POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AFRO-ASIAN MILITARY TAKEOVERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400110002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 22, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
May 22, 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Political Implications of Afro-
Asian Military Takeovers
REFERENCES: A. NSC 5820/1
B. NSC 511-29/5
Cf NSC 5701
D. NSC 5809
flC1
The enclosed report on the subject, prepared
as an internal working paper by the Department of _State,
is transmitted herewith for the inf_ormation of the National
Security Council in connection With a presentation on the
subject by the Department of State at the Council meeting
'on Thursday, May 281 1959.
I
JAMES S. LAY, JR
Executive Secret y
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ON AFRO-ASIAN
MILITARY TAKEOVERS
Igole of Contents
Pau.
Summary of Conclusions -
Quotations 1
I. Scope 2
A. Focus on Free Asia 2
B. Additional reasons for excluding Latin America- 2
C. Sequence of inquiry 3
II. Short-Range Policy Implications 4
A. The 1958 takeovers 4
B. Authoritarianism as the norm 5
III. Long-Range Implications 6
A. U. S. interests 6
B. Three basic questions 8
C. Do military regimes threaten U. S. interests 9
D. Does political authoritarianism presage a trend
toward economic authoritarianism 11
E. Does U. S. support of military regimes contri-.
bute to a non-democratic world-wide militaris-
tic image of the U. S. 11
Annex A.- Implications of Recent Military Coups d'Etat
in the Middle East 14
Annex B . Policy Implications of Recent Milit?try Take-
overs: The Far East Area 22
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EgkuighlumEuggigm CV AFRO-ASIAN MILITARY TAKEOVERS
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Political and economic authoritarianism prevails
throughout the underdeveloped world in general and represents
the predominant environment in which the U. S. must
associate its interests with those of the emergent and
developing societies of Free Asia. The major interests
of these societies are continued national independence
and social and economic development within their own ways
of life. Our basic interests coincide with these but ex-
tend to the encouragement of democratic concepts and an
appreciation of Western cultural values. The latter is of
great importance in (1) denying developing societies to
Communism by (2) maintaining and enlarging those bases of
influence which afford opportunities for us to play a more
decisive role than Communism in the "management" of the forces
of change released by the developmental process.
B. Our experience with the more highly developed
Latin American States indicates that authoritarianism is
required to lead backward societies through their socio-
economic revolutions; that if the break-through occurs
under non-Communist authoritarianism, trends toward demo-
cratic values emerge with the development of a literate
middle class; and that there is some correlation between
developmental progress and the wider acceptance of repre-
sentative institutions. It should be our purpose that
this progression repeat itself in the contest for "manage-
ment" of the developmental process in Free Asia.
C. For a variety of reasons, authoritarianism will
remain the norm in Free Asia for a long period. The trend
toward military authoritarianism will accelerate as
developmental problems become more acute and the facades
of democracy left by the colonial powers prove inadequate
to immediate tasks. Authoritarianism, centralized plan-
ning, governmental direction of the developmental process,
and reliance on socialism will in certain countries present
a governmental and developmental pattern perilously close
to Lenin's "democratic centralism".
D. We can do little in the short run to ameliorate
authoritarianism in Asia, but in the long range we can
perhaps provide the margin of security, assistance and
experiential know-how required to hold Free Asia non.
Communist. In this process, we must work through the
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soldier as well as the civilian in encouraging both to
modernize their societies by some "middle way" between
private enterprise and Communism, thus preserving the
residue of human rights and dignity essential to the
growth of democratic values.
E. In the circumstances, the essential test from our
point of view should be whether a particular military
regime responsibly confronts the problems facing it .
security and developmental progress?and, in so doing,
successfully resists Communist techniques. The military
takeovers in Burma, Pakistan and the Sudan have thus far
advantaged U. S. interests under this test.
F. Military autocrats do not necessarily threaten
U; S. interests if they are effective leaders of their de-
velopmental revolution, or if they can be influenced to
balance security considerations against developmental
necessities. They can benefit U. S. interests by maintain-
ing stability, introducing reforms from which civilian
politicians would shirk, and symbolizing national unity
during times of hardship and crisis - all essential to
the developmental process.
G. There are other reasons why we must support mili-
tary regimes at this stage of Free Asia's development:
(1) A real security threat confronts Red China's free
neighbors; (2) officer groups are often the most pro-
Western, disciplined, and educated institution-in-being
on which backward societies can draw in time of crisis;
(3) intervention of the military will continue to be neces-
sary to supplant ineptness, corruption or slippage toward
Communism; and (4) it will take decades for Free Asia to
develop those institutions which establish in more advanced
countries civilian control of the military.
H. Military regimes can, however, pose certain long-
range threats to U. S. interests in the crucial developmental
process: (1) Only the exceptional military-man is by
training and temperament equipped to .lead developmental
revolutions; (2) Tenure so to do encourages a parallel
trend toward "second stage revolutions", e.g., revolutions
engendered by the dissatisfaction or stifling of opposition
groups (labor, students, intelligentsia, dissident younger
officer groups); (3) especially if economic development is
deemphasized in favor of armament' and popular aspirations
are denied or suppressed.
T. To minimize these dangers to stability and orderly
development, U. S. civilian and military missions must incul-
cate in the Asian military a greater appreciation for
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economic development since it is the principal key to locking
off dissidence and the search for extreme alternatives.
This opportunity is available: eleven Of the twelve
countries to which we contribute defense support are within
underdeveloped Asia. The diplomatic and military arms of
U. S. policy must coordinate closely, therefore, in efforts
to promote U. S. interests more effectively through military
regimes.
J. The incidence of political authoritarianism in
Free Asia weakens the fiber of democratic values and points
the way toward an easier acceptance of economic controls
which trend toward Communist controls. Thus a developing
society can be lost to Communism short of military aggres-
sion and by failure to manage the developmental revolution
by non-Communist methods. This danger must be impressed on
military leaders and should remain one of our principal
policy guidelines in developing techniques whereby Western
values can be grafted on modernized indigenous developmental
systems.
K. No loss of prestige should be involved in our sup,
porting non-democratic military regimes who are making some
developmental progress. Nor should support of such regimes
contribute to a non-democratic militaristic image of the
U. S. Our image will depend basically on the example of
our own democracy at work, our unequivocal support for the
independence and development of emergent nations, and our
assisting the regime in power to satisfy popular aspirations.
We should make it clear that our interests do not conflict
with the republican tendencies of Asian nationalism agd not
necessarily with its neutralist inclinations'. We should
stay in touch with the intelligentsia and opposition
elements and we should avoid too close identification with
any authoritarian 'regime in power without vitiating
opportunities of influencing it.
? L. Encouragement of military regimes to emphasize
economic development, and our fuller recognition that
Asian neutralism is an extension of the anti-colonial bias,
can also contribute to off-setting any ill effects stemming
from our support of military regimes in Free Asia.
M. Finally, the complexity of the developmental
process requires that a military regime utilize civilian
competence to the utmost, lest it alienate other elements
of the population, including the intelligentsia, and
prepare the way for a "second stage revolution". The happy
medium from the standpoint of U. S. interests would be a
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military regime rocivilianized? to the greatest extent
possible and headed by a military leader who saw security
and development in perspective and thereby evidenced
political leadership of the type required in a developing
society,
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AFRO-ASIAN MILITARY TAKEOVERS
"Our security requires that both our Allies and the un-
committed countries have an opportunity to solve their
pressing economic problems within the framework of the free
world . . . Without such an opportunity, some of them offer
an easy target for communism . . ."
