SECOM REPORT ON POLYGRAPH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002800030012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
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DATE 14 February 1984
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to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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LVIVr iLJ i I IML
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-030
14 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM:
SUBJECT: SECOM Report on Polygraph
~~1~ 14 Fig 1984
1. Action Requested: Your approval to disseminate the attached report
to the Intelligence Community. The 49 anecdotal accounts of cases in which
polygraph testing produced data of vital security significance should be of
considerable value in the ongoing Congressional inquiry into use of the
polygraph.
2. Background: The Jackson Amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill
placed a moratorium on expanded use of the polygraph within DoD. The Brooks
Bill, HR 4681, jeopardizes any use of polygraph testing to screen candidates
for access to sensitive intelligence except CIA and NSA employees. Hearings
are now being held on this matter.
3. The data gathered thus far in Congressional studies and hearings tend
to emphasize input by those opposing polygraph testing for security screening
and leak investigations. The Brooks Bill states that polygraph testing has no
validity and suggests that it poses a threat to individual rights of govern-
ment employees. CIA and NSA employees are exempted from the provisions of the
Brooks Bill.
4. The task of proving that polygraph tests always provide totally
accurate indications of truth or falsehood is impossible. Nobody ever said
they did. But the NSA and CIA polygraph programs, which have excellent
records of proper observance of individual rights, could serve as the models
for other agencies' programs to screen those with access to sensitive
intelligence data.
5. The attached report, prepared by the SECOM Personnel Security
Subcommittee for unclassified use, does not address scientific reliability or
other factors emphasized by the Congressional reports. Its sole objective is
to demonstrate that polygraph testing is effective in obtaining relevant
REGRADED "OFFICIAL USE ONLY" CL BY SIGNER
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT DECL OADR
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CONFIDENTIAL
security information that would be unavailable otherwise and that significant
damage to the national security has been averted through polygraph testing.
It cites actual cases of attempts by foreign intelligence services to
penetrate the Intelligence Community; individuals who successfully passed
conventional investigation and were found by polygraph testing to have abused
the trust placed in them; and of polygraph interviews uncovering serious
character defects in persons who otherwise would have been cleared for the
Nation's most sensitive secrets. It shows that polygraph testing works and
that it is an invaluable tool to protect the national security.
6. The SSCI has scheduled hearings on the polygraph for 22 February
1984. NSA has expressed a desire to utilize this report in its testimony.
The Intelligence Community should present the best evidence available in this
hearing.
1 7. Recommendation: That you approve dissemination to the Community of
Attachment:
Chairman, SECOM Personnel Security Subcommittee
memorandum (002-84) dtd. 2 February 1984,
Subject: Polygraph Study
Approved:
V
A/-6` ecto f Central Intelligence
16 FEB 1984
`-
ri Q ,U 5 t4- v- c- tot-
CONFIDENTIAL
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Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/atts
1 - D/ICS Watts
1 - Ex. Reg. w/atts
1 - ICS Reg. w/atts
1 - Subject File w/atts
1 - SECOM Chrono Watts
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-,_. -AN NUt[N B iRL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
Serial: PerSSub-001-84
2 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
Chairman, PerSSub
Polygraph Study
In accordance with your tasking contained in SECOM-D- 25X1
172, dated 11 August 1982, the PerSSub undertook a survey
designed to establish the utility of the polygraph as a security
device within the Intelligence Community. This report represents
the results of that effort.
The survey makes no 25X1
Y pretense of objectivity. It was
desi to demonstrate that the polygraph is useful in eliciting
admissions which would not otherwise be forthcoming by other
investigative means. The survey did not address the scientific
validity of the process, its scientific reliability or the effect
the quality of the examiner's training may have on results. Its
utility in bringing out previously unattained information was the
only concern.
The survey was limited in scope to the period dating
from January 1980 to September 1983, with a few cases drawn from
earlier years. By essentially limiting coverage to this short
timeframe, the survey therefore represents but a sampling of a
larger body of evidence which supports the utility of the
polygraph.
All agencies of the Intelligence Community utilizing
the polygraph contri:.:ited. The identities of the contributing
entities have been masked through a unique numbering system, the
key to which is retained by Chairman, PerSSub. Any inquiries
arising regarding a particular case will be referred by Chairman,
PerSSub to the proper contributor who will respond in keeping
with the policies of the agency involved.
The 49 selected cases are reported in anecdotal style,
contain only the salient facts and are intended to be presentable
in an unclassified forum. The issues run the gamut from
Espionage to Security Violations. Because this is an
Intelligence Community survey, however, numerous criminal cases
from those Intelligence Community agencies having a law-
enforcement function as well were specifically excluded. In each
case, the use of almost-identical wording is intentional to help
preserve the anonymity of the contributor.
!" a. y r r r r r` s r
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Serial: PerSSub-001-84
25X1
The sole conclusion drawn from this effort is that
there exists an ample body of evidence to prove that the
polygraph brings out critical information otherwise denied. The
exemplars are but a fraction of material available to support the
utility of the polygraph. Our contention is not that the
polygraph is perfect but that it is so successful as to justify
its retention in our inventory of investigative tools. Its use,
or threat of its use, was sufficient to deter Christopher John
Boyce from seeking a position at a super-sensitive installation,
and David Henry Barnett from attempting reinstatement with CIA.
In Great Britain, the Russian spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, also
conceded that the polygraph would have deterred him from joining
GCHQ or would have exposed him while there. Again, how many
others have been deterred by threat of polygraph is a matter for
frightening speculation.
