? The current trend of events raises
this probability. In any event, the Soviets would surely prefer to persuade
India to attack Pakistan in some way than to do so themselves because of the
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political difficulties posed for Washington by Indian initiative. At this
moment, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets will
take action-against Pakistan entirely on their own, even though this would
be easier for Washington to react to.
The Baluchistan Option
Baluchistan is frequently cited as some kind of key to Soviet strategy
in the region -- which it probably is not. It is, however, an example of
one facet of Soviet strategy in the "great game" of playing on tribal
rivalries within primative states of the area, a subject which deserves a
lot more attention than it normally gets. The Soviets have long cultivated
ties to political and regional groups in Pakistan that might be mobilized to
overthrow the regime or dismember the state. Afghanistan gives them both a
motive and a place from which to operate. Baluchistan is one target of
Soviet attention.
Amidst much uncertainty as to what the facts are, there is controversy
about the significance of Soviet interest in Baluchistan. The inflated
claims of some that it is the USSR's final stepping stone to the Indian
Ocean are often countered by an less founded insistence that "there is no
evidence" of a Soviet penetration effort. A clearly incomplete body of
evidence supports the following:
Since well before the Afghan war the Soviets have sought influence
with all manner of Baluch, from traditional tribal leaders at home
and in exile to radical urbanized students. These efforts have
included supplying arms and military training for separatist
elements.
Some Baluch elements have reportedly been useful in interfering
with Afghan Mujahedin operations and supplies. The extent of this
help to the Soviets is probably very limited, however. Most Baluch
elements appear to have a very healthy suspicion of Soviet
activities, and they tend to be regarded by Afghan resistance as
allies.
Soviet ability to exploit Baluch separatism has probably been
reduced by Zia's more tolerant policies since 1977. But the Baluch
factor could become significant again if Pakistan goes unstable for
other reasons.
-- The slow outmigration, urbanization, and economic development of
Baluchistan's people probably increases, rather than decreases,
Soviet potential for troublemaking at Pakistan's expense.
More generally, Soviet interest in Baluch separatism should not be
viewed as a fifth column ready at some point swiftly to open the road to the
Indian Ocean coast. It reflects rather, and in a particularly strategic
place, a Soviet tactic of buying into the separatist forces which could abet
the destabilization of two vital barrier states of the region, Pakistan and
Iran. Other cases of comparable interest are the Azeris and the Kurds.
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Against both Pakistan and Iran the Soviets simultaneously seek a) to
exert influence on the central government; b) to cultivate potential
alternatives to the central government, e.g., oppositions; and c) to
penetrate and stimulate separatist movements.
Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf
Iran and the Gulf are the prizes of the region. The Soviets have long
believed that they should, by right of proximity and historically "objective
trends", exert a dominant influence over the area's security affairs and its
resources. The withdrawal of British influence, the fall of the Shah, and
the difficulties the US faces in positioning countervailing power should,
the Soviets believe, give them opportunities to advance their long-standing
interest. But their advances have not been commensurate with the apparent
opportunities. They are wrestling with how to shape a more effective
strategy for this critical part of the theater.
Khomeini's Iran has not afforded the Soviets great opportunities to
advance at the government level. Yet the Soviets do maintain diplomatic and
varied economic ties to Iran. Twenty percent of Iranian imports come via
Soviet territory and Soviet allies/clients are an important source of Iran's
arms. Tehran does not treat the "second (Soviet) devil" with quite the
disdain and hostility reserved for the "first (US) devil." Moreover, in
recent weeks Tehran, after some internal dispute, actively sought to plead
its case on the Gulf war with the Soviets at a high level; hence the
Gromyko-Sadr talks. We don't believe either side achieved much, but we can
conclude a) the diplomatic relationship is not without some promise, b)
there are elements in Khomeini's regime likely to survive him who are ready
to treat with the Soviets, and, therefore, c) the Soviets tactic of playing
both sides still works to some extent, despite the pronounced tilt to Iraq.
We have recent reporting to the effect that the Soviets now regard the
Iran-Iraq war as tending to play into their hands because the security
problems it has engendered encourage Iran and other Gulf states to seek
Soviet favor, including Soviet arms, permitting the Soviets to penetrate
politically without jettisoning their tie to Iraq.
