INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86R00893R000100180013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

OBJECTIVE:
1. Know the objectives, general subject matter, procedures, and
points of major emphasis in the course.
OVERVIEW:
The underlying objectives of this course are four. First, we want to
develop a sense of what the National Foreign Intelligence Community is and
how the U.S. intelligence system works. In so doing we will look at U.S.
intelligence from an institutional perspective, examining the organizations
and agencies which comprise the Community and the means by which they
interrelate.
Our second objective is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature
of the intelligence product. Strategic planning, crisis management, and
direction of military operations each dictate differing forms of
intelligence products. Similarly, institutional and substantive
considerations influence the processes used for the production and
presentation of different products. Thus, understanding the intelligence
product is an important prerequisite to understanding its use.
Third, since the intelligence product can have real value and utility
only insofar as it supports the national security decisionmaking process,
we will explore the peculiar relationship between the intelligence pro-
ducer and the intelligence user, or consumer. Our goal here is to
develop some insights into the role of intelligence in the formulation
'and execution of national policy and into the considerations associated
with evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the intelligence product.
Finally, we want to give some thought to the functions of intelligence
and the structure of the Intelligence Community in the future. How can
intelligence help us cope with threats to our national security while not
itself becoming a threat to our democratic society?
The organization of the course may suggest an intent to deal with each
of these objectives separately. This is not so. The objectives are inter-
related and pursuit of them will be both continuous and simultaneous. Our
premise is that no single objective in the study of intelligence can be
pursued in isolation from the others.
 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 : CIA-RDP86R00893R000100180013-8
Although intelligence is not a new discipline, it has traditionally
been shrouded in secrecy. In recent years, however, much of the secrecy
surrounding the U.S. Intelligence Community has been dissipated. In the
Optional Reading for this block, Professor Harry Howe Ransom a scholar
who has studied the role of intelligence in America for many years,
analyzes the growing body of literature on intelligence organizations and
operations. Many of the books he discusses are on reserve in the AU
Library. The required readings for the course are drawn from several
sources. Several readings on the Intelligence Community come from. the
Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the "Church
Committee . Although published five years ago, this report still pro-
vides the best available compilation of information on the history,
organizations, and operations of U.S. intelligence. They will supplement,
and sometimes disagree, with the lectures presented by representatives of
the intelligence organizations and agencies. We will also use some
contemporary intelligence products published by CIA, DIA, and Air Force
intelligence to further our understanding of the intelligence product.
These classified documents will be provided later. Finally, we will look
at the general problem of intelligence and policy and the complex producer-
consumer relationship through the writings of academics and intelligence
professionals. Both intelligence producers and intelligence users have
been invited to speak on these topics. In addition, we will employ the
case study method to focus on the role of intelligence in various military
and political events and crises.
READINGS:
Assigned: None.
Optional:
"Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies"
 1. Know the terminology used in intelligence activities.
2. Comprehend the intelligence process and the steps in the
intelligence cycle.
2.1 Explain how intelligence requirements are
formulated and expressed.
2.2 Summarize the methods by which intelligence
information is collected.
2.3 Explain how intelligence information is
processed into a form suitable for the
production of finished intelligence.
2.4 Summarize the process by which information
is converted into finished intelligence.
2.5 Explain the means by which finished
intelligence is disseminated to consumers.
OVERVIEW:
The intelligence process can be likened to an industrial one. Raw
material--fragments of information of various types and degrees of detail
and validity--is collected and fed into a factory--an analytic or
production organization. The factory processes its raw input into a
variety of products, finished intelligence, designed for the use of a
variety of consumers. Intelligence managers seek to determine the needs
of their consumers, to translate these into requirements for collection,
to direct collection in response to these requirements, and to shape the
finished intelligence product so as best to meet consumer needs. Since
the universe of information is infinite and consumers are insatiable,
while resources and budgets are finite, intelligence managers must also
establish priorities for what is to be collected and what finished
intelligence is to be produced. These priorities then drive budgetary
decisions, either to reallocate resources among existing organizations
and systems, to create new programs and capabilities, or to eliminate
unproductive ones.