25X1
The PerSSub does not endorse the polygraph as a panacea
for a security ills. The polygraph is not considered in
isolation, and is always used in conjunction with other
investigative tools. Recognizing its limitations and applying it
judiciously, the polygraph is essential in obtaining otherwise
unattainable information.
The following 49 anecdotal summaries clearly support
the premise that the polygraph is a valuable and useful tool in
the security programs of the Intelligence Community.
Chairman
Personnel Security Subcommittee
Attachment:
As stated above (summaries)
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was a former member
of the U.S. military, where he had access to classified information. He had
been favorably investigated in conjunction with his prior military service.
Subject was given an applicant screening polygraph examination and showed
deception in response to the question relating to intent to commit espionage
or sabotage against the United States. He made no admissions. During a
reexamination, deception was also noted on questions about clandestine
contacts with representatives of a foreign country. Subject then admitted
that he would sell classified information to a foreign power if it would
guarantee him a comfortable living. He continually denied ever having
committed espionage, having clandestine contacts, or actually having a
specific intent or plan to commit espionage. Deception was still indicated,
however, to questions regarding intent to commit espionage against the United
States and to having had clandestine contacts with agents of foreign powers.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen on active military duty
assigned to an Intelligence Community organization, was polygraphed in
conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. During a series of polygraph
examinations over a two-week period, Subject admitted that he had provided
classified information to a foreign security service without authorization;
had taken classified information to his residence on several occasions; and
had taken uncleared friends to his place of employment to explain the
classified mission and functions of the installation. Subject also revealed he
had been stealing office supplies since 1972, some of which he had sold, and
admitted taking money from office funds and from the desks of co-workers.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph
examination. When deception was indicated regarding counterintelligence
questions, she admitted that while overseas she was cultivated by the host
country intelligence service. The local service proposed that she travel to a
third country as a U.S. citizen under a false identity, and obtain employment
in the target country to gather information. She was to receive training in
intelligence tradecraft. Subject said that after two days of thoughtful
deliberation, she declined the host country's offer. She had not previously
reported this to U.S. authorities.
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, listed on his
security forms foreign travel to a communist-bloc country in conjunction with
previous employment. During a polygraph examination he admitted that during
the trip, in the company of Communist country nationals, he was drugged and an
attempt was made to have him engage in a homosexual act. Later, the
intelligence service of that country requested him to.work for them. Although
Subject claimed he refused, he never reported this entrapment attempt or offer
to any U.S. official. He continued to show deception on the polygraph
examination.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen, was employed in the Intelligence Community in
1980 and granted a TOP SECRET clearance following security processing which
was favorable except for minor illegal drug use. She was warned against
further drug use at that time. Subject received a routine reinvestigation
polygraph in 1983 and admitted to having used marijuana since beginning her
employment. Polygraph examination raised doubts about the truthfulness of her
admissions. She also admitted to identifying classified sites to an Iranian
national whom she dated and discussing her impending foreign assignment with
him.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, was suspected of having contact with the embassy of
a hostile country. Although many indicators of espionage were evident, a
lengthy investigation, complete with a complex surveillance, failed to produce
hard evidence of espionage. During a personal interview, Subject denied all
allegations. Subject submitted to a polygraph examination and deception was
noted concerning contact with a hostile intelligence service and passage of
classified information. Subject subsequently admitted to contacting the
hostile service, collecting a large quantity of highly classified information
and passing it to that hostile service in exchange for money. The polygraph
was also used to ascertain what information had been compromised.
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CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, stated on his
security forms that he had not used any illegal drugs or narcotics. During
his initial polygraph examination, Subject admitted only to limited drug use
but showed deception in the area of serious crimes. He later admitted to
theft of merchandise and pilferage from employers and to shoplifting the month
prior to the polygraph examination. After further testing, Subject also
admitted to expanded drug use.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, had undergone a
background investigation in connection with an earlier assignment. Personal
biographic data was favorable. During the applicant screening polygraph
examination, Subject admitted that while serving with U.S. forces overseas he
lived for more than a year with and was partly supported by a woman known to
him as an agent of a foreign intelligence service. Subject observed in her
apartment a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for clandestine use. He
had not reported any of this information to military intelligence authorities.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military, was one of five individuals
employed in a communications center from which highly classified information
on sensitive DOD, State and White House matters was being illegally provided
to a foreign intelligence service. All suspects held TOP SECRET clearances
and Sensitive Compartmented Information approvals. Conventional investigative
procedures failed to identify the guilty party. When polygraph testing of the
Subject indicated deception, he admitted to working for a foreign intelligence
service and to supplying a great quantity of information to that service.
Polygraph testing of the remaining suspects did not reveal deception.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen and long-time employee of an
Intelligence Community organization, was polygraphed in conjuction with his
periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph examination, subject admitted
to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to news media
personalities over a period of ten years.
