PROCEEDINGS OF THE FAR EAST CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE (BAGUIO, MARCH 14-17, 1960).

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 12, 1960
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
FROM
TO
REF
PRIORITY? -------
IrmigL 1
(Security Classification)
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH
MANILA (BAGUIO) UNN CO
DESP. NO,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WASHINGTON.
DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
120.1496/5-1260 (Reed
Y NO.
rL.
SERIES
MAY 12, 1960 (Reed)
DATE .
ICA u/ksc PER INR 0/FS 0/FSI U/CEA FBO
13
For Dept.
Use Only
ACTION
FE
REC.!)
5/12
Wk REP AF ARA EUR NEA IRC E P IO S/S C G M/O M/OP
N
F OTHER
AIR ARMY CIA NAVY OSD OCB USIA
SUBJECT:
Proceedings of the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference (Baguio, March
14,-17? 1960).
Distribution
Tokyo
Seoul
Manila .
Taipei
Saigon.
Phnom Penh
Vientiane
Bangkok
Rangoon
Kuala Lumpur
to: .
Djakarta
Canberra
Wellington
Singapore
Hong Kong
London
Karachi
New Delhi
Colombo
Paris
The Hague
Navy for CINCPAC
POW CINCPAC, Honolulu
.POLAD Naha
L i 37 Li 1.
--1"Lrenr.,
DrPADTCO
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRIff
"This document consists of 106pages,
Copy of 180 copies, Series E."
FAR EAST CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE
Baguio, March 14-17, 1960
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Chairman of the Conference - Assistant Secretary J. Graham Parsons
Coordinator Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkins, FE
Rapporteurs Mr. Henry L. T. Koren, Embassy Manila
Mr. Henry Brodie, Embassy Manila
Mr. Seaborn Foster, Embassy. Manila
Mr. Carl H. McMillan, Jr. Embassy. Manila
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
coNTErs
I. Conclusions and Recommendations.
II. Introductory Remarks by Assistant Secretary. Parsons.
III. A. World Review by Deputy Under Secretary-Hare.
B. General Discussion following Mr. Hare's Review.
IV. A. Remarks by the Honorable Felixberto Serrano, Philippine Secretary
of Foreign Affairs,
B. General Discussion following Secretary Serranols Remarks,
V. Have We Reached the Turning of the Tide in Asia?
Keynoter: Assistant Secretary Parsons,
VI. The Next Ten /ears.
A. As Seen from Tokyo. Keynoter: Ambassador MacArthur
B. As Seen from Peiping. Keynoter: Ambassador Drumright
C. AS Seen from New Delhi. Keynoter: Ambassador Bunker
VII. Comment from Southeast Asia.
Keynoter: Ambassador Jones
VIII. Prospects in Sino-Soviet Relations.
Keynoter: Deputy Assistant Secretary Morgan
? IX. General Discussion following Keynote Presentations.
X. Rise of New leadership in Asia.
Keynoter: Ambassador McConaughy
XI, Balance Between Security and Development in Newly Emerging Countries.
Keynoter: Ambassador Durbrow
XII. Regional Cooperation, Trends and Prospects.
Keynoter: Ambassador. Johnson
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SEMI'
?
XIII. General Discussion.
XIV. Administrative Matters
A. Presentations by Deputy Under Secretary Henderson and
Mr. Johnstone and Discussion.
XV, Annexes
A. Final Communique
B. Text of Ambassadors' Letter to the Secretary of State
C. List of Participants and Conference Committees
D. Probable Trends in Communist China Miring the Next Decade
(Ambassador Drumright)
Note: A special INR Assessment nThe Outlook for the Far East 1960 - 1965o
was reproduced and passed to participants in the Conference. This
paper is not inpluded in the Proceedings, since it is being revised
and updated, and will be issued in the near future by INR as an
Intelligence Estimate.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRE
FAR EAST CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE, BAGUIO, MARCH 14-179 1960.
I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCMMENDATIONS
THE DECADE BEHIND AND THE DECADE AHEAD
In reviewing the course of events in the Far VAst over the past decade,
it is our conviction that the policies and actions of the United States
have enabled the free countries of the area to survive. Compared with the
chaos of the early 1950s? the situation today in 1960 is much improved.
Through their own efforts and ours the free countries have made progress in
building their political, social and economic institutions. Nevertheless,
in facing the challenge of the decade ahead, we believe that the magnitude
of the task is increa6ing. The nature of the Communist threat poses less
dramatic but yet more difficult problems.
Japan, which represents a great element.of Free World strength in Asia,
has, in the Security Treaty signed this year, freely entered into a relationship
of confidence and trustiwitiOhe U.S. The country. has recovered its sense .
of national purpose and Is showing remarkable vitality. The integrity of
Free China has been m4intained? as has that of Korea, South Viet-Nam? Laos
and Cambodia, against -Odds Which appeared overwhelming at the beginning
of the decade. The Republia'of the Philippines wiped out the threat of
Communist insurgency and, iii spite of internal problems, has made considerable
economic progress. Indonesia, although facing formidable problems of Political
and economic instability 'whose solution is not yet in sight, is showing
increased determination to resist Communist pressures within and without.
Burma and Malaya have largely overcome the Communist insurgency which
threatened their existence at the beginning of the decade. Thailand has -
become an increasing1Y. important and effective cornerstone of U.S. and SEATO
policy in Southeast Asia. AUstralia and New Zealand constitute a position
of strength and political stability on the southern flank of the Free World
in Asia. Australia has continued to support U.S. policies in the area
generally and particularly in Southeast Asia, New Zealand's support has been
only slightly less despite .the present incumbency of a Labor Party government,
Australia, with its rapidly growing economic and industrial strength, has
contributed to a healthy grOwth of multilateral trade in the area.
SEATO has justified its establishmentby the increased sense of security?,
and confidence it hasiMparted to the countries of the Treaty area and is,
increasingly understood and appreciated by the non-members. In short, the
many crises that occurred throughout almost the entire area during the deCade
have been met as theyarose. The tense atmosphere in which these prises Arose
has to a considerable extent abated, Accordingly, the countries of the. area,.
can face the coming decade with both an increased sense of.confidence and 'a
more realistic appreciation of the difficulties they must yet surmount in
SECRET
npclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
r
SECRET
- 2 -
achieving their constructive objectives: national dignity enhanced in
independence and economic viability, and a better material life for
their peoples.
As the past decade has of necessity been largely preoccupied with
the problems of national survival and internal stability, the other basic
problems of the area have not yet found a real resolution. The growing
power of the Chinese Communists presents an even more serious threat to
the area than before. The threat now is not only in military-terms. but
in the economic challenge that the forced pace of Chinese_ industrialization
under Communist totalitarianism presents to the free..countries.ef_the_area.
.&ccept for Japan and Taiwan, the economic.progress.of_the.free_countries
of the area is discouragingly slow and behind not. only_ that. Communist
countries but generally-that of other free world countries as well..
some countries, such as Indonesia, there has been actual economic deterioration
rather than progress. .However? the increasing understanding and acceptance'
throughout the free countries of the area of U.S. purposes and objectives,
and the increasing confidence in U.S. dependability and ability to cooperate
with countries of the area in achieving common objectives.giVeams. firm
grounds for belief in our ability to deal with the future.
We have reviewed once again the Conclusions and Recommendations. made
by the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference in Baguio one year_ago and
endorse them as still valid.
Looking to the coming decade, it is essential to base and adjust our
policies upon the overwhelming fact that account must be taken not only. of
the Communist world but of the growing shifts of power both within and
without the Communist world from peoples of European heritage to other
peoples having a heritage different from that of Western civilization.
Thus there is coming about a profound shift in the power relatiOnshipeithich
prevailed during the 19th Century and for the most part during the_first
half of the 20th Century. The close of the coming decade will, in al].
probability see an Asia with a population of approximately two billion_perSens
increasingly industrialized and in some cases, especially.Japan.?..fully..equal
to and perhaps in some fields superior to the West in science and technology.
Communist China will also make major advances in science and technology,
Only if the U.S. recognizes these facts and adjusts its policies_thereto
will it be able to safeguard its interests in this vast area. This_will
require wisdom, courage and staying power.
COMMUNIST CHINA.
Communist China, as it has continued to evidence inits_policy.in Tibet,
its actions along the Indian border, Laos and in_Indonesia?._remains_the
implacable enemy of the independence of the countries of Asia. This fact
SECRET
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
c3 ?
is increasingly recognized throughout the area. It is probable that in the
decade ahead internal strain and difficulties in the. Chinese. Communist
regime will not be sufficient materially to inhibit the continued growth
of the economic9 military and hence political power of Communist China*
The increased arrogance of Communist China and its demonstrated disposition
to ignore world opinion and accepted norms of international behavior have been
shown by- its refusal either in principle or fact to renounce the use of force
to achieve its national objectives. The Chinese Communists increasing
insistence upon a withdrawal of U.S. power9 not only from Japan and Taiwan
but from all of the Western Pacific9 has during the past year made it
increasingly clear that they have little or no interest in reaching a
modus vivendi or other accommodation with the U.S. on any terms other than
complete American capitulation. In the light of these attitudes there is
no possible basis upon whioh`the U.S. could establish diplomatic relations
with Communist China. The Chinese Communists have been especially vehement
in their denunciation of any "tun Chines" solution9 which, of courses, is also
unacceptable to our ally9 the Republic of China*
The U.S. can and should present the rationale of its policy with respect
to Communist China in clear and positive terms and in a manner that will be
more readily understood and accepted by both domestic and foreign opinion.
This was well done in'Assistant Secretary Parsons address of February 19', 19609
at Milwaukee. The theme of that address should be given wider dissemination
in public statements By seniOr U.S. Government officials.
If progress should be made in general disarmament9 Communist China must
at some stage become a party to any meaningful agreement. The chief danger"'
in this connection is 'that the Communist powers will seek to use disarmament
negotiations as a means of undermining our China policy9 which we expect to
remain valid for the foreseeable future* lie should seek to have it understood
that it is possible to deal at the conference table with a power without
having diplomatic relations with it. This fact is not generally appreciated
despite the long history of our negotiations with the Chinese Communists.
There are also precedents for this in our dealings with other unrecognized
governments. If the Chinese' Communists attempt to attach political cOnditions
to their participation in disarmament, the responsibility for blocking '
negotiations should be placed squarely and unmistakably on them and kept there.
Finally, we repeat the recommendation of the 1959 Conferences The United
States policy of supporting the GRC and rejecting recognition of Communist
China should be continued." Any equivocation in this regard would risk the
loss of the progress made in the past decade in the area and would have
unsettling effects elsewhere.
sEcrur
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- ,
- j4-
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
In the relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union
cohesive forces remain greater than divisive forces. This is likely to
be the case for the foreseeable future. Differences are present, howeve,
and the past year has made them more evident than at any time since the
inception of the Mao r'egime. We should be alert to opportunities to exploit
and exacerbate Sino-Soviet frictions. In doing this, care must be taken
not to exult publicly over differences where this might welL result in
encouraging them to submerge such differences. However, we cannot count
on a steady progression of these recently demonstrated evidences of
Sino-Soviet differences. Deliberate combination of hard and soft tactics
by Communist partners is standard Communist practice.
.REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Our policy of close assocation and support of the Republic of China
continues to be in U.S. and Free World interest. In the several periods
of critical tension affecting Taiwan during the past decade, the GRC has
proved itself a staunch and responsible ally of the United States. Economic
and military progress of the GRC was noted with satisfaction, particularly
evidences that a real economic breakthrough appears possible, of an order
which may within the coming decade make Taiwan a viable economic entity.
These favorable developments and the contributions which the GRC makes to
the Free World security interests in the area should be given wider attention
so as to improve the international position of the GRC.
, INDONESIA
Although considerable ikpravement has been made in U.S.-Indonesian
relations, and the country *pears increasingly resistant to Communist
pressures, Indonesia continues to be politically and economically unstable.
The nation needs assistance in controlling its deteriorating economic
situation, not only through economic aid, but also in the form of highly
qualified personnel capable of advising on the manifold monetary and fiscal
problems faced by the country. The U.S. should be responsive to these
requirements as the opportunity arises. Meanwhile, we should do our utmost
to prepare our position so as to create such opportunity.
IMAGE OF THE U.S. IN THE AREA.
There is no question that the image of the U.qa_in-Asiis one more
to our interests than the case .a very 4175Wa-rs? ago. There are several
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
5 -
reasons for this. Newly-independent nations are becoming less sensitive
about receiving the help of a powerful friend as they recognize more fully
both their own inadequacies and the true nature of the Communist threat
to their existence. The issue of colonialism, with which in Asian minds
the U.S. has been associated, however illogical this may be, is, except
for the problem of Nest Irian, becoming less troublesome in the area.
There is more readineas to turn attention and energy to real problems and
a growing realization that the U.S. genuinely desires to see the achievement
of those objectives which are to the. interest of free Asian nations.
Communist actions -- seemingly purposeful demonstrations of aggressiveness
and arrogance, general insensitivity to Asian feelings, and other tactical
blunders -- have unquestionably contributed to the improved climate for
American presence in the area. Perhaps more than any of this, however,
the constancy of our Strong policies and the demonstration of our capability
and determination promptly to meet aggression in the area have contributed
to this shift in our favor. Asians have been impressed not only with our
resolution in living up to our commitments to them but, equally important,
with the care with which we have tailored both the nature and the degree
of our responses in the effort to prevent conflict from spreading into
large scale warfare.
As a result of this shift in Asian thinking, nationalism, which
continues to furnish tremendaus drives in the continuing Asian revolution's,
is more and more inclined to pin its hopes on the Free World, This is true
at least with regard to their desire for friendly relations with powerful
Western friends in the interest of protection from the Communist threat.
We have not yet fully-demonstrated, however, that free political and economic
institutions can best bring About the rapid entry into the 20th Century
which those nations are determined to achieve. The fact that relations
with the U.S. have constituted the common denominator in this area, so
markedly lacking in regional cohesion, provides us with unusual opportunity
and responsibility. Nor can we afford to overlook the intangibles in our
relations with Asia. We shohld? for example, face more forthrightly the
fact that racial sensitivities are an unspoken but basic factor in Asian
nationalism*
ampite the favorable trends noted above, the long-term impact of
Soviet achievemerfere?ariepArtrthlaily in space expniation,
is cause fqr serious concern'. The conferees noted witii-;;riiiinEi-iittent
of the favorable impre-siibriaieated in Far Eastern countries by Soviet
successes in the exploration of outer space as contrasted with the unfavorable
impressions which arise from the wide publicity given whenever an American
failure has occurred. These Soviet achievements have been regarded as
primarily intellectual_iF076dienti-fic rather than materialistic or_military
achievements.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
.SECRET
- 6 -
The increased prestige and influence accruing to the Soviet Union
thereby has been accompanied by some loss of confidence in the U.S.
ability to maintain or re am n re--Trierio7rem,n
Over-all U.S. progress in the scientific field, particularly that
relating to the exploration of outer space, is of major importance to the
maintenance of the U.S. position in the Far East and Asia. It is essential
that such progress be exploited and dramatized throughout this vital area.
The principal role of USIS in carrying out this obligation was recognized,
as was the responsibility devolving on the National Space Agency and other
scientific agencies of our Government to provide USIS with adequate exhibits
and information.
laNITED WAR CAPABILITY
The realities of the current nuclear stand-off are such that the
military danger to Asian nations in the coming years is more likely to
arise from limited conflict, ranging from terrorism and organized guerrilla
activity through probes of weak spots on the Chinese periphery to conceivably
a Korea-type of warfare. While recognizingthe strength and mobility of
our military forces in the area, the conferees expressed concern lest the
U.S. be moving away from an adequate capability, particularly a conventional
and anti-guerrilla capability, for dealing with the type of limited war
situations which are most likely to arise in Asia.
The aversion in Asia to the use of any type of nuclear weapon is so
strong that such use would Without question be at great political cost.
Accordingly, as much flexibility as possible with regard to conveltional
vs0 nuclear capability must be maintained for the foreseeable future. At
the same time, lest oUr posture lose its deterrent effectiveness care must
be taken not to give the impression that we would be reluctant, at least
in extremis, to use whatever capability we have in our arsenal in the
aorao
achievement of objectives vital to U.S. and Free World interests.
In this situation the manpower and conventional capability of indigenous
Asian forces play an increasingly important role in deterring aggression
in the area. Of these Free World forces, those in Korea, China and Viet-Nam --
three of the worldos four divided countries -- are the most important.
They and other friendly forces must not only be maintained but sufficient
force improvement carried out on a continuing basis to maintain their
anticipated roles. In Southeast Asia, emphasis should be placed on effective
anti-guerrilla training.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
? 7 ?
The need for the U.S. to see that an adequate military counterweight
to Communist power is provided in the area is as great as ever.
'ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
It is essential that our programs of military aid be continued. We
may hope that the Communists 'have learned, as a result of these programs
which have substantially strengthened the area, that armed aggression will
not pay. In this situation, more attention must be given to meeting the
demands of the peoples of the area for an existence beyond mere survival*
EMphasis should be placed on ,long-range economic development, although
occasional projects of a special or impact nature will be necessary. Means
must be found to render assistance with promptness and efficiency.
The job of demonstrating the possibility of achieving a reasonable rate
of economic development through free institutions., without doing violence
to human dignity and individual rights, is a big one indeed. The U.S*
cannot accomplish it alone. 'Fortunately, the evident turning of the economic
tide in Urope should make it possible for our friends there to assume an
increasing role in Asian economic development. The Developmental Assistance
Group is heartening, if yet tentative, evidence that this may be possible
to a significant extent. There is evidence that Japan, too, may be able
and willing to assume 'anincreasing role in this regard in the area. It
has shown a notably mature sensitivity to the feelings of smaller nations
in its post-war attempts to'regain vital markets, and has gone a long way
in eradicating ill will engehdered during the war.
A special case, however, is the Ryukyus so long as our administration
there continues. Development, aid there is an exclusive U.S. responsibility.
Since the importance of the gyukyus as our principal operational base in
the Far East and the only one under exclusive U.S. control is, if anything,
increasing, it is of vital importance to our interests that the present
acceptance by the Ryukyus and Japan of U.S. administration continue. An
increased emphasis on long-term economic development is prerequisite to this
and it is most important that funds be made available to the High Commissioner
on an annual basis for this iyurpose.
THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY
Parliamentary deMocracy has no deep roots in most of the under-developed
countries of the area. It would not be realistic to expect Western-type
democracy to flourish in the vastly different Asian environment in those
countries. Reversion to authoritarian rule has been a strong and under-
standable temptation. But the principle of government responsive to popular
SECRY2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 8 -
will is not dead or dying in free Asia. Many Asian leaders are searching
constructively for ways of combining the need for strong executive controls
with the advantages of popular government and respect for individual human
rights.
We need to recognize that democracy cannot survive in a country plagued
with insecurity and backwardness. We must be prepared to accept the fact
that in same cases the establishment of strong, benevolent executive-type
governments are required for security, stability and progress. However,
we need to avoid close identification with excessively authoritarian
regimes which do violence to the basic principles of human dignity and
the rights of man, for which. we stand. We believe we should be prepared
to support the growth,of free societies even though such societies may
differ substantially from oui- own model.
REGIONALISM
The area still has little regional consciousness or basis for extensive
regional cooperation. Increased regional military cooperation except within
SEATO does not seem feasible'at this time. However, cooperative efforts
in Southeast Asia should be encouraged in order to meet Communist guerrilla
and insurgent activity which acts increasingly across national borders.
However, there is a slowly growing interest in some countries of
Southeast Asia for increased political cooperation in the face of the growing
power of Communist China. This is likely to continue unless there appears
to be such a shift in the balance of power in the area adverse to the United
States and in favor of Communist China as to make an accommodation with
Communist China more attractive to the countries of the area,
Regional economic cooperation is beset with many difficulties but a
promising start has been made in such projects as the survey of the lower
Mekong River which is beineeponsored by ECAFE. U.N. organizations and the
Colombo Flan are making important contributions. Japan can also make a
useful contribution to this end.
U.S. policies and programs can contribute much to the growth of
regional cooperation, especially in the fields of communications and
transportation. Accordingly U.S. bilateral programs should, wherever
feasible, also be viewed in the regional context. For example, if the road
network of the Southeast Asian mainland countries could be so expanded as
to provide through highways connecting the countries it could have very
material political as"well as economic effects, as well as increase the
military defensibility of the area.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 9
Such projects as the Weapons Demonstrations held by CINCPAC, and to
which military leaders of all the free countries of Asia have been invited,
are also of great value. Itis hoped these can be continued.-
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
There was agreement as to the value of exchange programs, especially
of the FUlbright and leader grant types. They proved their worth
in the furtherance of mutual understanding and have made significant
contributions, in the U.S. as well as abroad, in many fields of academic
and practical endeavor. The'return on investment in these programs is of
such consistently high order as to warrant an increase in financial support
of them.
The interests of the U.S. will be well served in the long term by
Asians in public and private life who have been educated and trained in
America.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
We believe that? -while we have cause for confidence at this turn of
the decade, there is no room for complacency. The past decade has bought
time so that in the coming decade we may be able to achieve more tangible
and lasting results. If this is to be done we may need to adopt methods,
new in both form and dimension; in attacking the problems and seizing the
opportunities that lie ahead. There is need for broader recognition of
the degree to which developments in Asia are sure to affect vitally our
own future security and well-being, and consequently; for increased emphasis
on the importance to us of Asian problems. If we are to enlist the under-
standing and support of nations in this area whose importance is accelerating
so rapidly; we shall have to demonstrate more clearly-that we act confidently
from the basis of positive conviction in the superiority of our institutions
over those of Communism or any other totalitarianism. Since the immediate
post-war period, when there was indeed a possibility that not only much of
Asia but even Western Europe itself might fall to Communism, we have too
often succumbed to the temptation of attempting to motivate the American
people and to enlist the support of Congress on the basis of emphasizing
the threat which we face. The threat undeniably still remains, but we should
give more attention to engendering confidence in ourselves and in others,
not alone in the constancy of our policies and the promptness and effect-
iveness of our responses to force; but also in the positive values of our
fundamental beliefs and free institutions. Survival is elemental, but in
the Asian mind the survival bought through mutual effort in the past decade
is for the purpose of achieving far more positive goals than mere maintenance
sEcRin
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
10
of territorial integrity. The passing of a crisis atmosphere as chronically
characteristic of the area affords us an opportunity to plan and act for
the longer haul. For these plans and actions to be effective there must
be continuity and consistency. We must have no backing and filling on
basic policy and no succession of feast and famine in our economic and
military programs. We must keep everlastingly at the job with a will and
confidence in ultimate success. We see no other choice open to us,
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
Personnel
The conferees recommended that the tour of duty policy as recommended
in last yearos report (Section F. lok Conclusions and Recommendations)
be placed fully in effect. Considerable progress has been made. Direct
transfers should be avoided except under special circumstances.
Revision of the existing efficiency rating system was discussed.
Those present agreed that over-all numerical ratings should be discontinued.
Buildings
Progress in the buildings field was noted. Establishment of a Buildings
Needs Committee with subdieommittees in each regional bureau has afforded
the regional bureau the opportunity to state its most critical requirements.
This has resulted in a greater recognition of and fuller response to the
needs of the Far East area. It was agreed that there is a need in several
countries for construction of single-occupancy apartments to house single
people. Ekperience has particularlydemonstrated that serious morale
problems arise when single -girls are required to share apartments.
Cancellation of the requirement for submitting detailed annual
maintenance and repair estimates has lessened the paper work1oad9 and
establishment of allotments to regional F.B.O. representatives of modest
funds to make routine maintenance and repair of furniture and furnishings
has afforded welcome flexibility. It is recommended that F.B.O. insure that
posts are aware of these allotments and the purposes for Which the funds
may be used.