Report of the Draper Committee 0.959)
"What are likely to be the chief consequences of this
immense increase in world population? . . . the less developed
countries will hardly be squeamish about the means they
adopt to further their national goals. Caught in the pre-
dicament of having an ever larger share of the world's
people and an ever smaller share of the world's resources,
they will be driven to adopt reyoluntiopary policies . . .
Obvious possibilities (include) . .the transformation of
the economy by totalitarian methods,"
Kingsley Davis, New York Times Magazine (March 15, 1959)
"The appeal of Communism is , . . its ability to carry
backward countries speedily through the tremendous crisis of
modernization. It offers a successful pattern of industrial
saving and it provides the drive and discipline without
which saving, particularly in poor countries, cannot be
achieved. It also promises that the fruits of transformation
will ultimately be enjoyed 'by each according to his need'."
Barbara Ward, Five Ideas that Change the World (1959)
1
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POLITICAL TARE OVERS
I. SCOPE
1. This paper considers short- and long-range policy
implications of the trend toward military takeovers of
civilian governments which emerged in the last half of
1958 throughout the Near East (the Sudan, Iraq), South Asia
(Pakistan) and the Far East (Burma, Thailand). Staff studies
of these five takeovers are annexed,* together with
conclusions of the short-range policy implications, underlying
reasons for the takeovers, and certain long-range problems
posed by authoritarianism in Asia. Long-range policy impli-
cations are discussed in Section III.
A. Focus on Free Asia
2. The conclusions reached obviously bear a relationship
to the incidence of authoritarianism throughout the whole of
the underdeveloped world. This paper, however, focuses
inquiry on the Sudan and Free Asia for the reasons that
(a) the correlation between authoritarianism, including
military takeovers, and underdevelopment is so clearly ob-
servable throughout the region and (b) Latin America and
Africa, especially Africa South of the Sahara, represent
different planes in the evolution of underdeveloped areas.
3. Africa lags behind non-Communist Asia, as Afro-
Asia lags behind Latin America, both in the developmental
process and in the evolution of societal patterns and
attitudes in which the more sophisticated concepts of repre-
sentative government, separation of powers, and cabinet
responsibility can prosper and grow in popular acceptance.
Those civilian institutions and attitudes which more advanced
democratic societies have perfected to control the military
are more developed in Latin America than in Afro-Asia. Hence,
though authoritarianism throughout the underdeveloped world
poses related challenges to U. S. policy, Asian authoritarian-
ism presents somewhat different problems from those presented
by Latin America while also providing a laboratory in which
to anticipate similar problems in the emergent states of
Africa.
B. Additional Reasuis for Ex ding Latin America
4. Much of this paper deals with the correlation between
authoritarianism and underdevelopment. It is relevant, there-
fore, to enumerate other reasons why military authoritarianism
* Annexes A and B.
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in Latin America and Free Asia present somewhat different
challenges. They are these: Latin America
a. Is more distant from the foci of Communist
power, more secure in its military posture, and is
encompassed within a unique Organization of American
States which reduces the threat of military invasion
and the necessity of strong military regimes;
b. Has experienced more than a century and a
quarter of self-government and does not share to the same
dangerous extent Afro-Asiats anti-colonial and
racial biases against the West;
c. Has had long experience with varying degrees of
authoritarianism, including good and bad military
takeovers;
a. Is part of the Western cultural tradition
and has deeper democratic roots in a more responsive
soil; and
e. Has in general attained higher standard of
living and production growth indices than those of
underdeveloped Free Asia.
5. As a consequence, the trend in Latin America is
against dictatorship and toward more popularly based
governments. Thus, grave as its problems are, Latin
America is ahead of the younger countries of the East in
the governmental experience and social progress which,
viewed in the perspective of developing nations, appears
to be required to supplant authoritarianism, however
gradually, with more democratic governmental norms.
C. Sequence of inguity,
6. Consideration of the short-range implications of
the five 1958 military takeovers in Afro-Asia is followed
by an analysis of the long-range implications of military
authoritarianism throughout Free Asia. This analysis
admittedly enters the area of speculation but is conducted
within the context of these overriding trends now discernible
and likely to prevail for the foreseeable future:
a. The Sino-Soviet Bloc will further consolidate its
economic and military strength, will narrow the margin of
over-all power now enjoyed by the West, and will seek to
displace Western power and influence in non-Communist
Asia.
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b. Maintenance of independence, economic development,
and perfection of their own ways of life will remain the
major problems of the countries of Free Asia.
c. These problems are so great that the trend
toward military authoritarianism will likely accelerate.
d. There will thus be a parallel trend within Free
Asian societies toward "second stage revolution", e.g.,
revolutions engendered by a certain stifling of opposi.
tion groups, labor, students and other elements of the
"intellectual proletariat". In many countries under
military rule, the stimulus for this revolution may come
from dissident and younger officer groups (a distinct
possibility in Pakistan and the Sudan).
7. The analysis reaches three broad conclusions:
a. The trend toward military takeovers will
continue. Hence, both the diplomatic and military
arms of U. S. policy must coordinate in efforts to
promote U. S. interests more effectively through
military regimes.
b. Military regimes do not necessarily threaten
U. S. interests in the underdeveloped world if they
can be influenced to deal effectively with the
developmental problem, i.e., the gamut of social and
economic change involved in the modernization and
industrialization of a traditional agricultural society.
c. The complexity of the developmental problem
is such that military regimes must be encouraged to
utilize civilian competence to the greatest extent
possible and to work thereby toward the restoration
of civilian governmental responsibility.
II., SHORT-RANGE POLICY IMPLICATIA1
A. 1..42_1958 Takeovers
8. The takeovers in Burma, Pakistan and the Sudan
have contributed an element of short-range stability
advantageous to U. S. objectives. The dust has not yet
settled in Iraq but the trend is toward Communist control
of the country. The coup i4 Thailand does not materially
affect U. S. interests because of the traditional oligarchic
nature of Thai governments.
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9. A long-range appraisal of each of these takeovers
will obviously depend on the record of the regime. However,
there is a danger that the new regimes will become progress-
ively isolated from the people by failure to associate
themselves with popular aspirations or to make demonstrable
developmental progress. Risks are involved in our becoming
identified with unpopular and authoritarian regimes, but
authoritarianism is the norm throughout the region and
this is not without certain short-run advantages to the
United States.
B. Authoritarianism as the Norm
10. Factors common to the region explain the five
Coups in part at least and why authoritarian government and
a trend toward military takeovers are the likely prospects
in Free Asia for the foreseeable future. These factors are:
a. Essentially authoritarian traditions and con-
cepts of government and administration, with heavy
reliance on the military as a disciplined institution-
In-being;
b. Traditional acceptance of this institution-
in-being as a symbol of sovereignty and the guardian
of the national pride, especially in times of crisis;
c. A consequent shallowness of democratic roots
and little conception of civilian dominance of the
military;
d. Lack of experience in government administration
and management (with the possible exception of India);
e. A preoccupation with security in the face of
(1) an aggressive Communist threat (especially 14 the
Far East) and (2) regional rivalries and disputes
(Palestine problem, Nile and Indus waters, Kashmir, etc.);
f. Eductional and technological as well as
industrial underdevelopment;
L. A disposition toward the belief that government
should direct development-especially in the over-
populated states--and a reliance on socialist cliches;
and
h. Disenchantment in many countries with the
corruption, inefficiency, political bickering, and
lack of progress associated with the facade of democratic
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institutions left behind by the colonial powers (cf.
