COMMENT ON MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD, "POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AFRO-ASIAN MILITARY TAKEOVERS," OF 2 APRIL 1959.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000400110008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 10, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 April 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDI - Mr. Korner
FROM FE, 0/NE - H. P. Ford
SUBJECT : Comment on Memorandum for the NSC Planning Board,
"Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers,"
of 2 April 1959.
1. The study is a thoughtful, eloquent, and commendable attempt to
sell a difficult policy course: that of generally accepting and working
with military takeover regimes in Asia, while at the same time lessening
the military emphasis (and image) of US policy. The study is an admirable
one in many respects. It is fresh, frank, sophisticated, concerned with
the long-range, and sympathetic to the desires of the Asian states for
dignity, economic development, full independence, and (with some states)
neutrality. Its assessments of the situation in the Far East are in the
main consistent with National Estimates. This office shares its judgment
that military takeover regimes in Asia are not necessarily bad 2.21- se, and
may in fact (depending on the particular case) be the best available alter-
native for the given country and for US interests. The study's arguments
could perhaps be made more forceful by certain revisions. The following
are suggested.
2. The paper's impact might be increased if less discursive and re-
dundant presentation, and tighter, more logical organization were used. The
study attempts to discuss so much that there seem to be subjects left over
which do not quite fit into a logical progression. An example is all
,fee(Er
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!Ford'
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the interesting but long-winded stuff which preceeds the (buried, but
well-stated) heart of the paper: "Three Basic Questions," on pp. 13
ff. In addition, the behaviorist, conceptual language at times gets
in the way of clarity.
3. The paper seems a bit mesmerized by economic determinism,
expressed repeatedly (paras. 13-e, 15-b, 15-c, 24) in a great fear
that the Asian countries may slip into Communism via discouragement
with non-Communist economic development procedures and progressive
adaptation of Marxist models. The study might modify this concern
by reminding the reader that states are more likely to "slip" via
either being overrun or themselves accommodating to external Com-
munist pressures; and, furthermore, that a number of considerations
(not discussed) inhibit any "slipping" process by Asian states:
historic antagonisms with the Russians or the Chinese; the object
lessons of Hungary, Tibet, and the rather joyless communes; rejection
of Communist philosophy on religious and other grounds; desire for
continuing independence; and US policies and power.
4. The paper's enthusiasm for its cause is admirable, but it
weakens its case by an overoptimistic presentation which does not
even take note of many of the great problems which confront its
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desired ends for US policy in Asia. It over-states the coincidence
of US interests with those of the Asian states and peoples (paras.
13, 14, 27) and seems greatly to uilerplay the difficulties in
shifting US support away from military emphasis. This is not to
deny so much those points raised by the paper, as the failure to
discuss also such problems as: (a) the sometime US bind betwixt
the wishes of a NATO ally and those of an Asian state; (b) the
unhappy fact of the need for indigenous military strength (and s');
(c) the difficulties involved in persuading Messrs. Chiang, Rhee,
Diem, et al., that their military establishments should be sizably
cut; (d) the fact that necessary US moves to deter aggression in
Asia may at times also work to US disadvantage to the degree that
allied and Asian states scurry to cover in fear of hostilities;
(e) the many roadblocks (economic, military, and easy-living) in the
path of economic growth in the Asian states; (f) the generally shaky
nature of certain of these states; and (g) the great difficulties of
communication between the US and the mass of Asia's people.
5. Minor points:
a. In several places the text encourages the Asian regimes
to address themselves (only) to their developmental problems.
In each instance (paras. 19-e, 21-al 21-b), it would be well
to add that US interests would also be served to the degree that
a healthy political stability could be furthered in these countries.
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b. Para. 13-d-(i) should either be deleted or clarified,
since "the Free World's alliance with human nature" depends
for its force on whether the reader inclines toward Locke--
N. V. Peale or Freud--Nietzsche.
c. Annex B (The Far East) and the attachment on Burma
are quite sound. We have no quarrel with the discussion of
Thailand, but feel that this country should be dropped from
the document, since last fall's "coup" was basically more of
the same in Thailand, and rather different in kind from the
other military takeovers discussed in the paper.
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