SOVIET COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: LITTLE PROSPECT FOR CATCHING UP

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~ SeCI'et
Intelligence
Soviet Computer Technology:
Little Prospect for
Catching Up (c)
Secret
SW 85-10038
March 1985
copy 3 5 5
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....~...6~..~~
Soviet Computer Technology:
Little Prospect for
Catching Up
This paper was written b
Office of Scientific and eapons esearc .
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Information Technologies
Branch, OSWR
Secret
SW 85-10038
March i 985
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Soviet Computer Technology:
Little Prospect for
Catching Up
Key Judgments The United States leads the USSR in all fields of general purpose digital
/rljormation available computer technology. This lead ranges from at least three years for
as 4f /November /984 internal memory devices to more than 10 years in high-performance
was used in this report.
magnetic storage systems. In general, the outlook for the remainder of the
1980s will be for the US lead to increase slightly, although, for some high-
priority applications, the Soviets may be able to reduce or design around a
particular technology gap
The Soviets have made progress both in computer technology and in
computer production techniques; however, their progress has been over-
whelmed by the rapid advances made in the West and Japan. The Soviets'
status in seven important areas of computer technology is summarized in
figure 1. These estimates are based upon the first delivery dates of
functionally equivalent US and Soviet civilian computer products. If we
were able to include computer production volume and quality in our
measure of technology, then the United States would be at least several
more years ahead
We believe there are many reasons why the Soviets trail the United States
in computer technology:
? The Soviets' centrally planned economy does not permit adequate
flexibility to respond to design or manufacturing changes frequently
encountered in computer production; this situation has often resulted in a
shortage of critical components-especially for new products.
? The extraordinary compartmentalization of information in the USSR-
especially on technologies with potential military applications; compart-
mentalization not only restricts the flow of information, but also results
in much duplication of work because of a lack of knowledge about other
activities.
? The Soviet preoccupation with meeting production quotas, frequently at
the expense of component and system quality control.
? The lack of adequate incentives for Soviet managers to take the risks
associated with innovations or new technology.
? Poor coordination between separate design institutes and production
facilities, sometimes resulting in products that have to be redesigned to
fit a factory's production capabilities.
iii Secret
SW 85-/0038
March / 985
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Figure 1
Computer Technology: United States Versus USSR
Minicomputers
Mainframes
I ligh-pcr~ixnwncc
peripherals
U 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Il 12 13 14 IS
Approximate length of US lead in years
? The Soviets' lag in computer-aided design and computer-aided manufac-
turing techniques caused by a belated development start and also,
ironically, by the Soviets' lag in computer technology.
? Concerns by Soviet officials that a computer is a powerful tool that could
be used for antirevolutionary activity and that a proliferation of comput-
ers might reduce the tight control of information in the USSR; these
concerns tend to restrict access to and firsthand knowledge about
computers as well as their applications.
? Provincial disputes within and between ministerial and institutional
organizations.
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? Very poor customer support-including inadequate user feedback, poor
installation support, and delayed maintenance-that frequently results in
reduced efficiency and productivity for computers in use.
Similar reasons also account for the Soviet lag in microelectronics
technology as well as instrumentation and test equipment; these technology
lags in components and basic electronic tools that are essential for modern
computers contribute directly to the Soviet lag in computer technology. In
our view, the entrenched Soviet bureaucracy would probably find it
difficult to take the necessary steps in the foreseeable future to correct
many of these well-recognized problems
The Soviet lag in computer technology and production is resulting in a lag
in both civilian and military computer applications. We believe that the
Soviets have sufficient numbers of computers for high-priority, low-volume
military and civilian projects. It is the remaining user community,
including Eastern Bloc allies, who will experience shortages and delays in
obtaining their desired computer systems. We expect the shortage of Soviet
automation equipment to hinder seriously the modernization of their
industrial base and also the growth of their economy
The Soviets apparently lag the United States also in the application of
computers in their fielded military systems. Historically, there has been a
tendency in the USSR to avoid the complex multimission military
systems-for which computers are an essential subsystem-that are
frequently preferred in the United States. The generally conservative
Soviet weapon design philosophy has probably not taxed Soviet computer
capabilities in the past. However, this may be changing. We believe that
the Soviets will be forced to incorporate more-advanced technology into
their weapon systems in order to stay competitive with Western military
development
The Soviets' most significant hardware deficiencies are in supercomputers
and high-performance magnetic disk technology. We do not expect the
Soviets to have a supercomputer until 1985 at the earliest, whereas the first
US commercial supercomputer was delivered in 1976. In magnetic disk
systems, the Soviets are about a decade behind the United States. Lags in
these critical areas will constrain Soviet computer system performance for
applications requiring high-speed capabilities, such as ballistic missile
defense, and applications requiring high input/output data rates, such as
large real-time command, control, and communications systems. In the
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NOFOKN
software arena, the number of experienced Soviet programmers who are
also cleared for classified projects may still be insufficient to complete all
priority projects on time.
We expect the Soviets' future progress in computer technology to be
heavily dependent upon their advances in microelectronics and in second-
ary storage technology, and upon their continuing activity in legally and il-
legally acquiring Western and Japanese hardware and software. Judging
from past performance and current technology assessments, we expect the
Soviets to fall further behind the United States throughout the 1980s. If
the Soviets obtained turnkey production facilities or detailed production
know-how from the West or Japan-as they have done in the past-they
would be able to narrow, at least temporarily, a specific technology gap.
Also, if they made a major technological breakthrough in areas where they
appear to be investing heavily, such as in optical computing or optical
storage-and chances are about even that they will-the Soviets could
overcome some of their computer deficiencies, for applications such as
ballistic missile defense or real-time reconnaissance
25X1
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
Microprocessors
1
Internal Memory Technology
4
Semiconductor Memories
4
Magnetic Cores
5
Plated-Wire Memories
6
Minicomputers
7
Nairi-4 Minicomputer
8
PS-2000 Array Processor
9
General Purpose Mainframes
10
Large Scientific Computers
13
Magnetic Tapes
21
Magnetic Bubbles
21
Technological
and Military Implications
21
Tables
1.
Soviet Microprocessors
2
2.
Characteristics of Soviet SM-I Minicomputers
8
3.
Technical Specifications for Soviet Ryad-2 Mainframe Computers
15
4.
"Standard" Soviet Elbrus-1 Configurations
18
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Computer Technology: United States Versus USSR
iv
2.
US Intel-8080A Microprocessor and Soviet K580
3
3.