Ceylon, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Sudan).
11. In short, we find a correlation between authori-
tarianism and underdevelopment,and, in Free Asia especially,
we find that the military are either at the apex of power
or the major institution-in-being which supports, or is in a
position to overthrow, a government in power. In the
short-range, a military takeover can advantage the United
States by imposing stability and decisiveness. The long-
range balance sheet may be more dubious. But the fact
remains that in the future U. S. interests in Free Asia will
very probably become increasingly dependent on (a) what
military regimes do for good or bad, and (b) the measure
of constructive influence which the United States can exert
through military authoritarianism.*
III. LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS
12. Where authoritarianism is the governmental norm and
socialism is the developmental norm, the advancement of U. S.
interests does not depend basically on whether civilians or
soldiers exercise governmental power. The essential long-run
test from our point of view is whether a particular regime
responsibly confronts the problems facing it--security and
developmental progress?and, in so doing, resists Communist
techniques in perfecting its own way of life. The United
States can do little to ameliorate political or economic
authoritarianism in Asia. But it can, by aligning its own
interests with those of developing nations, provide the margin
of security, assistance and exPerimental know-how necessary
to keep these nations in the Free World. In this process, we
must work through the soldier as well as the civilian.
A. U. S. Interests
13. U. S. long-range interests will be served best in
underdeveloped Asia if six conditions prevail:
417-71171ollowing regimes are not military regimes strictly
speaking but are deeply dependent on the military to
maintain power by more or less authoritarian means:
Jordan, Iran, South Korea, Nationalist China, Laos, Viet
Nam and Indonesia. Some might categorize Egypt and
Lebanon as military regimes. See also OCB Special Report
on Military Training in the U. S. of Foreign Nationals
from Selected Countries (February 27, 1959), which lists
the following countries as likely candidates for military
takeovers within the next two years: Laos, the Philippines,
Ceylon, Iran, Jordan, the Lebanon.
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Maintenance of the independence of individual
countries s an obvious requirement to their continued
membership in the Free World and to U. S. association with
certain of the nationalistic and anti-colonial biases of
emergent nations.
b. Peace provides the best environment for an under-
developed .country -to cope with its primary tasks of social
and economic reform. Continued tranquility within the .
underdeveloped world is of vital importance because of the
(i) dangers of emergent natiOnalism sparking major war in
a bi-polarized world, and (ii) necessity of deemphasizing
military in favor of developmental expenditures to the
greatest extent possible.
c. olitica1stabi1i,y is an obvious additive to any
sustained program of nternal reform.
di Ezals.tioLo the indiv dua freedoms and values
now extant form the basis for 1 the Free World's alli-
ance with human nature and (2) the growth of more
Communist-resistant societies.
e. Developmental_progmeg..aaftE -non-Communist norms
is required at a'rate sufficient to contain trends toward
more extreme or Communist developmental techniques which,
if adopted, tend to draw underdeveloped societies within
the Communist net of experience and know-how.
fi Continued tport of non-communist developmental
Dorms by the Asian jnteliigent4 In a developing
society,-itiSvitaltocommandthe support of the
"intellectual proletariat", which is the normal spark of
any "second stage revolution" and which throughout history
has successfully led revolts against the "dominant
minority". Communism's appeal to the Asian intellectual
is its proven ability to carry backward countries speedily
through the crisis of modernization and industrialization.
This appeal can never be discounted until Western tech-
niques prove adequate to their developmental tasks. They
have not yet done so .(cf. Latin America and the
Philippines, where V. S. influence has been paramount).
14. U. S. interests thus defined coincide remarkably with
the basic interests of any developing non-Communist society.
An emergent nation's major interests and preoccupations are
security and economic development. Military regimes can be
relied on to tend their security fences. But there is always
the danger that they may neglect the developmental fences
which can also open the gates of an underdeveloped society to
Communist invasion. Thus, until acceptable developmental
progress is made, the leadership and intelligentsia of a
country must continue to weigh the relative advantages of
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Western or Communist techniques in solving their problems and
crises. The policy implication to be drawn is that the
quality of nationalism which attained fruition in political
independence from Western colonialism does pot necessarily
assure continued independence from the Sino-Soviet threat.
15. Three additional policy implications are pertinent;
a. Where underdevelopment, Socialism and government-
al authoritarianism coincide as norms, the gap between
such norms and Lenin's "democratic centralism" is peril-
ously narrow and will continue .to endanger U. S. interests
until it Is safely widened. Yet the margin cannot be
.widened until the barrier of self-sustained growth is
penetrated.
' b. We must learn to work more effectively with In-
digenous authoritarianism and thereby play a more influ-
ential role in the "management" of the internal socio-
economic revolution. Though we should encourage and sup-
port free enterprise, democratic values, and parliamentary
procedures as appropriate, it is essential that non-Com-
munist types of socialism be maintained at a minimum as
the developmental pattern and that slippage toward Com-
munism be avoided or held to a minimum. .
c. Should a country rely progressively on Communist
developmental techniques, U.S. interests will be served
best if we continue to identify our interests with the
main thrusts of Asian nationalism within the country,
e.g., its desire for independence and development. The
United States should be prepared to cooperate with nation-
al Communist regimes (cf. Yugoslavia) in an effort to
maintain national independence and provide resistance to
gradual satellization through adoption of Communist norms
and/or increased economic dependence on the Bloc (cf. Iraq).
B. Three Basic Questions
16. Long-range policy implications of military takeovers
to be derived from the foregoing can perhaps best be focused
on the answers to these three questions:.
a. Does the observable trend toward military regimes,
and the frequent corollary abandonment of parliamentary
procedures, threaten U. S. interests?
b. Does this trend toward political authoritarianism
presage a trend toward economic authoritarianism and thus
pave the way toward an easier acceptance of Communist
norms of government and economic development?
c. Does U. S. support of military regimes con-
tribute to a non-democratic militaristic image of the
United States damaging to our worldwide interests?
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17. An attempt to answer these questions is made in the
following paragraphs.
C. Do Militarxallaiges Threaten U. S. Interests?
18. No short or generalized answer can be given to this
question: all depends on the regime and its record. Latin
America is replete with examples of good and bad military
dictators and history will no doubt repeat itself in Asia.
It is probable that in the long-run U. S. interests will best
be served by benevolent and experienced civilian politicians
who have a broad popular base and are held to some form of
accountability by a parliament or organized opposition. This,
however, is an ideal which must in most countries be sub-
ordinated to the practical and the possible for many years to
come.
19. There are several reasons why we must continue to
support and learn to work effectively with military regimes,
a. A real military threat confronts Red China's
peripheral neighbors (Taiwan, Burma, Laos, Korea, Viet
Nam),
b. The officer groups are often the most pro-
Western and non-Communist organized cadres within an
underdeveloped society (Pakistan, Indonesia). They are
frequently the most educated and usually the most dis-
ciplined. In small countries especially, where security
and trappings of sovereignty are national obsessions,
the military can in political or economic crises make
demands which civilians would shirk from.
c. It will take decades in most of underdeveloped
Asia to develop those institutions which in the most
advanced countries establish civilian control of the
military (India is the present exception).
d. Situations will continue to arise where the
military will intervene in government to (i) supplant
ineptness or corruption of civilian governments (Pakistan,
Burma) or (ii) furnish strong political leadership in
an inherently unstable situation (Indonesia).
e. There is no reason why a military regime cannot
,safeguard U. S. interests in a given country as well as
a non-military regime if it addresses itself to the
country's developmental problems. In certain instances,
the military has proved more courageous in effecting
necessary reform measures than civilian politicians (land
reform in Egypt, Iraq and Pakistan). And, as noted above,
there are certain advantages in ruling by fiat during
times of crisis.