The decimation of the Tudeh and the leftist Mujahedin in Iran have
sharply reduced Soviet prospects for developing a congenial alternative to
the Khomeini regime at the center. But it's very hard to tell what Sovi
influence assets are still available.
Moreover, as indicated above, some Iranian leaders today are
more willing to entertain ties to Moscow than is Khomeini.
There is ample evidence that, over the years, the Soviets have sought to
penetrate and, occcasionally, support potential separatist groups in Iran,
notably the Azeris of "southern Azerbaidzhan", probably the Khuzistan Arabs,
the Kurds, and the Baluch. We have enough evidence to detect activity, not
enough to establish the magnitude or strategic direction of Soviet
involvement. Up to now, it is probable that Soviet investments have
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represented a fairly routine hedge for the future. Soviet priorities have
been on those ruling at the center and on the central opposition in Iran.
There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviets may increase their
attention to the minorities, especially in Azerbaidzhan. We don't yet see a
shift of Soviet strategy toward exploiting the minorities to destabilize the
country. But this is a possibility. Present and expected gaps in our
intelligence make it likely our detection of such a shift will be tardy and
uncertain. And their is strong resistance on the part of many analysts to
the idea that the Soviets would follow a destabilization strategy toward
Iran or any other major state of the region.
Although it still offers them strategic opportunities, the Iran-Iraq war
has been a net negative for the Soviets so far. They have tried, but not
yet succeeded in parlaying their relations with both sides into a major
advance in Iran or the region as a whole, and they still fear that the US
will exploit the war to establish a permanent military presence in the Gulf-
area. As suggested above, however, the Soviets may be getting more
optimistic about their prospects.
The Soviets would surely like to preside over a settlement of the
conflict along the lines of their mediating role between India and Pakistan
at Tashkent in 1965. The basic political requirement for such a role has
been absent, namely, a shared interest between the belligerants in
compromise. That interest could possibly arise fairly suddenly, however.
Khomeini's death could lead to a reduction of Tehran's demands. The Soviets
might be willing to promote the removal of Sadam Huseyn if they can identify
a successor regime in which they have confidence.
While probably not committed for all time to Sadam Huseyn, the Soviets
do not want to jeopardize their Iraqi connection seriously for uncertain
gains with Iran. Iraq is their one substantial entree into the affairs of
the Gulf now, and it usefully diversifies their engagement on the Arab side
of the conflict with Israel, notwithstanding Iraqi-Syrian tensions.
In the rest of the Gulf and with the Saudis, the current Soviet formula
is very quiet diplomacy -- which is all they can get away with. Basically,
they are trading on Gulf awareness that, sooner or later, the Soviet Union
is going to be a bigger factor in the area which must be taken into
account. Meanwhile, the most discreet reception to Soviet approaches gives
the Gulf states some leverage with Washington. This formula is unlikely to
carry the Soviets very far beyond their current relations with Kuwait,
however, barring some other change in the politics of the area, e.g., some
development which dramatically discredits the protective role of the US
(e.g., our leaving Pakistan in the lurch), and builds the image of the USSR
as very powerful but sufficiently benign to work with.
What, then, will be Soviet strategy toward this sub-region? The odds
seem to favor continuation of present policies because they are not without
promise and the present Soviet leadership appears disinclined to try major
policy departures in the face of risk and uncertainty. At the same time, we
see a significant increase in Soviet political activity recently. They are
clearly working harder on the opportunities they think they have.
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A significant shift of Soviet strategy cannot be ruled out. One
possibility would be substantially increased aid to Iraq coupled with severe
pressure on-Iran, including military pressure in the north, to force a new
consensus in Tehran for ending the war under Soviet sponsorship. Success at
this surely risky venture could leave the USSR the dominant superpower
protector of the Gulf. Failure could bring in the US and lead to much
deeper Soviet-Iranian hostility. On balance, it seems unlikely that the
Soviets would use this approach unless the Iranians look like they are
enjoying dramatic military successes against Iraq -- an unlikely prospect
according to most analysis.
