CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: July 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
? TOP SECRET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
25 July 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Chairman
SUBJECT: Congressional Presentation on Unauthorized Disclosures
Pursuant to your instructions at the 17 July 1984 IC Staff meeting,
attached is another try at a proposed presentation to the Congressional
oversight committees on leaks. It stresses the damage done by leaks. The
examples cited are sensitive, including SCI. It requests support of a
stronger. stance throughout the government on unauthorized disclosures and for
help in obtaining legislation to facilitate theprosecution of leakers.
Attachment: a/s
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
TOP SECRET
DCI Presentation on Leaks
for Intelligence Oversight Committees
I come before you today because I need the help of the Congress to carry
out my statutory responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and
methods.
When the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted, there were relatively
few recipients of highly sensitive intelligence; the sophisticated technical
collection systems which produce a high volume of useful intelligence had not
been developed; and the people who used intelligence products seemed to be
much more responsible in their treatment of classified information.
Today, things have changed. More people than ever, throughout the
government, have come to rely upon regular, in-depth intelligence reporting on
a broad range of topics. Much of this reporting is based upon sources and
methods that are incredibly susceptible to interdiction, destruction,
countermeasures or disinformation. The most difficult change to deal with,
however, is the tendency of cleared and trusted individuals to reveal
classified intelligence to unauthorized persons. While espionage and treason
by Americans remain relatively rare, the revelation of our intelligence
secrets to our adversaries through the news media has become a national
disgrace. Worse yet, it threatens the credibility of our intelligence in
peacetime and the continued existence of our most important intelligence
sources and methods in the event of hostilities.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
? TOP SECRET
The problem of leaks has reached unprecedented proportions. Scarcely a
day goes by without the publication of some purported information about the
U.S. intelligence services, the information they gather, or the operations
they conduct.
When I speak of leaks, let me make clear that I am not concerned about
such things as premature disclosure of partisan political matters, or
"whistle-blowing" about wrongdoing or corruption in public office. My concern
about leaks is restricted to the publication of unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence information.
Leaks, as I define them, are a two-part phenomenon. The news media
publish or broadcast the leaked information. The actual unauthorized
disclosure is committed by someone who, like you and me, is cleared for
official access to the information--someone who has accepted the solemn
responsibility not to disclose it except in the performance of his or her
duties.
It is for this reason that I speak to you, who regularly and officially
receive classified intelligence. We share a grave responsibility and a sacred
trust. I am required by the National Security Act of 1947 to protect
intelligence sources and methods. Each of you has given your word to protect
such information as well. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us who are allied
in this effort to help each other combat this pernicious problem.
Unfortunately, the problem lies with some few individuals among us who
have official access to intelligence secrets. Since we don't disseminate
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
TOP SECRET
classified intelligence directly to the news media, these individuals are
responsible for unauthorized disclosures. They create the problem, not the
journalists who simply publish what is given to them.
Why is the publication of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence a
serious problem? Because it damages the national security of the United
States in several ways. First, it tells our adversaries what we know about
their strengths, weaknesses and intentions. It also tells them, directly or
indirectly, how we collected the information and advertises the capabilities
and vulnerabilities of our collection efforts. Second, it enables hostile
nations to predict more effectively how we will respond to the intelligence we
gather, tells them how they can stop our collection activities, and finally,
it enables them to feed us disinformation through sources and methods we have.