The presence of Deputy:Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson afforded a
highly valued opportunity to discuss with the Chiefs of Mission personnel
and administrative matters essential to the welfare and operational
effectiveness of the Service.
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 11 -
Mr. Henderson agreed to circularize at a later date a letter dealing
with a number of these problems,
Ellsworth Bunkers,
Ambassador to India '
Homer M. Byingtons, Jr.
Ambassador to the '
Federation of Malaya
Everett F. Drumright9
Ambassador to China
Elbridge Durbrow,
Ambassador to Viet-Nam
John D. Hickerson,
Ambassador to the Philippines
U. Alexis Johnson,
Ambassador to Thailand
Howard P, Jones,
Ambassador to Indonesia
Julius C. Holmesp
Consul General9 Hong Kong
SECRET
Douglas MacArthur
Ambassador to Japan
Walter P. McConaughys,
Ambassador to Korea
Francis N0 Russellp
Ambassador to New Zealand
William J. Sebaldp
Ambassador to Australia
Horace H. Smith9
Ambassador to :Laos
William P. Snows,
Ambassador to Burma
William C. Trimblep
Ambassador to Cambodia
William P. Maddox,
Consul Generalp Singapore
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
C-.
SECRET
12
IL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PARSONS
As Chairman, Mr. Parsons opened the Conference, welcoming the observers
who had traveled long distances to attend, expressing his thanks to
Ambassador Hickerson and his staff for the excellent arrangements made,
and mentioning in particular his pleasure to have as participants
Ambassador. Bunker and Deputy-Assistant Secretary Morgan. lir. Parsons
cited Ambassador Bunkers presence at the Conference as an attempt this
year to present a picture of the Far Pastern area as seen from India, a
key country in considering the future of Asia. He expressed deep appreciation
for the presence of Deputy Under Secretary Henderson at the Conference,
and for his subsequent visits to a number of FE posts.
Mr. Parsons emphasized that no specific policy decisions or objectives
had been set for the deliberations and that the participants should aim at
free discussions of points that they considered of importance. Nevertheless,
it was planned to produce again this year three documents which had been
useful in the past: first, the Summary Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Conference which had proved of continuing value to the Bureau, and were
most helpful in the drafting of the NSC Policy-Paper on the Far East last
year; second, a letter to the Secretary on the Mutual Security-Program,
including comments of the Conferees on the proposed Mansfield Amendment;
and third, a brief communique for the press. Three Committees were established
in advance of the Conference to work on the drafting of these three documents.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 13 .
III. A. WORLD RhvIEW BY DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARYHARE
Mr. Hare opened-his review by saying he would cover four areas,
beginning with Europe, which is still the main ring of the circus,
Western Europe
Mr. Hare characterized the Scandinavian countries as normally undramatic,
and the Iberian Peninsula as showing the stagnant characteristics of the
aftermath of dictatorship. In the Low Countries, we have had some difficulty
with the Netherlands over KLM routes and with Belgium on Congo problems,
including that of an oversupply of nuclear ore, for which India is a
possible purchaser. However, Belgium seems more willing now to discuss
Congo questions with us. Italy continues to try to inject herself into
world affairs, but the problem is that she is internally weak.
As far as France is concerned, DeGaulle is France, and vice versa.
His main preoccupations are the home front, Algeria and external affairs,
in that order. He is motivated primarily by a psychological and subjective
desire to restore Frances prestige-, and is extremely nationalistic in his
thinking. Desiring to be an equal in the Big Three, he has evolved his
"Directorate idea. He believes in cooperation, but not integration, and
particularly not integration in a military sense. He fears a US-Soviet
agreement, and is therefore pushing the concept of Europe as a third force,
while the VS wishes to see Europe thoroughly integrated into NATO. DeGaulle
sees the Soviet threat primarily as lying outside Europe, and considers
China a greater threat than the U.S.S.R. He obviously wants to see France
a member of the nuclear group and he wishes firm European solidarity, but
with France as its leader.
The U.S. regards DeGaulle as the only person who can put backbone
into France and give it a boost forward. We are not fond of his Directorate
idea, some of his advanced ideas on black Africa, nor his hesitancy on
full European integration. However, in sum, it is better to have a strong,
though at times diffiault? ally than a weak France, and we do not anticipate
that DeGaulle will go'off the deep end.
Germany is a slightly different phenomenon, not quite so dependent
upon the personality of one Man. Germany has shown a phenomenal capacity
for recovery, which would undoubtedly have been demonstrated regardless ?
of Adenauftos leadership. ,Adenauer nevertheless is a very strong man,
who exhibits deep faith in_himself as a repository of wisdom,
Adenauer talks re-UnifiCation without really believing it can be
solved in the near futUre. He concentrates seriously on more immediate
questions such as the German alliance with the Free World, Franco-German'
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
(-)
SECRET
-14
friendship, European integration, and disarmament, feeling that this last
in particular would eliminate the German problem.
Great Britain also has Made a remarkable economic comeback. She is
a good ally of the United States but her strength is less than our own?
and therefore there is no real equality in terms of power. For this reason
Britain tends to concentrate on diplomacy, hoping that her diplomatic
skills can make up for other weaknesses.
Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, the doctrine of "many roads to Socialism" has
produced a spectrum with the Poles at one end and the East Germans and
Czechs at the other. While there is real tension in Eastern Europe, the
U.S.S.R. knows that this area is its jugular, and there is no indication
that the Soviet satellite syStem is about to fall apart.
Khrushchev is in-a strong position in the U.S.S.R. HIs personality
cult is being developed, but apparently intended more for the outside world
than for internal purposes. The emphasis on incentives and productivity
has created problems with the old line party members. The current U.S.S.R.
line is that Socialism has been achieved and that Communism must now be
attained. However, the new Soviet man has not developed as imagined.
Bourgeois tendencies and class concepts have emerged. Incentives
established to increase productivity have abetted these tendencies.
This is Khrushchevgs problem, stated theoretically as dogmatism vs. - #*1'
revisionism.
As for the relations between the party and the people, there is a
tendency for the people to take the credit themselves for Soviet accomplishments
rather than crediting them to the party leadership. At the same time, the?
heavy industry race with the U.S. slows the rise in living standards. In
summary, the effort to increase productivity by incentive has produced
certain obstacles to the achievement of the communist system.
Soviet economic achievements have been formidable, as suggested by
certain key statisticss
1953 - 1959s Industrial output has increased 75%.,,
Agricultural output has increased 50k,
Industrial growth has risen 10% a year (compared to
3% in the U.S.)'
Goals to overtake the U.S. in 1970,
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
GNP (% of 11.S.)t
1953
1959
Projected
1961
GNP
35%
46%
57%
Industrial portion
26%
39%
50% (100% by 1975)
Agricultural portion
55%
65%
75% (by 1965)
The consumer has benefited somewhat, but the greater part of increased
production has been reinvested. Consumption in the U.S.S.R. is only
one-fourth that of the U.S., and the consumer share of total GNP is
decreasing. However, the consumption rate is improving by 3.5% per year,
Which is a higher rate than in the U.S. Therefore, psychologically, the
low absolute consumption level is offset by a conspicuous rate of improvement,
Soviet foreign trade is only 1.4% of world trade but is increasing,
particularly with the under-developed countries. Soviet foreign aid amounted
to 8.5 billion dollars by 1959, the major part going to the Soviet bloc.
This aid has not hurt the Soviets much, though the Soviet citizen is ,not
enthusiastic about it. It has been largely in loans,. and much,of. it has
been sub-contracted to the satellite countries. Soviet aid tc. the under-
developed countries has emphasized the buying of.unsalable products.. 'Rost
Soviet aid has been economic rather than military,. The principal_beneficiaries
have been Egypt, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Guinea and Ethiopia.. 'When
the French unwisely withdrew all their technicians from Guinea, Soviet
technicians replaced the French at all levels, and Soviet penetration has
been enormous.
Mr. Hare described how the Soviets have substituted education for
religion and have mobilized the sciences and technology to challenge, and
not to cooperate with the rest of the world. He warned against under-
estimating the Soviet potential in this respect and cited the everiamreasing
figures of the number of specialized graduates in the U.S.S.R.., which we are
far from matching. Quoting a recent Rand Report, he said the Soviets might
well be considered to be first in space technology, and might even, put a
man on the moon this year.
With regard to military developments, the Soviets are concentrating
on long-range striking capability, with decreasing emphasis on manned
aviation, Also, their air defense has increased significantly, to the
concern of SAC. They could hurt our economy badly now, but are not yet
capable of knocking out our deterrent. There are two ways that this might
eventually be accomplished -- by saturation or by increased accuracy.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
-16 -
In sum, the Soviets are in good shape for war and for peace, with no
present fear of either. This is evident in KhrushchWs cocky attitude.
Their policy is still to hasten the "inevitable", meanwhile attempting
to lower our guard by plugging the themes of coexistence and summitry.
Accordingly, we are cautious concerning these concepts.
_ELrbp_s_anRegional Problems
Mr. Hare described briefly the various preparations that we have been
making, particularly for the Summit, and the difficulties we have been
having with some of the smaller countries. Final agreement was reached
that there would be three committees to deal respectively with:
Disarmament, Berlin and Germany, and East-West Affairs. These committees
are composed respectively of five, four and three powers. Besides the
U.S., U.K. and France, the first committee includes Italy and Canada,-
the second Germany, and the third a NATO observer to look after the smaller
nations v interests.
Because the disarmament question was so involved, Mr. Hare outlined
briefly same of the major aspects, emphasizing two main aspects: First,
the question of nuclear testing, on which same progress has been made, and
of which the key problem is detection. It is now a question of which side
will give way -- the Soviets on their stand for complete abolition, or. the
West on our "threshold principle". Second, the question of general
disarmament.; it is interesting that in these negotiations we have reluctantly
accepted the principle of parity -- that is, there will be five Bloc countries
opposing five Western ones. The principal questions center around force
levels, conventional armaments, and outer space. There is a possibility
of some progress on the force levels and outer space, but the difficulty
an the former is, of course, what to do about the Chinese Communists, who
have the largest conventional capability. Negotiations without them are
meaningless, and yet including them would raise the problem of implied
recognition in same minds.
On the third committee, subjects such as East-Vest Relations, non-
interference in internal affairs of countries, and aid to other countries
are included. The French have been rather difficult in this committee.
They want these agreements to take into account spheres of influence.
There are several outstanding economic problems relating to Europe.
First, the OEEC, which began as a European device to share Marshall Plan
aid, is in the opinion of the U.S. outdated and should be revised to
include the U.S, and Canada, Secondly, there are differences between
the EEC (common market) and the FTA (UK-backed). The U.S. has backed the
EEC primarily as a device to promote European integration. The U.S. is
dubious about FTA,
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
-*T
Africa
The rush for independence continues in Africa. The schedule for
independence this year includes a number of countries, with more to
follow. There is little rhyme or reason to the way Africa is emerging.
National boundaries are based on former colonial divisions, often quite
arbitrary, rather than on any more natural or logical distinctions. There
has been much talk of union, but there are tremendous obstacles; instead,
we have a sort of "Balkanization" of Africa.
The independence movement in Africa is anti-colonial and neutralist
as in other areas, but there are differences, including a desire to maintain
economic relations with the colonial powers and the presence of large
foreign communities. The African nationalist movement has shown itself to
be less hyper-sensitive than similar movements elsewhere. National /7dignity"
has specific historical precedents for nationalists in the Near East and
Far East, while there is no such tradition in Africa.
The emergence of new countries in Africa has created numerous inter-
national problems. In the UN, African and Asian nations in a few years
Will be able to swing the balance. There is the serious problem of Soviet
penetration in these new countries. For the US, there is the problem of
organization and money to enable us to play an influential,role in the area.
The Afro-Asian solidarity movement is worthy of special mention. The
initial Cairo Conference in the beginning of 1958 caused considerable concern
among the Western allies. The movement had Nasser ?s backing, and spuriously
claimed to follow in the footsteps of Bandung, although new countries were
involved and the U.S.S.R. was represented. The movement, however, has not
developed as ominously as feared. There has been a certain disenchantment
with Communist participation among the members, and an effort to keep the
movement on a neutralist line. This has created a split between the neutralists
and the pro-Communists in the movement. In summary, the movement has not
caught on as expected and the more responsible leaders in the Afro-Asian
area are suspicious of it.
Western Hemisphere
Mr. Hare spoke of the Presidentls trip to Latin America as "good will"
rather than substantive, with its main purpose to set to rest any feeling
these countries might have of being relegated to a second rate status by
the U.S. The public response was good, and the few disagreeable incidents
were exaggerated in the press. One of the conclusions from the tour was
that we should look at each country differently and not just lump the area
together as "Latin America". Development must be locally generated with our
help. There is obviously tragic misunderstanding of the U.S., as well as
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
sEmmr -
-lb -
a real general fear of future Coban-type revolutions. In this connection,
there appears to be general support for our present restrained policy on
Cuba. The greatest desire in Latin America is for us to talk to them and
to take them into our confidence, meeting them as equals. Consultation
is the best way to meet this desire.
With specific regard to Cuba, our aim is not to antagonize the Cuban
people nor to take any specific action that would rally general support
behind Castro. However, our public and Congress are becoming increasingly
restive. There is no doubt of solid Communist infiltration in Cuba, and
Mikoyangs visit did much to cement relations with the U.S.S.R. The question
is how long we can maintain this attitude; and we must always keep in mind
the strategic importance to us of Guantanamo Bay.
Our difficulties with Panama, primarily over the Canal Zone, have
political and economic connotations. There has been talk of a new canal
through Panama, since the present one will became saturated by 1975. In ,
the Dominican Republic, Trujillo is in real trouble. There is the possibility
of a Castro-type revolution.
Our relations with Canada have improved recently, but Canadags strongly
nationAltstic government is very sensitive about being taken for granted.
In some instances, particularly military projects9 Canada has dragged its
feet for fear of annoying the U.S.S.R. It has also opposed us on our
China policy, but the Tibet and China-India dispute has helped an the latter
score.
Conclusions
In conclusion, Mr. Hare raised several points which he felt we should
keep our eyes on. The first was the future of bi-polarity in world affairs.
It is necessary for us to make progress in the military and disarmament
fields, and in the economic area we must watch our own stability, and yet be
prepared to take up the Soviet challenge on aid. Also, we must be prepared
to accept the challenge in the battle for men's minds. We should keep in
mind the possibility of a third force which might take shape in &rope or
China or India or Japan. If bi-polarization fades out, it would seem the
trend would be toward greater internationalization.
Mr. Hare spoke of nationalism and how the U.S. always seems to be hit
on this score, whereas the Soviet Union, basically opposed to nationalism,
exploits it successfully in propaganda. The U.S. is traditionally
sympathetic to nationalism and we should be able to assume a less defensive
position. In this connection, he mentioned the emerging and re-emerging
countries of Africa, the Near East and Southeast Asia. We have assets in
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
'
SECRET
these countries in our institutions, our economic aid, and our language.
We should also get increased assistance from our European allies who have
now recovered economically.
In the divided and satellite countries, we must keep hopes alive and
in the former, finally promote union on our terms. The U.S.S.R.'s jugular
vein is Eastern Europe. If they that, there is no hope of their
propagating Communism.
We should take an understanding view of neutralism and should be able
to acquiesce in this posture in same areas and countries without weakening
our awn position.
We should also keep our eye on the union movements that are cropping
up both in the political and economic fields, particularly in the Near East
and Africa.
We must also keep up in the scientific and technical race and it
would be well for us in our own work that there be greater and more
generalized indoctrination in this field.
Finally, we must ask ourselves if we are fully aware that life
expectancy in the have-countries is shortened if softness develops. In
this connection, to jolt us from our mood of complacency we need to give
ourselves an occasional kick in the pants.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET,
Under Secretary. Dillon went to Europe in January to discuss these
matters with the Europeans, and their conversations resulted in
(1) The establishment of a trade committee to discuss differences
between the EEC and the FTA. Discussions are to begin this month.
(2) The creation of a committee of four nwise menu to discuss revision
of the OEEC and to report by April 21.
(3) The establishment of an Interim Group pending the 012C revision.
This group is made up of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Portugal, the U.S. and the U.K. This is not a formal, operational
organization, but rather an interim body to insure the continued availability
of capital on suitable terms.
Near East and South Asia
In the NA and an areas there is relative political stability, but
economic dislocation persists. The Soviets have adopted a sugary attitude
towards the Greeks and a tough line with Iran.
The Arab situation will continue to be volatile, but is somewhat
quieter now than it was a short while ago. Forces are in better balance
in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (which seems to have gone through its
anti-U.S. phase). The union of Egypt and Syria is anomalous in the long
term, but is a repetition of history.
With regard to India, the U.S. has attempted to avoid an "I told you
so" policy on the Tibet and Sino-Indian border problems, while maintaining
a sympathetic attitude. The U.S. has also tried to avoid involvement in
the India-Pakistan problem. There has been talk of India and China as
rivals and competitors, but it must be emphasized that China is far ahead
of India in terms of absolute accomplishment. A far greater effort will be
demanded to enable India to catch up.
Pakistan appears to be a little better off internally, and its relations
with India have improved. Afghanistan is more of a problem. While it will
undoubted-1y continue to follow its policy of neutrality, it has gone far
in its cooperation with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was just there and,
interestingly enough, came out in favor of Afghanistan in its border dispute
(Pushtunistan) with Pakistan, using the doctrine of self-determination as
justification.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 21 -
III. B. GENERAL DISCUSSION FOLLOWING DEPT= UNDER SECRETARY HARE'S REMARKS
Mr. Henderson said he wanted to raise the delicate question of racialism
and emphasized that in the past bo years, there has been a casting off of
worldwide control by peoples of European origin. As a result primarily
of the two World Wars, there had been a takeover both internationally and
internally by peoples of non-Etropean origin. Mr. Henderson emphasized
that in any projection over the next ten years, this trend cannot be
ignored, He said that in many instances what is called nationalism is
in reality racialism.
Mr. Parsons said that he wanted to elaborate on FE's involvement in
the disarmament negotiations. He said'that the problem of CammuniSt China
is the basis of this concern. In 1957, a policy had. been. worked oUt..at:
the highest levels of Government which was based on the determination to
attempt to discover, before all else, the Soviet. Union
.
with regard to a disarmament program. It was on this basis that _
Ambassador Wadsworth had begun negotiations on nuclear testing a year ago.
Mt. Parsons added, however, that the problem of Communist China is not: So
acute in negotiations an nuclear testing because China., is. not yet a nuclear
power.
It is on the question of general disarmament, upon which.. negotiations
will begin soon, that there is cause for particular concern.. U.S. leaders
are unanimously and sincerely desirous of facilitating Mr. Eaton's negotiatio4
However, FE is concerned lest discussion of force levels trigger prematurely
the question of Communist China's participation in disarmament negotiations.
There are three phases of the negotiations which might work to this
end. (1) Mr. Eaton has been instructed to propose a number of studies on
disarmament, including the feasibility of a general disarmament ,conference.
This would inevitably raise the question of Communist China, possibly before
the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions could be determined. FE has
feared that this might take the Soviet Union off the hook and enable it to
use the issue of Communist China's participation to stir up dissension among
the non-bloc countries. In this regard, Communist China only recently
announced that it would not honor any disarmament system to which it was not
a party, and implicitly, a negotiating party. However, the U.S.S.R. has
thus far avoided the question of China's participation in disarmament
negotiations. (2) The United States will inevitably want to raise the question
of an escape clause in any general disarmament program and this discussion
could not be meaningful unless the question of Communist China were raised.
(3) The question of second-stage reduction of forces. Reduction of force
levels could have serious consequences with regard to the United States'
ability to maintain its security arrangements in the Far East. Here again
the question of a settlement of the Communist China question might be raised
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
U
SECRET
prematurely. Moreover, there is concern that the question of Communist
-
China might be raised in the first negotiations in which there will be a
parity between the Western and Bloc representatives.
Therefore, FE has favored a reassessment of general disarmament nego-
tiating plans, and hopes a new tactics paper will clear the Department
which will seek to minimize the risks involved and delay the moment when
the question of Communist China will enter the negotiations.
Mr. Knight added that general disarmament principles had been agreed
upon, but the big question in Defense is how to implement them. Defense
cannot agree to force reductions before the Soviets are smoked out, and
there is therefore a need to adopt delaying tactics until a real evaluation
of Soviet intentions can be made.
Ambassador MacArthur said that on his recent trip home, he noted
considerable restiveness on the Hill regarding our Chinese policy, and
asked whether Mr. Parsons could give some assessment of Congressional
sentiment on that score.
Mr. Parsons replied that this, of course, was of vital importance but
very difficult to assess at present. There was, however, one distinctive
aspect. The House supports our China policy unquestioningly and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in particular appears to understand it and its
implications for all the countries around the rim of the Chinese mainland.
As a test of House sentiment, he noted the overwhelming vote against Chinese
representation in the United Nations. In the Senate, homever? there are -
several prominent figures who in an attempt to be constructive are exploring
ways of entering into meaningful negotiations from which both sides could
benefit. The whole question should be fully aired, because the.. Chicoms have
indicated that no compromise would be acceptable to them which waald not
involve relinquishment of Taiwan and U.S. withdrawal from the West Pacific.
Mr. Parsons quoted the Pe leos Daily.ga immediate and strong reaction
to his recent Wisconsin speech outlining the United States China policy.
He said it reaffirmed his feeling that the Chicoms want an agreement. that
will be '1,000% on their terms. With further regard to the Senate, he
thought the chances somewhat less than even for a major debate_this. session
on China but noted that all Democratic presidential candidates are under-
standably looking for a foreign policy issue to exploit.
The Conference participants expressed a general desire to receive
copies of the Peoples Daily article. (Note: sent participants under cover
of letter from Frank Lockhart, dated April Up 19600
Minister Holmes said he felt a concentrated campaign was necessary
to explain our China policy not only on the diplomatic front, but more
SECRET
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 23 -
especially to the U.S. public. He noted that for several reasons our China
policy had a bad reputation in many quarters. It was considered negative.
We should show that the true negativism is on the Communist side. The
weakness of our posture lies in the way it is explained.
Ambassador MacArthur added that in Congress some younger elements are
beginning to realize that they can make names for themselves in the foreign
policy field, and are exploiting our China policy to this. end.
Mr. Parsons agreed with both speakers and illustrated how difficult
it was to get the issue before the American people. While diplomatic., missions
had reported a significant response to his Milwaukee speech abroad, even
the New York Times did not print a commentary on it.
Ambassador Drumright related his shock in discovering the sparse foreign
news coverage in the U.S. press when he was home recently*
Ambassador Johnson stated that in his experience serious-minded
Congressional visitors are impressed by FE arguments in favor of our. China
policy.
Mr. Morgan added that if the fact that our China policy is primarily
a response to Communist China's aggressive actions were constantly emphasized,
it would inevitably transmit itself to the general public.
Ambassador McConaughy felt that additional work should be done to prepare
the American people for the possibility of dealing with Communist China
without recognition. Mr. Parsons agreed and emphasized that the U.S. is
already negotiating more with Communist China than are many others.
Ambassador Hickerson asked if the U.S. did not sign international
conventions with the U.S.S.R. before recognition. Mr. Henderson confirmed
that we did, noting that the acts were not to imply recognition.
Minister Holmes asked if Mr. Parsons' speech on the China:policy
would be publicized. lir. Parsons answered that a pamphIet_On_his_Nilwankee
speech had been published by the Department. It would_reach:students and
academic people, but not the public at large.
Ambassador Byington suggested that FE discourage Congressional economic
studies which postulate a change in U.S. policy-toward Communist China and
which speculate how such a change might affect other governments' trade with
Communist China. He explained that governments in the area are extremely
sensitive to any indication of any possible change in 'U.S.-China policy.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- -
Mr. Parsons stated that FE is also disturbed by the proposed economic
studies, one of which was recently requested by Senator Magnuson. It is
difficult, however, to turn them down without giving the impression that
the Department has something to hide. He added that the Secretary is
personally interested in the problem.
