LETTER TO WILLIAM CASEY FROM JIRI VALENTA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001900070001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 82
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 26, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943
rir. -v1 L L.LC11u l.dnCy
Director, Central Intelligence Agency jFG19~~k
Headquarters, CIA
Washington, DC 20505
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NC4(56Va)pmc
26 November 1984
Executive Registry
$4. 9827
Dear Director Casey:
Enclosed please find a copy of the published report:
"Soviet/Cuban Strategy in the Third World after Grenada"
[Toward Prevention of Future Grenadas] based upon a con-
ference held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
August 15-18, 1984. The report includes proceedings and
findings, as well as policymaking recommendations.
The conference report is a product of the Naval Post-
graduate School (Soviet and Eastern European Studies,
Department of National Security Affairs), and the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars). The report is co-
authored by Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. Herbert J. Ellison,
with assistance from Lieutenant Frederick F. Shaheen (USN),
(a student of Soviet Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate
School), and Mr. Bradford P. Johnson (of the Kennan Insti-
tute). Any comments or opinions of the report would be
greatly appreciated.
If a follow-on conference can be arranged for 1985,
it is hoped that you may be able to participate and
furnish input to stimulate discussion and a consensus of
recommendations of benefit to U.S. national security
interests.
Best regards,
JIRI VALENTA
Associate Professor & Coordinator
Soviet & Eas=t European Studies
Dept. of National Security Affairs
1 Encl: Report
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SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
AFTER GRENADA
TOWARD PREVENTION OF FUTURE GRENADAS
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A CONFERENCE REPORT
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SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
AFTER GRENADA
TOWARD PREVENTION OF FUTURE GRENADAS
A CONFERENCE REPORT
JIRI VALENTA, Naval Postgraduate School
HERBERT J. ELLISON, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
Rapporteurs
BRADFORD P. JOHNSON, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
FREDERICK F. SHAHEEN, Naval Postgraduate School
AUGUST 15-18, 1984
KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D.C. 20560
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PREFACE
SUMMARIES OF PAPERS
"Aftermath of Grenada: The Impact of the U.S. Action on
Revolutionary Prospects in Central America"
Howard Wiarda
"Grenada and the Caribbean Basin: Mutual Linkages and
Influences"
Anthony P. Maingot del Barco
"Grenada: Linkages and Impact on the Third World
Colin Legum
"The Grenada Operation and Superpower Relations: A
Perspective from the Pentagon"
Dov Zakheim
"The Grenada Operation and Superpower Relations: A View
from the Ivory Tower"
George Liska
"Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada: Notes Toward an Inner
History"
Marc Falcoff
"Fraternal Assistance: Eastern Europe in Grenada"
Charles Gati
"Leninism in Grenada"
Jiri and Virginia Valenta
"The Impact of the Grenada Events on the Soviet Alliance
System"
Vernon Aspaturian
"Recommendations and Options for Coping with Soviet/Cuban
Strategy in the Caribbean"
Margaret Daly Hayes
"Notes on Grenada, Soviet Proxies and U.S. Policy"
Charles Fairbanks
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SUMMARIES OF REMARKS BY KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
Vernon Walters
Winston Lord
Constantine Menges
Tom J. Farer
Jack Matlock
Richard Pipes
Sally Shelton
Alexander George
Herbert Ellison
Nestor Sanchez
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS by Jiri Valenta
The Grenada Documents 64
Leninism in Grenada 65
NJM and Soviet/Cuban Strategy 67
Impact of Grenada 69
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers 70
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A multidisciplinary conference was held August 15-18, 1984 at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The purposes of the conference
were:
-To generate scholarly examination of documents captured during the
U.S., East Caribbean forces' intervention in Grenada in October 1983, with a
view to determining causes of the bloody coup in Grenada, the impact of the
intervention upon Soviet/Cuban strategy and tactics in the Caribbean Basin
and other areas of the Third World.
-To examine in bipartisan fashion U.S. options for countering Soviet/Cu-
ban strategy and tactics in the Third World.
Though highly uneven, the documents captured during the Grenada invasion
nevertheless provide an unprecedented glimpse into the inner workings of an
aspiring Third World Leninist regime. They clearly illuminate Bernard Coard
and his faction's drive toward Leninist transformation of the New Jewel
Movement (NJM) Party which erupted in violent factional struggle, leading to
the death of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and precipitating the U.S./East
Caribbean security forces' intervention.
The Grenada Documents also provide new insights into Soviet and Cuban
policies vis-d-vis radical Third World regimes, particularly if compared with
views expressed by Soviet literature on the subject. A key Soviet/Cuban stra-
tegic objective in the Third World is to aid in the selective building of
"socialist-oriented", revolutionary, anti-U.S. regimes. The most advanced
socialist regimes are those with evolving vanguard Leninist parties structured
on the principle of democratic centralism (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola,
South Yemen, and eventually, the Soviets hope, Nicaragua) and cadres
trained in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, or at least well-
connected with Soviet bureaucracies. The Soviet objective in?Grenada - a
country not very high on the Soviet list of priorities, yet with a potentially im-
portant strategic location - was to help create an advanced type of socialist-
oriented country which could eventually serve as a bridge between the Soviets
and Cubans and other revolutionary forces in the region. A foothold in Gre-
nada and Nicaragua, and among revolutionaries in El Salvador, could also be
of benefit to the Soviet Union by preoccupying the United States in its own
strategic hinterland. Therefore the Soviets accorded special status to the New
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Jewel Movement in an ideological agreement with the Soviet Communist
Party (CPSU), concluded several top-secret arms transfer agreements, and
provided for military training and growing advisory assistance. The NJM
leaders aspired both to become a revolutionary bridge to other nations in the
region, and to emulate Cuba's example of a long process of institutionalizing
a Leninist system - the two essential preconditions to continued and im-
proved Soviet support. This the Coard faction hoped could eventually lead to
Soviet recognition of the NJM as a proper Communist Party.
The Grenada Documents also highlight the increasing sophistication of So-
viet methods in furthering Third World strategic objectives, such as their utili-
zation of the auxiliary capacities of junior allies like Cuba, North Korea,
Libya, and some Warsaw Treaty Organization nations. By acting through jun-
ior allies like Cuba, the Soviets are able to favor Soviet global interests while
deflecting costs and risks in other areas of their international relations. On the
other hand, when Cuba acts as a broker between the Soviets and radical re-
gimes, serious tactical disagreements can arise and precipitate crises such as
occurred in Grenada.
The absence of Soviet military support during the Grenada intervention had
an adverse impact - though uneven - on the Soviet alliance system and on
some of the developing radical regimes, particularly in the Caribbean Basin.
It helped to put Nicaragua on the defensive, increasing pressure for a negoti-
ated solution in El Salvador, and its effects were also seen in Surinam and
possibly in Angola and Ethiopia. Above all, the Grenada experience demon-
strates that the U.S.S.R. avoids contracting military alliances with more vul-
nerable Communist and Third World radical nations, particularly those adja-
cent to the U.S. periphery, where Washington is willing to protect its interests
with military force. Grenada created much concern in Cuba and raised the
perceived costs and risks of Soviet and Cuban support for radical Third World
regimes (especially in the Caribbean Basin). In its net effect, however, Gre-
nada was only a temporary setback for Soviet and Cuban policies, and the
long-term impact of the intervention should not be exaggerated, especially if
there is no domestic consensus upon long-term U.S. strategy aimed at curbing
Soviet/Cuban military activism in the Third World.
While there was no conclusive evidence of an immediate threat to U.S. secu-
rity interests in Grenada, circumstances in Grenada prior to the intervention
(such as the murder of the Prime Minister, the threat to U.S. citizens, and the
violent and unpredictable nature of the situation) made the U.S. and East
Caribbean security forces' intervention an extraordinary yet necessary mea-
sure. In the long run, the probable negative consequences of U.S. inaction far
outweighed the immediate costs of intervention. In spite of the reservations
held by some conferees, there was a strong consensus on this issue. The fol-
lowing recommendations were offered by one or more conference partici-
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pants, and no effort was made to arrive at a formal consensus on each point:
-Top priority should be given to long-term strategic planning toward pre-
vention of superpower confrontation and escalation of conflict in the Third
World.
-U.S. policymakers need to anticipate long-term challenges in the Carib-
bean Basin, Central and South America, and other parts of the Third World.
The Caribbean Basin is especially important to the United States; therefore,
the U.S. should heed Soviet/Cuban "security linkages" with nations in this
region. Studies are needed of Soviet/Cuban perceptions and policies regard-
ing the Third World and ties with radical forces.
-In Grenada, priority effort should be to influence political and economic
stability, and to prevent a return to left or right dictatorships by encouraging a
coalition of democratic forces.
-Bipartisan support should be given to long-term economic assistance
programs to Third World nations, particularly in the Caribbean region, and on
a higher level than presently contemplated.
-The National Endowment for Democracy should be encouraged to initi-
ate programs of education and research in the area of Soviet/Cuban Third
World strategy.
-As an immediate measure, the U.S. should continue to exert a high de-
gree of pressure to eliminate "death squad" tactics, and to support demo-
cratic processes and institutions in El Salvador and elsewhere in the Western
Hemisphere.
-The U.S. should be alert to possibilities for negotiation with Cuba and
Nicaragua. More caution should be exercised in the classification of Third
World radical regimes.
-The U.S. should increase political and economic aid to each Caribbean
Basin nation as its capacity permits, should strengthen existing ties with these
states and cultivate ties with both ruling and opposition parties through diplo-
matic exchange programs, and should post credible, dynamic, and linguisti-
cally qualified U.S. diplomatic representatives.
-In the Caribbean Basin, much more emphasis should be given to devel-
opment of technical infrastructures (roads, ports, communications), advice on
planning and budgeting, and education of economists and financial experts.
Funding should come from both the private and public sectors.
-The U.S. should be prepared to offer all forms of security assistance in
accordance with needs of the developing nations in the Caribbean Basin, tak-
ing into account each nation's stand on human rights.
-Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits police train-
ing, should be critically reviewed and amended for countries where there is
respect for human rights.
-U.S. policy should distinguish between Soviet/Cuban sponsored strife
and indigenous revolAutionary situations. Where appropriate, and warranted by
the circumstances, we should even consider aid to democratic forces combat-
ting oppressive governments.
-A counterstrategy should be developed to intensify constraints on So-
viet/Cuban acquisition and use of surrogates. U.S. policy should capitalize on
differences in Soviet/junior partner alliances and policies.
-U.S. negotiations with Cuba and Nicaragua should be based on reciproc-
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ity, verifiable agreements, and monitoring. Soviet and Cuban military ties
with Nicaragua or other radical regimes in the Basin should be non-
negotiable.
-The U.S. must continue to be prepared to combine diplomacy and force
(direct or indirect) to further foreign policy objectives and to insure security of
the United States in the Caribbean Basin.
-The U.S. should encourage allied cooperation to increase constraints on
Soviet, Cuban and other Soviet client states' military activities in Third World
areas.
-The specific elements of bipartisan policy in the Caribbean (Kissinger re-
port) should be institutionalized by legislation and be promptly implemented.
-An American bipartisan consensus regarding U.S. policies in the Third
World is essential. A more extensive program should be adopted to increase
public awareness of Soviet/Cuban policies in the Third World through new
research centers, more extensive cooperation between the U.S. Government
and academic institutions, and better use of the public media.
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PREFACE
The United States and East Caribbean security forces' invasion of Grenada on
October 26, 1983, focused attention on the problems of radical regimes in the
Third World in general and in the Caribbean Basin in particular. The interven-
tion also brought into focus Soviet and Cuban strategy and tactics in the Third
World. Notwithstanding Grenada's political and economic significance, the
intervention marked the first reversal in a decade of ostensibly Soviet-backed
Cuban military activism, which first became obvious in Africa in 1975-78
(the Soviet/Cuban interventions in Angola in 1976-77, and in Ethiopia in
1977-78). This activism subsequently extended to new revolutionary clients
in close proximity to the United States such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and
Grenada.
The discovery of voluminous secret files during and following the interven-
tion in Grenada has provided a unique opportunity to examine not only the in-
ner workings of a radical Third World regime, but also the rudiments of So-
viet/Cuban strategy in the Third World both before and after the U.S.
intervention.
The idea of a conference on Grenada was conceived during 1983-84 by the
conference chairs in Washington, D.C. at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars. A sense of urgency was felt about undertaking an inter-
disciplinary examination of the serious political and economic issues facing
the Third World, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. It was clear that Soviet
and Cuban policies vis-d-vis radical Third World forces and the genesis of
revolution was having a substantial impact on Third World development. It
was resolved to address these issues effectively by promoting bipartisan inter-
action among specialists on the Third World and the Soviet Union and Cuba,
both those inside and outside of government.
In the fall of 1983, scholars at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars began dialogue among specialists on the U.S.S.R., Latin Amer-
ica, and other Third World nations. This exchange-was stimulated in part by
the work of the nation's Bipartisan Commission on Central America which
had invited several Wilson Fellows to testify at its hearings. The ongoing need
to generate a multidisciplinary inquiry culminated in a conference organized
by the Soviet and East European Studies Program of the Department of Na-
tional Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and cosponsored by
the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and the National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
The conference group included about 50 prominent specialists with varying
political tendencies and perspectives, and represented the United States Gov-
ernment, the media, as well as American universities and research institu-
tions. Several of the participants served as leading consultants or witnesses for
the Bipartisan Commission on Central America. As a product of the interac-
tion of this diverse mix of specialists, analysts, and policymakers, this report
neglects neither the East-West nor the North-South dimensions of the prob-
lems of revolution in the Third World, specifically in Latin America.
There were three specific objectives to be met by convening this confer-
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ence. The first was to generate interest in a scholarly examination of the docu-
ments captured in Grenada which had until the time of the conference been
mostly ignored by the academic community. The second was to utilize these
documents in analyzing the New Jewel Movement (NJM) revolution and its
ties with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and other Communist and radical Third World
regimes, and in evaluating the impact of the Grenada intervention on Soviet/
Cuban strategy in the Third World. The third main objective was to examine
the U.S. options in terms of new opportunities and obstacles in the Caribbean
Basin, Cuba, and Africa after the invasion of Grenada.
The participants who were asked to write papers addressed a set of ques-
tions posed by the co-chair of the conference, Dr. Jiri Valenta. The conferees
were not held to a rigid frame of reference, nor did they represent a single
point of view. As a result, many differing interpretations were provided, both
by authors of papers and by discussants. The only common starting point was
an invitation to study the available Grenada documents, and to consider a
number of questions regarding the Grenada revolution and Soviet/Cuban
strategy that had been raised in an article by Jiri and Virginia Valenta recently
published in Problems of Communism (July-August 1984).
The findings and recommendations of the conference are written herein by
Dr. Jiri Valenta. These findings do not reflect unanimity of opinion on the
part of the conference participants or the organizations they represent. How-
ever, they are based almost exclusively on the exchange of ideas that took
place during the conference. The full proceedings of the conference, which
will include all papers and commentaries, will be published several months
from now in a monograph to be co-edited by Valenta and Ellison.
The conference required a great deal of organizational effort. A remarkable
group of officers of all services of the U.S. Military contributed time and tal-
ent to the conference while pursuing studies in Soviet and East European
Studies Program, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Monterey, CA. In many ways, this conference was their confer-
ence. Special thanks go to the conference coordinator, LT Fred Shaheen
(USN); Student Committee Chairman LCDR Steve Harris (USN), LT Jay
Wilkins (USN), LT Will Dossell (USN), LCDR Rickard Johnson (USN),
CPT Rosalyn Bellis (USAF), LCDR Kim Viner (USN), MAJ Joe Lahnstein
(USA), and CPT Karen Decker (USAF).
We are also grateful to Mr. Bradford Johnson (Kennan Institute) and LT
Fred Shaheen (USN) for their work as conference rapporteurs, and to Evan
Raynes, Larry McLellan, Gladys Clearwaters and Phyllis McClellan for their
editorial and technical support for the conference report.
For their assistance and encouragement of this project, we are particularly
grateful to Virginia Valenta, Mr. Nestor Sanchez, Mr. Hugh McGowan, Mr.
Walter Raymond, Dr. Constantine Menges, Dr. Charles Fairbanks, Ambassa-
dor Sally Shelton, Ms. Kay Stephenson, Mr. Anthony Gray, and COL
George Thompson (USAF); COMO Robert H. Schumaker, Provost David
Schrady, Dean Kneale Marshall, and Chairman of the Department of National
Security Affairs, Dr. Sherman Blandin at the Naval Postgraduate School; and
Dr. James Billington and the entire staff of the Kennan Institute at the Wood-
row Wilson International Center for Scholars.
.J, jroy Monterey, CAlWashington, D.C.
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11
AFTERMATH OF GRENADA:
THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. ACTION
ON REVOLUTIONARY PROSPECTS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
Summary of paper by Howard Wiarda
Grenada has provided us with a treasure trove of documents that are crucial to
understanding both the internal and external dynamics of revolutionary situa-
tions. The Grenada documents provide us with the first clear glimpse of a rev-
olution in progress.
While Soviet capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean have in-
creased, and Soviet tactics and strategy have become more sophisticated,
there are also severe restraints operating on Soviet initiatives in the Western
hemisphere. The Soviets and Cubans have increased their military and intelli-
gence capabilities in the area, and Soviet strategy has shown a new emphasis
on long-term rather than short-term gains; but Soviet economic problems (and
perhaps succession problems) and the risks of provoking a conflict with the
United States serve as limits to actual Soviet policy in Latin America and the
Caribbean. It therefore seems unlikely that we shall see a much larger and di-
rect Soviet presence in Latin America in the near future. Rather, the Soviet
Union will probably continue to take advantage of already existing anti-
American revolutionary movements to gain advantage for itself and to frus-
trate and embarrass the United States.
Our knowledge of the Soviet Union indicates that there is no Soviet time-
table, master plan, or blueprint for expansion in Latin America. It would be
more appropriate to say that the Soviet Union operates according to a set of
goals and tactics designed to further its interests. The goals include expanding
Soviet influence and prestige at the expense of the United States, and
strengthening the Soviet military apparatus. The tactics are to take advantage
of opportunities as they present themselves, and even to hurry them along if
possible. This means that Soviet foreign policy in the Third World is driven
more by specific conditions in developing nations than by a master plan. The
Grenada documents seem to confirm this.
During the Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its re-
lations with the Third World left, but early tactics were not altogether success-
ful. Military agreements did not greatly affect long-term relationships; few
staunch allies were gained; and setbacks such as the loss of Sadat's Egypt pro-
duced growing disillusionment with the Third World. During the late 1960's
and early 1970's, there was a retreat from some commitments to developing
nations. But the Soviets have recently reassessed their policies. When Nicara-
gua (rather like Cuba in the early 1960's) unexpectedly gravitated to the So-
viet camp, it became obvious that important gains could be made with rela-
tively few commitments. Soviet strategy began to focus on long-term
revolutionary possibilities, and this meant that assistance would be given to
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12
broad-based popular-front and anti-imperialist foces, not just national libera-
tion movements. At the same time, certain "quality controls" were built into
this newly flexible Soviet strategy which did not exist during the 1950's and
1960's. These included greater selectivity in determining the reliability of the
client; greater involvement in the internal affairs of client states; and increased
involvement by Soviet allies (especially the Cubans and East Germans) to
help consolidate and otherwise aid client regimes.
The Grenada documents, however, show that the Soviets appeared to keep
a certain distance from the Grenadian revolution and the New Jewel Move-
ment (NJM). The NJM was considered a "fraternal party," but it was not
treated on the same level as other communist parties. The Soviets were of
course supportive of the Grenadian revolution, but apparently there was no
"micro-managing" of Grenadian affairs as in Afghanistan. The Grenada doc-
uments also show that the Soviets wanted the Grenadians to serve as interme-
diaries to other English-speaking groups in the Caribbean and to bring another
country into the communist fold, either Suriname or Belize. The documents
further show that Soviet strategists thought of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada
as firmly ensconced in the Soviet camp, with El Salvador to be the next battle-
ground. But the Soviets did not press too hard; the Grenadian documents seem
to indicate a certain Soviet skepticism as to just how stable and trustworthy
their client was.
Soviet ties to Grenada were largely through Cuba, but the Grenada docu-
ments do not indicate to what degree there was central control from Moscow
as opposed to Cuban freedom of action. It appears that ultimate authority was
lodged in Moscow, but that Cuba had considerable leeway. The Cubans were
involved in all aspects of the Grenadian revolution. They served as intermedi-
aries between Grenada, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua, and Cuban officials
sometimes sat in on the meetings of the Grenadian Central Committee and
Politburo. One gets the impression from the Grenada documents that the
Grenadians did practically nothing without first consulting the Cubans.
The Grenada documents show that the revolution was much more planned,
sophisticated, serious, and Marxist-Leninist than was generally thought.
Equally impressive was the degree of coordination between Grenada and its
communist allies. The division of labor among the communist nations aiding
Grenada was as follows: the Soviet Union (and Cuba) provided overall guid-
ance and direction; the East Germans were involved in security and police
training; and Cuba also provided training, construction crews, and techni-
cians. The documents also reveal the degree to which Grenada and its allies
made strenuous efforts to manipulate the Socialist International-to turn it
into an anti-American organ, and to use it to gain support and legitimacy for
the revolution. Likewise, efforts were made to influence domestic opinion in
the United States and Canada.
The impact of the U.S. intervention in Grenada was felt most clearly in Su-
riname. Only hours after the invasion, the Cuban ambassador and most of his
staff were asked to leave the country. In fact, the decision to reduce the Cuban
presence in Suriname was made before the U.S. intervention. Suriname had
become increasingly resentful of what was considered Cuban interference in
its internal affairs, and efforts were being made to improve relations with the
United States. The Grenadian intervention was not solely responsible for the
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reduction of Cuban influence in Suriname, but it certainly speeded the pro-
cess.