 The theoretical concept utilized to describe this process is called
the "intelligence cycle." The reading on "The Intelligence Cycle"
summarizes the phases or steps in the process--planning and direction,
collection, processing, production, and dissemination. Articles by
Herbert Scoville, Jr. (former Deputy Director for Science & Technology
at CIA) and Major General Schlomo Gazit (former Israeli Director of
Military Intelligence) treat specific intelligence collection and
analysis issues.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"The Intelligence Cycle"
Optional:
 OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the history, organization, and role of the intelligence
Community in national security policymaking.
1.1 Describe the major trends and changes in the
National Foreign Intelligence Community since
1945.
1.2 Outline the current organizational structure
for National security policymaking.
1.3 List the current members of the National
Foreign Intelligence Community.
1.4 Describe the role of the Intelligence Community
in National security policymaking.
OVERVIEW:
The concept of an "Intelligence Community" can be both perplexing and
confusing to professional military officers. The idea is confusing
because professional military officers naturally identify with their
parent service, not with a loosely organized asmixture of civilian and
military organizations and agencies. The "Intelligence Community" concept
is perplexing to military officers because the nominal leader of the
Intelligence Community is responsible directly to the President and is
clearly not in the military chain of command. Where did this peculiar
system originate? How did it evolve? How does it function? Does it
really work? This block of instruction addresses these questions as a
means of introducing us to the Intelligence Community.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"The Foreign and Military Intelligence Operations of the
United States: An Overview"
 OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the past and present use of intelligence by the President and-
the means by which the President provides guidance and direction to the
Intelligence Community.
1.1 Describe the intelligence needs of the President
and his role in the national Intelligence Community.
1.2 Outline the primary instruments with which the
President controls, directs, and supervises the
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government.
OVERVIEW:
In its Final Report, published in 1976, the Senate intelligence
investigating committee (the "Church Committee") described the central
role of the President in U.S. intelligence:
Intelligence has been the province of the President.
It has informed his decisions and furthered his
purposes. Intelligence information has been seen
largely belonging to the President, as being his to
classify or declassify, his to withhold or share.
The instruments of U.S. intelligence have been the
President's to use and sometimes to abuse.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has.always enjoyed a unique relationship
With the White House, as this observation suggests. The President now
has three mechanisms to control, direct, and supervise the U.S. Intelligence
Community: the National Security Council, the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Intelligence Oversight Board. Do these instumentalities
insure that the President's intelligence needs are met and that intelligence
activities remain under Presidential control?
READINGS:
Assigned:
"t% Pr spsiden_}_~nrr___u
 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W70005-lL/1D
OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the history, organization, and functions of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its role in the`Tntelligence Community.
1.1 Identify the sources of CIA authority.
1.2 Trace the growth and development of the CIA
since 1947.
1.3 Outline the general organization of the CIA
and describe the functions of its major elements.
1.4 Describe the relationship between the CIA and the
other elements of the Intelligence Community.
The work of a service like the CIA can be broken down
into three general categories: intelligence-gathering
and analysis, the protection of its own integrity (or
political intervention.
Although all three are
undertaken by a single
institution, under the
authority of one man,
each of those functions
has its own purposes and
rationale. Criticism of
the Agency.. .has touched
in scattershot fashion
on all three aspects.
CIA people are willing
enough to concede the
blunders and excesses
of the past, but insist
that the basic business
of the Agency, if ugly
in some of its
particulars, is neces-
sary too, one of the
POLITICAL ,.
ANALYSTS"
?7 he:Central Intelll ehce Agency is seeking :a:.
~
.
political analysts with experience in the
application of quantitative methods to the
analysis of political issues, expertise in analysis of
foreign politics, relevent foreign language skills,
and facility in oral and written communication.
Ph.D in Political Science, International Relations,
Sociology, or closely related field preferred. U.S.
citizenship required. Salary is $18,000?$25,000,
depending on education and experience. Submit,-,-)
resume and writing sample to:
;:Department A. Room 821-U
'P.0. Box 1925
4l
?Washington, D.C. 20013
: MAIA+wi..A,Yan/f .dOppw..ljrwpb,w
fatal facts of modern life. Like taxes, prisons, and
armies. An outsider naturally resents this argument--
 but two thousand years of history, in which failures
of intelligence were often as destructive as failures
of arms, make it hard to dismiss. The trouble with
the argument is that it lumps the CIA's work all
together, and suggests that the rest of us must take
it or leave it. This we do not have to do.