Mr. Allen suggested that one of the difficulties in selling our China
policy is that it appears too static. Mr. Henderson added that it is at
times almost apologetic. Mr. Parsons agreed and added that the Department
should definitely not be half-hearted in its exposition of the policy.
Ambassador Durbrow remarked that President Diem is interested in
knowing whether the question of divided countries will be generally discussed
at the Summit Meeting inasmuch as the German question will be given such
prominence. Eh. Parsons answered that he has had no such indication.
Ambassador McConaughy mentioned Koreaos concern that unification on
acceptable terms not be neglected in any summit Far Eastern discussion,
while Ambassador Durbrow explained that President Diem is insistent that
Viet-Nam not be discussed in such a forum. Ambassador Drumright added
that Taipei has registered similar concern lest the general question of
divided countries be raised at the Summit Meeting,
Minister Holmes suggested that the disarmament negotiations might give
an opportunity-to maneuver Khrushchev into an embarrassing position with
regard to Communist China,
Mr. Parsons agreed and added that Mr. Murphy had emphasized this
possibility just before leaving the Department, but that the U.S. must be
careful haw it is accomplished. The tactic is based on that is sometimes
referred to as the "doctrine of partial responsibility" inasmuch as
Khrushchev talks peace and disarmament, while Communist China acts in
completely opposing fashion. The feeling is that we should not allow
Khrushchev to play it both ways. Both Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon have
emphasized this. However, there are those who oppose such action.
Ambassador Bohlen, for example, fears that we might push the Soviet Union
and Communist China together at a time when decisive forces are pushing
them apart. The policy must be carried out carefully but there seems to
be no harm in showing how hollow Khrushchevos statements are.
Ambassador Drumright pointed out that Khrushchev is also vulnerable
on his divided Germany policy, which is anathema to Communist China.
Ambassador Johnson raised the question of the need for a counter to
Soviet claims of spectacular economic growth. He wondered whether there
were not some ceiling on their rate of growth, mentioning that 50% of the
work force was engaged in food production as opposed to the 12 to 15% in
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 25 .
the U.S. He added that he realized that the statistics were not reliable
and that much depended on base figures. He noted the danger of appearing
to suggest that the Soviet Union was indeed the wave of the future and
proposed that the Conference should express the need for counter propaganda,
such as a summary of United States accomplishments in terms of production.
Ambassador Hickerson observed that low base figures for Soviet
production made it possible for en all absolute production increases to
show up as immense percentage increases, while U.S. production, with high
base figures, yielded low percentage figures even with high absolute
increases. He noted further that the use of percentages rather than
absolute figures in Soviet production was grossly misleading.
Mr. Henderson said that he thought it unwise to deprecate Soviet
growth rates, particularly as advances were concentrated in the field of
heavy industry, which most directly increased the U.S.S.R.'s power potential.
In contrast, great increases in television set production and gadgetry, in
the U.S. did not add to U.S. national strength.
It VAS generally agreed that it was important to recognize the separate
requirements of (a) domestic policy, which demand frank recognition of
U.S. failures to devote adequate resources to the increase of national
strength, and (b) the foreign propaganda requirement of not encouraging the
world to believe that the Soviet achievements in increasing national power
in the fields of weapons, science, and education were calamitously superior
to that of the Free World.
Ambassador MacArthur noted that there had been a series of gaffes
by the Soviet Union in Asia and questioned whether they were caused by
stupidity or by other reasons, such as ignorance. Mr. Parsons said he
personally felt these Soviet mistakes came from the compulsive nature of
their ideology that dulls their sensitivity-to the views of others.
Mr. Henderson and Ambassador Bunker agreed, and the latter cited
Khrushchev's ill-received speech to the Indian Parliament on the value
of the one-party system.
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 26 -
IV. A. REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE FELIXBERTO SERRANO PHILIPPINE SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Parsons opened the afternoon session by introducing
Secretary Serrano to the group and the participants to Secretary Serrano.
Secretary Serrano began by expressing his hope that Baguio mould continue
to be the site of the Conference, and his pleasure to be invited again to
address the group.
Secretary Serrano stated that he hoped that he had been invited not
simply as the Foreign Secretary of the country in which the Conference was
being held, but because he Philippines is the staunchest ally of the
United States in the area. He affirmed that despite legal differences
and family quarrels, and regardless of specific military arrangements between
the two countries, the Philippines would always stand by the United States
in times of peril.
He said that the Conference is of importance to the region and therefore
to the Philippines and that the importance of the Conference to the United
States is evident in the distinguished participation in the Conference.
He said that he would like to take the liberty of covering some of the
salient features of the region, not just the tremendous population and area
involved, but the variety of political arrangements which are included.
He cited the uncommitted nations of the area, others with commonwealth "
ties, and those openly allied with the United States. At the same time,
he mentioned the numerous criss-crossing defense arrangements such as
SEAM -United States bilateral treaties, and the Communist alliances.
lastly, he pointed to three potential colossi in the area -4- Red China,
Japan, and India. Red China is opposed to the United States, Japan is
allied, and India is neutral. By reason of their know-how and economic
power, these are the three principal indigenous forces in the area. At
the same time the U.S. is the common denominator in this multiplicity
through its treaty arrangements and active interests in each country of
the area.
Secretary Serrano said that he would like to review the role of the
United States in the Far East from the Philippine standpoint. First, the
progress of Communism appears to have made the U.S. realize that it must
take an active interest and discharge its responsibilities. Isolation
would make the U.S. position precarious. The Philippines is not concerned
whether EuropeAttieir, Asia is first in U.S. eyes, but rather with the nature
of the U.S. role in the Far East. Serrano mentioned five distinct methods
used by the U.S. in the discharge of this role: 1) Regional alliances;
2) Bilateral treaties; 3) Economic programs; 4) Informational activities;
and 5) the "checkmating" of Communist China with Japan and India. He said
that from the Filipino view the U.S. objectives of regional security and
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 27 -
democratic ideals and its methods of achieving these objectives are sound.
It is rather the attitudes and techniques relied upon which are more
vulnerable to criticism. First, the U.S. seems to demonstrate a fear
of Communism more than a faith in its own system. This leads in turn to
an emphasis on certain conditions in the granting of assistance rather
than* emphasis on generosity. The U.S. is therefore not reaching the
heart of the recipients of its aid, and instead creates the psychological
impression that the recipients are being bought.
With regard to SEATO, there is a tendency for Asian members to compare
NATO and SEATO and to feel that the UK and France, who no longer have
substantial interests in the area, are not seriously concerned with the
military-aspects of the treaty. The Philippines has readily come out with
bold statements of support for U.S. actions counteracting Communist use of
force in the area. The economic aspects of SEATO also need more emphasis.
The economic provisions of SEATO have been largely ignored, with only token
amounts for schools and fellowships.
The U.S. must atteMOt to understand the Asian heart. Heart more than
mind is, important to Asians.
U.S. assistance to Japan and India creates the impression of the
deliberate development of a counter-poise to Communist China. Asians in
less developed countries feel that by pursuing this course the U.S. is
creating a potential industrial and military vacuum .in Southeast Asia,
and that if the U.S. is forced by necessity-to withdraw from the area, it
will be defenseless against Japan or China. These are the Philippine
misgivings. As long as the U.S. is in the area, well and good, but if. the
U.S. is forced tO withdraw, the military and industrial power of. China and
Japan (India is not yet a real threat) will pose a danger to the area.
Mr. Parsons thanked Secretary Serrano for giving the Conference the
benefit of his views, and said that he hoped that the United States will
show more clearly in the future that it feels deeply the things that it is
for and is less concerned with the things it is against. He emphasized
U.S. resilience and U.S. confidence in its ability to protect the freedom
of the area.
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
L.)
SECRET
- 28 -
IV. B. GENERAL DISCUSSICiN FOL.WWJNG SECRETARY SERRANWS REMARKS
Ambassador Johnson said he felt Secretary Serranogs views on the
question of our being motivated by confidence or by fear indicated the
need for us to have reason for confidence in ourselves. Referring to the
morning discussion he thought comparison of the U.S. and the Soviet Union
was not as bad as it might seem, and mentioned specifically percentage
figures on economic growth. Mr. Hickerson agreed, and said we must remember
that growth from nothing always must be rapid and that comparative figures
of annual growth often have little meaning. We need something valid from
Washington which can be used in the field. There was general agreement on
this need.
Mr. Henderson stated that from a public relations point, these Soviet
figures are not good. He cautioned, however, that rapid U.S. strides in
certain areas, for instance consumer goods, are not indicative of growing
strength. What is really important is the amount of U.S. industrial effort
that is devoted to strengthening the basic power of the nation. Mr. Hare
agreed, and noted that in terms of absolutes, the Soviets were putting effort
into items of strength like basic military and economic development.
Minister Holmes questioned what was going to happen to the political
and social aspects of the Soviet State and what effect this effort toward
po%er would have internally. This led to a general discussion on whether
the Soviet regime was or was not undergoing pressures that might change
the regime and whether the power balance was going to continue to change
in favor of the Soviet Union, Mr. Henderson noted that internal pressures
on the Soviet monolith had been hopefully discussed for years. Mr. Parsons
said that he felt it was encouraging that there appeared to be in some of the
more influential sectors in the U.S. a desire to reexamine. the trend and
see whether we were following the path toward strength or not. Mr. Henderson
felt that Jt was needed was precaution, not fear and also preparation. for
the worst. Ambassador Durbrow agreed and said that it was foolish... for us
to think we could sit back and wait for the Soviets and the Chinese. to
break. Ambassador Smith questioned how serious were the strains within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Mr. Durbraw answered that he could see no
fundamental disagreement between them.
Mr. Allen asked what Secretary Serrano had in mind by his statement
concerning the U.S. fear of Communism and the conditions imposed on U.S.
aid. Ambassador Hickerson answered that it was partly Filipino rhetoric,
but added that Serrano also referred to our emphasis on the threat from
our enemies. Ambassador Hickerson explained that we couched our appeals to
U.S. public opinion in these terms and these statements are widely publicized
in the Philippines.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 29 -
Mr. Parsons added that we make other countries feel that they are
more important to us than we are to them. A difficulty is that we must
emphasize this to our own Congress. Ambassador Hickerson remarked that a
Filipino businessman had recently told him that he felt we should emphasize
the economic benefits accruing from our aid rather than the military
justification. Ambassador Johnson asked whether we must still use the old
approach to Congress. Mr. Knight commented that it is not just our
Congressional presentation but also our actions that give rise to this
attitude. Mr. Henderson added that it is not just Congress but also the
taxpayer who is involved; the taxpayer must still be frightened into paying
increased taxes.
Ambassador Durbrow commented that our emphasis on aid to Japan, India
and Taiwan has created the impression, as indicated by Serranogs statements,
that we will short-change the other countries in the area. Ambassador
Hickerson added that Serrano is genuinely concerned over the potential
Japanese threat and also feels that the Philippines have gotten the short
end of the deal in aid relative to Japan.
Ambassador Snow stated that Mr. Hare had raised a point that perhaps
should cause more concern than the Soviet-U.S. economic race. Khrushchev?
in his visit to Rangoon, chose to emphasize Soviet scientific achievements.
This line impressed his listeners, and it seems that the U.S. is less in
a position to refute the Soviets on this than on any other point. Our
Leader Exchange Program has been successful because ottPtechnological
prestige, and it is the elite to whom the Exchange Program in theSe countries
is directed who are impressed with Soviet scientific accomplishments.
Ambassador Trimble confirmed that there is a similar problem in Cambodia.
Sihanouk went to Red China and was much impressed by the same thing. However,
as he is always very flattered to have information passed to him on a
confidential basis, perhaps something could be arranged along this line to
impress Sihanouk with U.S. technological prowess. Ambassador Snow remarked
that the recent bathosphere achievements made a favorable impression on
Rangoon through the efforts of one friendly editor.
Admiral Felt commented that he was very interested in this information,
for he had been asked earlier in the week when he appeared before Congress
What reaction there had been in Asia to the bathosphere and had_responded
that he had seen nothing to indicate that the bathosphere operation. had
gotten a play in the free Asian press.
'Mr. Parsons remarked that weapons demonstrations have been an effective
technique in the past.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 30 -
Ambassador Snow explained that he had been referring not so much to
the military as to Soviet intellectual and scientific achievements as
having impressed the Burmese. Ambassador Johnson canmented that U.S.
press agencies have played an important role in undermining U.S. prestige
in the scientific and military fields by playing up our missile failures.
Mr. Henderson mentioned that he would like at some point during the Conference
to discuss with the ambassadors individually-their experience with science
attaches.
Ambassador Sebald suggested that the Chiefs of Mission themselves
might at some time witness a weapons demonstration to be able to discuss
U.S. military power more effectively.
Admiral Felt stated that such a demonstration could be arranged in
Okinawa, perhaps after next yearns Conference.
Mr. Parsons pointed out that Ambassadors Snow and Trimble had raised
the subject on the basis of their experience in uncommitted countries and
added that he would be interested in the attitude of ambassadors to countries
allied to the U.S.
Ambassador MacArthur answered that the question of relative U.S.-Soviet
military-power has not been such a problem in Japan, but the Soviet Embassy
had succeeded in arranging effective propaganda displays of scientific
accomplishments.
Mr. Allen commented that this is an important public information
problem. The National Space Agency is not as exhibit-minded as the Atomic
Energy Commission. There is general concern in Washington over the matter
of U.S. scientific prestige.
Gallup polls taken abroad have shown a devastating reaction to the
question, "Who will be ahead in ten years in science and in military-power?"
The answer overwhelmingly has been the U.S.S.R. However, this does not
mean the people answering the question are therefore pro-Russian. We -
must continually emphasize our determination to live up to our military
obligations.
Mr. Parsons remarked that perhaps Soviet scientific and military
achievements have more impact in neutralist countries. Ambassador Jones
agreed that in Indonesia each accomplishment has tended to add to Soviet
prestige. Ambassador Bunker commented that the Indians tend to take a more
sophisticated attitude and are skeptical of Soviet propaganda.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 31 -
V. HAVE WE REACHED THE TURNING OF THE TIDE IN ASIA?
Assistant Secretary Parsons - Keynoter
Parsons began his remarks by commenting that the subject of
his talk, he realized, was deliberately provocative. Nevertheless,
as this conference was being held at the turn of the decade, he felt
that it was timely to take a look at problems in a longer perspective,
back through the 1950gs and forward through the 19601s. In this way,
U.S. policies might be tested in depth to see how they had served us in
the past and how they measured up in terms of problems anticipated in
the future. He stated that personally he felt that U.S. policies had,
on the whole, been sound and continued to be vital to the survival of the
Far Eastern area. Nevertheless, certain questions might be asked of
ourselves: Mix:A image of ourselves are we projecting in the area? Are
we stressing too much what we are against and too little what we are for?
Are we too often defensive in our posture, rather than affirmative in our
attitude? Do we tend to take our friends for granted in our preoccupation
with the enemy threat? It is said that the interests of Nationalist
movements in the area are increasingly identified with us and less with
the Communists. Are we promoting this trend? Are we trying to anticipate
future problems?
Are we in Washington getting across to other sections of the Department
what is happening in the Far Eastern area? All the countries in the Far
East except Australia and New Zealand are on the Communist perimeter and
subject to the Communist threat, and at one time there was considerable
preoccupation with the Far East in our government. Should FE endeavor
to draw greater attention to Far Eastern problems and its own views of
world affairs?
These are all problems which Mr. Parsons said he hoped the conferees
could turn to from time to time during the conference. In the next hours
the conference would proceed to a discussion of the next ten years, as
seen from key capitals of the area. The partiapants would discuss the
Sino-Soviet relationship, the problem of leaderShip and succession in the
free countries of the area and, finally? the question of security versus
economic development as well as the problem of what can be done to promote
a trend toward greater regional cohesion and cooperation.
In an effort to gain perspective, Mr. Parsons stated that he would like
to take a look back to the beginning of the decade and contrast the situation
then with that which obtains now at the outset of a new decade.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 32 -
in 1949, Mainland China fell to the Communists, and the Asian
heartland was henceforth Communist dominated. This created problems
that continued to challenge the U.S. throughout the decade.
In 19509 India and Pakistan were engaged in a fratricidal struggle;
two major free world nations facing each other, rather than the true threat
to the North. In 1951 the "liberation" of Tibet brought an end to the
British policy of maintaining Tibet as a buffer, without a murmur from
India. In Burma there was chaos. The countryside was unsafe and the
government controlled Rangoon and not much else.
In Indonesia, the second Dutch police action had provoked almost a
scorched-earth policy-from the Indonesians. Communist intrigue and violence
were everywhere interwoven with the chaos of the movement. The situation
was similar in Malaya, where the British were determined but pessimistic.
In Indo-China it seemed a question not of whether but when it would
be lost and of what then would happen to Thailand. In the Philippines,
Communist Huk dissidence was on the rise. Japan was still an occupied
power, depending upon the U.S., uncertain how its institutions would
evolve, questioning the new and militant labor unions, unsure of its
national destiny's, unsure if it could establish a viable economic existence.
In Taiwan, the Mainland Chinese had just arrived and were disliked by
the native Taiwanese who remembered past misrule. President Truman and
Secretary Acheson had just announced the U.S. policy of noninvolvement.
In Korea the Communist attack came in June 1950 and completely changed
the situation. Although the war was to some extent a loss of face for the
white man, at the same time it served as a catalyst to United States
determination to redress the imbalance in the area. The same administration
which had announced so different a policy in January 1950 embarked on our
present China policy. The policy is thus in a real sense bipartisan,
because it was initiated by a Democratic administration. The present
administration added the structure of bilateral and multilateral security
pacts; and the aid programs, which had meant so much in Europe, came to
the Far East.
The situation today contrasts with the grim picture of the early
1950s. The Tibetan Revolt in 1959 and the Communist suppression that
followed has done violence to Nehrugs concept of Asian solidarity and has
produced a significant popular reaction in India. Although Chinese Communist
harshness and arrogance may again give way to the "smile tactics" of Bandung,
it is doubtful if the image of Communist China will ever be the same in
Pakistan, India and Burma. An element of fear has been permanently added.
Nevertheless, the United States must still reckon with the pull which a
colored Asian power has for other Asians.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
de/ ?er
8ECR1Ur.
?33?
In Burma the dissidence has been reduced. There is evidence of maturity
in the manner in which the Ne Win Government took charge and then gave
back its control after orderly and free elections; and the new government
will in the future not have to depend on the left wing pro-Communist elements
of the party.
In Indonesia, there is a certain immaturity and confusion which ultimately
stem from the failUre of the Dutch colonialists to delegate any responsibility
to the Indonesians. 'Share are tremendous difficulties an the economic side
and in the achievement of political stability. Nevertheless; there is
less negative talk and the U.S. influence is a more important factor.
In Malaya the emergency has been declared aver. The Malayan 'Government
has handled its affairs well, even its difficult comnunal problem. In
.Singapore the situation is serious, but has not deteriorated as feared.
In.Hang Kong, at the beginning of the 1950s, the Colony existed on a
day-to-day basis. It has since developed in a remarkable fashion. It is
at present a city-state? an economic unit of its own; and the administration
is looking now towards a possible rather than an impossible future.
Australia is undergoing a great burgeoning of national life. .It is
aware of the importance of developments to the north and is working. in
active cooperation with the United States.
In Viet-Nam, the developments have been close to miraculous....* one
predicted five or six years ago that Viet-Nam woad survive. :Deite_its
security problems, it has made extraordinary progreds. The'aituation:in.
Laos and Cambodia has also stabilized in a remarkable. fashion;:-.They. have
both survived, Cambodia despite its often ambiguous ways, including_reaognition
of Communist China, Laos as the keystone of the area. In Laos there has been
a remarkable shift in the situation. .The elite is no longer confused about
the riature of the Patbet Lao. .The problem today is almost one of restraining
than front ill-advised anti-communist action. ?Moreover? Laos is no longer
an obscure little place. .The interest of the United Nations and other
peoples in Laos has added a psychological deterrent.
In the Philippines, even though the accomplishments of the Magsaysay
era have been eclipsed somewhat by developments under the present adminis-
tration, Garcia has correctly read the results of the recent election and
the elections themselves serve as an indication of the democratic vitality
of the country. Most important, the Huk threat is over.
In Taiwan the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders have established a workable
relationship. The Taiwanese, moreover, are as militantly anti-Communist as
the Mainlanders, Taiwan has achieved the second highest living standard in
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
C.)
SECREP
- 311 -
Asia, with the possibility of an economic break-through in the next decade.
There is political stability and there has been an improvement in the
external posture of Taiwan following the :Allies-Chiang communique*
Korea is the symbol of the collective security effort of the United
Nations and the United States has the staunch Republic of Korea to work
with.
In Japan the recent signing of the Security Treaty is a real milestone.
Japan voluntarily sought alignment with the United States, ten thousand
miles away, at the risk of alienating the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Jai:miner:is-
have recovered their morale and their sense of national goals. !Their economic
recovery needs little mention..
Therefore, there has been a turning of the tide in the free Far East
as far as Communist expansion is concerned. Moreover, there is now a
line of demarcation between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds.
' There has been consolidation of free world forces and momentum has been
generated in the building of national institutions. The very acts of
the Communists have dissipated the atmosphere previously favorable to
them. Their.use of force in the Taiwan Straits and in Tibet, for example,
and their interference and pressures in internal affairs have produced
disillusionment. There has also been dissatisfaction with the Bloc Aid
Program. Peiping's harsh and unyielding stance has also contributed to -
this disillusionment. Therefore, on the psychological side there has been
a certain changing of the tide as far as the image of Communist, China is
concerned. Moreover, territorially, except for the Tachen'Islandsrthere
have been no further losses to the Communists; and in Laos, two provinces
have been recovered from them. The United States can take some credit
for this change because of the constancy of its policies, its posture of
dependability and ability, and its own determination and ability to counteract
Communist use of force.
In noting, some of the gains he felt had been made in the past dedade,
r, Parsons noted a better understanding of the true nature of CoMmunism;
brought on in part by disillusionment at events on the Mainland'and'afthe- -
same time by a better understanding of U.S. motivation. Our counterbalancing
presence is appreciated more, and the U.S. is in effect the one common
element in the area, as Secretary 'Serrano had noted.
As for a growing sense of regionalism, he noted that SEATO, which was '
not a natural evolution of regionalism and was formerly generally mistrusted,
is now being more appreciated by Asian countries such as Indonesia. As
other indications of a beginning sense of regionalism, he cited the Mekong
River Project, SEAFET? and the Weapons Demonstrationywhich imparted a
feeling of regionalism in a military sense.
SECREP
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013209/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Nag
?
Stumm'
- 35 -
Colonialism has became less of an issue. Asian countries formerly
preoccupied with the issue of colonialism now direct their efforts toward
real and immediate problems. -Equally encouraging is the emergence of
promising second generation of leadership in some of these countries.
While there has been no really dramatic shift in the allegiance of the\
overseas Chinese nor in their assimilation, there are encouraging signs\
of Assimilation in some of the countries where they are numerous. \
On the economic front; it is encouraging that the Development
Assistance Group has indicated that a number of European countries, have
reached the point where they can lend economic assistance to Asia 'tohelp
turn the tide. Our own continued economic stability has helped. to give
Asian nations ,a more favorable image of the U.S. .Also favorable Wee the
dramatic contest between President Eisenhower's reception and that of
Khrushchev. No assessment, however; had been made as to Whether that was
a reflection of the President's personality or greater appreciation of
what we stand for as against the Soviets,
While during most of the last decade there haS been a crisis'
atmosphere in Asia, MB are now permitted to look ahead. The menace of -
the Red Chinese is now recognized throughout.the area. However, Communist
China still retains the initiative. We have, however, learned the effectiveness
of a graduated; tailored response to Chinese aggression, and have demonstrated
it.. In this connection; Mr. Parsons observed that unfortunately we seemed
to be moving to an almost exclusively nuclear capability, thus tending to'
leave us only the alternatives of withdrawal or precipitating a holocaust.