The impact of the Grenada intervention was also felt by the guerrillas in El
Salvador. In general, the U.S. action was seen as a blow to revolutionary
hopes and aspirations throughout the hemisphere. For the Salvadoran guerril-
las it meant that the United States was willing to use force to prevent their
coming to power. According to U.S. intelligence officials, the guerrillas con-
cluded that either pressures should be increased for a negotiated settlement, or
a fall Tet-like offensive should be launched to affect U.S. election results.
The Cuban (and hence Soviet) role in the formulation of these plans is unmis-
takable. High Cuban officials have publicly set forth the logic for both of
these strategies.
The most noticeable effects of the Grenada intervention were felt in Nicara-
gua. The Sandinistas were convinced that they were next to be invaded, and
Reagan administration officials were deliberately vague when asked about the
possibility of an invasion. The Soviets and Cubans added to Sandinista fears
by making clear that Nicaragua could not count on military assistance in the
event of an invasion. Nicaragua's fears of impending disaster eventually gave
way to more reasoned assessments and increased military preparations, but
the threat still remained and this has given the United States an immense
amount of leverage in its relations with Managua.
It is not likely that the Grenada intervention was the watershed that some
analysts have claimed. Nevertheless, the intervention has had significant
long-term implications for guerrilla and revolutionary forces in Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean Basin. Cuba has been forced to take stock of its activi-
ties in the region. Although there is much rhetorical flourish to the contrary,
some reports indicate that Castro has realized socialism will not triumph any-
where else in Central America in the immediate future and that he has already
begun to reduce his Central American and Caribbean commitments. If this is
so, Castro may begin to look elsewhere to further the cause of "proletarian in-
ternationalism." There are also signs that the Soviet Union is reassessing its
role in the region, and will look for opportunities elsewhere so as not to pro-
voke the United States. The Grenada intervention may have been a victory for
U.S. policy in the Caribbean and at least a temporary defeat for the Soviets,
but it has not in any significant way reduced the overall reach of the Soviet
Union, or its capacity to look for advantages in areas where the United States
is less heavily committed.
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GRENADA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN:
MUTUAL LINKAGES AND INFLUENCES
Summary of paper by Anthony P. Maingot del Barco
The Grenada revolution and its demise create insights into the role of Marx-
ism in the Caribbean Basin and, in turn, the political culture of the area. The
term "role" implies that ideology can be used by both "true believers" as
well as by those who merely use it instrumentally, thus it is important to dif-
ferentiate between ideological "true believers" and "instrumentalists" in the
Caribbean Basin.
In 1976 the Carter administration launched a diplomatic campaign, the in-
tensity of which had not been seen since Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress."
U.S. policy toward Latin America emphasized a lower military profile, nego-
tiations for a Panama Canal treaty, numerous visits by U.S. emissaries, and a
more conciliatory attitude towards Cuba. The broad context of Carter's for-
eign policy clearly indicated a shift in perspective about vital U.S. interests.
Although the United States did not abandon concern for military security in
the region (especially in light of Soviet naval activities), U.S. policy clearly
became more political. The shift from military to political thinking in Wash-
ington began before the Carter administration took office and could be seen in
the early 1970s, when the United States downplayed the significance of the
radical threat to the region and emphasized the "opportunistic" nature of non-
Marxist leftists in Latin America.
For example, in 1972 the Defense Intelligence Agency attached little sig-
nificance to the Conference of Caribbean Revolutionary Groups held in
Guyana. Similarly, although Guyana had declared itself to be a Marxist-
Leninist state, in 1976 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs told a Congressional subcommittee that "an independent
Guyana seeking its own path to social progress is no threat to this country."
Administration officials began to develop an awareness of the selective radi-
calism of the non-Marxist left, but perhaps more importantly there was an in-
creased understanding of the varieties of socialist posturing. According to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the admira-
tion for Cuba in the black English-speaking Caribbean stemmed from Cuba's
participation in the anti-colonial and anti-white struggle in Southern Africa. In
general, Cuba and the Soviet Union were not perceived as posing a major
threat in the region.
The opportunistic aspects of certain self-proclaimed socialist states seemed
to be widespread during the Carter Administration. Events in the Caribbean
during the 1970s tended to indicate that constaints on further gains of Marxist-
Leninist influence stemmed from problems of development. Washington
trimmed its Caribbean policy accordingly, and Cuba's shift in focus from
Latin America to Africa also contributed to the obvious lack of panic or hyste-
ria in Washington's responses to radical developments in the hemisphere.
Throughout the Carter years, there were of course those who argued it
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would be a mistake to underrate the political and ideological significance of
Cuban activities in the region. For example, understanding the crucial impor-
tance of race in the Caribbean, the Cubans have taken full advantage of their
policies in Southern Africa to increase their local popularity. Similarly, Cuba
is represented almost exclusively by black diplomats in the Caribbean. The
United States has also played the racial diplomatic game, but the Cubans have
the advantage of being able to emphasize race and class at the same time. Is-
sues of race and class are closely intertwined in the Caribbean, and such a
strategy allows a fundamentally pragmatic approach to the political problems
of the region.
Two major events in Central America in 1979 brought the foreign policy of
the Carter administration into question. The first was the Grenada revolution
of March 13, and the second was the fall of the Somoza dynasty four moon n0 s a
later after a long and bloody armed uprising. In o addition, n, in an February ei Suriname
politics
group of army sergeants brought parliamentary
and began to make radical left statements. On March 13, 1980 Grenada cele-
brated the first anniversary of its revolution by hosting a meeting of Caribbean
radicals, and during the summer Cuban fighter planes sank the Bahamian cut-
ter Flamingo. In January 1981 the Reagan administration replaced Carter's
policies with a much harder line toward Latin America; spheres of influence,
geostrategic triangles and dominos became the operative concepts of U.S. for-
eign policy in the Caribbean.
It is fundamental for those who wish to understand contemporary relations
between the United States and the English-speaking Caribbean to note the ori-
gins of ideological pluralism in the area. With the exception of Guyana, the
political cultures of the British Caribbean colonies had already crystalized by
the 1960s, when Marxism began to make its appearance and significant con-
tacts were developed with the United States. These political cultures reflect
advanced consumer societies with a long history of electoral politics which
are more disposed to state-directed populism than people-oriented socialism.
This has made Marxist objectives in the Caribbean far more difficult to
achieve than those of the United States.
Guyanan politics moved steadily to the left during the 1960s, and in the
early 1970s Guyana took the lead in initiating radical reforms in the Carib-
bean. Its 1971 nationalization of DEMBA (an important Bauxite company)
contributed to legitimizing the idea of state ownership in the Caribbean. In
1975 the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Latin America
and the Caribbean declared itself to be in favor of the so-called theory of
"non-capitalist development," and by 1977 Guyana's economy was 80%
state-controlled. An April 1977 meeting of one of Guyana's "vanguard"
parties and other Marxist-Leninist groups in the region-which was heralded
by Guyana as a "turning point in the struggle in the region"-seemed to in-
terpret events in Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Guinea-
Bissau as having changed the "correlation of forces" in the world. They were
now in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Again, Guyana was the ral-
lying point for the Marxists of the region. Even the Carter administration's
view of radicalism in the area seemed to benefit Guyana.
Such a situation was well suited to the needs of the leaders of the New
Jewel Movement (NJM) in Grenada. Guyana was utilized for the links it pro-
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16
vided to the Caricom states, the non-aligned movement, the communist bloc,
and Cuba.
Yet radical politics were on the wane elsewhere in the region. In Trinidad,
for example, politics had already become a racial matter in which ideology
played a minimal role. Marxist-Leninists had little electoral significance by
1966, but calls for socialist reform found their expression in an uprising of
black youth in 1970-the so-called "Black Power" revolt. The term, how-
ever, is a misnomer. Undoubtedly, there were strong American-style Black
Power influences, but in reality the movement reflected discontent in Trini-
dad's Indian sugar-growing areas and seething anger among young unem-
ployed urban blacks. This frustrated uprising was followed by an attempt by
university students to create a Cuban-style guerrilla "foco," which was de-
feated by 1973. By 1974 Trinidad was back to conservative politics as usual.
Although Prime Minister Williams frequently used socialist rhetoric to his ad-
vantage, he read the conservative mood of his electorate well. He knew how
to play the "radical" game, as indicated by his close relations with Venezuela
and Cuba, but his domestic and foreign policies were consistently pragmatic
and far from radical, as his response to the 1970 uprising makes clear. Per-
haps the presence of a booming private sector and an active role for foreign
capital is what sets Trinidad apart from the more radical regimes in Jamaica
and Guyana.
Although Jamaica's Michael Manley began his political career by leading
the "moderate" trade union movement during the early 1950s, his policies
and rhetoric have been anything but predictable. Under pressure from radical
elements who showed increased electoral strength in the 1976 election, Man-
ley began to radicalize his rhetoric, but continued to express more moderate
sentiments as well. By 1978 Jamaican leaders had not defined the nature of
the socialist system they were striving for, and it became increasingly clear
that the majority of the electorate was in no mood for radical left experiments
in "scientific socialism. " Jamaicans do not vote race as in Guyana, and hence
widely different results are possible from one election to the next. This was
the case in 1980 as the electorate turned away from radical politics and back to
politics as usual. That Jamaican parliamentary politics survived the hectic pe-
riod from 1976-77 is an accomplishment not to be minimized.
Neither the Cubans nor the Grenadians seemed to be put off by the often
conflicting foreign policy statements of the leaders of Trinidad and Jamaica
who sought to play their "radical cards" whenever it best suited their inter-
ests. This stems from Cuba's policy of supporting friendly regimes no matter
how they might be opposed by radical Marxist forces. Jamaica is no different
from Spain, Peru or Mexico in this regard. In exchange for its support of these
nations, Cuba benefits from their international prestige. The Cubans have
learned that it pays to support friendly non-communist regimes rather than
placing all their bets on small communist parties with little chance of coming
to power.
It should be clear that Caribbean Marxism did not have its origins in the
Grenada revolution. There is a long history of Marxist political organization
in the Caribbean and the politicians of the region have long been adept at ma-
nipulating their rhetoric to obtain their objectives. Many of these leaders are
either ex-Marxists or people well acquainted with Leninist tactics. Just as
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some of these politicians play their radical cards to safeguard their position
within pluralist parliamentary systems, the Grenadians did the opposite. They
played their social democratic card in an attempt to consolidate their Leninist
state. In this respect, the Socialist International was of fundamental impor-
tance to the NJM. Furthermore, while Grenada was clearly under pressure to
act as an agent of socialist internationalism in the area, there can be little
doubt of Grenada's eagerness to play that role. Everything indicated that the
Soviets and Cubans encouraged the Grenadian leadership in that direction.
From the start, Grenada's foreign policy was oriented towards "non-
alignment," "anti-imperialism" (i.e., anti-Americanism), and "peaceful co-
existence. "
By 1979 the islands of the Eastern Caribbean had clearly joined the ideo-
logical fray. The 1979 "Memorandum on Economic Cooperation between
Trinidad and Barbados" was obviously meant to counter the activities of the
radicals in the area. In response, the July 1979 Declaration of St. Georges
(Grenada) signed by the prime ministers of Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia
was supposed to signal a dramatic shift to the left in the Caribbean. In addi-
tion, St. Vincent was fully expected to join the radical alliance when it be-
came independent; but St. Vincent's first election showed it was not yet ready
for socialism. Moreover, the post-election uprising of Rastafarians and the
quick dispatch of Barbadian police contingents indicated that there might not
be many more Grenada-like surprises in the Eastern Caribbean. Dominica
also began to moderate its rhetoric at about this time. The Grenada documents
repeatedly mention a hardening of attitudes among the "reactionary" govern-
ments of the area.
In August 1981 Bishop told the Central Committee of NJM that "We have
lost the propaganda fight on the regional front." He blamed this on U.S. ef-
forts to isolate Grenada. Contacts with the area's radicals continued, and Gre-
nada became a meeting place for radical groups that had little if any popular
support at home. It is conceivable that the failure to make significant inroads
in the Caribbean led the NJM to explore further contacts with the United
States. Bishop himself toured the United States in 1982, but the more radical
elements of the NJM viewed this as deviationism and passed a resolution call-
ing for stringent Leninist measures in the leadership. By mid-1983 Bishop
was doomed by the increasing radicalization of the NJM. In any case, the
Marxist-Leninist experiment in Grenada had not advanced the cause of radi-
calism elsewhere in the Caribbean. As Bishop himself reminded his col-
leagues, "It was the Party and the Party alone that took power. "
Radical movements in the Caribbean have been led by intellectuals with no
mass base of support, and electoral results and polling data indicate that com-
munism is not at all popular in the region. The initiatives of the radical left
during the 1970s, including the Grenada experiment, have not been any more
successful than the efforts of previous decades. Which then, is the correct
U.S. foreign policy approach toward the Caribbean? The flexibility of the
Carter administration or the hard line of the Reagan administration? It would
appear that the English-speaking Caribbean has consolidated its political cul-
ture with a preference for parliamentary pluralism. This, and not any U.S.
hard line, has been and is the best guarantor of democracy in the region. On
the other hand, Grenada shows it is wise to take Leninists at face value. This
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is especially important because parliamentary democracies are especially vul-
nerable to conspiratorial groups. It is also why the Reagan hard line can be
useful at times.
GRENADA: LINKAGES AND IMPACT
ON THE THIRD WORLD
Summary of paper by Colin Legum
Third World reactions to the military interventions in the Falkland Islands and
Grenada were strikingly different, and offer us interesting insights as to Third
World perceptions. The reaction to British intervention in the Falklands was
overwhelmingly supportive. The notable dissenting voices were those who
are normally expected to follow Moscow's lead, and those Latin American
nations which identified with Argentina's case. The two most often cited rea-
sons for this support were the Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination,
and opposition to the use of armed force as a means of settling territorial dis-
putes. The non-aligned movement apparently felt that Britain acted justly in
defense of these principles.
In the case of Grenada, however, the reaction was almost exactly the oppo-
site. The invasion of Granada was overwhelmingly condemmed, and the only
nations to support the action were those which normally support U.S. poli-
cies, and the six East Caribbean nations that requested the American interven-
tion. The reasons given for this opposition were quite varied. One of the most
important was the very idea of a superpower using military force to "occupy"
a small Third World nation. Many non-aligned leaders drew a parallel be-
tween their opposition to U.S. intervention in Grenada and the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan. Another reason cited for Third World opposition to the
invasion was that military intervention should not be used to deal with the do-
mestic political crises of any nation. Those espousing this view voiced their
support of regional rather than unilateral actions to deal with such crises. This
approach carried the endorsement of all the nations of the Eastern Caribbean,
except those which requested the invasion.
Other Third World nations made known their fears that supposed threats to
U.S. security interests could be used as a pretext for American intervention
elsewhere in the region. For example, President Forbes Burnham of Guyana,
like many other non-aligned leaders, saw the Grenada intervention as falling
into the pattern of past American interventions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Chile. Similarly, there is a widespread belief in the Third World that, irres-
pective of the particular administration, Washington is obsessed about the real
or imagined role of Cuba and the Soviet Union in supporting opposition
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movements or governments in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. The
Third World reaction to Grenada shows that this perception almost automati-
cally guarantees non-aligned support for Cuba in any situation where the de-
clared goal of the United States is to counter Cuban-Soviet actions. Thus,
Washington's claim (though well-substantiated) that the invasion of Grenada
was undertaken in response to a legitimate request for help, was widely
treated as simply a pretext for military intervention.
The leaders of the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) undoubt-
edly felt themselves to be severely threatened by events in Grenada, but their
testimony has been heavily overshadowed by the popular Third World percep-
tion that the United States planned to use military force in Grenada regardless
of whether it received a request for intervention or not. None of the evidence
contained in the Grenada documents is likely to change either this view or any
other Third World opinion regarding the Grenada intervention.
There are also more particular reasons why some Third World nations op-
posed the invasion of Grenada. Non-aligned nations are constantly wary of
how the actions of the superpowers in one part of the world might affect de-
velopments in their own region. For example, the Grenadian intervention has
increased fears among the African front-line states (Angola, Namibia and Mo-
zambique, for example) that South Africa might use the Grenadian precedent
to justify its invasion of their territories. This possibility seemed to be of par-
ticular concern to recently independent Zimbabwe.
Beyond the immediate debate over the rights and wrongs of the U.S. inva-
sion of Grenada, the larger perennial question remains how to provide for the
security of small and weak nations. The non-communist nations of Southeast
Asia, for example, have joined in a regional security organization, the Associ-
ation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). But such organizations have so
far met with little success due to a lack of political homogeneity in most re-
gions. Therefore, for practical reasons, many small nations find it expedient
to receive protection from a strong world or regional power. Undoubtedly, the
best solution would be to encourage and support the establishment of balanced
Regional Defense Forces, as is currently envisaged in the Eastern Caribbean.
At the Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi in November 1983, sharp divi-
sions of opinion over the Grenadian intervention were bridged by an agree-
ment that the Commonwealth should assist the OECS in setting up its own re-
gional security system. But when small nations cannot cope with crises that
threaten their survival, it is preferable that they should (for reasons of military
utility) be reinforced by a single power, perhaps with some form of window
dressing by regional contingents. After all, Grenada "worked."
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THE GRENADA OPERATION
AND SUPERPOWER RELATIONS:
A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE PENTAGON
Summary of paper by Dov Zakheim
Analysts of the Soviet Union who attempt to evaluate present Soviet motiva-
tions have little to go on in the way of hard documentation. Soviet society is
probably more closed today than during the 1930s, and recent changes in the
Soviet leadership have served to make middle-level bureaucrats extremely
cautious in voicing their views. Nevertheless, one cannot proceed with the
analysis of superpower relations without speculating as to Soviet motivations
and perceptions. Otherwise, one is left with only the official statements, and
the imbalance that arises between a West that speaks with many voices and a
Soviet Union that speaks with one.
To examine the impact of the American invasion of Grenada on superpower
relations is to presume that Grenada was important to the Soviet Union. Gre-
nada's value to the Soviet Union was a function of geopolitical considera-
tions, actions taken by the Grenadian leadership to move Grenada into the So-
viet bloc, and Moscow's support of Grenada in the brief period from
1980-1983 when Moscow responded to the New Jewel Movement's enthusi-
astic embrace of Leninism.
There are at least three different views of the motivations that propel Soviet
international behavior. One view holds that the Soviet Union is prompted by
an expansionist ideology that aims at world conquest. The main variant of this
view holds that Soviet foreign policy seeks to seize on opportunities as they
present themselves, but is still bent on global domination. A second view as-
serts that while communist ideology sets the USSR apart from other nations,
the Soviet Union can be expected to act like all other nations-i.e., it will act
in its own best interests. Finally, it has been argued that ideology might not be
the prime motivating factor in Soviet foreign policy, but it fits neatly into his-
toric expansionist impulses that can be traced to the Russian Empire.
To those who view the Soviet Union as just another state with a different
form of government, the Grenada operation was as much a sideshow of U.S.-
Soviet relations as it was of Soviet involvement in the first place. It was "op-
portune" for the Soviets to have a government in the Caribbean that consid-
ered itself a fraternal socialist state. It would have been just as opportune if
that government had been located elsewhere. According to this view, the in-
vasion of Grenada made little difference in the long run. But if one assumes a
more aggressive and expansionist thrust to Soviet foreign policy, Grenada's
importance to the Soviets becomes evident. Grenada was a promising devel-
opment for the ideologues in the Kremlin, and there is no evidence that this
breed has died out over the years. Grenada became a showpiece example of
the worldwide expansion of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, whatever the mo-
tivations of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement (NJM), there can be no
denying the degree to which they absorbed the political lexicon, culture and
structural norms of Marxism-Leninism. Their behavior reflected an almost
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slavish mimicry of the Soviet Union.
Grenada was not only a boon to the ideologues; it was also important to
those who practiced realpolitik because of its geostrategic dimensions. Gre-
nada was one of the factors in what Brezhnev constantly referred to as the
"correlation of forces" in the world-that great balance sheet that assesses
the relative standing of the two superpowers. More importantly, Grenada rep-
resented another successful effort to find holes in the Monroe Doctrine, an ob-
jective articulated by Khrushchev in his memoirs. The Grenada experience
also represented a break with British parliamentary traditions in the Carib-
bean. It embodied a clear reversion from democratic institutions to Marxist-
Leninist ones. In addition, Grenada was of potential military utility to the So-
viet Union. It complicated the efforts of American military planners, who had
to allow for the possibility that the island could become a base for Soviet long-
range bombers or reconnaissance aircraft, etc. It mattered little whether the
airport at Point Salines would be used primarily as a tourist facility, as the
NJM claimed. It was the potential that the airport offered to the Soviets that
worried American analysts.
Grenada was thus a useful asset to the Soviet Union, and consequently its
loss must have been viewed by Soviet policymakers as a blow to efforts aimed
at the expansion of its foothold in the Western hemisphere. The invasion also
resulted in several blows to the "progressive forces" of the region. Most no-
ticeable in this regard were the expulsion of Cuban advisors from Suriname,
and Castro's admission of his inablility to come to the aid of revolutionary re-
gimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is also arguable that the Grenada
operation signaled an even greater blow to the Soviet Union in terms of its
long-term relationship with the United States.
