DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRESS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001800060025-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
7D60 Headquarters Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
[Executive Registry
84- 073
17SEP1984
Four years ago the Reagan Administration undertook the
challenge of rebuilding America's defenses. It was a task
made particularly difficult -- and expensive -- by the previous
decade of neglect of America's military capability.
We have made progress, significant progress; but I'm not
sure that message has reached the audience that counts -- the
American taxpayer. I would appreciate your assistance in
spreading that important story. To help you I have enclosed
a brief progress report and the answer to nine tough questions
on defense.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRESS REPORT
The Challenge
For three and a half years Americans have been investing
prneglect of the
in the Reagan defense dprogram efenses to
eserve deterrence.
necessary to the
1970s and nd rebuild the
Because the Soviets had conducted an enormous arms buildup
while U.S. defense spending decreased 20% during the decade of the
1970's, we inherited a double burden--of allocating funds quickly
to restore the readiness
to modernize forces
long term investments
equipment.
- Our defense investments added about $75 billion in con-
stant FY 1985 the
projected for
The Results
Restored Leadership: We are rebuilding the means to
defend our vital interests and meet our global commitments.
No longer do we hear that America eis unable to act decisively,
or to offer leadership world.
Personnel Turnaround: Improved pay and benefits, increased
training, and a restored sense of pride in-wearing the nation's
uniform have given us highly qualified, confident servicemen
and women, and military units with a high state of morale and
discipline.
Improved Military Posture - Our on-going programs are
building:
-- Readier forces, better able to sustain themselves
in combat;
-- Nuclear forces
modernized to provide a more stable
strategic deterrent
-- Modern, well-equipped ground and tactical air forces
to maintain the technological edge needed to offset
of increasingly
the overwhelming Soviet numerical forces.
sophisticate
-- Maritime forces more capable of defending our sealanes
throughout the globe;
-- Mobility capabilities better able to support our
combat units global transportation needs;
Greater-Efficiency: Sweeping reform of defense management
r-Z is el nat ng deep-rooted procurement problems we inherited to
ensure we get more for each defense dollar spent.
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Progress Report
PEOPLE: When President Reagan took office, declining
recruitment and a massive exodus of experienced personnel
r
wethat
from the armed
would haveltotreturn
failedsexled man to periment, thatclaim
concept t was s a a
to conscription.
RecruitinS: In every year since 1981 each military
service has met or exceeded its enlistment goal.
Last year was the Army's best recruiting year in
recent history.
-- Overall, the percentage of recruits holding high school
diplomas has climbed from 68% in FY 1980 to an estimated
92% in FY 1984, giving us better educated men and women
to operate modern sophisticated technical equipment.
Retention: We have stemmed the tide of the exodus of
experienced service personnel.
- First term reenlistments have jumped by 35% since
1980. Last year, both the Navy and Air Force had
record high reenlistment rates -- 68% and 79% re-
spectively.
- We continue to make investments to maintain retention
as the economy improves. The military must train and
promote from within; senior personnel cannot be hired
off the street. Longer military careers promote
stability, reduce training and recruiting costs, and
strengthen leadership.
Reserves: Selected reserve strength exceeded one million
in 1983 or the first time since 1961 -- an increase of 18%
since FY 1980. This not only enhances our readiness to meet
a crisis, but also strengthens the bond between the active
duty military and the rest of the citizenry.
Tra ing: To ensure our soldiers can be ready on moments'
notice, and to challenge D ericoe~a forces soldiers
moreeresources-
us today, we are providing our
opportunities for realistic training.
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-- The Air Force now provides each of its tactical
aircrews almost120 hours of flying time per month
-- up from 16 hours in FY 1980 and a low of 13 hours
in FY 1978. Navvy aircrews now fly almost 23 hours
per month.
-- Navy ships are rigw steaming at an average rate of
34.9 days per quarter, up from 32.4 days in FY 1980.
-- The Army has increased its rotations to the National
Training center from 16 batallions in FY 1982 to 24
this year, giving 50% more troops an opportunity to
participate in some of the most realistic training we
have ever offered to our soldiers.
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION: When President Reagan took office
our newest long-range bomber was 19 years old. Our newest
strategic submarine was 14 years old and did not have missiles
capable of destroying hardened Soviet targets. Our land-based
missiles were threatened; by huge, new, accurate Soviet ICBMs,
while our own misiles lacked the-accuracy and destructive force
we needed for continued,deterrence.