Thomas Powers, The Man Who
Kept the Secrets
The Intelligence Community in general and the CIA in particular have
been the subjects of considerable discussion in recent years. No other
society has looked so deeply and publicly into its own intelligence
activities and thus no other society can claim more knowledge of its own
intelligence agencies than can ours. The reading and lecture will
present interesting and contrasting views of the CIA. Me eadi id *9
rTA na '--- How do these viewpoints compare?
How should we deal.with the assumptions cited by Thomas Powers?
READINGS:
Assigned:
"Wete'y 01 ra n
 OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the importance of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and the role
and functions of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service
(NSA/CSS).
1.1 Trace the history of cryptology in the U.S.
OVERVIEW:
SIGINT has played a prominent role in U.S. intelligence activities
throughout this century. In this block an instructor from NSA's
National Cryptologic School will discuss the history of cryptology,
the key contributions of SIGINT to the U.S. intelligence product, and
the role and functions of NSA.
READING:
Assigned: None
 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
W70007 -1D/1 JD
OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the organization, mission, functions, and relationships among
Defense intelligence staffs and organizations.
1.1 Trace the evolution of intelligence organizations
in the Department of Defense (DoD).
1.2 Describe the process by which intelligence policy
is formulated and implemented in DoD.
1.3 Describe the organization, mission, and functions
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the
role of the.Military Intelligence Board.
OVERVIEW:
One of the major trends in the Intelligence Community since its
establishment in 1947 has been increasing centralization of the
intelligence activities within DoD. This trend toward centralization
is a manifestation of a broader trend toward unified and specified
commands and enhanced authority for the Secretary of Defense over the
military services. Some centralization actions--the establishment of
D
f
ense
e
DIA in 1961 and the creation of an Assistant Seoretary of
(Intelligence) in 1971--occurred as a result of DoD efforts to control
intelligence activities previously performed by the Services. More
recent changes, such as the establishment of the Deputy Undersecretary
_- r._ alp J....... ..l
the Secretary of Defense to protect Defense intelligence resources and
missions from assimilation by the Director of Central Intelligence. The
military services are authorized to engage in those intelligence
activities necessary for,their operational missions (tactical and
"departmental" intelligence), but national and DoD departmental intelli-
gence--setting collection priorities, producing finished intelligence,
and preparing the Defense intelligence budget--is the responsibility of
the Director of DIA. The ine between national and tactical intelligence
has been relatively easy t define but very difficult to discern in
reality. Not only does co siderable overlap exist, but DoD has also
expended considerable tim and effort to achieve an effective and
efficient interface betwe n the two. Unravelling the complex Defense
intelligence roles, respo sibilities, and relationships will be our
 VULNERABILITY
DIA off a career opportnnid.. for
individuals with a ;.. degree in civll/stniotural
Fapsriertos in the analysis of nuclear
a /ventfonal weapons effects and the analysis
of p hysical vulneis ivy of targets is desirable for _
ENGINEERS
>DEPEIITSE INTELLIGENCE
i)1A hums direct " ?~ ~a~. ?A Y y
Applicants must be U.S. citizens and are subject to a
thorough bacfgr and . . Please send completed
Personal Qualifiaetlons Statement SF-171 or resume;
,including salary history, to:
'You will prepare yb ical vulnerability studies, :
mathematical aiulysis and computations to determine
the effect of applying various conventional and nuclear
weapons against spe~dfio targets...'; x will also plan the
scope and methodology of weapon projeob and
programs as well at develop methods and prooedores
for the phyaieal vulnerab lily analyds of targets to
various weapons effects ?av"7 zl
Dope ding upon oJuaatron and ~psn atarhng
salaries will be $19,747 GS-7) to $32,0 8 (GS-13).
including liberal fringe to associated with
Federal employment Civil Service statue not required.
READINGS:
Assigned:
e'T a Depa it an+ ?f nos . "
"Military Intelligence: Eyes and Ears of Defense"
 OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the organization, mission.-and functions of Air Force
intelligence organizations.