The Grenada operation was exceedingly popular in the United States, and
as such, it may have signaled a major movement towards recovery from the
Vietnam syndrome. Steps had already been taken in this direction as evi-
denced by the strengthening of America's military establishment, the down-
ing of two Libyan aircraft on August 19, 1981, and the willingness to deploy
U.S. forces in support of foreign nations such as Lebanon and the Sudan. The
Grenada operation went further, however. It was not only a rescue mission,
but a decisive use of U.S. military capabilities in support of U.S. interests.
Furthermore, the operation had important military implications. Though un-
demanding compared to the types of opposition that might be expected in con-
flicts in Southwest Asia or Europe, the invasion of Grenada nevertheless im-
posed a variety of demands on U.S. forces that were carried out with
considerable efficiency. Moreover, the cumulative impact of the Grenada op-
eration on America's self-image should not be underestimated. It represented
a clearcut military success that increased national self-confidence, and re-
stored the United States to its role as a vigorous leader of the Free World.
More than any other action since 1980, the invasion lent substance to the as-
sertion that the United States would refuse to countenance acts of aggression,
whether large or small, against American interests.
The 1970s witnessed a remarkable expansion of both the capabilities and
uses of Soviet military power. The Soviet Union completed a major moderni-
zation of its forces (both nuclear and conventional) that enabled it to under-
take new missions in the Third World, such as the airlift of Cuban forces to
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Angola in 1975, and a larger airlift during the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 displayed an even greater capabil-
ity to project Soviet power. But the Soviet Union has scored no new gains
since 1980. In the final analysis, this turn of events must be due as much to
the changing nature of American diplomacy as to leadership changes in the
Kremlin. The relations of the superpowers form a seamless web. Both watch
each other's moves closely to assess the impact of the other's actions on su-
perpower relations and the international balance of power. Considering the
problems the Soviet Union faces at home and among its allies, the resurgence
of the United States can only prompt an agonizing reappraisal of its own for-
eign policy. This reappraisal will certainly be influenced by an increasingly
powerful Soviet military that is reputed to be a force for conservatism.
The United States did not escape criticism for its invasion of Grenada, but
this criticism was far less harsh than some would like to believe. Yet the gains
that democracy made in Grenada will not be preserved without a struggle. The
liberation of Grenada was political, not economic. Unemployment is ram-
pant, and as long as it remains high, agitators will find ready listeners. Gre-
nada will continue to need economic assistance which is both specific to its
particular needs and within the more general context of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. The military campaign of October 1983 was the initial blow in
favor of democracy in Grenada. An economic campaign is the only way to
preserve the gains that have thus far been made.
THE GRENADA OPERATION
AND SUPERPOWER RELATIONS:
A VIEW FROM THE IVORY TOWER
Summary of paper by George Liska
This paper starts from the assumption that all major powers have forcefully in-
tervened at one time or another in their own sphere of influence to prevent
damage to their national interests. All disclaimers to the contrary, intervention
is almost as much an inalienable right as a practice in international relations.
The debates surrounding the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan raise the issue of whether the mode and scope of these in-
terventions were commensurate with the provocations that sparked them. To
apply the principle of proportionality to one's perception of these interven-
tions, one must balance the intervening power's right of intervention with its
duty to exercise restraint.
It is commonly accepted that a regional power's right of intervention is
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most justified if an outside power fosters or exploits a local disturbance in the
sphere of influence of the regional power. It is also self-evident that such out-
side interference is not justified if the regional power has refrained from inter-
vention in the external power's sphere of influence. Finally, when interfer-
ence is reciporocal, one power's right to intervene in its sphere of influence is
certainly not nullified. Strategy is not governed by abstract symmetries. How-
ever, it might be said that the outside power has a certain "right" to get in-
volved in the regional power's sphere as part of a bargaining process over the
rules of reciprocal intervention and non-intervention. In other words, to what
extent do past and present U.S. interference in the Soviet sphere of influence
"justify" Soviet-Cuban interference in the Western hemisphere? The follow-
ing discussion of land-based powers (read, the Soviet Union) and maritime-
mercantile powers (read, the United States) will hopefully illuminate this
question.
Historically, prominent land-based powers will invariably seek access to
warm water ports in pursuit of military and economic security. Conversely,
the dominant power in the international system, which is usually a maritime-
mercantile power, will invariably oppose this push in the interest of preserv-
ing its superiority. The two kinds of powers have always found it difficult to
agree on a balance of power that would afford each an equal measure of mili-
tary and economic security. Often, ideological factors are injected into this
competition for influence which is carried out in third nations (read, the Third
World). Unfortunately, these ideological variables impede prudent "realpolit-
ikal" considerations to the detriment of each power. In the final analysis, the
level of the threat imposed by each power on its rival is dependent on the de-
gree of effectiveness and autonomy of lesser regional powers (such as Cuba)
that serve as great power surrogates.
When these principles are applied to events in Grenada, it is still possible to
find that the U.S. was entitled to resist Soviet/Cuban involvement in the
Caribbean by invading Grenada. But this entitlement is qualified by prior and
simultaneous U.S. interference in Soviet spheres of influence, such as in Cen-
tral Europe and Southwest Asia. This interference creates an incentive, and
perhaps a "right", for the Soviets to look for opportunities in areas of U.S.
concern that might be used as levers to constrain such interference. U.S. in-
volvement on the Eurasian continent has stimulated the Soviet urge to seek
overseas influence as part of a strategy to equalize the status and security of
the United States and the Soviet Union. Ideological categories aside, this
"urge" can be explained with reference to the Soviet Union as the preeminent
land-based military power, and the United States as the preeminent industrial-
trading power.
Far-reaching social upheavals can sometimes cause Third World nations to
assert latent "statist" values (such as independence) over "societal" factors
(e.g., cultural patterns). This can result in the realignment of some Third
World nations away from the dominant regional power toward the extra-
regional power. Often the external regional power is involved in fomenting
the social upheaval that leads to such changes. Such is clearly the case con-
cerning Soviet actions in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Major re-
alignments are rather rare, however, as indicated by the time that has elapsed
from the Cuban revolution to the recent events in Nicaragua and Grenada.
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The above analysis defers to authoritative assurances that Central America
and the Caribbean Basin are areas that are strategically sensitive to the United
States and potentially vulnerable to Soviet strategic designs. It follows that
unqualified U.S. control over these areas is essential for safeguarding vital
American interests. The current alarm over Soviet penetration into America's
back yard through Cuban-inspired revolution is reminiscent of earlier Ameri-
can anxieties concerning foreign intervention into the Western hemisphere.
One of the main reasons for the present administration's overemphasis on the
Soviet threat to the Western hemisphere is the apparent willingness of the
U.S. to play the role of a regional policeman in the region. In the wake of the
previous administration's retreat from global commitments, the United States
has reasserted its interests in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin at the ex-
pense of the Soviet Union, and its regional surrogate, Cuba.
U.S. policy toward Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador is conditioned on
whether one views regional issues in a "globalist" East-West perspective, or
in terms of local social and economic issues. The global objectives of the So-
viet Union are defined by Soviet bids for both tactical and strategic power.
Tactical considerations are important because even limited regional gains sig-
nificantly enhance Soviet power and prestige. Such tactical expansions of
power are facilitated by the co-option of client-states into shared revolutionary
enterprises. Strategic considerations, on the other hand, are concerned pri-
marily with the achievement of global parity.
Given Soviet global objectives, and efforts by the U.S. to oppose the global
Soviet push, the only way for the superpowers to reduce bilateral tensions is
to exercise mutual restraint in each other's primary sphere of influence. It
should be emphasized, however, that efforts to combine mutual self-restraint
with "sharing arrangements" for access to all regions necessitates a bar-
gaining process to determine various "vital" and "non-vital" geopolitical in-
terests. For example, the Soviet Union will not exercise self-restraint in ex-
change for Western-supplied material or technological benefits. A different
type of bargaining is necessary. Each superpower must ease its attempts to
outflank the other and to create major bases of influence in the other's primary
sphere of influence. Such was the Soviet atttempt to use Grenada in order to
extend Soviet influence in the Caribbean, and such is the U.S. attempt to con-
tain Soviet power in the Far East by creating close links to the People's Re-
public of China. For the superpowers to reduce bilateral tensions and the level
of interference in each other's primary sphere of influence, adjustments will
be necessary in U.S. policy toward Poland and Afghanistan, and Soviet
policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean.
In the final analysis, it is a matter of speculation as to whether concessions
to Soviet interests or opposition to Soviet ambitions will facilitate the modera-
tion of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, there may be room for
an intermediate approach. This would entail extending the strategy of "differ-
entiation" to the entire Third World, including the Western hemisphere. As
the United States differentiates its policies toward Eastern Europe according
to their behavior, so we might extend this strategy to Third World regimes
everywhere. Such an approach might serve to exploit the differences between
the Soviet Union and its local proxies.
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BISHOP'S CUBA, CASTRO'S GRENADA:
NOTES TOWARD AN INNER HISTORY
Summary of paper by Marc Falcoff
The Grenada documents are one of the most important scholarly resources
since World War II for both Soviet and Cuban specialists. They are invaluable
to an understanding of Cuba's role in the Caribbean Basin and Grenada. It is
important that we fully understand this role, for the Grenada experience repre-
sents a watershed in Cuban foreign policy which is bound to affect the politi-
cal and strategic environment in the region for some years to come.
Since 1959 Cuban foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin
has shifted several times. At first, the Castro regime sought to export its own
model of revolution, the centerpiece of which was protracted guerrilla warfare
indiscriminantly directed against almost all Latin American governments,
whether dictatorships or democracies. This effort, however, did not include
the English-speaking Caribbean. After several failures, including a particu-
larly grevious setback in Bolivia, Cuba redirected its energies to other conti-
nents, and sought normal state-to-state relations with the governments it had
previously sought to overthrow. Cuban foreign policy became more flexible
in the 1970s as Havana directed its revolutionary efforts at various targets of
opportunity, whether in Africa, the Near East, or the Caribbean itself. By the
end of the decade, Castro was willing to lend support to any political force
which could be described as anti-American and capable of seizing and holding
power.
Without these changes in Cuban foreign policy, it is unlikely that the rela-
tionship between Cuba and Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM)
would have been so close. Far from following the proven Cuban formula, the
NJM seized power through the time-honored method of the Latin American
right-the coup d'etat, the first in West Indian history. Moreover, although
the NJM self-consciously attempted to turn Grenada into a Cuban-style social-
ist society, it was far less successful in this regard than might be imagined. In-
deed, the Grenada documents strongly suggest that the Grenadian revolution
was largely political rather than social, and was confined to the comings and
goings of a few party officials and the ethereal world of international rela-
tions.
The centrality of Cuba to the Grenadian revolution is now a matter of abun-
dant record. In Grenada, as in Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica under Michael
Manley, the Cuban presence was most immediately visible in the economic
sphere. Cuban economic aid took the form of outright donations of equipment
and construction materials, and skilled construction workers and some tech-
nical assistance was also provided. Cuban aid programs were directed at agri-
culture, education and health projects, and the largest focus was at the Port
Salines airport complex. The ostensible purpose of this facility was to in-
crease tourism, but the high priority that the Cubans assigned to its comple-
tion suggests something more.
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Cuba's economic ties with Grenada were essentially similar to the links
Castro maintained with other Caribbean governments that by no means could
be considered Marxist-Leninist. But the similarities end there. The Cubans
were active in encouraging and assisting the NJM to achieve the subordination
of all elements of society to the purposes of the state. The NJM seriously
studied the possibility of a version of Cuba's Labor Army for their system of
National Service. In the military sphere, the Cubans agreed to maintain mili-
tary advisors in Grenada, and they granted scholarships to Grenadian soldiers
and officers, and assisted the Bishop government in its efforts to counteract
the opposition of the Grenadian church.
Cuba's economic and political assistance to Grenada was significant, but
Castro's most important contribution to the NJM was in the international
sphere. Cuban officials acted as "guides" to the labyrinth of world politics,
instructing Grenadian diplomats at every turn about their relations with other
socialist nations, the Socialist International, and even the United States. Cuba
also served as an international conduit through which the Soviet Union and its
East European allies could funnel both economic and military aid. This was
largely due to the fact that Havana's port and storage facilities were far supe-
rior to anything in Grenada itself, but in all probability, the Soviet Union re-
lied on Cuba's infrastructure because it wished to maintain a low profile in the
region. According to the Grenadian ambassador in Moscow, the Caribbean is
a region where the Soviet Union is interested in reducing areas of conflict with
the United States.
The Cubans also became the most important source of guidance for the
NJM in its relations with the Soviet Union. This was true of matters both large
and small. For example when Bishop decided to send a delegation to Moscow
to request additional military assistance, he first sent the delegation leader
(and the Cuban military attache) to Havana. Most importantly, however, the
Cubans acted as the NJM's advocate in Moscow. According to the Grenadian
ambassador in Moscow, although the Soviets were cautious in making com-
mitments to the NJM, they had only responded as far as they had "because
Cuba had strongly championed our case." It would appear that the Soviets re-
garded Grenada as Cuba's "project," to which they would lend assistance
pending additional evidence of the NJM's stability, its immunity from U.S.
intervention, and the durability of its professed pro-Soviet orientation. In
other words, Grenada's relationship with Cuba was roughly similar to Cuba's
relationship with the Soviet Union. This suggests a kind of subcontracting of
Soviet influence in certain areas where Moscow lacks experience and geo-
graphical proximity, but possesses a reliable surrogate. This allows the Sovi-
ets to explore the possibilities for expanded influence without risking embar-
rassing setbacks such as the ones that occurred in Egypt, Somalia, Ghana, and
Peru.
As a result of the invasion of Grenada, it seems unlikely that Cuba will
again support a revolutionary regime so unreservedly merely on the basis of a
personal friendship with its leader. Furthermore, the invasion has forced Cuba
to revise its views on the political feasibility of U.S. military intervention in
the region. This will have serious implications for Cuban foreign policy, and
may well presage a long period of neglect for the Eastern Caribbean as Ha-
vana rededicates its efforts toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Sanda-
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27
nista regime in Nicaragua. Most importantly, Castro's capacity to gain Soviet
aid for Cuba's allies may have been seriously damaged. In the wake of Gre-
nada, Soviet decisionmakers may well be inclined to rethink the reliability of
Cuban intelligence capabilities and the perspicacity of the Cuban leadership.
FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE:
EASTERN EUROPE IN GRENADA
Summary of paper by Charles Gati
The Grenada documents captured by U.S. forces during the October 1983 in-
tervention provide us with important insights into Soviet-East European rela-
tions and the scope of East European involvement in the attempted Sovietiza-
tion of Grenada.
Aside from from insignificant trade activities, East European involvement
in the Third World began with the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms agreement of
1955. Clearly, the deal marked the beginning of East European support for the
Soviet Union's strategic objectives in the Third World. Since those meager
beginnings in 1955, Czechoslovak and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)
involvement in the southern hemisphere has grown significantly. No longer
merely focusing on Egypt, Iran, Iraq, India and Indonesia (the Third World
nations considered to be of primary importance to the Soviet Union during the
1950s), Moscow and its allies have established diplomatic ties, expanded
commercial links, offered military assistance, and maintained a presence in
dozens of Asian, African, and Latin America nations. Leaving aside the spe-
cial case of Romania, Moscow's allies have helped in the implementation of
Soviet objectives in the Third World while concurrently seeking economic
gain for themselves. Generally short of raw materials and eager to reduce their
dependence on Soviet energy, the East Europeans found certain Third World
nations to be ideal trading partners.
Yet the evolving pattern of East European-Third World trade clearly re-
flects political preferences as well as a measure of coordination within the
Warsaw Pact. The sudden expansion of East European activity with Mozam-
bique, Angola and Nicaragua in the 1970s was certainly not accidental. That
it occurred at Moscow's request or insistence is beyond doubt. Nevertheless,
it would be an oversimplification to argue that the East Europeans have no
room for maneuvering or that Soviet decisionmakers always demanded un-
conditional collaboration from their allies. An "unwritten law" presumably
contains the understanding that East Europeans have freedom of action to pur-
sue their own interests in the Third World to the extent that such freedom
serves, or at any rate does not interfere with, Soviet national interests.
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Accordingly, the communist nations of Eastern Europe have been guided
by several often conflicting considerations in their involvements with the
Third World. They have sought to satisfy Soviet foreign policy interests, as-
sure economic advantage for themselves, and act in such a way as to signal a
measure of independence from Moscow in order to keep their economic con-
nections to the West intact. At the same time, the East Europeans have sought
to keep their commitments modest because of pressing economic problems
and public opposition to most Third World assistance programs. The result of
these conflicting considerations is that East European involvement in the
Third World is very differentiated, ranging from Czechoslovakia's and East
Germany's overt activism to the largely symbolic activities of Hungary and
Poland. Except for Romania, each nation has assisted or trained radical forces
in the Third World, and each (including Hungary and Poland) has sold mili-
tary equipment to developing nations. But the scope and range of this involve-
ment has been greatly varied. East Germany has long specialized in the estab-
lishment of little "Red Gestapos", i.e., political police and intelligence
forces, and Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have long been major arms suppliers
to the Third World and various terrorist organizations. Hungary and Poland
have also trained PLO forces and perhaps other terrorist organizations, but
their Third World assistance programs have stressed mostly trade and tech-
nical aid.
The Grenada documents show that East European assistance to the New
Jewel Movement (NJM) reflected past patterns. The documents indicate that
members of the WTO-most notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany-
concluded a variety of formal agreements with the NJM. There is evidence of
a military accord with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and Czechoslovak arms
shipments through Cuba. Czechoslovakia also assisted in the formulation of
plans for Grenada's economic development. Furthermore, the documents
show considerable involvement by the DDR as well. The East Germans were
active in party, trade union and youth organizations, and provided equipment
and training for the Grenadian internal security forces. All three of these na-
tions were involved in some form of exchange program with the Grenadians.
No evidence is found in the Grenada documents of Hungarian or Polish ties to
the NJM. Both nations limited their support of Grenada to expressions of soli-
darity with the "struggling masses" of Grenada.
It seems that Grenada was primarily a Soviet-Cuban operation to which
Czechoslovakia and East Germany made a contribution. The Grenada docu-
ments leave no doubt as to Soviet and Cuban desires to exploit the opportuni-
ties offered by the Grenadian revolution and to turn this tiny island nation into
a Leninist state. Indeed, much of the aid the Soviets supplied to Grenada was
aimed at supporting the emerging ruling class. To this end, the Soviets sup-
plied weapons, propaganda machinery, an airplane, and even cars for the use
of the NJM leadership.
There is more to be learned about Soviet-East European relations from what
the Grenada documents do not contain, rather than what they reveal. Most no-
tably, in none of the Grenada documents is there any indication of Soviet
coordination with Eastern Europe. The strategic role of Cuba as a Soviet sur-
rogate and a conduit for arms transfers is clear. But if Moscow agreed on any
sort of division of labor with its East European allies, it is neither stipulated
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nor implied in the Grenada documents. The absence of more East European
support for Grenada should not be surprising. The fact of the matter is that re-
gardless of the particular views they held regarding Grenada, most East Euro-
pean states still regard themselves as minor players in the East-West conflict
outside the European theater. As most are weak politically, economically, or
both, their primary motivations are with their own political survival. Unlike
the Soviet Union, they have never had global ambitions, and hence their for
eign policy priorities have been different from Moscow's. Some have even
flirted with attempts to revive European detente, implying that the tense state
of U.S.-Soviet relations does not (or should not) necessarily apply to "East"
and "West" in general. Interestingly, the Hungarians published an authori-
tive statement earlier this year upholding the right of Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation nations to pursue their own national interests, at times even at the ex-
pense of their international obligations.
The manner in which each East European state interprets the relationship
between its national interests and international obligations is the key to under-
standing its foreign policy. Thus is appears that Czechoslovakia, living in
self-imposed isolation from the West, has the most to gain from supporting
distant Soviet causes in the hope of gaining favor with the Soviet Union. The
DDR, whose population is most exposed to Western information and values,
seems to have drawn back from its role in the 1970s as one of Moscow's main
surrogates in the Third World. Bulgaria, which is one of the strongest sup-
porters of "international fraternal assistance," lacks the resources to be of
much use to the Soviet Union. Poland and especially Hungary, for their part,
have done as little as possible without inviting Soviet criticism. Romania, it
seems, stands in a category by itself. None of this is meant to imply, however,
that the Soviets have "lost" Eastern Europe. It is rather meant to show that
Eastern Europe has far more maneuvering room in its relations with Moscow
than is commonly believed.
In the final analysis, the Grenada documents offer fresh evidence con-
firming the reluctance of most East European states (except Czechoslovakia)
to support distant Soviet foreign policy objectives. These regimes are depen-
dent on the Soviet Union, but their dependency does not translate into the ob-
ligation to support the USSR on all issues. Moreover, the reluctance of the
Soviet Union to disturb the status quo in Eastern Europe provides Moscow's
allies with significant freedom of action. The more that the Soviet Union is
preoccupied with succession struggles, the more room Eastern Europe will
have for maneuver. Likewise, the less important the issue, the more likely it is
that the East Europeans will become significantly involved.
As early as 1949, U.S. policy has sought to encourage "national commu-
nism" in the Soviet bloc. Unable to free Eastern Europe from Soviet domina-
tion, the United States has sought to weaken the ties that bind the members of
the Warsaw Pact. Without saying so explicitly, U.S. policy has attempted to
drive a wedge between Moscow and its junior allies. The technique by which
this objective has been pursued is called "differentation." In essence, this is a
policy of rewarding some communist states and punishing other according to
their degree of domestic liberalization and the distance they maintain from the
Soviet Union on foreign policy matters. To the extent that the Grenada docu-
ments confirm differences within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the United
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States should exploit such differences and compete for influence in Moscow's
front yard.
