COMMENT ON (STATE) MEMO FOR NSC PLANNING BOARD, "TEN PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS DERIVING FROM THE TAIWAN CRISES [SIC]," OF 2 MARCH 1959.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 3, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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5AKIT
3 March, 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDI - Mr. Komar
FROM
SUBJECT
FE, ONE H. P. Ford
Comment on (State) Memo for NSC Planning Board, "Ten
Principal Conclusions and Lessons Deriving from the
Taiwan Crises 6a27,0 of 2 March 1959.
1. State's memo seems to be a plea, in the name of "State-
Defense cooperation," that Defense incline to State's views that (a)
the offshore islands should be defended, and CO the US must have
a greater "cushion" of conventional weapons on hand for future crises.
2. Para.1 should be scrapped and re-done.
a. The para. does not square with the USIB's (SNIEls 100-9-58,
100-12-58, and 100-4-59) more restrained estimates of ChiCom
intentions in launching the crisis. The USIB has not made the
judgments that the Chinese Communists expected that a US
failure to support the GRC in defending the offshore islands
would necessarily result in (a) their "capture," (h) "the
elimination of one-third of the (RC's fighting effectives," or
(c) the "collapse of morale on Taiwan and a Communist takeover
of that big island from within."
b. Must Mr. Kissinger's name be invoked, especially when
Berlin and other cases could be cited to question his "ever" thesis?
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7.?
c. A suggested alternative pars: "Lis Kissinger has pointed
out27 The Communists are grei7 often likely to pose risks in
such a manner that they will 5lways7 often seem disproportionate
to the objectives in dispute. Thus the attack ? ? ? US failure
to support the GRC in defending these islands 5Ould7 might not
only result in their gapturg loss and possibly even in the
elimination of one-third of the GRC's fighting effectives, but
also -- and much more importantly -- in the gollapeg deterioration
of morale on Taiwan and the furthering of the probable ofjective
of a Communist take-over of that big island from within. The
ChiComs know they cannot capture it otherwise."
3. Para. 5, the heart and guts of the memo, is open to several
questions.
a. No one would question the statements in the paragraph that
the Chinese Communists want the whole thing -- offshore islands
and Taiwan -- and that no part of the whole package will satisfy
them.
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b. That is a far different thing, however, from saying that
"the issue is not the Offshore Islands but Taiwan." Unfortunately,
the issue is the offshore islands, both for the US and Communist
China, just as it is also Taiwan. Furthermore, the para. as
written is misleading, and possibly lulling to a policy reader,
in that is accepts at face value the ChiCom line that Peiping
is relatively indifferent concerning the offshore islands. To
the contrary, the ChiComs would probable be pleased to get the
offshore islands and the attendant political gains, and to that
end might even take a crack at one or more of the offshore islands
In the future. The reader should be so reminded.
c. To this observer, the issue in the offshore islands is
how to end an exposed and friendless maldeployment without
unacceptable consequences either on Taiwan or in world opinion.
0/NE has long held (since 1955) that the GRC would accept evacu-
ation, in the full spirit of State's discovery in its para. 6 that
the GRC is "amenable to realism and reason." It will be recalled
that SNIE 100-12-58 (October) stated that Southeast Asia would not
fold up were the Communists to gain the offshore islands.
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4. Para. 7 deals rather loosely with Asian opinion.
a. Did "each" FE government seem fearful that the US might
not support FE countries in time of need?
b. Did "most" responsible Asian leaders confide their under-
standing and support of US actions?
c. Was Asian public opinion (except in the ROK et al.)
generally critical only at the "outset"?
d. We should proudly take noeof the fact that the US did
get unexpected support from Asian leaders. We should not over-
estimate this, however, nor should we confuse their support of
our firmness necessarily with support for continued Nationalist
control of the offshore islands.
5. The judgments made in the memo's other paragraphs lbbk 041
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