-
Soviet Copies of US Microprocessors, 1971-83
4
- __ --
--
4.
Semiconductor Memory Technology: United States Versus USSR,
1971-87
5
5.
Magnetic Core Memory Technology: United States Versus USSR,
1955-85
6
6.
Soviet Copies of US Minicomputers
9
7.
Soviet SM-1420/SM-5 Minicomputer
10
8.
Soviet Nairi-41 Minicomputer
10
9.
Soviet PS-2000 Array Processor
11
10.
Timetable: IBM and Soviet Ryad Mainframes, 1964-84
12
1 I .
Soviet ES-1060 Twin Computer Complex
13
12.
Mainframe Performance: United States Versus USSR
14
13.
IBM System Software in Use in CEMA Countries
17
14.
Soviet Elbrus-1 Computer Complex, Circa 1980
18
15.
Magnetic Disk Technology: United States Versus USSR, 1965-88
20
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Soviet Computer Technology:
Little Prosp
Catching U
This report is an assessment of the state of the art of
Soviet general purpose digital electronic computer
technology. It is primarily a condensed version of a
more detailed Technical Intelligence Report on the
same subject.' The assessment is based on information
about Soviet civilian computer systems; however, we
believe that this information is indicative of Soviet
capabilities in military general purpose computer
technology
A basic microprocessor typically consists of the inter-
connection of an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), a
register set (very fast storage), a control unit, and
interrupts. A microcomputer consists of a micro-
processor plus a main memory, an input medium, and
an output medium
The current state of the art in Soviet microprocessor
technology is a 16-bit single-chip capability in low-
volume production and 16-bit chip-sets in serial pro-
duction. The Soviets are four to six years behind the
United States in microprocessor technology; however,
we expect the US lead to increase in the near future
as 32-bit monolithic processor technology matures.
We have been able to identify 20 types of Soviet
microprocessors (table 1). Although 20 is a small
number relative to the number of microprocessors
commercially available in the West and Japan, the
Soviets have judiciously spread their resources across
a wide variety of semiconductor devices and fabrica-
tion processes. Thus, Soviet design engineers may
choose a semiconductor device for a particular appli-
cation on the basis of a wide variety of trade-offs in
speed, power, radiation resistance, and cost
The Soviets can, however, be expected to make in-
creased use of complementary metal oxide semicon-
ductor (CMOs) devices in the next few years. The
best known advantage of CMOS technology is its low
power, both in the standby and in the operating mode.
The high immunity of a CMOs device to noise
encourages design engineers to use a lower voltage
power supply. In addition, special processing tech-
niques can make CMOS chips more resistant than the
widely used negative-channel metal oxide semicon-
ductor (nMOS) chips to a specified radiation dose rate 25X1
or fluence. CMOS devices have other advantages over
nMOS devices:
? Inherently faster switching times.
? Better resistance to "soft errors" caused by alpha-
particle radiation.
? Higher tolerance to transistor-leakage problems.
In the light of these advantages, we expect the Soviet
military to direct major Ministry of Electronics In-
dustry (MEP) resources toward the advancement of
their CMOs fabrication processes during the remain-
As in many non-Communist countries, US micro-
processors have served as the model for many, and
25X1
probably most, Soviet products (figures 2 and 3). In
general, Soviet microprocessors reflect various de-
grees of similarity to US products (table 1, column 4).
However, the Soviets have not copied US counterparts
exactly, but rather have adapted the US designs to 25X1
Soviet fabrication processes. We expect other US
counterparts to be identified in time. The Soviets also
have demonstrated an indigenous design capability in
microprocessors, according to evaluations of a K587
device that was received by a US firm in 197825X1
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the list of Soviet
microprocessors (table 1) is the preponderance of bit-
slice Zdevices. We believe that the Soviets' preponder-
ance of bit-slice devices resulted from deficiencies in
z Bit-slice devices and chip-set microprocessors implement the
functions usually associated with a monolithic (single-chip) inte-
25X1
25X1
LJ/~1
25X1
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Table 1
Soviet Microprocessors
Designator
K532
Technology/Width (bits)
CMOs/4 a
Earli
1976
KS36
pMOS/8 a
1979
K555
TTL/2 a e
1976
K580
HMOs/8
1978
K581
HMOs/16
1979
K582
IIL/4 a
1979
K583
IIL/8 a
1980
K584
IIL/4 a
1977
K586
HMOs/ 16
1980
K587
CMOs/4 e
1978
K588
CMOs/16a
1977
__
K589
- ---
STTL/2aa
- _
1977
K 1800
ECL/4 a
1982
K 1801
K 1802
HMOs/ 16
STTL/8 a
1980
1981
K 1804
STTL/4 a
1981
K1810
HMOs/16
1983
'?
SOS/?
1979
'?
HMOs/8
1983
?
HMOs/8
1983
~+ Bit-slice device.
~ It is not certain that K555 is a microprocessor. Soviet open-source
literature in 1977 identified it as atwo-bit-slice microprocessor; but
a 1984 open-source catalog equates the K555 family to the Texas
Instruments (TI) SN74LS series, which does not have a micro-
processor product.
Soviet Agat is modeled after US Apple microcomputer
architecture.
~ May have been originally TTL.
A G 1 l2 microprocessor was mentioned in a 1978 Soviet publica-
tion; we suspect that it is actually a microcomputer.
MOS =metal oxide semiconductor
CMOs =complementary MOS
pMOS =positive-channel MOS
HMOs =negative-channel MOS
TTL =transistor-transistor logic
STTL =Schottky-clamped TTL
ECL =emitter-coupled logic
SOS =silicon on sapphire
IIL =integrated-injection logic
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Soviet microelectronic fabrication capabilities during
the 1970s and early 1980x. nlthough single-chip
microprocessors are cheaper, smaller, and more reli-
able, they also place more-stringent demands than do
multichip microprocessors on the production equip-
ment and the overall fabrication process. The Soviets'
deficiencies in the production of semiconductor de-
vices would also explain their usage of bit-slice archi-
tectures in metal oxide semiconductor (MOST technol-
ogies -something that is not done in the West or
Japan, because it is simply not efficient or cost
cff~cctivc
We believe that all of the Soviet microprocessors
listed in table 1 are in at least limited production. A
US market analysis firm estimated that over 60
million microprocessors were shipped by companies in
the non-Communist world during 1983. On the basis
of fragmentary information, we suspect that the pro-
duction volume of Soviet microprocessors lags this
figure by two to three orders of magnitude. Ironically,
law production volumes of microelectronic devices
may hinder advances in Soviet microelectronic pro-
duction technology. Major US manufacturers have
attributed a significant portion of their high yield and
production technology advances to their very large
production volume, which quickly exposes the manu-
facturing processes that arc the leading causes of
rejection
There arc reliable reports reflecting Soviet interest in
or development of microprocessor applications for
their military. We do not have information at this
time that a Soviet microprocessor is currently de- 25X1
ployed in or designed into any specific Soviet military
system. There is a great potential for using small fast
microprocessors wish low power requirements in mili-
tary applications, and we believe that it is simply a
matter of tune before we obtain firm evidence that the
Soviets arc so using them 25X1
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Figure 3
Soviet Copies of US Microprocessors, 1971-83
United States
USSR
Intel-8088 ~~ 4 years ~ (?)