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CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for TOP SECRET employment with an
Intelligence Community organization, underwent a background investigation
which was completed with favorable results. During a subsequent polygraph
examination, Subject admitted that he had purchased and sold illegal drugs and
had been involved in other criminal activities, including theft, insurance
fraud, arson, and receipt of stolen goods.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence
Community foreign language translator position requiring a TOP SECRET security
clearance, was investigated with favorable results. During a subsequent
polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception on questions regarding
contact with a foreign intelligence service and the truthfulness of his
application for employment. Subject admitted that attempts had been made by a
hostile intelligence service to recruit him prior to leaving his country of
origin and by another foreign intelligence service while en route to the
United States. He also admitted omitting pertinent data on his employment
application.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph
examination. Subject admitted various radical and Marxist connections,
including residence with a British Communist Party member while both were
students at a British university. He acknowledged visiting the Soviet Union
twice on British student tours, and, during his initial tour, becoming
particularly friendly with a young woman described as a student and a part-
time INTOURIST guide. She was also his tour guide on the second trip. He
said he later corresponded with her and informed her that he had applied for
employment with U.S. intelligence agencies. Shortly thereafter, she came to
the U.S., supposedly to visit relatives. She contacted Subject and arranged
to meet him the day after his polygraph examination. After admitting to this
forthcoming meeting, Subject continued to show deception to counter-
intelligence questions during the polygraph examination. While Subject denied
that he had ever been approached to engage in espionage, he indicated
deception on questions regarding additional knowledge of individuals involved
in espionage against the United States.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor on a TOP SECRET
project, required security processing for access to another TOP SECRET
project. During a polygraph examination, Subject admitted that he furnished
classified information and industrial proprietary information to foreign
nationals of both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community and a
former member of the U.S. military, provided intelligence information of
questionable validity about planned terrorist activity at two U.S. military
installations, which purported to include the theft of military weapons.
Subject was given a polygraph examination and was found deceptive. Upon
further questioning, he admitted that he fabricated the story of planned
terrorist activity and reported it to gain recognition. Subject also admitted
to unrelated contact with hostile intelligence services to discuss military
and cultural matters as well as possible defection.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a SECRET-cleared U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor,
needed his clearance upgraded for access to Sensitive Compartmented Infor-
mation. During his polygraph examination, Subject showed deception to
questions about involvement in intelligence work for a foreign government,
espionage activity, intent to commit espionage against the United States, the
accuracy of his biographic data and other related questions. Subject admitted
that he falsely reported an academic affiliation during two tours abroad,
totalling eight years. He admitted that during those years he actually served
as a scientific advisor to the chief of a foreign military intelligence
service. He reported directly to the head of military intelligence of the
foreign power. Although Subject admitted that he might, in the future, pass
classified information to that foreign service, he claimed that he had never
done so. He had never revealed his foreign intelligence connection to his
employer or to the cognizant government security officer. Subject was still
in contact with the foreign intelligence service, though legitimately so
through his U.S. contractor employment. Subject continued to show deception
to questions about giving or selling classified information to the foreign
intelligence service.
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a staff employee of an Intelligence Community agency, admitted
during polygraph examination to a wide variety of homosexual activities with
foreign nationals overseas. He also admitted that an East Asian national with
whom he had lived in a homosexual relationship was blackmailing him for
money. Subject acknowledged disclosing his classified intelligence
affiliation to the blackmailer.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S.citizen employed on a classified contract requiring a TOP
SECRET clearance, had previously worked for the U.S. government and held a TOP
SECRET clearance. He had been favorably investigated for his prior government
position. As part of his processing for a TOP SECRET clearance as a
contractor employee, Subject was given a polygraph examination. He showed
deception to questions pertaining to unauthorized disclosure of classified
information. He admitted divulging classified information to friends, co-
workers, and family members. He had held a classified slide show for friends
and family and also provided classified information to a foreign national.
Subject indicated deception to questions concerning his intent to commit
espionage and/or sabotage against the United States. He threatened to divulge
classified information if he was denied a clearance. During his final
polygraph examination, Subject continued to show deception regarding his
intention to commit espionage against the United States.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen and an applicant for a sensitive
Intelligence Community position as a foreign language translator, provided the
required biographical data and was favorably investigated. There was no
indication in his declarations or during the background investigation of any
contact with a foreign intelligence service. During polygraph testing,
Subject admitted that a family member had in fact been a member of such a
service. Testing did not support his statement that this was his only foreign
intelligence affiliation. During subsequent interrogation and testing,
Subject made increasingly more damaging admissions about his recent work for
known members of a foreign intelligence service.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community with
access to TOP SECRET information, was given a polygraph examination in
conjunction with his reinvestigation. During the examination, Subject
admitted that he had shoplifted and changed price tags on merchandise. He
further admitted to accepting gratuities from contractors and to providing
classified information to uncleared contractors to assist them in their
bidding.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military who was known to have had contact
with a foreign intelligence service, was arrested while selling classified
material to undercover Federal Agents. During interrogation, Subject denied
additional contact with hostile intelligence services and admitted no
additional security infractions. During a polygraph examination, Subject was
found deceptive on both topics. He subsequently admitted further liaison with
a hostile intelligence service and possession of additional classified
documents at his residence.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen, applied for a sensitive Intelligence Community
position as an intelligence research specialist. His investigation raised
questions regarding his associates and travel in a Soviet Bloc country. When
these issues were discussed during a pre-polygraph interview, Subject main-
tained that he had no contact with foreign intelligence representatives. When
polygraph testing showed deception, Subject admitted associating with persons
he believed to represent a hostile intelligence service and having visited a
foreign embassy on occasion, most recently a week prior to his examination.