Since 1981, this Administration has vigorously pursued a
plan for maintaining deterrence by modernizing the nation's
aging nuclear forces, while stressing the importance of arms
reductions with the Soviet Union. Overall, nearly half of our
strategic weapons will be deployed aboard modern systems by the
end of the decade.
-- Three new Trident submarines are already at sea, a
fourth is nearing completion, and seven more are under
construction. Four years ago this program was plagued
with skyrocketing costs and slipping schedules; now it
is back on track.
-- The B-1B strategic bomber is now in production. The
first squadron of 15 aircraft will enter service in
1986 -- ahead of schedule and, if current trends
continue, below cost.
-- We have completed five successful tests of the Peace-
keeper (MX) missile, and the first deployment is planned
for late 1986. Consistent with the recommendations of
the bipartisan'Scowcroft Commission the Peacekeeper
deployment, and future deployment of a new small ICBM,
will enhance stability by breaking the Soviets' monopoly
on the capability to attack hardened, time-urgent
targets.
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-- We have begun work on a long-term research program
to find a way to defend against nuclear ballistic
missiles, an effort that offers the greatest promise
for security and stability since the dawn of the
nuclear age.
CONVENTIONAL MODERNIZATION: In 1981 we faced a major
shortfall n weapons and equipment, and much of what we did
have was aging and increasingly obsolete compared with new
Soviet hardware. Our qualitative edge, which helped to offset
the enormous numerical superiority of Soviet forces, had
eroded. We have embarked on a long-term modernization program
to restore our technological superiority.
Army: are providing our armored battalions with
faster, more . lethal and survivable M-1 tanks -- tanks that can fire
accurately on the move, day or night. We added 500 M-ls to the
FY 1981-1984 procurement plan of the previous Administration;
when delivered, they will have increased our FY 1980 tank
inventory by 25%.
-- To improve our tactical mobility and anti-armor capa-
bility, we added 550 more Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
Na.: From a fleet of 479 deployable battle force
ships at the end of FY 1980, the Navy's fleet will have grown
to 525 ships by the end-of FY 1984, and a force of 600 deployable
ships, including 15 carriers, by the end of the decade.
-- With this expanded fleet we can both meet the chal-
lenge posed by the transformation of the Soviet
Navy to a `bluewater" force capable of projecting
per far beyond Soviet borders, and protect the
vital sea lanes we rely on for trade and communi-
cation with our allies.
Air Force: Because we are severely
Alliance depends heavily on outnumbered
ground our cal air as a
counterweight.
-- To maintain our air superiority in the face of major
improvements in Soviet and Warsaw Pact air forces,
we will have acquired in FY 1981-84 some 700 more
modern tactical aircraft for the Air Force, which
when delivered will double the FY 1980 inventories of
these aircraft.
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-- F-15 and F-16 combat effectiveness will also be en-
hanced by new, more durable and easily maintained
engines. Due to tough competition, those engines were
purchased at considerably less cost than originally
anticipated, will come with impressive warranties,
and have provisions for future competition for
replacement spares.
Mobili: Since this Administration took office, our
mobility capabilities have increased by about 35%. By the
end of the decade, airlift capacity will have increased by
80%, sealift by 110% and the amount of prepositioned materiel
by 150%.
-- Airlift: By the end\of the decade we will have added
53 0 C- B cargo aircraft and 44 KC-10 tankers to the
fleet, and modified 19 commercial aircraft to carry
military cargo in an emergency. C-17 cargo aircraft
procurement will start later this decade.
-- Sealift: We have invested more to improve sealift in the
past three years than in all the years since World
War II.
READINESS: Increased military compensation, training and
materiel funding have dramatically improved the ability of our
forces to respond rapidly and effectively in a crisis.
-- Operational and Maintenance Support: During FY 1980-1984
we increased funding almost 25% in constant dollars for
supplies needed for daily operation and maintenance of
our forces.
Navy ships rated "fully" or "substantially" ready
has increased 25 percentage points since Jan 1981.
-- Projected FY 1983 mission-capable rates for fighter
and attack aircraft are 9 percentage points higher
than FY 1980 levels in the Navy and 5 percentage
points higher in the Air Force.