It is foolish to assume anything but continued formidable Chinese
Communist power and close partnership with the Soviets. It is questionable,
however, whether the success of the Chinese forced-draft methods will
attract other nations in the area. The attraction of the more rapid
industrial progress achieved by forced industrialization and authoritarian
rule in Red China may be offset by maintenance of human values and national
culture in the case of the Free Asian societies,
In the U.S., Mr. Parsons noted general support for our China policy,
but a support which can easily be eroded. .Also; the Balkanization!' 'of
Africa can change the picture in the UN on the China question.-It must
be noted that our Congress and people are becoming tired of aid.programs
which apparently hate no end in sight. We must progress along the line
of self-help in the area.
In sum, the need to redress the balance in Asia is just as strong
in 1960 as in 1950. There has been a considerable measure of success by
the Free Far East.; but the central problem of how to deal with Communist
China is far Pram solved. Thus; there is no room for complacency, but there
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
lk.)
SECRET
36
is cause for confidence. There is a solid growth of belief in the wisdom
of our policies and in our capability for dealing with the future. ?
We 'Trust, however, remain strong and alert, and stick to our principles,
molding our ideas to suit changing circumstances. During the 50.3?we gained
time. Now in the 600s it is up to us to decide what to do with it.
?
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECUT
37
VI. A. THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS SEEN FROM TOKYO
Ambassador MacArthur - Keynoter
Ambassador MacArthur prefaced his remarks by saying that his ten-year
projection was based on three assumptions: (1) that there will not be
a major war; (2) that there will not be a major world depression; (3) that
the Soviet Union and Communist China will maintain their alliance and their
expansionist policy in South and Southeast Asia, but that Communist
expansionism in Southeast Asia will be generally contained.
On the basis of these assumptions, the next decade in Japan will
continue the pace of the last fifteen years, which has produced the
greatest fundamental changes since Japan's emergence from feudalism.
Economic factors over the next decade will primarily determine the nature
of Japanese policies, both internal and external.
Japanese Domestic Projection
A. Economic
Ten years from now, Japan will be an even more modern, highly indus-
trialized power than at present, with a population of one-hundred million,
a high sustained rate of GNP growth and a labor force of same sixty-eight
million. National income will double, bringing it roughly to the level of
some of the industrial countries of Western Europe. This will be aocompanied
by substantial strengthening and broadening of Japan's middle class. Japan's
industrial structure will increasingly shift to heavy industrial products
and chemicals. With increasing Japanese ascientific breakthroughs", we can
expect Japan to produce nuclear-powered merchant ships, put rockets into
outer space, and came to the fore in electronics and automation. Although
Japan is now self-sufficient in rice and will expand its agricultural output,
it will not achieve food self-sufficiency because of population increases.
To deal with this growing population will require a steadily increasing
level of industrial production and the development of increased sources
of raw materials and increased markets. Japan will be primarily interested
in developing South and Southeast Asia as a source of materials and markets.
B. Political
The evolution of Japanese politics over the next ten years will be
affected by three factors: (a) the newness of the democratic system;
(b) the residues of the occupation; (c) Japan's re-emergency as an independent
sovereign nation.
We must constantly bear in mind that modern democracy in Japan is very
young, but the Japanese people are attached to the democratic reforms and
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 38 -
institutions introduced during occupation. However, in view of Japanes
many years of prior evolution, we can now expect to see an independent,
fully sovereign Japan modify certain of the laws and practices imposed
during the occupation, but this need not cause alarm.
At present, the factionalism within the Conservative Party is the
greatest cause of domestic political instability. This factionalism will
continue to plague the Conservative Party over the next ten years, but we
may see some improvement as the old-line leadership is replaced by
leaders. One of the most important post-war political developments in
Japan has been the formation of the new Democratic Socialist Party. The
Japanese voters need no longer choose between right or extreme left.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Conservatives will remain firmly in
the saddle for at least the next five years and should dominate the
political picture for the next ten years.
Communist and leftist penetration in Japan occurred primarily in the
press, labor and education. While the press will continue for many years
to be basically anti-Government and left of center, it has recently shown
some improvement and there is hope that it may continue in a more objective
and constructive direction. Labor has been heavily infiltrated by the
Communists. Leadership of SOHYO is solidly pro-Communist. However, a
balancing factor is ZENRO, militantly anti-Communist. In general, the
prospect appears good for labor to develop in a sound and healthy direction
in the next ten years. In education, deeply-penetrated by the Communists 9
there are hopeful signs that leftist influence among teachers and university
students will steadily diminish over the next ten years.
Militarism and the extreme right in Japan are totally discredited and
there are no prospects for a rebirth of either.
In sum, the domestic political situation in Japan should improve over
the next ten years as a result of the rise in standards of living; the
strengthening of the middle class; the reduction in leftist influence in
press, labor, and education; and the prospects of some reduction in
factionalism. The Conservative Party, during that period, will continue
to hold or share power, with its domestic policies based on a middle-of-the-
road course.
Japanese Foreign Policy
In foreign policy, there are three courses of action open to Japans
(a) close cooperation and alignment with the Free World, particularly the
United States; (b) a course of expedient opportunism where Japan would
blackmail and play the Free World off against the Communist world; and
(c) political and economic accommodation with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 39 -
In the final analysis, Japan's international alignment will depend
on where and with whom she can earn a living through trade. If the U.S.
and other free countries give Japan access to a fair and reasonable share
of their markets, conservative Japan is not likely to make an accommodation
with the Communists.
A. Relations with the U.S.
As far as economic relations with the U.S. is concerned, Japan has
been our second largest export market and we are Japan's largest single
market. Japan is also an especially important market for U.S. agricultural
products. U.S. private technical assistance has played a great part in
Japan's economic and industrial recovery. On the assumption that U.S.
liberal trade policies will continue for the next ten years, the relative
U.S.-Japanese market positions will remain at approximately the same level.
It is essential that Japan Continue to be tied to the Free World by
a military security arrangements, , because if Japan were militarily neutral,
the temptation to political neutrality would greatly increase. This tie
must be through Japan's security arrangements with the U.S. It is likely
that the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be ratified and tie Japan
solidly to the U.S. over the next eleven years. During this period, Japanese
bases and logistical facilities will remain indispensable to our "forward
strategy" in the Western Pacific, and will enable us to maintain both
U.S. and Free Asian forces in the Far East at greatly lower costs than would
otherwise be the case. The advent of operational ICBM capabilities will
not eliminate the need for these bases and facilities. If we become engaged
in hostilities in which Japan is not engaged, the logistical facilities
will still be available to us, but we will not be able to launch military
combat operations from Japanese bases without prior consultation, which
means Japanese agreement. This would probably not be forthcoming unless
such operations were in direct support of same UN action, when there would
be at least a possibility of Japanese concurrence.
The prospect of Japan accepting the presence of atomic weapons or
ICBM's or 'Maros on her territory during the next ten years is slight,
unless there is a substantial increase in the number of countries possessing
such weapons. The quantity and quality of Japan's Self-Defense Forces will
substantially increase over the next ten years, and this will further promote
assumption by Japan of defense responsibilities now borne by the U.S.
B. Relations with Communist China
The pressures for closer relations with Communist China will increase,
and trade and cultural relations will be restored, with same limited technical
agreements being concluded between the two governments. Japan will probably
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 4o -
not grant political recognition to Communist China or vote for Chinese
Communist admission to the UN unless the U.S. and other Free World
nations take these steps. Japan will continue strongly to support a
non-Communist Formosa while at the same time continuing to believe that the
ultimate solution of the Chinese Communist problem is either two Chinas
or an independent Formosan republic.
C. Relations with the Soviet Union
Japan will continue to fear and distrust the Soviet Union and regard
it as Japan's greatest danger. However, relations between Tokyo and Moscow
will became somewhat closern though remaining cooly correct, rather than
cordially close.
D. Relations with the ROK
Japan mill continue to desire to restore relations with the ROK.
The intransigent attitude of the latter does not make the prospect very
bright, and if the ROK does not cease abducting Japanese fishermen, the
Japanese will take steps, including the armed support of its fishing
fleetn which might have the most serious consequences.
E. Relations with Under-develami_ Countries
Japan will continue to devote primary effort and interest to strengthening
her over-all relations with the free nations of the less developed areas
in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa (which Japan views with increasing
interest), and Asia, particularly South and Southeast Asia. As potential
sources of raw materials and as potential markets, these areas are vital
to Japan's economic and social well-being.
There will be significant outflows of Japanese capital and technical
assistance to these areas as well as a marked increase in. student and teacher
exchanges. Japan will continue to act both within and without the UN in
such a way as not to bring itself in conflict with the free nations of
Asia. Japan will try to develop a more prominent voice in Asian and African
affairs and this voice will favor moderation as against extremism.
In SUFI, over the next decade we may expect Japan to play an increasing
role in international affairs. Her policy will continue to be one of close
cooperation with the free world, notably with the United States. However,
Japan will be less disposed to act merely to please the United States and
will increasingly-, in foreign affairs, assess alternatives fully to determine
where her own vital interests lie. She will develop closer relations with
the Communist bloc in the fields of trade and cultural exchanges but will
avoid becoming dependent on the bloc.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET.
- 141 -
Provided the free world will continue to give Japan access to a fair
and reasonable share of its markets, so that she is not forced into an
accommodation with the Communist bloc, Japan can become a show-piece of
economic development under a free enterprise system, a great trading
nation, an important collaborator in assistance to the under-developed
areas, and a constructive and useful ally in international politics. All
the conditions for economic growth and political stability are present
in Japan. They can, however, be realized only if the rest of the free world
is prepared to act rationally toward Japan, and in particular to permit
Japan to earn its living through trade with the free world by having acbess
to a fair and reasonable share of free world markets.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
VI. B. THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS SEEN FROM PEIPING
Ambassador Drumright - Keynoter
Ambassador Drumright prefaced his remarks by stating that as
he interpreted his assignment it was not to give an objective appraisal
of the prospects for the Chinese Communist Regime over the next decade
but rather to speculate upon the state of mind of the Chinese Communist
leaders as they enter the 1960s. He added that in approaching this task
he felt it helpful to cast himself in the imaginary, role of the Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister.
In the guise of Foreign Minister Chen Yip Ambassador Drumright begin
by stating that the opening months of 1960 are a time for serious,stook-
taking. The decade since the world-shaking events of 1949 and 1950 saw'
an immense growth in the strength of the Socialist camp? He said, however,
that he did not propose merely to recount past successes but rather to
direct attention to prospects and to the tasks that must be performed
in the decade ahead. He continued that the first subject which he would
like to discuss was the future of the revolutionary effort to lead China
along the path of Socialism toward the ultimate goal of Communism, as the
success of this effort would largely determine both the military might and
the international prestige of Communist China.
RevolutionarylEffort
To those who might wonder why in mid-1958 the Party launched the
"great leap forwardup the answer is that no other course could preserve
the revolution from disaster. As impressive as achievements had been in
the first eight years of rules, they had not resulted in the control over
men and resources required to drive China along the path toward the Communist
future.
Chinese Communist leaders had came to realize that new measures were
needed to solve two critical problems. First, how could the constant,
unrelenting pressure on menus minds be maintained which would allow no
opportunity for the persistent habits of thought and behavior of the past
to reassert their grip on Chinese society/ Second, how could a Socialist
economy be built in a land as poor as it is vast? The program popularly
referred to as the "great leap forward" was aimed at the solution of both
these problems.
The principal feature of the program is the system of rural communes,
"Chen /I" continued. Mistakes were made in the early phases of the gigantic
drive to organize communes throughout the country. These mistakes have in
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECR
- 43 -
large part been corrected, and the party remains satisfied that in the
commune it has found the answer to its fundamental problems.
This is not to say that no difficulties remain. "Chen Yi" added,
however, that he was permitted to reveal in confidence that in response
to the temporary difficulties encountered by the drive to establish communes
in the countryside, the Chinese Communist security apparatus had been
extensively reorganized and strengthened, and is now believed fully capable
of protecting the revolution against its domestic enemies.
Difficulties encountered in the "great leap forward" are only minor
annoyances, he said. The revolution has gained an almost irresistible
momentum. Within the decade, Asia and indeed the entire world will stand
in awe of the rapid economic strides of the Chinese people.
Military Build-Up
Secondly, concerning military strength, as a result of a continuing
improvement in the Chinese Communist Army, and its supporting air arm, and
the simultaneous reduction in Soviet ground forces, the Chinese People's
Liberation Army will soon be unrivaled in the field of conventional ground
warfare. The value of large conventional forces may be questioned in the
era of inter-continental missiles and nuclear warheads. Considerable scope
exists, however, for the threatened or actual use of these forces under the
umbrella provided by the nuclear stalemate between the Soviet Union and
the United States.
Growing Chinese Communist military power may be relied upon as a major
support for Chinese diplomacy. ,Lack of nuclear weapons reduces the weight
of Communist China's international influence, but this deficiency can be
reduced in the next few years if the Communist countries succeed in fastening
strong political shackles on American and British nuclear power, while
acquiring nuclear capability of their own. The latter task depends in
large part on the success of efforts to build Communist China's economy and
to obtain technical assistance from the Soviet Union.
External Trends
Still speaking as Chen Yi, Ambassador Drunright then turned to the
trends which the Chinese leader might see in the three great subdivisions
into which the countries of the world could be classified, the camp of
"Socialism", the camp of "Imperialism"? and the uncommitted states. He
began by saying that it has become too commonplace to speak of the unshakeable
solidarity of the camp of Socialism. Marxists should remember that even '
the camp of Socialism is subject to the forces of history and the Chinese
cannot grant a people only a few centuries from savagery a permanent
claim to the leadership of the forces of world revolution?
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
This is not to say that the alliance with the Soviet Union is not
necessary for the inevitable triumph of Socialism, "Chen Yl" continued,
nor is it implied that great differences of national interest divide the
Communist camp. The point, simply stated, is that history has chosen the
Chinese Communist Party to lead the final victorious surge of the forces
of world revolution. In preparation for that day Communist China must forge
stronger links with the People Governments of Eastern Europe and with
the revolutionary movements in all parts of the world. At the same time,
it must be prepared to act with greater independence, stopping short of
actions which might alienate its indispensable ally, the Soviet Union.
In the camp of Imperialism, "Chen Yin said he foresaw major changes
in the 1960s, changes which would work greatly to Chinese Communist
advantage if China could but rise to the opportunities which would present
themselves. The structure of aggressive military alliances which the United
States created in the 1950s is already beginning to crack and crumble.
The military and economic predominance of the United States on which the
structure of alliances rested is fading fast before the growing strength
of the Socialist nations.
In Europe NATO is torn by internal dissension and by doubts concerning
the strength and constancy of American support. In Africa colonialism is
disintegrating with almost explosive speed. In the Near East the Baghdad
Pact, deprived even of its name, survives as an empty'shello Even in
Latin America, according to "Chen Yin, American prestige was falling and
anti-imperialist forces gaining strength.
The Imperialist structure which confronts Communist China on its
eastern and southern borders is a cleverly contrived chain. Of hostile
military and political bases from which the United States works to check
Chinese liberating influence. However, this chain is nowhere invulnerable
and it lacks a firm western anchor. The Americans appear currently to
be engaged in an effort to remedy-this last deficiency by bringing India
into their system. Mile in the short-run the Americans may achieve gains
in India, when the older generation of western-trained Indian leadership
passes from the scene the fundamental forces at work will reassert themselves
fully and India will move into the Socialist camp.
The American ar,rangements in Southeast Asia still bear the mark of
their hasty tail origin, continued uChen Yi". SEATO is an alliance
only in name and has not appreciably strengthened the fragile military
regimes of the area. Once the Americans retreat from East Asia, these
regimes will be swept away.
The key-to the entire American position in East Asia is Japan. If
the Americans were to be expelled from Japan they could not long remain in
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 45 -
Korea9 or, Okinawa or Taiwan9 and with the loss of these areas their tenuous
holds in the Philippines and the mainland of Southeast Asia would be
short-lived. If Chinese efforts to block ratification of the revised
American Security Pact with the Kishi Government fail, Communist China
faces a long9 hard struggle to dislodge the United States from its position
in Japan. Howevers, Communist China must continue to concentrate upon the
exploitation of factionalism within the conservative Japanese ruling group.
"Chen Yi" concluded that it might also be possible to find openings to play
upon the eagerness of Japanese capitalists for trade with Communist China.
In Korea and Taiwan, he continued9 new opportunities would be afforded
Communist China when Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Check pass from the stage*
In Korea the political opportunity would be quite attractives since Rheens
regime has lacked strength and depth. _However9 the entrenched American
military. position in Korea- would complicate the possibility. In Taiwan
the passing of Chiang Kai-shek would signal the end of hopes for a return
to power on the Mai'nland and the Kuomintang leaders would then face the
choice of returning to the motherland while Communist Chinas generous
terms remained Open or waiting for the eventual shifting of American support
from their waning regime to the rising strength of the Taiwanese.
Pending the day of liberation9 Communist China cannot ignore Chlang9
and a portion of its armed forces must stand on constant guard against
desperate adventures. Chiang9 howevar9 is not a serious threat without
the active support of the Americans and this support ismost, unlikely to
be forthcoming. In both Korea and Taiwan, "Chen 110.emphasized9 the problem
is not so much the toppling of reactionary native regimeaas the creation
of conditions in which the Americans will be impelled to withdraw. This
is especially relevant to Chinese Communist policy toward the_offF?ehpre
islands, "Chen Yl" affirmed that Communist Chinans intent ,is to.. ac4i4e
these islands under circumstances which would weaken taie_position_of, he
United States in Taiwan and East Asia without precipitating aarge. scale
hostilities for which Communist China is not yet, prepared.
The uncommitted areas will almost certainly continue to, grow. ,Since
they would do so at the expense of the imperialist camp9 it is,in.Camminist
Chin' an s interest to promote the process wherever possible. Nentralism9
however9 is only a way station on the road to membership in the Socialist
camp. It has no positive virtues of its own.
Foreign Policy Tasks
In closing9 "Chen Yin said he would like to outline briefly the tasks
which9 in his opinion9 Chinese Communist foreign policy must carry out. in
the 1960s. He stated two major objectives s (1) to consolidate Communist
Chinans position as a recognized world power9 and (2) to drive the
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
_
United States from East Asia. Achievement of both objectives would be
furthered by the continued success of Chinaes domestic revolution. .Chinaes
foreign policy musts, howevers be prepared to make the greatest possible
use of its growing military and economic strength.
To achieve its position as a world powers Communist China must expand
its formal diplomatic relationss its trades its foreign aid programs its
cultural contacts and its links with other communist parties. It must
press for its inclusion in international conferences and when the time
is ripe launch an open and vigorous drive to gain aimission to the United
Nations as the sole representative of China.
In these efforts to achieve recognized great power status, Communist
China will be opposed at every turn by the United States. Realisms
"Chen Yin explained, also requires Communist China to recogoize that it will
not be assisted in all instances by its Soviet allies partior in v
regard to efforts to gain a position of greater leadership in the dauncils
of Socialist nations.
Of the two major objectives for the 1960s, driving the U.S. out of
East Asia involves by far the greater difficulty and danger. Communist
China should, on a broad psychological and political front attempt to
undermine the confidence of the American ruling circles in the wisdom of
their present Far Eastern policy. It must also work to undermine and
overthrow the regimes in the area which cooperate with the United States.
SECRET
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
147
V10 Co THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS SEEN FROM NEW DELHI
Ambassador Bunker - Keynoter
Ambassador Bunker opened his remarks by pointing out that the realities
of changed power relationships had been brought to bear upon India earlier
than Indian leaders had anticipated. Communist pressures on the Indian
border have turned Indiaas attentions to the north and east and have caused
India to strengthen its border defenses and accelerate its economic efforts
for a long-range competition with Communist China. Regardless of whether
a border settlement is reacheds, there will remain a significant residue
of concern in India over Communist China's long-range objectives.
Communist China is not likely to engage in full-scale military action-
against India. Nevertheless9 India will be faced with the challenge of
Communist China throughout the ten-year periods, primarily in the form of
a non-military effort to increase China's influence in Asia.
Wine Communist China has indicated that it considers it to be in
its interest to bring about a period of nominal reduction of tension in
its relations with Indies, it seems likely that the Chinese Communists will
continue to stir up unrest along the border. In the long runs, Communist
China can be prevented from achieving hegemony in Asia only by the counter-
action of strong independent Asian nations9 and India has the potentiality
to be one of the stronger free nations.
In terms of internal policiess, India ap reply to the Chinese challenge
will be to concentrate on economic development on the assumption that_she
will face no large-scale military action frOm Peiping.
Indian Internal Strength
Economic -.India will be well along the road toward a..selfgenerating
economy by 3_9700 The large gap between the rates of.developmenLol.CommUnist
China and India will probably narrow somewhat. Howeveri, 7ndim.does pot
have to equal Communist Chinaas progress in_orderAo_provide ameconbmic
base for stable non-Communist -Government or_to_present an exanpletobther-
nations of a non-Communist alternative method of achieving,economio_dsielopmen
Foreign Aid - India will continue to accept economic assistance from
both the Soviet and Western Blocs. Bloc aid will contribute to_the_achieve-
ment of much the same objectives as doee-Western assistance?and. there.ii
every prospect thbt India will be capable oi? accepting.,bloo_aid...in_suoti a
manner-that it will not end-Anger-her independence. The_West_ehould_help
to prevent the bloc from obtaining an unduly dominant_positianAnjw:
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 48 -
sectors of Indies economy and over sensitive India institutions such as
her educational system. India will over the next ten years also face the
danger of undue dependence upon trade with the bloc in certain commodities.
Political - The prospects for stable government under the Congress
Party during the next tep years are relatively good9 but by no means
certain? There are divisive and retarding factors such as caste9 languages,
regional and religious differences9 administrative corruption and
factionalism. If India were deprived of Nehru's leadership9 the Congress
Party-might split into two moderate parties, in such a way that stable
government could prosper9 or it might fractionalize9 leading to the
deterioration of parliamentary institutions. However9 if this process
went too far9 the civil and military services could provide effective
alternate leadership. There is no prospect of constitutional assumption
of power by the Communist Party over the next decade9 and should the
Communists attempt a takeover by extra-legal means, non-Communist foxpes
could prevent their doing so.
Foreign Relations
U.SoS.R. - Soviet objectives are to prevent Indies_benaming_a_member
of a Western military or political bloc, to obtain Indim,supportL1or....Sci4et
positions on world issues9 and to create a pro4ovist....attittide...withiii,the
Indian government and the Indian people generally. Tha.U050SOR0-will. '-
nevertheless seek to maintain in India a strong Communist Party to act
a powerful propaganda agent9 and will assist the Communist Party Of India
to build an illegal apparatus for future use. India will pursue policies
with regard to the U.S.S.R. which she believes will encourage_the.devalopment
of moderate forces in that country 9 and will therefore.seekAo_taintpin.
her neutral international position9 exercising independence_of.judgient, on
international issues.
