QUICK FE THOUGHTS ON MEMO FOR THE NSC BOARD ASSISTANTS ON "PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR EAST AND THE TAIWAN STRAITS," DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1959.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 25, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
TOP ECRET
25 February 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDI - Mr. Komar
FROM: ONE/FE - H. P. Ford
SUBJECT: Quick FE thoughts on Memo for the NSC Board Assistants on
"Problems Illustrated by Recent Developments in the Near
Eat and the Taiwan Straits," dated 19 February 1959.
The following additional problems, arising out of the offshore
islands crisis, deserve consideration:
1. Policy, for para. 1-A of text. The two opposing arguments,
as stated, are smmewhat in the natursoiships passing in the night --
since they pose firmness of US purpose against lack of allied support
for the US position re the offshore islands. Both of these arguments
are valid, and not necessarily as contradictory to one another as
presented in the text. Para. I-A might better hang its key first
sentence not on US prestige and maintenance of the Nat position on
the offshore islands, but, more accurately, on US prestige in not
permitting Communist expansion by force. The crisis also demonstrated
that the crisis potential is still there. The Coms, still want the
islands, they are still within artillery range, the Com still hold
the strategic initiative.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
TOP CRET
2. There is no question, once heavy Com shooting is underway,
about the need for a forceful US response. However, the question
might be discussed as to whether -- during a time in which there
is no heavy Com military pressures it might not be possible to
review the value of holding the offshore islands. It does not seem
inconceivable that such policy review could come up with ways and
means which would result in allied and world respect for both US
power and judgment.
3. Flexibility of US military operation plans. Para. III does
not include the clearest lesson of the offshore island crisis: that
military operation plans must be on hand for all types of possible
responses. The military commanders in the field cannot make the
political judgments for the White House, and must have the plans and
the capabilities to move into any situation ordered by Washington.
4. The need for prior contingency planning in Washington.
Section IV should include the finding that prior contingency planning
could have lessened the panic aspect of last summerst crises. Also/
it should be anticipated that from time to time in the future the US
may be hit with simultaneous crises -- Far East, Near East, Berlin,
and etc. -- and must be able to give attention to each of them at that
-2-
TOP CRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050015-9
. ,
?
176F