1.1 Describe the mission and responsibilities
of Air Force intelligence.
1.2 Describe the organization, mission, and functions
of Air Force intelligence organizations and
activities, including the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, the Air Force Intelligence Service,
the Foreign Technology Division of Air Force
Systems Command, and the intelligence organizations
of the Strategic Air Command.
The-Air Force has traditionally been a key element in the nation's
intelligence system because it operates in the medium best suited for
reconnaissance and surveillance of actual or potential adversaries.
Air Force intelligence activities span the full range of intelligence
collection disciplines and production responsibilities. In this block,
a senior Air Force intelligence officer will describe these activities
and the organizations which conduct them.
READING:
Assigned: None
 OBJECTIVES:
1. Comprehend the organization and'operations of the U.S. intelligence
system in collecting and producing foreign intelligence.
1.1 Summarize the means by which U.S. intelligence
collection requirements are established.
1.2 Explain the process for tasking national intelligence
collection systems.
1.3 Summarize the methods and means by which the
Intelligence Community prepares foreign intelligence
products.
1.4 Summarize the means by which finished intelligence
products are conveyed to consumers.
OVERVIEW:
The quantum jumps in science and technology in the 1960's and 70's
revolutionized the U.S. intelligence system. Highly sophisticated
electronic and photographic collection systems, operating in a new
medium, have given the Intelligence Community access to foreign military
information once unobtainable by any means. Computers have allowed
analysts to process, evaluate, and store huge amounts of data.
Sherman Kent, in the 1965 Preface to his classic work, Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy (1949), foresaw the turn toward
technology which U.S. intelligence would take. "Whatever the complexities
of the puzzle we strive to solve and whatever the sophisticated techniques
we may use to collect the pieces and fore them," Kent warned, "there can
never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intel-
ligence device supreme."
How has the technological revolution in intelligence affected the
organization and operations of the U.S. Intelligence Community? Do we
really collect more intelligence than we can analyze? Are there
institutional or technological barriers to making the U.S. intelligence
system more efficient and productive? Does the current system provide
an environment where the human intellect can function fully and success-
fully?
 These are some of the questions we will discuss as we sum up the
U.S. Intelligence Community and prepare to examine in detail the
relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.
READING:
Assigned: None
 INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
W70010-1L/1D
OBJECTIVES:
1. Comprehend the role of intelligence in the policymaking process.
1.1 Summarize the basic barriers to analytic accuracy
cited by Richard K. Betts.
1.2 Explain the "traditionalist" and "activist" views
of the appropriate relationship between the
intelligence officer and the policymaker or consumer.
1.3 Summarize the key issues in the Intelligence-Policy-
making relationship.
OVERVIEW:
Sherman Kent begins his discussion of the intelligence producer-
consumer relationship with the observation that: "Intelligence must
be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest
amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its
objectivity and integrity of judgment." How can intelligence organiza-
tions achieve this balance in relationships with their consumers? What
factors govern the maintenance of such a balance? What happens when
producer-consumer relationships sour? In this block we will investigate
the nature of the intelligence organization's relationships with its
consumers, looking at the natural tensions that exist between intelligence
and policy.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable"
"The Problems of the Intelligence Consumer"
Optional:
"Intelligence for Policymaking"
 INDICATIONS & WARNING (I&W) INTELLIGENCE
W7001f-1L/1D
OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the background of the U.S. warning system and how the World-
wide DoD I&W System operates.
1.1 Outline the evolution of the U.S. warning system.
1.2 Describe the mission, organization, and operations
of the Worldwide DoD I&W System.
2. Comprehend the nature of the warning process.
2.1 Summarize the characteristics of the warning
process and the problems inherent in identifying,
evaluating, and analyzing indicators.
2.2 Explain the concept of intentions and the inter-
actions between opposing decisionmakers.
OVERVIEW:
The primary objective of any national intelligence system is to acquire
information which contributes to warning of threats to the security of the
state. Failures to provide such warning have irr recent times had a pro-- -
found effect on world events. The Pearl Harbor attack, Hitler's attack on
the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War in
the Middle East represent instances in which intelligence indicators
.generated by one state were not correctly perceived and analyzed by
another state. The political leaders of the second state thus were not
sufficiently warned to make decisions and direct actions which might have
reduced or precluded threats of its security.