every reason to trust and rely upon: Over the long term, this could lead to a
disaster that would make the Pearl Harbor attack look like a picnic. Third,
leaks lead to the loss of agents and the cooperation of intelligence services
of friendly foreign countries. When I speak of the loss of agents, I don't
necessarily mean the imprisonment or execution of brave people who take
incredible risks to support freedom and democracy. Although such things
regrettably do happen, our ability to gather vital intelligence is harmed when
an agent decides cooperation with U.S. intelligence is too risky, because
everthing we do seems to appear in the press. Or when another country's
intelligence service decides to hold back important data because we don't seem
capable of protecting it from unauthorized disclosure, the U.S. intelligence
TOP SECF~ET
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
TOP SECRET
effort is severely handicapped. Finally, the economic cost of leaks to the
U.S. taxpayer can be staggering. As one intelligence operation after another
has its usefulness destroyed by media publicity, we must provide new ways to
learn what we must know about the capabilities and intentions of nations whose
avowed historical intention is to destroy our system of government and our way
of life. Developing human sources is a risky and expensive business. In
terms of cost, the development of new technical collection capabilities to
replace those which have been compromised and countermeasured is
astronomical. The American people can ill afford to have our economy burdened
with such unnecessary costs rising from unauthorized disclosures. And yet we
cannot afford not to know what our adversaries are about.
Let me give you some illustrations of how the U.S. intelligence effort is
harmed by unauthorized disclosures.
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
TOP SECRET
This story could have a severely limiting effect on our ability to
recruit agents abroad. If the prospective agent can anticipate that his CIA
contact will be identified in the U.S. media, he will have grave doubts about
accepting the risks involved.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
It was a COMINT compromise of the worst sort, in that
it revealed U.S. capabilities and ongoing operations. The result was that the
The information underlying this story was
extremely closely held. Whatever advantage may have been gained by release of
this information must be measured against jeopardy to our source.
These are only a few of the most serious publications in 1984 of
unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. In order to do something
about this porous situation, we need your help and that of other influential
people in the national government. We need to convince a lot of people that
leaking intelligence to the press is a dangerous game. Just because our
government and our nation are not destroyed by a single leak doesn't mean that
we will not eventually suffer devastating damage from the constant revelation
of our most sensitive secrets.
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
TOP SECRET
Often, the sources of these unauthorized disclosures do not believe their
acts are damaging. Some state they only discuss information that has already
been published.
Many unauthorized disclosures are relatively minor. Cumulatively,
however, they can be fatal, like the ancient Chinese torture of the death of a
thousand cuts. As each bit of information is published, a new piece is handed
to our adversaries, enabling them to assemble the mosaic of what we know about
them and how we know it.
We need the intelligence oversight committees to help bring a message to
the Congress and to the public. We need your help in making it known that
when people entrusted with our secrets leak them, they jeopardize our freedom
and that such activity will not be tolerated.
I have taken some first steps i'n the CIA to drive this message home.
Recently, I have taken severe actions against certain senior staff and
consultant individuals who mishandled classified material. Steps taken have
included suspension or revocation of security clearances, termination of
employment and referral to the Department of Justice for legal action.
Unpleasant though these actions may be, it is essential that others in the
government follow suit if we are to introduce a credible element of risk to
the act of betraying sensitive intelligence to the media. We need to convince
everyone that leaking classified intelligence for the "right reasons" is just
as damaging to our security as leaking for the "wrong reasons," including
espionage. Current attitudes about leaks are so ingrained that we need a
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
? TOP SECRET
clear, unmistakable message that things have changed. Leaks will be
investigated and leakers penalized, regardless of their status or their
motives.
We need your help also in support of legislation to deal specifically
with unauthorized disclosures. Prosecution under the Espionage Act, although
theoretically possible in leak cases, has never been successfully
undertaken. To prosecute a leak as espionage might strike many people as
driving tacks with a sledge hammer. Nevertheless, we n!ust have a legal weapon
to use against those who pledge their word to uphold the secrecy of classified
information and then dishonor that pledge. The legislation that is needed
would penalize government officials who flout their security obligations, but
would not affect the freedom of the press in any way. Obtaining such
legislation will require broad, bipartisan support in both houses of
Congress. Clearly, the help of the intelligence oversight committees would be
indispensable.
Finally, we need your help in encouraging responsible parties in all
three branches of government to recognize the need to take action to stop the
free flow of intelligence information to the media and to our adversaries
abroad. Support of this effort by word, action and example would be most
welcome.
TOP SECkt~
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
 Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4
Approved For Release 2008/09/26 :CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010046-4