LETTER TO R. W. KOMER FROM JOHN N. IRWIN II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 23, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

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INTERNATIONAL.
SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
September 23, 1960
Dear Bob!
Many thanks for forwarding me the USIA
report on "Free World Views of the US-USSR
Power Balance". I read it with much interest.
Sincerely,
Mr..-R. W. Komer
dohn N. Irwin Il
United States Information Agency
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Copies forwarded on 6 Sep 60 to:
Copies forwarded on 8 Sep 60 to:
DCI
DDCI
Bissell
Kirkpatrick
Copies forwarded on 14 Sep 60 to:
Cordon Gray
Karl Harr
Jack Irwin
Copies forwarded on 14 Sep 60 to:
Gerard Smith
Copies forwarded on 13 Oct 60 to:
AD/NE & Mr. Cooper
Jim Critchfield
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September 1960
1412119=4:14 BsNr. Oren Stephens
Director, Office of Research and Pan/yule
U. Co Information Money
=Nat um Study on Pres World Views of the
US?USSR Power 1aix,e
1. 1 have read with great interest the draft report, wo
asked you to do on thie key subject. It is a highly effective
and competent piece ofvorkvtich, incidentally, is quite
in accord with our own impressions as garnered not only from
other intellisenee sources 'bat tram earlier OBIALcountr7
opinion surveys.
20 Hence, please accept our thanks for a job well done.
I hope to see that it gets brought to the attention of the
top level of this Agency-and the intelligence comunitl as a
Maple.
MEW AWRY* 411.`'
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Distribution:
Orig. and 1--Addressee
2?ODD/I
0/DD/I:RWKomer:mhs(2 September 1960)
STAT
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SE ET ATTACHMENT '
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON
August 29, 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Free World Views of the US-USSR Power Balance
Since the report you requested on the above subject
has been some time in the making and still has to be dupli-
cated, I am attaching a carbon copy as evidence that you will
get the finished report shortly. If multiple copies of the
report are needed, we will be glad to supply the number
you wish.
Attachment
As stated.
Oren Stephens
Director
Office of Research and Analysis
SE T ATTACHMENT
AA-Q
Ar\v?
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CA,Juatabs.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
1 September 1960
The attached USIA survey, which we requested same time ago, is
first-class though gloomy reading. USIA has done a real service,
which we aught to exploit as another means of awakening people to
the realities of the 1960s.
a. Attached is a draft note to Oren Stephens thanking
him for a good job. and-requertimg-ee-eep?es,
b. In light of DCI's and Bissell's earlier interest, it
might be worthwhile to send copies personally to DCI, DDCI,
DDP, etc., with a little cover note from yourself. Will draft
one if you like.
c. We should also give it wide dissemination within
the Agency.
d. USIA will distribute this as a regular intelligence
report, but you may wish to consider bringing it personally
to the attention of higher level audiences. One suggestion
would be to send it to USIB members. More important, perhaps,
you might wish to send it to such as Gordon Gray, Karl Harr,
Jack Irwin, Gerry Smith, et al noting that it was done at
our request. Otherwise they may never see it.
e. You recall that when I did my own little study some
months ago (based on a culling of intelligence items by OCI
and DDP), I recommended not only asking for the USIA study
but also considering how we might integrate it and these
other materials into a paper with broader impact, perhaps
an SNIE. I still think that this subject is so important as
to justify our making a systematic effort of some sort.
R. W. MIER
STAT
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Ihruty Director (Istealigasee)
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4--
r Office of Research and Analysis
FREE WORLD VIEWS OF THE US-USSR POWER BALANCE
R-54-60 August 29, 1960
This repart is not a statement of USIA policy.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Foreword
A. GENERAL TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS 1
B. REGIONAL ANALYSES
Western Europe 4
Near East and South Asia:
Arab States 7
Greece, Turkey and Iran 9
South Asia 12
Africa 14
Far East 17
Southeast Asia 18
Japan 21
Latin America 22
C. SELECTED SURVEY FINDINGS
US Versus Soviet Faith and Dedication 24
US Versus Soviet Military Standing 24
US Versus Soviet Scientific Standing 26
US Versus Soviet Standing in Space Development 28
US Versus Soviet (Economic) Strength 25 Years Hence 30
D. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT IRI REPORTS PERTAINING TO
US-USSR STANDING 32
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FOREWORD
This report, originally requested as an informal
contribution to a government study, is being issued in
this series as of general interest to the Agency.
It comprises a summary of general trends and high-
lights; a series of regional discussions of the compara-
tive power images held; and summary tabulations of data
from available public opinion surveys that have a signi-
ficant relation to aspects of the power confrontation.
There is also appended a list of recent MI reports
bearing on the subject.
No uniformity of approach has been attempted in
the regional sections of the report, in view of the
diversity of factors that are locally active in shaping
impressions of US and Soviet power, and regional dis-
parities in the nature and availability of evidence
regarding opinions and attitudes. What has been sought
In these sections is to permit the issues to be seen
within the context of regional history, preoccupations,
and concerns.
It should be borne in mind that both the nature of
the questions at issue, and the nature and fragmentari-
ness of the evidence available, mean that overall analysis
of foreign views on relative US-USSR power is necessarily
generalized and tentative. As the report suggests, the
nature of power itself, as it is measured by foreign
opinion, is in the course of evolution, and the circum-
stances in which paver would be applied are not seen as
a constant by any audience.
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FREE WORLD VIEWS OF TBE US-USSR POWER BALANCE*
A. GENERAL TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS
1. The concept of national power in international relations is currently
undergoing redefinition in the public mind. In this process, the elements that
constitute power, the ways in which power is applied, and the context in which
power is envisaged and assessed, are all being significantly revised and ex-
tended. In this continuing flux, no clear and controlling concept, and no
final verdict on power-in-being or on relative power positions holds decisive
sway, although a number of the factors that influence popular judgments can
be discerned, as well as the current general direction of those judgments.
2. Current views of relative US-USSR power have changed sharply since
the advent of the first Sputnik and the development of intercontinental missile
capabilities. Prior to these events, prevalent opinion was that the US enjoyed
a clear preponderance of power. The current consensus would appear to be that
the USSR now enjoys a rough but effective equivalence in strength overall.
Behind in some fields, ahead in others, the USSR is seen as capable of offering
a credible competitive challenge to the US in the major arenas of international
rivalry.
3. The trend is adverse to the US; despite some fluctuations, and area
variations, impressions of Soviet power superiority or gains seem to be rising
in public opinion rather than falling. Anticipations of what the trend in
power will be -- popular estimates of which nation will emerge generally
strongest in a peaceful competition over the next few decades -- in most
available indicators favor the USSR.
4. In the critical areas of military strength and space achievements
and a rate of economic growth capable of supporting them at a high level,
popular opinion in most West European countries, presumably the best informed
and closely linked by interest and history, believes the US to be inferior
to the USSR, although more sophisticated opinion may perceive a rough balance.
In these specific fields, too, the trend is adverse. Elsewhere, most opinion
is divided on military strength, with the predominant belief apparent that a
nuclear stalemate prevails. However, in almost all areas, expectations appear
to be that the USSR will achieve military superiority, although there is
probably no clear concept of what this superiority will consist of, or what
its significance will be.
5. In most parts of the world, the USSR is believed to lead the US
in space achievements. This impression, stemming from the first Sputnik and
strengthened by its aftermath, appears to have sometimes a durability
impervious to fact, sometimes a volatility suggesting that it could be
readily modified by sensational developments. Given the present capabilities
of both sides, it is probable that the most favorable verdict the US can
hope to elicit on its space performance will be the expectation of a see-saw
pattern.
6. Virtually without exception, world opinion is now convinced that
the USSR has made tremendous economic progress over the past decade. So
much, in fact, that the gap between it and the US, which is still acknowledged
to have the world's most powerful economy, is rapidly being closed. Con-
current with the widely held view that the USSR's current rate of economic
* The reader should be cautioned that this assessment does not include
the reactions to the Soviet Union's latest triumph -- the successful
recovery of its "second cosmic space ship" with its dog passengers.
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growth is substantially higher than that of the US, is the general tendency --
even in highly industrialized Western Europe -- to suspect that within the
foreseeable future the USSR might even surpass the US in overall economic
strength.
7. Popular acceptance of the idea that a "nuclear stalemate" obtains
appears to be increasing; it may be the most widely held single view on
relative US-USSR power. It does not necessarily conceive US-USSR strength
as equal; it is based rather on the view that no margin of superiority is
likely to be decisive in a nuclear war, since the side that initiated major
hostilities would incur unacceptable retaliatory damage in turn. This view
is less a judgment on ratios of strength than a belief that strength is held
in an equilibrium of deterrence, "the balance of terror." The concept of
such a deadlock seems to have rational and emotional attractiveness to
foreign audiences: (1) Such a military stalemate appears to lessen the
danger that either side would deliberately resort to force and is thus wish-
fully welcomed; (2) A. balance of this kind appears to hold for third powers
the prospect that their own international influence could assume expanded,
perhaps decisive, weight; (3) It permits readier maintenance or assumption
of neutralist positions by eliminating the attraction of a possible victor
it is easier to be neutral if no one is going to win.
8. A, nuclear stalemate carries for many the implication that the
US-USSR rivalry will be resolved in alternative arenas. If major modern
armaments are seen as unemployable to enforce settlement of the US-USSR
competition, greater weight and decisiveness are given to other aspects of
strength -- on the one hand, the political, economic, psychological, and
ideological facets of a peaceful international competition; on the other,
the ability successfully to fight a geographically limited war, a war with
conventional weapons, or to intervene forcibly (directly or indirectly) in
a local situation.
9. There appears to be a preponderance of belief that the USSR
rather than the US would win a conventional war; there appears uncertainty
whether wars could be confined to local areas or conventional weapons. In
Western Europe, opinion seems convinced that any war between the major
powers would be a nuclear war, and could not be localized; in areas where
the interests of the greater powers do not appear so critically or manifestly
engaged, the possibility of local and limited wars seems to have wider
acceptance.
10. The sources of the public impression that the USSR has closed
or is closing the power gap appear to be primarily:
a. Widespread belief that the Soviets lead in space achieve-
ments, and that these can be equated directly with military capability, and
to a lesser extent with overall scientific and technical development and
with the efficacy of the Soviet system.
b. The greatly expanded international presence of the USSR,
which has appeared in recent years to be exerting influence and leverage
in areas which had hitherto been denied it or where it had hitherto been
inactive.
c. The confident tone and aggressive posture of the USSR,
which has appeared to be speaking and acting from assumed strength. This
assumption has apparently been lent credibility less by Soviet propaganda
efforts than by concrete Soviet actions or successes, and by the apparent
corroboration given Soviet claims by Western reaction. US expressions of
public and official concern regarding the challenge of Soviet power appear
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to have been a significant element in validating the Soviet posture.
d. Doubts that the US has succeeded in effectively organizing
and focussing the resources of the Western alliance, or that the US has
shown itself fully effective in bring its awn power to bear on its objectives.
e. Soviet foreign economic programs, that despite their
comparatively restricted size have had high impact and visibility, through
selective deployment and timing for maximum effect; these have helped to
create the image of a productive and accelerating Soviet economy, especially
in underdeveloped areas.
f. An impression of Soviet ruthlessness and fixity of purpose,
combined with the impression that the Soviet people have greater faith in
their principles, and are willing to work harder, than the people of the
US. This view has not served to raise USSR in general esteem over the US,
nor can it be equated with admiration for Communist institutions or doctrine,
but presumably contributes to raising popular estimates of overall Soviet
capabilities.
g. In Asia particularly, the belief that Communist China, with
its massive population, has shown tremendous economic growth and dynamism
makes itappeara substantial increment to Communist bloc strength -- a
belief qualified, probably, by the sense that this strength is currently
more potential than actual, and by some uncertainty about the ultimate
correspondence of Communist Chinese and Soviet interests. In much of the
Far East (notably excluding Japan) the impact of Soviet power is still
relatively slight; Communist China is the basic power against which the US
is measured in Southeast Asia, and Soviet power is sometimes also viewed
as a force to be measured against that of Communist China.
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B. REGIONAL ANALYSES
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WESTERN EUROPE
Introduction
The question "How do Western Europeans currently rank the United States
and the Soviet Union on the international balance of power scale in view of
their worldwide rivalry?" is not easily answered for two major reasons --
both of which are highly subjective in character.
The first difficulty is inherent in the initial and personal decision
regarding the relative weight to be assigned to each of the three major
sectors of opinion; to political opinion as revealed in official government
policy, parliamentary debates and public political speeches; newspaper opinion
as reflected in editorials and feature commentaries; and man-in-the-street
opinion as indicated by public opinion surveys. However, given the kind of
democratic political society that prevails throughout most of Western Europe,
this appraisal arbitrarily assumes that political opinion is the most
important, followed fairly closely by press opinion and at some considerable
distance by man-in-the-street opinion.
The second major difficulty stems from the lack of any commonly agreed
on current yardsticks for measuring the relative power-standing vis-a-vis
each other of such super-states as the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although there is a fairly firm consensus as to what constitutes international
power in the abstract -- military strength, economic might, scientific-
technological skill and moral stature -- there is no corresponding agreement
as to the relative importance of these various power-components within the
context of the current US-USSR worldwide rivalry For basic to any meaning-
ful and realistic ordering is the subjective determination as to whether
this rivalry will remain peacefUl -- i.e., confined to the struggle for the
minds and stomachs of mankind -- or whether it will eventually erupt into
nuclear war. In either event, this appraisal again arbitrarily assumes that
Western European opinion regards military strength -- "Who can beat whom?" --
and the will to use it as the acid tests of power in the current scientific
nuclear-missile age, followed fairly closely by economic might and at some
considerable distance by moral stature.
The Pre-Sputnik Image: Unchallenged US Dominance
From the vantage point of the present, it seems clear that "Sputnik I"
and the cumulative American reaction to its manifold implications represent
a major watershed in the Western European evaluation of the relative power
standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. For, prior to the advent
of the space or missile age in October 1957, few Western Europeans seem to
have entertained any real doubts about American military, scientific, economic
and moral superiority vis-a-vis the USSR and the American intention of using
this superiority for the general good of mankind -- at least for mankind in
the free world.
The fact that the United States could expose the Soviet Union to nuclear
destruction while the latter could not effectively retaliate in kind -- the
basis of the Dulles "massive retaliation" doctrine -- was universally regarded
as concrete evidence of American military superiority. A superiority, more-
over, which most Western Europeans believed was implicitly acknowledged by
the Soviet Union itself. For, following the formation in 1949 of the North
Atlantic defense system based on US nuclear might, there were no further
direct Soviet challenges to the territorial status quo of Western Europe.
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U
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The fact that the United States had the highest standard of living of
any nation in the world was viewed as indisputable proof of American economic
superiority. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly demonstrated by the
ease with which the United States carried the tremendous burden of the postwar
economic reconstruction of Western Europe -- the Marshall Plan -- and furnished
increasing amounts of economic and technical assistance to other needy regions.
The fact that on virtually all levels of American society there was mass
ownership of products of American scientific-technological ingenuity -- cars,
radios, television sets, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines,
etc. -- was generally regarded as incontrovertible proof of the validity of
the traditional picture of American scientific-technological pre-eminence.
A superiority, moreover, which had been clearly demonstrated in the develop-
ment of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and in the means of delivering them to
their intended targets.
The fact that the United States was an open and democratic society --
one which was clearly dedicated in principle to the Western European liberal
ideal of individual freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity -- was
generally considered to be strong evidence of the moral superiority of
American society vis-a-vis its dictatorial and regimented Soviet counterpart.
A superiority, moreover, which was clearly manifested in American goodwill
and benevolence towards most nations in the difficult postwar era and in
its assumption of the unsolicited role of defender of the free world against
the march of international communism.
The Post-Sputnik Image: US Dominance Seriously Questioned
Under the cumulative impact of Soviet spectacular "firsts" in rocket
developments and the continuing chorus of sharp American self-criticism
most Western Europeans have been shocked into a drastic -- and perhaps
excessive -- revision of their pre-sputnik image of general Soviet inferi-
ority to the United States. Accompanying this re-evaluation of the USSR as
a dynamic and powerful military-economic-and-scientific complex has been a
concomitant re-examination of the continuing validity of the pre-sputnik
image of invincible American power and unquestioned world dominance.
Currently, most Western Europeans are convinced that the balance of
military power no longer favors the United States as it formerly did. For,
in their opinion, the Soviet leapfrog development of a nuclear interconti-
nental ballistic missile has cancelled out the pre-sputnik American advantage
of being able to rain nuclear destruction upon the Soviet Union while being
virtually immune to a similar Soviet attack.
While sophisticated political and press opinion tends to regard the
current military situation as one of nuclear stalemate in which neither of
the two super-powers has any material advantage over the other, the more
impressionistic popular opinion has seemingly concluded from Soviet boasts
of superiority and American admissions of a temporary "missile gap" that
the United States is not only currently militarily inferior to the USSR but
will continue to be so for the next decade or two as well. Nevertheless,
popular opinion is in complete accord with sophisticated opinion in holding
that a major war between the US and the USSR is most unlikely in the present
circumstances because, regardless of their relative military strengths, each
still has the capability of inflicting terrible destruction upon the other.
In short, regardless of differences of opinion about the relative military
strengths of the world's two super-states, there is universal acceptance
of the Churchillian thesis that "mutuality of terror" is a major deterrent
to war in the nuclear age.
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Although convinced that the Soviet Union's recent success in redressing
the military balance vis-a-vis the United States has paradoxically reduced the
danger that either protagonist would deliberately resort to war as a means of
resolving their differences, Western European opinion -- at least on the more
sophisticated political and press levels -- is currently disturbed by two
possible (albeit contradictory) implications of the post-sputnik military
situation. First, the possibility of war by miscalculation -- that is, the
fear that war might inadvertently result from a Soviet miscalculation as to
how far it can exploit the current nuclear stalemate for the attainment of
limited objectives, such as the takeover of West Berlin, for instance. And
second, the possibility that "Western Europe could no longer reckon uncondi-
tionally upon the protection of America's atomic shield in the event of
limited conflicts" -- that is, the fear that the United States might consider
the possible nuclear destruction of an American city (such as New York or
Chicago or Los Angeles) as too high a price to pay for resolutely opposing
a limited Soviet aggression, such as the takeover of West Berlin or Helsinki,
for example.
While Western European opinion still subscribes to the view that the
United States is indubitably the world's economic leader and leagues ahead
of the Soviet Union, its closest rival, of late increasing doubts --
particularly on the more sophisticated political and press levels -- have
developed about the continuing supremacy of the American economy. Contri-
buting to these growing reservations have been four major developments.
First, the general agreement that the Soviet Union's boasts of
tremendous economic strides in the postwar era have a firm foundation in
fact, as evidenced by such objective standards as the visible improvement in
its level of living, its deep and continuing penetration of the aluminum,
asbestos and oil export markets (to mention just a few) and its increasing
foreign aid programs such as the ambitious Aswan Dam project on the Nile.
Second, the widespread currency and authenticity that American reports, both
official and private, have given to the USSR's claim that its economy is
growing at an appreciably faster rate than that of the United States and that
the gap between the two is being rapidly closed -- a claim which Western
Europeans find easy to accept (even without American confirmation) in view
of their own superior rate of economic growth over the past decade. Third,
the visible faltering of the American economy on at least four major occasions
in the past fifteen years, most particularly the 1957-58 recession and the
current economic difficulties. And fourth, the apparent concern of the
United States -- as indicated by its current exports drive and sponsorship
of the still-to-be-born Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development --
that it can no longer singlehandedly carry the increasing burden of
economic assistance to the developing nations of the world in direct
competition with the USSR.