Another option would be a longer-term Soviet shift toward reliance on
minorities to promote destabilization and fragmentation of a post-Khomeini
Iran. This course might seem less risky in the short term because it could
be explored gradually. But if it begins to prove successful, the risks
start rising sharply. Iran might at some point begin to fall apart; but it
won't happen quickly and cleanly. The Soviets would have to threaten
intervention on behalf of their favored minority, the Azeris probably. The
worst outcome would be a still unified Iran, nudged closer to the US by
Soviet actions.
Recitation of these uncertainties and risks should not be taken to mean
that, after all, the Soviets have no prospects around the Gulf. The
"megatrends".of superior military power, deep strategic interest, and local
instability continue to favor them. And the outcome in Afghanistan (and
closely related Pakistan), so critical to everything else, is still up for
grabs.
Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
Israel's attack on Lebanon and defeat of Syria's forces inflicted a
major setback to the Soviets. But they have recovered through persistence
in rearming the Syrians and US inability to sponsor a settlement in Lebanon.
The visits of Politburo member Gaydar Aliyev to Syria and Central
Committee expert Karen Brutents to Lebanon and Syria earlier this year
suggested that the Soviets might be reconnoitering for new diplomatic
initiatives in the area. After the US pullout from Beirut, the opportunity
seemed inviting. Until very recently the Soviets have been in somewhat of a
waiting posure, rather like the US at present. They have acted to protect
their position in Syria against the vagaries of political intrigue in
Damascus, particularly Rifat Asad's unreliability. They appear to be
leaving Lebanon largely to the Syrians, but the impending Polyakov visit and
other signs indicated that they want to play a hand of their own there as
well. They are making sustained, but low key, efforts to restore some
degree of cohesion to the PLO; here too they have left the initiative to the
Syrians and noticeably distanced themselves from Yasir Arafat.
Moscow is clearly pressing for movement in relations with Jordan,
exploiting King Husseyn's need for arms and his desire to pressure
Washington with a live Soviet option. A tie to Jordan is always of value to
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"the Soviets because it diversifies the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli
confrontation and could open doors to the conservative states of the
Peninsula. -
It is not apparent at present that the Soviets have a longer-term
political strategy for this portion of the region other than sticking with
clients they have, cultivating new relationships where possible, and waiting
to see what happens. Something new is bound to happen before long, however,
and the Soviets are position themselves to act on new opportunities.
The formation of a new government in Israel may be the next break point
for Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli nexus. Should a coalition government
in Israel start casting about for new paths of compromise, the resulting
fluidity may give the Soviets new diplomatic opportunities, even the
prospect of relations with'Israel. Although there is not much novelty in
it, the lastest Soviet proposal for "comprehensive peace" in the region
represents, at a minimum, a marker for a Soviet role in the near future, and
an effort to appeal to Arab moderates frustrated by the inability of the US
to get any movement. If prospects for movement on Arab-Israeli issues do
reappear, however, the main Soviet problem will stem from the US resuming a
much more active role on the basis of its superior political position as
Israel's guarantor and the security partner of many Arab states. The Soviet
Union can only deliver arms; the US just might be able to deliver Israeli
concessions. Should a revival of the peace process take place, the Soviets
may concentrate, as in the past, on backing the most radical Arab demands
and even pushing events toward another confrontaton.
The problem for Soviet diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli context, as
elsewhere in the region, is that the USSR's great military muscle "over the
horizon" to the north and its local instruments of subversion and intrigue
are not easy to use constructively, to build political order among and
within nations who have autonomous political vitality. To exploit its
military power effectively for political ends in a region constantly beset
by war, the Soviets must credibly threaten to use direct force. This is
risky. In countries with a very unformed internal environment, the Soviets
try to build a disciplined Marxist-Leninist core on which to rely. But most
nations of Islam resist this. Short of direct military intervention, the
Soviets must exploit arms supply and the myopic tenacity of local conflict
to insinuate their influence. When the region's governments begin to think
seriously about ways out of their age-old conflicts, the US tends in the end
to be the more congenial partner. Should policy blunders or strategic
retreat from the region reduce US leverage, or renewed confrontation magnify
the relative disparity of US and Soviet military capabilities in more
extreme scenarios, then the Soviets will have new prospects to advance.