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20. Military regimes, however, can pose long-range
threats to U. S. interests.
a. It is the exceptional military man who by
temperament and training possesses the technical back-
ground, political skill and mass leadership which
developmental progress in Free Asia demands.
b. A military oligarchy runs the danger always of
losing touch with the people and, therebyl?of permitting
to develop that counterelite which can one day rise
against it. This, of course, is a problem inherent in
all authoritarian regimes which are not benevolent and
which do not make developmental progress.
P. A military oligarchy also risks losing contact
with the non-military intelligentsia which, history
teaches, ultimately shapes the choices and destinies of.
society. Thus a military regime can be too conservative
to satisfy the left-of-center orientation of the Asian
intelligentsia, it can be too pro-Western, or it Can
alienate itself from a popular acceptance of neutralism
(now true to some extent in Pakistan).
d. Because military figures so often do not have
the "grass roots" feel of the mass politician, there is
the danger that economic development will be under-
emphasized or that it will be de-emphasized in favor of
armament. By the very nature of things, a military
oligarchy is inclined to overemphasize its armament
requirements (cf. Pakistan and Iran).
21. Two conclusions are justified;
a. Military regimes need not necessarily threaten
U. S.' interests in Asia in the foreseeable future if ?
they can be influenced to attack the developmental
problem more seriously and responsibly since develop-
mental progress is the principal key to locking off
dissidence and the search for extreme alternatives on
the part of the intelligentsia and civilian political
spokesmen.
b. It should be within U. S. capabilities to
Influence such regimes as the United States itself
comes more clearly to see that its own interests will be
served best by placing greater emphasis and urgency on
economic development throughout Free Asia.
22. Our MAP-related training programs offer great
opportunities for inculcating in the Asian military a
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greater appreciation of the necessity for economic development
and a more rational allocation of resources, both internal
and external, as between military and developmental programs.
23. Eleven of the twelve countries to which we con-
tribute defense support fall within underdeveloped Asia.
It is possible and necessary that our diplomatic and military
arms coordinate their approach to Asian military leaders
toward the end of assuring that a given country has both
adequate military support and economic development to protect
U. S. interests and, in the case of allies, to develop the
desired complementary limited war capabilities. This
will require a clear understanding on our part and on theirs
that the Communist threat is not exclusively a security or
military threat.
D. Does Political Authoritarianism Presage a Trend Toward
Economic Authoritarianism?
24. Political authoritarianism unquestionably weakens
the tenuous fibers of democratic beliefs and values in Asia
and points the way toward an easier acceptance of economic
controls which trend toward Communist techniques. This
does not mean, however, that a given country cannot preserve
its independence if it embraces Communism (Yugoslavia). Any
trend in this direction, however, endangers U. S. interests
and adds to our difficulties in communicating with and in-
fluencing a society which must depend more on Sino-Soviet
developmental experience than on Western.
25. Hence, the correlation between political
authoritarianism and economic authoritarianism, and its
dangers, must be impressed on the minds of military leaders
and must remain one of our principal policy guidelines in
exploring and developing techniques whereby Western values
can be grafted on indigenous varieties on non-Leninist
socialism.
E. Does U. S. Support of Military Regimes Contribute to a
Non-Democratic World-Wide Mill aristic Image of the
United States?
26. The answer to this appears to be, that it need
not. It is perfectly possible for us to perpetuate our
image as a democratic and basically non-militaristic power,
notwithstanding our support of military regimes and our own
armaments posture. If we set an example of liberal
democracy at work, mute our own militarists somewhat, show
a greater understanding of neutralism, and identify ourselves
more firmly with developmental progress, we can certainly
remedy a somewhat tarnished U. S. image throughout much of
Asia.
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27. In conducting relations with a country ruled by
a military regime, the United States should make every
effort to make it clear that our overriding interests
coincide with those of the mass of the people: continued
independence, economic growth, and some progress toward
constitutional and democratic norms within their own way of
life. We should stay in touch with opposition elements and
avoid too close identification with any authoritarian regime
in power, while preserving available opportunities of
Influencing the regime in directions consistent with U. S.
interests. Above all, we should seek maximum contact with
the main streams of a country's intelligentsia. We shall
no doubt find that to make acceptable progress toward these
objectives we must allocate greater resources to exchanges
and training programs and use such programs as a major arm
of policy to influence desired evoluntionary trends.
28. Our encouragement of military regimes to emphasize
economic development and our recognition that neutralism is
basically a prevalent and understandable extension of the
anti-colonial bias can also do much to offset any ill effects
stemming from our support of military regimes. To the
extent that neutralism reflects nationalistic feeling, it
serves as a constructive force in containing Sino-Soviet
influence and therefore is a force with which the United
States should be aligned (India, UAR, Indonesia). Hence,
military regimes must be influenced to de-emphasize the
military where over-emphasis (a) is detrimental to the
development effort (Iran, Pakistan), (b) contributes to
regional instability (Pakistan), or (c) alienates neutrals
(India) without concomitant advantages.
29. In sum, if the United States quietly proceeds to
make its own democracy work, stands unequivocally for the
independence and development of emergent nations, and assists
the regime in power to confront its problems of security
and development--each in balance--we shall have made the
best of the necessity of working with and through military
authoritarianism in this stage of Asian development.
30. In making a virtue of the necessity of dealing
with military regimes, we should nevertheless bear in mind
that the complexity of the developmental process requires
that the military utilize civilian competence to the utmost
lest it alienate the intelligentsia and prepare the way
for its own destruction through a "second stage revolution".
The other horn of this dilemma is that if this is done,
and if the military regime makes progress toward over-
coming educational and economic underdevelopment, it pre-
pares the way for its own replacement by a return of civilian
power, a restoration of political debate, a more pragmatic
approach to problems confronting the society, and a
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re-establishment of what is commonly accepted in non-Com-
munist societies as a traditional division of labor between
the civilian and military elements of government.
31. The happy medium from the standpoint of U. S.
interests, therefore, would appear to be (a) a military
regime "civillanized" to the greatest extent possible
(b) headed by a military leader who sees security and
development in perspective and thereby evidences political
leadership of the type required in a developing society.
Our past experience with military regimes testifies
eloquently to the difficult4.04 of sttai,441g such a happy
medium.
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ANNEXA
I1PLIcATIoNL9gLaggal_MIIIIABLIQUELZETAI
xN,THE MIDDLE EAST
131211Eallna
1. During 1958 there were three military takeovers
in the Middle East.
2. On July 14 the government of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Said, who had strongly supported the Baghdad Pact and
in other ways demonstrated his friendship for the West, was
overthrown by elements of the Iraqi Army. In the accompany-
ing violence and disorder, members- of the Iraqi royal
family and high officials of the Nuri regime were cruelly
murdered and other prominent political and military leaders
subjected to unfair and undignified trials. Today there
continues to be a large measute of instability in Iraq, and
the Communists appear to be the most powerful single
political entity in the country. The. Qassim regime on the
one hand has displayed cordial and friendly attitudes
toward the Communist Bloc and on the other hand, while
professing friendship for the U. S., has both demonstrated
and voiced suspicious and in some cases hostile attitudes
toward the United States.