Intel-8086 ~ 6 years K1810
Intel-8085 ~ 7 years (?)
Motorola-10800 ~ 7 years K1800
AMD-2901 ~ 6 years K1804
GI CP-1600 ~~ 4 years
~ Intel-4004
World's first microprocessor
1971 72 74 76 78 80 82 83
Semiconductor Memories
The Soviets are three to five years behind the United
States in semiconductor random-access memory
(RAM) technology (figure 4), but when production
capability and quality are considered we assess that
the US lead can be extended by at least several more
years. The Soviets' literature indicates that they are
even further behind the United States in read-only
memory (ROM) technologies, including programma-
ble ROMs (PROMS) and erasable PROMS
(EPROMs)
Over 50 semiconductor RAMS and over 50 ROM-
type memory devices, most in more than one version,
have been identified in Soviet catalogs and open
literature. As with their microprocessors, the Soviets
have spread their semiconductor memories across a
variety of technologies, including to -
and high-speed emitter-coupled logi
the Soviets began
using sma -capacity semlcon uctor RAMS in the late
1970s. There were "...adequate supplies of accept-
able quality ..." of 16-Kbit (1K = ],024) RAMS in
mid-1980 The
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Figure 4
Semiconductor Memory Technology: United States Versus USSR, 1971-878
Capacity in bits
United States
~ USSR
1,024 K
1971 72 74
a R;aed on meta Loxide semiconductor
drnumlr random-access memories.
4 years - >~
25X1
303319 12-84
Soviets probably had a 64-Kbit dynamic RAM in
sample production by the early 1980s. In the United
States and Japan, the 256-Kbit RAM is now being
produced and prototypes of a 1-Mbit RAM have been
made with improved photolithographic techniques in-
stead of X-ray or E-beam lithography, contrary to
what was frequently forecast in the technical litera-
ture. We expect that the Soviets will not put 256-Kbit
RAMS into production until the late 198
Magnetic Cores
Magnetic core memories have several features that
are attractive to the military. First, magnetic core is a
random-access memory; the time to retrieve data is
the same no matter where the data are stored in the
memory. Second, core memories are nonvolatile; when
power is disconnected or interrupted, core memories
do not lose their information as many semiconductor
memories do. Third, core memories are available in
systems that have been hardened against nuclear
radiation. Fourth, cores require no power in order to
retain data in a standby mode. On the other side of
the ledger, core memories require much more physical 25X1
space and more power to operate, and cost much
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Figure 5
Magnetic Core Memory Technology:
United States Versus USSR, 1955-85
1?xternal core diameter in mils
- United States
Ussk
can be stored at each intersection of these wires.
Plated-wire memories have several characteristics
that are attractive to military-system designers.
Plated-wire memories provide protection against elec-
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) and have good radiation
hardening properties. These memories are nonvolatile
and can be made with a nondestructive readout
(NRDO), thus providing additional protection for the
stored data. However, plated-wire memories are ex-
tremely expensive-on the order of $1.00 per bit,
whereas most other mPmorv technologies are just
pennies per bit or less.
reported in the mid- 25X1
s on t e ov~ets pure ase of a turnkey factory
more, than a semiconductor memory of like capacity.
The trend in US military applications is toward
semiconductor memories, with backup or shadow
memories in critical applications
Magnetic core technology is frequently gauged by the
external diameter of the basic ferrite toroid'-the
smaller the diameter, the greater the memory capaci-
ty per unit of area. Using this core diameter as a
figure of merit, we find that the Soviets lag the
United States in magnetic core technology by about
five years (figure 5). We believe that this lead was
maintained during the 1970s, even though the empha-
sis on the development of magnetic cores in the
United States decreased as fast as the popularity and
usage of semiconductor memories increased
Plated-Wire Memories
A plated-wire memory is arandom-access memory
that consists of a plane of parallel wires electroplated
with a thin film of magnetic material and overlaid by
a set of transverse word lines. One bit of information
from the Japanese to produce plated-wire memories.
Included in the agreement was extensive documenta-
tion that should enable the Soviets to build duplicate
plants if they so desired. The Japanese turned the new
factory in Yerevan over to the Soviets in December
1976-the same year that the Japanese firm discon-
tinued plated-wire memories. The output capacity of
the Soviet plant was rated at 120 million bits of wire
memory per year. This was actually higher than the
capacity of the plated-wire plants in Japan, because of
the high requirements set forth in the contract with
the USSR in 25X1
the first 18 months t e Yerevan plant pro uce ewer
than eight million bits of plated-wire memory. This
shortfall was attributed not to the Japanese equip-
ment but to the low quality of Soviet base metals.
[n the United States, plated-wire memories have been
developed for the guidance computer in the Polaris
and Poseidon missiles. Plated-wire memories have
been used also in the US Minuteman weapon system
computer as well as briefly in a few US and Japanese
commercial computers. Ina 1982 list of US space
computers being used by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, nine of 17 systems used
plated wire for their main memory. It is reasonable to
expect that the Soviets would also use their plated-
wire systems in ruggedized mobile applications with
modest memory capacity requirements
25X1
25X1
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The Soviets are four to six years behind the United
States in 16-bit minicomputer technology. They may
realize their first 32-bit superminicomputer by the
end of 1985
Following along the lines of the successful CEMA
cooperative program in mainframe computers, the
Council of Principal Constructors of Minicomputer
Systems was created in 1974 in an attempt to coordi-
nate minicomputer development within CEMA coun-
tries. The Soviet Union assumed the major role and
developed four new minicomputers: the SM-1, -2, -3,
and -4. This group, and possibly the SM-5, constitutes
the first eneration of SM minicomputers, SM-I
(table 2).