Communist China - India will seek to achieve disengagement on its
borders with Communist China in order to forestall further conflicts and
to resume more normal relations with Peiping. She will not_use. force, to
eject the Chinese from India-claimed territory9 nor win she t!sullmit" to
the Chinese Communist claims under duress. Wale this would ,appear to
rule out a deal with regard to Ladakh as long as the Chinese Communists
remain unwilling first to withdraw their military forces9 some deal 'could
eventuate if the Chinese were prepared to make the necessary concessionso_
While Nehru recognizes similarities between the Soviet Union and
Communist China9 he has chosen to view the Chinese Communist threat to India
in terms of the traditionally imperialistic and expansionist objectives of
China rather than in terns of international Communism. India_can_be_eipected
to continue to make this distinction between the two bloc powers. in_order-to
prevent its relations with the Soviet Union from being adversely.,affected
by its difficulties with Peiping*
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 49 -
United States - U.S. relations with India will remain good so long
as the U.S. continues to present its positions on international issues in
such a manner that India believes them sincerely directed toward world
peace. India moreover believes the U.S. aid programs are adequate and
adapted to Indian needs, and will seek increasingly closer relations with
the U.S. and the Wast in the economic field. Occasional strains must be
expected when U.S. and Indian concepts of their own national interests
differ. During Nehru?s lifetime, India will continue its public posture
of disfavor of Western support of large military forces in Asia, but will
became increasingly-understanding of the reasons and motives underlying
these policies.
Far East and Southeast Asia - India will increase her informal ties
with the nations at Southeast Asia and the Far East, but willrefrain-Cram
joining in a regional political grouping. Her economic ties willmult4ply
as her manufactured products became available for export and as her capacity
to offer technical assistance increases. She will continue to seek to
act as leader of new underdeveloped nations in international forums.
During the next ten years, India will have neither the strength nor the
desire to assume the responsibilities of a center of Asian power. After
this period she will tend to shift from primarily "moral" leadership
to a position based on her overall strength. Her moral leadershipgias
suffered from her equivocal positions on certain international issues.
Until she can establish her leadership on the basis of strength and
Willingness to assume responsibility, the U.S. must be the main supporter
of smaller nations in the area.
Commonwealth - India will remain in the Commonwealth. The improvement
in her relations with Pakistan is likely to be maintained and further .,
improvements may occur. A Kashmir settlement is unlikely. Difficulties
with Pakistan are not likely to affect adversely Indian economic development
or her defensive posture with regard to Communist China.
Conclusions
Considerable unfavorable change in the picture projected above
could result from failure of the India government to meet minimum popular
economic and social aspirations, from fractionalization of the. Congress
Party, inadequacy of leadership after Nehru, large-soale.aggreseion. against
India by Communist China, or large-scale warfare plsewhere in the world"
which would disrupt foreign trade and aid. In the absence of such unfavorable
developments, Ambassador Bunker concluded that the U.S. can look forward
to an increasing pace of Indian development, a strengthening of Indiaos
ties with free Asian countries, and an increase in Indias territorial
security in the northern border areas. He added that the EMbaesTin
New Delhi would welcome any suggestions for cooperative actiort which would
assist in the effort to advance trends in India favorable to U.S. interests.
5E=
npclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 5o .
VII. COMMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA
Ambassador Janes - Keynoter
Ambassador Jones opened his remarks by saying that before
attempting to add the Southeast Asian ingredients to the broth that
had been so ably brewed that morningp it might be helpful to summarize
the attitudes of the Asian Big Three toward Southeast Asia as they appear
to an observer in Southeast Asia itself, While this interpretation
might differ somewhat in emphasis from those presented by preceding speakers9
in general the outlines would be compatiblee
Ambassador Jones continued that if he borrowed Ambassador Drumrightos
technique and cast himself momentarily in the role of the Chinese Communist
Foreign Minister9 he would find himself looking at Southeast Asia primarily
as a target for future absorption9 a tempting morsel of small9 weak
principalities commanding a wealth of commodities desperately needed by.
Communist Chinas raw materials for the continued forced expansion,of her
industries and living space as an outlet for her massive population') '
While this tempting morsel has thus far been denied as a result of American
policyp the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister would probably feel confident
that one way or another9 through direct action or carefully managed
subversion9 Communist China would eventually get ito
The Japanese Foreign Minister mould consider Southeast Asia primarily
as a market and a source of supply. He would admit_that.the Japanese _!
attempt to seize this market and source of supplyAhrougliknoonquest
was ill conceived9 but would hold that the situation. that foroad.Japan
into that adventure continued to exist and one way or another had...tabs
met.
Ambassador Jones said that a Foreign Minister in New Delhi would
look upon Southeast Asian countries primarily as his adolescent Telativesp
a group of small9 unprotected principalities whose culture and.way of.life?
derived largely from Indies and whose still immature_governments needed
Indies guidance through the forest of internal affairs. Eventually they
might became useful markets, but now they would be viewed from New Delhi
chiefly as objects to be denied to predatory powers and to be permitted to
attain maturityp preferably under Indiaas protective shadow,'
",.
Ambassador Jones continued that while the attitudes towards Southeast
Asia in Peiping9 Tokyo9 and New Delhi include widely differing.:plementsp'.
they had one common feature p a view of Southeast Asia as_a:passive_ohject
of manipulation rather than a dynamic source Of policy in its own right?
The current weakness of Southeast Asian stateain terms of military and
SECRET
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
L.)
?
SECRET
economic power, their chronic instability and the frequent naivete of
their leaders have all reinforced this common picture of Southeast Asia
as a field for international politics rather than as an active participant
therein. Southeast Asian countries have not found themselves as yet,
and have been undergoing a painful transition from colonial dependence
toward responsible independence. Much of the coming decade might be taken
up by this same debilitating evolutionary process, and 1970 might still
find Southeast Asia so engrossed in its own problems that its independent
weight on the international scene would be minimal.
Ambassador Jones stated, however, that he believed this a dangerous
assumption upon which to construot future policy. Rather than the
emergence of an Asian political system revolving around the main centers
of Peiping, Tokyo and New Delhi, the next decade might bring increasing
fragmentation. Southeast Asian states themselves would do their.utmost
to contribute to this fragmentation. They would resist the substitution
of an Asian power in place of a European. Southeast Asian states are
willing to scarifice political and economic stability for political,
economic and cultural independence. Their attitudes toward Japan and India
are likely to depend upon the extent to which these countries are willing
and able to assist them toward their objective of economic development.
Southeast Asies emergence as an autonomous factor in an.Asian..power
system would depend upon its ability to assume such a role._ Ambaasular.Janes
stated that to determine the existence of such.. abilityit.wox0d be necessary
to take a brief look at the potentials and weaknesses_ nf. the_regian.
While the component countries of the region differ widely, Southeast
Asia is far from a network of small PA3kan-like states, as occasionally
portrayed. Roughly, half of Southeast Asia in area and .pulation consists
of a single nation, Indonesia. The remainder is made up of four.medium-
sized states and four smaller units. The region contains.vastandAargely
untappe resources. Control of these resources has been a majorBource
of international contention for centuries. The Southeast Asian states
are determined to retain control of their own resources.
The Southeast Asian countries share a number of common characteristicss
almost all have emerged from colonial status within the past fifteen years
all but the city-state of Singapore are founded on a base of peasant
agriculture at the subsistence level.; none possess an industrial plant of
any magnitudEq, and all are dependent upon the import of manufactured goods
to sustain their agricultural economies. Although there is a fairly wide
spectrum of racial and ethnic types among them, the extremes are no greater
than those found in China and far less than those of, say, India. Politically
they represent a patchwork, but running throughout the region is a common
thread of inexperienced leadership and inadequately trained civil servants,
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
LI
SECRET
-
S2.
an
an immature party system and a concentration of political power in the
hands of a mall educated or semi-educated elite. Finally, all of them
have inherited to some degree the problem that is increasingly assuming
larger proportions as the power of Communist China grows -, that.of the
overseas Chinese.
Ambassador Jones observed that the picture is obviously not one of
strength either in the political or economic fields. Moreover, the trend
is hardly towards the rapid increase of strength in either of these fields.
He remarked that it is impossible to say with any degree of confidence that
the next ten years will see an over-all improvement in the political and
economic fields in Southeast Asia. Certain countries may make substantial
progress, others little, some may even retrogress. The weight of evidence
suggests that 1970 Will still find Southeast Asia an explosively troubled
region with many of its inhabitants still groping for political stability
and the various keys to economic progress.
In the light of this, Ambassador Jones suggested that it would be
fair to ask how one could expect the Southeast Asian states to became
increasingly the masters of their own houses during the next decade, or even
to defend adequately their unexploited wealth. He said the answer may lie
in the fact that in a world physically dominated by a handful of nuclear
superior powers the influence and the self-assertion of the other powers
tends to depend less and less on their economic or military strength or
even an their political stability. The refusal of the Southeast Asian
countries to accept a satellite status in relation either to the Asian
"Big Three" or to the World Big Three will be based on the reality af the
world power stalemate.
Secure in the knowledge of her own motives, the United States sees
this process as one by which a number of Southeast Asian states make.use
of her disinterest and her deterrent to protect them while,they?go?their
own my. During much of the past decade, however, .a nuanber,..of the. Soiltheast
Asian countries have maintained an .honest snspitian_of_U.S.,mntiuss.
Among this group there has been a definite impravement_in.thia.respect
aver the last year or so, in part due to continuing sympathetic. ..UOS... support
se restraint, as well as to a gradual increase in the level of sophistication
of regional leaders. To an equal extent, however, this improvement can be
attributed to the emergence of what few responsible Southeast Asians can
fail to see as a threat of the utmost gravity, the growing strength and
ambitions of Communist China. Southeast Asians are determined not to become
a subordinate link in an Asian system dominated by China, India and Japan.
Their immediate fear, however, is that of becoming totally engulged in an
Asia dominated by the massive power of Communist China.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
,
SECRIM
- 53 -
The Southeast Asian attitude towards China and toward the Chinese
Communist Regime is a complex one. An awareness of Imperial China, a
feeling of fear and respect, VW in evidence long before the colonial era.
During the colonial period the basis for a strong and enduring atmosphere
of resentment and dislike was created by influx of overseas Chinese.
In the 20th Century the rise of Kuomintang as an early exponent of Asian
nationalism struck a responsive chord. The initial reaction to the victory
of the Chinese Communist Regime was a compound of all these factors,
although much of Southeast Asia was in such turmoil at the time that the
issue of recognition was determined in a rather haphazard fashion. The
Korean War and to a greater extent the war in Indo-China further split
Southeast Asia into two factions, one participating in the formation of
SEATO and the other succumbing to the facile picture of the Indo--China
War as a pure anti-colonial struggle. At the Bandung Conference in 1955
the latter seemed to have mon the day and the Conference raised the
Chinese Communist Regime to the highest point of Southeast Asian acceptance
it had yet enjoyed. Since 1955 the Chinese Communists have revealed their
aggressive intent and have demonstrated their power to an extent that has
sent a shiver of fear through Southeast Asia,
Surveying Asia today, the Southeast Asian leader sees a disquieting
situation: at the center is Communist China with its grouting aggressive
power; at its western flank is India - its adherence to Western forms and
the status of its leadership combining to assure that it can count on the
West to deflect China; on the Eastern flank stands Japan, an industrial
power which the United States is almost totally committed to defend.'
Between these two flanks lies China's immediate opportunity.
At present the only visible shield against Chinese aggression in
Southeast Asia is SEATO, which, however, includes only a portion,atSoutheast
Asia under its umbrella and which has been such a long-standing...target of
abuse by neutralist leaders that they are largely precluded_from_joining_it.
Communist China has thus provided the free world with both ..a ohAllenge
and an opportunity in Southeast Asia. Nothing short of firra and determined
moves on the part of the Free World can deflect the Chinese Communists
from one of their most immediate objectives.
The United States, Ambassador Jones suggested, can meet this challenge
and opportunity in a number of ways. It can emphasize its support of
Southeast Asian countries, not as an annex to its policy toward Japan. or
India but as a policy in its own right. It can expand its technical,'
economic and military aid as a means of contributing to Southeast Asian
defensive strength and as a way of building confidence in this strength.
The United States can address itself to the task of keeping Southeast Asian
eyes focused on the real threat to their existence, and can continue to
follow its policy of friendly disinterested concern.
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
Ambassador Jones went on to speculate on the particular form that
the threat from Communist China might take in Southeast Asia over the next
decade and on the reactions that might be anticipated. Discounting the
unlikely eventuality of direct military aggression, he said that pressure
would primarily be exerted from two directions9 down the weak central
corridor of the peninsula through Laos and Cambodia and beyond the peninsula
in Indonesia. The first would offer an opportunity to split and engulf
Thailand and Viet-Nam without posing such a direct threat to the United
States that intervention mould became inevitible. The second would offer
even greater promise9 that of overcoming the SEATO barrier in one leap.
The success of either could be disastrous to the United States position
in Southeast Asia. The success of the second could have repercussions far
beyond Southeast Asia9 threatening Australasia and placing at Soviet
bloc disposal the incalculable resources of the Indonesian archipelago.,
No one questions that our security in Asia depends on keeping Japan and
India from Communist hands. It is equally essential that Indonesia be
similarly defended.
To accomplish this task may not be easy9 Ambassador Jones concluded.
Nowhere in Southeast Asia can there be found a government with the inherent
stability of those of Japan and India. There are certain assets9 however9
the chief of which is that Southeast Asians are independent9 are determined
to remain so, and are gradually coming to an awareness of the sacrifices
this may entail.
The best answer to Communist aggression lies in collective defense.
INIth a full-fledged system of collective defense9 Southeast Aaia_would.be
infinitely more prepared to face the threat of indirect aggression_that_are
the present fragmented states. The initial attempt to foster. regional
defense9 SEATO9 achieved only partial success. Suggestions_have.been.raised
that effective regional association might be fostered through_regional
economic cooperation leading more gradually to direct political_inferdepeadence.
This is a possibility9 but it is necessary to face the obstacles in the way
of economic regionalism. The economies of Southeast Asian countries are
largely competitive. Industrializat4on9 when it comes on a larger scale9
will initially offer little further incentive to regionalism? The
combination of national aspirations and competition for foreign capital
also impedes the growth of a regional spirit.
The eventual emergence of some sort of regional system is nevertheless
possible., The Southeast Asian countries may ultimately find the Chinese
Communist threat pervasive enough to bring about a tightening in relations
and an enhanced sense of interdependence. Our objectives in Southeast Asia
should certainly include a continuing search for indications that some such
regional system may be in the offing9 a careful cultivation of conditions
likely to bring it about9 and tactful and warm support if it does begin to
emerge.,
SECRET
J
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
(
SECREr
Ambassador Jones stated that in closing, and with considerable
trepidation, he would like to extract from his foregoing remarks some sort
of specific projection for the next ten years in Southeast Asias (1)
Internally, most of the Southeast Asian states will continue in an atmosphere
of political and economic ferment, progress toward political stability will
be slow. Economic developments will be hampered by? political instability,
nationalist suspicisons? the absence of skilled indigenous personnel and a
tendency to avoid the necessary in favor of the palliative. Political
institutions will tend to continue to deviate from their original western
models, probably without assuming an entirely totalitarian character.
Economic systems will tend to settle along moderately Socialist and
strongly Nationalist lines. (2) In their external relationships Southeast
Asian nations will stronglky resist outside efforts to give them a subordinate
role in a larger Asian system. (3) The chief menace to their existence
during the next decade will cane from Communist China. They will increasingly
recognize this fact and will react by drawing closer together in some sort
of regional understanding. (4) If direct Chinese Communist armed aggression
against them does not take place, they will be able to withstand and
eventually to overcome the threat ?of internal ccmmunism.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECREr
VIII. PROSPECTS IN SINO-SCRIET RELATIONS
Mr. George Morgan - Keynoter
Mr. Morgan said that, after listening to previous presentations,
he had found a great deal of kinship in lines of thinking between the
conferees and S/P on current trends and provects.
Sino-Soviet relations are opening up in an exciting may., and there
are increasing signs of differences between the Soviets and the Chinese
Communists. There is, for instance, an apparent coolness between Khrushchev
and top Chinese Communist leaders. Even Chiang Kai-Shek has modified his
feelings to the extent that he feels there is a real cleavage and that Mao
is on the way out.
Underlying this personality clash are the basic factors of national
character and psychology. Recent Soviet internal lecturers have talked
of the Chinese Communists with disdain, particularly regarding the communes.
This type of Soviet arrogance is offensive to the Chinese Communists who
have, of course, the deep racial and cultural pride of the ancient Chinese.
In party and ideological relations, Mao became the senior ideologist
after Stalinus death. Khrushchev is a newcomer to the league. There is
evidently considerable ideological autonomy:in Communist_ China, and there
appears to be an increasing tendency. VI assert_ Chinas.e_ascendancy in the
Communist world. Chinese Communist carping on rerlatonis%,whi4e
ostensibly directed at the Yugoslays, seamadactually, pointed.itthe Soviets.
Because the two countries share a common Communist ideology? the
parties of each are naturally interested in the internal policies of
the other, as witness the Soviet criticism of the communes. The Soviets
were doubtless worried lest the Chinese Communists do zanething that would
lose face for communism5?_or.take_action.that _conceiyably.00uld _result in
a mainlamiRmagary._ fannuAldhoes program-01? de-TStslinization on the other
hand did not suit the Chinese Communists because Mao .represented the cult
of personality, and the Chinese Communists at., that period required more
police terror and centralized control.
In military affairs, the Chinese Communists undoubtedly want nuclear
weapons but the Soviets have apparently dragged their feet, retaining control
of warheads and thus creating another source of friction. In the nuclear
test suspension negotiations, the Soviets made more concessions to the Wrest
than in any other field, testifying to their serious desire for same
agreement. They probably do not want fourth countries in the nuclear club.
The Chinese Communists 'want to get in, and this Soviet attitude probably
SECRM
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
57 -
irritates them. Thus a test suspension agreement would probably cause
friction between them. Similarly, any agreement between the West and
the Soviets on broader arms control measures, while remote at this time,
would further irritate the Chinese Communists.
In international meetings and particularly the UN, the Soviets speak
for the Chinese Communists, who are not only irritated, to begin with at
their exclusion but they quite likely at times dislike the way the,. Soviets
state their case.
On the domestic front, the Soviets are probably concerned at the
disparity in size of population and rate of growth between themselves and
the Chinese Communists, Intimately related to population trowth is the
question of living standards. The Chinese _Communist leaders will probably
make the bare minimum of consumer concessions and caitinue to drive the
population hard. This would mean a source of considerable_dispaty between
the U.S.S.R. and Red China.
In the aid field, the Soviets are doing a great deal to help the Chinese
Communists, but recent agreements appear to hold to 1955 levels. Perhaps
the Chinese Communists originally could not absorb much more, but as their
capacity grows, they will probably pressure the Soviets for more for
themselves at the expense of Asian neutralist countries -- parti-cularly
India, with which the Chinese are having a serious dispute,
As for political spheres of influence, the Chinese Comnmnists achieved
considerable stature in North Korea during the Korean War, but have since
been largely eliminated there. There are also .signs, .of rivalry in North
Viet-Nam, with Ho Chi Minh wanting to draw closer. to the. .Soviet Union in
order to balance Chinese pressures. 'In addition, there are cross-currents
of Chinese and Soviet influences in the European satellites. Peiping has
alternated there between favoring more liberal treatment and adVocatini
a harder line. ,At present, the it Germans and Czechs seem the closest
to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists are reviving their
activities in Outer Mongolia, once under Chinese suzerainty are now-a
Soviet satellite. Ith regard to spheres. of influence in the.nonvCommunist
world there may well be cause for. friation_between..theLU.S.S,20 and. the.
Chinese Canmunists over the control. of. local. ,Asian...,cormanniet...parties.
Finally there are many signs of differences between the two allies over
Soviet relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Khrushchevls
visit to the U.S. and other Western capitols produced the semblance of a
d ,etente which was clearly not to the Chinese Communists' liking. This
situation bears the seeds of future friction, depending of course on how
U.S. relations with the Soviets evolve.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 58
A particularly striking case is the difference between the Soviet
attitude on a divided Germany as contrasted with the Chinese Communist
attitude an a divided China.
In general, there are differing stages of industrial development
between the two powers and differing national and racial fact ors increasing
strength on the part of one mill tend to engender more nationalism rather
than less. It is a fair inference that if the Chinese Communists become
increasingly self-sufficient militarily and economically, they will act
more independently of Moscow.
To balance the foregoing analysis, it should be stressed that there
are many-points in common between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China?-and
there is no question but that cohesive forces are now stronger than divisive
ones. The present relationship is likely to last at least during the
decade under consideration. The penalties of a rift between the 'two far
outweight any gain for either one. It ?is, however, poesible that
the alliance may become inoperative in certain phases?_and.at particular
periods of time, just as the Suez affair momentarily. .paralyzed.the b,abically
much stronger. Western alliance.
In general the U.S. should not be oversanguine; .ancLaertainly.onot
predicate its policies on the possibility of serious .SinoSciet friOgon.
However, apparent differences do introduce a new, diMension, whioh:shoUld
be included in our calculations.
SECREP
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
\-Y
SECRET
- 59 -
IX, GENERAL DISCUSSION FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATION$
Ambassador Russell said he took no exception to the statements made.
He did, however, want to point out that the major Wellington newspaper had
used just these evidences of friction to affirm that arguments against
recognition of Communist China are weakened, as China is no longer part of
a Communist monolith, The newspaper also argued for moving closer to the
Kremlin on disarmament. Ambassador Russell said that he felt that widespread
public discussion of Sino-Soviet differences tends to undermine U.S.
objectives in the area.
Mr. Henderson said that he wished to raise several points in connection
with the morning presentations. With regard to Ambassador Bunkeres excellent
exposition of the Indian situation, he recalled that ten. years ago Nehru
had a complete contempt for the small powers.. In,a speech at the time,
Nehru said that the United States was making many mistakes in Agia by paying
attention to the unimportant nations, while the two important_pdwers the ,
United States should Oultivate were India and Communist China. It was
around these two powers that the countries of the area would tend to
gravitate.
As for birth control, Mr. Henderson said that he understood the Communists
are theoretically opposed to it and he would be surprised if Communist China
checked its birth rate as Japan hae.
Finally, he said he wished to point out that the Trotskyites had been
influential in the early communist movement in China and had left a definite
impression. He said that Trotsky had favored communes, and that this is
perhaps one of the reasons why the Chinese have adopted the commune system
rather than the collective farm system of the Soviet Union,
Ambassador Bunker commented that an Indian delegate to the Planned
Parenthood Conference last year had told him that while the Chinese Communists
had originally worked out a detailed birth control program, they had
later totally abandoned it. The Indian had told him that the Chinese would
undoubtedly return to birth control with the same efficiency. with Which
they had originally approached it. .
Ambassador MacArthur remarked that the high literacy rate in Japan
had facilitated the birth control campaign there, He said the primary
vehicle, however, was legalized, subsidized abortion.
There followed a discussion of further reasons for the success of
the birth control program in Japan. It was out that the campaign
was fully backed by the Japanese Government, and moreover planned parenthood
appealed to the Japanese character, especially in the early post-war period
of chaos and privation.
SEM=
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 60 -
,Mr. Henderson then said that he wished to add to his earlier statement
an Nehru's attitude ten years ago, Nehru's conclusion that India must have
close relations with China and that the two poles in Asia, as he saw them,
must not be allowed to drift too far apart. Mr.. Allen commented that he
believes Nehru still feels this way and that Nehru would be willing to
give up Ladakh if public opinion would permit him to do so. Ambassador
Bunker agreed, and added that Nehru mould be milling to reach a settlement
on Ladakh because it is militarily indefensible. In further discussion
it was pointed out that China had historically claimed these border areas,
and that the United States has not taken a formal position on the
conflicting Sino-Indian claims.
Mr. Allen turned to the subject of Soviet aid and wondered ,if the
Soviets were telling the whole story on their aid program. He said that
after the Kerala action the Soviet Union had explained its continued aid
to India as an effort to keep Nehru out of the Imperialist camp. However-,
he wondered if a more basic reason was Soviet desire to build up India.
as a counterweight to Communist China, Mr. Morgan said that Ambaseador
Thompson had commented along similar lines upon the_occasion.of_Khrushchev's
recent trip to South and Southeast Asia, feeling that the.long-range Soviet
policy was to contain Communist China.