3. On October 7 President Mirza of Pakistan, acting in
concert with Army Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan and
other key officers of the Pakistan military, issued a
proclamation through which he assumed full responsibility
for the conduct of the Government of Pakistan. In this
peaceful takeover the Constitution of 1956 was abrogated,
the national and provincial legislatures dissolved,
political parties abolished, and martial law declared. After
a short period in which Mirza and Ayub acted as a duumvirate,
General Ayub on October 27 assumed full powers and in effect
exiled Mirza from the Oountry. Ayub continues to exercise
full control of the country, but the administration of the
country has been ostensibly turned over to the professional
civil service.
4., On November 17 General Abboud, Commander-in-Chief
of the Sudanese Armed Forces, announced that the Sudanese
Army had taken over because Of corruption in the country.
The leaders of this bloodless coup immediately banned
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political parties and shut down newspapers 4 The transitional
constitution was suspended and the Parliament dissolved. It
appeared that the leaders of the Sudan coup may at least
partially have-been.motivated by a desire to prevent and
control pro-Nasser .and Communist activity in the Sudan. In
the first few weeks of its life the new government main-
tained friendly relations with the UAR And at the same-time
has demonstrated a friendly attitude toward the United -States.
5. Although there are superficial dissimilarities in
the immediate causes 4nd circumstances leading up to these
three coups d'etatl_there is a striking similarity in their
basic causes as well as in the structure and development of
the political and social base on which they occurred. The
policy implications of these three military takeovers can
best be understood in terms of the basic similarity of
causative factors and socio-political structure.
II. Basic Similarity in Underlying Causes of Three,Coups
6. .In considering the implications of the military
takeovers in Iraq, Pakistan, and the Sudan, it is important
to recognize that authoritarian regimes, frequently with
military support if not actual participation, have been
the rule rather than the exception in the newly independent
states of the post-World War II Middle East. For example,
the Iraq of Nuri al-Said was in many respects as authoritar-
ian as the Iraq of General Qassim. The previous regime in
Pakistan was as authoritarian in practice as its successor
but was impeded in its operations by a facade of democratic
institutions that did not work. .Even states with a
relatively long history of independence, 'such as Afghanistan
and Iran, are no-leSs authoritarian than their "recently
liberated" sister nations in the Middle East. The author-
itarian nature of the current regimes in the UAR, Iran,
Jordan, and others is plain for all to see.
7. Nov is the military coup d'etat a phenomenon that
suddenly appeared in the Middle East in 1958. In Iraq there
had been several military movements, some unSuccessful,
since the country obtained its independence in 1932.. A
succession of.coups'dtetatl.some with violence, plagued
Syria from early 1949 -(roughly three years after its
achievement of independence) until .its union with Egypt in
early 1958. In Lebanon in 1952 the. military had helped to
depose President Khoury. The Egyptian Revolution of July
1952 was effected by a Military coup d'etat. Even in Saudi
Arabia and the Yemen there havebeen abortive anti-
governmental activities bY military elements in the past few
years.
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?
8. Perhaps primarily because of their basically
authoritarian nature and tradition, the independent states
of the Middle East have placed great emphasis on building
up the security forces and keeping the military happy.
Although it is surely not the only cause, this has been one
of the principal causes of the heavy demands on friendly
governments for military assistance. Upon the achievement
of independence of these countries became responsible for
the control of their own armies and police power, both of
which had formerly been controlled by a mandatory or colonial
nation of the West. Western forces were removed from
Lebanon and Syria only in 1946; from Egypt, only with the
evacuation of the Suez Canal, although the evacuation of
1946 had taken British forces from most of the country; from
Pakistan, in 1947; from the Sudan, after 1953. The bulk of
the younger officers of the Middle Eastern armies have
derived from social groups that have increasingly challenged
the old orders. Al]. of these factors taken together have
given the military a key role in the Islamic states of the
Middle East,
9. With few exceptions the states of the Middle East
pay lip service to democratic forms of government. Although
the outward forms of such Western political institutions as
parliaments, elections, and political parties have been
grafted on to the predominantly Islamic society of the Arab
states and Pakistan, in practice these Middle Eastern
societies have still retained their own traditional, highly
authoritarian concepts of governmentand administration. When
the concept of secular-based government was adopted by
Middle Eastern intellectuals in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, Western-type parliamentary government and polit-
ical forms were part of the leading intellectual movements
of the time. On a practical basis these concepts were
adopted because the French and the British were then in
control of the areas in question. As British and French
prestige began to wane in the 1930's and the nationalist
quarrel with them grew in intensity, the rising power and
prestige of Germany and Italy exerted a powerful attraction
for some of the Middle Eastern intelligentsia. Although
there had developed disillusionment with Islam as a way of
life, the inherent authoritarianism of Islamic society
predisposed many Moslems to sympathetic understanding of
authoritarian political philosophies. This explains why the
anti-democratic aspects of fascism apparently constituted so
little intellectual hindrance to the Arab intelligentsia and
why, after World War II, many of the same intelligentsia
have found a somewhat similar attraction in Communism. It
is not an oversimplification to state that basically the
attraction of these and other anti-democratic mcmements has
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been their authoritarian,, totalitarian content and their
alleged ability to "get things done". Thus, disbelief and
disillusionment in the feasibility and desirability of
democracy is in many respects the common denominator of the
Middle Eastern pro-Communists of today and the pro-fascists
of the 19301s.
10. To add to other underlying causes, there has
developed widespread disillusionment, particularly on the
part of educated groups, with the group of politicians who
were in most cases the original leaders of the independence
movements. Whether the belief was valid or not it was
widely supposed in Iraq, Pakistan, and the Sudan, and in
most cases in those countries where coups had occurred
earlier, that the civilian politicians had become exceedingly
corrupt. It was easy for educated groups to see that these
politicians had failed to fulfill their oft-repeated promises
of reform and progress. At the same time, there has devel-
oped a generally greater faith on the part of the Middle
Eastern peoples in the relative honesty, patriotism, and
political detachment of the military, particularly the
younger element. An authoritarian, repressive regime is not
necessarily unpopular with the people, particularly if it
appears to be fulfilling popular aspirations.
11. Although the new elites of the Middle East profess
to speak in the name of "the people" and have always
promised to restore liberties suppressed under previous
regimes, power continues to be exercised and monopolized by
small circles in almost all of the countries of the Middle
East. The new regimes possess the means In arms and
communications by which to compel obedience. They know
how to use propaganda and mass persuasion and indoctrination.
These techniques, however, are 'a two-edged sword, for in the
changing society of the Middle East the new leaders are
creating a wide range of expectations, both material and
political, that must be satisfied if the leaders of a coup
today are to survive without themselves being overthrown
by a countercoup tomorrow.
III. Implications of Military Takeova..?.92J14....4.....12214.2LJA.
the Middle East
12. 'There are obvious embarrassments to the United
States:, both in its world posture and in the eyes of many
Americans, in maintaining friendly relations with what for
all practical purposes may be military dictatorships ruth-
lessly suppressing democratic life. Our major problems,
however, derive not from the fact that we maintain relations
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with an authoritarian regime in power but that we may
continue to find ourselves in the position of being identifi-
ed with such a regime and its policies rather than with the
aspirations of the people concerned.
13. It is of course essential in the Cold War situation
to seek to promote stability in the underdeveloped countries
of the Middle East where instability may invite Communism.