The pre-sputnik Western European image of the United States as the
leading scientific-technological nation in the world has likewise been
sharply eroded of late under the cumulative impact of the Soviet Union's
spectacular successes with outerspace satellites -- largely because of the
widespread layman's tendency to equate them with a high degree of scientific-
technological attainment in general. Although the almost universal accept-
ance of Soviet superiority in rocketry has resulted in an across-the-board
upgrading of Soviet science and technology, Western European opinion is
still inclined to believe that the United States leads the USSR in the
application of science for the general welfare of mankind In addition, the
more sophisticated opinion holds that American outerspace research, while
less spectacular than its Soviet counterpart, is contributing more to man's
basic scientific knowledge and eventual control of outerspace.
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While the moral stature of the United States as a nation dedicated to
freedom and liberty remains as high as ever, a number of developments have
combined of late to induce in Western European opinion -- particularly on the
sophisticated political and. press levels -- increasing doubts about the
continuing American ability to provide the kind of imaginative and responsive
leadership required by changing world conditions, such as the shift in Soviet
strategy from the crude "cold war" philosophy of Stalin to the more subtle
challenge posed by Khrushchev's "peaceful but competitive coexistence"
philosophy.
A.bighly selective listing of the major events leading to this Western
European questioning of American leadership during the past two-and-a-half
years would of necessity include the following: the alleged tardy American
recognition of the military and psychological challenge posed by the Soviet
Union's spectacular series of "firsts" in auterspace developments; the
alleged hiatuses in the conduct of American foreign policy occasioned by
internal bickering, the illness of high US officials and elections; the
alleged amateurish bungling which led to the Soviet torpedoing of the much-
heralded Paris summit conference and the Geneva disarmament talks; the
alleged failure to prevent the division of Western Europe into two poten-
tially rival economic groupings; and the alleged inability of the Eisenhower
administration to exercise effective and unified control over the complex
governmental machinery concerned with foreign affairs.
Conclusions
Three major conclusions are suggested by the preceding analysis of
current Western European opinion of the relative power standing of the
United States and the Soviet Union. First, that the past few years have
witnessed a sharp deterioration in the pre-sputnik Western European image of
American military, economic, scientific and moral superiority vis-a-vis the
USSR. Second, that during this same period Western European opinion has
drastically revised its pre-sputnik view of the USSR as a generally backward
nation to the current image of a modern dynamic and powerful military-
economic-and-scientific complex -- one, moreover, which has already taken
giant strides towards redressing the balance with the United States. And
third, that Western European opinion is inclined to the "safe" view that
the United States and the USSR will become progressively more equal in
overall strength over the course of time, with neither having any appreciable
military or economic or scientific advantage over the other.
BEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Arab States
Introduction
Given the absence of survey data for the Arab countries, any assessment
of Arab opinion must be derived wholly from the radio and press and from
private expressions of opinion, including those of officials -- the latter
often more rational and moderate than that publicly expressed. Recognition
must be given to the Arabs' volatile nature and subjective outlook through
which events are measured in extreme terms according to the interests of
the Arab "nation" and reactions shaped by recent history: the continuing
existence of Israel, the intense bias against "Western imperialism," and the
commitment of Soviet bloc political, military, and economic support to the
Arab world.
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Leadership
Arab opinion in recent months has tended to view the United States as a
nation increasingly isolated and declining in prestige primarily because of
"mistaken" policies and conflicting pressures within American society. There
has been some contrast, however, between private and publicly expressed
opinion with the latter denouncing US policies in extreme terms -- under
government direction in the case of the UAR (because of dependence upon
Soviet economic and military aid) and in other areas impelled by a desire
to humiliate the US because of the Israeli issue. While private Arab opinion
largely blamed the Soviet Union for the collapse of the Summit meeting, US
judgment on the handling of the U-2 flight was seriously questioned. (The
revelation of such flights occurring over a four-year period had the
paradoxical effect of enhancing American military capability in Arab eyes,
however.) Because of Israel, Arabs have tended to view American policy-
making as "confused" and subordinated to "Zionism, imperialism, and reaction-
ary influences" -- Western democracy in this respect tends to be regarded
as decadent. The events in Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Cuba have been inter-
preted both as a defeat for America in supporting "unpopular" regimes (not
necessarily dictatorships) and as an overwhelming vindication of Arab
beliefs concerning military pacts and bases. Exclusive of the Communist
press, there has been little effort in this context to vindicate Soviet
policy, but Arab private opinion credits the USSR with having emerged in a
stronger position. Arabs, however, have derided US statements concerning
Communists in Cuba and Japan as another reflection of the US "failure" to
recognize the force of nationalism. Some press accounts noted that the
Japanese were not anti-American but opposed to military bases as "proved" by
the favorable reception -given Eisenhower in India.
There are indications that some Arab opinion at least tends to credit
Soviet military power -- as measured by the effect of its retaliatory threats
with having induced the violent Japanese reaction and more recently, with
having "frustrated" US designs on the Congo. It is likely that, aside from
aspects of policy and leadership, most Arabs tend to equate the US and the
USSR in terms of overall power admitting an American edge in economic strength.
This rough equation gives rise to the resentful fear that a detente --
affecting the Bear East and in which Arabs will not be consulted -- may at
some time take place. In this narrow context, Arabs tended to look privately
upon the Summit collapse with favor. Most Arabs now hope that neutral forces
will play a larger role for the purpose of protecting such third party
interests and taking advantage of American "defeats."
Military
Arabs tend to regard the US and the USSR as about even in available
military strength but most would probably credit America with greater
military capability given her superior economic resources. They would re-
gard the West today as the probable winner of a hot war and would look with
alarm at the prospect of being aligned on the Soviet side in such a conflict
at the present time. Most informed Arabs were privately pleased with the
knowledge that the U-2 flights had taken place for four years and regarded
the U-2 as a first-class technical achievement while expressing some
skepticism about Soviet military defenses. They also expressed admiration
for the flights as a reflection of American "toughness." Arabs are fully
aware of the nuclear capability of both powers and tend to feel that a
total conflict (inevitably involving the Middle East) is more likely than
a limited war. (The Summit collapse apparently gave rise to genuine fears
In this regard.) Informed Arabs are also aware of the growing strength of
the Soviet economy and its military strength as measured by the increasing
Soviet threats to Western military installations in the Middle and Far
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East -- threats to which Arabs have given at least some credence in the cases
of Suez, Japan, and the Congo.
Alliance System
There has been no change in the deep-seated Arab opposition to military
alliances and foreign bases. Recent events in Japan and the Congo for example,
have intensified and, in Arab eyes, vindicated such opposition with the result
that Arabs would like to believe that the Western base system is collapsing..
They have attributed the weakening of alliances first to local opposition
and secondarily to the U-2 affair and increasing Soviet pressure against the
host countries. There appears to be no firm evidence that they equate this
belief with a net decline in American military power. They contend privately
and publicly, however, that US prestige and influence have declined and
that the combined power of neutral nations will fill the vacuum.
Scientific
Arabs probably rate the US ahead of the USSR in overall scientific and
technological achievement thus retaining the conventional view of American
pre-eminence in these fields and bearing in mind the American lead in
nuclear developments and application, and the widely recognized superior
economic power of the United States. Soviet space achievements neverthe-
less have had a spectacular and generally favorable impact but the initial
Arab impression of a Soviet lead in this narrower field may have been modi-
fied so as to view both powers as about even. It is probable that
Arabs tend to link space accomplishments with military capability and make
little differentiation between scientific, military, or (propaganda) space
ventures.
Economic
Most informed Arabs are aware of American economic superiority relative
to the USSR and have a marked admiration for the US standard of living,
recognizing Soviet drawbacks in the latter respect. However, the massive
economic aid given by the Bloc to the UAR and Iraq during a period of ex-
treme anti-Western feeling had the effect of portraying Moscow as "the
greatest friend of the Arabs." This local outlook has since been modified
by subsequent Arab reservations concerning Communist inroads in Iraq. Arab
opinion tends to credit the USSR (and to some extent Communist China) with
notable achievements in social welfare and industrialization and regards
their ruthless fixity of purpose as worthy of application in the Arab world,
although with avoidance of the human cost involved. A late 1957 survey of
Arab student opinion at the American University of Beirut indicated that
nearly half believed the Soviet Union would surpass America in economic
strength in the next 25 years.
While Arabs would be inclined generally to accept "unconditional"
aid from both sides and have done so (Yemen, Iraq, UA19), they remain pre-
disposed to look first to the West. There is some unmeasured Arab opinion
holding that Soviet aid projects which emphasize industrialization are more
pertinent for their needs than American programs which Arabs feel are overly
concerned with agriculture.
Greece, Turkey and Iran
Introduction
? The proportion of the number of persons to the country's total
population observed thinking aloud on the topics included in this report
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tends to decrease as one looks first at Greece, next at Iran, and finally
at Turkey. Yet, all three countries share in common experiences which pre-
dispose them to view such matters either as favorable to the United States,
or, in times of temporary setback to the US, with considerable equanimity.
Thus, they have in common the memory of US strength and leadership exhibited
in World War II, the successful employment of US pressure against Communist/
Soviet encroachment on their territory daring the late 1940's, and US military
and economic aid given to their countries since World War II. Most recently,
they have witnessed US defiance of Soviet threats against the West. More-
over, membership of each of these countries in a Western defensive allianimt-
whether it be NATO or CENTO, does afford at least to the government leaders
and military participants in NATO or CENTO exercises a better realization of
the actual strength of the United States than if their countries were not
within these alliances.
The Eisenhower Doctrine and the defense treaty with each country growing
out of that declaration have, it appears, given these governments a sense of
protection, and has thereby served to decrease -- but not entirely eliminate --
their critical review of the balance of power between the United States and
the Soviet bloc. This is not to say, however, that each government is above
using, on occasion, such observations as a pretext to wheedle more aid from
the United States. Nor does it mean that opposition elements, particularly
in Iran, like such a guarantee when it appears to keep the governing group
in power.
In Iran the majority of the public probably would favor a modification
of Iran's policy in line with the traditional stance of playing one great
power off against another. At present, moat Iranians who advocate this
change in policy probably feel that the "cold war" will continue indefinitely,
with neither bloc gaining much preponderance over the other. Among those
Iranians who fear that a "hot wee might come any time, there probably is a
desire for Iran to break sway from the alliance in order to seek the compara-
tive security of neutralism.
American officials returning from Turkey report that even the Turks who
talk about East-West relations seldom go much further in their thinking than
to assume that if the United States is against the "Russians" (Turkey's
traditional enemy), then surely the Russians can be stopped -- for one Turk
is always worth two Russians. The Greeks tend to be the most vocal of the
three nationalities on these power subjects and there are probably more
shades of opinion concerning them in Greece than in either Turkey or Iran.
Currently the press in Greece affords a fairly reliable index of what
the public is thinking on these issues. In Turkey this is also true, despite
the fact that the press is now saying very little on such matters, due to
public preoccupation with internal developments under the new regime. In
Iran, on the other hand, the press usually reflects only official thinking
(or direction) on these issues. If that opinion sometimes coincides with
the public's opinion, it is usually coincidental.
Leadership
In all three countries the United States is viewed as a well-intentioned
but, on occasion, inept leader of the Free World. The 'Dirks are constantly
worried that the US will be tricked by the USSR into a false sense of
security. The Iranians feel that the US is leading Iran along a dangerous
path of all-out opposition to the Soviet Union, which can at any time lead
to a "hot war" and place Iran directly on the firing line. The Shah is
concerned that the US will concentrate so much on a nuclear war that it
will overlook the possibility of a conventional and regionally localized
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war in which Iran will have to cope with encroachments from bordering areas
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The majority of Iranians (that is a majority of
those who think about such matters) believe that the US exhibits naivete in
pouring so much aid into Iran without carefully checking on how that aid is
being spent. In Greece the United States was criticized by a number of news-
papers for its "clumsy" handling of the U-2 incident, but although these
same papers expressed a desire to see the return of "old and experienced"
French and Britain influence in Western councils, they probably have remained
convinced that both France and Britain have lost their one-time influence
in world affairs. Many Greeks, according to Edbassy Athens, felt that
through the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit conference,
the United States had allowed the Soviets to regain the propaganda offensive
against the West.
Military
The Turks are the most inarticulate about US military strength. None-
theless, army officers and civilian leaders have expressed concern that the
Soviet bloc might overtake the US in military strength within the next
decade or so miless the US increases its awn strength and that of its allies.
Each American success in the missile field, therefore, probably enhances
Turkish confidence in US military strength. In Greece, there apparently
has been some doubt felt by the public that the US is keeping up with the
USSR in the missile race. But the recent success in the firing of the
Polaris missile from submarines has elicited favorable press reaction con-
cerning the redress of balance of Western power versus the Soviet Union.
In Iran, the successful launchings by the United States of satellites and
military missiles during the last few years have, it seems, wiped out any
inclinations by Iranians to ascribe undue military significance to Soviet
achievements along these lines. Iran's two leading newspapers, Ettela'at
and Kayhan, were particularly impressed by the failure of the Soviet Union
to follow up its threat to bomb air bases after the RB-47 incident. But
what does seem to bother some Iranians (and especially the Shah) is the idea
that the East and the West have reached a nuclear stalemate and, therefore,
have made a conventional war more likely, if and when a war should break
out. It is in the realm of conventional warfare that they fear the US is
allowing itself and its allies to fall behind.
Alliance System
The vast majority of Greeks and Turks staunchly support their
governments' membership in NATO (Greece and Turkey) and CENT? (Turkey). A
majority of the Iranian public, however, does not enthusiastically support
their country's membership in CENTO. These Iranians would prefer their
country to return to a neutral stance so that 1) it might play one great
power off against the other, 2) it might avoid provocation of the Soviet
Union, and 3) the Shah's unpopular regime might lose the strong American
support which they believe it now enjoys. In both Greece and Iran the
press indicated, at the time of the cancellation of the President's trip
to Japan, that it appeared that the US alliance system in the Far East was
beginning to crumble due, it said, to a combination of Communist agitation
and American support of unpopular regimes. Iranians, in particular, are
still greatly impressed by the 1958 coup in Iraq and that country's sub-
sequent (1959) withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. In Greece and Turkey,
the governments, supported by their publics, have remained unshaken by
Soviet threats of retaliation against Western military installations.
Such threats did, however, stir up a demand in the Greek press (represent-
ing both pro-government and opposition opinion) that the government assure
the Greek people that Greece retained the right to exercise control over
reconnaissance flights. In Iran, although the (government-controlled)
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press contended that Iran retained the right to permit such flights in the
future, these sentiments probably did not reflect Iranian opinion.
Scientific
In all three countries the majority opinion probably holds that the
United States is ahead in the fields of science and technology, except in
the missile field, and will likely remain ahead, or at least even, with the
Soviet Bloc during the next 25 years.
Economic
The elite in Turkey tend to feel that, although at present the US is
ahead in economic developient, the USSR is rapidly catching up and may
within the next 25 years overtake the US. (Based on a survey in June 1958
of students of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of
Ankara. The results of this survey are believed to reflect general elite
opinion, both civilian and military.) In Greece, on the other hand,
according to a survey conducted in late 1958, public opinion felt that the
US would emerge economically stronger than the USSR within the same time
span; there is no reason to believe that this opinion has changed. In
Iran, the Turkish attitude probably is shared by a majority of the Persian
elite. While the Turks view this prospect of Soviet economic supremacy
with considerable apprehension, the Iranians are probably less concerned.
There is considerable resistance among the elite in Iran and Turkey
to acceptance of large-scale aid programs from the Soviet Bloc. In Greece,
according to the survey mentioned above, more than half of the respondents
were willing to accept aid from any country. Only a small minority ex-
pressed an unwillingness to accept aid from the Soviet Union.
South Asia
Introduction
Newspaper editorials, the main source of impressions of South Asian
attitudes on the following subjects, are not an accurate reflection of
public opinion. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the press is government con-
trolled; in Repel the papers are frequently the mouthpiece for various
political groups; and in India and Ceylon, where the press has had a
relatively free voice on international issues, it is more critical of the
Soviet Union and Communist China than is the general population. Except
for India there is no public opinion survey data available, and even there
the latest data is about a year old and is limited to urban, educated
Indians. Many of the following assertions should therefore be regarded
as "probably" or "possibly" true, and should be considered descriptive of
the attitudes of the better-informed rather than of the rural, illiterate
mass of the population whose opinions on such subjects are largely un-
crystallized.
Leadership
The image of American statesmanship and leadership has suffered*
setback as a result of several recent events, primarily the U-2 incideht,
the abortive Summit conference, the Japanese riots and the Cuban situation.
Goodwill toward the United States is largely unimpaired, but doubts con-
cerning its skill and ability to formulate and implement a successful
foreign policy vis-a-vis the Communists has increased. South Asians are
still disposed to accept the good intentions of the US, but its prestige
and position as the leader of the Free World has fallen sometihat.
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Soviet belligerency and threats of military action against the US and
its allies caused considerable apprehension, particularly in Pakistan, but
also tended to increase the Soviet power image vis-a-vis the US. Pakistanis
were also aware of the fate of several leaders whose governments, closely
allied with the US, were overthrown in the past year or so. Under the impact
of these various developments, many Pakistanis expressed strong reservations
on the extent to which Pakistan could rely on the US for protection. Feeling
was fairly widespread among the politically aware that Pakistan was a mere
pawn in the East-West conflict whose loss would be a matter of regret to
the US but, nevertheless, an acceptable minor setback in the larger struggle.
Latent neutralist sympathies which had been suppressed for some time came
to the surface in fairly strong form. In other South Asian countries, such
as India, where existing non-alignment policies were firmly supported by
public opinion, recent events were considered pointed justification for this
policy; a rather vocal minority in India who had been advocating some form
of regional anti-Communist pact became, for the time being at least, fairly
quiet.
Military
The US and the USSR are viewed as of about equal military strength at
the present time, although the Afghans partly because of physical proximity
may be more impressed with Soviet military strength. However, the slightly
predominant view in South Asia, particularly in India, is that time is on
the side of the Soviets and it will not be too many more years before the
USSR will be stronger militarily. Despite South Asian respect for power,
this prospect is not looked upon with equanimity by Indians and Pakistanis,
where the growing image of a powerful USSR arouses some apprehension. A
military power balance between the two blocs is generally favored because
It is considered that this balance is an effective deterrent to war. In
times of crisis, fears that a nuclear war may be triggered off by some
Individual miscalculation are more frequently expressed in India than are
assumptions that an East-West conflict can be contained to conventional
warfare. Controlled nuclear disarmament is considered the primary dis-
armament objective.
Alliance System
The predominant attitude toward the US alliance system continues to be
one of rather strong disapproval except in Pakistan, which is the sole South
Asian member of SEATO and CENTO. Despite a more frequent expression of
neutralist attitudes in Pakistan recently, there has been little if any
public questioning of the membership in these two organizations. Sentiment
has been expressed, however, that the US aught to assume greater obligations
In CENTO. On the other hand, alleged inefficiency and lack of coordination
in Washington have raised some doubts that the US could be relied on to
, act decisively and with sufficient speed to help Pakistan if it were
attacked.
Scientific
The USSR is considered about equal to the US in the general scientific
field and perhaps slightly superior to the US in space science. Soviet
space achievements are for the most part responsible for the rapid upward
reevaluation of Soviet scientific capabilities in the last few years. New
advances in space science capture far less attention than earlier ones,
however, and it would probably require some very dramatic achievement by the
US to balance the Soviet's lead in the public mind. At present the general
opinion is that the USSR will have the edge over the US in the general
field of science in a few years time.