The SM-1 and the SM-2 are modeled after the
Hewlett-Packard HP-2100 architecture and are pri-
marily for process and production control as well as
real-time applications. The SM-2 is essentially an
SM-1 with an improved central processing unit and
more main memory. These two machines are unusual
examples of Soviet plagiarism in that the resulting
Soviet systems are not compatible with HP software.
The Impuls Scientific Production Association devel-
oped the SM-1 and the SM-2; the SM-1 is produced
at the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation
Equipment, and Control Systems (Minpribor) plant in
Orel, and the SM-2 is produced by the Impuls
association in Severodonetsk. Impuls is currently pro-
moting modernized versions called the SM-1M and
the SM-2M. The great majority of the publicity has
been given to the SM-2M, which has been identified
in a Soviet brochure with 25 different configurations
including 22 dual-processor versions. In an open-
source article, the deputy general director of Impuls
states that different computer architectures will be
used to overcome the "disadvantages" of traditional
minicomputers such as the SM-2. He then describes
the SM-1210 multiprocessor and the PS-3000 array
processor, which Impuls may now have in production.
As in the United States, the trend in the USSR is
toward multiprocessor systems to avoid the through-
put bottleneck caused by sequential processing on a
uniprocessor system
and for having put these machines into serial produc-
tion. The SM-3 and the SM-4 are modeled after the
low end of the US Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC) PDP-11 minicomputer line and are intended
primarily for small scientific and engineering applica-
tions. The SM-3 and SM-4 can execute DEC soft- 25X1
ware without modification. The newer SM-4 with 256
Kbytes of main memory can execute DEC's RSX-
11 Moperating system. The popular UNIX operating
system, which was originally written in the United
States for DEC PDP-11 minicomputers, also is known
to be available in the USSR. Copies of PDP-11
minicomputers are also being produced in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East German Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Cuba 25X1
Being copies of US systems, the Soviet SM systems 25X1
provide a good basis for a comparison of 16-bit
minicomputer technology. According to the year of
first installation for the SM-1 through the SM-5
(figure 6), the Soviets are about four to six years
behind the United States in general purpose 16-bit
minicomputer technology. However, if we were to go
by the quality and quantity of production, several
more years could be added to this US lead. In 1979
Soviet official
were having "yield and reliability"
pro ems m t eir SM production line. They hoped to
resolve these problems and to be producing 1,000 SM
units per year by 1982, the bulk of which were to be
SM-3 and SM-4 models. In the fall of 1981 ~
the Kiev production plant was
,500 SM-4 units would be produced that
year. Even the more optimistic forecast is quite
modest, considering that the SM is the primary
minicomputer series for the entire Soviet Union. By
comparison, after about a decade of production, DEC
had almost 100,000 PDP-11 minicomputers installed
worldwide by the end of 1981. In late 1982 a reliable
source reported that the SM-4 would be replaced by
the newer SM-1420-also called the SM-S-mini-
25X1
25X1
25X1
computer in 1983 (figure 7) 25X1
25X1
the Ministry of Electronics 25X1
n ustry as eci ed to develop, manufacture,
and sell its own line of minicomputers in the Soviet 25X1
In 1981 the USSR State Prize in Technology was
awarded to 10 Soviet managers and engineers for
having developed the SM-3 and SM-4 minicomputers
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Table 2
Characteristics of Soviet SM-I
Minicomputers
Characteristic
SM-1
SM-2
SM-3
SM-4
SM-5
Average speed in kops a
130
155
135
215
400
Main memory, Kwords
4 to 32
32 to 128
16 to 28
16 to 124
128 to 2,097
Instruction time in microseconds
Fixed point
Addition
Multiplication
Division
Floating point
Addition
Multiplication 110 b 23
Division - 40
~~ These speeds, except for the SM-5, whose speed is estimated, were
cited in Soviet literature and seem to be more realistic than the 250
kops for the SM-1 and 800 kops for the SM-4 which are frequently
quoted in open literature.
n Probably implemented in software.
Implemented in software.
kops: 1,000 operations per second.
Kwords: 1,024 words with 16 data bits per word.
Not known.
Note: Soviet open literature has placed the SM-5 in the SM-I
family; however, a Soviet export brochure (circa 1983) claims that
the SM-5 is in the SM-II family of minicomputers.
410 ~ 34
Union. The Soviet official said that MEP had made
"exact replicas of the DEC minicomputers." We do
not know at this time whether the Soviet official was
referring to DEC's 16-bit PDP-1l minicomputer line
or to its newer 32-bit VAX superminicomputer fam-
ily. Minpribor has been the primary manufacturer of
minicomputers in the USSR to date. If MEP begins
producing minicomputers, serious interministerial
conflicts could easily arise between MEP and Minpri-
bor, because MEP is also the primary (possibly the
sole) source of microelectronic com onents for Min-
pribor minicomputers
At an international conference in 1981, an East
European scientist stated that the Soviets were devel-
oping aminicomputer that would be compatible with
software for DEC's VAX superminicomputer. Al-
though information is very sparse, we believe, on the
basis of past Soviet accomplishments, that the Soviets
will produce their first 32-bit minicomputer by the
end of 1985, and that this machine will be compatible
with DEC VAX software. DEC's first VAX, the
1 1 /780, introduced in 1978, is a complex machine
requiring 23 printed-circuit boards for its central
processor. We believe that the Soviets will have an
easier time copying the DEC VAX 11/750, which,
with its four-board processor, is much less complicat-
ed than the 1 I /780.
Nairi-4 Minicomputer
Although the SM series has no known special versions
for military applications, at least one civilian general
purpose minicomputer, the Nairi-4, has been modified
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Figure 6
Soviet Copies of US Minicomputers
~ United States
~ USSR
PDP-11/44(?)a ~~-- 3 years --~ SM-5
PDP-11/34A ~~ 4 years ~{~ SM-4b
PDP-11/40 ~~ S Years --!!~ SM-4b
PDP-ll/OS
HP-21MX ~f
HP-2100 ~~-
1971 72 74 76 78 80 82 83
Year of production
May he a copy o(PDP-I 1/44, less [he cache memory.
n The SM-4 is known to have been a copy of DEC's PDP-11/34A since a[ least [he
early 19gOs. The original SM-4 may have been a copy of [he PDP-Il/40.