LENINISM IN GRENADA
Summary of paper by Jiri and Virginia Valenta
The invasion of Grenada on October 26, 1983 focused attention on the prob-
lems of the Caribbean Basin. Some observers have argued that Maurice Bish-
op's New Jewel Movement (NJM) was a typical Third World radical regime;
others emphasized the regime's Marxist-Leninist character. But by now it is
difficult to deny either the NJM's attempts to create a Leninist state, or its ex-
tensive political, ideological, and above all military ties with the Soviet Union
and Cuba. Regardless of one's opinion about the invasion, the documents
captured on Grenada are a windfall for scholars in providing an unprecedented
glimpse into the inner workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime
and its relations with other communist nations.
Because of its miniscule size, Grenada could easily be taken over by a
small but well-organized and disciplined force-which is precisely what hap-
pened on March 13, 1979, when the government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy
was overthrown. Gairy became prime minister in 1967 when his United Labor
Party came to power after Grenada was granted the right of internal self-
government by the British. Once in power, however, Gairy resorted to politi-
cal violence and intimidation. Some important socio-economic changes oc-
curred under his regime, but eventually his oppressive rule antagonized most
of his following. Worsening economic conditions set the stage for the popu-
larly supported NJM takeover in 1979. The leftist New Jewel Movement had
come into being in 1973, when two radical groups merged under the leader-
ship of Maurice Bishop and adopted a socialist manifesto.
After Grenada was granted full independence in February 1975, the NJM
concluded a tactical electoral coalition with two conservative groups. Dissat-
isfied with Gairy's presumed manipulation of the 1976 elections, the NJM or-
ganized trade unions, and some leaders began to push for the radicalization of
the movement. Gairy's secret police forcibly suppressed strikes organized by
the NJM, but a solid enough core of the party remained in 1979 to mount the
successful takeover of the capital. The seizure of power was expertly planned
and executed. Bishop was already a friend of Fidel Castro, and it is possible
that the NJM revolutionaries were assisted or trained either by Cubans or
Cuban-trained comrades from Guyana. Although the NJM had a radical eco-
nomic program from the start, several factors contributed to the regime's fur-
ther radicalization. One factor may have been a lack of tact on the part of
some U.S. diplomats in dealing with the new Bishop government. Most im-
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portantly, the pace and extent of socialist tansformation was influenced by the
radical wing of the NJM, led by Bernard Coard, which wished to turn the
NJM into a Leninist vanguard party.
Grenada kept a mixed economy, but the state sector gradually became dom-
inant as the government's central planning role increased in all sectors of the
economy. The private sector was tolerated as long as it served the revolution.
NJM efforts to improve living standards resulted in a substantially expanded
public sector, which reduced unemployment from 40% under Gairy to 33%
by 1982. There was also some drop in illiteracy. Rallies and marches were or-
ganized to increase labor productivity and awaken social consciousness, but
these means of mass mobilization became unpopular as the revolution moved
into its fifth year and economic conditions stagnated or worsened.
During the course of the revolution, the NJM was gradually transformed
into a Leninist party that functioned through a Politburo and Central Commit-
tee. The impetus for this radicalization came from Coard and his followers,
and ultimately resulted in a coup against Bishop in October 1983. Shortly
after seizing power, Bishop replaced Grenada's constitution with a series of
People's Laws, and in 1982 the NJM appointed a constitutional commission
to create a "people's democracy constitution." To advance Grenada's politi-
cal transformation, the NJM sought to build mass organizations (e.g., the Na-
tional Youth Organization) modeled on those found in communist states. In
this as in other matters, the NJM actively sought the help of foreign instruc-
tors in building itself into a vanguard party. As in other Leninist states, party
members held the most important positions in both government and mass or-
ganizations. The obedience of the army was also ensured by party supervi-
sion. In addition, the NJM took control of the media, and its security forces,
while preparing to fight external counterrevolutionaries, also engaged in
harassing internal opponents. During Bishop's rule, an estimated 1,000 per-
sons were detained at one time or another, most for political reasons.
The Bishop regime's interest in cultivating close ties with foreign commu-
nist states was fully reciprocated by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Grenada
documents show a gradual increase in both Soviet and Cuban involvement in
Grenada'a affairs. The Soviet Union's most important objective in the Carib-
bean Basin is political-namely to encourage and support anti-imperialist and
anti-American forces. Moscow gives its fraternal support only to fully devel-
oped Leninist regimes like Cuba, or nations such as Nicaragua and Grenada
that are progressing toward socialism. As early as 1981, the Soviet press
spoke of Grenada's "progressive social transformation," but exercising their
usual caution, Soviet leaders would not classify the NJM as a Leninist van-
guard party. The NJM was informally considered a "fraternal" party, but was
not treated on the same level as the Nicaraguan junta.
Formal relations between the NJM and the Soviet Union began when Coard
travelled to the USSR in 1980 as the result of lobbying efforts by Cuba and Ja-
maica. The Soviets finally decided to make a formal commitment to Grenada
in July 1982, when a secret agreement was consumated stating that the NJM
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would cooperate in
ways similar to those pursued by the Soviets in dealing with other socialist-
oriented Third World nations. Ties among the Soviet Union, its allies and
Grenada increased rapidly at this point, especially on a party-to-party basis. In
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1983, the NJM concluded various new agreements with the Communist Party
of Cuba, which provided for far closer and more regular ties than the NJM
maintained with the CPSU.
The next most important Soviet objective in the Caribbean Basin is mili-
tary. Moscow has sought to develop military ties with revolutionary regimes
in the region to increase its military reach. Although the Soviets have pro-
ceeded very cautiously so as not to provoke the United States, they probably
desire to secure access to additional facilities of the sort they now have in
Cuba. The Grenada documents demonstrate that military aid actually pre-
ceded other ties with Grenada, and that this aid was gradually upgraded dur-
ing the course of the revolution. The Soviets concluded three significant arms
deals with Grenada "free of charge of delivery," which included the transfer
of such weapons as armored personnel carriers, anti-tank guns, and rocket
launchers. In accordance with these agreements, several Grenadian officers
were sent to the Soviet Union for training. Military agreements were also con-
cluded with Cuba and other communist nations, including Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Vietnam, and North Korea. Small numbers of military and other ad-
visors were stationed in Grenada, with the Cuban contingent by far the largest
by 1983. Arms transfers were scheduled through 1986, but when the United
States arrived in October 1983, the weapons recovered were already sufficient
to equip a force of about ten thousand.
By comparison, economic objectives play a relatively minor role in Soviet
strategy in the Caribbean Basin. Soviet-Grenadian economic cooperation pro-
gressed between 1979 and 1983, but not nearly as rapidly as political or mili-
tary cooperation. Grenadian officials frequently consulted with Soviet eco-
nomic planners, and the Grenadians actively sought long-term markets in
Soviet bloc nations. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Soviets pro-
vided funding for the controversial Point Salines airport complex. Most of the
funds for this project came from Libya, Cuba, Canada, Iraq, Syria, OPEC,
and the European Economic Community. The Soviets provided some equip-
ment free-of-charge, but none of this assistance was sufficient to have an ef-
fect on the troubled Grenadian economy.
It was against this backdrop of political uncertainty and economic hardship
that high-level tensions surfaced in Grenada in September 1983. The Grenada
documents suggest that in addition to Coard's personal ambitions, one of the
reasons behind the leadership struggle was the generally shared feeling in the
NJM Politburo that the revolution was failing due to an increasing lack of re-
sults, both at the mass and party level. On one level the Bishop-Coard strug-
gle was a personality conflict, and on another, it was ideological. Coard and
his radical followers were impatient with the pace of socialist transformation,
whereas the Bishop minority was in favor of a more gradual approach. Coard
accused Bishop of "right opportunism" and the inability to tighten Grenadian
relations with the world socialist movement. The radical wing of the NJM
passed a resolution that insisted, "based on the fundamental Leninist princi-
ples of democratic centralism" (i.e., subordination to the decisions of the
party majority), the decisions of the Central Committee have the force of law.
A plan to reorganize the party put forth by the Coard faction was designed to
errode Bishop's power and clear the way for his eventual removal. When
Bishop refused to go along with this plan, his opponents called for "cold-'
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bloodedness" and "Bolshevik staunchness," or what some called the "Af-
ghan line." Bishop made a crucial tactical mistake by leaving the country (to
visit Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Cuba, among others) in late Sep-
tember and early October when the party debate was at its height. On October
15 Bishop was expelled from the party and confined to house arrest.
The majority of the Central Committee had turned against Bishop, but the
masses had not. On October 19--Bloody Wednesday--a mob of at least
10,000 people (about one-tenth of the entire population) liberated Bishop and
made their way to Fort Rupert, where they would have access to radio equip-
ment and arms. If the socialist transformation of 1979-1983 was a revolution
from above, this appeared to be a revolution from below. Coard was faced
with the prospect of a popular armed uprising, and in response he ordered the
army to attack the fort with its Soviet-supplied armored personnel carriers.
Bishop and his followers could have tried to defend themselves, but it appears
that they lacked the heart for an all-out civil war. Many demonstrators were
killed in the unresisted attack, and Bishop and some of his supporters were
executed.
There is no clear evidence as to the extent of Soviet or Cuban involvement
in the NJM power struggle. But it is likely that Soviet officials knew about the
Bishop-Coard rivalry, and probably favored the anti-Bishop Leninist faction.
The Soviets certainly made no effort to support him, and were probably suspi-
cious of Bishop's attempts at rapprochement with the United States in June
1983. This was probably the turning point in Bishop's relations with Moscow.
Bishop was extremely secretive about these meetings in the United States, and
given traditional Soviet paranoia about the loyalty and orthodoxy of its allies,
it is not surprising that the Soviet leadership lost confidence in Bishop. Fur-
thermore, the Soviets usually prefer to deal with various cliques in a collective
leadership, rather than with charismatic leaders. Whether or not the Soviets
were actively involved in the anti-Bishop coup is a matter of speculation. Suf-
fice it to say that unlike the Cubans, the Soviets did not eulogize Bishop after
his downfall. By contrast, Castro tried to boost Bishop's prestige and morale
shortly before the coup that deposed him. There was no sustained Cuban ef-
fort on Bishop's behalf, but as Bishop and Castro were friends there was at
least a symbolic effort.
Castro's mistrust of Grenada's new leaders may have been one reason why
Cuban military assistance was reduced after the coup. But another more com-
pelling reason was the Cuban and Soviet awareness that a U.S. naval task
force originally destined for Lebanon was moving toward Grenada. Castro
sent 150 to 200 seasoned Cuban soldiers to command the symbolic resistance
of the Cubans stationed in Grenada, but while it appears he fully expected an
American invasion, he did not anticipate its exact timing. The Soviet response
to the invasion was limited to displays of anti-American sentiment during the
October Revolution anniversary parade in Moscow.
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THE IMPACT OF THE GRENADA EVENTS
ON THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM
Summary of paper by Vernon Aspaturian
It is important to consider the impact of the Grenada events on the Soviet alli-
ance system, here defined as the extended network of often uneven obliga-
tions that the Soviet Union has assumed or has contracted toward its allies,
clients and friends. These obligations are not only military in nature; they are
political, ideological, economic and diplomatic as well. Any forceful asser-
tion or action by the United States that affects Soviet interests is bound to have
an impact on the Soviet alliance system. It can be argued that the invasion of
Grenada sent reverberations through the Soviet alliance system. Its impact
was of course uneven, depending on the character and intensity of Soviet obli-
gations towards its allies. Some were weakened; others were strengthened;
and some were probably unaffected.
The intensity and juridical character of Soviet commitments to its allies
varies considerably. Some Soviet obligations are taken contractually in the
form of an official treaty. The best example of this type of obligation is the
multilateral Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), but the WTO is supple-
mented by a series of bilateral alliances between the Soviet Union and the na-
tions of Eastern Europe and other smaller communist states. Other Soviet
commitments are essentially unilateral in character. Under the Brezhnev Doc-
trine, for example, the Soviet Union unilaterally reserves the right to come to
the aid of communist nations which are threatened either internally or exter-
nally. A weaker form of unilateral commitment was announced in the wake of
the invasion of Afghanistan, whereby the Soviet Union reserves the right to
come to the aid of any friendly Third World nation that requests assistance.
However, it is more accurate to say this is an "option" for Soviet policymak-
ers rather than a "commitment." The nature, intensity, and credibility of So-
viet commitments vary in accordance with the status and character of the de-
pendancy, its importance to Soviet interests, and the risks and benefits of
fulfilling contractual obligations. The impact of the Grenada events should
neither be under- or over- estimated, and should be viewed in the above con-
text.
Grenada was not recognized by Moscow as a "socialist state" in the tech-
nical Soviet meaning of that phrase. It was not considered part of the Soviet
community or alliance system. Thus the political, economic, ideological and
military obligations that the Soviet Union has assumed toward its East Euro-
pean allies did not apply to Grenada. Furthermore, as the Grenadians repeat-
edly lamented, the Soviets were prepared to make commitments only to the
extent of their capacity to fulfill and defend those commitments, and Grenada
is only a small and distant country to the Soviet Union-an observation that
applies to an entire class of Soviet dependents around the world. In light of
this realization and the invasion of Grenada, several Soviet dependents are
probably reassessing their relationship with the Soviet Union, especially those
located in the Western hemisphere.
Grenada was not high on the list of Soviet priorities because of its rather in-
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significant size, remote location, and vulnerability to "imperialism," i.e., to
American power. But Grenada may have rated higher on the Soviet list of pri-
orities than the Grenadians imagined because of its potentially strategic loca-
tion. As the Grenadians realized that global and regional considerations are
paramount in Soviet calculations, they were extremely eager to make them-
selves an important revolutionary force in the Caribbean to enhance their posi-
tion in the Soviet scale of priorities. Grenada's .ambitions became greater as
the revolution progressed. One of the Grenada documents asserts that Gre-
nada should become the mouthpiece for the entire universe of socialist-
oriented nations in order to establish a higher priority for itself in the Soviet
alliance system.
Soviet policy toward Grenada illuminates the relationships between the So-
viet Union and an entire class of Soviet dependencies. Interestingly, the Gre-
nada documents show that the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instructions
to its smaller Third World allies. The Soviets do not assign these nations ex-
plicit missions, but somehow they use their own ingenuity to discover what
the Soviet Union has in mind for them. This was a practice that was first em-
ployed by Stalin in his dealings with his subordinates. Much of the time they
were forced to interpret vague orders from above and assume the risks associ-
ated with failure while Stalin could always claim the credit for success. A
similar relationship exists between the Soviet Union and its dependencies. To
a certain extent, this also explains the activities of various East European na-
tions in the Third World.
Aside from strategic considerations, the ideological character of the Grena-
dian regime had relevance for Soviet expectations and anticipated commit-
ments to other socialist-oriented regimes, especially Nicaragua. By July
1983, according to Grenada's ambassador to Moscow, the Soviets already
considered Grenada to be what will be called in this discussion a Type I
"socialist-oriented" nation on the verge of becoming a Type II nation, i.e.,
one with a Leninist vanguard party. To become a Type II nation would have
brought Grenada closer to becoming part of the "world socialist system" and
presumably increase the Soviet commitment to Grenada, although Grenada
would still likely rate relatively low in the hierarchy of socialist nations be-
cause of its size.
It should be noted that Soviet preoccupation with the ideological character
of the NJM played an important role in triggering the factional conflict that
led to the anti-Bishop coup that preceded the U.S. intervention of October
1983. In their zeal to meet the Soviet criteria of a "vanguard party," a major-
ity of the NJM leadership voted to accelerate the revolutionary process, purge
the party, and restructure it in accordance with Leninist principles. The rela-
tionship between the Soviet Union and Grenada on this score was an accurate
reflection of Moscow's relations with other socialist-oriented nations deemed
to. be in a similar stage of development. This also highlights the fact that ideol-
ogy is an important controlling mechanism used by the Soviet Union in its re-
lations with Third World nations. By having custody of categories and reserv-
ing the right of authoritative analysis, the Soviet Union is in a position to
shape the behavior of Third World radical parties that believe their develop-
ment should follow Soviet patterns.
Cuba and Nicaragua have noted, both by word and by deed, that the Gre-
nada precedent is too close for comfort for their tranquility. Although Cuba is
considered to be part of the world socialist system, the Soviet Union has no
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formal treaty to come to the defense of Cuba. Soviet commitments to Cuba
and Nicaragua are unilaterally assumed, but whereas Cuba is presumably cov-
ered by the Brezhnev Doctrine, Nicaragua is at best covered only by the loose
obligation to provide military assistance if requested. In any event, Moscow
alone decides whether such obligations will be observed. In light of the Gre-
nada events, neither Nicaragua nor Cuba can reasonably expect the Soviet
Union to risk war with the United States in their defense. Moscow has care-
fully limited its explicit promises of military support only to those nations
with which it has formal treaties. Everything else is assumed, implied, and in-
ferred.
Apparently neither the Soviet Union, Cuba, nor Grenada believed until the
last minute that the United States would invade Grenada. The Grenadians
were encouraged in this view by repeated Soviet claims that the "correlation
of forces" had shifted in favor of socialism. Undoubtedly, this view was par-
tially the result of American non-intervention in the Nicaraguan and Iranian
revolutions of 1979. In any case, the invasion of Grenada not only signaled an
erosion of Soviet credibility in Latin America and the Caribbean; it also called
into question the accuracy of Soviet assessments regarding the world military
balance and the willingness of the United States to define its interests with
force.
For Soviet decisionmakers, the invasion of Grenada has meant that the risks
involved in the further expansion of the Soviet bloc have increased. Corre-
spondingly, the intensity of an already weak Soviet commitment to socialist-
oriented nations has diminished, and the attraction of such commitments for
Third World leaders has also been reduced. The Grenada documents demon-
strate that Moscow is very wary of making commitments to socialist-oriented
nations which cannot be classified as Type II nations. This tendency will
likely continue, for the Soviets have been "burnt" in Grenada (as they were
in Egypt and Somalia), and they are apt to be even more careful in committing
themselves in similar situations in the future. In this connection, it should be
noted that reversibility of the historical process for socialist nations is not
ruled out according to Soviet theory. This amounts to a form of ideological
self-defense, since the Soviet Union wishes to preserve the precedent that no
socialist state has ever been overthrown. Once the Soviet Union recognizes a
Type II nation as authentically socialist, Moscow becomes committed to its
survival. This is one of the major reasons why the Soviets are reluctant to
grant Type II status to socialist-oriented nations.
In terms of specific Soviet commitments, one must assume that the Gre-
nada events have served to weaken Soviet commitments to North Korea, Viet-
nam, and especially Cuba. As a rule, the Soviet Union is reluctant to provide
ironclad military obligations to vulnerable, divided, and territorially distant
states because it does not wish to be drawn into conflicts as the result of the
adventurism of its allies. Most importantly, the invasion of Grenada arrested
whatever movement there had been for increased Soviet commitments to the
above nations. The ambiguity of the Soviet commitment to Cuba and its prox-
imity to the United States will probably impel Castro to act more gingerly and
prudently in his foreign relations. In general, nations that are part of the So-
viet alliance system are at greater risk the greater their proximity to the United
States. Thus, for both the Sandanistas and the rebels in El Salvador, the fun-
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damental lesson of Grenada is that the most important restraint on the exercise
of American power is not the Soviet Union, but rather the domestic politics of
the United States.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS
FOR COPING WITH SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY
IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Summary of paper by Margaret Daly Hayes
The Grenada experience should be sobering to analysts of revolutionary situa-
tions such as those in Suriname, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Each of these
nations has demonstrated fundamental political and economic weaknesses that
facilitated takeovers by revolutionary elements. It is clearly in the interest of
the United States to avoid future Grenadas in Latin America and the Carib-
bean Basin. Towards this end, the United States should actively support
"stable, friendly, prosperous states that permit the free movement of goods
and services throughout the region, that respect the political integrity of their
neighbors, and that offer no support to the global political rivals of the United
States." If the United States is to achieve these goals, it will have to become
profoundly involved in the region, both economically and poltically.
American interests in the Caribbean derive from the fact that U.S. security
concerns are closely linked to regional stability. In addition, since the British
departure from the region, the United States has been the nearest power with
which the Caribbean states share some democratic and cultural traditions. The
question is therefore not a matter of whether the United States should be in-
volved in the Caribbean, but how it should be involved.
The problems of the Caribbean islands have to do with the scale of their
economies and the political and social strength of their institutions. In eco-
nomic terms, the region is plagued by the outmigration of some of its most
qualified and productive workers and entrepreneurs. Problems of rising im-
port costs (especially of oil) and declining prices for major exports have been
exacerbated by economic mismanagment and corruption. Such problems were
profound in certain nations, such as Jamaica during the 1970s. The lack of
sufficient political will to find solutions to these problems has made them all
the more difficult to solve, but there is still a great deal of unrealized eco-
nomic potential in the region.
U.S. policymakers should realize that the political spectrum in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean in quite varied. In Central America, most governments
are weak and have no tradition of stability, organization or insitutionalization.
The tradition of parliamentarism is strong in the Commonwealth Caribbean,
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yet political parties have not had a great deal of success in implementing far-
reaching policies. Because of the ineffectualness of these governments, they
have become increasingly vulnerable, and communist penetration of their in-
stitutions has increased over time.
One of the key frustrations of the present political situation in the Caribbean
is the attractiveness that Marxism holds for young political leaders. For the
long term, the only way to avoid future Grenadas is for the United States and
its allies to work aggressively to accomplish the political, economic, and so-
cial development of the Caribbean so the Marxist model no longer holds sig-
nificant appeal. It is more important that the people of the Caribbean do not
become so dissatisfied with their governments that they are willing to accept
the idea of armed revolution. Such goals can only be accomplished through
long-term commitments of human and financial resources, but more impor-
tantly, they will not be accomplished unless the political leadership of the
Caribbean becomes heavily involved in the process. Finally, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to implement such policies unless a sufficient degree of do-
mestic support can be developed in favor of U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Unfortunately, such support is not likely to be forthcoming until there is
agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat facing the United States in Latin
America and the Caribbean Basin.