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Economic
The US is considered somewhat ahead of the USSR at the present time,
and far ahead of Communist China in economic strength. In ten or twenty
years time, however, the general belief is that the USSR will be an economic
equal of the US, if not slightly superior. There is, however, little if
any interest in the strictly regimented economic system of the Communist
bloc, despite an acknowledgement that economic goals can possibly be reached
faster by such methods. A. mixed economy is strongly favored.
The predominant attitude is that economic aid from both Communist and
non-Communist countries is desirable providing no strings are attached.
Pakistanis, however, resent the large amounts of US aid given "neutral"
countries like India, and Afghans feel that the US is not as dynamic in ex-
tending aid as it should be. Both Afghans and Indians deplore U.S. military
aid, particularly that given to Pakistan.
AFRICA
Introduction
Africans view the American and Soviet power structures in terms of
their awn apprehensions and desires. They are overwhelmingly concerned with
independence, socio-economic development and the preservation of "positive
neutralism." They have only a tangential interest in the Cold War, except
as it directly impinges upon Africa. Knowledge and opinion about the Soviet
Union are in the formative stage. Africans have a greater, if sometimes
distorted, awareness of the US, including the negative as well as the
positive aspects. Furthermore, they tend to associate the US with
European colonial powers -- by race, culture, military alliance, and African
policy.
There are very serious limitations to the data available for an
assessment of the American power image in Africa. The very fey available
opinion surveys confirm that the US stands well above the Soviet Union in
overall esteem but the surveys have not elicited African views on the
various categories covered below. This assessment, therefore, relies
primarily upon statements by government officials and other articulate
leaders -- the statements are neither numerous nor detailed on the parti-
cular items involved -- upon newspaper editorials, very limited survey
data, and impressionistic insights. The fact that Africans are just
beginning to relate themselves to the rest of the world accounts for the
absence of a perspective against which to interpret current African
opinion.
Leadership
Their demand for strong government at home conditions Africans to
respect forceful and wise leadership elsewhere in the world. During the
past year particularly, many Africans have felt that Khrushchev has seized
the initiative around the world and that American leadership has been
increasingly on the defensive. Some sections of the African press have
linked together the U-20 Summit collapse, Japan, Turkey, and Cuba as
evidence of the decline of American prestige and leadership. Khrushchev's
arrogance at Paris did much to redress the earlier inclination to criticize
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severely American 'blunders" in the timing and subsequent handling of the
U-2 incident. Except in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which were directly
involved, there was little African reaction to the President's foreign tours,
except that the cancellation of the visit to Japan was viewed as a set-back
to American prestige. Conscious of their own inability to assume a decisive
role in world politics, Africans argue that both the US and the USSR fail
in their grave responsibilities toward all mankind. Africans continue to
look to Washington for positive leadership (in French tropical Africa,
however, DeGaulle is probably the most highly esteemed world statesman) and
feel that the US must exercise more initiative if the West is to cope with
Moscow's world-wide efforts to undermine the West's position. Africans
await a more dynamic American role in Africa and interpret the absence of
it as proof that American leadership, deferring unnecessarily to the
colonial powers, has not yet grasped the meaning of the new structure of
world politics.
Military
By and large, African opinion tends to believe that the US is ahead
of the Soviet Union in total military power but that the margin is shrink-
ing rapidly. Increasingly the USSR is held to be equal or slightly superior
to the US in missile capability and a survey in Nigeria indicates that
college students believe that the USSR will lead the US in overall military
posture after two decades of coexistence. There has been relatively little
African attention to the capacity of both sides to engage each other in '
limited warfare but Africans are very aware that either side can wage
nuclear and missile iarfare at the present time. Apprehensive over the
possibility that all-out nuclear war could be provoked by accident or in-
flamed passions, Africans disapprove of what they believe to be sporadic
reckless behavior on both sides -- for example the U-2 incident. The U-2
affair reinforced overwhelming opposition to foreign military bases on
African soil, an opposition which now extends to space-tracking stations
which Africans fear may have military implications involving them in the
Cold War. Africans hold that both countries are endangering all mankind by
exorbitant expenditures on armaments and that neither has worked hard
enough towards arms reduction. Some Africans think that the US is overly
cautious about a disarmament agreement with the Soviets; Ehrushchev's UN
disarmament speech in 1959 was well received in some quarters and the US
was urged to approach it with utmost sincerity and a "proper respect" for
the fears of mankird.
In their propaganda to Africa the Soviets have not boasted of their
military capability as much as they have of their readiness to repel
American or NATO "military aggression." They have, however, hammered at
.the theme of American military encirclement of the Orbit and particularly of
American efforts to drag Africa into this "Western aggressive bloc." The
impact of this propaganda is largely unknown. While it probably has served
to enhance the Soviet military posture in African eyes, Africans have
tended to oppose any Big Power military venture in Africa and particularly
outside of the UN. Thus it is at least probable that Soviet propaganda
has not served to impair African views of US military strength.
Alliance System
African opinion about American involvement in military alliances is
concentrated almost entirely upon NATO. The reasons for the existence of
the alliance are eclipsed in African eyes by the widely-held persuasion
that US deference to its Western allies is the single most important cause
of the failure of the US wholeheartedly to support African aspirations for
independence and socio-economic development. Nowhere is this more apparent
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than in long-standing African resentment -- particularly in North Africa --
over alleged American indifference to independence for Algeria. On the same
grounds there has been very minor criticism of the US for not taking a
stronger stand against Belgian military intervention in the Congo in July
1960. The feeling persists that the US supports European desires to associ-
ate Africa with the NATO system. For example, Moroccans in 1958 vigorously
opposed what they believed to be a move to place the US bases in Morocco
under NATO command. One aspect of peripheral interest in recent events in
Korea, Japan, and Turkey is the feeling that the US supports "political
corpses" primarily in the interest of maintaining her military alliances.
Africans recognize that Soviet propaganda coincides with their awn desires
to be free of military pacts with the West, but also tend to recognize that
such propaganda is calculated in the first instance to serve Moscow's and
not Africa's objectives.
Scientific
African opinion places the US ahead of the USSR in total scientific
achievement but believes that the Soviet Union has made remarkable strides
in a short space of time. Soviet space accomplishments have made the largest
single impact and tend in African minds to be taken as representative of
total Soviet scientific capacity. In late 1959, following spectacular
Soviet space successes, many Africans believed that the USSR had temporarily
outstripped the US in this field but at the same time confidently expected
the US to redress the balance. They may now believe that the US has done so.
What most impresses African thinking -- the same applies to Soviet economic
strength -- is the speed with uhich the USSR became a major scientific power.
This attitude is based in part on a lack of knowledge of the scientific
tradition inherited by the Soviets and in part on what Africans resentfully
call the West's calculated downgrading of Soviet scientific capacity in the
past. The US is generally placed ahead of the USSR in the teaching of
science, and African students who have been to the Soviet Union unfavorably
contrast Soviet restrictions upon scientific inquiry with unencumbered
scientific experimentation in the US. There is some feeling that the Soviet
system is better geared than is the American for rapid growth of science and
technology and this attitude, together with Soviet space accomplishments,
probably accounts for the belief in some quarters that in future years the
Soviets may surpass the American scientific effort.
Economic
African opinion places the US ahead of the Soviet Union in total
economic power but believes that the Soviets are steadily decreasing the
margin. As in the case of scientific development, the pace of Soviet
economic growth has made a considerable impact upon an underdeveloped
Africa searching for the best approach to its own economic hurdles. Africans
feel that the US economic system has been uniquely rewarding for the US but
that it is not applicable to Africa's very different situation. Predisposed
to a large governmental role in the economic sphere, African opinion respects
the results that Communist organizational techniques can provide in a
relatively short time. The organizational techniques and the pace of
development largely account for a growing African belief that the Soviet
economic system -- properly adapted to local circumstances -- represents
the "wave of the future." These assumptions give rise to the impression
that the Soviet centralized economic effort is inherently more powerfUl
than an American capitalist system which they tend to view in nineteenth
century terms. At the same time Africans are critical of excessive regi-
mentation in the Soviet Union. They picture the US as fantastically
wealthy but feel that the US does not use its economic abundance as judi-
ciously as it might. Some tend to be critical of American "consumer waste"
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and believe that the US can and should devote more resources to Africa's
economic development. They believe that American capacity to assist Africa
exceeds Soviet capacity, but that the scarcity of American economic aid
results from excessive American deference to the colonial powers.
FAR EAST
Summary and Conclusions
The general trend of informed opinion in Southeast Asia seems to
agree on the following propositions.
1. The image of US power has deteriorated while that of the Soviet
Union has appreciated. In general, the United States still is regarded as
the leading industrial nation of the *world and as the leader in scientific
and technological fields. The margin of US leadership has been narrowed,
however, and it is considered as lagging in the missile race.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union is regarded as the leader in the
missile field. The dramatic quality of its seizure of this position has
rubbed off on its general power image in other scientific and industrial
categories, but not enough yet to place it ahead of the United States in
these general fields.
In sum, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be at a
stand-off. This in itself, however, represents a considerable reduction
in the stature of US power from its pre-1957 position when Sputnik was
first launched into space.
2. As the US power image has faded, however, the recognition of the
need for US power in Southeast Asia has increased. This largely resulted
from the impact of the threatening acts of communism during 1959 in Tibet,
along the Sino-Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia in the dispute over
the Overseas Chinese there.
3. The compelling presence of Communist China in the area -- with
its expansionism, its massive population and its tremendous economic
growth -- provides the basic power against which that of the United States
is measured in Southeast Asia. The impact of Soviet power is still
relatively slight and is sometimes viewed in the area as a force to be
measured against that of Communist China rather than with it.
Japanese opinion too agrees that US power has diminished relative to
that of the Soviet Union, but also without providing a clear-cat opinion as
to which is ahead. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, the Soviet Union remains
the chief threat to Japanese security and Communist China's power potential ?
is still undervalued.
* * * * * * * * * *
The hopes, fears and doubts about American power in the region were
reflected accurately in a recent series of remarks attributed to the Prime
Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who made them during a recent in-
formal discussion with a Western businessman. Rahman reflected an un-
written fear in the Far East that the United States will not use its power
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effectively to defend them when he observed that during World War II, "Asia
was let go to the dogs." The common fear of Communist China was clearly
present in Rahman 's observation that China will dominate the Asia of the
future. The Malayan leader went on to describe what he termed American
"provocation" of Communist China over Taiwan and offshore islands as a cause
for great concern in Southeast Asia. And finally, according to the report,
Rahman declared that it was his belief that the Soviet Union would probably
surpass the United States in productivity within 15 years, and that Communist
China would probably not be far behind.
Southeast Asia
US-Soviet Power
The change in the power images of the United States and the Soviet
Union in Southeast Asia is due almost entirely to the Soviet launching of
the Sputnik in October 1957. The continued disparity in the size of rockets
and the weight of the payloads has solidified Southeast Asian opinion that
the Soviet Union indeed retains its rocket supremacy over the United States.
This image is conditioned somewhat by limited recognition that the United
States has engaged in more frequent space "shoots" and that these have been
more meaningful in scientific terms than have the Soviet weight-lifting
performances. But the dramatic quality of the first Sputnik, coupled with
the fact that the Soviet achievement appeared to came from nowhere -- since
the prevailing view was that the Soviets had only a poor scientific
capability -- has not yet been matched by the United States. And the
popular image has tended to place perhaps undue emphasis on the missile
capability as the portent of the future, perhaps even as a rough rule-of-
thumb of future overall military power.
The Soviet space achievements have, as a result, created a favorable
setting for more serious Southeast Asian consideration of other scientific,
technical and industrial accomplishments of the Soviet Union. The Countries
of Southeast Asia for example are now more prone to consider USSR offers of
technical aid and to adopt textbooks and educational techniques from Moscow.
The Soviet Union, in fact, has been moved up on the scale of modernized
nations to a place second only to that of the United States.
Despite this dramatic upgrading of the Soviet Union, the US lead in
industrialization, in technological know-how and in scientific stature is
still recognized. Leaders in Southeast Asia are prone to balance Soviet
rocketry against the more conventional US power apparatus. For the present,
the US appears to bold a thin margin of lead in terms of the total compon-
ents of power. But it is a fragile thing at best, for reports reveal that
the Soviet Union is whittling away at the keystone of the US power image,
total economic power. Surveys conducted among students in the Philippines
(1958) and in South Viet-Nam (1959) continue to show a majority believing
that the United States will retain its economic lead after 25 years; but
30-40 percent in both cases view such a long-term competition as ending
either in a draw or are undecided. In the Philippines, one out of ten
interviewed foresaw the Soviet Union ahead by that time. These opinions,
coming from nations predisposed in favor,of the US, do not reflect over-
whelming confidence in the outcome.
An editorial in the Times of Viet-Nam on March 5, 1960, summed up the
prevailing current of opinion on the respective US-Soviet power images:
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19
American protection has become questionable. The,
Soviet Union now possesses the nuclear bomb. American
protection is no longer absolute. An association with
the United States may become risky.
Appreciation of the Need for US Power
While American power may have deteriorated in competition with that of
the Soviet Union, the appreciation of US power and the recognized need for
its protective presence in the area is more commonly acknowledged now than
ever before. Events in 1959, including such developments as the repression
in Tibet, the threatening Laos crisis, the explosive Sino-Indian border
dispute and the Sino-Indonesian recriminations over the status of Overseas
Chinese, have combined to produce an aura of uneasiness in the minds of
Southeast Asian leaders and elites. Many chose neutralism as a practical
recognition of the inherent vulnerability of their nations under pressure
from two powerful blocs. Lulled by the talk of peaceful co-existence under
the five principles evolved by Nehru and Chou En-lai, Southeast Asia be-
lieved it had found a reliable course upon which it could be free to con-
duct the necessary business of consolidating independence. The onslaught
of Communist aggressive acts during 1959 shattered this euphoria.
The reaction in Southeast Asia showed elements of both resentment and
fear. The Southeast Asians were resentful that their hopes for peaceful
conditions were so rudely shattered in what seemed to them a denial of
pledges of peace made to them repeatedly by the Communists. But they were
fearful over the implied threat and power that the renewed belligerence
Appeared to hold in store. Many leaders and military men in particular
reacted with a new appreciation of and expression of interest in US power
in the area.
For virtually the first time it was directly acknowledged that in the
final analysis, it was American military power which 'would determine the
freedom or demise of the vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia, faced with
the potential of Communist aggression. Two of the nations in the area most
firmly committed to a course of neutralism, Indonesia and Burma, expressed
their sentiments on this question guardedly but unmistakably. On several
occasions during 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicated that
he had a new appreciation for the presence of American forces in the Pacific
and during a visit of American warships to Indonesia in November 1959,
Subandrio privately stated that Indonesians consider the US Seventh Fleet
a valuable protective screen. The army regime in Burma during 1959 too
expressed similar sentiments. General Ne Win, then Premier of Burma, ex-
pressed an appreciation of SEATO and of American power in the area and a
desire to have the US protective screen available.
Thailand and the Philippines, allies and friends of the United States,
have turned increasingly to SEATO as a result of the Communist belligerence.
Surveys in both countries, but particularly in Thailand in 1957, 1958 and
1959, showed an increasing awareness of SEATO and a better appreciation of
its value to their country and area. During the crisis in Laos in the early
fall of 1959, many papers in the area for the first time reported that SEATO
would have to act should UN intervention prove to be ineffective.
Cambodia's tentative turning toward a closer tie with Communist China
as a result of the pressure of events in 1959 highlights the impact of
fear of Communist China by neighboring states.
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The appreciation of US power and of the need for it has, however, been
only a relatively recent phenomenon, even among many of our allies in the
area. It is in part dependent upon recognition of the real threat posed by
Communist aggression and subversion. The naked Communist threat to the area
was readily apparent in 1959, but this will not always be true. Thus, the
favorable attitudes toward US power may tend to vary considerably with cir-
cumstances and may depend in part on our avoidance of actions which could be
viewed as "colonialist." It should be borne in mind also that even with the
bald nature of the Communist actions in 1959, almost no prominent leader made
a public pronouncement of his privately expressed desire for US military
protection, and none of the neutralist nations abandoned their efforts to get
along with both camps.
American Power Challenged by Communist China
The Communist aggressiveness which has aroused the fear of the Southeast
Asian nations has come fram Communist China rather than from the Soviet Union.
The frequent hesitation of the area's leadership to give public utterance to
their desire for US protection has been in large part due to the conviction
that Chinese power is next door, while US power, no matter how great, is
relatively remote and even undependable. Russian power, though a factor, is
almost never considered as a real threat to the area; in fact, it is occasion-
ally treated as a factor to be balanced against that of Communist China.
Many in Southeast Asia appear to believe that the Chinese colossus in
the north is now embarked on a tremendous build-up of economic and military
power which will sooner or later be used to engulf Southeast Asia. More and
more opinion appears to regard Communist China as the "wave of the future,"
not necessarily ideologically but in terms of tangible power. It is against
this ray image that US power is being measured. Despite a desire to regard
American power in defense of Southeast Asian independence as a firm and
decisive force, hesitation and doubt are clearly evident. An editorial in
the Times of Viet Dam of March 5, 1960, quoted earlier, observed:
TO the allies of the United States, especially
the smaller ones, the application of this doctrine
5assive retaliatiog means that their association
with America increases the risk of their being
destroyed. The type of war which will take place
in the small countries will be the limited war.
And precisely according to the 'massive retaliation'
doctrine, the United States should not let itself be
involved in this type of war. America's full power
will be used only to defend America.
The implication presented in this editorial, and present in other
opinion from the area, is that US power is currently designed to meet global
military situations, not the limited, jungle-type warfare most likely to
materialize in Southeast Asia. It is reported too that high Indonesian
officials, including a close advisor of President Sukarno, expressed doubt
that American assistance would be sufficiently timely or effective to
defend Indonesia from a Chinese Communist attack. This direct question
is not frequently discussed openly in the area, but one aspect of it was
explored directly by the military President of our SEATO ally, Pakistan,
In an interview with the New York Times on June 25, 1960.
General Ayub Khan, according to the Times, noted that Pakistanis
were "beginning to doubt" that the US Government could react quickly enough
to repel an enemy attack. The President of Pakistan said he did not doubt
that the United States possessed the power to repel any attack, i.e., the
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image of US power was a strong one, but he commented that the governmental
machinery to apply this power was "cumbersome, sluggish and a clumsy jugger-
naut." Ayub's comment bears on the central question raised in Southeast Asia,
namely, the application of US power in a timely and effective manner to meet
Southeast Asian needs.
It is ironic, but nonetheless central to the issue at question, that the
nations of Southeast Asia, though often deploring the use of US power in such
places as the Taiwan Straits in the fall of 1958 and in Lebanon and the
Middle East earlier, that summer, nevertheless were impressed by the effective
disposition of American power in these situations which they could identify
with those which could be operative in Southeast Asia. These demonstrations
of our military effectiveness and national purpose, especially in the suc-
cessful defense against the Chinese Communist operations directed at the off-
shore islands, worked to our advantage and enhanced Southeast Asian confidence
In our national power. The doubts and hesitations considered here, however,
have not been dissipated, and they remain as a significant shadow on the
image of American paver.
In the past several years, the Japanese have unmistakably revised down-
ward their estimation of US power relative to that of the Soviet Union but
there is no clear evidence that the Japanese consider either nation as hav-
ing a significant power advantage over the other.
Soviet space and rocketry achievements, economic progress and expanded
aid to underdeveloped areas, together with rapidly advancing Japanese tech-
nological and scientific capabilities, have ended the post-war era of almost
mystical awe of US achievements and inevitably produced a relative downgrading
in the Japanese estimate of US pre-eminence and power. Likewise, the recent
instability of Japanese popular sentiment toward relations with the US in
part reflects lessened confidence in the ability of the US to withstand and
counter Soviet pressures exerted around the Free World defense perimeter.