for such use
special Nairi-4 with gold contacts was being built in
1977 for the Soviet military. Indeed, the Nairi-4 has
several other conspicuous characteristics that would
make it useful for many fixed land-based military
applications. One is the use of plated wire to provide a
nonvolatile main memory having a nondestructive
readout. Plated-wire memory also has good radiation-
resistance characteristics
The Nairi-4 minicomputer has used a magnetic drum
for bulk storage. Magnetic drums were used in many
early automated subsystems for the US military, but
they have largely been replaced by fixed-head mag-
netic disk systems, by core memories, and, more
recently, by semiconductor memories. The physical
size of the Nairi-4 computer would limit it to applica-
tions at fixed ground-based sites or on large mobile
platforms. A new version called the Nairi-41 was
briefly mentioned several times in the open literature
in 1982. A nonoperational Nairi-41 was displayed at
the 1983 Leipzig Spring Fair (figure 8). According to
a technical brochure, the Nairi-41 has a 540-nanosec-
ond cycle time for register-register instructions and up
to 256 Kbytes of semiconductor memory
PS-2000 Array Processor
The PS-2000 is a microprocessor-based array proces- 25X1
sor system developed in the late 1970s at the Control
Problems Institute, Moscow, in coordination with the
Impuls Scientific Production Association in Severo-
donetsk (figure 9). With Impuls' involvement, it is
likely that the PS-2000 will operate only with the
SM-2 and the SM-2M minicomputers. Soviet litera-
ture states that the PS-2000 consists of eight, 16, 32,
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Figure 7. Soviet SM-1420
SM-5 Minicompute
or 64 "processing elements" that can be dynamically
rrrrranged. In Soviet literature, "processing element"
usually refers to a bit-slice microprocessor component.
The word lengths in the PS-2000 (12, 16, or 24 bits)
suggest a 2-bit or a 4-bit device as the basic building
block. This hypothesis, in conjunction with the opera-
tional speed of the PS-2000 and the time at which it
was developed, suggests that the K5894
microprocessor is used in this machine
n Suviet article announced that the PS-2000 was able
to halve the computation time of a modeling problem
executed on a uniprocessor minicomputer-probably
an SM-2. This increase in performance seems more
realistic than the extraordinarily high speeds claimed
in the Soviet press since 1981. Even so, the PS-2000 is
important because it reflects the Soviets' interest and
progress in array processor technology
The term "mainframe," which originally referred to
the central processing unit and sometimes the main
memory, is now generally used to describe a class of
computers exemplified by the IBM large-computer
line. nlthough far surpassed in numbers by the
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microcomputers and minicomputers sold today, the
mainframe class still accounts for over 50 percent of
the dollar volume in computer sales worldwide
Historically the Soviets, together with their CEMA
partners, have placed great emphasis on, and have
invested significant resources in, the development and
production of their series of software-compatible
mainframes known as the Unified System (ES: Edin-
aya Sistema) or as the Series (Ryad).
the Soviets patterne t e
first Ryad family after the highly successful IBM
System/360 line; Ryad-2 developers used the IBM
System/370 as a design basis. The adoption of a
proven commercial system was aloes-risk decision
enabling the Soviets to circumvent much of the R&D
costs associated with the development of new comput-
ers as well as most of the software development costs.
In both Ryad-1 and Ryad-2, Soviet models were first
installed approximately seven to eight years after
their IBM counterpart (figure 10). Several improved
versions of the Ryad-1 series were put into serial
production during the 1970s in Bulgaria (ES-1022B)
and the USSR (ES-1022, -1033, and -1052). Other
Ryad-1 machines included the Czechoslovak ES-
1021, which was not compatible with IBM Sys-
tem/360 software, and the Polish ES-1032~~
The Ryad-2 family initially consisted of five members
that entered production in the late 1970s-the
ES-1025 (Czechoslovakia), ES-1035 (USSR, Bulgar- 25X1
ia), ES-1045 (USSR), ES-1055 (GDR), and ES-1060
(USSR;--plus a sixth, the ES-1065 (USSR), which
was in production by 1982.` The ES-1060 slipped
from the Ryad-1 program because of technological
problems including overheating of its fast integrated
circuit logic, and is now considered part of the Ryad-2
scrics (figure 11). Three improved Ryad-2 models .5X1
were in or nearing production in 1984: the Czechoslo- 25X1
vak ES-1026, the East German ES-1056, and the
Soviet ES-]061
Figure 12 shows a performance comparison of Ryad-2
mainframes and some IBM System/370 computers.
The values for the speed-operations per second s
(ops)-and the memory size are taken from Soviet and
Western literature. Although lagging US mainframe
Hungary produces the ES-1015 minicomputer, which is also listed
as a Ryad-2 machine but is not compatible with IBM System~370
Operations per secon and other single measures of efTectiveness
are an oversimplification, as system performance is actually a
comnlex fir~f many factors, especially the specific applica-
25X1
25X1
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Figure 10
Timetable: IBM and Soviet Ryad Mainframes, 1964-84
~ IBM
;, Ryad
S/=Sys[em
S/360 delivered
Ryad- I revealed
S/370 delivered 303X announced
7 years ~
Ryad-2 revealed
Ryad-1 Ryad-I delivered
announced
Ryad-3 Ryad-3
revealed announced
Ryad-2
delivered
Ryad-2
announced
- -I- L---~-L~ -1_ i_ _.. i_-
1964 66 68 70
72 74 76 78 80 82 84
technology, the Ryad-2 family still offers the Soviets
and their allies a fairly wide range of computing
capability. Table 3 shows some Ryad-2 technical
specifications. We believe that the Soviets are produc-
ing Ryad-2 machines in sufficient numbers to satisfy
at least priority users. However, when one considers
quantity, quality, and performance/cost ratios real-
ized by the general-user population, the Soviets are
about four years further behind the United States
than the seven to eight years indicated by the dates of
first delivery
Based on open literature, figure 13 illustrates those
IBM system software products that we believe are in
use, with some name changes, in the Soviet Bloc.
Open literature suggests that the Soviets are using
most IBM system software products released prior to
1978; the most ,notable exception is Multiple Virtual
Storage (MVS)
In November 1981 the Soviets announced a new Ryad
mainframe, the ES-1036; a scale model of this com-
puter was exhibited at the Budapest Spring Technical
308X delivered
308X announced
43XX delivered
Fair in 1983. A Soviet export brochure obtained in
1984 states that the ES-1036 represents the first stage
in developing Ryad-3 computers. According to open
literature, the ES-1036 can execute up to 400,000
operations per second, has a main memory of 2 to 4
megabytes, has an 8-kilobyte buffer (or cache) memo-
ry, and will have a virtual machine operating system.