Although he declared he had nothing more to admit, further testing indicated
deception. He later admitted additional contact with Soviet Bloc embassies
during his overseas travel.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position,
had been cleared previously for access to sensitive compartmented information
(SCI). During polygraph testing, he admitted to the unauthorized disclosure
of SCI on many occasions to associates and family members. Previous
investigations had given no indication of such disclosures by him.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was serving in the U.S. military and had
access to sensitive cryptologic information. During the applicant screening
polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception. In the post-test
interview, he admitted to various petty crimes. The polygraph examiner noted
continued specific reactions to relevant questions. When the Subject was
reexamined several weeks later, the same reactions continued. His access was
withdrawn and an investigation opened. During the investigation, Subject was
found dead in his automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been
engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
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CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a TOP SECRET cleared U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence
Community, received a polygraph examination in conjunction with his periodic
reinvestigation. During the examination, Subject admitted to falsification of
reports, fraudulent accounting practices, improper handling of classified
material and serious drug abuse.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was favorably investigated for a
sensitive Intelligence Community clerical position. There were no indications
in his personal history statement of association with a foreign intelligence
service. Initial polygraph testing indicated that Subject failed to list a
previous employment at a foreign embassy in his country of origin, and that he
was related by marriage to a member of a foreign national police force.
During subsequent testing, Subject was also found to be deceptive on current
work for a foreign intelligence service and on instructions by a foreign
intelligence service to seek U.S. Government employment.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community position
requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, had been favorably investigated for
an earlier U.S. Intelligence assignment. All personal biographic data were
favorable. During a polygraph examination, Subject indicated deception to
questions about knowing others engaged in espionage, intent to engage in
espionage, and the truthfulness of the information on his security forms.
During the post-test interview he admitted that he had been terminated from
his employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a year of training but
before he was assigned to a position. He admitted that he engaged in
freelance journalism in the U.S and abroad with an Asian. During their work,
the Asian told him he was an intelligence agent for his country. Although the
Subject identified the agent by name, his U.S. location, and his intelligence
service, he would not give details of their joint activities and continued to
show deception about intending to commit espionage against the United States.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence
Community position as a foreign language translator, was favorably
investigated for a TOP SECRET clearance. During his polygraph examination, he
declared that he had no contact with officials of foreign intelligence
services and denied that he had been directed by any such service to seek
Intelligence Community employment. Testing showed deception on these
issues. Subject subsequently admitted that prior to leaving his country of
origin, officials of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service contacted him in a
recruitment attempt.
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LOSS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject was one of three military personnel with direct access to
approximately one thousand classified aperture cards, which were reported
missing. An investigation was initiated and all three individuals denied
culpability. Each was then given a polygraph examination. No deception was
indicated by two of the individuals, but Subject's polygraph examination
indicated deception. When questioned further, he admitted that he had
deliberately destroyed the aperture cards because of inventory and filing
problems. Additional polygraph testing gave no indication that the missing
cards had been compromised.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a non-U.S. citizen, was one of two hostile espionage agents put
ashore in a country friendly to the United States. Subject survived a fire
fight and was subsequently interrogated for almost a year before being turned
over to U.S Intelligence for additional questioning. The friendly country,
without polygraph, had accepted his statements and elaborate cover legend.
U.S. Intelligence interrogation, using the polygraph, penetrated Subject's
cover and eventually was instrumental in eliciting positive intelligence
concerning important military installations in the Subject's home country.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S citizen who divided his employment career between two
agencies within the Intelligence Community where he had access to TOP SECRET
information, required security processing for detail to a third intelligence
organization. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted to unauthorized
disclosures of classified information (e.g. data on U.S. technical collection
capabilities) to Soviet intelligence and involvement in a homosexual act in
Soviet controlled space in the USSR.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community and
holding a TOP SECRET clearance, received a polygraph interview in conjunction
with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted to operational security
indiscretions and sexual misconduct with a foreign national overseas. He
continued to show deception to counterintelligence questions.
a
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a foreign national, was employed in a non-sensitive position
with an Intelligence Community agency, in a friendly foreign country. His
position gave him access to biographic data on and travel plans of senior U.S.
personnel abroad. His father was employed in a non-sensitive position with a
U.S. Intelligence agency in his homeland, Poland. During normal debriefing
interviews, Subject admitted several contacts with representatives of the
Polish intelligence service but denied cooperation with them. He appeared
forgetful and evasive on this issue. The polygraph showed deception regarding
the contact issue. When confronted, Subject admitted to greater contact with,
recruitment by, and cooperation with the Polish intelligence service. He
attributed his cooperation to his family's hostage situation in Poland. As a
result of his admissions, Subject was terminated from his position.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community, was
arrested for petty theft. During polygraph examination administered by his
Community employer, he admitted to skimming $7500 from operational funds, in
addition to extensive shoplifting.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen holding a TOP SECRET clearance with 20 years'
Intelligence Community experience, underwent a periodic reinvestigation
polygraph examination. He admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified
information to non-U.S. citizens, including a foreign liaison official.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a foreign language
translator position in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET
security clearance. He was polygraphed and found to be deceptive in response
to questions regarding his claimed membership in organizations and his claim
that none of his relatives was employed by or was cooperating with any hostile
intelligence service. When questioned further about his relatives and their
cooperation with hostile intelligence services, Subject terminated the
interview without making any admissions.
10
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DRUG USE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a civilian position
in the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance. A background
investigation had been conducted in conjunction with his military service.