This was obviously one of the factors some Japanese had in the back of their
mind when speaking of the "changed atmosphere" in Japan after the U-2 affair
and the Summit debacle. Yet, even earlier, the Japanese press was wont to
speak of "the precarious military balance between East and West." And the
Japanese have evidently begun to doubt the capability of American power to
provide adequate protection to Japan in the event of conflict with the Sino-
Soviet bloc.
Such was the psychological context in which during May and June so many
Japanese apparently came to accept the claim of Bloc propaganda that the new
US-Japan Security Treaty would increase the danger of war to Japan, even
though they generally rejected the corollary claim that the treaty was
aggressive in nature.
At the same time, it should be noted that the diminution in confidence
in US power over the past several years has resulted in part from a faulty
assessment by many Japanese of some of the realities of world power relation-
ships, as well as from their tendency to project onto the international level
their doubts about the ability of domestic democratic forces to meet the
challenge from leftist forces and to withstand the encroachment of re-emerging
authoritarian elements.
Those are some of the trends that have worked to reduce the reservoir
of confidence in and respect for US power that had been built up through
popular experience with, and information about US technological, military
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and economic capabilities since 1944. However, as to the net effect of
these trends, the fact remains that neither the findings of public opinion
surveys since Sputnik I nor the output of Japanese "opinion leaders" have
produced a clear-cut statement as to which power the Japanese in general
feel is the stronger.
Unlike opinion in Southeast Asia, the Japanese do not yet regard Chinese
Communist power as a threat to their security. They have, however, begun to
regard with greater seriousness the growth of Chinese economic power as a
potential competitor in Southeast Asia.
LATIN AMERICA
The Evidence
It should be borne in mind that the materials available for assessment
of the Latin American view of the balance of power between the US and the
USSR are fragmentary and uneven in reliability. These sources are field
reporting, newspapers and periodicals, books, panphlets, radio commentaries,
returning US government officials, direct contacts while traveling in the
area, and a few public opinion surveys. Therefore, any inferences drawn
must for the most part be broad rather than detailed, suggestive rather than
definitive. Moreover, attitudes on many issues related to the formation of
the Latin American power images of the US and the USSR are still unformulated
and unstable. For example, the relative strength attributed by Latin
American opinion to an open society versus a controlled society for military
purposes cannot be accurately measured from material available, nor can the
Latin American opinion of such intangibles as moral strength, sense of
purpose, or the "best man" in the "may-the-best-man-win" contest.
The Psychological Setting
Before discussing Latin American attitudes toward the US-USSR balance
of power, the point should be made that Latin Americans generally regard
themselves as not immediately involved in the Cold War. A lack of apprecia-
tion of the true nature of international communism and of the threat that
it represents makes it difficult to convince Latin Americans of the neces-
sity for coordinated anti-Communist measures. Moreover, it must be observed
that domestic problems take priority over everything else in Latin American
preoccupations, and that international issues, including that of inter-
national communism, are more likely to attract substantial public attention
only when plainly seen as closely related to domestic considerations. Thus,
Latin America tends toward isolationism from rather than direct involvement
in the Cold War, despite its moral and political commitment to the West and
the recognition on the part of informed Latin Americans of their dependence
on the US for the defense of the hemisphere.
The Current Power Image of the US and the USSR
The Latin American power image of both the US and the USSR had improved
during the Second World War, but there was no question that in the minds of
Latin Americans the US held first place, especially subsequent to the .
development of the atomic bomb.
With the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb new images began to
develop which tended to polarize power between the US and the USSR. The
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23
superiority achieved by the US was maintained, but the "balance of terror"
concept began to creep in, tending to cut into the US overall superiority.
Polarized atomic power, in turn, promoted or deepened the feeling that weak
countries might better disengage themselves from entanglements in which they
could play no significant role. The true extent of "third positionism" in
Latin America was (and is) a matter of conjecture, but the scant military
support offered against communism during the Korean War demonstrated its
influence.
Nevertheless, there was a feeling of Latin American security within
"fortress America," lead by the still considerably superior power of the US.
Then came the first Sputnik and its apparent implications for missile warfare
capabilities. The effect of Soviet missile developments on Latin American
opinion has not been to downgrade the US power image as much as to raise the
Soviet. The new trend is rather a reversal of the post-World War II, pre-
Sputnik, trend: both power images have improved in relation to themselves,
but the Soviet image has improved much more.
The drama in this change for the better in certain aspects of the
Latin American image of the Soviet Union stemmed from the fact that up to
the time of Sputnik esteem for US accomplishments in the scientific and
military fields had been so high among Latin Americans that they considered
it virtually beyond belief that any power could challenge US supremacy in
these areas. Opinion surveys conducted in several Latin American cities
subsequent to Sputnik (November 1957 and May 1958) showed that many felt
that the Soviet lead in space development would be only temporary. Moreover,
these surveys revealed that leadership in space science was not necessarily
equated with leadership in science generally, and that many respondents
still had sufficient confidence in the power potential of the US to estimate
that the US rather than the USSR would emerge stronger at the end of a
twenty-five year period of peaceful competition.
Although survey data and other standards of measure are very scanty
and difficult to appraise, it seems that the image of the Soviet Union as a
power capable of outstanaing achievements in the field of military science
and technology is gaining bold. The USSR's ability to compete successfully
with the UB may thereby be becoming more believable. The results of a survey
conducted in Buenos Aires in February 1960 might be regarded as a minor
indicator of this trend. More respondents felt that the USSR had more
military power than the US, and when asked which country would emerge
stronger after twenty years of peaceful competition, more felt that the
USSR rather than the US would emerge as the stronger power.
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C. SELECTED SURVEY FINDINGS
1. U.S. Versus Soviet Faith and Dedication
a. The Current West European View
"Now a brief comparison on more personal qualities between
the Soviet people and those of the U.S.: Who do you think
has greater faith in their basic principles -- the Soviet
people or the people of the U.S.?"
"And who do you believe is willing to work harder to have
their country lead the other in national achievement?"
Greater Faith:
Great
Britain
West
Germany
France
Italy
Feb.
60
Feb.
'60
Feb.
'60
Feb.
'60
No. of cases
(67-37
(599)
(608)
(591)
Soviet people
39%
51%
44%
35%
People of U.S.
28
18
14
28
Both same
15
12
19
18
No opinion
18
19
23
19
100%
100%
100%
100%
Net Favorable
-11
-33
-30
-7
Willing to work harder:
Soviet people
62%
65%
67%
52%
People of U.S.
14
10
5
11
Both same
11
8
11
17
No opinion
13
17
17
20
100%
100%
100%
100%
Net Favorable
-48
-55
-62
-41
2. U.S. Versus Soviet Military Standing
a. The Current World View
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia
is ahead in total military strength at the present time?
Considerably ahead or only a little?"
Country Type of Survey
Date of Survey
Net Favorable
to U.S.
Viet-Nam
(College Students)
March, 1959 ,
32
Greece
(General Population)
November, 1958
20
Okinawa
(General Population)
December, 1958
14
Italy
(General Population)
February, 1960
6
Uruguay
(General Population)
June, 1958
4
West Germany
(General Population)
May-June, 1960
3
Japan
(General Population)
December, 1958
-1
Turkey
(College Students)
June, .,1958
-2
France
(General Population)
May, 1960
-15
Buenos Aires, Argentina
(General Population)
February, 1960
-21
Norway
(General Population)
June, 1960
-30
Great Britain
(General Population)
May, 1960
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b. The West European Trend
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is
ahead in total military strength at the present time?
Considerably ahead or only a little?"
Great Britain
Feb. May Nov.
v60 '60 '57
(615) (1150) (813)
Noy,
157
Oct.
'58
No. of cases
(05)
(-617
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
U.S. a little ahead
15
19
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
31
22
Russia considerably
ahead
19
19
Both equal (Vol.)
6
8
No opinion
25
25
100%
100%
Net U.S. ahead
-31
-15
0-0645%)?,16%
) )141. 22
) ) 17
)59 )55
) ) 6
4 5 20
22 28 19
100% 100% 100%
-44 -43 15
No. of cases
France
Nov.
'57
(857
Oct. Feb.
'58 '60
May
'60
(UT)
(608)
(1000)
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
U.S. a little ahead
6%
11
3%
16
)16%
)
)%25%
)
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
13
21
)
)
Russia considerably
)37%
)40
ahead
12
8
1
,
)
Both equal (Vol.)
20
34
16
No opinion
38
18
31
35
100%
100%
100%
100%
Net U.S. ahead
-8
-10
-21
-15
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Nov.
'57 '58 '59 '59 '60
(807) (635) (E-917) CEEY (591)
West Germany
Norway
Oct.
'58
Feb.
'60
May-
June
'60
Nov.
'57
June
"60
(1739)
(599)
(1010)
(845)
(1020)
9%
)22%
?26%
))3 %
))15%
15
)
)
16
)
)
)
)
)47
)23
)31
)45
7
)
)
)
)
22
8
16
11
17
31
23
35
23
23
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
1
-25
3
4
-30
Italy
Oct. Nov.
Dec.
Feb.
17% 13% 16%
17
17 25 17
13 14 11
9 9 7
23 22 24
21 17 25
100% 100% 100%
12; 15 15
18%38%
18
)--""
10
)
)32
8
)
26
5
20
25
100%
100%
18
6
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3. U.S. Versus Soviet Scientific Standing
a. The Current World View
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or
Country
Russia is ahead in scientific development at the
present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"
Net Favorable
Type of Survey Date of Survey to U.S.
Philippines
Turkey
Greece
(General Population)
(College Students)
(General Population)
March, 1959
June, 1958
November, 1958
48
29
23
West Germany
(General Population)
February, 1960
18
Uruguay
(General Population)
June, 1958
12
Philippines
(College Students)
August, 1958
12
Italy
(General Population)
February, 1960
7
Viet-Nam
(College Students)
March, 1959
0
Norway
(General Population)
November, 1957
-12
Mexico
(General Population
March, 1958
-13
Mexico City)
India
(General literate
Population)
August, 1958
-16
Japan
(General Population)
December, 1958
-17
Buenos Aires,
Argentina
(General Population)
February, 1960
-25
Okinawa
(General Population)
December, 1958
-26
Great Britain
(General Population)
April, 1960
-29
France
(General Population)
February, 1960
-40
Nigeria
(University Students)
February, 1959
-46
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-27-
The West European Trend
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or
Russia is ahead in scientific development at the
present time/ Considerably ahead or only a little?"
Great Britain West Germany Norway
Nov. Oct. Feb. Apr. Nov. , Oct., Feb. Nov.
'57
'58
'60 '60
'57 '58
'60
'57
No. of cases
(800)
(587)
(Fai) (1357
CgriT (1175)
(6111)
(845)
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
7%
17%
)
U.S. a little ahead
13
26
)25%
Russia a little ahead of
U.S.
39
23
)
Russia considerably ahead
19
7
)58
Both equal (Vol.)
6
12
4
Eo opinion
16
15
13
100%
100%
No%
Net U.S. ahead
-38
13
-33
France
Nov.
Oct.
Feb.
No, of cases
'57
(EF)
'58
(57)-
U.S. considerably ahead
4%
5%
of Russia
7
15
U.S. a little ahead
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
29
21
Russia considerably ahead
20
13
Both equal (Vol.)
16
33
No opinion
.24._
_II_
100%
100%
Net U.S. ahead
-38
-14
'60
60157
)
)58
9
15
100%
-40
)
)23%
)
)52
6
_12_
100%
-29
14%
22
27
5
15
17
15%
29
19
4
19
14
)
)45%
)
)27
9
19
12%
19
34
9
14
12
100%
4
100%
21
100%
18
No%
-12
Italy
Nov.
'57
Oct.
'58
Apr.
'59
Nov.
'59
(E.57
-Dec.
-'59
Feb.
'60
(757
(807)
(77)
(076)
(3.36)
12%
15%
10%
11%
11%
)
11
18
16
9
9
)40%
24
16
15
27
26
)
13
14
13
18
16
)33
21
21
26
17
21
4
19
16
20
18
17
23
100%
no%
l00%
100%
100%
100%
-14
3
-2
-25
-22
7
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4. U.S. Versus Soviet Standim in Space Development
a. The Current World View
"All things considered, which country do you think is
ahead in space developments at the present time --
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"
Country
and Date
Number
of cases
U.S.
Ahead
U.S.S.R.
Ahead
Neither
Ahead
No
Opinion
Net
Favorable
West Germany
(May-June '60)
(1010)
11%
53%
12%
24%
-42
Great Britain
(July '60)
( 947)
10
58
4
28
-48
India - 4 Major Cities
(August '58)
( 724)
7
58
9
26
-51
Turkish Students
(June '58)
( 230)
7
67
20
6
-60
Norway
(June ?60)
(1020)
7
71
12
10
-64
Italy
(February '60)
(1170)
11
75
3
11
-64
France
(May '60)
(1000)
7
74
19
-67
b. The West European Trend
No. of cases
"All things considered, which country do you think is
ahead in space developments at the present time --
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"
Great Britain
Feb. Apr. May July
'60 '60 160 '60
(1221) (1100) (1150) 047T
U.S. ahead 5%
U.S.S.R. ahead 84
Neither ahead (Vol.) 2
No opinion 9
100%
Net U.S. ahead
11% 7% 10%
64 81 58
5 4 4
20 8 28
100% 100% 100%
-79 -53 -74 -48
France
Feb. May
'60 '60
(1228) (1000)
2% 7%
85
74
3
10
19
100%
100%
-83
-67
West Germany
Italy
Norway
June
'60
Feb.
'60
May-June
'60
Feb.
'60
No. of cases
(1222)
(1010)
(1170)
(1020)
U.S. ahead
7%
11%
11%
7%
U.S.S.R. ahead
77
53
75
71
Neither ahead (Vol.)
3
12
3
12
No opinion
13
24
11
10
100%
100%
100%
' 100%
Net U.S. ahead
-70
-42
-64
-64
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c. The Current West European Desire
"Going back to space developments for a moment, what
Would be best, in your opinion -7- for the U.S. to be
ahead in space developments, the U.B0S.R, to be ahead,
or neither to be ahead? How important do you think
this is -- very important or not so important?"
No. of cases
Great West
Britain Germany France Italy
Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb.
'60 '60 160 '60
((W) (62-5) cou (579)
27%),. 20%),? 20)36
11 ).-- 5 r, 8 )
* ) * 4 ) L 10)13
-) 2) w 3)
32 )47 31 )56 25 )31
15)" 25) 6)
15 13 20
100% 100% 100%
Prefer U.S. ahead - very important
Prefer U.S. ahead - not so important
33%)43
10 )
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - very important
1)
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - not so important
3
2)
Prefer neither ahead - very important
32
)?
Prefer neither ahead - not so important
12
)""
No opinion
10
100%
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-30-
5. U.S. Versus Soviet (Economic) Strength 25 Years Hence
The Current World View
"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition
without war for the next twenty or twenty-live years,
which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"
Country
and Date
Number
of cases
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
Both
Equal
No
Opinion
Net
Favorable
Philippines Students
(Aug. '58
( 887)
50%
9%
24%
17%
41
Philippines
,
(March '59)
(1609)
42
2
8
48
40
Netherlands
(April '56)
( 825)
44
13
16
27
31
Uruguay
(April '59)
(1612)
36
15
8
41
21
Rio de Janeiro
(May '58)
( 200)
39
19
8
V34
20
Vietnamese Students
(Feb. & Mar. '59)
( 462)
27
7
22
44
20
Greece
(Nov. '58)
(1207)
30
12
8
50
18
Norway
(Nov. '57)
( 845)
38
23
18
21
15
Japan
(Dec. '58)
( 676)
23
17
6
54
6
Mexico City
(May '58)
( 200)
45
40
3
12
Okinawa
(Dec. '58)
( 577)
25
21
5
49
4
West Germany
(Feb. '60)
( 599)
29
29
19
23
0
Italy
(Feb. '60)
( 591)
22
24
32
22
-2
Buenos Aires
(Feb. '60)
( 560)
19
32
23
26
-13
India
(Mid May-Aug. '58)
( 724)
17
35
17
31
-18
Great Britain
(Feb. '60)
( 613)
25
44
10
21
-19
Turkish Students
(June '58)
( 230)
18
43
30
9
-25
France
(Feb. '60)
( 608)
7
35
25
33
-28
Arab Students
(Dec. 1, '57 &
Jan. 7, '58)
( 274)
8
46
16
.30
-38
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b. The West European Trend
"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition
without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years,
which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"
No. of cases
Great Britain
West Germany Norway
Apr. Nov. Oct. Nov. Feb.
'56 '57 '58 '59 '60
Apr. Nov. Oct. Nov. Dec. Feb.
'56 '57 '58 '59 '59 '60
Nov.
'57
(5747
(806)(800)(l198)
(613)
(865)(813)(1195)(1258) (599)
U.S.
35% 37% 36%
25%
37% .31% 38% 36% 29%
38%
U.S.S.R.
25 34 34
NA 44
22 21 21 2Q NA 29
23
Both equally strong(Vol.)
15 11 11
10
14 24 25 19 19
18
No opinion
25 18 19
21
27 24 lb 25 23
21
100% 100% 100%
100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100%
Net U.S. stronger
10 3 2
-19
15 10 17 16 0
15
France
Italy
No. of cases .
(800)(802)(1220)
(608)
(911)(807)(1272) (691)(650)(591)
U.S.
lo% 9% 14%
7%
25% 28% 29% 27% 31% 22%
U.S.S.R.
21 20 24
NA 35
14 14 25 19 16 24
Both equally strong(Vol.)
14 22 30
25
26 34 27 23 28 32
No opinion
55 49 32
33
35 24 19 31 25 22
100% 100% 100%
100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Net U.S. stronger
-11 -11 -10
-28
11 14 4 8 15 -2
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D. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT IRI REPORTS PERTAINING TO US-USSR STANDING
R-2-60:
R-22-60:
R-25-60:
R-27-60:
R-47-60:
RN-19-60:
RN-20-60:
RN-22-60:
The Impact of President Eisenhower's 11-Nation Tour on
World Opinion: An Assessment
U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology in Foreign Public
Opinion
Western European Public Reaction to Current Disarmament and
Test Ban Talks
The Free World's image of the Soviet Union: A Tentative
Appraisal
Latin American Opinion on U.S. Economic Policies and Private
Investment
Public Opinion Abroad and U.S. and Soviet Science and
Technology
pioneer V and Tiros I: A Summary of Free World Reaction
Reaction to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks
RN-25-60: Free World Reactions to Selected International Issues
RN-28-60: Free World Reactions to President Eisenhower's Far Eastern Trip
414-114HHHHI4HHHHHE-X?
FE-23-60:
BE-6-60:
WE-61-60:
WE-62-60:
WE-63-60:
wE-64-60:
wE-65-60:
wE-66-60:
WE-67-60:
The Comparative Image of the U.S. Versus the Communist Powers
Among Philippine University Students
Free World Versus Communist Bloc Standing in the Four Major
-Cities of India
The Impact of the Current Cold-War Detente Upon Trends in
U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings
West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris
Summit Conference. I. General Standing of the U.S. Versus the
U.S.S.R. in an Atmosphere of Detente
West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris
Summit Conference. II. U.S. or U.S.S.R. The Wave of the Future?
Post-Summit Trends in British and French Opinion of the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
Post-Summit Trends in West German Opinion of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.