We suspect that Ryad-3 computers will be copies of
the IBM 43XX and 303X families. In the spring of
1982, the Soviets also briefly mentioned that they
were developing a prototype ES-1061 computer,
which will be a modernized version of the ES-1060.
The ES-1061 was to enter serial production in 1984,
according to Soviet open literature. Other new Ryad
designators include:
? Hungary: ES-1016, -1017.
? Czechoslovakia: ES-1026, -1027.
? Poland and/or USSR: ES-1034, -1047.
? GDR: ES-1056, -1057.
? USSR: ES-1046, -1066, -1067, -1077, -1087.
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We believe that at least the ES-1036 and -1061 were
in production in 1984, and that most of the machines
listed above will enter production over the next two to
three years
Status
We believe that the Soviets will not develop their first
digital electronic supercomputer until 1985 at the
earliest. The lack of a modern supercomputer can
restrict or slow advanced R&D programs as well as
civil and military applications, such as energy explo-
ration and strategic missile defense, that require a
Elbrus Computer
The USSR does not have a supercomputer in a class
with the US Cray-1 or Cyber-205. The machine most
likely to become the first Soviet supercomputer will
probably come from the Elbrus project at the Institute
for Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology
(ITMiVT) in Moscow. The Elbrus-1 multiprocessor
computer was created and fostered during the 1970s
by V. S. Burtsev, the director of ITMiVT. The
Elbrus-1 system employs a tagged architecture with a
stack organization and an addressing structure similar
to those of the Burroughs B-6700 system first deliv-
ered in 1970, in the United States. However, Elbrus-1
is much more ambitious in that it reportedly has from
huge number of computations.
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Figure 12
Mainframe Performance: United States Versus USSR
-- IBM
Ryad
195
168
165
135
izs
1 111.11
I Ill
Main memory in kilobytes
1.1.1111
1060
1045
1055 (East German)
11111111. 1 I I1
one to 10 central processing units (CPUs) operating
asynchronously ? with up to four input output proces-
sors and 32 memory modules interconnected through
a series of crossbar switches (figure 14). In 1982 a
" nn asynchronous multiprocessor assigns tasks to difTerent proces-
surs, using a set of indicators to designate which processors are free
and which arc busy. Typically, a processor will operate on a task
until it has completed the task or until it is interrupted by the
"all" of the Elbrus-1 com-
puters o w lc e was aware are single-processor
models except one machine that has two CPUs. We
suspect that this small number of processors in Elbrus
computers being delivered may be due to the lack of a
generalized operating system or to troubles with such
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Tsble 3
Technical Specifications for Soviet Ryad-2
Mainframe Computers
Estimated date of first
delivery
1980
1977
1979
1979
1978
1984
1982
Production plant
Cakovice
Minsk-Brest/Sofia
Kazan
Dresden
Minsk
Minsk
Minsk
Country
Czechoslovakia
USSR/Bulgaria
USSR
GDR
USSR
USSR
USSR
Processor
Speed (1,000 operations/
secontn
35
160
650
450
1,000
2,000
3,000
Fixed add time (?s)
5-13
4.5
0.7-0.85
0.6-2.7
0.25-0.30
a
0.12
Fixed multiply time (?s)
95-220
23
2.8-3.4
3.4-5.2
1.5-1.8
_
a
0.6
Floating point add
time (?r)
50.0
95.0
1.9
1.6
0.80
a
0.24
Floating point multiply
time (?r)
9.7
19.8
2.8
2.7
2.3
a
0.30
Main memory
Capacity (Mbytes)
0.1-0.5
0.25-1
1-4
0.25-4
0.5-8
1-8
2-16
Cycle time (ns)
1,250
800
840
1,140
_
800
a
e
Access time (ns)
500
550
650
a
e
e
870
Bytes fetched per cycle
8
8
8
8
8
e
e
Microprogram control memory
Capacity (Kbytes)
48RW
7R0 +
1RW
8
48
e
a
Cycle time (ns)
380
200
120-380
135
a
e
a
Access time (ns)
a
e
a
140
65
e
e
Length of word
accessed (bytes)
a
a
8
8
16
e
e
Cache (scratch pad) memory
Capacity (Kbytes)
X
X
8
X
8
e
32
Cycle time (ns)
X
X
120
X
135
e
e
Access time (ns)
X
X
72
X
65
e
a
Length of word
accessed (bytes)
X
X
8
X
8
e
a
Channels
Maximum number
2
5
6
5
7
8
e
Total transfer rate
(kbytes/s)
a
1,200
5,000
6,000
9,000
a
15,000
Maximum number
1
4
(5) 6
(4) 6
(6) 6
a
(16)
Transfer rate
(kbytes/s)
33
740
(1,500)6
(1,500)6
(1,300)6
a
(1,500)
Byte-multiplex channels
Maximum number
1
1
2
2
2
e
e
Transfer rate
(kbytes/s)
24
40-280 ~
40-160 ~
40-1,500 ~
110-670 ~
a
110-?
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Table 3
Tecbnical Specifications for Soviet Ryad-2
Mainframe Computers (continued)
Block-multiplex channels
Maximum number
X
5
Transfer rate
X
1,500
(kht~res/s)
Class, per State Standard
GOST 16325-76
ll
~~ Data not available.
n On these models the block-multiplex channel can be operated as a
selector channel.
Speed varies depending on numbers and types of operational
channels in system.
?s =microsecond = 10-? second; ns =nanosecond = 10-? second.
Byte = 8 bits (8 binary digits); Kbyte = 1,024 bytes; kbyte =
1,000 bytes; Mbyte = 1,048,576 bytes.
X =equipment not available on model; RW =read/write; RO =
read only.
ote: peel canons or ya computers vary, sometimes great y,
in CEMA literature. None of the values in this table have been
confirmed by direct access to a Ryad-2 computer, and we believe
that they tend to be overly optimistic. Ryad-2 systems introduced in
the late 1970s had ferrite-core main memories; these were upgrad-
ed [o semiconductor memories in the early 1980s. Operational
parameters for semiconductor devices are used in this table. The
performance of the ES-1065 is based upon a uniprocessor
configuration.