There is a tendency in the United States either to exaggerate of downplay
Soviet intentions and activities in the Third World, especially in Latin Amer-
ica. In reality, the Soviet Union is not likely to establish itself in the Western
hemispere in any significantly threatening fashion in the foreseeable future.
This would only provoke conflict with the United States, and furthermore, the
Soviet Union does not need to "colonize" Latin American and the Caribbean
to pose a global challenge to U.S. interests. The Soviets accomplish their for-
eign policy goals simply by supporting revolutionary movements or regimes
which weaken U.S. influence. The real threat to the United States and the citi-
zens of the Caribbean is the generalized destabilization that would result from
upsetting the ideological status quo in the region.
It is wishful thinking to believe that the Soviet Union and its allies will
forego any opportunities to influence events in Latin America and the Carib-
bean that are unfavorable to the United States. The Grenada documents sug-
gest that the Soviets create and cultivate opportunities as much as they take
advantage of opportunities offered by spontaneously occurring events. The in-
strument of this opportunism is Soviet ideology, and to counter this ideologi-
cal threat, the United States must maintain better intelligence data on Latin
America and the Caribbean, and indeed the entire world. This realization
stems from the fact that the reduction of U.S. intelligence capabilities during
the 1970s contributed to a series of diplomatic and political failures, most no-
tably the successfull challenge to the Somoza regime that began in 1978.
American policymakers must also resolve to increase economic aid, and ex-
pand the diplomatic presence of the United States throughout the Caribbean.
The current economic situation in the Caribbean in characterized by severe
balance of payments problems, heavy government debt problems, little real
growth of GNP, decapitalization of human and financial resources, and a lack
of investment. The United States must work to solve these problems both bi-
laterally and multilaterally, and efforts to stimulate economic development in
the Caribbean should combine the energies of both government and private in-
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stitutions. The American effort in this enterprise will of course have to be the
greatest, for only the United States has any direct and immeditate security in-
terest in the region. Furthermore, only a significant U.S. presence in the Car-
ibbean, both economic and political, is likely to encourage other donors and
institutions to become involved in the region. In this regard, the Caribben
Basin Initiative (CBI) shows great promise for helping to alleviate the re-
gion's problems. It will be several years before we see significant results, but
the investment incentive mechanisms and market opportunities created by the
CBI will undoubtedly have a positive effect over the long term. As Edward
Saga has noted, one simply cannot live next to the richest market in the world
and remain poor.
Finally, the United States must realize that one of the most important keys
to economic recovery in the Caribbean can be found in accelerated regional
integration. Unfortunately, political differences, which have developed over
the last several years as a result of the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions,
have nearly destroyed the once notable political integration of the English-
speaking Caribbean. On a practical level, the United States should promote
domestic security capabilities in the Caribbean, but equally important, it
should assume the role of sponsor for promoting regional integration. Toward
this end, the United States should use its newly asserted presence in the region
to encourage an infra-regional dialogue on the economic and political prob-
lems of the region. The Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS), the
Caribbean Common Market (Caricom), the World Bank's Caribbean Group,
and the Contadora group all offer forums for such a dialogue. The commit-
ment to this and other efforts designed to help the Caribbean must be long-
term if they are to be successful.
NOTES ON GRENADA,
SOVIET PROXIES AND U.S. POLICY
Summary of paper by Charles Fairbanks
When we ask ourselves how to improve relations with the Soviet Union, we
tend to look for answers of a bilateral nature, with special emphasis on arms
control talks. A more sophisticated view, however, sees formal negotiation as
only a part of a continuum of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union,
many of which might not be readily observable. Moreover, the U.S.-Soviet
relationship is not merely a matter of how the United States deals with the So-
viet Union. Soviet behavior is also the result of the opportunities and limits
faced by the Soviet Union throughout the world. Part of these opportunities
and limits derive from American policy, but many other factors are involved
as well. Just as American policy toward the Soviet Union is substantially
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shaped by the objective situation the United States faces in Europe, the Near
East and Central America, etc., so Soviet policy towards the United States
arises in large measure from the same forces. In other words, Soviet conduct
takes its character largely from U.S. foreign policy toward third parties. It is
possible that U.S. policy toward third parties is in fact more important than bi-
lateral U.S.-Soviet relations in determining Soviet behavior. Soviet officials
emphasize, much more than their American counterparts, that objective con-
ditions of this type, which they call the "correlation of forces" in the world,
are an essential determinant of their policy.
In 1945 an enduring bipolar system emerged for the first time in world his-
tory. This shift from multipolarity to bipolarity fundamentally changed the
conditions of postwar diplomacy. Major shifts in the relations of the great
powers are much less likely than before 1945, and hence the U.S.-Soviet
competition has largely become a matter of superpower maneuverings for in-
fluence in the Third World. This is precisely why tiny Grenada has signifi-
cance for East-West relations. The developing nations are vitally important
for structuring the foreign policies of the superpowers, but they are also the
source of greatest danger in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Neither the right nor
the left of the current foreign policy debate in the United States takes this into
sufficient consideration. Conflict is most likely to arise where opportunities
are great, risks are percieved to be small, and commitments are unclear. To a
certain extent, detente stabilized the "central" (i.e., European) aspects of the
U.S.-Soviet competition, but in other respects it cleared the way for continued
conflict in the Third World.
Several characteristics of Third World politics facilitate the expansion of
Soviet influence in the southern hemisphere. The first is the relative instability
of most Third World nations. Internal instability generates opportunities for
the Soviet Union to expand its influence, and the hallmark of Soviet foreign
policy is its vigorous exploitation of opportunities. For example in Grenada,
the emergence of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and its eagerness to adopt
Leninist ideals, was purely an indigenous development that owed very little to
Cuban or Soviet encouragement. But once the NJM came to power in 1979,
first Cuba and then the Soviet Union and its other allies moved in to exploit
whatever opportunities they could. The Soviets also adeptly exploited the op-
portunities presented by the Ethiopian revolution during the late 1970s. The
United States, on the other hand, did little to shape events in Grenada and the
Horn of Africa during this period.
Second, the relatively small size of many developing nations creates oppor-
tunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the Third World. It also
makes it easier for nations like Cuba and South Yemen to influence events in
the smaller states in their respective regions. Grenada again provides a strik-
ing example. With a population of about 100,000, it was fairly easy for a
small group of revolutionary intellectuals to take control of Grenada, and then
closely cooperate with the Cubans and Soviets, who seized on this opportu-
nity to increase their influence in the Caribbean Basin.
Third, the expansion of Soviet influence is facilitated by the leftist or radi-
cal ideological bent of many Third World nations or groups. This was one of
the real surprises of the Grenada experience. Most people who knew anything
at all about Grenada or the NJM had regarded it, prior to the intervention, as a
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leftist pro-Soviet regime, but not an avowedly communist one. But the Gre-
nada documents reveal that the leaders of the NJM thought of themselves as
serious communists, and the faction that took control just before the interven-
tion considered itself to be truly Leninist in insisting on the further radicaliza-
tion of the NJM.
Leninist ideology is a valuable and pragmatic instrument of Soviet foreign
policy in the sense that it enables the Soviet Union to accomplish certain goals
more easily than it could without the use of ideological tools. Communist ide-
ology remains a powerful force for radical change in the Third World, despite
its decreasing appeal in Europe. It is a powerful motivating force for those
who are discontent with the status quo, and it offers important legitimizing
and organizing principles for those rebelling against established authority.
Once a ruling elite or revolutionary group adopts Leninist principles, an ele-
ment of continuity and stability is achieved (through the use of totalitarian
controls) that enables the Soviet Union to maintain and consolidate whatever
gains have been made towards the achievement of Soviet goals. What the So-
viets have gained through instability, they can also lose by instability, and
Leninist political structures help to act as insurance against this possibility.
Leninist ideology is not always successful in achieving this end, as shown by
events in China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Somalia. But it is more useful than
any substitute yet discovered for maintaining more or less direct control of
distant nations.
Finally, Soviet expansion into the Third World is made easier by the exten-
sive use of allies or proxies to achieve Soviet objectives where the Soviet
Union does not wish to become directly involved. The term "proxy" is a use-
ful one because it implies that the states in question are not necessarily con-
trolled or guided by the Soviet Union. Rather the proxy's relationship is gen-
erally defined by nationalist motives which are also conducive to Soviet
objectives. From their own point of view, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Ethio-
pia are not proxies. To the contrary, they are merely furthering their own ob-
jective with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Cuba is a slightly different
case, however, because of the high degree of coordination between Cuba and
the Soviet Union in most foreign policy matters.
U.S. policymakers are seriously concerned about the Soviet Union, but
there is a tendency to regard the Soviets themselves as the greatest danger,
while downplaying the dangers posed by Soviet proxies. This tendency is a
serious mistake. Soviet proxies pose a threat to U.S. interests that we are only
just beginning to understand. The reinforcing nature of the Soviet alliance
system enables Moscow to maintain multiple channels of influence over cer-
tain nations. For example, the Grenada documents show that while Maurice
Bishop and the NJM were particularly close to Cuba, the Coard faction had
gained favor with the Soviet Union. Thus, whoever won the internal power
struggle, the outcome would have been more or less acceptable to the Soviet
Union. This would not have been the case if Cuba had been rigidly guided by
the Soviet Union in its policy toward Grenada. A similar situation exists in
Ethiopia, where the Cubans supply troops, and the Soviets supply arms and
have insisted on the formation of a Communist Party of Ethiopia. If any of
these channels of influence fail, others will remain and Soviet gains in Ethio-
pia will not be totally lost.
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Though many of the activities of Soviet proxies are independent of direct
Soviet control, efforts by the Soviet Union and its proxies reinforce one an-
other. In essence, this constitutes a proxy system of many dimensions. One of
the major advantages of this system is that most Soviet proxies are not under-
stood to be clients of the Soviet Union by most members of the international
community. Consequently, Soviet proxies can carry out actions against U.S.
interests that the Soviet Union would never contemplate. Cuban troop deploy-
ments in Angola and Ethiopia and various terrorist activities are the most no-
table examples of this phenomenon. Proxies therefore increase the reach of
the Soviet Union while they reduce the risks incurred by the USSR at the same
time. The danger of course is that Soviet proxies might inadvertently draw the
Soviet Union into direct conflict with the United States. This was avoided in
Grenada by the reluctance of the Soviets to enter into formal obligations to the
NJM. Accordingly, we can expect the Soviet Union to display similar caution
toward its allies throughout the world, especially in Central America.
The proxy problem is above all a problem of how the United States handles
Cuba and Libya, the two Soviet proxies that have assumed a global role for
themselves. The previous administration did not regard these nations, and the
proxy problem in general, with enough seriousness. But the Reagan adminis-
tration has clearly demonstrated its willingness to take action against Soviet
proxies, with special emphasis on those that pose the greatest threat to U.S.
national interests-Cuba and Libya. The invasion of Grenada is the most no-
table example of this strategy, and the record suggests that a continuing and
vigorous policy directed against Soviet proxies could have a substantial effect
in limiting their activities.
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Herbert J. Ellison, Constantine Menges, Sherman Blandin, and Richard Pipes
Alexander George, Virginia Valenta, Condi Rice, and Vernon Aspaturian
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44
Dov Zakheim, Jiri Valenta, George Liska, and W. Bruce Weinrod
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George Thompson, Edward Rowny, and David Schrady
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46
Jerry Hough, Robert Steele, and Edward Desmond
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Charles H. Fairbanks, Alexander George, Jiri Valenta, Sally Shelton, and Margaret Daly Hayes
Howard Wiarda, Robert Wesson, Susan Purcell
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Nestor Sanchez and Robert Steele
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Jay Wilkins, Michael Massing, Bradford Johnson, and Jorge Dominguez
e
Howard Wiarda, Charles Maynes, Robin Kent, and Margaret Daly Hayes
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Alberta Ellison, Mark Falcoff, and Georges Fauriol
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SUMMARIES OF REMARKS
BY KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
At various points during the conference, distinguished participants offered es-
pecially salient comments on Soviet and Cuban strategy in the Third World
after the invasion of Grenada. Summaries of several of these remarks are pre-
sented here in order to illustrate the diversity of views among the conferees.
Vernon Walters
Ambassador Walters emphasized several myths concerning Central America
in his remarks on U.S. policy in the region. First, he asserted that Central
America is not the back yard of the United States, but rather its front yard.
What happens in Central America is of vital interest to the United States be-
cause the area between the Panama Canal and the Rio Grande contains over
100 million people. Another myth is that the United States regards all insur-
rections against injustice and oppression as communist inspired. Many revo-
lutionaries-such as Umberto Ortega or Fidel Castro-identify themselves as
communist, and the United States should take such profestations seriously.
Walters stated that it is also a myth that the United States has pushed the Nica-
raguans into the arms of the Soviets and Cubans. To this day, the United
States remains the largest donor of aid to Nicarauga. It is therefore not that the
United States turned its back on the Sandanistas, but that the Sandanistas
chose to support the Soviet Union and the Marxist ideal. Finally, it is a myth
that U.S. military aid to Central America indicates a preference for military
solutions. About 70% of all U.S. aid to Central America has been economic,
but such assistance is inadequate by itself; it must be augmented by an ade-
quate security shield.
The ambassador suggested that perhaps the United States should have a
doctrine that guarantees the achievements of democracy just as the Brezhnev
Doctrine holds that when a socialist regime is threatened, the Red Army re-
serves the right to intervene to protect the achievements of socialism. This
would have benefits not just for the people of Central and South America, but
for the entire world, for the history of the last century shows that democracies
almost never engage in aggressive wars. Dictatorships, on the other hand,
whether of the right or the left, are driven to external adventure by their very
nature. This is one the reasons why the United States should support democ-
racy in Central America. However, it is even more important that the enemies
of democracy do not obtain control over Central America. According to Mr.
Walters, the Soviet Union adheres to Lenin's dictum, "Probe with bayonets.
If you run into steel, try somewhere else." It is therefore important that the
Soviets do not find the absence of steel in Central America. Certain target na-
tions have been chosen in Central America, and in Mr. Walter's opinion, the
ultimate target of the Soviet Union in the region is Mexico.
The United States should give the peoples of Central America a chance to
develop democratic institutions, but democracy is under external attack in the
region. As evidence of this, Mr. Walters invited us merely to turn on the radio
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and hear the storm that beats down upon Central America from outside forces.
In discussing the issue of whether or not the United States should negotiate
with the guerrillas in El Salvador, Mr. Walters asserted that the United States
must convince its Soviet and guerrilla adversaries that the route of force does
not pay. The United States must also convince its friends that it has the means
to meet the use of force by its enemies. Above all, the United States must not
lock itself into an inflexible position by informing its adversaries of what it
will or will not do in the future. Uncertainty, Walters stated, can be a very
powerful weapon.
If Central America falls to the communists, the United States will be del-
uged with millions of refugees, according to Mr. Walters. But he optomisti-
cally stated that all is not lost in the region by any means. Costa Rica and
Honduras have recently had democratic elections, and there have been four
democratic elections and four democratic changes of government in the Do-
minican Republic since 1965, when the United States intervened in that na-
tion's affairs over great protest. Mr. Walters was optimistic that if democracy
can take root in Central America, it will become the normal accepted process
for change, just as coups have been the normal accepted process until now.
In conclusion, Ambassador Walters asserted that the United States must
make a stand in Central America and defend friendly regimes that are admit-
tedly not perfect. The solution is not to allow flawed regimes to be replaced
by totalitarian Marxist dictatorships. We must act soon, he said, for no one
knows what the consequences will be if we delay.
Winston Lord
Throughout his remarks, Mr. Lord emphasized his support for the findings of
the Bipartisan (Kissinger) Commission on Central America.
According to Mr. Lord and the Kissinger Commission, the turmoil in Cen-
tral America does not have a single cause, but is the result of both indigenous
factors and external intervention. On the one hand, liberals see revolution as
the result of only poverty and injustice; they ignore the East-West security di-
mensions of the problem, the role of Marxist/Leninist ideology, and the ac-
tions of the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, conservatives point to the evil
machinations of the Kremlin and its proxies to explain the causes of revolu-
tion; they ignore the economic, social and political roots of discontent. In re-
ality, however, the causes of revolution are both internal and external.
Likewise, Lord stated, one cannot specify which aspect of the conflict in
Central America deserves the most urgent attention from the United States-
The economic or the security dimension. Both aspects of the problem form a
seamless web, and accordingly, the Commission set forth three key aims of
U.S. policy in Central America: democratic self-determination; social and
economic freedom; and cooperation in meeting the security threats to the re-
gion. Without progress on the first two, there can be no security, and without
an adequate security shield, there can be no social progress. Mr. Lord empha-
sized that if U.S. policy is going to succeed in Central America, the problem
must be attacked at all levels and treated as a whole. Likewise, the commis-
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sion's report must be treated as a whole, and Mr. Lord found it unfortunate
that both liberals and conservatives have emphasized those aspects of the re-
port they agree with while attacking the other side of the "seamless web."
The selective approach-to emphasize either economic or security issues-
guarantees failure, said Mr. Lord.
Military aid to El Salvador should be conditioned on progress towards hu-
man rights as a matter of necessity, according to Mr. Lord. Most of the Com-
mission answered in the same manner, but three members (including the
chair) qualified their support of the human rights condition in their footnotes
to the report. They generally endorsed the approach, but said such a strategy
should not be pursued if it means a Marxist takeover would ensue. Mr. Lord,
however, disagreed and emphasized that the only way the United States can
give people like Duarte leverage to make progess on human rights is to use the
ultimate threat of ceasing aid, "applied sensitively and in terms of progress,
not instant solutions." He admitted that this strategy is risky, but nonetheless
is a policy that the United States must pursue. The wisdom of this approach
has already been shown, according to Mr. Lord, by the progess Duarte has
made and the increased international support he has consequently received,
especially in Western Europe.
Mr. Lord concurred with the Commission's preference for elections in El
Salvador as opposed to power-sharing arangements as the best way to ulti-
mately end the conflict there. The guerrillas propose to scrap the present gov-
ernment and military in El Salvador, and instead install a mixed provisional
government by fiat-a classic Marxist-Leninist approach, according to Mr.
Lord. He warned that precedents strongly suggest this would only be a pre-
lude to the elimination of the moderate elements of the coalition. On the other
hand, he recognized that the left cannot be asked to take part in elections with-
out security guarantees. But Mr. Lord was hopeful that security can eventu-
ally be provided once Duarte's position is more consolidated. First, Duarte
must forge an alliance with the "sane right" and the center before he can
make any overtures to the left. Perhaps he can even split off some elements of
the left if he can keep the pressure on militarily and further solidify his politi-
cal position.
As regards Nicaragua, Mr. Lord felt that the United States should not rely
exclusively on a strategy of either applying military pressures or opting for ne-
gotiations in its relations with the Sandinistas. We must reject the fatuous no-
tion that force and diplomacy can be neatly compartmentalized-that if the
United States would only relax its pressures on Nicaragua, the Sandanistas
would be ready to negotiate. Just as in El Salvador, the left is more likely to
reach for a political solution if it cannot count on a military victory. Mr. Lord
noted that Sandinista rhetoric in fact became more conciliatory after U.S. na-
val deployments in Central America, military exercises in Honduras, and the
Grenada rescue mission. Mr. Lord endorsed U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan con-
tras, and felt that such aid should be used as a bargaining chip in future negoti-
ations.
Finally, Mr. Lord stated that the United States should not simply settle for
the "containment" of Nicaragua, but press for internal reforms as well. He
noted that this is also the clear preference of Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama,
and the Contadora nations. It would be a blatant double standard to insist on
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progress toward democracy in El Salvador, but not in Nicaragua, he empha-
sized. On balance, Mr. Lord argued that if the basic thrust of the Commission
report is followed, the United States can succeed in Central American in the
long-term. There is no guarantee of success, he warned, but there is the guar-
antee of failure without the package approach outlined-by the Bipartisan Com-
mission on Central America.
Constantine Menges
Dr. Menges began his remarks on U.S. and Soviet foreign policy toward Gre-
nada by recalling that the U.S. action on that island was justified by the re-
quest of several Caribbean nations for U.S. intervention to restore order and
democracy on Grenada. The other immediate reason for the action was to res-
cue the citizens of all countries who seemed to be in danger as a result of the
"shoot-to-kill" curfew. Dr. Menges emphasized that there were many corol-
lary benefits as well.
The first was that the invasion ended a significant subversive threat to Gre-
nada's neighbors, Belize and Suriname, and other nations in the region, were
threatened by violent groups that were receiving support, training and weap-
ons through individuals from Soviet bloc nations (such as Cuba, Libya, North
Korea, and Bulgaria) who were living and working on Grenada.
Secondly, the invasion prevented a further military buildup in Grenada.
This buildup was small by any absolute measure, but large for such a tiny na-
tion whose neighbors have very small armed forces numbering in the tens and
hundreds. Obviously, if the buildup had continued, the military situation in
the Caribbean would have required defensive preparations by the other na-
tions in the area, diverting scarce resources away from economic development
and increasing the risk of conflict.
Another benefit of the invasion of Grenada was that it prevented the Soviets
and Cubans from using the airfield and harbor complex which was being
rushed to completion. Dr. Menges reminded us that in the spring of 1982, the
United States was preparing to deploy medium range missiles in Western Eu-
rope and the Soviets were publicly threatening analogous deployments against
the United States. Thus he postulated that Grenada might have offered the So-
viets a convenient oppportunity to create a very tough bargaining position
with respect to American missile deployments. This is a theory other analysts
will disagree about, said Mr. Menges, but he argued that it is a possibility
worth considering.