Post-Summit Trends in Norwegian Qpinion of the U.S. and the
British Views on U.S. vs U.S.S.R. Standing on Specific
Aspects of Space Achievement
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MEMUMRRUUM run: AD/RE
Mr. Cooper
'Don't you think that the thrust of this
should be included in the new Estimate of the
World Situation? However, intangible, it is a
+ key factcr in the changing power balance. Bill
Morell is giving it considerable play in his
power study.
omer
13 October 1960
(DATE)
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STAT
(47)
/,/: . , /1
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,I' ' i -
t
$
FREE WORLD V
S OF
SECRES7
US-USSR POWER BALANCE
R-54-60 August 29, 1960
This report is not a statement of USIA policy.
SECRET
,/
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TABU _OF C0,11111116
Foreword
A. CLMSAL TUBS AID BIOILIGETS- ? 1
1.MOOIONAL MUMS-
Western tarcgs
4
Near test and South Asia:
Arab States 7
Orsocep Turkey and Iran 9
South Asia 12
Africa 14
Far last
17
Southeast Asism 18
Japan? . 21
Latin America 22
C. Mt= WRVS! TIMM
US Versus soviet Faith and Dedication 24
US Versus Soviet Military Standing. 24
OS Versus Soviet Scientific Standing 26
US Versus Soviet Standing in Space Develapmant- 28
ttS Versus Soviet (canomie) Strength 25 Years lance 30
D. sumummoommr OF MOUT VI MOATS PI:STU:MG TO
US-USSR ElfAIDING- 32
Siterger
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FORICWORD
This report, origSnaily requested as an informal
contribution to a government study, is being issued in
this series as of general interest to the Agency.
It comprises a summary of general trends and high-
lights; a series of regional discussions of the comera..
tive power images held; and summary tabulations of data
from available public opinion surveys that have a algal-
ficant relation to aspects of the power confrontation.
There is also appended a list of recent IRI reports
bearing on the subject.
No uniformity of Approach has been etteepted in
the regional sections of the report, in view of the
diversity of factors that are locally active in shaping
impressions of US and Soviet power, and regional dis..
parities in the nature and.avellability of evidence
regarding opinions and attitudes. What has been sought
in these sections is to permit the issues to be seen
within the context of regional history, preoccupations,
and concerns.
It should be borne in mind that both the nature of
the questions at issue, and the nature and fregmentari-
ness of the evidence available, mean that overall analysis
of foreign views on relative US-USSR power is necessarily
generalized and tentative. As the report suggests, the
nature of power itself, as it is immured by foreign
opinion, la in the course of evolution, and the circum-
stances in which power would be applied are not seen as
a constant by any audience.
t3ECRIT
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FROB woma VflWS 0
SEC
A. OEREETRENDSJINDartanzenTs
1. ThWhcon t of national over in internatonai relations is currently
undergoing redefinition in the public mind. In this process, the elements that
constitute power, the ways in which power is appliedl and the context in which
power is envisaged and assessed., are all being significantly revised and ex.
tended. In this contimainig flux, no clear and controlling concept, and no
final verdict on power-in.being or on relative power positions holds decisive
mow, although a number of the factors that influence popular judgments can
be discerned, as well as the current general direction of those judgments.
2. Current views of relative US-USSR over have changed sharply since
thl advent of the first Sputnik an e eve opment of intercontinental missile
capabilities. Prior to these events, prevalent opinion was that the US enjoyed
a clear preptinderance of power. The current consensus would appear to be that
the USSR now enjoys a rough but effective equivalence in strength overall.
Behind In some fields, ahead in others the USSR is seen as capable of offering
a credible competitive challenge to the US in the major arenas of international
rivalry.
3. The trend is adverse to the US; despite some fluctuations, and area
variations, iepreseione of or gains seem to be rifling
in public opinion rather than falling. Anticipations of *what the trend in
power will be popular 'estimates of which nation will emerge generally
strongest in a. peaceful competition over the next fey decades in most
available indicators favor the USSR.
4. In the critical areas of military at and ace achievements
and a rats of economic growth capable of supportinga hi.. level,
fpular opinion En most West European countries, presumably the at informed
and closely linked by interest and history, believes the US to be inferior
to the USSR, although more sophisticated opinion may perceive a rough balance.
In these specific fields, too, the trend is adverse. Elsewhere, most opinion
is divided on militar7 strength, with the :predominant belief apparent that a
nuclear stalemateprevaile. 106wever, in almost all areas, expectations appear
to be that the USSR will achieve military superiority, although there is
probably no clear concept of What this superiority will consist of, or that
its significance will be.
5. In most parts of the world, the USSR lieved to lead the US
in space achievements. /his impresaion, stemming from the first Sputnik and
strengthened by its aftermath, appears to have sometimes a durabilitor
impervious to fact, sometimes a volatility suggesting that it could be
readily modified by sensational developments. Given the present capabilities
of both sides, it is prdbable that the most favorable verdict the US can
hope to-elicit on its space perfarmance will be the expectation of a see-saw
pattern.
6. VirtuaL4 without exception, world
USSR has made tremendotui economic
much, in fae that the gepbetween it and the acknowledged
to have the world's most powerful economy, is rapidly being closed. con.
current with the widely held view that the USSR's current rate of economic
* The reader shoul& be cautioned that this assessment does not include
the reactions to the Soviet Union's latent triumph the successful
recovery of its "second cosmic space ship" with its dog passengers.
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growth is substantially higher than tht of the US, is the general tendency
even in highly industrialieed Western EUrope to suspect that within the
foreseeable future the USSR might even eurpass the US in overall economic
strength.
7-a ar ace of
seats" obtains
appears to vi
relative US?USSR power. it does not necessarily conceive U -USSR strength
as equa3, it is based rather on the 'view that no margin of superiority is
likely to be decisive in a nuclear war, since the side that initiated major
hostilities would incur unaccpptable retaliatory damage in turn. This view
is less a judgment on ratios of strength than a belief that etrength is held
/ in an equilibrium of deterrence, "the balance of terror." The coneept of
ouch a deadlock seems to have rational and emotional attractiveness to
foreign audiences: (1) Such a military stalemate appears to lessen the
danger that either side would deliberately resort to force and is thus wish..
fully welcomed; (2) A balance of this kind appears to hold for third powers
the prospect that their own international influence could assume expanded,
perhaps decisive, weight; (3) it permits readier maintenance or assurantion
of neutralist positions by eliminating the attraction of a possible victor -
it is *osier to be neutral it no one is going to win.
8. A nuclear atalemete carries for ? the ;'Ueaton that
.If major modern
ts are seen as unel. Is to enforce settleeant of the USA/SSR
competition, greater weight end decisiveness are given to other aspects of
strength -- on the one hand, the political, economic, psychological, and
ideological facets of a peaceful international ccepetition; on the other,
the ability successfully to fight a geographically United war, a var with
conventional weapons, or to intervene forcibly (directly or indirectly) in
a local situation.
9. Thee eaxe o b a , ..oderanceor beliet that the USSR
rather than wcul win a w eentiona1. war there appears uncertainty
whether be confined to local areas or conventional weapons. In 1
Western Europe opinion seems war between the ma3or
powers woad b; a nuclear war, and could not be loelisedj in areas where
the interests of the greater powers do not appear so critically or manifestly
engaged, the possibility of local and limited wars seems to have wider
acceptance.
a. Widespread belief that the Soviets lead in space achieve-
d that these can be equated directly with military capability, end
er extent with overall scientific and technical development and
efficacy of the Soviet system.
b. The greatly expanded international presence of the USSR,
has appeared in recent years to be exerting influence and leverage
which had hitherto been denied it or where it had hitherto been
inactive.
0. The confident tone and aggressive posture of the USSR,
which has appeared to be speporing and acting firm assumed strength. This
assulaption has apparently been lent credibility less by Soviet propaganda
efforts than by concrete Soviet actions or successes, and, by the apparent
eorroboration given Soviet claims by Western reaction. US expressions of
public and official concern regarding the tihellenge or Soviet power appear
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SIZRZT
? 3..
to have been a significant element in validating the Soviet posture.
d.Doubts that the VS has succeeded in effectively organising
and focussing the resources of the Western alliance, or that the US has
shown itself fully effective in bring its own power to 'bear on its Objectives.
e. Soviet foreign economic programs, that despite their
comparatively restricted else have had high impact and visibility, through
selective deployment and timing for wawa effect; these have helped to
create the imago of &productive and accelerating Soviet econogr, especially
in underdeveloped areas.
S. An impression of Soviet ruthlessness and fixity of purpose,
combined with the impression that the Soviet people have greater faith in
their principles and are willing to work harder, than the people of the
VS. This view hiLl not served to raise USSR in general esteem over the VS,
nor can it be equated with admiration for Communist institutions or doctrine,
but presumably contributes to raising popular estimetas of overall Soviet
capabilities.
g. In Asia particularly, the belief that Communist Chine, with
its massive population, has shown tremendous economic growth and dynamism
makes it clear a substantial increment to CommadAt bloc strength .. a
belief qualified, probably, by the sense that this strength is currently
more potential than actual, auditor some uncertsint-latout the ultimate
correspondence of Communist Chinese and Soviet interests. In much of the
Far last (notably excluding Japan) the impact of Soviet power is still
relatively slight; Communist China is the basic power against which the US
is measured in Southeast Asia, and Soviet power is sometimes also viewed
as a force to be measured against that of Communist China.
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ev--7"?
6, R676,%2A/..92,
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WNSTNRS FUNOrN
Introduction
The question "Now to Western Idropeans currently rank the United States
and the Soviet Union on the international balance of power scale in view of
their worldwide rivalry?" is net easily answered for two major reasons -
both of which are highly subjective in character.
The first difficulty ii. inherent in the initisl and personal decision
regarding the relative weight to be assigned to each of the three major
sectors of opinion; to political opinion as revealed in official government
policy parliamentary debates and public political speeches; newspaper opinion
as reflected in editorials and feature eommentaries; and man-in-the-street
opinion as indicated by public opinion surveys. Rowever, given the kind of
democratic political society that prevails throughout most of Western Nampa,
this appraisal arbitrarily assumes that political opinion is the most
important, folloved fairly closely by press opinion and at some considerable
distance by man-in..theiastrest opinion.
The second major difficulty stems from the lack of any commonly agreed
on current yardsticks for measuring the relative power-standing vis-a-vis
each other of such super-states as the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although there is a fairly firm consensus as to what constitutes international
power in the abstract -- military strength, economic slight, scientiflo.i.
technological skill and moral stature there is no corresponding agreement
as to the relative importance of those various power...components within the
context of the Current US-USSM worldwide rivalry For basic to any meaning.
Au and realistic ordering is the subjective determination as to Whether
this rivalry will remain peaceful -... i.e., confined to the struggle for the
mind* and stomachs of mankind -- or whether it will eventually erupt into
nuclear war. In either event, this appraisal again arbitrarily assumes that
Western Itropean opinion regards military strength -.4. 'Who can beat !whom?"
and the will to use it as the acid tests of power in the current scientific
nuclear-missiles**, followed fairly closely by economic might =deans
considerable distance by moral stature.
the Pre-Zeutnik lose: Unchallenged US Dominance
From the vantage point of the present, it seems clear that "Sputnik I"
and the cumulative American reaction to its manifold implications represent
a major water-shed in the Western Nuropean evaluation of the relative power
standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. For, prior to the advent
of the space or missile ago in October 1957, few NeSeern &trope:no sees to
have entertained any real doubts about American military, scientific, meonomic
and moral superiority vis-a...vis the USSR and the American intention of using
this seperiortfor for the general good of mankind -- at least for mankind in
the free world.
The fact that the Uhited States could expose the Soviet Union to nuclear
destruction while the latter could not effectively retaliate in kind -- the
basis of the Dulles "massive retaliation" doctrine was universally regarded
as concrete evidence of American military superiority. A, superiority, more-
over, which most Western Stropeani believed was implicitly aelmowledged by
the Soviet Union itself. For, following the formation in 1949 of the North
AtAantic defense system based on US nuclear might, there were no further
direct Soviet challengee to the territorial etatus_quo of Western ftrope.
SECANT i
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The fact that the United States had the highest standard, of Uvir2g of
any nation In the world was viewed as indisputiible proof of American economic
superiority. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly demonstratedIarmar
ease with which the United States carried the tremendous burden of the postwar
economic reconstruction of Western Europe the Marshall Plan and furnished
Increasing amounts of economic and technical assistance to other needy region*.
The fact that on virtually all levels of American society there was mass
ownership of products of American acientittechnolea3. ingenuity -... cars,
radios, television sets,refrigeratomvacuumoless;?eanwashing machines,
etc. -0. was generally regarded as Incontrovertible proof of the validity of
the traditional picture of American scientific-technologieal pre.oeminence,
A superiority, moreover, which had been clearly demonstrated in the develop-
ment of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and in the ream; of delivering them to
their intended targets.
The fact that the United States was an open and democratic soctety
one which was clearly dedicated to principle to the Western European liberal
ideal of individual freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity -- vas
generally conAidered to be strong evidence of the moral superiority of
American society vis-a-vis its dictatorial and mad Soviet counterpart.
A superiority, moreover, which wax clearly manifested in American goodwill
and benevolence towards most nations in the difficult postwar era and in
Its assumption of the unsolicited role of defender of the free world against
the march of international communism.
Ths Post4Outaik taisMat US Dmalaeuee....8edellk....%M.4201
Under the cumulative impact of Soviet spectacular "firsts" in rocket
developments and the continuing chorus of sharp American aelf-criticiem
most Western Europeans have been shocked into a drastic end perhaps
excessive -- revision of theirpre..nputnik image of general Soviet inferi
ority to the United States. Accompanying this re...evaluation of the USSR as
a dynamic and powerful milltary..economic..and..scientlfic complex has been a
concomitant re....exatleation of the continuing validity of the pre...sputnik
image of invincible Americsnpower and unquestioned, world dominance.
Currently, most Western Europeans are convinced that the balance 'of
lijai7 power no longer favors the United States as it formerly did. Per,
n tieir opinion, the Soviet leapfrog development of a nuclear interconti-
nental ballistic missile has cancelled out the pre-sputnik American advantage
of being able to rain nuclear destruction upon the Soviet Union while being
virtually immune to a similar Soviet attack.
While sophisticated political end press opinion tenth; to regard the ?
trent unitary situation as one of nuclear stalemate in which neither of
the two super-powers has any material advantage over the other, the more
impreSeionletic popular opinion has seemingly concluded from Soviet boasts.
of superiority and American admissions of a temporary "missile gap" that
the United States is not only currently militarily Ulterior to the USSR, but
will continue to be go for the next decade or two as well. Nevertheless,
popular opinion is in oomplete accord with sophisticated opinion in holding
that a major war between the US sod the USSR is most unlikely in the present
circumstances beeause) regardless of their relative military strengths, each
Still has the capability of inflicting terrible destruction upon the other.
In short, regardless of differences of opinion about the relative military
strengths of the world's two super...states, there Is universel acceptance
of the Churdhillian thesis that "mutuality of terror" is *major deterrent
to war in the nuclear age.
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,
sEcBsT
6
,
Although convinced that the Soviet Uhion's recent success in redressing
the military balance vis-ar.vis the United States has paradoxically reduced the
danger that either protagonist woad deliberately resort toner. es a means of
resolving their differences, Western European opinion at least on the more
sophisticated political and press levels is currently disturbed by two
possible (albeit contradictory) implications of the post-eputnik military
situation. First, the possibility of war by miscalculation -- that is, the
fear that ear might inadvertently result fras a Soviet miscalculation as to
how far it can exploit the current nuclear stalemate for the attainment of
limited Objectives, such as the takeover of West Berlin, for instance. And
second, the possibility that "Western Europe could no longer reckon uncondi.
tionally Won the protection of America's atomic shield in the event of
limited conflicts" -- that is, the tear that the United States might consider
the possible nuclear destruction of an American city (such as New 'fork or
Chicago or Los Angeles) as too high e price to pay for resolutely Mooing
a limited Soviet aggression, such as the takeover of West Berlin or Helsinki
for example.
While Western European opinion still subscribes to the view that the
United States is indubitably the world's economic leader and leagues ahead
of the Soviet Union, Its olosest rival, of late &meaning doubts
particularly on the more sophisticated politica *napless levels -- have
developed about the continuing supremacy of the American economy. Contri-
buting to these growing reservations have been four major developments.
First, the general agreement that the Soviet Union's boasts of
tremendous economic strides in the postwar era have a firm foundation in
fact, as evidenced by such objective standards as the visible improvement in
its level of living, its deep and continuing penetration of the aluminum,
asbestos and oil export market? (to mention just a few) and its Increasing
foreign aid programs such as the aMbitious Aswan Dem project on the Nile.
Second, the widespread currency and authenticity that American reports, both
official and private, have given to the USSR's claim that its economy is
growing at an appreciably faster rate than that of the Uhited States and that
the gap between the two is being rapidly closed -- a claim which Western
EUropeans find easy to accept (even without American confirmation) in view
of their own superior rite of economic growth over the past decade. Third,
the visible faltering of the American economy on at least four major occasions
in the past fifteen years, most particularly the 1957-58 recession and the
current economic difficulties. And fourth, the apparent concern of the
United States -- as indicated by its current exports drive and sponsorship
of the still*to.be*born Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
that it can no longer singlehandedly carry the increasing burden of
economic assistance to the developing nations of the world in direct
competition with the USSR.
The pre-sputakWeetern European image of the United States as the
lending scientific-teobnological nation in tWeimrldhsa likewise been
sharply eroded of late under the cumulative Impact of the Soviet Union's
spectacular successes with outerapece satellites largely because of the
widespread layman's tendency to equate them with a high degree of scientific-
technological attainment in general. Although the almost universal accept-
ance of Soviet superiority in rocketry has resulted in an acrose..the?board
upgrading of Soviet science and teehnology, Western European opinion is
still inclined to believe that the United States leads the USSR in the
application of science for the genera welfare or mankind. In addition, the
more sophisticated opinion holds that American outerspace research, while
less spectacular than its Soviet counterpart, Is contributing more to man's
baste scientific knowledge and eventual control of outeraPace-
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,7
While the moral stature of the United States as a nation dedicated to
freedom and libi75-iemains as high as ever, a nuiher of developments have
combined of late to induce in Western Xuropean opinion 44a particularly an the
sophisticated political and press levels increasing doibts about the
continuing American ability to provide the kind of imaginative and responsive
leadership required by changing world conditions, such as the shift in Soviet
strategy from the crude "cold war" philosophy of Stalin to the more subtle
challeoge posed by Shrushchev's "peaceful but coepetitive coexistence"
philosophy.
Ahighly selective listing of the mejor events leading to this Western
Bemoan questioning of kserican leadership during the past tvo.and.a-half
years would of necessity include the following: the alleged tardy hear/can
recognition of the military and psychological challenge posed by the Soviet
Union's spectacular series of "firsts" in outerspace ilevalcsmmonts; the
alleged hiatuses in the conduct of American foreign policy occasioned by
internal bickering, the illness of high US officials and elections; the
alleged amoboudshbunglinglitich leoid to the Soviet torpedoing of the much-
bereldediparis summit conference and the Geneva disarmament talks; the
alleged failure to prevent the division of Western Swope into tiro poten-
tially rival economic grompinge; and the alleged inability of the Eisenhower
adsdatistration to exercise effective and unified control over the complex
goveromental machinery concerned with foreign affairs.
Conclusions
Three major conclusions are suggested by the preceding analysis of
current Western lUropean opinion of the relative power standing of the
United States and the Soviet Union. First, that the past few years have
witnessed a sharp deterioration in the pre-sputnikWhetern &trope= image of
American military, economic, scientific and morel superiority vis-a-vis the
4 / USSR. Second, that during this same period Western Sumo= opinionorbes
drastically revised its yr...sputnik view of the USSR as a generally backward
nation to the current image of a modern dynamic and powerful military-
economlomand..scientific complex one, moreover, 'which has already taken
giant strides towards redressing the balance with the United States. And
third, that Western European opinion is inclined to the "safe" view that
the United States and the MI will become progressively more equal in
overall strength over the course of time, with neither having any appreeiable
military or economic or scientific advantage over the other.