The ensuing discussion of Khrushchev's trip centered on the ways in
which it highlighted certain Sino-Soviet differences. It was agreed that
the Chinese Communists had looked upon the Soviet Premiers tour with same
apprehension and, uncertain what attitude he might adopt, had deliberately
softened their line toward the countries visited - India, Burma, and
Indonesia. It was also concluded that Khrushchev had in his actions during
the trip deliberately tried to disassociate himself from his unpopular
Chinese allies.
Ambassador Sebald turned the discussion to the growing Japanese
economic role in Southeast Asia and questioned whether the Japanese. would
revert to their characterisitic arrogance when in a position of_smgeriority.
Ambassador MacArthur remarked that he felt that the Japanese_raltze thee
if they are to have access to Southeast Asia's markets, they must win.the
concurrence of the peoples concerned. He said that with the exception, of
a few Japanese businessmen, whose insecure financial position might lead
them to resort to unethical practices, the Japanese would lean over backwards
to make arrangements fully acceptable to the countries involved.
Ambassador Ryington confirmed that the Japanese were engaged in a
skillful and reasonably successful good-will campaign in Malaya. Mr. Parsons
remarked that even should the Japanese emerge as the major trader in the
area, they would not be the dominant power as they were in the pre-war
period. He added that the Japanese realize that they cannot be a primary
power in the day of super-powers.
SECREI
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
I `, '
sEcRET
-61-
In response to a question Mr. Parsons noted that it was generally agreed
that increased consultation by Ambassadors with their client governments
was a? good thing, and he felt that the conclusions of this Conference
might well be the subject of such consultations. There was, of course, a
certain amount of information that was sensitive, but he thought that each
Chief of Mission could decide for himself 'what might be passed on.
Ambassador MacArthur said that if it were true that Japan and India
are the anchors of the great Asian aro, then after them surely came
Indonesia. He pointed out that internal stability in Indonesia is
threatened by the lack of a coherent economic program, while nationalist
pride and sensitivity prevent the Indonesians from seeking outside adixe
and assistance. Ambassador Jones agreed, but reported that some. progress
had recently been made. The Indonesian government had requested two economic
experts to work an the five-year plan. However, a topflight economic
adviser was more urgently needed, and Ambassador Janes said he had hopes
that the Indonesians might now request one. It was agreed that such a
request should have top priority, and Mr. Henderson added that there was
a similar position to fill in Laos.
Ambassador Sebald said that many Australians are concerned over what
they feel is very irresponsible economic leadership in Indonesia, and asked
Ambassador Jones to comment thereon, Ambassador Jones cited Indonesian
actions against the Dutch and most recently against the Chinese as probably
having given rise to this feeling. Action against the former was well.aknown;
that against the latter was prompted by the Chinese stranglehold on the
distribution of basic commodities, The Indonesian action was taken to break
this stranglehold before the political weight of the Chinese prevented
their doing so. They took this action for political reasons inthe_face
of the economic disruption it would cause. It was a major_steps;_and.of
Such far reaching consequences that the Indonesians.felt,thermight..eVen
have to review their neutral policy of "active independence,,Ambassador
Jones said that he does not feel that there is: any_question_of_11WWs
next?" and present signs are reasonably favorable.,....commented that the use of economic weapons. for_politinal purposea'is very
dangerous.
Turning to a military subject, Mr. Parsons referred to the recent
communist probes in the Taiwan straits and Laos and the,need_farflexible
U.S. military approach. He asked Admiral Felt to .comment.on_thia..topic.'
Admiral Felt said that a combination of U.S. and loc.al...forces,.in..the
area gives us freedom of .action and that his objective is to maintain.. this
flexibility. Both we and the Soviets have now reached the poinLwhere_each
can seriously damage the other, and the Soviets are going to try to expIOA
this situation. Admiral Felt referred in this connection to recent book
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
0
SECRET
- 62 ?
by Garthoff called THE SOVIET IMAGE OF FUTURE WARE, which he recanmendedo
Admiral Felt said he believes that the Soviet military objective over
the next decade will be to lull the U.S. into abandoning the means of
stopping limited aggression. The Soviet leaders want us to devote most
of our energies and resources to the production of large yield nuclear
weapons.
The Soviets, on the other hands, have traditionally fought limited
wars, and intend to maintain this capability. They will therefore continue
to maintain huge ground forces and attempt to occupy land masses in
Southeast Asia and if possible in Europe. Admiral Felt suggesteds,
therefore, that one of the meeting's conclusions be a recommendation that
the U.S. maintain the means of containing local aggression in the area.
In this respect, we must remember that fram a military point of view it
may be necessary to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. We must not run
the risk of defeat merely because of hesitancy to use Nukes.
Admiral Felt pointed out that the situation in Laos is still
potentially dangerous, but that we have developed considerable capabilpty
to move into such areas. U.S. weaknesses lie mostly in communicatiam,ind
logistic support.
Admiral Felt then related that the British are expanding their base
at Singapore and proceeding with plans to establish one in Borneo. This
will considerably enhance Western military strength in the Indian.Oteano
He added that the Panama Canal is a constant concern because of... its
inadequate defenses.
Mr. Henderson said he interpreted Admiral Felt's remarks to mean
that under certain circumstances, if conventional weapons were not
sufficient, we would have to resort to small-yield nuclear weapons.
Ambassador MacArthur pointed out the danger of getting into a situation
where there was no military alternative to the use of nuclear weapons, for
overriding political considerations might nevertheless militate against
their use.
Mr. Morgan said that there had been continuing discussions with
Defense on the subject of the use of nuclear weapons. He thought it would
be well for the Conference to go on record in favor of the maintenance of
adequate military capability against limited aggression. It should also
recommend that as much weapons flexibility as possible be allowed for
political reasons?
Mr. Parsons said that it is extremely important that the U.S. maintain
forces on Taiwan and in Korea. Congress has questioned the maintenance of ,
forces in these areas, but if they were cut, the posture_of. thefree.world
SE0RET,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
r
SECRET
- 63 -
in the Far East would suffer seriously. Ambassador Durbrow mentioned the
increase in large-scale terrorist tactics in Viet-Nam and felt we should
give attention to increasing our anti-guerrilla capabilities.
Consul General Maddox thought that the Conference should consider that
U.S. interests lie in ensuring as far as possible that the UK position
and bases in Singapore remain secure. Mr. Parsons noted that in recent
discussion with the British they appeared most receptive to our interests
in the area. Ambassador Sebald remarked that the Australians put little
trust in the ability of the British to hold Singapore.
Ambassador MacArthur drew attention to the Ryukyus question as a
permanent irritant in U.S.-Japanese relations. As long as Kishi remains
Prime Minister, there should be no request for the transfer of their
administration to Japan. However, a,new prime minister might be sorely
tempted for political reasons to renew the demand. As long as the people
of the Ryukyus are basically satisfied with U.S-. rule the situation should
be manageable, but if they agitate for a change, then the Japanese will
reopen their demands. We must continue our current wise policies and:
administration and in particular we must have resources available on. an
annual basis for the long-term economic development of the. Ryukyus.
General Booth added that we are in the Ryukyus for, pure military
reasons 3 and for the foreseeable future Okinawa is the sole_hata whera,the-
U.S. policy governs without question. He noted the overill_value. of Okinawa
as an intermediate military base and staging-point for. limited. war..., He
feltthe political situation over the next ten years depended: entirely, on
how much we do for the welfare of Okinawa, and said that Weirenat,MainUdii
an adequate level of aid. He put the figure at six minion_ dollatt annually.
Mr. ParsOns'noted that with the population of Okinawa_twice that of Hawaii
2
this was no small matter. '
At the invitation of Mr. Parsons, Mr. Allen described a new 'Waite...House
committee headed by Mansfield Sprague to review U.S. information activities,
something which had not been done since the Jackson Committee_of1953.
Mr. Allen pointed out that the latter had recommended that_ USIS should carry
on as much unattributed activity as possible. This has since been the
policy, but Mr. Allen feels that it may have gone too far. He prefers to
shift the unattributed more to CIA, with the objective of building up the
reliability rating of USIS to such an extent that we can be proud of its
by-line. He is not trying to get entirely out of the gray field, but only
to strike a proper balance between attributed and non-attributed material.
Ambassador McConaughy said that he would like to raise a point from
earlier discussion before beginning his keynote presentation. He said
that he would like to strike a note of caution on the conclusions that might
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 64 -
be drawn from discussion of friction between the Soviets and the Chinese
Communists. He said that a serious look should be taken at the evidences
of this friction. While there is evidence that some irritations and
annoyances exist and go beyond mere personal differences, it is conceivable
that the Soviets may be trying to make a virtue of the situation, deliberately
playing up these irritations. Most of the evidence is external rather than
internal, coming from the Soviets themselves. Certainly they have the
discipline to conceal these differences if they wished. It seems, therefore,
that if they snub the Chinese, they are doing so deliberately for effect.
On fundamentals the evidence indicates that they act in concert by previous
agreement.
Why should the Soviets encourage the assumption that there are differences
between them and the Chinese Commnists?
1. It dulls our sense of the urgency of the crisis.
2. It reinforces the arguments of those who advocate a soft China
policy.
3. It enables the Communists to play the game both ways, thue giving
them a flexibility and variety of tactics, through seeming_differeacee,of
approach.
It would seem the part of prudence, Ambassador McConaudby concluded,
to assume that the differences between the Soviets and Chinese Communists
are superficial. While certainly their differences must be discussed at
the Conference, it mould seem unwise to encourage public speculation about
increasing friction between the two bloc powers.
Mr. Parsons thanked Ambassador McGanaughy for his remarks, and said
that they added a new dimension to the discussion. He added that he has
always publicly taken the view that it would be folly to base policy, on
the assumption of a rift between the Soviets and the Chinese. However,
earlier discussion was based an a projection over the next_ decade??and
therefore a discussion of potential differences seemed. valid.
Ambassador Jones said he agreed with Ambassador McConaughy and mentioned
that after the Khrushchev visit he had discussed with Subandrio the
significance of the Soviets? snubbing of the Chinese. Subandriatook the
view that it was an indication that one partner had failed and the. other. was
taking over, not of any disagreement between governments, merely a
tactic primarily for the benefit of the Indonesians.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET,
? 65 ?
Ambassador McConaughy said that he had wished to raise the possibility
that the Russians were using Machiavellian tactics in deliberately playing
up differences with their Chinese allies.
Mr. Henderson pointed out that the combination of hard and soft tactics
was an old strategm of the Soviets. He said that before the Second World
War, the Soviets used to invite the foreign ministers of victim countries
to Moscow, and after the foreign ministers had been figuratively "beaten
to a pulp,' by the hard tactics of Stalin? s subordinates, completely demoralized
they were ushered into Stalin, who shifted abruptly to a soft and kindly
approach. He added that the GPU used the same tactics, first treating its
victims roughly and then suddenly switching to soft methods.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
c66=
X. THE RISE OF NEWISADER5HIP.IN-ASIA
Ambassador McConaughy Keynoter
Ambassador McConaughy began by cautioning that generalizations are
particularly hazardous in an area as diverse as Asia, but that they
nevertheless were necessary to provide some framework for discussion of
this difficult topic. He thanked his colleagues for providing background
material and their viewpoints on the subject as related to their respective
countries. He added that his remarks would pertain largely to the under-
developed countries of Asia, and that Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
to same extent Malaya, would therefore be exceptions to most of what he
would say.
Basic Factors Affecting Asian Leadership
Ambassador McConaughy- pointed out that many. Far Eastern countries remain
under the leaders who first brought them to independence. Timms is a prevalence
of authoritarian governments for obvious reasonss authoritarian and pater-
nalistic traditions ? a lack of experience in self-rule the overriding
for security and stability ? hence, strong armies and police, which provide
agencies for authoritarian control? a compelling desire for rapid advancement
and industrialization, and therefore the need for strong leaders who can
maintain discipline and get things done; the poor base for democratic processes
in areas where a great deal of the people are illiterate and struggling for.
survival.
Ambassador McConaughy pointed out that at the same time Communism
continues to have a peculiar appeal to Asian intellectuals and reactionaries,
largely because of Russians impressive development and because of their lack
of knowledge of real developments within the Communist ortd.t.
Durability of Old Political Leadership
The older generation of experienced revolutionary leaders continues
to show a remarkable ability to remain in rower. In addition to the_ basic
reasons already stated, their prestige and statuS with the people have given
them a remarkable staying-power. In India, for example, as Ambassador Bunker
pointed out, the principal hindrance to the rise of new leadership is the
towering stature of Nehru ? it is difficult for second-line leadership to
grow in his shadow.
There would appear to be no alternative to Rhee and Chiang as natiOnal
leaders as long as they are alive. Nehru, Diem, and Sihanouk_are.:Irounger
men, but their staying-power seems fairly well assured. .Even.in.the
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
sEcRir
- 67 -
Philippines, the death of Magsaysay has not led to new leaders, but rather
to the re-emergence of old guard leadership. In Japan conservatives
seem likely for the foreseeable future to continue their hold on political
power. In several countries where the old leadership has vanished or was
never strong, control has passed to new military-type rulers, Who have
preserved or revised authoritarian rule.
Recent Afro-Asian Military Takeovers
As a recent Department of State study concludes, military regimes are
theoretically as competent as civilian regimes to carry societies through
the developmental crises, provided they understand the problems, keep
security and economic development in balance, and ncivilianize" as fully
as possible. They also have the strength and organization to seize control
and hold it.
In the past two years, military takeovers have occurred in Thailand,
Burma, Iraq, and Pakistan. Military influence in political affairs hamgrown
in the VAR, Laos, and Indonesia. However, the 1958 military coup was nothing
new in? Thailand; and in Burma the No' .n regime has now been replaced by
civilian leadership.
The experience of these regimes has shown that they are capable. of
considerable maturity and effective understanding of national_interests. .
Nevertheless, the history of mdlitary takeovers in other partm_of_themorld
suggest a potential instability in such regimes, principally: dueto a failure
to keep security and developmental progress in balance.
New Leadership-in Asia
The most striking fact about political leadership in underdeveloped
Asia is the absence of new names and faces. Limited opportunity is provided
for new leaders to emerge, except in those countries where military. .,regimes
have taken over.
New political leaders are already on the scene, but they have yet to
come to the forefront. Future leaders in the government party remain
overshadowed; whereas the weakness of opposition parties has helped to blight
the growth of leaders of national stature within the non.sgovernment parties.
Although it is true, as Ambassador Durbrow has pointed out, that
dissatisfaction exists among a considerable number of intellectuals, this
problem is more of incipient than current importance. Intellectuals have
tenuous links with the masses in the rural areas. However, extremist
movements under dissatisfied intellectuals remain a future hazard.
szclar
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
. 68 -
There is a hopeful rise in the levels of competence and expertise
in the admistrating and military servides. Numbers of younger Asians are
being trained in good schOols at home and abroad. Quite a number of these
younger Asians have risen to ministerial ranks, or to positions of leadership
in business or the professions. They form a valuable seconc6line_leadership
reserves, but few may have the magic quality needed to become great national
leaders.
It remains unknown whether the new9 unidentified leaders, whatever
their technical competence, will be as disposed as the old leaders to'thrOM
in their nationS0 lot with that of the United States. Ilkiny of these potential
leaders lack the Western education and exposure to the West of some of their
elders.
With the immediate aims of independence largely achievedy ultra-
nationalism may give way-to greater understanding of the need for international
cooperation. Complex economic problems such as the population explosion will
demand greater attention.
The Fate of Democracy in. Asia
Parliamentary democracy has not driven down roots in most of under.,
developed. Asia9 and is unlikely-to-do so for many ysars_to_cane.-RaVersion
to authoritarian rule has come to be accepted as a-practiop1 necessity.
At the same times, the democratic concept is not dead or dyingyeven
where it has been suspended or modified. Leaders seem to. casting,. about
for some way to combine the. necessities of strong executive control With
the advantages of popular government.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The United States must accept as a fact of life that our brand of
democracy has no real change of survival in any Asian nation plagued with
insecurity and backwardnessl, The United States cannot afford to take a
hostile attitude toward an5e,free Asian regime however authoritarian?,. On
the other handy to became tOo closely identified with an excessively
authoritarian regime harms our standing and influence with non-Communist
elements opposing that regime. The answer to this dilemma would seem to
lie in accenting our belief in the principles of human dignity and the
rights of man. We should bring our influence to bear to induce countries
to recognize basic human rights9 and should maintain personal friendships
with members of all nono.Communist parties. Greater emphasis should be placed
on continuing contacts with Asians trained in the United States. We should
continue to observe politicial tendencies carefully-and be prepared to move
rapidly to support new groips under certain conditions. Mb must bear in mind
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
? 69 ?
that by and large new leaders have not committed themselves. They seek
to experiment in various systems and we must show sympathy for the grave
problems they face and with the way they are trying to cope with these
problems. We should be prepared to back their aspirations even when they
follow lines which differ substantially from our own model,
Ambassador MeConaughy concluded that the image of itself which the United
States projects is of paramount importance in winning the cooperation of
Asia s? new leadership. This imagine must be that of a strong, principled
leader, who is a sympathetic supporting friend.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
0
SECRET,
- 70 -
Klo BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NEWLY EMERGING COUNTRIES
Ambassador Durbrow - Keynoter
Ambassador Durbrow opened his remarks with the statement that the
problem of balance between security and development in newly emerging
countries is one of the most difficult of the cold war problems ..to. solve?
The basic difficulty, he said, stems largely from the....fitat.:that...the_val.irlity
of any balanced program depends not only on thoroughness..in..,planning,...but7
More importantly on the shifting military, economic and political tactIcs -
of the Communists, the eharging balance .of military forces, between the Communists
and the Free World and filially, the, attitude of the American public 'and'
Congress as expressed in yearly- appropriationso- Congress and.the..Airerican
people, said Ambassador Durbrott, because of their lack Of .underStandine
of basic Communist long-range tactics and goals ars.. becoming. more.i..eindAriore
impatient about continuing ,military and economic aid and:.are inolined;t6
think that since we won the battle in Europe by the Marehall...Plari..tliii..war
is overo Most Americans, he said, do not understand that,. the_ptroblems.j
created by the Ccimmunist threat are much more difficult and complet'..in .less
developed areas than they were in Europe. As a resu.lt, Ambaasadori.Durbrow
said, too many Americans have failed ,t? comprehend that if we are.,to..prevent
further Communist conquest 9 military and economic .aid frorn,,the. and
other free...world. countries . must continue...for.. the. indefinite.. future.
Ambassador Darbrow outlined the four principal .factors...linichAinat, be
weighed and understood, apart from a fundamentalone...of....0ominuntaL:tactics,
in trying to strike the proper balance between. security,...and..davelopmenti:in
newly emerging countries. These factors , he said,. ..are.s....(1)._ the,..need,te
have adequate military forces to main
deterrent' effect to outside .aggression, _(2).,..the...need...to_?build_34)..tha. economic
infrastructure so that solid limig-range development._can_take...place,....(.3.). the
need of the governments of the newly .nergng...,aountra.to..adoptmeanirigful
plans for political development so as _to help...fotter_the..p.eoplete.g. ppith-cr.al
consciousness and understanding. of the reasons far certain.action -A and
policies, and (Ii) the need for at least modest..masa?drapact....prograni4;to
meet some of the basic material desires and requirements of the porrillsrki on
and thereby to generate their support*
Internal. and ,,External Security.
The need for adequate military forces to ensure internal security and
some measure of external security, Ambassador Thirbrow pointed 0#-9 was
dictated by the fact that the Communists- are trying by subversive propaganda
or guerrilla terrorism to disrupt economic development in all newly_ emerging
countries? Unless adequate forces are maintained,- said Ambassador: Durbrotro:
SERET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
? 7l.
to meet this Communist challenge, little or no real economic development or
investment can take place in the newly emerging countries. The Communists
by terror or subversion will impede or slow down the process of economic
development, production will fall, investment will decline and economic
stagnation will set in. The problem of maintaining internal security in
order to foster economic development was especially important in Burma,
Laos, Korea, Viet?Nam? Cambodia, Indonesia, and even Malaya and Thailand.
Wale emphasizing the paramount importance to newly emerging countries
of maintaining forces adequate to ensure internal and external security,
Ambassador Durbrow warned that too much of the country's resources ahould
not be allocated to attain these ends since (1) force alone will not assure
the loyalty of the population, and (2) it is necessary to make. sure that
sufficient resources remain to avoid economic stagnation and permit essential
development to take place as rapidly as possible. As regards the_latter?
Ambassador Durbrow stated that the allocation of resources must be kept
constantly under review to ensure that under any given circumstances the
maximum permissible is devoted to economic development. Ambassador Durbrow
then pointed out that the maintenance of security forces is not Italy a
drain on the economy of newly emerging countries, in view of extensive
unemployment in these countries, and the fact that personnel in the security
forces learn to read and write, learn useful technicarskille? and.. are
inbred with a sense of discipline and the advantages ofcooperative_effort.
Economic Infrastructure
The need, for basic infrastructure, Ambassador Durbrawcontinued,,is
dictated by the fact that most of the newly emerging. countries sorely. lack
basic economic facilities. Therefore, to promote the solid_econakic -
development of these countries, investments in_such.projects_asLroads,
telecommunications, irrigation, basic agricultauraliagamvements.,...pompr?
light industry using local rawmaterials? sane heavy industryamd:training
schools for technicians and administrators should beenpharized_rather..tban
mass impact programs, which would bring immediate but_superficialbenefita
to the mass of the population. Unfortunately, said...Ambassador...Dorbrow?..it
is rarely understood by the masses of people and.. even. same_of_the_mcamL
educated leaders that such investments call for_sacrifices_bythe.people.
Because of this ignorance, Ambassador Durbrow said, it was important
that the governments of the newly emerging countries initiate propaganda
programs to explain the fundamental facts of life about the relationships
between savings, basic investment, and economic growth.
Political Development
An effective plan for political development is essential so that the
governments of the newly emerging countries have the active support of their
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 72 -
people in the task of attaining economic independence. Such political
plans, he said, should create and encourage private and sok-political
organizations and institutions such as farmers it organizations, cooperatives,
youth movements, intellectual groups, etc., to serve as sounding boards,
safety valves and cement between the government and the people. The new
government must plant are encourage the seeds of democratic and stable
goverrnnent. Through these institutions, he indicated, the governments must
plant and encourage the tenets of democracy as we know them, which should
be explained and applied only gradually s'ince it is unrealistic. to_expect the
untutored masses to suddenly accept the responsibilities of. democracy. 1
Furthermore, Ambassador Durbrow said, these semi-political OrgPni 7ationa ..and
institutions provide vehicles through which the government canexplain the
whys and wherefores of its policies. It is not sufficient, Ambassador Durbrow
emphasized, to merely decree and announce essential worthwhile programs
from on high. A sufficient number of local leaders, if not the masses,
must have some effective way to express their views regarding. these_programs,
if their active cooperation is to be enlisted. An essential...ingredient, of:
this political plan, said Ambassador Durbrow, is the need..to.keep_corpitit,Xon
to a minimum. If a political plan does not achieve this .result, he said,
all other beneficial results will be nullified.
Mass Impact Programs,
Mass impact programs must be secondary- to factors previously outlined
and should concentrate on such activities as training more teachers,
establishing more low-level elementary and technical schools.?... and. basic
health and sanitation programs The Communists,.. be not.eds,..d.0..,nrat...try. to
disrupt these mass impact programs, but rather concentrate.,,on,..diRrnpt4ng
essential and fundamental programs such as land...reform?...better
agricultural and industrial production and better_methoda.,..of..a.ttain,ing
internal security.
Ambassador Durbrow affirmed that the liberal-inspired mass impact
programs should not have top priority in view of the basic. attitudes..of. the
Asian peasants. They, by tradition, habit, and general ignorance? he said, -
want to be left alone. They have little interest at. this time inp.nliti1 s,
freedom of speech or the press, in voting rights, rival..poli'tical_partiee -
or the opinions of parliamentarians. If the masses..are gi.ven basiet pratectpn
while the basic infrastructure is being built up, if the.seede.of....self-
government and democracy are being planted and basic needs are .cateed.to,
real progress can be made and economic independence attained in. a shorter
time than by reversing the priorities.