Finally, Dr. Menges felt that the most important corollary benefit of the in-
vasion was a psychological one. The decision to respond quickly to a request
for intervention from friendly nations prevented the demoralization of our al-
lies throughout the region.
American policy toward Grenada has been consistent in the aftermath of the
intervention, and Dr. Menges identified the three main elements of this policy
as: cooperation with the Caribbean democracies to maintain a small peace-
keeping force on the island to prevent threats to order; an effort to help the in-
terim government with its deinstitutionalization of the previous regime; and
support of the interim government's restoration of democratic institutions.
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In discussing Soviet policy toward the Caribbean and the Third World in
general, Dr. Menges described a multilayered approach which is both aggres-
sive and well-organized. The United States has adequately dealt with the
threats of nuclear and conventional warfare, but should become more conver-
sant with the threat posed by indirect aggression from the Soviet Union and its
partners-an alliance Dr. Menges called the "destabilization coalition." The
character of this threat changes from situation to situation, but open military
force is employed only rarely, as was the case of Cuban intervention in An-
gola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.
Dr. Menges argued that the destabilization coalition operates on three sepa-
rate fronts simultaneously. The first area is Western public opinion and vari-
ous international organizations. The goal in this area is to alter the views of
these groups to delegitimize and isolate certain target governments. This can
be seen from the documents captured on Grenada describing efforts to ma-
nipulate the views of the democratic socialist in the socialist international.
This tactic is carried out by the Soviet bloc propaganda apparatus, communist
parties in Western nations, various Soviet front groups, and a wide range of
covert measures. The second area outlined by Menges concerns the domestic
politics of the Western nation supporting the target government. Here the goal
is to alter the views of the supporting government so it cuts off aid to the target
there was an elaborate effort to
nation. In the case of Grenada, for example,
manipulate the American press and certain segments of Congress. The third
area is the target government itself, where the goal is to bring about commu-
nism through a coup or some type of power-sharing arrangement that will ulti-
mately lead to the dominance of a communist party. Many conflicts since
World War II have had a similar character, but Grenada is unique for the evi-
dence it has provided on the operations and strategy of indirect aggression.
Grenada clearly illustrates the multilayered nature of this strategy, as does the
presence of 905 Soviet bloc personnel on the destabilization coalition.
Dr. Menges asserted that the West can successfully cope with the threat of
indirect aggression, and in this respect Grenada was important in showing that
the United States has the will to help its friends defend themselves against the
destabilization coalition. In conclusion, he suggested a counterstrategy to deal
with the threat of indirect aggression. Menges said that the United States must
affirm its democratic values, and that there should be a concerted effort to im-
prove social and economic conditions in the Third World and an active strat-
egy to help our friends defeat attempts at indirect aggression.
Tom J. Farer
Acccording to Tom Farer, in terms of the geopolitical balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union, most of the Third World counts for very
little. Indeed, Dr. Farer stated that a, U.S. policy for the Third World that is
designed primarily to contain the expansion of Soviet influence has considera-
ble potential to actually degrade American national interests.
First, Dr. Farer emphasized that a strategy of total containment guarantees
a high level of tension in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, for it denies the Soviet
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Union equal status with the United States as a great power with global inter-
ests. The United States has not seriously challenged Soviet dominance over
Eastern Europe since the end of World War II, but on the other hand, America
seems to regard the rest of the world as exclusively its own, said Dr. Farer. If
the Soviets feel they have the right to seek influence throughout the globe, and
if the United States feels that all expansions of Soviet influence must be chal-
lenged, then conflict will remain endemic. Thus a policy of total containment
can be justified only if it can be shown to be clearly necessary for the protec-
tion of U.S. national interests. Not only did Dr. Farer feel such a policy unjus-
tified, but it would also harm our relations with our West European and Japa-
nese allies. Furthermore, the maximalist approach to containment would have
a negative effect on the U.S. economy by requiring vastly increased expendi-
tures on conventional weapons. Finally, Dr. Farer feared that over the long
term, such a policy would also lead to increased domestic security measures,
thereby threatening the institutional balances essential to the maintenence of
democracy and civil liberties.
The Third World counts for little in the global balance of power, because it
suffers staggering economic and political problems, both internally and exter-
nally. Dr. Farer made the case that even if the Soviet Union occupied several
Third World nations, Soviet power would not be greatly enhanced unless it
occupied the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf. (Such an endeavor
would in fact overextend the Soviet Union by dissipating scarce resources.)
As an alternative to a strategy of maximalist containment, Dr. Farer sug-
gested that the United States should stop worrying about ideology and seek to
influence the foreign policies of important Third World nations. Admittedly,
many revolutionaries turn to the Soviet Union after acheiving power. But Dr.
Farer suggested that even regimes proclaiming themselves Marxist should be
"co-opted" by the offer of American assistance in exchange for Western ac-
cess to local markets and a commitment not to allow Soviet bases. Dr. Farer
insisted that this does not mean he did not take revolutionaries and their ideo-
logical commitments seriously, but the U.S. should not accept all revolution-
ary rhetoric at face value. For example Said Barre of Somalia proclaimed
himself a "scientific socialist" upon his assumption of power in 1969 at least
in part to obtain Soviet military assistance. He is now considered to be firmly
in the Western bloc. Several other Marxist or nominally Marxist states (most
notably China and Yugoslavia) have shifted their alliances over the last 30
years despite the fact that little effort was made to co-opt them. Even if one
does not accept the assumption that the Third World is strategically unimpor-
tant, Dr. Farer still urged that the United States adopt a less ideologically rigid
policy that would allow room for maneuvering the alignments of certain Third
World regimes to the benefit of U.S. national interests.
In conclusion, Dr. Farer suggested that it is in the American national inter-
est to engage the Soviet Union in some sort of broad negotiation concerning
the "rules-of-the-road" for competition in the Third World. If we fail to do
so, then we are engaged in a collision course, said Dr. Farer.
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Jack Matlock
The fundamental importance of the Grenada documents, according to Dr.
Matlock, is that they illuminate the role of ideology in Soviet motivations and
behavior, and help us to answer the question of whether the Soviet Union is a
revolutionary or traditional imperialist power. Ideology is not something that
can be ignored in our analyses of the Soviet Union, said Dr. Matlock. It was
apparently very important to the Soviets in their relations with the New Jewel
Movement (NJM), and this suggests that the Soviet Union is something more
than merely a traditional expansionist power.
At the same time, Dr. Matlock warned, we should not exhaust our percep-
tion of Soviet foreign policy by saying that it is purely Leninist, Marxist-
Leninist, communist, or totalitarian. Indeed over the past 60 years, it appears
there has been a fusion of many of the characteristics of imperial Russian for-
eign policy with Leninist ideology. This amalgam was evident in the Grenada
experience. The Grenada documents reflect the more ideological aspects of
Soviet foreign policy, but even from a "traditional Russian" point of view,
there would seem to be some value-ideology entirely aside-in having a po-
tential strategic base in the Eastern Caribbean.
Dr. Matlock suggested that perhaps Soviet officials and citizens do not
really "believe" in communist ideology anymore, but the Soviet regime is
unwilling to give up on ideology because it provides the sole form of legiti-
macy for the exercise of Soviet power. At a time when the Soviet Union is ex-
periencing serious economic problems, the presumed and claimed victories of
Soviet ideology throughout the world serve to legitimize the goals of the re-
gime and decrease domestic discontent. In addition, although ideology may
no longer be a dynamic motivating force for the Soviet Union, it does have the
function of providing a framework for analyzing world events.
Aside from its legitimizing role, ideology also serves to order the Soviet al-
liance system into groups of socialist-oriented regimes and parties, and Lenin-
ist vanguard (i.e., communist) regimes and parties. The Soviets always push
for the creation of vanguard parties, and they afford more trust to the leaders
of such movements than the charismatic leaders of socialist-oriented groups.
This is largely the result of Soviet apprehensions regarding setbacks in nations
such as Egypt and Somalia. Moreover, highly bureaucratized vanguard
parties are far less likely to turn against the Soviet Union than parties that are
merely socialist-oriented or vaguely pro-Soviet. Soviet pressures on its allies
to rapidly nationalize and socialize their economies have lessened since the
1960s. This is because many Soviet economic experiments in the Third World
have run aground or tended to be extremely expensive. But while the Soviets
might not be pushing for radical economic measures at the present, Dr. Mat-
lock suggested they they will certainly do so as a matter of course, as much
for pragmatic reasons as ideological ones. Through economic socialization,
communist-style parties eliminate many competing sources of power (e.g.,
the middle class), which could later pose a threat to their dominance.
Soviet ideology, Dr. Matlock explained, has far more to do with Leninism
than it does with Marxism. Many people commonly interchange the terms
"Marxism" and "Leninism", and indeed, Leninism was an outgrowth of
Marxism. But in fact it was Lenin and not Marx who formulated the concepts
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of the vanguard party, "democratic centralism", and proletarian internation-
alism, which have been such fundamental elements of Soviet ideology since
the 1920s.
Finally, Dr. Matlock emphasized how Soviet ideology can be particularly
useful to revolutionary leaders who are having difficulty maintaining or con-
solidating their power. This is the real appeal of Leninism to radical Third
World elites, Dr. Matlock asserted. Through its totalitarian controls and party
supervision of the government, the economy, and especially the military, the
Leninist vanguard party can rapidly consolidate its position and remove oppo-
sition elements, including from the party itself, with ample ideological justifi-
cation. In the final analysis, then, Soviet ideology is not a formula for eco-
nomic development, or for correcting social inequality. Ideology does not
solve these problems, Dr. Matlock insisted. It exacerbates them, and is
merely a formula for staying in power.
Richard Pipes
In his discussion of the Soviet Union and Grenada, Dr. Pipes noted how strik-
ingly easy it was to superimpose communist ideology on Grenada. However,
just as gigantic industrial projects imposed on underdeveloped nations tend to
collapse, so do many Marxist experiments in the Third World.
According to Dr. Pipes, it has become clear in the last several years that the
Soviet economy cannot sustain an imperial drive of the dimensions of the
1970s. Soviet resources simply will not stretch that far, he said. In some
open-source publications, Soviet specialists on the Third World are advising
their comrades abroad not to rush the nationalization of industries or the de-
velopment of socialism in general, and to maintain good relations with the
United States. This is the advice that has been given to Nicaragua, for exam-
ple. The patterns of Soviet expansion during the last several years suggest an
effort to concentrate on smaller, relatively inexpensive nations that will not
impose a great strain on the Soviet economy, but which are of potentially
great strategic value. Dr. Pipes asserted that the Soviets are shying away from
long-term policies that seek to transform Third World societies from feudal
states into socialist democracies. Such efforts have been extremely expensive
in the past, and they have often led to tremendous disappointments for the So-
viet Union. Instead of trying to transform the world in its own image, the So-
viets are now concentrating on gaining cheap access to naval and air bases in
the Third World.
From this point of view, Grenada was an ideal target for the Soviet Union.
As Grenada sits athwart important shipping lanes, its significance to the So-
viet Union was primarily military, not political or even ideological. Despite
the rhetoric of its leaders, Grenada was hardly a fully-structured communist
society. Rather the Soviets considered Grenada a socialist-oriented nation,
which according to Soviet theorists, is a nation making the transition from
feudalism to socialism without going through capitalism. Accordingly, said
Dr. Pipes, the American liberation of Grenada was not a setback that the Sovi-
ets would find intolerable. Grenada, one can argue, was merely another ex-
ample of a socialist-oriented nation going wrong--of which there are many
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examples. However, the major difference between Grenada and other Soviet
setbacks was that the 1983 setback was by the force of American military
power. This is something new in the Soviet experience, and it must have had a
profound effect on Soviet foreign policy considerations.
Over the last 20 years, the Soviet Union has learned that charismatic lead-
ers are useful for creating socialist-oriented regimes in the Third World. But
they are also very unreliable once they come to power because oftheir nation-
alist character. Thus the Soviets often replace popular charismatic leaders
with "internationalists" who owe their allegiance entirely to Moscow. Dr.
Pipes noted that this was apparently the case in South Yemen and Afghani-
stan, and most recently in Grenada.
Dr. Pipes noted that in the aftermath of Grenada, Third World leaders de-
pendent on the Soviet Union cannot be assured of continuing Soviet support.
But he also asserted that the Grenada experience was not necessary to come to
this realization. Soviet officials have repeatedly said that nations far from the
periphery of the USSR would have to defend themselves in the event of an
American invasion. The lack of formal treaty commitments to Cuba corrobo-
rates this assertion.
Finally, in summarizing his views on the Soviet role in the Grenadian revo-
lution, Dr. Pipes maintained that the problem in Grenada was not poverty, but
the activities of a few radicals supported by the Soviet Union (and Cuba). Ad-
mittedly, poverty and other social problems are widespread in Latin America
and the Caribbean Basin, yet according to Dr. Pipes, these problems only be-
come international problems and a threat to U.S. security when the Soviet
Union moves in. As Dr. Pipes put it, "I do not deny that poverty is a problem
in 90 percent of the world, but the real problem is the Soviet Union."
Sally Shelton
Ms. Shelton's remarks on the origins of revolutionary change in the Carib-
bean Basin focused on the differences between liberal and conservative view-
points explaining that change. Liberals have traditionally explained revolution
in the Third World as the result of economic deterioration resulting from the
colonial legacy, increasing oil prices, and the recession of the 1970s. Con-
servatives, on the other hand, tend to focus on the threat posed by the Soviet
Union and its allies. Certainly, elements of both of these views are determi-
nants of revolutionary change in the Caribbean, but Ms. Shelton identified an-
other operative factor that she defined as "institutional corruption", or the in-
ability of existing economic, political and security systems to manage the
challenges they are confronted with. Most of the problems faced by the
smaller nations of the Caribbean have not been the result of economic deterio-
ration or the Soviet/Cuban threat, Ms. Shelton asserted, but rather of various
"non-traditional" armed elements.
The general consensus among most Caribbean analysts is that democratic
processes and free enterprise are deeply rooted in the region as the result of its
British colonial past. But aside from the U.S. government's interest in seeing
that the Caribbean remains democratic and stable, the United States also has
important economic and military interests in the region. There is a significant
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degree of American investment in the Caribbean, and there are certain stra-
tegic minerals in the region (such as bauxite) to which the United States must
maintain access. Moreover, Ms. Shelton emphasized that the sea lanes
through the Caribbean must remain secure because in the event of a conflict in
Europe, most of the equipment that would be needed to resupply NATO
forces would be sent from ports in the Gulf coast area.
In addition to economic deterioration, Soviet/Cuban involvement, and in-
stitutional corruption, Ms. Shelton identified several additional causes of in-
stability in the region. First, there is lack of commitment to the kinds of eco-
nomic and political policies that are necessary to insure growth and stability.
Indeed, some islands are literally surviving on international aid from the
United States, Canada, and multilateral lending institutions. On the political
side, a number of Caribbean governments are attempting to subvert legal or
constitutional procedures to assure their survivability. In essence, the basic in-
effectualness of most Caribbean governments has increased their vulnerability
to external threats. To deal with these problems, Ms. Shelton suggested the
strengthening of existing institutions, and several specific policy recommen-
dations.
For example, Ms. Shelton cited the need for better intelligence gathering
capabilities in the Caribbean. This was clearly the case in Grenada, where
U.S. information on the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was sketchy because
the NJM was not taken very seriously until late 1983. We ignore political de-
velopments in the Caribbean, whether of the left or the right, at our own risk,
said Ms. Shelton. She also suggested that the United States upgrade and ex-
pand the quality of its diplomatic representation in the Caribbean. In addition,
the United States should maintain contacts with opposition groups (as Ms.
Shelton did when she was ambassador to Barbados), and like the British, the
United States should maintain a U.S. embassy or consulate on every island in
the region - perhaps on the non-independent ones as well. The United States
should also work to develop the technical infrastructure of the region. A cer-
tain degree of continuity in long-term U.S. policy must also be developed,
and the United States should revive its multilateral contacts in the Caribbean
Basin because regional cooperation movements seem to be breaking down.
The economic and security needs of the Caribbean can best be met through ef-
fective regional cooperation, according to Ms. Shelton. Hence the United
States should couple its bilateral and regional approaches, while being willing
to make substantial financial commitments to the region over the long term,
for the Caribbean will probably remain economically dependent on the United
States and Canada for the forseeable future.
Alexander George
Dr. George's remarks stressed the importance of understanding what role the
use of force-or the threat of the use of force-should play in efforts to pre-
vent further Grenadas, Nicaraguas, and Cubas. It is certainly important to ad-
vocate preventative measures that attempt to consolidate existing pluralist re-
gimes, but the question according to Dr. George is what to do when
confronted with the failure of such efforts. Like the Kennedy administration,
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we can act out of the desire to allow "no more Cubas in the Caribbean"-
which was clearly the case in the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Repub-
lic. But it is useless to propose an optimizing strategy that runs aground on do-
mestic political restraints, according to Dr. George.
Dr. George stated that there seemed to have been a consensus that the
United States must not separate force from diplomacy. Unfortunately, he
said, they must bear some relationship to each other. Above all, the United
States must face up more realistically to the domestic constraints on any ad-
ministration to develop a policy that is relevant and can be implemented over
the long term. Whether we like it or not, the United States must strive to iden-
tify optimal strategies and policies for protecting American interests.
Dr. George also touched upon the idea that U.S. foreign policy in the Car-
ibbean should be concerned about the fact that what happens in the region is
of fundamental concern to America's allies. He stressed that the United States
has failed to recognize the important security interests of Western Europe in
the Caribbean, at least partially due to the perception that its allies have been
"soft" on the Soviet Union. This is unfortunate, for the Caribbean is impor-
tant to America's allies because it lies along critical sea lanes from the Gulf of
Mexico to Western Europe-the route by which most American supplies
would be sent to Europe in the event of war. Dr. George noted that America's
West European allies might have the following interest in the Caribbean:
closer coordination with the United States, especially in terms of security ar-
rangements; joint economic assistance; and perhaps open diplomatic relations
with Cuba, which could serve to widen the differences between Cuba and the
Soviet Union, thus facilitating West European and American interests in the
area.
Herbert Ellison
Dr. Ellison commented on some of the ways in which the study of the Gre-
nada documents suggested continuities in the historical relationship of the So-
viets with foreign communist movements. This was very clear in the Soviet
support for Coard's "Leninization" of the New Jewel Movement, the process
that led to the purge of Bishop and to his death. The epithet "right-wing op-
portunist" that was applied to Bishop recalls a long succession of such intra-
party struggles from the 1920s to the present in which the Soviets have been
direct or indirect participants, whether through the agency of the Comintern,
the Cominform, or the contemporary International Department. Indeed the
process recalled Soviet pressures on Castro himself during the 1960s to accept
a Soviet-style party, even as they pressed him to abandon "left-wing oppor-
tunism" in his pursuit of revolution in Latin America.
Another element of historical continuity is provided by the Soviet role as
senior partner in the revolutionary enterprise. Several conference participants
noted that the Cubans were given broad leeway in the Caribbean and Central
America, both in locating revolutionary opportunities and developing them.
Yet the Soviets, through regional party conferences and other mechanisms,
continued to provide broad ideological leadership and to mobilize the commu-
nity of socialist states. And it was clearly the Soviets calling the tune when
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Coard moved against Bishop, an action which not only precipitated an inter-
nal crisis but provided the pretext for the external intervention that shattered
the whole revolutionary enterprise. As in previous situations, the Soviet pre-
occupation with Leninist ideological/organizational orthodoxy-and aversion
to charismatic leaders-precipitated a fatal crisis.
Another historical theme that Grenada suggests is the steady expansion of
the instruments and range of Soviet action in support of foriegn revolution.
During the interwar years the Soviets were confined to their own limited
group of diplomatic and commercial missions abroad, to a handful of foreign
communist parties, and to a few publications and front movements. The ex-
pansion of the community of communist states and parties in the postwar
era-in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America-and the emergence
of the Soviet Union as a superpower, have had tremendous consequences. Of
the five secret military agreements the Grenadians had signed, one was with
Cuba and one with North Korea. And the nearly 900 personnel from
"friendly" states resident in Grenada at the time of the intervention included
Cubans, Soviets, North Koreans, Libyans, East Germans and Bulgarians. Not
the least important consequence of this change was the ability of the Soviets to
mask their own role, and thus minimize U.S. opportunities for diplomatic
confrontation.
Dr. Ellison stated that the latter point suggests still another continuity of
Soviet policy in the postwar years: the concern to thwart American interven-
tion in Soviet revolutionary projects abroad. The availability of surrogates, or
proxies, was a newly important advantage. Yet the American military capac-
ity for intervention remained, and it was clearly the reckoning of both Soviets
and Cubans that the power would not be used, a reckoning based on U.S. hes-
itancy in such matters since the Vietnam War and the impact of a massive ef-
fort in the U.S. to discredit such initiatives, an effort that included propa-
ganda, disinformation, and special pressures on the U.S. Congress. The
Grenada documents show much about the effort to influence American per-
ceptions of the Grenadian revolution; perhaps these materials can help us to
understand better the system and instruments through which that influence is
applied.