In her seminal study on attack warning, Pearl Harbor: Warniniand
Decision, Roberta Wohlstetter examined the details o w y intelligence
concerning the possibility of a Japanese attack did not result in proper
tactical warning for U.S. forces in Hawaii. Wohlstetter developed the
thesis that the true "signals" of Japanese intent became imbedded in back-
ground "noice" which supported other plausible explanations of events. In
the article from Foreign Affairs she summarizes much of her book and
suggests that a similar analytical approach is useful to understanding
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
267
 READINGS:
Assigned:
"Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight"
"Indications, Warning & Crisis Operations"
Optional:
"Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the
Analysis of Surprise Attacks"
 W7001,Z 1 S
OBJECTIVES:
1. Comprehend the warning problems involved in the 1973 Yom Kippur
War between Israel and the Arab states.
1.1 Explain the Israelis' explicit and implicit
assumptions concerning the conditions under
which the Arabs would attack.
1.2 Give examples of the "signals" which the Arabs
sent concerning their intentions.
1.3 Summarize the character of the "noise" in
which the Arabs' signals were imbedded.
The total balance of forces is in our favor, and
outweighs all other Arab considerations and motives, and
puts a brake on the immediate renewal of hostilities....
Our military superiority is the double result of Arab
weakness and our own strength. Their weakness derives from
factors which, I believe, will not change quickly.
Israeli Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan in a speech to the
Graduates of the Military
Staff and Command College,
10 August 1973
Richard K. Betts, in an earlier reading, suggested that: "Intelligence
failures are not only inevitable, they are natural." The October 1973
Yom Kippur War represented an intelligence failure of unparalleled
significance, not only for Israel, but also for the intelligence services
of the Western democracies. The consequences of failing to foresee the
Arab attack on Israel remain with us today. In studying the Yom Kippur
War, we can see quite vividly how perceptual biases and filters make it
so difficult to pick up the "signals" out of the "noise." What lessons
does the Yom Kippur War hold for U.S. intelligence producers and
consumers?
 READINGS:
Assigned:
"Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the
Yom Kippur War"
Optional:
"The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise"
 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
W70013-2L/1D
1. Comprehend the major issues involved in the production of intelligence
estimates on Soviet strategic forces and objectives.
1.1 Summarize the historical record of U.S. Intelligence
estimates on Soviet strategic forces.
1.2 Explain the analytical methodologies employed in
estimating the present and future capabilities of
Soviet strategic forces.
1.3 Give examples of the major.problems encountered in
producing estimates on Soviet forces and objectives.
OVERVIEW:
Estimative intelligence on Soviet strategic forces and objectives
constitutes one of the principal production functions of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. As we develop and deploy our own strategic forces,
it is important that military planners and defense policymakers understand
present and future Soviet strategic capabilities and comprehend likely
Soviet responses to our policies and actions. The arms control negotia-
tions of the past decade have given impetus to the efforts of the
Intelligence Community to improve the quality of`its estimates.
Planners and policymakers must, however, bear in mind the limitations
of estimative intelligence, as Klaus Knorr points out in one of the later
readings:
Although the future, within some framework of
particulars, can be estimated, it cannot, of course,
be known. To estimate is-to guess in order to reduce
uncertainty dictated by lack, of knowledge. The
assumptions and preconceptions about reality that
structure the guesswork can be more or less rigorously
deduced from past behavior. But--as the historical
record discloses...--even the most sophisticated
assumptions can lead threat perception astray. To
depend wholly on any one preconception or set of
assumptions is to court surprise. This risk is
magnified by the tendency that the selection of an
assumption about the real world becomes an act of
cognitive closure that easily leads the perceiver
to be close-minded and to ignore or explain away
 discrepant information. It must therefore be
accepted that although good estimates can reduce
uncertainty about the future', even the best cannot
be depended on to prove it.
Knorr also identifies several kinds of predispositions that intervene to
affect the selection of assumptions and receptivity to incoming information
and which are apt to distort estimates. Among these are emotions, strong
ideological commitments, bureaucratic behavior, and wishful thinking.