Egypt
Egypt deserves special treatment, apart from the Arab-Israeli context,
not only because it assumed at Camp David a special stance toward that
conflict, but because, unlike the other Arab states, Egypt is a nation. It
has a national heritage and future more cohesive and substantial than any
other Arab country.
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The Soviets would certainly like to return to a position of influence in
Cairo. They sought the recent exchange of ambassadors toward that end. But
they probably have no illusions that this step alone puts the relationship
even tentatively on a course back to the status they enjoyed under Nassar.
No doubt they expect that an improved diplomatic relationship with Egypt
will enhance their bargaining leverage throughout the region, although
perhaps not as much as it will enhance Cairo's leverage in Washington and
Jerusalem. They probably also expect that it will give them increased
access to Egypt's internal politics, which are sure to face turbulent times.
A return to the past Egyptian dependency on Moscow for arms is highly
unlikely given the US supplier role that has developed in the last decade.
Nevertheless, the cost and political uncertainty of relying on the US for
arms may encourage the Egyptians to turn again in a limited way to the USSR
for less sophisticated weapons.
The Soviets probably look to a limited arms supply relationship,
increased diplomatic influence, and the possibility of internal
discontinuities in Egyptian political and economic development to provide
them new opportunities downstream. In any case, the location, size, and
long-term political gravity of Egypt in the Arab world makes the investment
worthwhile.
The Yemens and the Horn of Africa
The Soviet positons in Ethiopia and the PDRY, to a lesser extent also in
North Yemen, offer the potential of backdoor access to the Middle East.
They offer physical advantages in terms of basing for military,
paramilitary, and various covert activities against neighboring states such
as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Sudan. They also present to the governments of
the region an image of encircling Soviet power which, if it cannot be
contained reliably, must be accommodated.
Soviet policy toward Ethiopia is at present aimed primarily at
consolidation and stabilization of the Soviet position. The Mengistu regime
is beset by serious insurgencies and severe economic problems. At the same
time, it is not eager to build a strong Marxist-Leninist party apparatus
Moscow has long been lobbying for because it could eventually challenge the
power of Mengistu's military junta and give the Soviets a more viable base
of support inside the country without him. In short, making sure that the
Soviet position in Ethiopia is not reversed gets more Soviet attention now
than efforts to exploit that positon regionally. Nevertheless, the Soviets
continue to develop and use the military base access they have in the
country.
We have evidence that more pro-Soviet figures have advanced their power
in the PDRY recently. This may give the Soviets new tactical options. Some
fear that the Soviets may step up their subversive activity against Oman and
Saudi Arabia from the Yemens. But there is no strong evidence on this as
yet. Since these outposts of Soviet influence are more means than ends in
themselves, future Soviet policy toward them probably turns on developments
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in the vital sub-regions of the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli neighborhood, and
Afghanistan.
Turkey
Geography and culture make Turkey an important target of Soviet policy
toward the Southern Theater. Historic animosities and its membership in
NATO obstruct Soviet influence. Turkey's sense of vulnerability, the
Ottoman political tradition of evading confrontational relationships where
possible, and the enduring potential for internal instability give the
Soviets recurrent prospects.
The military significance of Turkey to Soviet strategic planning is
enormous. It controls Soviet maritime access to the Mediterranean,
notwithstanding the permissive conditions of the Montreaux Convention. It
lies astride the most direct air routes into the Middle East. Depending on
the fulfillment of plans for its air and land force modernization, it is
potentially one of the most formidable military powers in NATO. And it is a
potential base from which US military power can act to interfere with Soviet
operations toward the Gulf region. Whether Turkey would permit US access to
its bases during a Gulf or Iranian contingency involving the Soviets is
uncertain. That very uncertainty must weigh heavily in Soviet strategic
calculations, however. If Turkey could somehow be dislodged from NATO the
potential for Soviet military access to the region would be vastly improved
and the political impact would be revolutionary.
During the 1950s and 1960s the Soviets prusued a policy of diplomatic
and economic detente toward Ankara. In the 1970s the Soviets activated the
"second path" of destabilization through wholesale and indiscrimminate
terrorism. While some find the evidence inconclusive, the role of Bulgaria
as source of arms for sustained domestic violence in Turkey makes Soviet
complicity apparent.