The ES-1026, -1056, and -1061 are modernized Ryad-2 versions of
the ES-1025, -lOSSM, and -1060, respectively.
an operating system for Elbrus-1 computers having
more than two processors. By analogy, the first US
commercial supercomputer, the Cray-1, initially was
delivered in 1976 with only the most primitive soft-
ware support for system management
Table 4 lists four Elbrus configurations identified as
"standard" in a Soviet brochure. All of the through-
put values are quite optimistic; and the maximum
main memory capacity is modest relative to US state
of the art. On the basis of comments by Soviet
scientists and the size of the Elbrus machine, we
estimate that between five and 10 Elbrus computers
have been built each year since 1979. Cray Research
Corporation in the United States delivered an average
of seven Cray supercomputers each year between
1976 and 1984
there
would be two versions of Elbrus: one for civilian use,
and one for the militar the
only difference between these two computers would be
the method of testing. Ballistic missile defense is an
application frequently cited by emigres for the Elbrus
computer. It was rumored in Soviet scientific circles
around 1978 that an Elbrus was to be installed on an
aircraft carrier
A new model, Elbrus-2, has been under development
at ITMiVT. According to Soviet literature, this ma-
chine will exceed 100 million operations per second.
Elbrus-2 was mentioned as early as 1977, but we
suspect that Burtsev has been busy debugging Elbrus-
1 and is still trying to perfect an Elbrus-2 prototype.
A Soviet scientist stated in September 1983 that no
Elbrus-2 machines had been produced as of that date.
If Elbrus-2 is realized, it will be, we expect, the
Soviets' first entry into the supercomputer realm.
(S NF~
M-10 Computer
In May 1979 M. A. Kartsev published a description
of a synchronous multiprocessor system called the M-
10 that he had designed at the Institute of Electronic
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Figure 13
IBM System Software in Use in CEMA Countries
Release dates of
IBM software
products
1966 Batch
Single task
1967 Spooling
Multiprogramming
1968 Multitasking
1969
1970
1971 Teleprocessing
Timesharing
1972 Virtual storage
Virtual machines
1973
1974 Parallel operations
1975
1976
1977
1978 Program products
1979 High-performance
option
1980 System product
1981
1982
1983 Extended
architecture
1984 Extended
virtual machines
System/360
announcement
DOS/VSE
Program products
OS/VS1
Program product
CP/CMS
CP/40
OS/VS2 R2
MVS
MVS/SE
Program product
VM/SP
System product
MVS/SP V2
MVS/XA
Systems believed to be in use
in CEMA countries
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"fable -t
"Standard" Soviet }~:Ibrus-1
('onfikurations
Number of (~PUs
I
'
4
10
Throughput in Mops
1.5
3.0
5.5
12.0
Storage capacity,
576
1,152
2.304
4,608
Kb~'tcs
M1lenwn blocks
I
'
4
8
h1cnwn~ commutators
I
2
4
8
Input~autput
~
~
2
4
processors
U:ua communication
(Il
~
2
16
processors
(~Pl~: central processing unit.
Mops: millions of operations per second.
Kb~tc: 1,024 bytes 8,192 bits.
1 t uption;il.
('omputcrs ~Il?UM1 in Moscow.' Kartsev said that up
to seven M-10 computers can be joined together in a
' In a synchronous multiprocessor system, the processors operate in
a lockstep manner usually timed to a worst-case operation. This
procedure greatly reduces the management overhead associated
with asynchronous systems but can Icad to inefficiencies for very
operations per second
single synchronous complex. Another open source
suites that Ryad peripheral equipment can be used
with the M-10. According to Kartsev, this 32-bits
word computcr has an average speed of over 5 million
Kartsev described the control unit of the M-10 as
being able to dynamically adapt the number of pro-
cessors under program control as a function of the
word length. This approach is similar to a technique
used in the US Illiac-IV supercomputer, which made
it possible either to execute with 64 processors on
word lengths of 64 bits or to use 128 processors on 32-
bit words. Having these alternatives is useful in
applications that arc suited to parallel algorithms and
have variable numerical range requirements
computcr available in the Soviet Union during the
Although the new Ryad-2 ES-1065 computer may be
faster, the M-10 may have been the most powerful
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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1983, we suspect that the design philosophy of this
domineering personality is well entrenched at the
institute that he directed. We expect that improve-
ments and variations on the basic M-10 architecture
t oug artsev ie m pn
The number of experienced Soviet software program-
25X1
mers who also are cleared for classified projects may
still be insufficient, thus probably leavine manv mili-
25X1
will continue through the 1980s
Ye. P. Velikhov, vice
president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stated
in late 1983 that he was the focal point for an
accelerated program on the development of supercom-
puters. This pronouncement is interesting because
Burtsev's institute and the Elbrus program are under
the control of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Until
now, Burtsev seems to have had an autonomous reign
in pursuit of his high-performance Elbrus computer.
Many sectors of Soviet society, especially the military,
are known to be anxious for a supercomputer
Velikhov's appointment a
oca point or managing a supercomputer program
may be the first step in opening up the development of
these machines to other or anizations within the
academ
We estimate that, in general, the Soviets are five to 10
years behind the United States in the implementation
of large multiuser and real-time software systems as
well as in - chniques for various
industries
There are numerous causes that contribute to the
Soviet software lag. Some of the problems frequently
cited by Soviets with access to programmers in the
USSR are:
? The Soviet hardware lag.
? A belated appreciation of, and belated emphasis on,
software.
? A poor or nonexistent vendor-user feedback loop in
the USSR.
? Low pay for programmers relative to other technical
personnel.
? Poor software development tools.
? A Soviet preoccupation with meeting quotas-usu-
ally at the expense of quality control.
? Duplication of work due to the excessive compart-
mentalization of software routines written at many
facilities
tary projects not completed on time
Software is one area where technology transfer from
the West can help the Soviets close specific gaps with 25X1
quantum jumps. Software programs are conveniently
stored on relatively small media such as diskpacks,
floppy disks, or magnetic tapes-or on solid state 25X1
memory devices, which are even smaller. It is not just
classified military software that is of interest to the
Soviets; they also can use many commercial software
programs to improve their industrial base or to imple-
ment military subsystems. Programs are available
from thousands of commercial outlets in the non-
communist world. Thus, the United States has a
major technology transfer problem. If the Soviets
were able to obtain a microprocessor from the United
States, a team of engineers and technicians would
need from one to four years to reverse engineer the
device. However, if the Soviets obtained just one copy
of a software program, it would be a minor project for
even a novice to turn out copies of this program
immediately. With the increasing number of comput-
ers available to the Soviets that are functional equiva-
lents of Western systems, we can expect the Soviets to
25X1
2ox~i
continue, and probably to increase, their legal and
illegal acquisition of Western software systems~~ 25X1
Magnetic Disks
The Soviets are about 10 years behind the United
States in high-performance magnetic disk technology.
