SEMANTICS AND STRUCTURE OF DISINFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 3, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
UL1 V Girt/%~0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Semantics and Structure of Disinformation
1. We have given some thought to the issues raised in your
correspondence with Cherne, Levenstein, et al., regarding the
semantics and structure of disinformation. I agree on the
importance of undertaking a serious effort to examine these
issues. There are a couple of reasons why I believe such an
effort should begin with a broad, theoretical inquiry--probably
in a small conference outside the Agency--as a first step toward
possible applications.
2. First, it seems to us that the question of the use of
words and concepts as weapons against our security interests is
more than simply a Soviet, or a SOYA, problem. While it
certainly is true that the Soviet Union can often skillfully
employ such techniques in its Communist jargon, a similar threat
is real enough from countries in Latin America, the Middle East,
and other areas of the worldt.where--to cite the simplest
examples-- the epithets "gringos," "yankees," "infidels," and
"devils," etc., have resonance among those predisposed against
Western ideals and values.
3. A second, related question is how to measure US or
Western vulnerability to the use of rhetorical devices by the
Soviets or others in their disinformation efforts. While a good
case can be made that democracy today faces a real danger from
the decline of clear thinking and language use in the U.S.--as
Levenstein has forcefully argued--others might argue that Western
democracies are inherently strong and not especially vulnerable
to the external application of such devices. Just how vulnerable
are we? Obviously, any observer's judgment depends in part on
his cultural, historical, and philosophical perspectives.
4. Regardless of the extent of our ility, there are
things we could do to protect ourselves. pointed to
two important needs: First, to identify and define present-day
propaganda techniques and, second, to examine the role that
modern communication media play in influencing mass psychology.
As these two are closely interconnected, they could form the
basis of the theoretical inquiry that I believe should be
undertaken.
5. If an appropriate effort to tackle the problem were
undertaken within the Agency--say, under the auspices of the
CONFIDENTIAL CL BY SIGNER 6_1C)
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7 OADR
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
UUNI-IULNIIHL
National Intelligence Council or within FBIS--the resource cost
could be significant (if, indeed, we have the experts in
semantics, philosophy, etc., that the task would require).
6. I am therefore inclined to think that a good beginning
would be to arrange funding of a small but high-powered
conference--the Department of State has indicated a willingness
to sponsor such an affair after 1 October--that would bring
together respected academics and other specialists with a wide
variety of semantic, philosophical, and cultural expertise, as
well as knowledge of modern media techniques. Possible hosts
might include the Hoover Institution, the Rand Corporation, or
the Council on Foreign Relations.
7. If you think that this is a good way to beg'
the problem, it clearly would be worthwhile to invit
(and perhaps one or two others) for a day or so of consultations
involving several Agency officers in working up an agenda for
such a conference. SOVA could provide the principal contact
point for such consultations and for subsequent dealings with
State on questions of participation, location, etc. It would be
desirable, however, to involve other Directorates in the early
stage of planning--specifically, an experienced CA officer from
the DO and an old hand from the FBIS Analysis Group. Together
with the SOVA rep they could ensure a broad but well focused
agenda relevant to national security concerns.
Memoranda from DCI, 8 and 19 June 1984
-2-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Semantics and Structure of Disinformation
DDI/SOVA :mb (3 July 84)
Original - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - D/SOVA
1 - PAD
1 - Originator
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Executive Registry
84- 2560/9
1. The attached is on the subject of the use which the other side
makes of words and 'n damaging our reputation and diminishing our co rent 1 policies. s a very knowledgeable social democrat who has
been following communist propaganda for over forty years. If you think he
would be helpful in formulating the project you and I talked about, I think
he would be available for consultation.
2. Also attached is a paper I asked Pat Moynihan, who has pronounced
on the subject, to give me. I'd like to talk about how we might address
this subject which everybody seems to think is as important as it is
elusive.
William J. Casey
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7
Executive Registry
L84- 2560/
8 June 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Semantics and Structure of Disinformation
Here is material I talked to you about this morning on our
vulnerability to words, verbal formulations and concepts used as
weapons against our security interests. I am groping around for
a way to get some concentrated brain power, high level policy
attention and possible 'public attention paid to this subject --
perhaps a small analytical group, perhaps a conference, perhaps a
research program.
William J. Casey
Attachments:
Commentary, June 1984
Copies of correspondence
25X1
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/09/26: CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010007-7