A new, authoritarian regime, though in appearance less
"democratic" than its predecessor, may possess much more
stability and may well lay the ground for ultimate return
to a more firmly based "democracy". These are compelling
reasons for our maintaining relations with regimes in power.
On the other hand, to become identified with an authoritarian
regime and its policies makes us a target for anti-regime
propaganda and activity and creates the impression both
inside and outside of the country concerned that we approve
of authoritarianism and repression so long as our self-
interest is thereby satisfied. This impression once created
tends to isolate us from whatever progressive forces may
exist in a given country, and it discredits our sincere
dedication to the principles of freedom, democracy, economic
progress and development, and respect for human dignity.
14. The answer to this general problem of the nature of
our relationship with authoritarian regimes, particularly
those that may come about through military takeovers,
probably lies in our following a policy that would permit us
to present openly, clearly, and unmistakeably our belief in
the principles of human dignity and freedom and to identify
ourselves with the aspirations of the peoples of the area.
This would give assurance to indigenous opposition groups
that though we would not interfere in internal affairs we
would not in principle be opposed to peaceful changes brought
about by the peoples concerned. Of course, the regimes in
power will be suspicious of the most innocent contacts we
may maintain with opposition groups. For example, we have
been aware of opposition to the Shah in Iran, but the
importance of our relationship with the Shah as the leader
of the regime in power requires us to exercise great caution
in maintaining routine, overt contacts with actual or
potential opposition groups. Yet, if we have maintained no
contact with opposition groups in the Middle East, we may
as in Iraq find ourselves facing a suspicion and latent
hostility that seems almost impossible to pierce.
15. The increased Middle Eastern emphasis on the mili-
tary power of the state poses in itself a serious problem
for the U. S., whether the regime in question is a new or
an older authoritarian government. The Soviet intrusion
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into the Middle East in 1955 came about largely because of
the desire of the Egyptian and Syrian military regimes for
arms. One of the first acts of the Iraq regime under
General Qassim was to negotiate an arms deal with the Soviet
Bloc. It is no secret that our military aid to Pakistan and
our connection with the Baghdad Pact of which Pakistan is a
member have been significantly persuasive factors in the
continuing friendly attitude of the new Pakistan regime
toward us. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, our
refusal to deal with a military or authoritarian regime in
the Middle East could lead almost necessarily to the
establishment of that regime's friendly relations with the
Soviet Bloc, if only to gain a cheap arms source. The key
role of the military in most of the Middle Eastern states
raises further important questions of (1) how the U. S. can
go about strengthening its relations with existing military
leaders, (2) how the.U. S. can either strengthen existing
civilian institutions or encourage military leaders to
create and strengthen civilian institutions, and (3) whether
the U. S. should make a greater effort to challenge the
heavy dependence of certain Middle Eastern states on the
Soviet Union for military equipment. These questions might
conceivably be settled by an internationally-agreed embargo
on arms shipments to the Middle East. However, we do not
foresee that the almost insuperable obstacles to such an
embargo can be overcome at this time or in the near future.
16. The heavy dependence of some Middle Eastern states
on the Soviet Union for military equipment may give the
Soviet Union a greater degree of long-range influence on the
policies of those countries than their present political
orientation might indicate. On balance, it might well be
found in our interest to make a greater effort to challenge
the USSR as a source of supply, but such a decision must
take into account other factors such as the effect on Arab-
Israeli relations and their military postures. A partial
answer would certainly lie, however, in the increased train-
ing of Middle Eastern Army personnel in this country at our
expense.
17. An important aspect of our relations with the
Middle*Eastern regimes is in the field of economics. Many
of the authoritarian regimes have come to power with
promises of reform and economic development that they have
been unable to fulfill. Public impatience for the benefits
of development has been another factor in the generally
widespread support for strong authoritarian regimes. Some
of them have turned to the Soviet Bloc to obtain relatively
large amounts of economic assistance. Such shifts toward
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0
the Soviet Bloc for economic assistance may have resulted
only partially from the refusal of the West to grant assist-
ance or to extend it only "with strings". Of more sign-
ificance may be the trend toward "neutralism" or, perhaps
more properly, "non-alignment". Many of the Middle Eastern
countries appear to be coming around to the view that their
national interest can best be served by divorcing themselves
from the Cold War and from such close identification with
either the United States or the Soviet Union as to invite
internal reactions. Such neutralism is not necessarily
inconsistent with our interests, if in fact it promotes
stability and progress in the country concerned. Our
recognition of this fact and greater willingness to assist
neutralist countries may reduce tensions and help to reduce
the instability that breeds new coups. In addition, the
largely agricultural base of the Middle Eastern economies
creates a foreign trade problem in that primary export com-
modities such as cotton and wheat are surplus in the Western
world and particularly in the U. S., thus tending to force a
dependence upon Sino-Soviet Bloc markets. Other trade
problems, including those of oil, must be taken into account
in evaluating our relationships with these regimes.
IV.. The Outloc4
18. In view of the underlying factors predisposing the
Middle Eastern states to the establishment and acceptance of
authoritarian, military-based regimes, and the unlikelihood
that such groups will be able quickly to solve their
countries' basic problems, we must anticipate that there wiiL
continue to be military takeovers from time to time in the
Middle East. Within the next few years, according to
intelligence estimates, there is at least a fair possibility
that security forces might be used as the basis for attempted
coups d'etat in Ceylon, Iran, Jordan, and perhaps even in
Lebanon. Dissatisfied military elements in the new regimes
of Iraq, Pakistan, and the Sudan may well attempt to seize
power from the military factions now in control. There is
at least an outside chance coups d'etat, supported by if
not organized through the military forces may take place in
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen.
With this outlook in view, the U. S. must anticipate that
it will be called upon to recognize new authoritarian regimes
in the Middle East. In view of the implications for U. S.
policy pointed out in Section III above, it would appear
to be in our interest to take such steps as may be feasible
to ensure that, without becoming in any way involved with
actual plotters, appropriate contacts have been maintained
with opposition groups that might conceivably constitute a
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new regime. It is also in our interest to take such steps
as may be feasible to identify ourselves with the aspirations
of the peoples of the Middle East and to counter any efforts
to depict us as cynically supporting unpopular regimes.
Thus, the official public position of the U. S. should be
that it is for the peoples concerned to determine the nature
of the regime they desire. The U. S. itself is dedicated
to the principles of freedom, justice, economic progress and
development, and respect for human dignitg and believes in
the applicability of these principles everywhere. However,
it is not our policy to interfere in the internal affairs
of other states, and we would hope that all political changes
might be made peacefully by the peoples concerned. It is
our policy to recognize and to maintain relations with
those established governments that seek to maintain relations
with us on the basis of proper recognition and due ackno14-
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ANNEX B
291.4aLaPjaCATIONS OF RECENT
MILITARY TAKEOVZS:_.31,?Ulli_MTAREA
1. Attached are two papers, on Burma and Thailand,
giving factual background on the only two takeovers to have
recently occurred in the Far East. Each of these country
papers concludes with comments on what those takeovers
portend for U. S. policy.
2. It would be hazardous to draw any general con-
clusions for the Far East area from these two military
takeovers. They do not appear to reflect any area trend in
this direction, it being noted that the October 1958 coup
in Thailand was typical of past Thai political practices.
As to whether these two coups could be regarded as advant-
ageous or disadvantageous from the standpoint of U. S.
interests, the Burma takeover seems to have been generally
favorable, at least in the short run. No perceptible
advantage to the U. S. would appear to flow from the Thai
owl); on the other hand, owing to the long-standing
oligarchic nature of Thai politics, the coup could not be
represented as ay Major reversal from democratic trends in
Thailand.