REAR MART AID SOUTH ASIA
Arab States
Introducticn
Given the absence of survey data for the Arab eountries, any assessment
of Arab opinion mutt be derived wholly from the radio and press and from
private expressions of opinion, including those of officials -- the latter
often more rational and moderate than that publicly expressed. Recognition
must be given to the Arabs' volatile nature snd subjective outlook through
which events are meaawred in extreme terms according to the interests of
the Arab "nation" and reactions shaped by recent history: the continuing
existence of Israel, the intense bias against "Western imperialism," and the
commitment of Soviet bloc political, military, ani economic import to th4q
Arab world.
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Leadership,
Arab opinion in recent months has tended to view the United States as a
nation lacreasiagly isolated and declining in prestige primarily because of
"mistekea" policies and softflictine pressures within American society. There
has been same contrast, however, between private and pUbliely expressed
Vopinion with the latter denouseing o policies in extreme terms under
government direction in the came of the 1/AR (because of dependence on
Soviet *commie and military aid) and in other areas lapelled by a deSire
to humiliate the US because of the Israeli issue. While private Arab opinion
largely blamed the Soviet Union for the canvas of the Summit meeting, US
judgment on the handling of the U-2 flight was seriously questioned. (The
revelation of such flights occurring over a four-year period bad the
paradoxical effect of enhancing American military capability in Arab eyes,
r?i howeverr lectause of Israel, Arabs have tended to viev American policy*
making as "confused" and subordinated to "Zionism, imperialism, and motion-
al* inn:emcee" Western demoeragy in this respect tends to be regarded
as deeedent. The events in Korea, Turkey, Japan, ani Cabs have been inter.i
preted both as a detest for America in supporting "unpopular" regimes (not
neeessarily dictatorships) and as an overwhelming vindication of Arab
beliefs concerang military pasts and bases. ftelusive of the Commmnist
pre's, there has been little effort in this context to vindicate Soviet
policy, hut Arab private opinlea credits the USSR with having emerged in a
stronger position. Arabs, however, have derided VS statements concerning
Communists in Cuba and Joan as another reflection of the US "failure" to
reoognise the force of nationalism. Bose press accounts noted that the
Japanese wen not anti-American but opposed to allitarf bases as "proved" by
the favorable reception given Risenhower in India.
There are indisatiens that some Arab opinion at least tends to credit
Soviet military power -- as measured by the effect of its retaliatory throats
with having induced the violent Japanese reaction and more reeently, with
having "frustrated" US designs on the Congo. It is libely that, stile frma
Upsets of policy and leadership, most Arabs tend to equate the US and the
USSR in terms of overall power admitting an American edge in economic strength.
Thi. rough equation gives rise to the resentfal tear that ? detente --
*Milting the Near Nast and in which Arabs will mot be consulted -- may at
some time take place. In this narrow context, Arabs tended to look privately
upon the Summit collapse with favor. Most Arabs now hope that neutral forces
will play ? larger role for the purpose of protecting sueh third party
interests and taking advantage of Ameriean "defeats."
MMlitary
Arabs tend to regard the US and the USSR as about even in available
military strength but most would probably credit America with greeter
military sagebility gives her iseperior economic resources. They would re-
Nara the West today as the probable winner of a hot war and would look with
alarm at the prospect of being aligned on the Soviet side in such a tontliet
at the present time. Most informed Arabs were privately pleased with the
knowledge that the 1J-2 flights; had taken plasm for four years and regarded
the V-2 as a first-class technisal ashievement while expressing some
skeptleism about Soviet militery defenses. They also expressed admiration
for the flights as a reflection of American "toughness." Arabs are fling
aware of the nuclear capability of both powers end tend to feel that a
total conflict (inevitably involving the Middle lest) is more likely than
a limitei var. (The Summit collapse apparently gave rise to genuine fears
In this regard.) Informed Arab* are also aware of the growing strength of
the Soviet economy and its military strength as measured by the increasing
gimlet threats to Wester, military installetions in the Middle and Tar
SZCNIT
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East, threats to which Arabs have given at least se credence in the cases
of Suez, *Upon; end the Congo.
Alliance System
Thera has been no change in the deep-'seated Arab opposition to military
alliances and foreiem, bases. Recent events in 4epan and the Congo for example,
have intensified and, in Arab eyes vindicated such opposition with the result
that Arabs would like to believe tat the Western base system is collapsing
They have attributed the weakening of elliances first to local opposition
and secondarily to the U-2 affair and increasing Soviet pressure against the
host coontriee. There appears to be no firm evidence that they equate this
belief with a net decline in American military power. they contend privately
and publicly, however, that Ugopxestige and influence have declined and
that the combined power of neutral nations will fill the vacuum.
Scientific
Arabs probably rate the US ahead of the USSR in overall scientific and
technological achievement thus retaining the conventional view of American
pre-eminence in these fields and bearing in mind the American lead in
nuclear developments and application, and the widely recognized superior
economic power of the United States. Soviet space achievements neverthe
less have had a spectacular and generally favorable impact but the initial
Arab impression of a Soviet lead in this narrower field may have been modi.
fled so as to view both powers as about even. It is probable that mmli
Arabs tend to link space accomplishments with military capability and make
if little differentiation between scientific, military, orpropsganda) apace
ventures.
Economic
Most in rmed Arabs are aware of American economic superiority relative
to the USSR and have a marked admiration for the US standard of living,
mop-Wag Soviet drembeeks in the latter respect. However, the massive
economic aid given by the Bloc to the UAR and Iraq during a period of ex-
treme anti-Western feeling had the effect of portraying Moscow as "the
greatest friend of the Arabs." This local outlook has since been modified
by subsequent Arab reservations concerning Communist inroads in Iraq. Arab
opinion tends to credit the USSR (and to sem extent Communist China) with
notable achievements in social welfare and industrialization and regards
their ruthless fiXity of purpose as worthy of application in the Arab world,
although with avoidance of the human cost involved. A, 1st* 1957 Onrvey of
Arab student opinion at the American University of Beirut indicated that
nearly half believed the Soviet Union would surpass America in economie
strength in the next 25 years.
While Arabs would be inclined generally to accept 'unconditional"
aid from both sides and have done so (Yemen, Iraq, UAR), they remain pre-
disposed to look first to the West. There is some unmeasured ArWb opinion
holding that Soviet aid projects which emphasize industrialization are more
pertinent for their needs than American programs which Arabs feel are overly
concerned with agriculture.
reecTurky and Iran
bitoduction
The proportion of the number of persons to the country's total
lation Observed thinking aloud on the topics included in this report
SECIZT
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10.
tends to decrease as one looks first at Greece, next at Iran, and finally
at TUrkey. let, all three countries share In common experiences which pre*
dispose them to view sueh matters either as favorable to the United States,
or, in times of temporary setback to the US, with considerable teganftity.
Thus, they have in common the memory of US strength and leadership exhibited
in World War II, the successful employment of US, pressure against Communist/
Soviet encroachment on their territory during the late 1540's, and US military
and economic aid given to their countries since World War II. Most recently,
they have witnessed US defiance of Soviet threats against the Weet. More.
over, membership of each of these countries in a Western defensive alliance,
whether it be NATO or CO, does afford at least to the government leaden,
and military participants in MATO or ONTO exercises a, better realization of
the actual strength of the United States than if their countries were not
within these alliances.
Th* Eisenhower Doctrine and the defense treaty with each country growing
out of that declaration have, it appears, given these governments a sense of
protection, and has thereby served to decrease 0. but not entirely eliminate
their critical review of the balance of power between the United States and
the Soviet bloc. This is not to say, however, that each government is above
using, on occasion, such Observations as a pretext to wheedle more aid from
the United States. Nor does it mean that opposition elements, particularly
in Iran, like such a guarantee when it appears to keep the governing ,gronp
in power.
In Iran the majority of the public probably would favor a. modification
of Iran's policy in line with the traditional stance of playing one great
power oft against =other. At present, most Iranians who advocate this
change in policy probably feel that the "cold war" will continue indefinitely,
with neither bloc gaining much preponderance over the other. Among those
Iranians who fear that a "hot wee might come aey time, there probably is a
desire for Iran to break away from the alliance in order to seek the compara-
tive security of neutralism.
American officials returning fron Turkey report that even the Turks who
talk about East.Weat relations eel go much further in their thinking than
to assume that if the United States is against the "Russians" (TUrkey's
traditional enemy), then surely the Russians can be stopped .4. for one Turk
is always worth two Russians. 7h0 Greeks tend to be the most vocal of the
three nationalities on these paver subjects and there are probably more
shades of opinion concerning them in Greece than in either Turkey or Iran.
Currently the press in Greece affords a fairly reliable index of what
the public is thinking on these Issues. In Turkey this is also true, despite
the fact that the preen is now spying very little on such matters, due to
public preoccupation with internal developments under the new regime. In
Iran, on the other hand, the press usually reflects only official thinking
(or direction) on these issues. If that opinion sometimes coincides with
the public's opinion, it is usually coincidental.
Leadership
tu all three countriesthe United States is viewed as a well.intent oned
but, on occasion, inept leader of the Free World. The Turks are constantly
worried that the US will be tricked by the USSR into a_filse sense of
Security. The Iranians reel that the US is loading Iran along a dangerous
path of all.iout opposition to the Soviet Union, which can at any time lead
to a "hot war" and place Iran directly an the firing line. The Shah is
concerned that the US will concentrate so much on a ratc14zr var. that it
will overlook the possibility of a conventional and regionally localized
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WRIT
war in which Iran viii have to cope with encroachments from bordering areas
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The majority of Iranians (that is a majority of
those vho think about such matters) believe that the US exhibits naivete in
pouring so much aid into Iran vithout carefully checking on how that aid is
being spent. In Greece the United States vas criticised by a number of mews.
papers for its "clumsy" handling of the U-2 incident, but although these
same papers expressed a desire to see the return of "old and experienced"
French and Britain influence in Western councils, they probably have remained
convinced that both ?ranee and Britain have lost their one.time influence
in world affairs. Many Greeks, aceording to Embassy Athens, felt that
through the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit conference,
the United States had allowed the Soviets to regain the propaganda offensive
against the West.
litar
The Turks are the most inarticulate about US military strength. None.
tholes. am officers and civilian leaders have expressed concern that the
Soviet bloc sight overtake the US in military strength 'within the next
decade or so unless the US increases its own strength and that of its allies.
Bach American success in the missile field, therefore, probably' enhances
Turkish confidence in US military strength. In Greece, there eppartnbly
has been some doubt felt by the public that the US is keeping up via the
USSR in the 'missile race. But the recent success in the firing of the
Polaris missile from submarines has elicited favorable press reaction can..
earning the redress of balance of Waits= power versus the Soviet Union.
In Iran, the successful launchings by the UMW States of satellites: and
military missiles during the last few years have it seems, wiped out any
inclinations by Iranians to ascribe undue military significance to Soviet
achievements along these lines. Iran's two leading newspapers ittels'at
and Urban, were particularly impressed by the failure of the newspapers,
Union
to follow up its threat to bomb sir bases after the MS-47 incident. But
what does seem to both...jams Iranians (end especially the Shah) Is the idea
I that the bist and the West have reached a nuclear stalemate and, therefore,
have made a conventional var MOTO likely, if and when aver should break
out. It is in the realm of conventional warfare that they fear the US is
allowing itself and its allies to fall behind.
Alliance Sxstma
The vast majority of Greeks and Turks staunchly support their
governments' membership in 1AT3 (Greece and Turkey) and ONTO (Turkey). A
majority of the Iranian public, however, does not emthuslastically support
their country's membership in OCITO. Thee* Iranians would prefer their
country to return to a neutral stance so that 1) it might plow one great
power off against the other, 2) it might avoid provocation of the Soviet
Union, and 3) the Shah's unpopular regime might lose the strong American
support which they believe it now enjoys. In both Greece and Iran the
press indicated, at the time of the cancellation of the President's trip
to Japan, thatdit smeared that the US alliance system in the Par Bast VAS
beginning to crumble dee, it said, to a combination of COmmunist agitation
and American support of unpopular regimes. Iranians, in particular, are
still gristly impressed, by the 1958 coup in Iraq and that country's sub.
segment (1959) vithdrewal from the Baghdad Pact. In Greece and Turkey,
the govermentn, supported by their publics, have remained unshaken by
Soviet threats of retaliation against Western military installations.
Such threats did, however, stir up a demand in the Greek press (represent-
ing both pro-government and opposition opinion) that the government assure
the Greek people that Greece retained the right to exercise control over
resonnaissance flights. In /ran, although the (govermment.controlled)
OICRIT
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press contended that Iran retained the right to permit such flights in the
Mere, these sentiments probably did not reflect Iranian opinion.
Scientific
In all three countries the majority opinion probably holds that the
United States is ahead in the fields of science and technology, except in
the missile field, and will likely remain ahead, or at least even, with the
Soviet Bloc during the next 25 years.
Secnomic
The elite An Turkey tend to feel that, although at present the US is
ahead in OCOMMie development, the USSR is repidly catching up and mey
within the next 25 years overtake the US. (lased on a survey in June 1958
of students of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of
Ankara. The results of this survey are believed to reflect general elite
opinion, both civilian and military.) In Greece, on the other bend,
according to a survey conducted in late 1958, public opinion felt that the
US would emerge economically stronger than the USSR within the same time
spas; there is no reason to believe that this opinion has changed. In
Iran, the Turkish attitude probably is shared by a majority of the Persian
elite. While the Turks view this prospect of Soviet economic supremacy
with comsiderable apprehension, the Iranians are probably lass concerned.
There is considerable resistance among the elite in Iran and Turkey
to acceptance of large-scale aid programs from the Soviet Bloc. In Greece,
according to the survey mentioned above, more than half of the respondents
wire willing to accept aid from any country. Omly ? smell minority ex-
pressed an =willingness to accept aid from the Soviet Union.
South Asia
introduction
Miwepiper editorials, the in source of impressions of South Asian
attitudes on the following subjects, are not an accurate reflection of
public opinion. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the press is government con-
trolled; in Nepal the papers are frequently the mouthpiece for various
political eroups; and in India and Oeylon, whore the press has had a
relatively tree voice an international issues, it is more critical of the
Soviet Union and Communist China than is the general peculation. *accept
for Wiathere is no public opinion survey data available, and even there
the latest data is about ? year old and is limited to urban, educated
Indians. Many of the following assertioni should thereltait be regarded
as "probably' or "possibly" true, and should be considered deseriptive of
the attitudes of the betterdatoramrd rather than of the rural, illiterate
moss of the population whose opinions on such subjects are largely un-
crystallized.
psederlka
The Immo of American statesmanship and leadership has suffered a
setback as a result of several recent events, primarily the U4.2 incident,
the abortive Summit contemns' the Japanese riots and the Cuban situation.
Goodwill toward the United States is largely unimpaired, but doubts cons'
eernimg its skill and Ability to formulate and implement ? successful
foreign policy visa-vi, the ftemunists has intreased. South Asiaas are
still disposed to accept the good intentions Of the US, but ita prestige
and position as the leader of the Tree World has fallen somewhat.
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Soviet beUigerncy and threats of military action against the US and
allies =mood considerable apprehension, particularly in Pakistan, bat
tended to increase the Soviet power image vis-a-vis the US. Pakisten9if
also aware of the fate of several leaders whose governments, closslY
allied with the US, were overthrown in the past year or so. Under the impact
of these various developments, zany Pakistanis expressed strong reservations
on the extent to which Pakistan could rely on the US for protection. Peeling
was fairly widespread among the politically aware that Pakistan was &inert
pawn in the gesteiWeet conflict whose lose -would be a matter of regret to
the US but, nevertheless, an acceptable minor setback in the larger struggle.
Latent neutralist sympathies Which had been suppressed for some time came
to the sniflace in fairly strong form. In other South Asian countries, such
aa India, When, existing non...alignment policies were firmly sUpported by
public opinion, recent events were considered pointed justification for this
policy; e rather vocal minority in India who had been advocating some torn
of regional anti-Cceenmiet pact became, for the time being at least, fairly
quiet.
Attlita7
The US and the USSR are viewed as of about equal military strength at
the present time, although the Afghans partly because or:physical proximity
may be more lavressed with Soviet military strength. However, the slightly
preeminent view in South Asia, particularly in India, is that time is on
the side of the Soviets and it will not be too many more years Were the
USSR will be stronger militarily. Despite South Asian respect for power,
this prospect La not looked upon with equanimity by 3:adieus and Pakistania,
where the growing image of &powerful USSR arouses sone apprehension, A
militarypowerbalaece between the two blocsais generally favored beatutse
it is considered that this balance is an effective deterrent to var. In
times of crisis, fears that a nuclear war may be triggered off by some
individual miscalculation are more frequently expressed in India than are
assumptions that an Fasti.West conflict can be contained to conventional
warfare. Controlled nuelear disarmament is considered the primary dis
armament objective.
The predominant attitudetoward the US alliance systan continues to be
one of rather strong disapproval except in Pakistan, which s the sole South
Asian meaber of &SATO and =TO. Despite a more frequent expression of
neutralist attitudes it Pakistan recently, there has been little if any
public questioning of the membership in these two organizations. Sentiment
hes been expressed, however, that the US ought to 48sUMO greater obligations
in CO. On the other handl alleged inefficiency and lack of coordination
In Washington have raised some doubts that the US could, be relied on to
act decisively and with sufficient speed toaelp Pakistan if it were
atteeked.
Scientific
s
The USSR is consideredebct *Qua to the US in the general ecientific
field imulpembscps Slightly superior to the US 14 Owe science. Soviet
Once achievements are for the most pert responsible for the rapid upward
reevaluation of Soviet scientific cepobilities in the last few years. New
advances in spews science capture far lees attention than earlier ones,
however, and it woullkoquire some very dramatic achievement by the US to
balance the Soviet's lead in the public mind. At prevent the general
opinion is that the USSR will have the edge over the US in the general
field of science in a few years time.
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3.4
ponom14
The US is considered someWhat ahead of the USSR at the present time,
and far ahead of Communist China in economic strength. In ten or twenty
years time, however, the general belief is that the USSR will be an economic
equal of the US, if not slightly superior. There is, however, little if
any interest in the strictly regimented economic system of the Communist
bloc, despite an ackrundedgemint that economic goals can possibly be reached
faster by such methods. Amazed economy is strongly favored.
The predominant attitude is that economic aid from both Communist and
non-Communist countries is desirable providing no strings are attached.
Pakistanis, however, resent the large amounts of US aid given "neutral"
countries like India, and Afghans feel that the US is not as dynamic in ex-
tending aid., it should be. Doth Afghans and Indians deplore U.S. military
aid, particularly that given to Pakistan.
AFRICA
ktroduction
Africans view the American and Soviet power structures in terms of
their own apprehensions and desires. They are overwhelmingly concerned with
independence, socio-economic development and the preservation of "positive
neutralism." They have only a tangential interest in the Cold War, exeept
as it directly impinges upon Africa. Knowledge and opinion about the Soviet
Union are in the formative stage. Africans have a greater, if sometimes
distorted, awareness of the US, including the negative as well as the
positive aspects. FUrthermore, they tend to associate the Usesorith
ftropean colonial powers -- by race, culture, military alliance, and African
policy.