Bear these considerations in mind while you review the controversy
over U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces in the
readings. We will have an opportunity to explore them more deeply
during the lecture on weapon system analysis as applied to Soviet
strategic estimates. Two of the historically controversial subject
areas of these estimates--Soviet strategic bombers and ICBM's--will be
highlighted to illustrate the techniques of weapon system analysis.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record"
"The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode
Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives"
Optional:
"Soviet Strategic Forces" (Handout)
 INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
W7001(l L/1 D
OBJECTIVES:
1. Know the means by which the Executive and Legislative branches
exercise oversight of U.S. intelligence activities.
1.1 Describe the role and responsibilities of the
Intelligence Oversight Board.
1.2 Describe the role and responsibilities of the
Inspector General for Defense Intelligence and
the intelligence responsibilities of the OSD
General Counsel.
1.3 Describe the role and responsibilities of the
Congressional intelligence oversight committees.
OVERVIEW:
From World War II to 1976 the term "oversight" as applied to the
Intelligence Community meant "something overlooked." The organizations
comprising the Community remained free to conduct business virtually as
they saw fit. The Rockefeller Commission and Congressional investigating
committees findings on improprieties in intelligence operations forced
the Executive and Legislative branches to change their definition of
"oversight" to something approximating "watchful care." Executive Branch
oversight is now exercised at the Presidential level by the Intelligence
Oversight Board. It receives reports from the Inspectors-General and
General Counsels of the various intelligence agencies and may conduct
investigations of improprieties when it deems warranted. Congressional
oversight of CIA and Defense intelligence activities was traditionally
exercised by the Armed Services Committees, In 1976, however, the
Senate created a Select Committee on Intelligence with jurisdiction over
all the agencies and entities of the Intelligence Community. The House
established a similar committee the following year. Our purpose in this
block is to examine how oversight of intelligence activities works and to
determine what effect the oversight system has on the conduct of intel-
ligence operations.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"U.S. Intelligence and the Congress"
 THE FUTURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
W70016-11/1D
OBJECTIVES:
1. Analyze the major institutional and substantive issues facing
the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 1980's.
1.1 Outline some of the proposed changes in the
structure of the Intelligence Community.
1.2 Identify some of the management challenges facing
intelligence organizations.
1.3 Identify some of the major problems in foreign
intelligence collection and production which the
U.S. will encounter in the 1980's.
wu~
During the past years the U.S. Intelligence Community has been
probed, measured, and studied as never before. Not surprisingly, these
examinations of U.S. intelligence organizations have yielded numerous
recommendations for changes in the structure of the Intelligence
Community. Often these recommendations for change derived solely from
analysis of past performance. Intelligence, however, is a dynamic field
governed by constant change and uncertainty. Intelligence problems of
the future may differ markedly from the problems with which intelligence
organizations grappled in the past. Basing a new national intelligence
structure on old needs may not be the most productive course of action.
The international environment of the 1980's will affect not only how
we structure the Intelligence Community, but also how we collect and pro-
duce intelligence. Rapid advancements in technology will provide new
opportunities for gathering and manipulating strategic foreign military
information. These developments may significantly enhance our ability
to verify arms control agreements, thereby making arms control more
attractive to national policymakers. Such a course would place heavy
strategic monitoring responsibilities on the Intelligence Community and
require a continuing heavy investment in technological systems. On the
other hand, we may see a marked increase in low intensity conflict in
the future which will necessitate an entirely different intelligence
response. Increasing violence and instability in a Third World about
which we know relatively little but on whom we and our allies depend
more and more for scarce resources is likely to generate new intelligence
requirements. So, too, is the growing threat of international, trans-
national, and urban terrorism. Can intelligence technology be adapted
 to these problems? What kind of expertise should the Community be
nurturing today to cope with the intelligence issues of the 1980's?
Are there extraordinary analytical techniques that we should be investi-
gating for application in the future?
In this final session, we will discuss the outlook for U.S. intelligence
in the 1980's by exploring the challenges facing the Intelligence Community
and examining ideas for structural change and methodological innovation.
READINGS:
Assigned:
"Strategic Intelligence: Problems and Remedies"