II
3. Apart from the significance (or lack thereof) of
the takeovers in Burma and. Thailand, the following factors
are likely to make military takeovers or some form of
authoritarian control a likelihood in most of the Afro-Asian
countries for the foieseeable future:
a. Their lack of experience in government and
management. Thus 8 of the 11 East Asian (FE) countries
have gained independence since 1945.
b. 'Their own traditional, authoritarian concepts
of government and adminlstration.
Their emphasis, which we support, on building
up conditions of security and stability in the face of
a very real Communist menace. This magnifies the
Importance of strong armies and police and generally
creates 4 climate conducive to authoritarian control.
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d. Their backwardness, together with their
desire for rapid economic advancement and indus-
trialization, The peoples in these countries are
widely attracted to the kind of leadership that can
"get things done".
e. Conversely, there may be disillusionment in
democratic processes which may be associated with
corruption, inefficiency and lack of progress.
4. These and other factors will continue to impede
democratic growth in most of the Far Eastern countries. We
must accept this as a fact of life. Moreover, we must bear
in mind that democracy has little or no chance of emergence
in a nation which is torn by civil strife, insurgency or
general insecurity, The first task of these newly independ-
ent nations must be to establish security and stability,
though not at the expense of human freedoms, education and
enlightenment. Some regimes may be less "democratic" than
their predecessors but have the compensating advantage of
being more efficient in creating those conditions of stabi-
lity and progress which are so essential for the long-term
growth of democracy.
5. Our Ambassador in Viet-Nam has suggested that per-
haps we should concentrate more on assuring as best we can
the recognition of certain basic individual rights (including
education) and continue to do all we can to contribute to the
social well-being and economy rather than worrying too much
about the outward forms of democracy. Not that We should
encourage totalitarian dictators, he adds, but rather that
we should back strong anti-Communist leaders who must act
in this formative period in a fairly autocratic manner.
6. Actually there is very little choice for us in the
matter of whether or not to support a regime which is in
power. To take a cool or unfriendly stance vis-a-vis a
regime in, say, Laos or Cambodia or Indonesia, is to risk a
replacement of U. S. influence and standing in that country
with neutralist or even pro-Communist forces'. The Communists
are, of course, prepared to step in whenever and wherever we
step out,
7. On the other hand, to become closely identified
with an authoritarian regime and its policies makes up a
target for anti-regime propaganda and activity and creates
the impression that we approve of authoritarianism as long
as our self-interest is thereby satisfied. This impression
tends to alienate us from democratic opposition and progress-
ive forces and it discredits some of the very principles
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for which our country professes to stand. The answer to
this general problem of the nature of our relationship, with
authoritarian regimes probably lies in accenting our belief
lathe principles of human dignity and freedom and to
identify ourselves with the aspirations of the peoples of
the area. Without interfering in the internal affairs of
these countries, we should maintain personal friendships, or
at least contacts, with non-Communist opposition party
members. The manner and extent to which this is done. must,
of course, be decided on a country-by-country
8. Finally, there is the question of what our policy
should be toward governments which are corrupt, inefficient
and easy prey to the Communists. Should we interfere to the
extent of helping to overthrow those governments and replac-
ing them with ones Which are more cooperative and useful
from our point of view? There is no general answer to this
queStion. Here again each case.must be judged on its own
merits. Obviously we should only interfere in the internal
affairs of a country When and to the extent it is absolutely
essential to our national interests that we do so. Any
interference runs clear risk of disclosure, and any disclo-
sure could impair the standing of our country all around the
globe. Whereas the temptations may be great to seek a short-
term solution to problems of inefficiency and corruption by
fostering 4 military coup, in the long run the same problems
seem to reappear under dictatorships as well. Furthermore,
removing them legally then becOmes much more difficult. It
is likely to give rise to a succession of coups and general
political instability.
Attachments:
1. The recent military takeover in Burma.
2. The recent military takeover in Thailand.
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pURMA
1. The military takeover in Burma was not the result
of a sudden COUP d'etat but rather the final consequence of
a series of disintegrating events which began with a split
1.4 the ruling Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPEL)
coalition in the spring of 1958. After that split, U Nu's
government lost a good portion of its ministers and more than
half of its parliamentary support. In a parliamentary test
vote of confidence held early in Junet the government was
able to remain in. office only with the support of the
Communist-infiltrated National United Front (NUF). The
logic of this situation emboldened the extreme leftwing
political groups to place pressure on U Nu to ease the
government's policy toward the insurgents. The Communist
insurgents themselves attempted to negotiate favorable
"peace" terms. A crypto-Communist group did arrange a
"Surrender" and converted itself into a recognized political
party dedicated to "achieving a communist world".
2. During the summer months, while these developments
were taking place, tensions between the two dissident
factions of the old AFPEL became sharper. Some of U. Nu's
ministers, anxious .to consolidate their positions in ?
anticipation of general elections, resorted to force and
threats of force in an effort to capture control of
significant political positions of strength. By the middle
of September, there was a real danger of violence on a
national scale as Skirmishes developed between the two
AFPEL factions
3. Although the Army ha$ a strong tradition of non-
involvement in political affairs, it could hardly be
expected to be indifferent to these events. Its leader,
General Ne Win attempted as best he could to prevent
excessive concessions to the insurgents and seems to have
been successful in precluding direct negotiations with
the Communists. But, when the fighting between the two
AFPgL groups reached such proportions that Army units
appeared likely to be involved, he and his senior officers
decided to take action in the political sphere. Consequently,
they delivered what was in effect an ultimatum to U Nu,
giving him approximately 72 hours either to reform the
government or to resign.
4. From all accounts, U Nu was also deeply disturbed
by the trend of events and, in a sense, welcomed the Army's
intervention as a way out of an impossible situation.
Consequently, within the time limit allotted by the
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ultimatum, he and the military officers worked out a scheme
for the transfer of power which would avoid any rupture of
the constitution and which was designed to insure that?
military control would be temporary. Accordingly, on
September 26, it was announced that U Nu intended to summon
the parliament lay before them his resignation and nominate
General Ne Win as his successor. Ne Win, on the other hand,
expressed his willingness to accept the nomination and to
serve six months during which he and his non-partisan
government would lay the basis for "free and fair elections".
This arrangement came into effect on October 28, and Ne Win
was sworn into office on October 29. He appointed a cabinet
of distinguished nonpolitical figures and took over control
of Burma in a general atmosphere of relief and political
relaxation. Only the Communists and the extreme left-wing
expressed unqualified disapproval.
5. Upon his assumption of office, Ne Win announced
that his first task was to restore law and order throughout
the country. He let it be known that he intended to launch
a military campaign against the insurgents and to clean up
corruption, gangsterism and general racketeering at all
levels, government and private. He repeated his intention
to hold elections within six months, but qualified this by
stating that fulfillment of this intention depended on
',cooperation" of all parties concerned.
6. The translation of this program into action is as
yet far from complete, but enough has happened in the last
two months to give some general indications of the trend.
In the first place, it is patent that the Army has every
intention of becoming a fairly permanent fixture on the
Burmese political scene. While leaving nominal control of
government in the hands of the cabinet, military officers
have eatablished a sort of ?shadow" regime by insinuating
their own members into various strategic positions in the
bureaucracy where they have control over such significant
functions of government as agricultural policy, the railroads,
public information, food distribution, the police, trade
unions, national registration, state-owned industry, and
even the administration of the City of Rangoon.