Prior to his polygraph examination, Subject admitted minor use of marijuana
and hashish. He reported identical information to a staff psychologist during
his employment processing. During the polygraph examination, he admitted to
heavy use of marijuana, in addition to repeated use of hashish, "speed", and
quaaludes while in the military between 1978 and 1982; to purchasing these
drugs for his personal use; and on several occasions to selling small amounts
to finance his own drug use. He admitted that he falsified his application
forms and lied to the staff psychologist to enhance his prospects for
employment.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. contractor employee requiring access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, was given a polygraph examination. When the test
indicated deception to questions concerning espionage, Subject admitted that
her former husband was engaged in espionage against the U.S. for a foreign
intelligence service. These activities spanned several years while her former
spouse held various positions with the U.S. government and with defense
contractors requiring classified access. Subject provided very specific
details on espionage activities.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a sensitive
investigative position in the Intelligence Community. A complete background
investigation for a TOP SECRET clearance failed to disclose any unfavorable
information. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject admitted to providing
non-intelligence information to a Far Eastern intelligence service. The
polygraph examination indicated deception in that area. During subsequent
interrogation Subject confessed to gathering intelligence information for a
Far Eastern intelligence service.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a position in the
Intelligence Community requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information. He had been favorably investigated for SCI access while in the
military. During the polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive to
questions concerning espionage against the United States. He then described
several visits to the Soviet embassy to make arrangements to defect. He
admitted that embassy officials obtained extensive biographic information on
him, retained copies of his documents, and upon learning of his pending
applications for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to
remain in the U.S.
11
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DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed in the Intelligence Community, was
investigated and polygraphed in connection with her initial assignment in
1974. She was cautioned in 1976 to heed regulations against taking classified
information home. She was cautioned again in 1977 when it was determined that
she had discussed SECRET information with her husband, a foreign-born
naturalized U.S. citizen. Reinvestigation polygraph examinations elicited
admissions of additional significant unauthorized disclosures and the fact
that, between 1976 and 1980, her spouse acted as an attorney for the Soviet
Embassy, where his principal contact was a KGB officer.. Subject continued to
show deception in response to questions regarding unauthorized diclosures.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position in the Intelligence
Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was employed as an engineer by
another government agency. During his polygraph examination, he admitted that
the engineering degree he listed in his biographic data was phony and had been
purchased in London through the mail for $100. Subject also admitted that he
shot and wounded his second wife and served two years in prison for this
offense. (He did not list his prison term on his biographic data form.) His
present wife was missing under unusual circumstances, which he refused to ex-
plain. Subject continued to show deception to questions regarding additional
involvement in criminal activity.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, was alleged by a superior officer to have passed
classified information to a member of a hostile intelligence service. During
a personal interview, Subject admitted only to passing one piece of classified
data to a representative of that country. When polygraph results indicated
deception, Subject admitted giving a substantial number of classified items to
that representative, who proved to be a member of his country's intelligence
service.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a non-U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community
position as a foreign language translator, was favorably investigated for a
TOP SECRET clearance. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject denied that
he had been in contact with representatives of a hostile Middle Eastern intel-
ligence service. His polygraph charts showed him to be deceptive to questions
regarding such contact. After further questioning, Subject admitted that
while he was employed as a contractor for a U.S. -intelligence service he had
contacts with members of this hostile intelligence service. Subject never
reported this information to his employer or to U.S. authorities.
12
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EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL
Subject, an applicant for employment with an Intelligence Community
organization, was favorably investigated and cleared for limited access to
classified information. During a polygraph examination he admitted discussing
with friends and relatives classified information pertaining to sensitive
sites and missions. He also acknowledged stealing from his previous employers
over a ten year period. Testing further disclosed that alcohol consumption
affected his personal and professional life style and that he had been unable
to work on five occasions and blacked out weekly due to excessive drinking.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position in the Intelligence
Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was favorably investigated.
Polygraph testing surfaced an issue of divided loyalty. Subject claimed to be
loyal both to the United States and another country. He stated that if
approached by the other country he would relocate there to offer his assis-
tance., after resigning his U.S. position. Subject admitted that he would
provide information obtained through his U.S employment to the other country
if he judged that this would not harm U.S. interests. Polygraph testing
further resulted in Subject's admission to recent use of illegal drugs and two
acts of shoplifting.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and cleared for SCI
access, was suspected of discussing highly classified information concerning a
special project with unauthorized persons. During a personal interview he
denied making any unauthorized disclosure. He displayed indications of
deception during a subsequent polygraph examination. He later admitted that
he had discussed with unauthorized persons details of the highly classified
project on which he was employed.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a TOP SECRET foreign
language translator position in the Intelligence Community, was polygraphed
following a favorable background investigation. Subject was found deceptive
to questions concerning contact with foreign intelligence services. During
subsequent interrogation he admitted that he had been contacted by
representatives of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service prior to leaving his
native country. The foreign service provided him a system for clandestine
receipt of instructions from them after he arrived in the United States. He
signed an agreement with that service promising never to reveal this
contact. Subject also admitted numerous contacts with the Soviet Bloc
intelligence service in the months prior to entering the United States and
clandestine contact in the pre-arranged manner after his arrival.
13
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, applied for a position within the
Intelligence Community as a foreign language translator. A polygraph examina-
tion to determine his association with non-U.S. Intelligence agencies was
scheduled after a background investigation for TOP SECRET clearance raised
questions about his overseas travel.During a pre-examination interview, the
Subject admitted that a relative was a member of the Armed Forces of a non
Western country . He omitted this from his application forms. The subject
claimed he had no contact with anyone he knew or suspected to be a member of a
non U.S. Intelligence agency.Polygraph testing failed to support his claim.