-- Increases in USAF spare parts stocks for tactical
aircraft led to a 60% increase between FY 1981 and
FY 1983 in the number of fully supported combat
sorties that could be flown in the early phases of
a conflict.
SUSTAINABILITY: In 1981, stocks of ammunition and spare
parts were dangerously low, inhibiting the "staying power" of
our forces in combat.
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-- Although building ammunition fuel and equipment stocks
is a slow and expensive process, between FY 1983
and FY 1986, stocks of war reserve munitions are
projected to grow steadily -- by 14% for the Army,
58% for the Navy, 62% for the Air Force, and 24%
for the Marine Corps.
-- Only by the end of the decade, however--with
continued funding support from Congress-will
we begin to achieve a sustainability posture that
fully deters an adversary from beginning aggression
in hopes of outlasting us.
MANAGEMENT REFORM: We are modernizing our forces in the
most efficient and economical way possible.
Finding the Problems: Dedicated efforts of DoD auditors
and other employees have uncovered long-standing management and
procurement problems. The new DoD Inspector General's office
is coordinating the campaign against waste and inefficiency.
identified
billion audits
During alone
of 6 $1.6 internal
a
savings 18,467
through greater
a total potential efficiency.
The Defense Hot Line has produced thousands of
calls and suggestions that are being acted on.
During FY 1983 aggressive DoD-Justice prosecution
resulted in 657 convictions and $14 million in fines.
-- Debarments and suspensions of
almost doubled in the past Y
Solving the Problems:
-- Using a task force approach, the DoD Council on Integrity
and Management Improvement (DCIMI), coordinates the
implementation of management reform programs and actions.
now focuses
- Our A uisition Improvement Pr ram now focuses
on s x areas: progr stab 1 ty, multi-year pro-
am
curement,*economic production rates, realistic bud-
geting, improved support and readiness, and increased
competition.
Between FY 1982-84 we proposed 38--multi-year
$3.8 were billion approved,
programs to Congrss; sultinng in an estimated 23
savings.
sul 9
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We have submitted 12 new multi-year programs
in the FY 1985 budget which should result in
a further $1.1 billion cost avoidance.
--- More economic production rates in the
FY 1983-84 budgets will save an estimated $2.6
billion during FY 1982-89.
Improved Spare Parts Management, involving a DoD in-
ventory of almost 4 million different items, is a com-
plex and massive management challenge. Secretary
Weinberger's 10-point program is already working --
revamping old contracts to allow competition, challenging
high prices, obtaining refunds, continuing audits, and
enhancing competition.
--- The DoD IG, just completed the largest spare
parts audit in DoD history and confirmed that
these reforms are on the mark.
--- As one example, the famed stool-cap, whose
original four-digit price was challenged by
an alert Air Force Sergeant, is now being ob-
tained for 31 cents. We received a full refund
and gave the Air Force Sergeant a $1,100 cash
award.
The same commitment from our DoD employees to identify
wasteful practices and solve them is leading to simi-
lar reforms of Defense property disposal practices.
Increasing competition has become a key element of
all our reform efforts -- in acquisiton as well as
spare-parts management.
--- "Competition Advocates" are now working in all
buying commands to challenge all non-competitive
purchases. As a result, competition in aircraft
spares has tripled. To assure continued com-
petition, new contracts include provisions de-
signed to provide the data-necessary to seek
second sources of supply in purchasing parts.
FINAL NOTE:
The Reagan Administration has used its defense invest-
ments effectively to redress serious deficiencies in our
military posture. We are a much more capable and ready
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fighting force in 1984--and we are moving toward a more stable
conventional and strategic deterrent. But maintaining the
military balance, like any other long-term investment, requires
a determined and sustained effort.
Calls for retrenchment are once again being heard, ever
though the defense budget has already borne large reductiors
in the effort to cut federal deficits (relative to our earlier
projections, total defense obligatioral authority has beer
cut back $75 billion in current dollars since FY 1983 alone).
-- The most recent cuts bring the revised FY 1985 budget
down to $297 billion in total defense spending--a
reduction of almost $30 billion in little more than
a year's time. Further cuts in defense spending
would undermine the progress of the last three years
and repeat the "stop and go" spending patterns that
have driver up weapon system costs in the past.