Because the organizational base of terrorism in Turkey was so anarchic,
the military which seized power in 1980 was able to quell it very
effectively. Whether the Soviets might at some time in the future be able
to reopen this path to destabilizing Turkey depends a great deal on the
political and economic effectiveness of the present Turkish regime. Given
the picture only five years ago, the present outlook for Turkish stability
and development is promising, but not conclusive.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have returned to the first path of seeking
government-to-government detente, inhibited by their tilt toward Greece on
Cyprus, their occasinal badgering of Turkey about INF and other NATO
initiatives, and, above all, the deep cloud of suspicion left by the era of
mass terrorism. The present Turkish government is strongly committed to
NATO and to the US tie. It enjoys wide public support for this stance.
Yet, like other NATO members, Turkey has its own reasons for a more nuanced
policy toward the USSR than the US might wish to see it pursue. US support
for Turkish interests in Cyprus and for military modernization has been
disappointing to Ankara. Turkish interests in the Middle East frequently
oblige a certain distance from US policies. Underlying is Turkey's
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persistent sense of exposure with insufficiently reliable backing. the
Soviets can be expected to exploit any opportunity these circumstances might
give them to increase their influence in Turkey.
Conclusion
The hallmarks of the Soviet posture toward the Southern Theater are:
Abiding ambitions to dominate the region for both offensive and
defensive reasons.
The military potential for strategic dominance created by the
buildup of Soviet regional and intercontinental forces over the past
twenty years.
Multilayered tactical tools -- from arms supply to terrorism -- for
exploiting the internal and interstate instabilities of the region.
Persistent and severe obstacles to the expansion of Soviet
influence arising from the limits of Soviet political and cultural
appeal, the risks of using military power, and the desire of the
region's people to avoid domination by a real imperialist.
To the extent the Soviets can be said to have a region-wide strategy it
is opportunistic and flexible: defend what you have, press where openings
appear, and keep a variety of options simultaneously in play. Specific
policies toward the major sub-regional issues addressed above will probably
continue to dominate Soviet strategy toward the region as a whole.
How hard can the Soviets be expected to press in the years ahead? The
foregoing discussion has tended to focus on Soviet policy problems and
obstacles. Will they persist? Or will favorable "megatrends" of the
regional power balance and local instability play into Soviet hands?
In retrospect, Soviet behavior during the early 1980s represents a kind
of strategic underachievement. Given what appear to have been their
opportunities after the fall of the Shah, they did not move very decisively
or actively to exploit them, but appeared to adopt more of a defensive or
holding posture. The obstacles already discussed account for this only in
part. Other factors weighing on Kremlin decisionmaking also played a major
role:
-- The unexpectedly high cost of the Afghanistan commitment.
-- The distracting effect of turmoil in Poland.
-- The high degree of US commitment to the region after 1980.
-- The onset of conditions within the top Soviet leadership
conducive to risk avoidance and indecision.
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The total effect of these factors on Soviet policy may persist for
several years, but is unlikely to last indefinitely. Even now Soviet
diplomacy in the region is getting more active, and a the results of a
crisis over Pakistan -- especially whether it magnifies Soviet power or
underscores US credibility as an ally -- will resonnate powerfully
throughout the region. Sooner or later and perhaps quite suddenly given the
volatility of the region, the historic Soviet aim to dominate it is very
likely to be pressed with increased determination and initiative. It is
next to impossible that the countries of the region will, by themselves,
become united and strong enough to pose an insurmountable obstacle to Soviet
advances in the long run. Those advances are most likely to be thwarted if
the next generation of Soviet leaders, now in the process of emerging, is
persuaded that the "great game" in the Southern Theater is not worth the
candle of cost and risk. What will persuade them is a combination of
failure in Afghanistan, an unfavorable regional correlation of forces based
on US commitment, and their own pressing internal priorities. Otherwise the
next phase of the struggle over this strategic region is likely to be more
lively and potentially more explosive than the recent past.