Dr. Ellison noted that one of the conference speakers had argued that the
Third World was really unimportant in the broader U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
He argued that the Third World-as it is called today-has been regarded by
the Soviets since the 1920s as the central arena of their confrontation with the
capitalist world. They have come to accept a long-term stability of the ad-
vanced capitalist states, and have repeatedly affirmed that their best opportu-
nities lie in the "weakest link" of the "world imperialist system"-the colo-
nial (now decolonized) peoples and states. Since the restructuring of the
International Department in the 1950s, the central focus of activity of that key
foreign policy instrument of the Central Committee and Politburo has been
upon the Third World. It would be wise to look more closely at the Soviet lit-
erature on this subject, and to examine more carefully the pattern of revolu-
tionary support actions, before diminishing its importance.
A final element of continuity is the historical pattern of excessive (or too
exclusive) concentration of the West upon the military elements of the U.S.-
Soviet rivalry. What one deals with in Grenada is, in the first analysis, an ex-
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ercise in ideological/political action-one that has military-strategic implica-
tions, but one that suggests a future need for more effective political, as well
as military, responses to the communist challenge.
Nestor Sanchez
Mr. Sanchez stated that both he and the U.S. Department of Defense strongly
support conferences such as the present one on Grenada. The value of these
conferences is that policymakers and members of the academic community
can engage in meaningful give-and-take discussions and analyze possible
policy alternatives.
According to Mr. Sanchez, although the United States has historically ig-
nored Central America, the present administration was quick to recognize the
importance of the region to American security interests. Neither Havana nor
Moscow is responsible for the root problems of Central America, but they are
taking advantage of the region's problems, and this requires an American re-
sponse. It is important that this administration should develop a consistent,
long-term policy with respect to Central America that has enough built-in
flexibility to insure national and bipartisan support. If we fail to do this, Mr.
Sanchez warned, the United States might find itself in the position of having
to react to an emergency that requires outright intervention.
Mr. Sanchez argued that the United States has several options in Central
America. It can walk away from the problem, or resort to the use of combat
troops. But as neither of these are realistic alternatives, Mr. Sanchez advo-
cated the further development of current U.S. policy toward the region. The
aims of this policy are to support four goals: democratic institutions and hu-
man rights in the region; economic reform, including land reform; negotia-
tions; and security assistance to our friends in order to give the first three ob-
jectives a chance to succeed. He noted that dispute over U.S. policy in Central
America is not so much a matter of goals, but rather the specific mix of eco-
nomic and security assistance. Generally, the mix has been about 5-to-1 in
favor of economic aid, according to Mr. Sanchez, and if the recommendations
of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America are accepted, the ratio
could increase to 7-to-1. But he cautioned that the United States should not try
to shape Central America in its own image; the frustrations would be endless
if this were the aim of U.S. policy.
Mr. Sanchez outlined evidence that progress has recently been made in
Central and South America. El Salvador has had three elections under the
pressure of a guerrilla war; Guatemala has elected a legislative assembly and
is planning a presidential election; Argentina and Brazil are in the process of
making their way towards democratic change; and Chile has promised elec-
tions in 1989. Unfortunately, U.S. policy toward Central America usually
generates more emotion that clear thought, but nonetheless Mr. Sanchez was
confident that if we seek consensus and bipartisan agreement, a sound, long-
term policy is within reach.
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64
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by Jiri Valenta
The following findings and recommendations are based on Valenta's own
work as well as on the discussion among conference participants. No effort
was made to arrive at a formal consensus on each point.
THE GRENADA DOCUMENTS
The Grenada documents provide an unprecedented glimpse into the inner
workings of an aspiring Third World Leninist regime and its relations with
more established Leninist regimes elsewhere. It is true that the documents are
not comprehensive and are highly uneven, and perhaps the most sensational
were destroyed by defenders of the island. Moreover, they are primarily Gre-
nadian, as few documents from Soviet sources were discovered. Despite these
shortcomings, however, this unique set of documents possesses an extraordi-
nary historical value that is comparable to the Soviet documents Professor
Merle Fainsod had at his disposal when writing the seminal How Russia Is
Ruled.' Another such windfall were the internal documents of the Central
Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party dealing with the crisis of
1968 which have been analyzed by Gordon Skilling, Galia Golan, and Jiri Va-
lenta.
Unfortunately, some of the Grenada documents are incomplete, and others
are illegible. Furthermore, not all of the documents had become available to
the public by the time of the conference "Soviet/ Cuban Strategy in the Third
World after Grenada" (August 1984). The volume of documents is enor-
mous, and many still have not been properly catalogued and sorted. However,
as a senior U.S. Government official attending the conference noted, none of
the Grenada Documents have been classified and the vast majority2 will be
made available to the public as soon as they are processed. According to the
same official, it has been agreed among U.S. and Grenadian officials that
upon completion of the processing all documents will be returned to Grenada.
Notwithstanding their limitations, the study of the Grenada documents can
be very useful in analyzing strategies and tactics employed by the Soviet
Union and Cuba. The documents allow cross-reference and comparison be-
tween the Grenadian New Jewel Movement (NJM) Party perceptions and as-
sessments and those drawn from open sources of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other Communist and radical developing countries. Such comparisons were
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used extensively by most of the scholars who were asked to write papers for
the conference, and by the discussants who attended. Their contributions rep-
resent a significant step in the ongoing effort to understand better Soviet and
Cuban strategies and tactics in the Third World.
It is important to consider how the Grenada documents shed light on the NJM
Party and its ties with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the latters' allies. The prevail-
ing view among the conferees was that the revolution in Grenada was much
more Leninist-oriented than originally anticipated. Admittedly there remains
the conceptual problem of how to characterize accurately the ideological and
political orientation of the NJM and similar radical Third World movements.
Analysts refer to them alternately as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, or even Sta-
linist. However, perhaps the most appropriate label for a party in a Third
World country that is building a vanguard party and pursuing a pro-Soviet for-
eign policy is Leninist. Despite the obvious shortcomings of this classifica-
tion, it would appear more appropriate than the term provided by the Soviet
vocabulary: Marxist-Leninist. This is because it was Lenin, not Marx, who
developed the concept of a vanguard party dictatorship of the proletariat that,
combined with proletarian internationalism, forms the core of the political
system adhered to and propagated by the Soviet Union.
Current Soviet ideology has very little to do with Marxism, and almost
everything to do with Leninism, as illustrated in the Grenada situation. Al-
though reasonable analysts can and do differ over the degree to which Lenin-
ism had been established in Grenada, and how successful it was, no one can
deny the violent drive of Bernard Coard's faction toward an absolute Leninist
transformation of the NJM party and Grenada. This process was richly docu-
mented in the voluminous, sometimes secret, files discovered on the island.
Ultimately it was the Coard faction's emphasis on ideological mobilization,
economic control, democratic centralism and "Bolshevik staunchness" that
produced the factional bloodshed in Grenada during October 1983. The ongo-
ing development of Grenada along Leninist lines was a significant phenome-
non for the Soviets. After a period of cautious appraisal, Soviet officials be-
gan to describe Grenada publicly as socialist-oriented, while privately they
classified the NJM as a "fraternal party". This level of relations was reflected
in a CPSU and NJM party-to-party agreement on ideological cooperation. To
be sure, the elevation of Grenada to a "higher" political category (that in-
cluded Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Nicaragua) de-
pended in part on ideological considerations.
Obviously, Grenada was not officially recognized by the Soviet Union as a
Communist state and, as shown by the Grenada documents, it was not very
high on the Soviet list of priorities. This was for a variety of reasons, though
mainly because of its minuscule size and geographical remoteness. Neverthe-
less, Soviet officials hoped that in due time, given its strategic importance and
a projected change in the correlation of forces, Grenada would become a valu-
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able ally. The documents provide no conclusive evidence that Grenada had
become a depot of Soviet arms for future use in the region, nor were there any
Soviet or Cuban military bases or facilities at the time of the U.S. invasion,
aside from the controversial airport, which also had clear-cut civilian pur-
poses. (The military nature of the airport is suggested by circumstantial evi-
dence: Grenadians reportedly were prohibited from approaching certain areas
of the construction project, and the full storage tanks were considerably larger
than similar airport facilities in the region.)
It is likely that the Soviets and their allies made a significant and guarded
commitment to Grenada, by according it a special revolutionary status. They
also concluded several top-secret arms transfer agreements, and sent a consid-
erable number of weapons, and dozens of advisors, in a military assistance
package that far exceeded the reasonable defense requirements of a small is-
land. It is possible that Grenada might have become a component in Soviet
military planning as well as a bridge to revolutionary forces elsewhere in the
region (Surinam and Belize), thereby following the Cuban example of the last
quarter-century. The documents clearly suggest that this possible role for Gre-
nada was attractive to some NJM officials who considered it essential to ob-
tain continued and improved Soviet support.
The study of the Grenada case, together with the analyses of leading Soviet
Third World experts (e.g., Karen Brutents)3, suggests that in the Soviet mind
there exist at least two types of socialist-oriented countries in the Third
World. First is the type-A country having no vanguard party, and only a
vaguely defined Leninist ideology. These countries are typically led by a
charismatic leader (e.g., Mali, Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, and Somalia, of the
1960's and 1970's).
The second is the type-B country having an incipient Leninist vanguard
party, together with other structures built around Lenin's principle of demo-
cratic centralism. Because of previous experiences with Yugoslavia, China,
and other Third World regimes, the Soviets tend to distrust charismatic lead-
ers of Communist and radical regimes, although they may be prone to be co-
operative in paving the way toward proper Leninist societies.
This is demonstrated by the case of Cuba, where the Soviets worked with
Fidel Castro to build a more advanced, type-B socialist-oriented government
from a type-A structure. The final stage in this long and arduous evolution
was the Soviet recognition of Cuba as a proper Communist state in the 1970's.
During this process, Cuban leaders had to establish their Communist creden-
tials by building a vanguard party and holding regular party congresses,
among other things.
The events in the Grenadian situation illustrate that in the 1980's the Sovi-
ets have preferred to deal with a structured Leninist party that has Soviet-
trained cadres or is well-connected with Soviet bureaucracies. The Soviets
also tend to deal more readily with Leninist-apparatchik types (like Coard)
than with charismatic and unpredictable leaders (like Maurice Bishop). The
evidence does not conclusively support Soviet backing of Coard in the Octo-
ber coup in Grenada, but there is evidence to suggest possible Soviet displeas-
ure with Bishop. Bishop and U.S. officials had agreed prior to the coup to
avoid antagonistic rhetoric as a "confidence building" measure in U.S.-
Grenadian relations. For several months, Bishop kept his promise, hoping for
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substantial talks with the U.S. while apparently displeasing the Soviets for
failure to brief Moscow.
According to the Soviets, the stability and reliability of any--socialist-ori-
ented country in the Third World should not depend so much on a leader's
popularity as on the leading role of a bureaucratic vanguard party. At the mo-
ment, the most advanced existing socialist-oriented countries appear to be Af-
ghanistan and Ethiopia, In September 1984, with Soviet ideological backing,
Ethiopia established a Communist Party under the name of Worker's Party of
Ethiopia. Grenada was about to become a part of that select grouping, and
very likely would have had Coard's coalition prevailed. It is no wonder that
Coard and his supporters studied Karen Brutents so intensively.'
NJM AND SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY
The Grenada Documents reveal a certain degree of tentativeness and ambigu-
ity in Soviet policies vis-d-vis Third World nations. First, it shows that the
U.S.S.R. does not necessarily seek to create Communist regimes at any cost.
Secondly, the Soviet Union seems in many instances to prefer that its allies
(Cuba in Africa and Latin America, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia) microma-
nage-and play a primary role in-the initial development of new relation-
ships with aspiring Leninist forces. As used here, a Soviet ally is not necessar-
ily a state controlled by the U.S.S.R., nor a Leninist state, although some
Soviet allies do conform to these qualifications. They might more appropri-
ately be called junior Soviet partners, like Cuba, who (using Soviet military
and economic aid) pursue policies that benefit Soviet strategic objectives. For
instance, Cuba's shrewd move in sending black diplomats and military advis-
ors to both Africa and the Caribbean helped the Soviets to make friends in rad-
ical circles.
Finally, the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instructions or assigns tac-
tical missions to socialist-oriented states in the Third World. (Afghanistan is
an exception because of its special conditions, geographical location on the
Soviet border, and direct engagement by Soviet armed forces.) Instead, aspir-
ing Leninist leaders in the Third World are usually at liberty to use their own
imagination (with Cuba often acting as a broker) to cultivate ties with the So-
viets and explore basic Soviet strategic objectives and limits of tolerance.
Thus, in the first years after the revolutionary coup of 1979, the primary task
of Grenadian leaders was to demonstrate their usefulness to the Soviet leader-
ship.
As the leaders of revolutionary regimes consolidate internal power, the So-
viets gradually become interested in strengthening ties with them. Ultimately,
the Soviet Union aims to reduce or eliminate Cuba's brokerage role and de-
velop direct relations with socialist-oriented regimes. This strategy became
apparent in Angola in 1977-78 and may have been a factor in the internal lead-
ership conflict in Grenada in October 1983. A similar trend may evolve in
Nicaragua.
The Grenada documents suggest that although Soviet leaders are initially
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cautious about assigning tactical missions, they do have implicit long-term
strategic objectives in the Third World. This is indicated by the 1983 remarks
of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, re-
garding the growing struggle of anti-American progressive forces in the West-
ern Hemisphere: "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in Latin Amer-
ica; today there are Nicaragua and Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in
El Salvador." 5
Over the last few decades there has been a remarkable continuity in Soviet
strategy and tactics concerning Communist parties and radical forces in devel-
oping nations. At the same time, there has been a noticeable increase in so-
phistication of methods used by the Soviets. As seen in Grenada (also in An-
gola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, and Nicaragua), the Soviets
have expanded the scope of their policy instruments, particularly the auxiliary
capacity provided by foreign communist parties and radical Third World
movements.
In the last ten years, the Soviets have made expert use of military security
aid via allies who often act as proxies. To be sure, the Soviet ally phenome-
non is complex, and the use of the term does not necessarily imply that the
U.S.S.R. is directing the foreign policy of allied or semi-allied countries; in
some instances, the contrary might be more true. Thus, the Soviet Union
might be perceived at times as a proxy of quasi-independent Cuba in Africa
(Angola and Ethiopia), and in the Caribbean Basin (Nicaragua, Grenada, and
El Salvador). As an actor having a great interest in and knowledge of the
Caribbean Basin region, it was Cuba that discovered the revolutionary oppor-
tunities in both Nicaragua and Grenada. It could be argued that Cuba drew the
Soviet Union into the region, much as Vietnam helped to deepen Soviet in-
volvement in Southeast Asia. In the final analysis, however, the Soviet Union
exercises leverage, if not control, over key decisionmaking by their allies.
Moreover, the Soviets also benefit from the Cuban and Vietnamese ventures
in strategic areas of the Third World, and one might add the activities of Libya
and North Korea. East European involvement, both in Africa and in the
Caribbean Basin, has been much more limited than that of Cuba and Libya.
As illustrated by the Grenadian experience, the intensity and scope of So-
viet allied involvement in the Third World varies from state to state, even
among Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) nations. This depends upon the
general nature of each nation's alliance with the U.S.S.R., internal conditions
and interests, and particularly the need to reinforce the regime's legitimacy.
(Among the most involved countries have been East Germany, Czechoslova-
kia, and Bulgaria; generally less involved have been Poland and Hungary; Ro-
mania generally has pursued autonomous policies.)
The strategic objectives of some junior Soviet allies like Cuba are formu-
lated independently, but must win the approval of the Soviets, who provide
substantial military and economic assistance. In spite of frequent tactical dis-
agreements such as those witnessed in Grenada in October 1983, the division
of labor among Soviet allies ultimately favors Soviet global interests. By em-
ploying Cuban personnel, the Soviets avoid damage to their reputation in the
international community, do not directly provoke the U.S., and are even able
to blame others for errors.
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The impact on the Soviets and their allies in radical Third World regimes
caused by the U.S. /East Caribbean intervention in Grenada should neither be
exaggerated nor underestimated. The intervention was a watershed in the his-
tory of the Caribbean Basin. (The last watershed appeared to have been in the
1950's when Western labor movements won over the pro-Soviet labor move-
ment.) The failure of Leninism in Grenada can be interpreted as a general fail-
ure of Leninist temptation in an environment such as the East Caribbean
where the prevailing political culture is democratic and parliamentarian.
The decline of Leninism in Grenada sent reverberations throughout the So-
viet alliance system. The intervention in Grenada came as a surprise in the So-
viet Union, where it was taken as an important signal that America may be re-
covering from the Vietnam syndrome, and may once again be prepared (as in
the 1950's and 1960's) to use military force to defend its interests. In the
months following the Grenadian intervention, the Soviets appeared to be reas-
sessing their costs and benefits of support for revolutionary forces in the
Caribbean Basin. Although the intervention added a dimension to the policy-
making process in Moscow, it did not trigger a wholesale reappraisal of So-
viet foreign policy. The operation was too small, too simple to be compared
with what Vietnam demanded, or what Nicaragua may require. Among other
things, the long-term impact will depend on the results of the 1984 U.S. Presi-
dential elections, and on the policies of the future administration concerning
aspiring Leninist forces in the Third World in general, and in the Caribbean
Basin in particular.
Grenada also had an impact on the perceptions of other Communist and
radical Third World leaders. The intervention indicated that Soviet allies out-
side the immediate Soviet sphere of influence were not automatically assured
of Moscow's protection, even when faced with a mortal challenge from impe-
rialism. These are troubling implications for Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia,
and even Cuba. The Soviet failure to protect Grenada explains to Communists
and their socialist-oriented allies why the U.S.S.R. has avoided contracting
military alliances (with implicit military commitments) with the more vulner-
able Communist states of Albania, North Korea, and Vietnam (before 1978).
Fidel Castro may now be even more greatly concerned about the ambiguous
Soviet commitment to Cuba in the case of direct conflict with the United
States. Unlike their behavior in their own periphery (or even in remote regions
of Africa), Soviet Union leaders are less able or willing to support pro-Soviet
regimes in the American backyard, particularly when Washington is willing
to protect its interests with military force. After Grenada, the Caribbean may
be a lower priority on Castro's agenda, while he may rededicate his efforts to
expand Cuban influence in Central America.
Initially, the intervention in Grenada had a considerable impact in Nicara-
gua, where the Sandinistas had earlier anticipated a "Grenada-style" inter-
vention in their own country. (Junta leader Daniel Ortega was said to have
sent his family out of Nicaragua immediately after the invasion of Grenada.)
U.S. pressure in the form of military exercises in the Caribbean and Central
America, U.S. sponsorship of revolutionary activities in the region, and the
Grenada intervention created a bunker mentality in Nicaragua, and proved to
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the Sandinistas that there was a limit to U.S. patience. Despite this sobering
effect on Managua, the impact of Grenada on Nicaragua should not be overes-
timated. The intervention contributed to a noticeable weakening of Nicara-
guan support for guerrillas in El Salvador, and increased the pressures to-
wards negotiations with the Duarte government. However, it sharpened
Managua's obstinance, and played into the hands of the hard-liners such as
Minister of the Interior, Tomas Borge. For him, -the intervention served as
proof of a forthcoming U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.
Some residual effects of the intervention were evident elsewhere in the Car-
ibbean Basin, particularly in Surinam. Under pressure from Brazil, but also
because of events in Grenada and just hours after the U.S. intervention on Oc-
tober 26th, Surinam expelled Cuban advisors and diplomatic ties with Cuba
were reduced to a minimum. The Cubans were held responsible for the bloody
October 19th coup. The expulsion decision appeared to have been made after
the anti-Bishop coup, but the U.S. intervention may have accelerated the dis-
engagement. Recent developments such as improved relations between Nica-
ragua and Surinam suggest that the impact of the intervention has dissipated
somewhat.
It is not surprising that in Asia and Africa (particularly in Angola and Ethio-
pia) the effects of the U.S. intervention in Grenada were not as profound as
they were in the Caribbean Basin. However, even leaders in Ethiopia and An-
gola probably were surprised by Soviet and Cuban inability to support Gre-
nada. The action in Grenada conveyed a message about U.S. resolve which
may support the U.S. "constructive engagement" strategy in Southern
Africa. The intervention was viewed as a positive sign by the Angolan anti-
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerrilla forces such
as the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) which in
fall of 1984 increased the scope of its activities to include the capital Luanda.
It also sounded a positive note among Afghan freedom fighters.
While the Grenada intervention raised the costs of Soviet and Cuban sup-
port for revolutionary activities in geographically remote regions, its effect
upon Third World revolutionary regimes is still unclear. If followed by long-
term U.S. strategy to curb Soviet/Cuban influence in Third World regions,
and a successful stabilization in Grenada and the Caribbean Basin as a whole,
the impact of the intervention may be more lasting than some observers have
anticipated.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
Most conferees agreed that the U.S. /East Caribbean intervention in Grenada
was an extraordinary yet necessary measure. Although the detrimental conse-
quences of the intervention to U.S. relations with Western Europe and some
Third World countries were acknowledged, most conferees agreed that in the
long run, U.S. inaction in Grenada was fraught with grave consequences for
the security of the United States and East Caribbean nations. For example,
U.S. inaction could have led to demoralization of friendly nations in the Car-
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ibbean region, and elsewhere. The extraordinary circumstances preceding the
U.S. decision to intervene, such as the killing of a popular Prime Minister and
several Cabinet members, the uncertain status of American students, and the
urgent request for help by East Caribbean nations, made intervention an entic-
ing option for U.S. policymakers.
There is no conclusive evidence of an immediate, direct threat to U.S. se-
curity interests due to conditions in Grenada. Had a military buildup taken
place in the future, a threat to U.S. security interests could have become a re-
ality, and it would have been more difficult to effect a reversal. However, the
prevailing consensus among members of the Organization of East Caribbean
States (OECS) in 1983 was that Grenada's military build-up had threatening
implications for the region. There is no doubt that Mr. Reagan's decision
prevented the consolidation of a more brutal Leninist, and more pro-Soviet,
regime.