There are very serious limitations to the data available for an
assessment of the American power image in Africa. Thervery few available
opinion surveys confirm that the US stands well above the Soviet Mice in
overall esteem but the surveys have not elicited African views an the
various categories covered below. This assessment, therefore, smiles
primarily upon statements by government officials and other articulate
leaders -- the statements are neither numerous nor detailed on the parti-
cular items involved on newspaper editorials, very limited survey
data, and impressionistic insights. The fast that Africans are just
beginning to relate themselves to the rest of the world accounts for the
&beam, of &perspective against which to interpret current African
opinion.
Leadership
Their amend for strong government at home conditions Africans to
respect forceful endwise leadership elsewhere in the world. luring the
past year particularly, many Africans have felt that Xhrushebev has seised
the initiative around the world and that American leediarship bas been
increasingly on the defensive. Some sections of the African press have
linked together the U-2, Summit collapse, Japan, Turkey, and Cuba as
evidemce of the decline of American prestige and leadership. Ihrusbchev's
arrogance at Paris did nue to redress the earlier inclination to criticise
SZC/UIT
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severely
U-2 incident.
involved, there
erupt that the
?
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1 re in the timing and sub eexent handling of the
Morocco autd Stu:dais, both of which were directly
e African reaction to the President'a foreign tours
celletion of the visit to Japan was viewed as a set-back
to American prestige. COTISCiOUS of their own inability to assume a decisive
role in world politica, Africans argue that both the US and the USSR fail
Lu their grave responsibilities toward all mankind. Africans continua to
look to Washington for positive leadership (in ?mob tropical Africa,
however, DeGaulle is probably the most highly esteemed world statesmen) and
feel that the US (suet exercise more initiative if the West is to cope with
Moscav's world-wide efforts to undermine the West's position. Africans
await a more dynamic American role in Africa and interpret the absence of
it so proof that American leadership, deferring unnecessarily to the
colonial powers, has not yet grasped the meanies of the new structure of
World politics.
111.1.Am
tf and large, Afric to believe that the US is ahead
of the Soviet Union in total military power but that the margin is shrink*.
tag rapid.4. Increasittgly the USSR is held to be equal or slightly superior
to the US in missile capability and.cit survey in Nigeria indicates that
college studente believe that the USSR will lead the US in overall military
posture after two decades of coexistence. Mere has been relatively little
African attention to the capacity of both sides to engage each other in
limited Warfare but Africans are very aware that either side can wage
nuclear and missile warfare at the present time. toprehensistn. over the
possibility that all-out nuclear war could be provoked by accident or in
flamed passions, Africans disapprove of what they believe to be aporadie
reckless behavior on both sides -- for exaziple the U-2 incident. The U-2
affair reiyaforced overwhelming opposition to foreign 'nil itary bases on
African soil, an opposition which now extends to space.trxeldng stations
which African(' fear may have military implications involving them in the
Cold War. Africans hold that both countries are endangering all mankin4 by
exorbitant expenditures on armaments and that neither has worked hard
Anouigh towards arms reduction. Some Africans think that the US is overly
cautious about a disarmament agreement with the Soviets; Ktuushchev's UN
disarmament speech in 1959 vas well received in acme quarters and the US
was urged to approach it with utmost sincerity and a "proper respect" for
the fear* of mankind.
In their propaganda to Africa the Soviet(' have not boasted of their
military capability as mach as they have of their readiness to repel
American or NATO "military aggression." They have, however, hanmered at
the theme of American military encirclement of the Orbit and particularly of
Merit:an efforts to dreg Africa into this "Western aggressive bloc." The
impact of this propaganda is largely unlmown. While it probably has served
to enhance the Soviet military posture in African eyes, Africans have
tended to oppose any Dig Power military venture in Africa and particularly
outside of the UN. Thus it is at least probable that Soviet propaganda
has not served to impair African views of US military strength.
Alliance System
African opinion about American involvement in military *ULanceis
concentrated almost entirely upon NATO. The reasons for the existence of
tlus alliance are eclipsed in African eyes by the videly.held persuasion
that US deference to Its Western allies is the single most important cause
of the failure of the US wholeheartedly to support African aspirations for
indevendeace and socioeconomic development. Nowhere is this more apparent
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them in lowstanding African resentment -- particularly in North Africa
over alleged American indifference to independease for Algeria. Oa the same
grounds there has been very minor oriticiem of the US for not taking a
stronger stand against Belgian military intervention in the Congo in July
1960. The feeling persists that the US supports 'grope= desires to associ-
ate Africa with the MATO system. for example, Nbroccans in 1958 vigorously
mould ilbat they believed tobeamove topless the US bases in Nbroeco
under NATO commend. One aspect of peripheral Interest in recent events in
Korea, Japan, and Thirhey is the feeling that the US supports "political
serpses" primarily in the interest of maintaining her military elliances.
Afrisens recognise that Soviet propaganda coincides with their own desires
to be free of silitary pacts with the West, but else tend to recognise that
sun% pregagande is calculated in the first instance to nerve Mbscov's and
not Africa's Objectives.
Westin?
Afrisan opinion places the US ahead of the UM in total scientific
acblevemostbut believes that the Soviet Union has made remerhible strides
in a short space of time. Soviet space accomplishmeats have mode the largest
single impact and tend in African minds to be taken as representative of
total Soviet scientifie callosity. In late 1959, following spectacular
Soviet space successes, meny Africans believed that the VIS$A had temporarily
outstripped the US in this field but at the same time confidently expeeted
the US to redress the balance. They mey now believe that the US has done so.
What most impresses Atrium thinking -- the same applies to Soviet esonomic
strength -* is the speed with which the USSR became aaajor eglantine power.
This attitude is based in part on a lack of knowledge of the scientific
tradition inherited by the Soviets and in part on what Africans resentfully
tall the West's calculated downgrading of Soviet scientific capacity in the
past. The US is generally placed ahead of the USSR in the teaching of
science, and African *imamate who have been to the Soviet Union unfavorably
contrast Soviet restrictions upon scientific inquiry with unencumbered
scientific experimentation in the US. There is acme feeling that the Soviet
system is better geared than is the American for mid growth of scissor and
technology and this attitude, together with Soviet space secomplishments,
probably accounts for the belief in some quarters that in future years the
Soviets my surpass the American scientific effort.
African opinion planes the US ahead of the Soviet Union in total
economic paver but believes that the Soviets are steadily decreasing the
margin. As in the case of scientific development, the pace of Soviet
economic growth has med. a considerable Impact on =underdeveloped
Africa searching for the best approach to its own eoenomic hurdles. Africans
feel that the US isotonic system has been uniquely rewarding for the US but
that it is not applicable to Africa's very different situates. Predisposed
to a large governmental role in the economic sphere, African opinion respects
the results that Communist orgamisational techniques can, provide in a
piamlively short time. The organisational techniques and the p.4' of
developmemt largely =Count for avowing African belief that the Soviet
- economic system -E. properly adapted to local eireumstances -- represents
the "etre of the future." Thee* assumptions give rise to the impression
that the Soviet sentrilised econnale effort is inhereatlymore powerful
than an American capitalist system which they teed to vivo in nineteenth
costars terms. At the same time Africans are critical of excessive regio
mental= in the Soviet Union. They-plots, the WS as fentastically
wealthy but feel that the US does not use its economic abundance as Judi-
cieuely as it eight. Sem tend to be critical of American neonsumerwaste
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andtmlieve that the US can and should devote more resources to Africa's
economic development. They believe that American capacity to assist Africa
exceeds Soviet capacity, but that the scarcity of American economic aid
results tram soullessly* American deference to the colonial powers.
PAR MAST
Summary and Conclusions
The general trend of informed opinion in Southeast Asia seems to
agree on the following propositions.
1. The image of US power has deteriorated while that of the Soviet
Union bas appreciated. In general, the United States still is regarded as
the leading industrial nation of the world and as the leader in scientific
and technologicel fields. The margin of US leadership has been narrowed.,
however, and it is considered, as lagging in the missil, race.
Ob the other bend, the Soviet Union is regarded as the leader in the
missile field. The dramatic quality or its seizure of this position has
rubbed car an its general power image in other scientific and industrial
categories but not enough yet to place it ahead of the United States in
these general fields.
In mum, the United States and the Soviet Union appear tab, at a
stead-off. This in itself, however, represents a considerable reduction
in the stature of US power from its pre-1957 politica when Sputnik vas
first launched into apses.
2. As theOpower image has faded, however, the recognition of the
need for ITS power in Southeast Asia has inoreaspd. This largely resulted
from the impaot of the threatening acts of communism during 1959 in Tibet,
along the Sino-Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia in the dispute over
the Overseas Chinese them
3. The easpelling presence of Communist China in the area with
its expansionism, its measly* population and its tremendous economic
growth .. provides the basic power against which that of the United States
is measured in Southeast Asia, The impact of Soviet power is still
relatively slight and is sometimes viewed in the area as a force to be
measured spinet that of Communist China rather than with it.
Japanese opinion too agrees that US power has diminished relative to
that of the Soviet Union, but also without providing a clear-cut opinion as
to which is ahead. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, the Soviet Union remains
the chief threat to Japanese security and Communist Mina's power potential
is still undervalued.
* * * ? ? * * ? ? *
The hopes, fears and doubts about American power in tbe region were
reflected accurately in a recent series of remarks attributed to the Prime
Minister of Melva, Tunku Abdul Ashman, who made thee during a recent in.
formal discussion with a Wistorn businessman. nehmen reflected an un-
written fear in the Par lest that the United States till not use its power
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SE
eff*cive1 to defend them whaa he observed that during World War XI, "Asia
VU let go to the doge." The oommon fear of Communist Chine, wee clearly
present in Rahman's dhservation that China will dominate the Asia of the
future. Thoe Malayan leader went on to describe what be termed American
"provoeation" of Communist China over Taiwan and offshore islands as a cause
for great concern in Southeast Asia. And finally, according to the report,
Rahman declared theta was his belief that the Soviet Union would probably
surpass the United States in productivity within 15 years, and. that Communist
Chinavould probably not be far behind.
Son
USI-Soviet Power
The change in the Power images of the United States Soviet -
Union in Southeast Mi.le due almost entirely to the Soviet launching of
the Sputnik in Ooto er 1957, The continued disparity in the site of rockets
and the weight of the payloads has solidified Southeast Asian opinion that
the Soviet Union indeed retains its rocket supremacy over the United States.
This image is conditioned somewhat by limited recognition that the United
States baa engemd in more frequent space -"shoots" and that these have been
more mesningtul in scientific terms than have the Soviet weight-lifting
performances. But the dramatic quality of the first Sputnik, coupled with
the fact that the Soviet achievement appeared to come from nowhere since
the prevailing view was that the Soviets had only apoor scientific
capability hes not yet been matched by the United States. And the
popular image has tended to place perhaps undue emphasis on the missile
capability as the portent or the future, perhaps even as a rough rule-of-
thUth of future overall military power.
The Soviet space achievements have, as a result, created a favorable
netting for more serious Southeast Asian consideration of other scientific,
technical and industrial accoeplishments of the Soviet Union, /be countries
of Southeast Asia for *nevi* are now more prone to consider USSR offers of
technical aid and to adopt textbooks and educational techniques from Moscow.
The Soviet Union, in fact, ba e been moved up on the scale of modernized
nations to a place second only to that of the United States.
teepite this dramatic upgrading of the Soviet Union, the 'US 1 in
industrialization, in technological knoWilov and in scientific stature is
still recognised. Leaders in Southeast Asia are prone to balance Soviet
rocketry spinet the more conventional US power apparatus, For the present
the US appears to holds thin margin of lead initerms of the total coepon-
ents ()Troyer. But it is a fragile thing at best, for reports reveal that
the Soviet Union is whittling sway at the keystone of the US power imam,
total economic power. Surveys conducted among students in the PhiliPPinee
(1958) and in South Viet.aem (1959) continue to shoo &majority believing
that the United States will retain its economie lead. after 25 years; but
3040 percent in both cases view such a long-term competition as ending
either in a, draw or are undecided. In the Philippines, one out of ten
interviewed foresaw the Soviet Union ahead by that t These opinions,
coming from nations predisposed in favor of the US, ? reflect over-.
Yhabning confidence in the outcome.
An editorial in the am on Werth 5, 1960, nurmied up the
prevailing current of opinion on the respective US-Soviet power imegee:
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. 19 .
American protection has become u5stiobab1 The
Soviet Union now possesses the nuclear b. American
proteation is no longer absolut.e. An association with
the United States mey become risky.
bia_eciation of the Need for US Power
While American power may have deteriorated omtition with that of
the Soviet Union, the Appreciation of US power and the recognised need for
its protective presence in the area is more commonly acknowledged now than
ever before. Events in 1959, including such developments as the repression
in Tibet, the threatening Laos oriole, the explosive Sino?Indian border
dispute end the Sino-Indonesian recriminations over the status of Oversews
Chinese, have combined, to produce an ours of uneasiness in the minda of
Southeast Asian leaders and elites. New chose neutralism as a practical
recognition of the inherent vulnerability of their nations under pressure
from two powerful. blocs. Xialed by the talk of peaceful co-existence under
the five principles evolved by Nehru. end Chou En-lai, Southeast Asia be-
lieved it had found a reliable course on which it could be free to con-
duct the necessary business of consolidating independence. The coslaught
of Communist aggressive acts during 1959 shattered this euphoria.
The reaction in Southeast Asia showed elements of both restatmeat and
fear. The Southeast Miami; were resentful that their hopes for peaceful
conditions were so rudely shattered in what seemed to them a denial of
pledges of peace node to them repeetedly by the Ocemunists. But they were
fearful over the implied threat and power that the renewed belligerence
smeared to hold in store. *my leaders end military me:a in particular
rusted with a new eirpreoiation of and expression of interest in US power
in the area.
For virtually the tint time it was directly iseknowledged that in the
final analysis, it was American military power which world determine the
freed oe or demise of the vulnerable countries or Southeast Asia, faced with
the potential. of Communist eggreelion.Teo of the nations in the area most
firmly ?emitted to a course of neutralism, Indonesia and Perm, expressed.
their sentiments on this question guardedly but unmistakably. On several
occasions daring 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subendrio indicated that
he had a new apprectiation for the presence of Merle= forces in the Pacific
and. during a visit of Mariam warships to Indonesia in November 1959,
itatrauirio privately stated that Indonesians consider the US Sweatt Fleet
a valuable protective screen. The army regime in Sumo during 1959 too
expressed Similar sentiments. General Na Win, then ,Premier of Purl" exe
pressed an appreciation of SEATO and or American power in the area and a
desire to have the US protective screen available.
Thailand and the Philippines, allies and friends of the United States,
have turned increattiegly to SEATO as a result of the Communist belligerence.
Surveys in both countries, but particularly in Thailand in 1957, 1958 and
q 1946 *homed an increasing awareness of SEATO and. a bettereopr et I Lytton ot
its value to their country end area. During the crisis in Laos in the early
fall of 1959, many papers in the area for the first time reported that SEATO
would have to act should ON intervention prove to be ineffective.
Cembodie,ta tentative turning toward a closer tie with Communist China
es a neat of the pressure or events in 1959 highlights the impact of
tear of Comunist China by neighboring states.
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PO
The appreciation of =power and of the need for it has, however, been
/ only ? relatively recant phenomeNK, even among many of our allies in the
' area. It is in part dependent upon recognition of the real threat posed by
economist aggression and subversion. The naked Communist threat te the area
1011 readily apparent in 1959, but this will not always be true. Thas, the
favorable attitudes toward VS power soy tend to vary considerably with sir-
enerstaaces &Maw depend input an our avoidance of actions 'which could be
viewed as "colonialist." It should be borne in mind also that even with the
bald mature of the Communist actions in 1959, almost no prominent leader made
a publiepajwituiciment of his privately expressed desire for US military
inroteetion, and none of the neutralist nations abandoned their efforts to get
along with both camps.
Ameriesn Power Challenged by Communist China
The Communist aggressiveness ubidb has aroused the fear of the Southeast
Asian nations has come from Communist China rather than from the Soviet Union.
The frequent hesitation of the area's leadership to give public utters*** to
their desire for =protection has been in largo pert due to the conviction
that Chinese power is next door, while US power, no matter how great, is
relatively remote and even undependable. Russian power, though ? factor, is
almost never considered as a real threat to the area; in fact, it is occasion-
ally treated as a factor to be balanced against that of Communist China.
*my in Southeast Asia smear to believe that the Chinese colossus in
the north is now embarked on a tremendous build-up of economic and military
',mar 'bleb viii sooner or later be used to engulf Southeast Asia. Norm and
more opinion appears to regard Communist China as the Nave of the future,"
not necessarily ideologically but in terms of tangible power. It is against
this raw image that US power is being measured. Despite a desire to regard
American power in defense of Southeast Asianiindependenee as a firm and
desisivs force, hesitation sig doubt are clearly evident. An editorial in
the Timms of Viet Moo! March 5, 1960, quoted earlier, observed:
To the allies of the United States, especially
the smaller ones, the implication of this doctrine
&
lye retalaticemmens that their association
th Americavincreases the risk of their being
destroyed. The type of 'mar vbish will take place
in the smell countries viii be the limited war.
And precisely according to the 'measly* retaliation'
doctrine, the United Staten should not let itself be
involved in this type of var. Aneriea's fall power
will be used only to defend America.
The implication presented in this editorial, mid present in other
opinion from the area, is that US power is currently designed to meet global
nilitary situations, not the limited, jungle-type warfare most likely to
materialise in Southeast Asia. It in reported too that high Indonesian
officials, including a *lose advisor of President SUkarno, expressed doubt
that American assistance veuld be sufficiently timely or effective to
defend Indonesia from a Chinese Communist attack. This direct question
is not frequently discussed,openly in the area, but one **peat of it vu
explored directly by the military President of our SWO ally, Pakistan,
in an interview with the Mr, York Times on June 25, 1960.
General Ayub Khan, according to the Times, noted that Pakistanis
were "beginning to doubt" that the US Government could react quickly enough
to repel en enemy attack. The President of Pakistan said he did not doubt
that the United States possessed the power to repel any attack, i.e., the
SZCSIT
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image of US power was a strong one, but he commented that the governmental
=whiner, to apply this powerless "ensibersome, sluggish and a clumsy jugger-
smut." Ayub's cent bears on the central question raised in Southeast Asia,
namely, the eppliention of US power in a timely and effeetive menner to meet
Southeast Asian needs.
It is ironic, but nonetheless control to the issue at qmestion, that the
nations of Southeast Asia, though often deploring the use of US power in such
"Wes as the Taiwan Straits in the fall of 190 and in Lebanon end the
Middle *1st earlier that summer, nevertheless were ispressed by the effeetive
disposition of Merle= power in theme situations which they could identify
With those which could be operative in Southeast Asia. These demonstrations
of mar ell/tary effectiveness and national purpose, especially in the sue-
cessfUl defense gamiest the Chinese Communist operations directed at the off-
shore islands, 'worked to our advantage and enheaced Southeast Asian comfidenee
in our national power The doubts and hesitations considered hers, however,
have not been dissipated, and they remain as a signifleast shadow an the
image of American power.
In the past several years, the Japanese have unmistakably revised down-
ward their estimation of US power relative to that of the Soviet Union but
there is no clear evidence that the Japanese consider either nation as haw.
tag a significant power advantage over the other.
Soviet space and rocketry achievements, economic progress and expanded
aid to underdeveloped areas, together with rapidly advancing Japanese tech*
sological and scientific eepabilities, have ended the postwar era of almost
mwetlealenwe of US achievement, and inevitably produced ? relative downgrading
An the Japanese estimate of I= preassinence and power. likewise, the resent
instability of Japanese popular sentiment toward relations with the US in
part refastens lessened confidence in the ability of the WS to withstand and
. counter Soviet pressures exerted around the Free World defense perimeter.