Conclusion
. ,
In conclusion, Ambassador Durbrow stated that the problem of achieving
a balance between security and development has been made more difficult_ in
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 73
recent years by the Communists o being forced to follow our lead and enter
the economic field. As a results he said, it is now perhaps more incumbent
on us and other free world powers to continues if not step ups economic
aid. If we do not? many countries may fall pm- to the Communiste false
claims that their system is an easy shortcut to economic independence*
Ambassador Durbrow then vent on to state that because of differences between
individual countriess it is difficult to come up with a general formula
on how to reach the balance between security and development. He said
nonetheless there are certain common factors with regard to the problem
of striking a proper balance which apply generally. These are (1) the
need for sufficient security-forces to maintain requisite internal and
external security, (2) better road networks and teleconmrunicationa.for
economic and security reasons, (3) measures which improve generalhealth?
which are essential for effective security forces and a healthy labor
forces (4) the need to foster elementary and technical educations. and (5)
greater flexibility on the pert of our own government to shift programs
and priorities to meet expeditiously changing conditions and particularly
changing Communist tactics.
Finallys said Ambassador Durbrows aside from these common factors,
the most one can recommend is that since we do not control both sides of
the equations the question of proper balance must be kept. constantly_under
review in order to divert resources to meet changing situations.... .Special
cares he saids must be exercised to make sure that we do not. concentrate
on security for security os sake at the expense of fUndamental economic
development.
SECRET.,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 74 -
XII. REGIONAL COOPERATION TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
Ambassador Johnson - Keynoter
- Ambassador Johnson opened his remarks by stating that he was not
entirely sure that he had a real topic:, since the Far East area is still
latte*y: a geographic expression and the concept of regional cooperation
has as yet not progressed very far. He added, however, that he was encouraged
that same progress, although to be sure still slight, MRS being made in
the direction of regional cooperation with the encouragement of the U.S.
Ambassador Johnson then vent on to describe the obstacles to Far East
regional cooperation and the progress that had been_madeAmthis_direotion?
using primarily a functional .approach to. the..questiont.e...?..p.olitical,.:
cultural, Military and economic.
Political Cooperation
Obstacles
Ifilth respect to political cooperation, Ambassador Johnson...noted
numerous obstacles, sane a legacy of the past, some of more_recent vintage.
As an example of the former, he referred.to the_Korea-Japan_relatianship,
and Thailand's historic struggles with neighboring_countries... Ea_pointed
out there has been no sense of regional cooperation_in_the.Far_Ewt in
modern historical times, the area having been divided into colonies' or spheres
of influence by the major powers. Japan 's co-prosperity sphere. during
World War II was cited as the nearest thing to an attempt to pull the
region together.
Since the war, Ambassador Johnson stated, the preoccupation_of_the
individual countries of the Far East with their.own.internal_problems
largely has absprbed.all.their-energies.....Moreovers-be_stated?_the desire
of the former colonies.tocast.off their. shackles has_impeded_efforts_.
of metropolitan.powers.to. serve.ascatalyst_for regionalism._In this
regard, Ambassador Johnson noted the U.S. was .ealaTIAKAL,mnall_measureof
success since it was less suspect than the other former_colonial povers.
Other obstacles to political cooperation mentioned by Ambassador_Johqson
wares (1) growing nationalism in Southeast Asia. (2):comfacting po3itipal' -
.interests between individual countries of the region,. e..g....?_Malaya-Singapore?
Cambodia-Thailand, and (3) the fact. that the economiee; of the region,
except for Japan, are largely competitive rather than complimentary.
Manifestations of Regionalism
Despite these obstacles, however, Ambassador Johnson stated that in
addition to existing regional organizations there were many ..recent
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
C.)
SECRET
- 75 -
manifestations of groping toward regional political cooperation. He cited
as an example of such gropings the exchange visits of leaders such as the
visit of the Thai King to Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Burma ? of Diem to Taiwan
and Malaya ? of Tengku Rahman and Subandrio to Australia and of many
officials and quasi-official business missions. Also noted were the
Rahman-Garcia-Thanat initiatives for SEA regional organization v the
improved Thti-Malayan cooperation on the Communist terrorist problem?
the Thai-Lao transit agreement of June 1959; the Thai training of Lao
forces ? and economic regional projects - telecommunications, Mekong
development.
Cultural Cooperation
Ambassador Johnson noted that the legacy of the past which, inhibits
regional political cooperation operates more forcibly to hinder cultural
cooperation. He noted among. the_more serious obstacles to._ cultural...cOoperation
the fact that most of the people_ of the area have?..widely..divergent...rarti n.1 .and
historical backgrounds. He noted further that while enuntries,like,Burma,'
Thailand, Laos and Cambodia share the same branch of 13uddhism,....their -
practices differ widely from country- to country. Lken more. sericnfas, he
noted, are the conflicting relations within the region._ The c.olonial.,era,
Ambassador Johnson pointed out, left each country of.the_area with different
outlooks toward Western civiliaation, differing, ideologies,. and_ varying
acceptance or rejection of Western cultural..values. Moreover.?..he..stated 9
because of the geogr. aphio isolation of the countries ..,of the. area,... esperri y
in Southeast Asia., the countries know less _about_ each_ other_tban..they..lindu
about the United States'or Western . Europe and are., leas interested_ in. each
other as well. Finally, Ambassador Johnson referred. to .. the.. barrier....to:. cultural
cooperation imposed by widely divergent languages, though he. not_ed.that
English was rapidly becoming the lingua franca of the region.
Military Cooperation
Area-wi'de military cooperation, Ambassador Johnson stated,.. was., not
feasible.. He cited the recent soundings of the Korean Mission. anctthie
repeated but unsuccessful attempts of the Taiwan regime to. interest countries
of the area in military cooperation. Ambassador Johnson. said_that_ areaF44.-de
military cooperation under Japanese leadership would.be...opposed...by thereat
of the area and was not desired by Japan itself. Many of the. cauntries,.Of
the region, Ambassador Johnson noted, feel that they are adequately covered
by existing military arrangements such as that provided by the...SEATO
unbrella or are inhibited from participating in regional military...arrangements
by such considerations as in the case of Burma having _a.common border...with.'
Red China.
SECRET,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 76 -
Despite the region as lack of interest in military cooperation, SEATO
has gained increasing acceptability-in recent years as a non-aggressive
organization and increasing recognition as a stabilizing force in the area.
Ambassador Johnson expressed the view, however, that any increase in the
membership of SEATO would add considerably to its burdens without contributing
very much on the positive side and would thereby weaken its stabilizing
role.
?Economic CoomiAgall
Soo e of Economic Cooperation
Ambassador Johnson continued that it would be first necessary to define
the region within which countries would cooperate. There could, for example,
be a number of various ways of grouping the countries in the area. Ibuld
India and Pakistan be included? Would Australia and New Zealand? There
mould also be the necessity to define the framework for economic cooperation
and type of organization under which cooperation would take place. Finally,
the specific fields of cooperation should be defined. For example, trade,
commodity stabilization schemes, devices to stimulate the flow of capital,
etc.
Difficulties Involved in DefinincampluE_Economic Cooperation
With the exception of Japan and to a lesser degree_Australie_ and
New Zealand (and perhaps in the near future India and Mainland China) all
area countries produce primary commodities. This limits intraregional
trade opportunities. Moreover, the major markets of most of these countries
lie in the West (plus Japan) and the West (plus_Japan) is also,. their major
source of supply.
The regio ni .therefore falls into no logical economic_grouping_such
as those used to promote,economic cooperation in EUrope,TheLnatural
tendency is for Asian countries to compete rathetr_than_to_cooperatkin
the economic field.
Present and Potential Catal ts and Sources ef_pinanerbigAsian
Economic Cooperation
The most important is the U.S., through its participation in bilateral
and regional programs. The construction of a road in one countrx may,
for example, contribute to a regional road. Regional projects sponsbred
or financed by the U.S. may stimulate regional cooperation.
UN bodies are also important. The IBRD? the proposed IDA., and the
Special Fund, all as financial and advisory bodies, and the AFE? FAO,
and WHO as bodies whose operations draw the countries of the region
closer together.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET,
- 77 -
The industrial nations -- the United States plus Wtstern Europe and
Japan -- can provide financing and technical assistance for projects
contributing to regional cooperation.
Finally, the countries of the region itself. It may be asked whether
Japan is an essential element in any regional scheme. Japan is the only
Asian country now important as a source for industrial and consumer goods
and as a market for primary products. Japan is also a source of capital
and technicians. On the other hand, Japan wields little.political or
cultural influence in the region. Japan ?s greater self-sufficiency in rice
has impeded its role as a unifying element. Memories of the co-prosperity
sphere make Japan suspect in many Asian countries.
India may play a further role as an economic leader.lf.its. develotanent
programs succeed. Other countries, at the same time, may. draw. closer. together
in the face of rising Indian competition,
Mainland China may inspire a Communist-oriented regionalism or.impose
difficulties by competing in markets of Asian countries, or as in the_ease
of India, force countries to draw closer together in the face of_Cammunist
competition.
Manifestations of Asian Economic Co eration
While limited in scope, existing manifestations of regional cooperation
are nevertheless valuable in promoting further cooperation. First? there...
are projects of ECAFE auspices, the Mekong River Project_ixunibdng...four
countries who have continued to cooperate despite political_strains.mong
them. The Asian highway concept adopted by ECAFE serves as a4guide.utich
Asian countries may follow in their highway improvement plane.. anally,
ECAFE provides a valuable forum for meetings, training programs and trade
discussions.
The Colombo Plan is useful, particularly as a medium,for.technipal
assistance. SEATOus engineering school at Bangkok is.important,All
members are contributing in some degree to this project- and? if successful,
it could provide a useful pattern for further training programs. ..in the-area.
United States Rol
The U.S. can continue bilateral assistance to projects which foster
regionalism and can grant aid for regional projects. It can.encourage. other
capital exporting nations, especially Japan, to contribute more_heavily.tO
Asian economic development. The U.S. can grant financial and technical
assistance to those projects and economic sectors which promote regional
cooperation, such as the Asian highway, regional airline, and. regional
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 78 -
telecommunications. Finally, the U.S. can support the "islands of development"
concept* A logical "island" for Southeast Asia is Thailand, whose
successful economic development under the free enterprise system could have
a considerable influence on its more socialist-inclined neighbors.
Dangers in Promoting Greater Regional Cooperation
There is the danger that closed marketing arrangements could develop,
shutting out the United States. A regional body could become primarily
a price fixing device. At the same time, regional cooperation could promote
the bloc voting concept in international organizations. Finally, increasing
tariffs to outsiders could result, further shutting off U.S. and Western
European imports.
Summary and Conclusions
Ambassador Johnson concluded that increasing regional military cooperaticn
is neither favorable nor desirable. However, divergent cultures will _serve
to impede a growth of regional consciousness. There is likelvto be_increasing
political cooperation in the face of a Communist. threat, provided adverse
shifts in the balance of power in the area does not make accommodatiolitoo
attractive.
Regional' economic cooperation is beset by many fundanental_problemS.
Nevertheless, there are promising developments such asthelfekOng_Ptolect.
?
Outside assistancecan contribute significantly in the. right...ciont.eZL? ?
However, increasing regional economic cooperation also_could_involvicertain
disadvantages for the United States.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
C_y\'
SECRET
- 79 -
XIII. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Mr. Knight said he would like to speak briefly about disarmament,
as he felt the countries in the area would be paying more attention to
this subject during the next year. There would be a series of disarmament
meetings?, the Ten Power talks, the Summit Meeting, the United Nations
discussions on Outer Space, the Antarctica Conference and the nuclear
testing talks. Since, at least in the Defense Department, there was a
feeling that armaments stemmed from political tensions rather than vice? versa,
Mt. Knight felt that the ambassadors should be prepared for a lack of any
immediate accomplishments in the disarmament line. Accordingly, they should
expect the propaganda warfare aspects of the disarmament talks to be
materially increased as the talks proceed.
He pointed out that there were certain dangers implicit in the
negotiations s (1) the United States has put a great deal of effort and resources
into building its nuclear deterrent and there was the danger that the iJnited
States, stockpile of nuclear weapons might be stigmatized; (2) with disarmament
talks proceeding on so many fronts there might be an unhealthy relaxation
and a feeling that there was no need for continuing effort; (3) if the
United States announces its intention to disarm in competition with the
U.S.S.R., other countries may feel abandoned; (4) there 1.5. danger of, false
hopes and over-reaction resulting from popular disillusionment. He said
he felt that the Ambassadors could play a role in minimizing all these
dangers.
Mr. Knight said that he would like to mention certain,factual_aspepts
of this disarmament question. First, he wished to explain...the...I/threshold',
proposal, in the nuclear test suspension talks, He ..said_that?.theAdet:140-
based an the fact that nuclear explosion cannot be..detectedundergraurikup
to a certain threshold in explosive power.
He also explained that Mr. Eaton's instructions are this year based.
on the acceptance of individual proposals in turn, a different. approach:from
the old package-deal concept. These individual proposals ,include cessation
of nuclear production and the transfer of specified_quantities_ofmuclear
weapons to international control. Mr. Knight concluded by_expressinghis
gratitude for being invited to attend the Conference and said that.he:found
the discussions extremely valuable.
. Ambassador Byington proposed that there be included in the recomendations
of the Conference the Ambassadors.' endorsement of the usefuIness_an&value
of. weapons demonstrations. He explained that such demonstrations_haVsJ6ebn
extremely successful with the Malayans. Mr. Parsons agreed and said that
there was a definite relationship between this and the morning's discussion
of the image of the U.S. among new leaders in Asia.
SECRIEC
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 80
Admiral Telt said that the Ambassadors' support of the concept of
future weapons demonstrations would be very useftil. He added that it would
be feasible to have the Ambassadors themselves attend a weapons demonstration
as long as plans were made sufficiently far in advance. Mr. Parsons remarked
the most opportune time woad be in conjunction with the next Chiefs of
Mission Conference.
Ambassador. Sebald then pointed out, in connection with the problem
raised that morning of the passing of old leadership to the disadvantage of
the United States, that Prime Minister Menzies VAS largely responsible
personally for Australia's close relationship with the United States*
He said that Menzies, who had been Prime Minister for ten years, would
probably retire in a few years and that he mould probably be succeeded by
second-rate leadership, with the possible exception of Sir Garfield Barwick,
who has only recently appeared on the political scene.
Ambassador Russell commented that in New Zealand the older leadership
presented certain problems for the United States. Prime Minister Nash is
engaged in proving that he is carrying out election promises. He had
promised the recognition of Communist China in principle. .Whils. he recognizes
that there are real problems involved, he may try to convince the_electwate
that he is making same steps in that direction. Oa his Way to the forthcoming
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London, he plans to stop in Moscow
for talks with Khrushchev? and it is uncertain how the meeting will go.
It is possible, however, that Nash may return somewhat disillusioned, as he
did after his meeting with Nehru. Nash believes in the two-China,concept?
with the United Nations as a guarantee. He might attempt_toget.,the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers to support this_concept.
Mr. Allen wondered if there had been any, Asian reaction to the. impending
change in U.S. leadership.
Mr . Parsons suggested that there be included. in the...racommenda.tions
a sentence relating the problem of the rise of new leadership..to_tha..Bichange
of Persons Program. He said the United States position. in..the,_ar_ea.has
repeatedly been helped by U.S.-trained leaders.
Ambassador Johnson commented that in Thailand the Fabright Program
was operating on a hand-to-mouth basis because of the lack of local currency
funds. He said that Senator FUlbright had complained that the Department
was reluctant to support the program with appropriated funds.
Mr. Henderson explained that it was not reluctance but budgetary
obstacles which prevented this, as well as the difficulties which the
Department's budget met in the House. Nevertheless, he agreed that the
Conference recommendation would be useful.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
f '
SECRET
- 81
Ambassador Sebald mentioned that in Australia money for the Fhlbright
Program would soon run out but there was a possibility that the Australian
Government might go fifty-fifty in support of the Program.
Ambassador Jones commented that there is no Fhlbright Program in
Indonesia.
Al]. of the Ambassadors agreed that they were very enthusiastic about
the results of the Ftlbright Program in the area.
Mr. Knight raised the question of directing a similar program toward
the next generation of leadership in Communist countries, which would involve
the task of identifying them and inviting them to the United States.
Admiral Felt raised the point of the International Cultural Center in
Hawaii proposed by Senator JOhnson.
Mr. Henderson remarked that the State Department would be contributing
little money to this project, and that most support Would come,fram_MSA
funds.
Mr. Parsons commented that he was not too enthusiastic abouttheAdea
because he felt that the average Asian wants to go to the Continental
United States.
Admiral Felt explained that the Hawaiians were enthusiastic about
the idea because they feel that their university courses are. tailored
specifically to the needs of Asians.
Mr. Allen mentioned that there was also the argument that same...115,000
foreign students come to the United States each years the number going.to
Hawaii would be only a fraction of the total. If given a choice,_a nunber
of Asian students might want to spend part of their time in Hawaii._ He
mentioned the excellent inter-racial setup there.
Mr. Parsons agreed that the preliminary indoctrination aspect night
be of value, but reiterated that most Asians want to see the continental
United States and avoid special interc-racial situations.
Mr. Allen said that one consideration night be whether. the_Hawaiian
Representatives in Congress supported the idea, as it would certainly_be
unwise to lose their friendship.
Ambassador Durbrow said that the Viet-Nam reaction toward the SEATO
Engineering School in Bangkok illustrated Asian preference for training in
Western countries rather than in Asia.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 82 -
General Booth pointed out that some Okinawan students have had bitter
experiences in schools in the U.S. South.
Ambassador Johnson remarked that Thai students have had happy experiences
in Louisiana and a number regularly enroll there.
Ambassador Trimble raised the problem of Cambodian students who go to
France with little money, and fall prely: to the Communists. He said that
Sihanouk told hie that he. considered this a pressing problem and was therefore
concentrating on the teaching of English in order to direct more Cambodian
students to English speaking countries.
Ambassador Durbrow added that President Diem had stopped the sending
of Vietnamese students to France.
Ambassador Drumright pointed out that for the Chinese.there,was the
additional problem of students going to the United States_and_never_returning,
Mr.. Henderson said that he felt that it was terribly important that
Asians in new countries master a European language so that they mightmnot
lose contact with the Western world. He said that the United.States_Must
be careful about adopting any course of action that might result. in the
eradication of French as we might lose everything in the process.
Ambassador Durbrow agreed and said that it was important to move with
care in this respect in Viet-Nam.
Ambassador Jones pointed out that Indonesia was an exception, that while
Dutch has disappeared, English has become a real second language.
Mr. Allen remarked that in many of these countries the_leaders_themselves
are demanding more English instruction because they realize.that...Englishris.:,
the primary means of communication in the world today.
Mr. Henderson said that he agreed that we should teach_English_to_those
who want it, but had wished to point out the danger_ofcampeting with _other
-European languages and the net loss that might.. result.
Ambassador Smith said that there was a similar problem in Laos.
He said that we were trying to meet the demand for English instruction while-
at the same time encouraging the preservation of French language.and culture,
especially in the primary grades.
Minister Holmes said that he had been much impressed by the high quality
of the keynote presentations and felt that this material could be put to '
excellent use In the FSI? particularly the Senior Officers' Course..Abere
SECREE
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/11 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 83 -
was general approval of this suggestion and it was also suggested that the
presentations be made available to the various participants. It was
therefore agreed that copies of the complete texts would be reproduced by
the authors and sent by them to the participants. This would be in addition
to the record of the Conference0
With regard to the question of regionalism in the area, Ambassador
Jones said he felt that meetings of ambassadors in sub-regions would be
most helpful. As an example, ambassadors in Malaya, Indonesia and the
Philippines would profit, he thought, from an occasional conference.. Also
a general SEA get-together would be a good idea. Mr. Parsons said that
he agreed and the only limiting factor was the budget.
Ambassador Byington explained the Tungku rationale for SEAFET. Malaya,
as a new country, wants to associate with other countries; this appeals to
its sense of nationalism. Malaya also wants something positive rather than
merely anti-Communist, something in the psychological field to substitute
for mere negativism. The Tungku was regretful that there had not been more
response, but he was determined to push ahead with it. Ambassador. Byington
was somewhat disturbed about a study emanating from the Department_which
spoke of SEAFET in terms of a ftmirage"? and he hoped that, even though the
Department understandably could not come out positively for it, there would
at least be not too much negative attitude taken on SEAYET0
Mr. Anderson said that SEX did not share the views of the_memorandum,
that it came from' INR and was not fully cleared.
Mr. Parsons observed that the Department very often keeps_qUiet:on
certain subjects because coming out strongly for them might_have jukt.Ithe
opposite result to that desired. Therefore, he welcomeiguidance_framthe ,
field on how the Department should treat these subjects.
Further in regard to regionalism, Ambassador MacArthur agreed Japan
cannot be the keystone of any such move though he feels that it must be an
important element therein. In this connection, he mentioned two actualities
bearing on this subject. First, the Asian Productivity Organization in
Tokyo, and, second, the technical training Japan gives maay Southeaet.Asians.
Japan, he feels, can be very useful in stimulating regionalism.
Mr. Knight said that Defense was putting more and more emphasis on
training programs, but was having difficulties expanding them in this area
because of lack of qualified people, particularly in English.
Ambassador Johnson brought up the question of length of tours.. for
JUSMAG personnel and hoped that something could be done to lengthen. them
for the sake of continuity. He said the Thais were contirnlarly_complaining
to him about the rapid turnover.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECREr
- -
Mr. Henderson said this was also true of attaches and the subject
was being taken up with Defense.
Ambassador Johnson said one of the difficulties was no home-leave
privileges for the Military and Mr. Henderson added that armed forces policy
was generally not to keep an individual too long away from his particular
service.
Mr.. Knight said this whole question was being worked on in Dap.
Ambassador Smith said he was in general agreement with the ideas and
conclusions presented by McConaughy, and wanted to cite one
particular aspect regarding Laos. There, he said, we must rely still on the
old guard to run things the way we umnt, even though there are some good
young leaders coming up. Furthermore, we must not accept too readily a
pattern of guided democracy and military leadership as being necessary in
Laos, where there is a stubborn and ancient danocratic tradition, just because
in certain neighboring countries we have accepted autocratic regimes as
necessary. Even though we may not be "out to export democracy" we are
certainly not out to destroy it or to weaken its genuine proponents
unnecessarily.
Mr. Parsons said that in this connection, we are under_constmat_fire
in the press at home and in Congress for suppprting,regimes.such.ae_that
of Chiang and Rhea. This is, however, based on a false_premisel;_we_are
not exporting democracy. We must take governments_as_we,find_them_anctwork
with than as they are. This, however, is very difficult_to_get_acroserto
the press.
Ambassador Drumright said an increasingly-truculent Communist China
is putting greater pressure on the countries around its periphery.. V% should
watch closely and we should encourage any movement to coalesce,aeritnst this
pressure, whether it be a political or military_groupinge
Mr. -Parsons agreed that we should certainly watch for such opportunities.
Referring back to his previous statement on exporting democracy, Mr. -Parsons
said that we must of course try where possible to reflect our democratic
image, but we cannot and should not try to inject our way of government and
institutions into an unfavorable climate. We should, of course, try where
we can to moderate the excesses of dictators.
Turning to the subject of aid programs, Mr0 Parsons said we should try
to give them a long-term perspective. These programs as mere means of
survival are not enough and we should have a sense of going forward. In
this respect, he mentioned that new U.S. officials coming into the area
normally stay only two years and often have inadequate perspective on how
far the country they are in has already progressed. This often results
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 85 -
in their having a different premise from the country representative with whom
they talk. Sometimes this results in reporting potential crises, whereas
in reality the country has progressed in some positive measure, even though
this is not perhaps perceptible to a newcomer. A backward perspective is
necessary and may avoid precipitate action.