7. In the second place, it appears that the Army
attaches more significance to rooting out above-ground
Communist contact men than to actual military operations
against the underground insurgents. Despite its announced
intention to take to the field against these guerrilla
units during the current dry season, the Army has as yet
mounted no serious campaign. The dry season has less than
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three months to run. On the other hand, legislation has
been passed by the parliament and administrative action is
in hand to prosecute vigorously those left-wing leaders who
have been in active touch with the underground. A number of
arrests have already been made and more are reportedly
scheduled.
. 8. In the third place, the direct, blunt military _
mentality of the new regime is being applied to most aspects
of national policy. Because of Burma's precarious inter-
national position, the official policy of neutrality will
be preserved. Because of Burma's relative impoverishment,
"fancy" economic development schemes will be dropped and
stress will be placed on hard work to convert the country's
normal resources into a reasonable standard of living for
the country's population. Dependence upon foreign assist,
ance will be eschewed unless such assistance is given freely
in response to Burmese requests.
9. As for the politicians, the issue seems open to
speculation. U Mu, who, in the eyes of the Army, brought
the country to the brink of disaster, is decidedly in dis,
favor. On the other hand,. U Ba Swe1 who was former Minister
of Defense, is generally appreciated by the military men.
However, he is associated so closely with U Kyaw Nyein,
the principal architect of the "fancy" economic development
schemes, that it is doubtful the Army would freely turn over
complete control of the country to his leadership. Rumors
suggest that some negotiations are now taking place to .
devise a means, within the letter of the constitution,
which will permit No Win to relinquish nominal control of
GoVernment to U Ba Swe at the end of the prescribed six
month period, but to let the Army exercise continued
direction of policy indefinitely through the instrumentality
of its "shadow" regime of political colonels.
10. A general evaluation of the policy implications for
the U. S. inherent in this military takeover is difficult
to make until the end of six months "interim" period has been
reached. The mannerin which this critical moment will be
bridged could be determinative of the entire future
relationship between the United States.and Burma. However,
pending this event and its consequences, the following
preliminary judgments can be registered,
a. On balance, the military takeover was a good
thing.. It checked a serious leftward drift in Burma
and prevented the outbreak of serious violence which
could only have led to further chaos in a country sick
almost to death of civil strife.
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1. The current regime can be expected to be mil-
itantly anti-Communist and to deal firmly with both
guerrilla insurgents and their above-ground agents.
The sharp shaking being given to public
corruption, inefficiency, and sheer slovenly lazineSs
is long overdue and well merited. There is a danger,
however, that it will be done in such a heavyhanded
manner that the Army will become extremely unpopular and
will create deepseated popular currents of resentment
which can eventually be exploited by the Communists,
d. Despite their anti-Communism, the Army leaders
are not necessarily pro-American and are inclined to
view U. S. policy in Burma with suspicion. This will
continue tO make it difficult to do business with them
in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. They may bend
over backwards to avoid being labelled as the "tools of
the Americans9.
e. The blunt military approach to national policy
matters, especially in the field of economic aid, will
make it difficult for the U, S. to be effective in
assisting Burma with the means now at our disposal. The
Development Loan Fund, for example, is considered by the
current regime to be in the "fancy" category, and will
probably not be utilized by Burma.
f. On the other hand, deliveries under the U. E.-
Burmese military sales agreement are extremely well
recaved and seem to, afford the current best meass of
continuing rapport between the U. S. and the present
Burmese leadership.
11. In summary, the situation produced in Burma as a
result of the military takeover makes it probable that the
government will be more willing and able than its predecessor
to defend itself against Communist subversion and manipula.
tion, At the same time, the new government presents us with
a new series of complications which may require certain
reviJorz in the tactics which we have developed for the
condwA'of relations with Burma. The exact shape of these
complIcations will not become firm until April of this year.
In the meantime, our best tactic in relations with Burma
would seem to involve continued close contact with the
Burmto military through fulfillment of our military sales
dellves, coupled with a quiet acquiescence in the
gene.r1 trend of national policy developments over which we
have ao control. Aside from making minor adjustments to meet
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specific Burmese requests, we should refrain from any major
policy commitments in the field of economic aid until after
the critical decisions of next April are resolved.
UAW&
lialgruLaaoywaattuat
1. In October, 1958, a group of officials and military
Officers led by Field Marshal Sarit, Supreme Commander of
the That Armed Forces, announced that it had abolished the
constitution and parliament, on grounds that these institu-
tions could not cope with the Communist threat. The group
immediately declared its support of the throne, and there
have been no signs of significant non-Communist opposition
to its control. Since the change of government, the group
has ruled by decree, but it has announced that an interim
government and constituent assembly will be formed to govern
Thailand and prepare a new constitution. The group is
virtually the same as that which overthrew Phibun in
September, 1957, and contains many of the officers who had
previously supported his government. The October change of
government appears to have been made largely for the purpose
of ridding the military leaders of a parliament which they
found it troublesome to have to control chiefly by money and
intimidation. NevertheleSs, the group's leadership has made
particular efforts to gain Popular support, thereby demon-
strating that it is not totally unconcerned regarding public
opinion.
Comment
2. In Thailand military leaders have traditionally
been the chief determinant of the nation's political leader-
ship. Whenever the chief political leader has lost control
.over the leaders of the armed forces his downfall has become
inevitable. This was true in the days of the absolute
monarchy and has cintinued to be true since the formation of
a constitutional monarchy by military coup d'etat in 1932.
As a result the accepted means of altering the national
political leadership in Thailand has been the coup d'etat
tather than elections. The recent change of government,
however, was not even a coup'd'etat, as Field Marshal Sarit
already exercised power through the Army General he had named
as Prime Minister.
3. Owing to the oligarchic nature of Thai politics the
parliamentary institUtions created 14 1932 have been 'largely
a pretense. The military group in power has ensured passage
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of desired measures by cash and/or cajolery, and the legis-
lative assemblies have seldom performed representative
functions. The Assembly abolished on October 20 was much
the same as its predecessors in this respect.
4. The use of force to change the government in
October, 1958, the continued maintenance of political power
by Thai political leaders, and the abolition of a legislative
body which the leaders had controlled by undemocratic means,
ao not constitute a new trend in Thai politics. These devel-
opments are but a continuation of past practice, with both
advantageous and disadvantageous aspects. From the stand-
point of Thailand's stability and security, continued
political control by 'militaryleaders helps ensure conti-
nuity over the long run, in spite of periodic competition
for leadership, and also tends to inhibit Communist infil-
tration and subversion. On the other hand more attention
will have to be paid in future to the views of nonmilitary
opinion leaders. There has never been a popular revolt in
Thailand and there are AO pigns that one is in the offing;
nevertheless, there is a growing Political consciousness
among urban Thai, and continued social and economic progress,
as well as some progress toward more representative govern-
ment over a period of years, are essential to the long-term
maintenance of Thailand's stability. There are serious ob-
stacles to such progress, but encouragement can be found in
indications that the present regime desires public
approbation.
5. Assisting Thailand to develop toward representative
government continues to be one of our important long-term
objectives. In the meantime, however, we should maintain
a constructive relationship with the top leaders of the
present regime, at the same time avoiding such close ident-
ification with them as to prejudice prospects of cooperation
with their eventual successors. We should also continue to
assist Thailand's efforts to strengthen itself economically
and militarily, in order that this nation may have the time
and means to achieve stability and progress.
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