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06 July 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Fritz Ermath
NIO/USSR-EE
FROM: NESA/Persian Gulf Division
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Paper "Soviet Strategies in
the 'Southern Theater'"
1. Persian Gulf analysts questioned in particular the
discussion on page 12 and elsewhere about possible Soviet efforts
to destabilize Iran by exploiting the country's minorities. They
argue that:
-- The Soviets might not find it in their interest to
destabilize Iran, particularly given the uncertain
outcome of such instability and the possibility that the
country would fragment;
-- The Soviets generally have tried to preserve stability in
this area in the past;
There is no recent reliable reporting of Soviet efforts
to penetrate and support potential separatist groups in
Iran;
-- The Turkomans would not be worthy of Soviet interest
since they constitute only a bite-sized minority found
only along the border with the Soviet Union and in a few
enclaves elsewhere;
-- Western observers tend to overestimate the potential for
separatism in Iran. The Azerbaydzhanis were expected to
provide an effective counter to Khomeini, and the Arabs
of Khuzistan were expected to rally to Iraq's side at the
outset of the war, but neither development occurred;
-- Even if the Soviets do increase their attention to Iran's
minorities, their ideological blinders will cause them to
repeat past mistakes and there will be little, if any,
payoff for Moscow.
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SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Paper "Soviet Strategies in the
- 'Southern Theater'"
2. Other random comments:
-- On page 13, first full para, would add "trust in Moscow
as a mediator" as one of basic political requirements in
sentence two.
-- On page 13, last para, second sentence, question use of
word "awareness." Would fear or paranoia be a better
one.
-- On collection/analysis, one of our analysts notes that
Soviet scholarship on the Kurds is outstanding. Another
suggests that Soviet theoretical monographs on
nationalities issues are tightly circumscribed by
Marxist-Leninist dogma and would be of little use to us,
but notes that the Soviets do produce good basic
ethnographic studies.
-2-
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18 July 1984
I found your essay on Soviet strategy in the "Southern
Theater" misleading regarding Soviet actions and policies toward
the Third World and Soviet regional opportunities vis-a-vis the
United States. This rejoinder is intended to start a dialogue on
several key issues that you address, particularly the strategic
importance of the southern theater to the USSR.
Your essay appears to turn on the unconventional notion that
the "future of the Soviet Union as a superpower" and ."the East-
West power balance" are "likely to be determined" in the southern
frontier. Although I would argue that the chances for Soviet-
American confrontation are greater in this region than anywhere
else, the larger strategic issues that you raise will ultimately
be settled in Europe or in Asia and will be determined by long-
term trends in the strategic military and economic balance. The
"most important developments" in the region for the Soviets are
not oil and the ability of the Islamic world to "undermine
essential parts of the Soviet system," but rather the proximity
of the region to the USSR and the importance of the region to the
West. The Soviet system is hardly as-fragile as you suggest.
Nor is Western-Japanese dependence on oil from the Middle East
what it once was.
FROM IC/SOYA/TWAD
SUBJECT Memo on Soviet Strategies in the "Southern
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO USSR-EE
The so-called "megatrends" that you cite are particularly
misleading.
-- The Soviets have mixed feelings about "political
volatility" and "social turmoil" in the region. Past
experience has taught them that it presents threats as
well as opportunities. Soviet caution in key third World
states and Moscow's setbacks in Egypt, Somalia, Guinea,
Mali, Ghana, and the Sudan testify to this fact.
-- The "military buildup" that you cite is overblown. The
Soviets have moved more slowly on this frontier than any
other; they have limited ability to project power beyond
bordering areas; although they possess some military
advantages vis-a-vis the West in a contest for Iran, they
are at a serious disadvantage in South Asia, the Levant,
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and the Persian Gulf. The consequences of your
observations for US policy in this regard are
particularly questionable, exaggerating the limitations
that do exist on Western capabilities.
-- The success or failure of the USSR in Afghanistan ("the
keystone of future Soviet power") will not determine
Soviet success or failure in the region. Iran is clearly
the more pivotal state.
Indeed, your discussion of Afghanistan is particularly
worrisome to me. You make far too much of Soviet efforts to "win
the war;" Moscow's interest is in controlling the situation,
which it has succeeded in doing so far by establishing its own
government in Kabul. You refer to mounting Soviet "anxiety and
frustration" about the war as well as "popular and elite
discontent;" the evidentiary base for these points is weak and
even if you were correct these factors are not about to
jeopardize Soviet policy in Afghanistan. In any event, most
countries in the region are not accommodating to Soviet power;
instead, they are trying to increase contacts with the United
States.