The Subject subsequently admitted he had indeed talked. while traveling to
individuals who were representatives, possibly intelligence officers, of a non
Western government
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM: EXTENSION NOS
EE &i - 03o -P3y 25
SECOM
5E25 Hqs. DATE 14 February 1984
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Director
Intelligence Community Sta
ff 14
FEB 19
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP86M00886R002800030012-9
The Director of Central Intelligence
STAT
Honorable John H. Chafee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Chafee:
Wtrswr" D C 20505
OLL 83-1679 `t
0 1 AUG 1983
I want to extend to you my personal appreciation for
your work in securing passage of Amendment No. 1501 to the
Defense Authorization Bill of 1984 relating to the use of
polygraph examinations by the Department of Defense.
Language in section 1007 specifically exempting Department
of Defense personnel from the requirement of polygraph
examinations would have seriously inhibited my ability to
effectively fulfill my statutory responsibilities to
protect intelligence sources and methods. Your amendment
allows the current practice to continue and provides for
hearings during which the need for polygraph examinations
can be clearly and emphatically set forth. This letter is
also being provided to Senator Leahy.
Again, my thanks for all your help on this critical
issue.
Sincerely,
/s/ William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Distribution:
Original - Addressee-
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex Dir
4'-ER
1 - D/OLL
1 - DD/OLL
1-GC
1 - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
OLL:KAD:maw (21 July 1983)
Retyped:OLL:KAD:maw (26 July 1983)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
01 AUG ??'?J
Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Leahy:
I want to extend to you my personal appreciation for
your work in securing passage of Amendment No. 1501 to the
Defense Authorization Bill of 1984 relating to the use of
polygraph examinations by the Department of Defense.
Language in section 1007 specifically exempting Department
of Defense personnel from the requirement of polygraph
examinations would have seriously inhibited 'my ability to
effectively fulfill my statutory responsibilities to
protect intelligence sources and methods. Your amendment
allows the current practice to continue and provides for
hearings during which the need for polygraph examinations
can be clearly and emphatically set forth. This letter is
also being provided to Senator Chafee.
Again, my thanks for all your help on this critical
issue.
Sincerely,
17-01 ' 1? }m J. Casey
William J. Casey
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex Dir
ER
1 D/OLL
1 DD/OLL
1-GC
1 - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
OLL:KAD:maw (21 July 1983)
Retyped:OLL:KAD:maw (26 July 1983)
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Iq
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I''r I~,ri l v o! Cr;1lr;31 In;C1w(r c
DC '(KUS
Honorable Barry M. Goldwater
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
.. 19$3
I am writing to express to you my grave concern with
legislation pending in the Senate which would restrict the use
of polygraph examinations by the Department of Defense. The
restriction on use of the polygraph contained in Section 1007
of S. 675, the Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Authorization Bill,
would impair my ability as Director of Central Intelligence to
fulfill my statutory and other legal responsibilities for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
The Director of Central Intelligence is by statute
responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods (50 U.S.C. ?403(d)(3)). The Director of Central
Intelligence is also responsible for ensuring the establishment
by the Intelligence Community of common security and access
standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence
systems, information, and products (Executive Order 12333,
?1.5(g)) and for ensuring that programs are developed which
protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical
procedures (id., ?1.5(h)). Finally, the Director of Central
Intelligence is responsible for establishing special access
controls and standards for sensitive compartmented information
(SCI), which consists of extremely sensitive intelligence
information (Executive Order 12356, ?4.2(a)).
Department of Defense personnel have access to a great deal
of intelligence information, including SCI and information
relating to intelligence sources and methods, produced by the
various elements of the Intelligence Community. As Director of
Central Intelligence, I thus have a direct legal and practical
interest in the use or non-use of the polygraph as a security
method with respect to Department of Defense personnel. Under
very carefully delimited and controlled circumstances,
polygraph examinations currently may be required of personnel
of the Department of Defense who hold positions which involve
access to extremely sensitive intelligence information. New
restrictions on the use of polygraph examinations with respect
to Department of Defense personnel, and on the use of the
information derived therefrom, could jeopardize the security of
intelligence information, sources, and methods.
STAT
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I cannot effectively fulfill my statutory and other legal
responsibilities for the protection of intelligence sources-and
methods if Department of Defense personnel, who must have
access to in-telligence information to perform their duties, are
to he specially exempted by statute from security practices
applicable to the personnel of other agencies who have
equivalent access to such information. For this reason, I
strongly oppose Section 1007 of S. 675. I would note that this
provision was attached to the Defense Authorization Bill
without the benefit of any hearings or substantial discussion
in committee. A legislative decision with such a potentially
grave impact on the security of our nation's most sensitive
secrets deserves much more thorough consideration.
Sincerely,
Al. William J. Casey
William J. Casey
Honorable John G. Tower
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
Honorable Henry M. Jackson
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
Honorable Joseph R. Biden
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
(OGC:GMC:maw)
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex Dir
1 - ER
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246
Second, administrative authority over school personnel would be
uncertain if the transfer takes place. The Department of Education
Organization Act provides in sections 401 (f) and 419(aX2) that
school personnel will continue to be treated as Defense Department
employees for certain purposes after the transfer. These provisions
could confuse the administrative authority governing the employ-
ees' activities.
Third, the Committee is concerned that the morale of our mili-
tary families would be affected if the close working relationship
that has developed between overseas military installations and
their schools were upset. This intangible but important considera-
tion could not be replaced by a series of inter-agency agreements
between the two Departments.
These practical reasons and the high quality education they have
engendered have convinced the Committee to recommend that the
scheduled transfer of DoD schools to the Department of Education
be rescinded.
The initial part of the Committee recommendation would amend
the Department of Education Organization Act by repealing all
those provisions related to the overseas dependents' schools system,
its transfer and its planned administration by the Education De-
partment. The second section would return the Advisory Council
on Dependents' Education to the Department of Defense. Finally,
the recommendation of the Committee authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to call upon the Secretary of Education for advice and
technical support in the operation of the schools.