It is imperative that U.S. policymakers pursue a vigorous and sustained
program of political and economic stabilization in Grenada. Regardless of its
size, Grenada is a challenging test of American resolve and commitment to
democratic values. Therefore, by democratic means, the United States must
do its utmost to prevent the return to rule of Eric Gairy or another NJM dicta-
torship that would be a serious blow to U.S. credibility and sincerity.
The successful military intervention in Grenada must be followed by long-
term economic assistance. By political and economic means, the U.S. must
seek truly to restore the democratic process in Grenada. In this effort, the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy should develop educational and research
institutions for study of causes and conditions of years of oppression under
Gairy and the NJM, and contribute to the democratic education of future gen-
erations of Grenada and other Caribbean countries. The lure of oppressive
rule to the power-hungry of both right and left is a lesson that should not be
forgotten, as it is applicable to the region as a whole.
A point eloquently made at the conference was that the Third World arena
matters little in terms of geopolitical struggle between East and West. Most
participants either explicitly or implicitly challenged this assumption. Since
the late 1950's, superpower competition in the Third World, and the potential
ignition of global conflict, has been a central issue for U.S. policymakers. As
always, prevention of superpower confrontation and escalation of conflict in
the Third World should be given highest priority in U.S. strategic planning.
An understanding and appreciation of the Third World's historical, politi-
cal, economic, and social diversity is essential for a successful and sensitive
U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin region. It is simplistic to attribute the
source of conflict solely to Soviet and Cuban policies; equally naive is the no-
tion that poverty is the cause of the problem. What is undeniable is that the
U.S.S.R., its allies, and proxies often take effective advantage of political in-
stability or crisis in developing nations. This has been particularly true over
the last decade as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and, along with Cuba
and other proxies, became active in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen.
Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans provided substantial security aid (weap-
ons and advisors) to revolutionary forces in,Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Gre-
nada.
Given the centrality of the Soviet-American competition in Third World
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areas, U.S. policymakers must abandon short-term strategies that address
short-term crises; instead, we must develop consistent long-term strategies de-
signed to avoid conflict and control future crises effectively.
The Caribbean Basin is especially important to the United States because of
its geographic proximity. The Basin constitutes a vital passageway for petro-
leum and other important raw materials, and would assume critical strategic
importance if the United States were to be involved in an overseas conven-
tional war. In that event, a growing Soviet/Cuban military presence in the
Basin could endanger U.S. logistical support for NATO forces in Europe, as
well as the delivery of strategic materials to the United States. The United
States also has compelling economic interests in the Caribbean Basin by vir-
tue of the large private business investments there. The safeguarding of U.S.
interests in the region and domestic stability require preventing abrupt eco-
nomic dislocation, massive immigration, and hostile radicalization of Carib-
bean political life.
The Reagan administration has recognized the importance of Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean Basin to the United States, and has directed attention to
this long-neglected region. Formation of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America (chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger) was an important step
toward devising long-term viable policies. U.S. officials should be more visi-
ble in their support and implementation of legislation that is based on the rec-
ommendations of the Kissinger Commission report.
Beyond the scope of the work of the Bipartisan Commission, there is an ur-
gent need to anticipate long-term challenges to the United States, not only in
Central America (the only region dealt with by the Bipartisan Commission),
but also in the Caribbean Basin, South America, and other parts of the Third
World. An analysis of NJM strategy in Grenada suggests linkages among the
revolutionary forces of Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.
These perceived linkages are very much part of Soviet and Cuban strategic
thinking, and must not be neglected or overlooked by U.S. policymakers.
There is an equally urgent need to study the dynamics of political and eco-
nomic challenges in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the changes
that are anticipated in Chile in 1989. Of no less importance are the economic
problems and possible political destabilization in Mexico. It is also necessary
to study the strategies and tactics of communist and radical Third World re-
gimes that affect these Central and South American countries, and to examine
the latter's ties with the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. Given the experience in Grenada
and elsewhere in the Third World, Soviet and Cuban perceptions and policies
deserve special attention by U.S. policymakers.
We should be better prepared to anticipate and prevent crises in the Third
World whenever possible, and to control those which are unavoidable.
Policymakers need to substitute ideological rigidity with a resilient frame of
mind to understand radical Third World regimes. They should avoid indiscri-
minant labeling of all radical forces as Marxist or Marxist-Leninist, since
these tend to confuse the political and ideological orientation of these groups.
It is ludicrous to call Surinam's LTC Dese Bouterse a Marxist. Careless usage
of the Marxist-Leninist label (even in documents such as the distinguished re-
port of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America) belies a mis-
reading of the complexity and differences existing among Communist and
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radical Third World parties. National Communist parties such as those of
China and Yugoslavia fear Soviet imperialist ambitions, while others such as
Italy's Eurocommunist Party and Yugoslavia's party are of pluralist or semi-
pluralist orientation and refuse the Leninist label. Some radical regimes in the
Third World are not Leninist-oriented. As suggested by the Grenada docu-
ments, radically nationalistic forces coexist with Leninist factions within radi-
cal Third World regimes; the distinction between Leninist and non-Leninist
forces should not be blurred. Because "Leninist-oriented" clearly means hav-
ing both a vanguard party and a pro-Soviet foreign policy, U.S. policymakers
and their advisors should avoid stereotyping and classifying Third World radi-
cal parties.
Politically, U.S. policymakers must support democratic processes in Third
World countries, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean Basin,
that resist oppression, be it of the left or right. We must exercise greater pres-
sure on the El Salvador government than we did before the 1984 election to
curb and eliminate right wing death squads. However, experience indicates
that the extreme left cannot be defeated by wiping out the political center; nor
can we endorse the guerrillas' violent approach. Moreover, we must avoid
creating a double standard by insisting on progress toward democracy in El
Salvador, but not in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas are establishing a re-
gime similar to that which existed in Grenada.
Political and economic aid should be extended to friendly Third World re-
gimes in an amount that each nation can utilize effectively and that is depen-
dent on the observance of basic human rights. The most prudent way to pre-
vent a future Grenada is to strengthen existing ties and encourage more
capable democratic institutions in developing nations. In the Caribbean Basin
in particular, we must help democratic forces resist attempts by the parties in
power to subvert legal and constitutional procedures, as in Grenada under
Gairy, or Guyana under Forbes Burnham. The projected work of the National
Endowment for Democracy is an important step toward these goals. How-
ever, we need to go beyond this framework to develop new and imaginative
ways to accomplish the establishment of capable and responsible democratic
institutions in developing nations.
In terms of politics, the U.S. should promote friendly political ties with
Third World radical~ regimes, excluding only those aligned with the U.S.S.R.
and its allies. Meanwhile, through diplomatic exchange programs, we should
attempt to cultivate political ties with opposition parties of various persua-
sions, while becoming better acquainted with and more knowledgable about
their leaderships. The Carter administration erred by failing to do this in 1979
in Grenada. It is imperative that we understand various elites and counter-
elites in radical Third World nations. We must upgrade and expand our diplo-
matic personnel through permanent representation in each of the developing
nations, no matter how minuscule their size, heeding the British example. The
paucity of U.S. intelligence about the political development in Grenada points
out that intelligence gathering and evaluating activities in the area must be im-
proved.
According to East Caribbean sources, in 1980-81 there were no experts on
Grenada whatsoever in the U.S. intelligence community. Within the U.S.
governmental structures, we must strengthen and disseminate appropriate in-
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telligence evaluations. Moreover, we must train and prepare credible and dy-
namic diplomatic cadres with adequate linguistic abilities to cope with new
challenges in radical areas of the Third World.
The economic situation throughout Central America is appalling. We need
to allocate greater resources to encourage economic development in emerging
nations, particularly in those geographically near to the United States. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Central American Project are new pro-
grams urgently needed to formulate economic assistance packages and im-
prove the floor of credit and investment in Central America and the Caribbean
Islands. Immediate economic aid, from both the private and public sectors, is
imperative-even before political solutions are found.6
Immediate emergency aid should be followed by the long-term five-year
economic assistance programs recommended by the Bipartisan Commission.
The success of this approach will require not only American resources, but
also bipartisan public support, and above all, patience, as there will be no
quick fix. However, financial aid alone is not the answer to all the problems
of the Caribbean Basin, In fact, economic assistance to some Caribbean is-
lands is relatively high at present, and may be at the upper limit of what these
nations can absorb for the time being. Other more urgent needs include con-
centrated assistance in developing a technical infrastructure (roads, ports,
communications, etc.), advice on planning and budgeting programs, and edu-
cation of economic and financial experts. We should employ both private and
public sector approaches to provide this assistance.
The U.S. Government and its citizens must not entertain unrealistic expec-
tations for Central America and the Caribbean Basin. We must recognize that
despite the best efforts, at least some of the Caribbean nations may never
achieve self-sustained economic growth and therefore will continue to depend
on economic aid from the United States, Canada, and other industrialized na-
tions.
U.S. security assistance must be an integral part of U.S. strategy vis-a-vis
Third World nations. Whereas security threats in many remote parts of Asia
and Africa tend not to affect vital U.S. interests, threats in the Caribbean
Basin do. In the Caribbean Basin, threats to a given nation's stability may not
always be caused by deteriorating socio-economic conditions, or by the
U.S.S.R. and Cuba, but by coup attempts organized by North American
gangsters (Dominica), or by bands of modem-day buccaneers (Barbados).
Therefore, in the Caribbean Basin we must not separate diplomacy and
force. Although, one cannot give exact recommendations as to how, or under
what circumstances, force should be used, it should be remembered that direct
use of American force should only be carried out under extraordinary circum-
stances such as those in Grenada in October 1983. However, in some extreme
circumstances the careful use of direct U.S. military force may again become
necessary.
The indirect application of force (military exercises, for example) is the
preferred approach. The expanding U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean,
and the military exercises in Honduras, in conjunction with the Grenada inter-
vention, have had a sobering effect upon Havana and Managua. Whenever
prudent, the U.S. should continue to use indirect military force in peacetime
to further its foreign policy objectives, particularly by regular and irregular bi-
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lateral and multilateral exercises in the Caribbean Basin and Central America.
To be effective, joint military exercises and other forms of military activities
in the Caribbean Basin, as elsewhere, require an extraordinary sensitive touch
on the part of the U.S. military in recognizing our allies' national pride and
self-respect.
Responsible arms transfers and other forms of security aid to friendly Third
World nations, taking into account the reasonable security needs of each
country and each country's record on and human rights, criteria, are also an
option. In this respect, Congress should repeal Section 660 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act which prohibits the use of U.S. foreign assistance funds for train-
ing national police in developing nations. Surely such training should be per-
mitted in countries having Westminster parliamentarian political cultures such
as those found in the Caribbean. We should also help strengthen the coast
guard, internal security, and intelligence capabilities of friendly developing
nations in the Caribbean, and in the democratic nations of Central America
such as Costa Rica.
The experience of Grenada suggests that one of the most complex difficul-
ties facing the United States is to counter the activities of Soviet junior part-
ners such as Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and some of the East Euro-
pean countries. It is one of the most serious security problems to face the
United States in the last decade. An important lesson coming out of the Gre-
nada experience is the recognition of the need for the United States to develop
an effective counter-strategy which would multiply and intensify the con-
straints on the Soviets and their allies in strategic regions of the Third World.
Inducements and pressures need to be exercised upon the U.S.S.R., Cuba,
Libya, the WTO nations, and other countries whose Third World policies pur-
posely serve Soviet security and political interests. The indebtedness and
otherwise serious economic problems facing nations such as Cuba and Nicara-
gua provide the United States with some opportunities to employ negative in-
centives to curb their activities. The U.S. Government should do its utmost to
coordinate Western credit policies toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and other Soviet
junior partners.
In addition to various forms of pressure, and indirect use of force, the
United States should not discourage allies like former Egyptian President An-
war Sadat from actively pursuing policies aimed at hampering the activities of
Soviet allies. While exerting pressure upon Soviet allies, we should not dis-
count proposals for negotiation when offered by regimes such as those in Ni-
caragua and Cuba. However, we should guard against naivete: given Cuba's
and Nicaragua's expressed commitment to revolution, any negotiated solution
must be based on reciprocity, verifiable agreements, and careful monitoring.
Soviet and Cuban military ties with Nicaragua should be unacceptable, and
therefore nonnegotiable.
The Grenada documents reveal some tactical differences between the So-
viet Union and Cuba, as well as between various competing factions in radi-
the United
cal, socialist-oriented regimes. Using new and imaginative tactics,
States can play upon those existing and future tactical differences, thereby
undermining Soviet partnership policies. In some cases, we might consider
the option of furnishing aid to insurgents fighting against recognized oppres-
sive governments. Other means can be devised to co-opt non-Leninist insur-
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gents who might otherwise develop close ties with the U.S.S.R. via Leninist
elements such as Coard's group in Grenada, or that of First Secretary Shafik
Handel of the Communist Party in El Salvador. Such a strategy might have
been quite effective in both Nicaragua and Grenada prior to 1979.
The experience of Grenada should have dispelled any preexisting misper-
ceptions regarding Third World revolutions. We should neither exaggerate
nor underestimate the ties of some of these revolutionaries with the Soviet
Union and its allies. Each revolution must be judged independently, and we
should distinguish between Soviet/Cuban-fomented strife in the Third World,
and revolutionary situations indigenous to developing countries.
No American foreign policy can be successful without the bipartisan sup-
port of the American people. Implementing policy over a period of time is dif-
ficult in the American political system. Long-term U.S. policies recom-
mended by the Bipartisan National Commission on Central America require
strong domestic support and an enduring commitment, as does any effective
U.S. counter-strategy to Soviet/Cuban policies in the Third World.
Obviously, the U.S. presidential election season does not provide the most
propitious time for bipartisan support on any issue. Yet it is very encouraging
ing that so far the issue of Soviet/Cuban activities in the Caribbean Basin in
general, and of the Grenadian intervention in particular, has not become a
subject of controversy between the presidential candidates. In fact, the inter-
vention in Grenada wqs subsequently supported by candidate Walter Mon-
dale, who declared that if he had been President, he too would have used mili-
tary force "to go there and protect U.S. lives".7 However, regardless of who
assumes office on November 6, 1984, every effort should be made to develop
long-term American policies to cope with revolutionary regimes faced with
the Soviet/Cuban threat, and the threat to the United States via these coun-
tries. The Soviets and their allies place great importance on reaching, and
even influencing, public opinion in the United States. Indeed, one of the cap-
tured documents in Grenada was a telephone book listing sympathetic media
and other useful contacts in the United States.
Much as been written about the need to educate the American public con-
cerning Soviet-American arms control and strategic balances, but little has
been done to generate public interest in revolutionary problems in the Third
World, and in Soviet/Cuban attempts to exploit them. It is up to U.S. Govern-
ment agencies and private organizations to foster more research and to in-
crease public awareness about Third World revolutions as they relate to So-
viet, Cuban, and allied proxy strategies and tactics.
There is likewise a great need to educate the American people about Soviet
efforts to reduce the U.S. capacity to respond to and challenge Soviet strat-
egy. This reduced capacity has been achieved not only by the impressive So-
viet military buildup of the last decade, but also by indirect political maneu-
vering and propagandizing. These latter efforts are aimed at distorting the
nature of local Third World conflicts, presenting each as a new Vietnam and a
menacing prelude to general war. More funding should be made available for
East-West and Third World specialists to study these problems, because ex-
perts from both groups often have differing perspectives. A divided foregin
policy establishment and divided community of foreign policy specialists in
the United States seriously inhibits the formulation of and support for U.S.
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foreign policy. We do ourselves a great disservice in speaking of liberal ver-
sus conservative positions regarding Soviet power and the Third World. We
should put all such ideological stereotypes behind us, and work toward a na-
tional consensus in support of realistic and effective long-term policies. These
efforts should not be sponsored only by a few elitist institutions, but should
also tap the talent of a broad cross-section of educational and research institu-
tions.
Funding should be provided to produce a first-rate series of television docu-
mentaries for sustained and expanded coverage of activities of radical Third
World regimes and aspects of Soviet and Cuban policy toward the Third
World. National Public Radio should broadcast aspects of Soviet and Cuban
activities in the Third World. There should be more extensive interaction on
these subjects among U.S. Government agencies and academic and research
institutions. New research centers dealing with Soviet involvement in the
Third World should be funded, and the U.S. Government should take a more
active role in bringing about the interaction of Soviet and Third World experts
in a number of short- and long-term projects.
An extensive effort must be made to bridge existing divisions on these is-
sues through education of the American public. This will promote signifi-
cantly the consensus building needed to implement and sustain long-term for-
eign policies intended to counter deletorious Soviet/Cuban strategy in the
Third World.
1. Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
2. A handful of documents, perhaps ten, appear to affect the privacy of U.S. Citizens. These will
not be available for public scrutiny.
3. Karen Brutents, The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies, Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1979, p. 106.
4. J. Valenta and V. Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada", Problems of Communism, July-August
1984, p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 11.
6. For a more substantial discussion, see William H. Bolin "Central America's Real Economic
Help Is Wanted Now," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1984, pp. 1096-1108.
7. The Washington Post, September 19, 1984.
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CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Vernon V. Aspaturian
Director of Slavic and Soviet Language Studies
Pennsylvania State University
Mr. John Blacker
Deputy Coordinator for Public Diplomacy
Dr. Georges Fauriol
Fellow, Caribbean Studies-Senior Research Staff
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
Dr. Charles Gati
Department of Political Science
Columbia University and Union College
for Latin America Dr. Toby T. Gati
U.S. Department of State Vice President for Policy Studies
Dr. Sherman Blandin United Nations Association
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs Dr. Alexander George
Naval Postgraduate School Department of Political Science
Col. Brian J. Bosch, USA Stanford University
Defense Intelligence Officer for Latin America Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes
Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Richard C. Brown
Deputy Asst. Secretary for the Caribbean
U.S. Department of State
Dr. Michael Clough
Coordinator of African Studies
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Mr. Charles E. Courtney
Associate Director, Bureau of Programs
United States Information Agency
Mr. Edward Desmond
Correspondent, Time Magazine
Dr. Jorge Dominguez
Department of Government
Harvard University
Professional Staff, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate
Mr. John Helgerson
Director, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis
Central Intelligence Agency
Professor Jerry Hough
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution and
Kennan Institute
Mr. Karel Jezdinsky
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Mr. Bradford Johnson
Kennan Institute
Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
Dr. Herbert J. Ellison Dr. Stephen S. Kaplan
Kennan Institute Central Intelligence Agency
Woodrow Wilson International Center Dr. Andrzej Korbonski
for Scholars Political Science Department
Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. University of California at Los Angeles
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Mr. Colin Legum
Department of State
Dr. Mark Falcoff
Resident Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Tom J. Farer
Distinguished Professor,
Rutgers School of Law and
Chair of the Inter-American Committee
on Human Rights of the OAS, 1980-82
Senior Editor, London Observer
Dr. George Liska
School of Advanced International Studies
and Department of Political Science
Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Winston Lord
President, Council on Foreign Relations
Cdr. William Lyda
United States Navy
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 Approved For Release 2008/08/20: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900070001-7
Colonel James McDevitt, USA
National Defense University
Strategic Concepts Development Center
Dr. Anthony P. Maingot del Barco
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
Florida International University
Dean Kneale Marshall
Naval Postgraduate School
Mr. Michael Massing
Contributor to
Atlantic Monthly Magazine
Hon. Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Dr. Charles Maynes
Editor, Foreign Policy
Dr. Constantine Menges
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for Latin American Affairs
National Security Council
Dr. Richard Millett
Director of History
Southern Illinois University
Dr. Richard Pipes
Department of History
Harvard University
Dr. Susan Purcell
Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations
Dr. Condi Rice
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
Hon. Gilbert A. Robinson
Special Advisor to the Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy
U.S. Department of State
Hon. Edward Rowny (Lt. Gen., USA Ret.)
Chair, U.S. START Committee
Office of the Director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Inter-American Affairs
Provost David Schrady
Naval Postgraduate School
Lt. Frederick F. Shaheen
Naval Postgraduate School
Hon. Sally A. Shelton
International Business Government Counselors
Commodore Robert H. Shumaker, USN
Superintendent
Naval Postgraduate School
Ms. Sonia Sluzar
Senior Editor, Problems of Communism
United States Information Agency
Mr. Dan Southerland
Christian Science Monitor
COMO Robert Steele, USN
Dir. Pol.-Mil. Policy
and Current Plans Div. OP61
U.S. Department of Defense
Ms. Kay Stevenson
Policy Support Programs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Dr. Dana Sweet
Chief, Cuba-Caribbean Section
Defense Intelligence Agency
Colonel George Thompson, USAF
Deputy Director, Policy Support Programs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Dr. Jiri Valenta
Coordinator, Soviet and East European Studies
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Mrs. Virginia Valenta
Monterey, California
Hon. Vernon Walters
Ambassador-at-Large
U.S. Department of State
Mr. W. Bruce Weinrod
Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies
The Heritage Foundation
Dr. Robert Wesson
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Stanford University
Dr. Howard Wiarda
Director of Hemispheric Studies
American Enterprise Institute
Professor of Political Science
Amherst College
Dr. Walter Max Woods
Dean of Educational Development,
Executive Director, Office of
Continuing Education
Naval Postgraduate School
Dr. Dov Zakheim
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy and Resources)
U.S. Department of Defense
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 Approved For Release 2008/08/20: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01900070001-7
The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies is a program of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and is located in
the Smithsonian Institution Building on the Mall in Washington, D.C.
Established as the first international division of the Wilson Center in
1974, the Kennan Institute is dedicated to fostering advanced research
on Russia and the USSR.
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