If we are allowed to continue or the path we have set, we
can look forward to a substantially strengthened defense posture,
with far less risk that our adversaries will miscalculate our
will and our capabilities to preserve the peace.
S. Jones/DASD-PA(DES)/August 1984/697-8191
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Nine Tough Questions on Defense
Q. I understand the need for a strong defense, but the prices
the Pentagon pays for spare parts are a scandal. How can
you explain the $400 claw hammer, or the $1,100 plastic
stool cap? Has the Defense Department put anyone in jail,
gotten refunds on these absurd prices, or suspended business
with these dishonest contractors?
A. This Administration had the courage and foresight to look
for skeletons in the defense closet, for problems that have
plagued defense business for decades. One of Secretary
Weinberger's first acts after coming to the Pentagon in
1981 was to hire additional auditors and create a position
for an Assistant for Review and Oversight, a post that
subsequently became the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense. We hired 2,000 new auditors, inspectors
and investigators. We have also created the Joint DoD-
Justice Fraud unit to prosecute procurement fraud, waste
and abuse; and recently concluded the most far-ranging
audit in Department history. And these efforts are
paying off:
- Criminal indictments of those attempting to defraud
the government quadrupled from 1982 to 1983 and
convictions doubled.
- In 1983 alone, our investigations led to nearly
$15 million in fines and recoveries and we obtained
refunds from contractors of over $1.5 millon for
overpricing.
- 323 contractors were debarred or suspended -- a five-
fold increase over 1980.
The word is out that swindling the Defense Department doesn't
pay. Meanwhile the Defense Department has instituted far-
reaching management reforms to eliminate any opportunity for
abuse or inefficiency in'the future. The policies and proce-
dures that have been put into place are not "quick fixes,"
but have been aimed at solving the long-standing problems
of defense procurement and purchase of spare parts. The
cycle of audit, reform, inspect and reaudit will continue
until the Defense Department has tightened the procurement
process to the point where the American taxpayer has every
right to expect it to be.
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Some of the problems uncovered by our reform efforts have
been well-publicized as examples of Pentagon mismanagement.
But often the full story is not told.
The Diode
What is generally known is that two diodes were bought
at a price of $110. each and that the same diode is (and was)
available through the DOD supply system for four cents. Few
accounts mention that DOD obtained a substantial refund, nor
that 112,429 identical diodes were issued at the correct price
(four cents each) to military customers during the eleven-month
period ending February 1983.
The Claw Hammer
What the newspaper headlines say is that one common claw
hammer was purchased at a price of $436; some stories mention
that the contractor paid a substantial refund; but what is
never told is that thousands of Defense orders during the past
year for common claw hammers were purchased at a price of
roughly $6.40 each.
The Allen Wrench
What is often claimed is that Defense was billed $9,600 for
one simple Allen wrench. What is generally not known is that
t ihih s wrench was never purchased.
The Plastic Stool Cap
The now infamous $1,118 navigator's stool cap was both
over-engineered (requiring over 20 separate manufacturing steps)
and bought in very limited quantities--3 in a two year period.
It is generally known that an Air Force Sergeant found the problem,
challenged the system and was rewarded. But seldom is it reported
that the contractor refunded $3,123 for previous purchases and
located a suppller who can produce the parts inexpensively.
The next time an AWACS crew chief needs a plastic stool cap, it
will cost his unit 31 cents.
Part of the problem has been the method of distributing
overhead costs. The claw hammer and diode were both purchased
as parts of larger-packages that included many other items.
The inflated prices charged for these items, $436 and $110
respectively, included not just the price of the item itself,
but the costs for engineering, manufacturing, storage, shipping,
and associated overhead expenses. The contractors allocated
these various overhead costs on a per item basis. Using this
method, an equal overhead amount could be assigned to both a 4
cent diode and to a $6,000 dollar mechanical assembly.
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This method of distributing overhead costs was misleading
and made it difficult to determine fair prices. New regulations
in effect now require contractors to allocate their costs based
on the quanity and intrinsic value of the item. Thus, a larger
and more expensive item will now have a higher overhead charge
than a smaller"and less expensive one.
Other initiatives include:
- Requiring contractors certify to DoD that their prices
are as low or lower than those charged to their "most
favored customer."
- Restricting purchase of any spare part whose price has
increased more than 25% in the last 12 months.