SEC. 1007. POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Section 1007 of the bill would limit, in certain respects, reliance
on polygraph examinations in the Department of Defense. The pro-
vision would not ban polygraph use in the Department which has
been going on for some time. But the bill would ensure that the
polygraph continues to be used only as a suppld:hent to other in-
vestigatory tools and resources available to the Department. Final-
ly, the provision would require the submission to the Congress of
data essential to understanding the basis for proposing greater reli-
ance on the polygraph and the reliability of the polygraph itself.
The Committee's attention to polygraph use in the Department
of Defense was stirred by several plans which would provide for
greater use of polygraph examination and, more importantly,
would permit adverse actions against military or civilian employ-
ees (e.g. denial of access to certain classified information) solely for
refusing to submit to a polygraph exam. Actual and planned revi-
sions to Defense polygraph directives would use the polygraph as
part of a random, periodic security check of certain Department
employees. A revision to the Department's primary polygraph di-
rective currently being considered in the Department would-in
the estimate of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Af-
fairs)-have the effect of "quadrupling the testing" and "involve
almost 60,000 employees." Indeed the Secretary of Defense told the
Committee that the Department would have to hire an additional
138 polygraphers to implement this revision; it cost $6,000 just to
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;onnel would be
ant of Education
3-419(a)(2) that
nse Department
'hese provisions
ng the employ-
ale of our mili-
ng relationship
stallations and
tant considera-
icy agreements
ation they have
amend that the
A of Education
a would amend
r repealing all
schools system,
Education De-
[visory Council
fence. Finally,
ie Secretary of
for advice and
pests, reliance
Fense. The pro-
ent which has
isure that the
it to other in-
rtment. Final-
ie Congress of
g greater reli-
lygraph itself.
e Department
Id provide for
importantly,
.rilian employ-
ion) solely for
planned revi-
polygraph as
i Department
polygraph di-
nt would-in
e (Public Af-
and "involve
Tense told the
an additional
$6,000 just to
train one of these polygraphers and their current average annual
salary is $32,311.
More troubling than the larger number of tests are the policy
provisions which would permit adverse personnel actions against
civilian and military employees based solely on the refusal of the
individual to submit to an exam. Indeed, a recent National Secu-
rity Decision Directive requires that Defense agency heads must
have the authority to administer "appropriate adverse conse-
quences" when an individual refuses to submit to a polygraph
exam during certain types of investigations.
The apparent goal of these plans-to protect against potential
unauthorized disclosures of classified information and provide the
tools to investigate such disclosures when they do occur-is a meri-
torious one. But the results of polygraph examinations are not ad-
missible in federal courts, and substantially less than half of the
states even permit the introduction into evidence of the results of
stipulated pot graph exams. Serious questions have consistently
been raised about the accuracy and reliability of the polygraph
exam. Within the Department itself, the Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Health Affairs) has confirmed that there are "seri-
ous scientific concerns about the therory of and the accuracy of the
polygraph technique." Indeed, he cited studies where up to 55 per-
cent of the innocent people involved were misclassified as untruth-
ful individuals. Military personnel ordered to positions covered by
expanded polygraph screening requirements or falling within the
scope of a classified leak investigation could have their careers ir-
reparably damaged without cause. The morale of all DoD employ-
ees-military and civilian alike-could very well be detrimentally
affected. The Committee believes these would be unfortunate and
counterproductive developments.
For this reason the Committee has included a provision in the
bill which ensures that DoD does not overrely on polygraph results,
whatever the degree of use. It also will provide the. Congress with
some relevant information' about the need for and implications of
expanded polygraph use.
First, the provision would prohibit, as a matter of law, DoD from
taking any adverse personnel action (e.g. reassignment, suspension,
denial of access to classified information) against a military or ci-
vilian employee solely on the basis of the results of a polygraph
exam or the refusal to take such an exam. Civilian employees and
prospective civilian employees of the National Security Agency
(NSA) of the Department of Defense would be exempt from this
provision. Polygraph use could be made with respect to these indi-
viduals in accordance with applicable NSA or Defense regulations
in effect as of date of enactment.
Representatives of DoD have indicated to the Committee that
current DoD policy was not to take action against an individual
based solely on polygraph results. Refusal to take such an exam-
one with a known potential for inaccuracy-also should not auto-
matically label an individual as guilty of an infraction justifying
adverse action. There must be something more.
By denial of access to classified information, the Committee
means denial of access to any level, compartment, or category of
classified information solely on the basis of polygraph results or
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the refusal to submit to an exam. Under the bill, such a denial
would constitute an "adverse action."
Secondly, justification-for expanded use of the polygraph, espe-
cially in leak investigations, is to prevent further damage to na-
tional security resulting from unauthorized disclosures of classified
information. If this is the problem which is motivating the various
polygraph proposals, the scope of nature and extent of the damage
which has occurred should first be explained. Reports indicate
there may even be a diversity of view on this subject among re-
sponsible Administration personnel. Therefore, the bill requests a
report from the President on this damage issue.
The Committee also believes it essential to know the Depart-
ment's position on a central concern raised by these proposals to
place greater reliance on polygraphs-the accuracy and reliability
of the instrument and process. To that end the bill requires a
report from the Secretary of Defense setting forth the Depart-
ment's position on this issue, including percentage accuracy reli-
ability and statistical and other analyses to support this position.