This was Obviously one of the factors same Japanese had in the haft of their
mind when speaking of the "Changed atmosphere" in Open after the U-.2 affair
and the Summit debacle. Yet, even earlier, the Japanese press was wont to
speak of "the precarious military balance between Seat and West." And the
Opines* have evidently begun to doubt the capability of American power to
provide adequate protection to Japan in the event of conflict with the Sine.
Soviet bloc.
Such was the psychological context in which during Nay and One so many
Japanese apparently came to accept the claim of Sloe propaganda that the new
US,Japan Security Treaty would increase the danger often, to Japan, even
thliugh they generally rejected the corollary claim that the treaty was
aggressive in nature.
At the same time, it should be noted that the diminution in confidence
in =power over the past several years has resulted in part from a faulty
assessment by Emmy Omens of some of the realities of world power relation-
thips, as well as from their tendency to project este the international level
their doubts about the ability of domestic democratic forces to meet the
challenge from leftist forces and to withstand the encroachment of re-emerging
authoritarian elements.
Those are some of the trends that have worked to reduce the reservoir
of confidence in and moist for US power that bad been built up through
papier experience with, and information about US technological, military
SEM
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SECRET
-22-.
and economic capabilities since 1944. layover, as to the net effect of
thee, trends, the fact remains that neither the findings of public opinion
surveys since Sputnik I nor the output of Japanese "opinion leaders" have
produced a clear-.cut statement as to which power the Japanese in general
feel is the stronger.
Uhlike opinion in Southeast Asia, the Jewess do not yet regard Chinese
Commnist power as a throat to their security. They have, however, begun to
regard with greater seriousness the growth of Chinese economic power as a
potential competitor in Southeast Asia.
urn maaacA
The Evidence
It should be borne in mind that the materials available for assessmmat
of the Latin American view of the balance of power between the US and the
USSR are fragmentary and, uneven in reliability. These sources are field
reporting, newspapers and periodicals, books, pamphlets, radio commentaries,
returning US government officials, direct contacts while traveling in the
areal and a fey public opinion surveys. Therefore, any inferences drown
must for the most part be broad rather than detailed, suggestive rather than
definitive. *rover, attitudes on many issues related to the formation of
the Latin American power imago of the US and the =Rare still unformulated
and unstable. For example, the relative strength attributed by Latin
American opinion to an open society versus a controlled society for military
pummels cannot be accurately measured from material available, nor can the
Latin American opinion of such intangibles as moral strength, sense of
purpose, or the "best man" in the "any-the-best-man-vin" contest.
The Psychological Setting
Before discussing Latin American attitudes toward the US-USSR balance
of power, the point should be made that Latin Americans generally regard
themselves as not immediately involved in the Cold War. A lock of apprecia-
tion of the true nature of international communise and of the threat that
it represents makes it difficult to convince Latin Americans of the Deese.
sity for coordinated anti...Communist measures. Moreover, it must be observed
that domestic problems take priority over everything else in Latin American
preoccupations, and that international issues, including that of inter-
national communism, are more likely to attract substantial public attention
only when plainly seen as closely related to domestic ecosiderations. Thus,
Latin America tends toward isolationisn from rather than direct brrolvement
in the Cold War, despite its moral and political commitment to the West and
the recognition on the part of informed Latin Americans of their dependence
on the V3 for the defense of the hemisphere.
The Current Power image of the US and the USSR
The Latin American, power image of both the U3 and the USSR bad improved
during the Second World War, but there was no question that in the minds of
Latin Americans the US held first place, especially subsequent to the
development of the atomic bomb.
With the explosion of the first Soviet ataxic bod. new images began to
develop 'which tended to polarise power between the US and the USSR. The
SECRET
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? ?
litilOggaerity achieved by the US was maintained? but the "balance of terror"
concept began to creep in, tending to cut into the US overall superiority.
Polarised atcmie power, in turn, promoted or deepened the feeling that week
countries might better disengage themselves from entanglements la which they
coed play no significant role. The true extent of "third positionism" in
Latin America was (end is) a-matter of conjecture, but the scant military
support offered against ecommniem during the Korean War demonstrated it?
influence.'
Nevertheless, there was a feeling of Latin American security within
"fortress America," lead by the still considerably superior power of the US.
Then came the tint Sputnik and its apparent implications for missile carfare
capabilities. The effect of Soviet missile developments on Latin American
opinion has not been to downgrade the US power image as much as to raise the
Soviet. The new trend is rather a revetsal of the post-World War II, pre-
Sputnik, trend: both power images have improved in relation to themselves,
but the Soviet Liege his improved much more.
The drama in this change for the better in certain aspects of the
Latin American image of the Soviet Union stemmed from the fact that up to
the time of Sputnik esteem for= accomplishments in the scientific and
military fields had been so high among Latin Americans that they considered
it virtually beyond belief that any power could challenge US supremacy in
these areas. Opinion surveys conducted in several Latin American cities
subsequent to Sputnik (November 1957 and May 1958) showed that many felt
that the Soviet lead in space development would be only temporary. Moreover,
these surveys revealed that leadership in space science was not necessarily
equated with leadership in science generally, and that many respondents
still bad sufficient confidence in the paver potential of the US to estimate
that the US rather than the USSR would merge stronger at the end of a
Went:T.41v, year period of peace:a competition.
Although survey data and other standards of measure are very scanty
and difficult to appeals*, it seems that the image of the Soviet Union as ?
power capable of outstanding achievements in the field of military science
and,teehnolow is gaining hold. The USSR's ability to compote successfully
with the US may thereby be becoming more believable. The results of a survey
cendueted in Buenos Aires in lebriery 1960 night be regarded as a minor
indicator of this trend. More respondents felt that the USSR had more
unitary power than the UN, and when asked which country vault emerge
stronger after twenty years of peaceful cometition, more felt that the
USSR rather than the US would emerge as the stronger power.
SECIUM
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/
P.i.Div.ct I SECRET
41.
Thy curriont
an Vire
"Now a brief comparison on move personal qualities betwain
the Soviet people and those of the U.S.: Who do you think
has greater faith in their basic principles two Soviet
people or the peoplo of the U.S.?"
"And who do you believe is milling to work border to have
their country lead the other in national achievement?"
Great West
Greftbrrflith4A Britain gam Franc
Feb Feb. Feb.
No. of cases ( (W) (658) (
Soviet people
People of U.S. 28
Both some 15
No opinion
Net Favorable
14111119,P workherdcr,*
1
Soviet people
62%
Pimple of U.S.
14
Both same
11
No opinion
-IL.
100%
Net Favorable
-48
51%
44%
18
14
12
19
Iffii
30
65%
67%
10
5
8
11
-IL
tomg
7
4-62
Fob.
35%
28
18
A
-41
The cyrrent World vk
"All things considered, do you think the U.S MOWS
Is ahead in total military strength at the present time
Considerably ahead or only a little?
country. IltlatALOMIX
Viet-nom (College Students)
VO*464
(General Population)
Okinawa (General Population)
Italy (General Population)
Uruguay (General Population)
West Germany (General Population)
Japan (General Population)
Turkey (College Students)
France (General FoOkation)
Buenos Aires, Argentina (General Population)
Norway (General Population)
Great Britt: (General Population)
SECRE'r
t Favorable
PO, ortPAIrvW
1.0 Vast_
Match, 1959
32
Novamber, 1958
20
December, 1958
14
February, 1960
6
June, 1958
4
May-June, 1960
3
December, 1958
.1
June, A958
-2
May, 1960
.15
February,
-21
June, 1960
30
May, 1960
-43
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b -21 the Vest Evropeart Trencl,
U.S.
of
U.S.
SB:RET
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is
ahead in total military strength at the present time?
Considerably ahead or only a little?"
No. of cases
considerably ahead
Russia
a little ahead
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
Russia considerably
ahead
Both equal (Vol.)
No opinion
Net 114. ahead
No. of cases
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
U.S. a little ahead
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
atissia considerably
ahead
Roth equal (Vol.)
No opinion
Net WS. ahead
Orlet Britain
Nov. Oct. Feb. May
!_57,_ .58 .88 .60
(Mi) anT (1150)
4% 7%)
15
31
19
6
-31
19
)
22
)
)59
19
8
4
Z
22
100%
-15
..44
Rot qtrmallv -
May"
Nov. Oct. Feb. June
az '58 '60 '60
(813) (1:73M OM (1010)
)1z 16% 9% )
)55
22
17
5 20
15
67
16
)
)47
)
22
8
28
ra 6
.1
-43 15 1 -25
-*r1- France
Nov. Oct. Feb. May
!:57_ '58 !DO_
(-8172. arr4 (Far (147
(% )
11 16 )
)25%
13 21 ) )
)37%
12 8 ) )
20 34 16
23 jag_ 31
17- 100% 100% itag
41,
-10 -21 -15
SECRET
Italy
16
3
Norway
Nov. June
'51
(M)
*60
(1020)
)35%
)15%
)
)
)31
)45
)
)
11 17
..n. 23
100% 101
4 -30
Nov. Oct," Nov. Dec. Feb.
"57 MR_ 159_
(807 (67-33) (6-91.7 (65-6T (3-97
17% 13% 16%
17 25 17
13 14 11
9 9 7
23 22 24
10%
18
10
8
26
)38%
38%
)32
5
.21_ .a. -25_ _M..
l00% 100% 100% 100%
12 15 15 18 6
100%
Declassified
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tft US,vp
The,Currept World Vic
POuPtFY
Philippines (General Population)
Turkey (College Students)
Greece (General Population)
West Germany (General Population)
Uruguay (General Population)
Philippines (College Students)
Italy (General Population)
Viet-Nara (College Students)
xico (General Population
All things considered, do you think the U.S. or
Russia is ahead in scientific devo1ont at the
present Una Considerably ahead or only a litt
Mexico City)
rway (General Population).
,India (General literate
Japan
Population)
(General Population)
Buenos Aires,
Argentina (General Population)
Okinawa (General Population)
Great Britain (General Population)
Date atSurfol
Net Favorable
tq
March, 1959
413
June 958
29
November, 1933
23
February, 1960
18
June, 1.958
12
August, 1958
12
February, 1960
7
March, 1959
r
0
3
1')
November, 7
-12
August, 1958
-16
December, 195$
-17
February, 1960
-25
December, 1958
*26
April, 1960
29
-France (General Population) February, 1960 .40
Nigeria (University Students) Februarys 1959 .46
SECRET
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SECRET
L4, 8r. The Viest ftwormaniTlepd
"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or
Russia Is ahead in scientific development at the
present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"
No. of cases
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
U.S. a little ahead
Great Britain
Nov. Oct. Feb.,, Apr,
_157_58
(80-7(587J (11W- (113T2
7% 17%)0,&
13 26 )-"
Rusila a little ahead of
U.S. 39
Russia considerably ahead 19
Both equal (Vol.)
No opinion
Net U.S. ahead
No. of cases
23
7
6 12 4
.4? .4.
100% 100% It4
-38 13 ..33
)58
Nov.
57
87k7
West Goyim Ngymav
Nov. Oct*. Feb. Nov.
!..6.410
(Targ (114 (35)
)01t
)---
14%
22
15%
29
r*".
12%
19
27
19
)
34
)
5
4
)27
9
6
15
19
9
14
19
?412
34
..
maia%
lam
loos
100%
.29
4
21
18
-12
Foncl, Itap _
Oct. Fe43. Nov. Oct. Apr. Nov. Dec. Feb.
alggi gRiOT (i) r ay(1076)y OiT T
U.S. considerably ahead
of Russia
U.S. a little ahead
Russia a little ahead
of U.S.
Russia considerably &mid
Both equal (Vol.)
No opinion
Net U.S. ahead
4%
7
29
20
16
44
100%
-38
5%
15
21
13
33
12
100%
.14
)
)18%
)
)58
9
100%
-40
12%
11
24
13
21
19
15%
18
16
14
21
.112.20
100%
3
10%
16
15
13
26
It%
9
27
18
17
9
26
16
21
X.
)
)40%
)33
4
AL
100%
7
100%
.14
100%
.1.2_
100%
*25
100%
42
SECRET
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44 if. U.S. Versus SovAet Std1nct Spacepevelooment
c.A e Cytrent World view
eAll things considered, which country do you th
ahead in space developments at the present time
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"
is
Country
MI pate
Number
of cases
U.S.U.S.S.R.
Alma
Neither
MeV
No
POnton
Net
favorable
West Germany
.abtad..
(May-June '60)
(1010)
11%
5335
12%
24%
-42
Great Britain
(July '60)
( 947)
10
58
4
28
-48
India - 4 Major Cities
(August "58
( 724)
7
58
9
-51
Turkish Students
(June '58)
( 230)
7
67
Norway
(June '60)
(1020)
7
71
12
10
Italy
(February Ito)
(1170)
11
75
11
-64
France
(May 460)
(1000)
74
19
-67
No. of cases
tr
.0-Eureen TrRO
"All things considered, which country do you think is
ahead in space developments at the present time --
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.'?"
Stan _Fran9e_ ,
Feb. Apr. May
.60 .60
(1221) (irin (Ti
July
917T
May
.60
(1228) (1000)
U.S. ahead
5%
1214
7%
10%
2%
U.S.S.R., ahead
84
64
81
58
85
74
Neither ahead (Vol.)
2
5
4
4
3
No opinion
9
28
100%
1
100%
100%
bigg
100%
Net U.S. ahead
49
4.53
-74
-48
-83
-67
No. of cases
U.S. ahead
U.S.S.R. ahead
-
Neither ahead (Vol.)
No opinion
Net U.S. ahead
WesVGermany__
Feb. Mar-June
'60
(12r2)
77
3
.a.
100%
-70 -42
10
11%
53
12
24
100%
SECRET
Norway
Feb,
June,
.60
(1170)
(1020)
11%
7%
75
71
3
12
10
_Lk.
100%
100%
-64
-64
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SECRET
The nt Nest European pplitre,
ISolnit back to ewe developments for a moment, what
- would be best, in your opinion for the U.S. to be
ahead In space developments, the U.84=. to be ahead
or neither to be ahead? Now important do you think
this Is very Important or not so important?"
No. of cases
Great
Pritain
Feb.
((Ta)
Vest
ARPm4Pv
Feb.
(623
Prefer U.S. ahead - very Important
Prefer U.S. ahead - not so important
4/143413
10
1
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - very important
)
* ) *
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - not so important
2 )
.? )
Prefer neither ahead - very important
32)
32)
Prefer neither ahead not so important
12 )
15 )
No opinion
15
SECRET
Preqq, LUIZ
Feb. Feb.
'60
(620)(579)
161
1'
loos
20
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? ?
SECRET
S-E1 U.S. Vtrsue Soviet (Econtamic) Strength 25 Yea pore
a r?
The current World View
"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, settle down to competition
without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years,
which of the two do you think will and up as the stronger?"
Country
en4 Date
Number
pf cases
U.S.
pep,
Both
MAL
No
OVinkal
Net ::1-.
Tealfavorakke 11
Philippines Students
(Aug. '58
( 887)
50%
9%
24%
17%
41
Philippines
(March '59)
(1609)
42
2
8
48
40
Netherlands
(April '56)
( 825)
44
13
16
27
31
Uruguay
(April *59)
(1612)
36
15
8
41
21
Rio de Janeiro
(May '58)
( 200)
39
19
8
34
20
Vietnamese Students
(Feb. & Mar. *59)
( 462)
27
7
22
44
20
Greece
(Nov, *58)
(1207)
30
12
8
50
18
Norway
(Nov. *57)
( 845)
38
29
18
21
15
Japan
(Dec, '58)
( 676)
23
17
6
54
6
Mexico City
(May *58)
( 200)
45
40
3
12
5
Okinawa
(Dec. '58)
( 577)
25
21
5
49
4
West Germany
(Feb. *60)
( 599)
29
29
19
23
0
Italy
(Feb. *60)
( 591)
22
24
32
22
-2
Buenos Aire*
(Feb. '60)
( 560)
19 :-:
32
23
26
-13
India
(Mid May-Aug. *58)
( 724)
17
35
17
31
-18
Groat Britain
(Feb. '60)
( 613)
25
44
10
21
-19
Turkish Students
(June '58)
( 230)
le
43
30
9
-25
France
(Feb. '60)
( 608)
7
35
25
33
-29
Arab Students
(Dec. 1, *57 &
Jan, 7# '58)
( 274)
8
46
16
30
-38
SECRET
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- . ?
No. of cases
SECRET
The West Europeen Irene!
'if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition
without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years,
which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?V'
Great ayitaini
Apr. Nov. Oct. Nov. Feb.
'57
'60
(8-FT8 (MR ma (6-BY
U.S. 35% 37%
U.S.S.R. 25 34
Both equally strong(Vol.) 15 11
No opiniona
**/.
36% 25%
34 NA 44
11 10
Fiat csmany %MU
Apr. Nov. Oct. Nov. Dec. Feb. Nov.
!_56_ !_58
(C179R ETig( 11C'5)(
125)
,:iva
(599)
37%
31%
38%
3eed
29%
22
21
21
20
NA
2,7
14
24
25
19
19
16 16 A IOC100%
16 .21.
'57
(676)
38%
23
18
21
l00%To0%
Net U.S. stronger 10 3 2 -19 15 10 17 16 0 15
fine
No. of cases (800002 1220 (600
14%
24 NA 35
30 25
U.S.
10%
9%
U.S.S.R.
21
20
Both equally strong(11014 14
22
No opinion _55 AL
l00% law
Net U.S. stronger
-11 -11 *10 -28
SMRET
25%
28%
29%
27%
31% 22%
14
14
25
19
16 24
26
34
27
23
28 32
1
1
luvA
100%
100% 10ux
11
14
4
8
15 -2
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4
,
?
SECRET
32-
..-
8E= BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT IRI REPO TO US. USSR AIDING
R-2-60:
R-22-60:
R-25.060:
R6-27-60:
Re.47.60:
The Impact of President Eisenhower's fl4taticn Vox on
World Opinion: An Assessment
U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology in Foreign PUblic
Opinion
Western Europeen Public Read on to Curreit isarmenen
Test Ban Talks
The Tree World s Ipage of the Soviet : A. Tentative
APPreisal
Latin American Opinion. on U.S. Econorda Policies and Ft. vete
Investment
RN-19-60: ,Public Opinion Abroad and U.S. end Soviet Science and.
Technolog3r
16-20-60: Pioneer V and Tiros I: A Summary or Free World Reaction
RN-22-60: Reaction to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks
RN-25-60: Free World Reactions to Selected International Iasues
RW-28-60: Free World Reactions to President Eisenhower's Far Eastern Trip
FE-23-60:
ME-6.60:
WE-
61-60:
ME-62-60:
VE-63.60:
WE-64.60:
WE-0.60:
WE-66.60:
WE-67-60:
The Comparative image of the U.S. Ve
Among Philippine University Students
Free World Versus Communist Bloc Standing in the FOur Major
Cities of Znais
Comminist Powers
The Impact of the Ourrezt Co3.d.4iar Detente Upon Trends in
U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings
West EUropean Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris
Summit Conference. I. General Standing of the U.S. Versus the
U.S.S.R. in an Atmosphere of Detente
West Ehropean Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Faris
Summit Conference. U. U.S. or USS.S.114 The Wave of the Pi ?
Post-Summit Trends In British and French Opinion of the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
Post-Sumnit Trends
U.S.S.R.
Post -Summit Trends
U.S .8.R.
West German Opinion of the U.S. and the
Norwegian Opinion of the U.S. and the
British Views on U.S. vs U.S.S.R. Standing on eeIfio
Aspects of Space Achievement
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030005-0