- Identifying vendors who can compete for future spare parts
business.
- Increasing competition across the board--in FY 1980 the
value of competitive awards was $25.1 billion, last year
it had jumped to $47.8 billion.
- Increasing use of fixed price contracts--82% of all mili-
tary procurement dollars last year were under fixed price
contracts, up from 75% three years ago.
Our reforms are on-track--we're making sure we get the most
out of each defense dollar spent.
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Q. The Defense Department continues to pay exorbitant prices
for everything they buy, from spare parts to advanced fighter
aircraft. Why don't they shop around to get better prices
and instill some competition into their buying practices?
A. Enhancing competition is a basic element of Secretary
Weinberger's management reform program. The value of
competitive awards in DoD jumped from $25.1 billion in
FY 1980 to $47.8 billion by the end of FY 1983. In the same
time period, the number of contracts awarded competitively
jumped 1.1 million to a total of 5.5 million.
Key to the success in expanding competition is a recently
established competition advocate program. Now an advocate
is assigned to every buying command to challenge any
purchase that appears to be non-competitive. Competition
in aircraft spares has already tripled. And many new
contracts for major systems include provisions requiring
the contractor to provide the necessary data to seek second
sources of supply in purchasing replacement parts. That
ensures competition today as well as in the future.
All the Services are using competition to bring down prices:
- Rather than but all spare parts from a single contractor,
as in the past, the Army will require that at least 44%
of the engine parts for its new experimental helicopter
will be purchased competitively. It also will require
'contractors to relinquish proprietary rights on some
parts after six years, so other companies can bid to
supply replacement parts.
- In FY 1983, the share of Navy competitive contracts
jumped from less than 30% to 40%. The Navy expects
to increase the number of competitive actions to 50%
or better this year.
- To promote continued competition between two major
engine manufacturers, the Air Force split its recent
contract for a new fighter engine, and awarded
75% of this year's new business to the contractor
providing the best plan for future competition for
spare parts.
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Q. Why does the Pentagon punish whistleblowers?
A. Despite what you hear in the media, we reward them.
As one example, the now-famous stool cap came to
light because an alert Air Force sergeant at Tinker
Air Force Base questioned the price tag of $1100,
and "blew the whistle" to the base office established
to find such abuses. We obtained a full refund from
the defense contractor and now buy that same plastic
stool cap for 31 cents. The Air Force sergeant received
a $1,100 cash award for his whistleblowing.
In fact, we have provided a means for whistleblowers
throughout the Defense Department to challenge question-
able practices: the Department of Defense Hotline.
Since June 1981, when Secretary Weinberger offically
revitalized the Hotline, over 20,000 calls and letters have
been received--1/3 of which merited serious inquiry.
Documented savings to date are over $3.5 million.
We have given our employees incentives to use the Hotline.
The first point of Secretary Weinberger's Ten Point spare
parts program calls for bonuses and other rewards for
employees who rigorously pursue cost savings or increased
competitive bidding. Since the inauguration of the Ten
Point program, nearly 400 defense employees have received
over $200,000 in cash incentives for earning the government
many times that amount through their recommendations.
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Q. We are constantly reading about cost overruns on "gold
plated" weapons system. Why can't the Pentagon get
these costs under control?
A. In fact, we have largely succeeded in making cost overruns
a thing of the past. As reported recently by the Congres-
sional Budget office, annual cost growth, in current dollars,
has dropped on a selected group of major weapons systems
from 14% in 1980 to about 1% in 1983. More realistic
budgeting, using independent cost estimates, and building
competion into the procurement system are the primary
reasons for the halt in cost growth. We are also promoting
multi-year programs, improving program stability and seeking
more economic production rates. Some results:
- The B-lB development program is ahead of schedule
and within cost. Multi-year contracts on this
program will save $1.2 billion.
- In 1983, 8 of 21 ships delivered to the Navy were
ahead of schedule, only one was late. Most were
under cost, far different from the unpredictable
record for shipbuilding in earlier years.
- In 1980 the Trident ballistic missile submarine
was running months behind schedule and over cost.
We turned that around and Trident submarines are
now delivered 4-6 weeks ahead of schedule and
under cost.
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Q. Our weapons systems always seem to have something wrong
with them, like the new M-1 tank that breaks down every
few miles. Why doesn't the Defense Department get
warranties on what they buy? Why did the Pentagon
oppose congressional efforts to get warranties?