Finally, in the Committee's view, use of polygraphs in DOD
should be kept at the level in effect before any expansion was au-
thorized (i.e. in accordance with rules and regulations as of August
1, 1982) until Congress has had an opportunity to review these two
critical compilations of information.
Therefore, until the Committee receives the reports required by
this provision and for 60 days thereafter, the Committee requests
the Department not to issue, implement or enforce any rule, regu-
lation, directive or order that would permit the use of polygraph
examinations of civilian employees or members of the armed forces
to any extent greater than permitted under the rules, regulations,
and directives of the Department of Defense in effect as of August
1, 1982.
The Committee believes this provision is a reasonable way to pro-
tect individuals who might be erroneously identified under existing
polygraph rules and regulations or subjected fb adverse action
merely because of their justifiable concerns about the accuracy of
the polygraph. Further, it will permit DOD to proceed with poly-
graph exams under current rules, regulations, and policies while
data is gathered which should be considered before any expanded
use is made of such exams.
SEC. 1008. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF TEST PROGRAM To AUTHORI'E
PRICE DIFFERENTIAL To RELIEVE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION
Section 1008 continues for one more year a test program that
allows a limited price differential to be paid for the purpose of re-
lieving economic dislocations on any contract entered into by the
Defense Logistics Agency, except a contract for the purchase of
fuel. The test program is an exception to section 2392 of title 10,
United States Code, commonly referred to as the Maybank amend-
ment, which prohibits the use of funds appropriated to or for the
use of the Department of Defense, in connection with any contract
awarded by the Department of Defense, to pay a price differential
for the purpose of paving higher prices in contracts in areas of
high unemployment (labor surplus areas).
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defense, de-
itives from
.e Assistant
ecretary Of
'the Coun-
'0 U.S.C.
it appears
929(c)) is
ind (5) as
ration " in
Lis subsec-
.nt Secre-
131
1 (f) The Director of the Office of Management and
2 Budget, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Edu-
3 cation are each directed to take such action as may be neces-
4 sary to assure the continued effective administration of the
5 defense dependents' education system pursuant to title XI V
6 of the Education Amendments of 1978.
7 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
8 SEC. 1007. (a) Chapter 49 of title 10, United States
9 Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
10 new section:
11 "" 979. Prohibition against certain actions based upon re-
12 sults of polygraph examinations
13 "(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection?(c), a civilian
14 employee of the Department -of Defense may not be separated
15 from his employment with the Department of Defense, sus-
16 pended from such employment, reduced in grade or pay, fur-
17 loughed, denied access to classified information, or subjected
18 to any other adverse action with respect to his employment in
19 any position in the Department of Defense solely on the basis
20 of the results of a polygraph examination or solely on the
21 basis of a refusal to submit to such an examination.
22 "(2) A member of the armed forces may not be perma-
23 nently or temporarily transferred to a new duty station, as-
24 signed or detailed to perform new duties, denied access to
25 classified information, or subjected to any other adverse
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Q 77 Ric'
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132
1 action with respect to such member's military status or any
2 duty assignment in the Department of Defense solely on the
3 basis of the results of a polygraph examination or solely on
4 the basis of a refusal to submit to such an examination.
5 1"1(b)(1) Not later than March 1, 1984, the President
6 shall submit to the Congress a written report describing (A)
7 unauthorized disclosures of classified information that neces-
8 sitate expanded use of polygraph examinations in the Depart-
9 ment of Defense, (B) the nature and extent of such unauthor-
10 ized disclosures, and (C) the nature and extent of the damage
11 to the national security that has resulted from the unauthor-
12 ized disclosures, including specific examples of the damage
13 and the manner in which the damage was determined and
14 measured.
15 "(2) Not later than March .1, 1984 the Secretary of
16 Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report which
17 expresses the position of the Department of Defense regarding
18 the accuracy and reliability of polygraph examinations and
19 which includes-
20 "(A) a description of the specific studies (includ-
21 ing statistical analyses based on such studies) conduct-
22 ed by or for the Department of Defense, or relied upon
23 by the department, to support the department's use of
24 the polygraph; and
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 'alus or any
,olely on the
or solely on
ation.
.e President
scribing (A)
that neces-
the Depart-
4 unauthor-
the damage
s unauthor-
the damage
mined and
ecretary Of
port which
regarding
ations and
?s (includ-
) conduct-
elied upon
it's use of
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133
1 "(B) the Secretary's analysis and explanation of
2 how any potential damage to innocent persons errone-
3 ously identified by polygraph examinations as having
4 given false responses or information during the course
5 of polygraph examinations is offset by the potential
6 benefits to the United States of expanded use of the
7 polygraph.
8 "(c) Polygraph examinations may be used with respect
9 to civilian employees and prospective civilian employees of
10 the National Security Agency of the Department of Defense
11 in accordance with and to the extent provided for in regula-
12 tions of the Department of Defense or the National Security
T
13 Agency as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. '
14 (b) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 49
15 of such title is amended by adding at the end thereof the
16 following new item:
"979. Prohibition against certain actions based upon results of polygraph examina-
tions.":
17 ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF TEST PROGRAM TO AUTHORIZE
18 PRICE DIFFERENTIAL TO RELIEVE ECONOMIC DIS-
19 LOCATIONS
20 SEC. 1008. (a) Subsection (a) of section 1109 of the
21 Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (10 U. S. C.
22 2392, note), is amended by striking out "fiscal year 1983"
23 each place it appears and - inserting in lieu thereof "fiscal
24 years 1983 and 1984
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