This is one of their most serious computer hardware
deficiencies and it is limiting the performance of their
computer systems in many applications
Figure 15 illustrates the significant lead that the
United States has in magnetic disk devices. The
Soviets have announced their own 200-Mbyte disk
drive (ES-5080)-about four years after the Bulgari-
ans began low-volume production of comparable
equipment (ES-5067) and about 10 years after the
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Figure 15
Magnetic Disk Technology: United States Versus USSR, 1965-88
? US Bulgaria
USSR
3380-2~
8 years --
5066
10 years ~ 5061
7 years ~ 5052
__I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1965 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
Year of first delivery
advent of IBM's 3330-11 counterpart. Bulgaria and into computer systems believe that system perfor-
the USSR have, however, been able to adopt some mance above approximately 5 million operations per
mechanical features of disk drives, such as voice-coil second would be severely hampered without further
motors, in a very timely fashion advances in disk technology. We believe that this
Although the low performance of Bulgarian and
Soviet disk drives may impose some inconveniences
now, Western engineers who integrate disk memories
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~ecrcr
situation is currently slowing or negating many appli-
cations on the Elbrus-1 multiprocessor system and
will also hinder system performance on Ryad comput-
ers beyond the current top of the line, the ES-1065.
the Soviets
are p acing a tg prtortty ono tatmng now-how for
the production of high-performance magnetic disks,
probably via Western Europe or Japan. We believe
that the Soviets also are seriously pursuing optical
storage technology to alleviate this bottleneck in
system performance
Magnetic Tapes
According to open literature
state of the art in magnetic tape drives in CEMA
countries is 1,600-bits-per-inch (bpi) density with a
data transfer rate of 189 kilobytes/second. IBM first
released comparable equipment in 1966-an 18-year
diH'erential. A density of 6,250 bpi at 1.25 mega-
bytes/second has been used in the United States since
1973. In March 1984, IBM announced its new high-
performance magnetic tape drive, Model 3480, sched-
uled for delivery in 1985. The new 3480 will have a
linear density of approximately 19,000 bpi and a data
transfer rate of 3.0 megabytes per secon~
Magnetic Bubbles
The Soviet Union possibly had a prototype 64-kbit a
magnetic bubble memory (MBM) by 1980 and a 92-
kbit prototype by 1981. By comparison, at the same
"MBM size has had a confusing evolution. Early MBM products
used "bit" quite loosely, generally rounding a number to the closest
1,000 bits. Later products reverted to the "normal" powers-of-2
sizing for memories. In this MBM section, we use lk as ap rp Oxi_
time in the United States, 256-kbit MBMs were in
production and 1-Mbit MBMs had been developed in
the laboratory. MBM is an attractive storage technol-
ogy for military applications because bubble memo-
ries exhibit very good performance in severe environ- 25X1
ments presenting extremes in dust, shock, heat,
humidity, and radiation. Bubble memories are nonvol-
atile and have a reputation for high reliability relative
to magnetic tape and disk a ui ment which use
electromechanical drives 25X1
25X1
Today, the Soviets are trailing the United States in all
aspects of electronic computer technology. If we
include the quantity and quality of computer produc-
tion, the US lead averages several years more than is
indicated by just comparing the dates of first installa-
tion of functionally equivalent US and Soviet systems.
As a result of the more advanced microelectronic
technology and computer packaging techniques in the
United States as well as the poor state of the art in
Soviet peripheral equipment, we expect the US lead to 25X1
increase by one to three years in all ma'or electronic
computer technologies by 1986 25X1
It is difficult to assess accurately the impact of the
Soviets' lag in computer technolo on their develo -
ment of military systems
25X1
25X1
It is rare 25X1
when computer 25X1
tec no ogy is In ertng t e eve opment of a specific
military program,
However, at the high- 25X1
per ormance en o computer technology, at least, we
can speculate with reasonable confidence that mili-
tary systems requiring high-throughput computers
have been negated, delayed, or reduced in capability
because of the Soviets' deficiency in this area. The
impact would have been serious on large high-speed 25X1
computational problems such as ballistic missile de-
fense and on high-volume, high-speed data transfer
applications such as real-time command, control, and
communications systems requiring large data bases.
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The Soviet scientific community has frequently ex-
pressed the opinion that the lack of a supercomputer is
hampering many R&D projects such as in computa-
tional physics and chemistr
Apart from large scientific computers, the impact on
military systems of the Soviet lag in computer tech-
nology is more difficult to judge; here the lack of
information is more of a barrier. One may argue that
the tr~iditionally conservative design philosophy asso-
ciated with Soviet military systems has not stressed
their computer technology. Another possibility is that
system requirements were kept modest in line with the
Soviets' knowledge of the limitations of their comput-
ers. The truth is probably a mixture of both
hypotheses
The Soviets tend to have less reliable computer sys-
tems than the United States or Japan because Soviet
microelectronic components are less reliable and Sovi-
et quality control is generally weaker. An example of
how this reliability can affect a critical system is
ICBM design. The Soviets use triply redundant com-
puters on board their ICBMs. Although individual
computers have failed during flight tests, there have
been no mission test failures to date attributed to the
onboard computer complex. By contrast, the United
States has used a single computer for navigation,
guidance, and control functions on board its Minute-
man and MX missiles. Ironically, today US contrac-
tors arc reportedly going to redundant computer
systems in many designs for increased reliability. For
example, the F-16 flight control system and the
navigation system on the Navstar satellite will both
have triply redundant processors on board
The Soviets understand and appreciate the potential
impact of high technology on weapon systems. Auto-
mation in the Soviet military sector will grow steadily
and become an integral part of new system designs.
We suspect that the Soviets during the 1980s are
following the US approach from the 1970s; that is,
expanding the use of mil-spec minicomputers for
tactical military applications, while continuing to
decrease reliance on special-purpose computers. As
the reliability of Soviet microprocessors in severe
environments improves, they will become more preva-
lent in Soviet tactical systems. Although automation
in the Soviet military is expected to increase through-
out the 1980s, the rate of increase is expected to be
slower than in the United States, especially for mobile
tactical systems. Over the next three years we expect
that the Soviets:
? Will improve the quantity and quality of their
semiconductor memory devices and
microprocessors.
? Will phase in the production of Ryad-3 mainframes.
? Probably will build their first 32-bit minicomputer.
? Probably will build their first supercomputer.
? Will fall further behind in all areas of computer
technology
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