A. The M-1 tank is the finest tank we have ever built.
Like all new items of equipment, it had some initial
bugs that had to be worked out. One of those
was in the transmission, and indeed the manufacturer
honored the guarantees in the contract and repaired at
no cost to the government all faulty transmissions.
Our objective for everything we buy is to ensure that DoD
obtains the highest quality, most reliable military
equipment, at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. Warranties
play an important role in helping to achieve that objective,
and that is why our contracts have included warranties for
years.
Most recently, the Air Force negotiated a major aircraft
engine contract that has a strong warranty--in fact,
the warranty was an important factor in selecting the
winning bid.
We intend to continue seeking such warranties whenever
they make good sense. We do oppose, however, any legis-
lation that forces us to pay for warranties that are not
cost effective.
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Q. If it weren't for congressional cuts of the defense
budget, Pentagon spending would be out of control.
Why can't the Pentagon present a realistic budget?
A. For the past 3 years we have presented a realistic, rational
budget that is based on a careful assessment of the threat
we face and the degree of risk we feel the nation'can prudently
accept. The budget increases of the past 3 years were designed
to restore defenses that were weakened during the decade of the
1970's, when defense spending fell by 20% while entitlements
increased about 120%. This year about 28% of the total federal
budget goes for defense; in 1962 it was 49%. And this fiscal
year the Pentagon budget is $57 billion less than the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
Since last year, the President's original budget projections
for defense have been cut back by $75 billion. Additional
cuts mandated by congressional action have delayed rebuilding
our defenses, forced uneconomic program stretch-outs and,
in some cases, perpetuated "pork barrel" projects that were
neither requested nor necessary.
Further cuts in defense spending this year would undermine
the progress of the last three years, interrupt the
momentum we have built up in restoring America's defense
and mark a return to the disasterous defense spending
patterns that so weakened our deterrent capability in the
past 1970's.
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7
A House committee staff report claimed that despite the billions
we have spent for defense over the past four years,
readiness has declined. How can this be true?
A. It is not. The House report is a year old and was based on data
reflecting conditions a year before that. Since it takes
at least two years between the obligation of funds and
delivery of equipment to the field, the report was bewailing
inadequate suppliers ordered during the previous administration.
it confirms what we have been saying all along--that the
neglect of the 1970's seriously undermined our readiness.
Fortunately, those conditions are being rectified by the readi-
ness investments of the past 3 years. Today, as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, recently
stated: "We have better people, they're armed with better
equipment, their training has been improved, and they have
better support behind them. And that makes a readier force."
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Q. Is it true that if we had to go to war today, our troops
would run out of bullets and gas within a few days? Is
it true that we could not defeat an attack in Europe with
conventional weapons, and that we would have to resort to
nuclear weapons within a week or so?
A. It is not true that our troops would run out of ammunition
and gas within a few days. However, it is true that in
1981, because funding levels in previous budgets were
often insufficient, we were very concerned about our ability
to sustain our forces in combat on a large scale at high
intensity. Since 1981, we have made significant progress
in rebuilding our stocks by funding large increases in
ammunition and by improving the flow of logistics to our
deployed units. By the time our purchases are delivered
to the field, sustainability will have increased by over
50%.
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The Defense Department is getting ready to launch another
arms race with its Star Wars Program. Won't this violate
the ABM treaty, provoke the Soviets, and bankrupt the
country in the process? How do we know such a scheme
will work?
A. The Strategic Defense Initiative is not in violation of
the ABM Treaty. It is a program that holds great promise
for improved opportunities for genuine arms reductions.
The Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program
designed to identify options for building a thoroughly
reliable defense against ballistic missiles, options
that will permit a future President to decide how best
to create a safer world free from the threat of nuclear
missiles.
While we do not know how much an effective defense based
on these new technologies might cost, our technical
experts are confident that new technologies offer the
promise of defensive systems that are cheaper than the
cost of overcoming them. This would fulfill President
Reagan's vision of rendering offensive nuclear missiles
obsolete. Thus the-Strategic Defense Initiative could
enable us to reduce future spending on offensive arms,
to strengthen deterrence, to improve prospects for arms
reductions, and, in the end, make possible a surer and
safer peace.
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