Of course, the Soviets would like to see an end to Pakistani
aid to the Mujahideen, but your essay exaggerates the possibility
of and the extent of our knowledge of joint Soviet-Indian action
against Zia, Soviet manipulation of Baluchistan ("a major
target"), the Soviet "penetration effort" against Pakistan and
the Soviet interest in separatism. (Baluchistan as an issue
could vanish in the next ten years; there are already more Paks
there than Baluchis.) Similarly, the Soviets would like to be in
a stronger position in Iran, but your essay exaggerates so-called
Soviet opportunities vis-a-vis the United States in Iran, likely
Soviet penetration efforts among potential separatist groups, and
Soviet opportunities in a post-Khomeini period. (I find your
critical comments of our best source on these subjects,[ 25X1
particularly unfortunate. If there is a 25X1
better source, then we would like to see him.) Finally, you
suggest that the Soviets would promote the removal of Iraq's
Saddam Pusayn if they could identify a reliable successor; since
the latter is impossible then the former is specious.
I also agree that "something new is bound to happen before
long" in the Middle East, but not on the basis of the factors you
cite.
-- The key to opening doors to conservative Arab states is
not so much with Jordan but with Saudi Arabia, and the
Soviets have made scant progress in their approaches to
Riyadh.
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-- Although the Soviets have distanced themselves from
Arafat, they have not abandoned him. They still see him
as the best available head of the PLO and are trying to
bring some cohesion to the PLO in spite of Syrian
unwillingness to compromise.
-- There is no evidence of serious Soviet diplomatic
initiatives on Arab-Israeli issues and no basis for
assuming Soviet backing of the most radical Arab demands
if the peace process should be revived. More often than
not the Soviets have tried to moderate certain radical
demands in order to bring about a peace conference in
which they would play a role.
-- I understand neither the reference to Egypt as the "only"
Arab nation nor the certainty of the assumption that
Cairo will be facing "turbulent times". I believe that
our time would be better spent trying to determine
Moscow's options for getting back into the Middle East
game without a strong position in Egypt.
-- These options do not include, however, your own view of
"backdoor access" to the Middle East via the Yemens and
Ethiopia. In view of the strategic stakes that you
identify in the region, it would appear that these states
are tertiary to Soviet objectives.
Finally, your discussion of Turkey bears little resemblance
to political developments on Moscow's southern theater.
-- The Ottoman political tradition of "evading
confrontational relationships" would be applicable to
-internal enemies but not to such external enemies as the
USSR.
-- The conditions of the Montreaux Convention are not
"permissive" but, in fact, define the choke point that
the Soviets confront into the Mediterranean.
-- The outcome of past such efforts suggests that Soviet
efforts to destabilize Turkey would drive Ankara closer
to NATO and not to the USSR.
-- The reference to Soviet activation of "indiscriminate
terrorism" in Turkey in the 1970s grossly distorts the
evidence about a complex-and controversial issue.
On balance, I do not agree that the USSR has established the
"military potential for strategic dominance" in the region or the
"multilayered tactical tools" to destabilize key regional
actors. Moscow's lack of options to a US move to clear the Gulf
with military power, if necessary, is a good example of the
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USSR's regional military impotence. Nor do I believe that Moscow
has failed to move "decisively or actively to exploit" numerous
opportunities in the region or is compelled to do so given the
"historic Soviet aim to dominate" the region. Your essay, in
exaggerating these opportunities, Soviet advantages, and so-
called favorable "megatrends," ignores Moscow's fundamental
problems and disadvantages that have been accruing in the region
since the USSR's expulsion from Egypt in 1972. Soviets have
effectively been shut out of the Middle East since they "lost"
Egypt, which is the only Arab country with real potential to
challenge Israel. US policy has been exploiting these
vulnerabilities with some success for the past ten years and it
would be incorrect to suggest to US policymakers that the cost or
effectiveness of such exploitation will become more difficult in
the near term. Please let me know when you want to discuss some
of these points.
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