Mr. Henderson expressed a word of caution about the U.S. identifiying
ittoelf with non-Cammunist groups who are tolerant of Communists. Such groups
m4 be very djangerous and must be watched closely.
SECREr
cs.??==.1.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
- 86 -
XIV. A. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS PRESENTATIONS BY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY HENDERSON AND MR. JOHNSTONE
Mr. Henderson opened the session by stating that he had only a few
points to add to those he had already discussed with the Chiefs of Mission
during the course of the Conference.
He stated that first of all he wished to clarify the role of the Country
Team. The Country Team is an advisory group 'which has no command function.
It cannot relieve the Ambassador of fundamental responsibility for decisions
taken. The question what should be the composition of,the Country Team is
often asked. Mr. Henderson stated that its composition is flexible and
varies according to the situation at each post. However, it should always
include the heads of USIS, ICA, MAO and CAS.
Ambassador Sebald stated that it seemed to be general opinion that
each agency should be represented an the Country Team. Mr. Parsons remarked
that it is up to each Ambassador to decide who should attend.the__Country-
Tean meetings.
Mr.. Henderson said that in accord with a recent Cabinet decision he
wished to emphasize that each Ambassador should continually assess the
effectiveness of every U00 Government operation in his country. Every
effort must be made to ensure that their staffs are held to a minimum.
He suggested that Ambassadors assign an officer to advise.them.on.the
effectiveness of their USCM9s. This officer, however should not.stand,in
the way of direct contact between the Ambassador and theUSOK Director.
Responding to a question by Ambassador Hickerson,.Mr..Henderscn_stated
that he felt that at least the senior Military Attache ..should_he?..inclusple&
in the Country Team.
Ambassador McConaughy stated that he felt that the Political. and
Economic Counselors should attend the Country Team meetings, although not
necessarily as members of the TEAM.
Mr. Henderson stated that at least the Deputy Chief. of Mission should
be present. He said the group should not grow too large.
Mr. Henderson stated that as a last subject he wished to emphasize
that Ambassadors should take a direct interest in the Consular function.
.They should ensure that adequate and appropriate space is allotted to that
section. He remarked that frequently Vice Consuls can pick up valuable
information and should be encouraged to do so. The public relations function
of the Consular Section should be kept constantly in mind and the question
to be constantly asked is nDo our visitors go out feeling well servedry
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRET
. 87 .
Minister Holmesstated that he had adopted the device of inviting
section heads to brinea junior officer with them to his weekly staff
meetings. He said he also tries to include junior officers in briefing
sessions. He reported this had paid immediate dividends in morale.
Mr. Henderson remarked that this was an excellent idea*
At this point Mr. Henderson asked Mr. Johnstone to discuss area
administrative matters. Mr. Johnstone stated that he first wanted to read
a paper explaining the role of an evaluation team operating.. of of the
Office of Under SecretaryBillon. The team is first going to Taiwan;,it
will be lead by Mr. Frank Waring. Its mission is to assess_ the efficiency
of the Mutual Security Program, Mr. Johnstone emphasized that this is not
an inspection team. Recommendations resulting from the work of these teams
will be acted on by Regional Bureaus,
Mr, Johnstone stated that on the general subject of Personnel he first
wanted to speak about the tour of duty policy. He said.that_etlast year's
Conference there was general agreement that tours should.be longer., The
Bureau has tried to follow the agreed rule of home leave at the, end of two
years and a return to post for an additional two years. In the event an
officer elects to forego home leave he might be transferred to another area
after three years.
Mr. Henderson then read from a paper prepared by the Office of Personnel
which gave tour of duty-polities at various posts. He emphaaimed:thatan
employee has the right to home leave at the end of two years,
Mr. Johnstone pointed out that the Far East Bureau feels that more. than
one additional Year should be served after home leave*
-
Ambassador Byington stated that he feels that the tour of duty policy
should be as flexible as possible in order that there can be_same.freedot
of action in normal situations.
Ambassador Durbrow pointed out that the tour of duty policy has conflicted,
at times, with career planning.
Ambassador Johnson made a plea that officers not be assigned. to FSI
for training while on home leave, He said that the training dhould be_given
between assignments. He also remarked that an effort should bammie,to,assign
an officer to a more responsible position after his return_ for the ,second_half
of a four-year tour.
Mr. Johnstone stated that several Bills are now pending in Congress
which he feels have a reasonable chance of success. One of these is the
Health Insurance Bill which will apply to all Federal employees. Premiums
SECRIKP
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
sEcREr
- 88 .
will be paid through payroll deductions. The program will be vtauntarys, and
will apply to the employees and dependents in Washington as well as abroad.
Mr. Johnstone also stated that recent legislation has been introduced
amending the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
Mr. Henderson offered to review these amendments, and summarized them
as follows
1. To set up a new ten-grade staff corps, the top three grades corresponding
to FM grades 5, 4 and 3. After ten years in the staff corps the employee
would be eligible for the Foreign Service Officer retirement system.
2. To eliminate dual-service positions in the Department.
3. To provide a 15% hasardous duty differential for courier. duty.
4. To establish language requirements for Chiefs of Mission.? It
provides that9 to the extent possible9 the Chiefs of Mission_must.have a
knowledge of the languages, history and culture of the country.of assignment.
Mr. Henderson remarked that this did not result from a Departmental,request.
50 To provide for appointment directly to Class 7. The purpose_is
to provide an avenue to Class 7 for certain specially qualified_new_officars.-
These officers would be required to pass the regular FSO .entrance examination9
and only five or six would be appointed annually.
6. To permit direct reappointment to the Service of an officer_who
has left the Service under specified circumstances.
7. To provide probationary appointments for Staff officers.
8. To eliminate the payment of salary differentials. to, FSOps Assigned
to positions in the Department that carry a higher salary_thanthat,of_the
officer. The differential will continue to be paid in thecase_of assignments
to positions that are not designabed FSO positions. (Mr. Henderson mentioned
his regret that there is little immediate prospect of providing small- .housing
allowances to FSO e8 assigned in Washington.)
9. To consolidate regulations governing separation for cause.
10. To grant longevity increases to staff employees and thus permit
overlapping of classes. Some staff employees have suffered. low morale_because
they are not promoted and receive no in-grade promotions. This provision
permits in-grade promotions to continue even though there_is_considerable
overlapping with next higher grades. .
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
L.)
SECRET
- 89 -
11. To provide for orientation courses and language training for FSO
wives. Although some of this training has been given in the past there is
no legal authority for it.
12. To establish monetary incentives for the attainment and maintenance
of proficiency in exotic languages.
13. To increase the premiums paid by the individual to the FSO
Retirement System from 5% to 6-1/2% per annum. The increase makes possible
a number of significant improvements in the retirement system.
14. To permit retired FSO's to accept Federal employment and still
receive their annuity payments. Salary plus retirement pay, however, could
not exceed the officer's final annual salary in the Foreign Service,
15. To raise Foreign Service annuities to retired officers by 10%.
At this point Mr. Johnstone resumed his dimussion of personnel_matters.
He stated that he has been asked by the Office of Personnel ta explain that
there is a great shortage of personnel except at the top. FSO grades.. There
is also a shortage of secretarial and staff personnel.. The result.is
unavoidable delays in personnel replacements? particularly in. the case of
emergency departures. A delay of nine months is estimated in the case of
some positions. Mr. Johnstone stated that the Office of Personnel. alSo
asked him to encourage posts to assign officers when practicable to positions
classified higher than their Foreign Service grades. Mr. Johnstone stated
that FE originally had 70% full-staffing positions,. and is.now down to, 55%.
Mr. Johnstone stated that in the scarcity of secretarial help awl Clerk-
stenographers the post should be encouraged to hire locally to the extent
possible.
Budget and Fiscal Matters
1960 Budgeta Picture
Mr. Johnstone continued his presentation with a summary of the 1960
budgetary picture, which he felt was somewhat brighter than at.the same time
last year. Urgent needs have been met and FE has gotten along.quite well,
despite the fact that there was no budget increase in FY 1960. This has
been made possible by reprogramming, i.e., shifting personnel within the area
to meet emergencies, and through the reduction of over-complements.
Mr. Henderson commented that while local hirings often involve
financial saving, they are charged in number equally with American personnel
and Congress keeps a close tab on these numbers. This is a basic. obstacle
to increased local hirings.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECRIM
- 90 -
Mr. Johnstone continued by pointing out that it had been possible
to issue fuil-year allotments earlier this year than in the past. This
had been made possible by-a system of advanced agreement on amounts among
the various agencies.
He explained that if it has not been possible to meet requests for new
positions in all cases, it is because Congress watches this very carefully
and holds the Department to its estimates.
Pk'. Johnstone also mentioned that official residence expenses for Duty
Chiefs of Mission are now granted in only two FT:posts. He said that extremely
good cases must be made in order to extend these allowances.
1961 Budgetary Outlook
Mr. Johnstone stated that he felt that FEis proposed 1961 Budget had
run into few difficulties so far. He explained that position increases in
the 1961 budget included for the areas political, eight officers and seven
locals; economic, ten Americans and five locals (largely commercial positions
consular, one American and eleven locals; and also under consular, requested
Increases of two Americans and six locals for implementation of PL 86.363.
He said he had no idea how these requests for increased positions_might.go?
but that Congressman Rooney had already affirmed that Government agenoies'
should not expect approval of requests for personnel increases_in.FY 1961.
Mr. Johnstone said that reprogramming might therefore_again-be_necessary.
Mr. Johnstone remarked that salary increases for locals,might_be
possible in 1961 because of rising living costs and higher competitive
salaries.
He asked the Ambassadors to take a hard look at the administrative
complement of their posts and discuss FY 1961 levels with their Administrative
Officers. He said that the administrative complements appeared way out of
line and one remedy might be to Show administrative support. for_other_agenoies
separately.
Ambassador Drunright commented that administrative support at his
post involved some thirty U.S. agencies and expressed the need for further
classification of administrative support principles.
Mr. Johnstone then raised the question of the export program to promote
sale of II,S. goods abroad that is currently under discussion in Washington.
He said that this program involved the possibility of substantial increases
in commercial officers in the area. He said that State and Commerce were
trying to reconcile their divergent views. Commerce's original request for
supplemental commercial positions had been reduced from 272 to 54, of which
only 9 would be assigned in the Far East. Fir. Henderson commented that
the Department believes in hiring more locals to fill the requirements of
this program.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Le)
SECRET
-91-
Mr. Johnstone proceeded to discuss representation allowances.
He said that in FY 1960 a worldwide increase of from $750,000 to $825,000
had been approved and that FE shared proportionately in this increase.
He said that reimbursement for special events was hopeful, but that the
posts must document their requests very carefully*
He said that in FY 1961 a 5% increase in representation for FE had
been requested due to the increased cost of living.
He then discussed procedures for income tax deductions for out-of-
pocket expenses. Consul General Maddox asked what might be included under
"other necessary expenditures" of principal officers. Mr. Johnstone replied
that whatever expenditures had been made solely as a result of an officer's
position as Chief of Mission could be included.
1Bb.dgetary Outlook for FY 1962
Mr. Johnstone pointed out that plans were already under way in FE for
FY 1962. He said that additional positions must be carefully justified
by the posts. He suggested that the EMbassies have subordinate consular
posts initiate their own requests and that the Ehbassies then_screen these
carefully before referring them to Washington.
Foreign Buildings Operation
Mr. Johnstone stated that the handling of the Department's_overseas
building programs should gradually improve with the recent establiRhment
of a Building Needs Committee with representatives from.. every:Bureau*
The Committee, he said, will review and screen the building requeets of all
of the Bureaus and make the appropriate recommendations to the FBO. The
Committee, Mr.. Johnstone indicated, represents an important step forward
in the sense that for the first time the regional bureaus will be able to
exercise a real influence over FB0 decisions with respect to the overseas
building program.
Mr. Johnstone said that despite recent improvements in the general
building situation there still remain serious housing and office space
problems in a number of FE posts. He noted the unsatisfactory Ehbassy
Residence situation in Phnom Penh and the inadequacy of office space there.
In Vientiane and Rangoon he mentioned staff housing was particularly needed,
and an office building was needed in Tokyo.
With regard to Embassy housing Mr. Johnstone noted that there still
MRS a need for compound housing, primarily for staff, people, but that the
Embassy must be careful that such housing is not useW by political and
economic officers, who should be physically located with the local population.
With regard to compound living, Ambassador McConaughy noted that there was
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
sEcmgr
- 92 -
a serious problem when two women had to be housed in one apartment and
suggested that9 if possible9 all new apartment projects should provide an
adequate number of singles so as to reduce this problem.
Mr. Johnstone noted that some progress had been made toward giving
the EMbassies more discretion in handling small expenditures for building
repair and the like. He noted, however, that FBO officers at some posts
have been given small funds for use at their awn discretion without any
supervision from p3Ogs. It was suggested that furniture be acquired locally
to be used in leased .housing. Mr. Johnstone stated that he Considered this
a worthwhile idea and said he saw no reason why funds for this purpose could
not be made available.
Mr. Parsons expressed general appreciation for the considerable progress
in the over-all administrative situation in FE during the past year
and gave Mr. Johnstone considerable credit for this improvement.
Ambassador MacArthur closed the discussion with the statement that all
owe a debt of gratitude to Under. Secretary Henderson for the leadership
he has given the Department in his present position and for the many specific
improvements h has brought in the administration of the Foreign Service.
SECREr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
ITN() ,ASSIFI ED
- 93 -
XV. A. Ca4MUNIQUE
The annual meeting of the United States Chiefs of Mission in the -
Far East has adjourned after four days of discussion from March 14 through
March 17 at Baguio, Philippines.
Among those who attended the Conference from Washington were Deputy
Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under . Se.cretaryl of State
Raymond A. Hare, and the Director of the United Stat es Information
Agency, Mr. George V. Allen. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs J. Graham Parsons was Chairman of the Conference*
Deputy Under Secretary Hare gave the Conference a comprehensive
briefing and review of the world situation.
This year's Conference again provided a useful exchange of views
concerning the relations between the United States and the various countries
of the Far Eastern area. The presence also as observers of Admiral Harry Do
Felt and other senior military commanders normally stationed.in this area
afforded an opportunity for the Conference to be briefed on some of the
problems incidental to mutual security arrangements in the Far East.
The Conferees were privileged to hear an address by His Excellency
Felixberto Serrano, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, on
the opening day of the Conference. This address was an outstanding
contribution to the Conference and was much appreciated.. They .also wish
to express their thanks to the Philippine Government for its assistance
in making possible the holding of this meeting in Baguio for the second
successive year.
March 17, 1960
1111 CLASS:17f JO
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
UNCLASSIFIED
? 94 ?
rcro B.
Dear Mr. Secretarys
American Embassy,
Baguio, Philippines,
March 17, 1960.
The Ambassadors of the United States in the Far East and Southeast
Asia, including India, have met in the Philippines from March 14 to
March 17.
We have reviewed, country-by-country, the situation which confronts
the United States in this critical area of the world, sometimes called the
Great Arc of Free Asia, which stretches from the subcontinent of India through
Southeast Asia to Japan. This great arc, made up mainly of newly independent
nations, contains almost eight hundred million of the free world s population.
It is tremendously rich in human and natural resources waiting to be
developed, and in Japan contains one of the four major industrial complexes
in the world, 1 Its economic, political, and social development in freedom
is essential to the security and future well-being of the United States
and other fres nations,
Tra.) are unanimous in concluding that since our last meeting a year
ago progress toward our national objectives has been made in this great area.
The political, military, and economic problems with which we must cope are
still numerous and very difficult, but we have more reason for encouragement
than we had a year ago. The improvement in the situation is in large measure
due to the efforts of the free Asian nations and to the steadfastness and
vigor with which NB have pursued our own policies and programs in Asia.
Most important, we have had under the Mutual Security-Ant the essential
means and instruments for the conduct of policies fitted to the. different
threats and to the varied circumstances that exist in the Far.East.andtAsia.
While United States military power has been a primary ,deterrent to
the Communists o resorting to large-scale overt armed attack againet the Free
Asian nations, our Military AssistamaProgram to our free Asian allies has
added substantially to the deterrent. It should be recognized, however,
that while the military power of the United States and our Asian allies
is a major factor in deterring overt aggression against the free nations
of this area, this deterrent would serve little purpose if they were to
The Honorable
Christian A. Herter,
Secretary of State,
Washington.
VNCLASar.FYI.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
UNCIASSIFIED
- 95 -
succumb to indirect Communist subversion and insurrection. In addition to
increasing the capability to deal with direct military aggression,. our
Military Assistance Program has also been of major.. importance..,.in..imabling
countries directly threatened by Communist subversion, or insurrectiOn:'
directed and supported from without, to maintain.their.,,internal,,seCiu4tY-.
and to help to cope with such indirect aggression. Our military...aieprogram
has made a major contribution not only to the stability and..the. securlity,Y
of many of the countries in. this area. but also to the securitr.of...the
United States. itself.
The governments of these countries._ are, striving..,t.a..improve..the....adonomic
lat of their peoples and to demonstrate that material progress .can.be achieved
without sacrifice of human values or.. loss ..th.eir....nat4.anal.. independence...::
The assistance that the. United States has been able to extend to this.)Mid
has been a vital supplement to their. own...efforts.... ? A....continued.demonstr.ation
of our constancy and deteimination_to cooperate....with.?thlittse'..,cowitries
achieving the economic prigress. which.. they.seek...is....a.,
ability of these countriei to maintain their_ indeperuience......,....The.ne.edsof.. each
country of this great area vary, and the means by which...we...meet,them...must
be` varied and flexible.
Economic assistance under the Defense Support program has provided
the minimum civilian resources needed to sustain, without disruptive
inflation, the necessary military forcet in the countriesmost_iiMedia.tely
threatened by direct Communist pressure. This applies., and Atll continue
to apply with particular cogency to those countries,...tragicAlly_di.vided
as a result of Communist aggression and intransigence.
Special assistance programs in other countries, have enabled us ,to
assist in meeting urgent political and economic needs rapidly ,and...flexib3.y.
Technical cooperation remains an indispensable element in our_policies.
The greatest asset of the Asian countries is their people. We. must,. continne
to help them to develop their skills and to create_the indispensable base
of human resources for econcmics, ia19, and pal iti cal ..progreiss.
Finally, we have in the Development 1?Dan,Fund.?...aa_welL.as im_the.Erport
Import Bank, a major source of developmentaLcapitaL assistance which. we .
hope will be increasingly supplemented by other loan assistance and private
investment. The Development Loan Fun& serves..not..merely?as a. lending '
institution to help supply such capital for sound projects_which_cannot
otherwise be financed, but also as an invaluahle.assur.ance_that.thUnited
States is prepared to help those who -wish to help themselvesto...a. _better
way of life and that there is, indeed, hope for the, future.
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
13NCLASSTITED
- 96 -
Our assistance progrann with their specific emphasis on economic
development, bear directly upon the great and broadly shared insistence of
the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian people for relief from poverty and want.
The peoples of Free Asia are determined to achieve a better way of life.
But this will not be possible without economic and industrial development,
which in turn requires capital.
We are continually striving to relate our aid programs to the longer
term needs and aspirations of these countries, to find waysato emphasize
the mutualityof our programs, and,to further their_effectivenessathrough
improvements in their operation.
All phases of the Mutual Security Program are. designed..and, are used
to deal with particular aspects of our problem..in.. Asia._ _That problem..is
to assure, so far as is practically within our power, that.., the. countries., of
this great area shall have the opportunity to. go. formard..with thalirapeacaful
economic, social, and?politir....al.de_vel.opmen.t in freedom., according to the
wishes of their peoples.. Ma are convinced., that. the_Mutual.?Secairity Prog.ram
as recommended by the President is the .minimum..required.h3r, thiR...purp.os%
We believe strongly that it merits the continued underetandin' g and the
fullest support of the Congress and the American people*
Respectfully submitted,
er,
Ambassador to India
Homer M. Byington,
Ambassador to the
Federation of Malaya
Everett F. Druzarii-VG-4?
?
Ambassador to China
&bridge
Ambassador to to Viet-Nam
John D. Hickerson,
Ambassador to the Philippines
U0 Alexis Johnson,
Ambassador to Thailand
uNcu.sa FTED
HoM-75M
-liCarr-la?
Ambassador to Indonesia
bougl?MWthur,
Ambassador to.. Japan
Walter,. P0.Mcconangily,
Ambassador_ to. Korea
Francisae, ?
Ambassador ...to..New . Zealand
William J. Sebald,
Ambassador to.. Australia
Horace .H0..
Ambassador. to Laos
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
?wi C.7
11\19s1,4:IFEEP.
William P. Snow,
Atbassa.dor to Bnrma
William C. Trimble,
Ambassador to Cambodia
?97?
DITIAEM I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
UNCLOSE FIED
- 98 -
C. FAR EAST CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE
-----71?aguio;--ffalFarn=1771767r-
PARTICIPANTS
Deputy Under Secretary Loy TAT. Henderson
Deputy-Under Secretary Raymond A. Hare
Assistant Secretary J. Graham Parsons
Deputy Assistant Secretary George A. Morgan
Executive Director/FE9 Mr. James R. Johnstone
Ambassador
Ambassador
Ambassador
Ambassador
AMbassador
Ambassador
Ambassador
Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker, New Delhi
Homer M. Byington, Kuala Lumpur
Everett F. Drumright, Taipei
Elbridge Durbrows Saigon
John D. Hickerson, Maila
U. Alexis Johnsons_Bangkok
Howard P. Jones, Djakarta
Douglas MacArthur 119 Tokyo
Ambassador Walter P. McConaughys Seoul
Ambassador Francis M. Russells Wellington
Ambassador WIlliam J. Sebalds Canberra
Ambassador Horace H. Smith. Vientiane
Ambassador William P. Snow, Rangoon
Ambassador William C. Trimble, Phnom Penh
Consul General Jolius C. Holmeas Hong Kong
Consul General William P. Maddox, Singappre
Mr. Byron E. Blankinship, POLAD/HICOM Ryukyus
Mr, Sterling J. Cottrell, TOLAD/C1NCPAC
013SERVERS
Mr. Daniel Anderson, Director, SEA
Mr. George M. Abbotts DCMs Manila
The Hon. Georg V. Allens Directors U.S. Information Agency
Mr. Richard S. Barnsley, CPAO? Manila
Mr. Frederick P. Bartlett, Directors SCA
It. Gen. Donald F. Booth, U.S. HICOMs Ryukyus
Rear Admiral J. M. Carson, CINCPACREPPHIL
Capt. Eugene W. Davis, USN, Joint Staffs J.C.S.
Admiral Harry D. Felt, GINCPAC
Mr. W. L. Georges Consultants Department of State
14r0 Lewis E. Gleecks Jr., Special Assistant for,SEATO9 FE
Vice Admiral Charles D. Griffins Commanders Seventh Fleet
Mr. Alfred le S. Jenkinss Regional Planning Advisers, FE
Mr. Robert H. Knights Deputy-Assistant Secretary of,Defense
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
UNCWSIFTED
99
Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., Commander, 13th Air Force
Maj. Gen. lalliam H. Nutter, Chief Adviser, JUSMAG, Philippines
Mr. Leland A. Randall, Acting Director, ICA, Manila
Mr. John H. Richardson, American Embassy, Manila
? Mr. Woodruff Wanner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Warren W. lEggens Assistant Deputy Director for Program, ICA
6 RAPPORTEURS
Mr. Henry L. T. Koren, Counselor for Political Affairs, Manila
(March 14-15)
Mr. Henry Brodie, Counselor for Economic Affairs, Manila
(March 16)
Mr. Seaborn Foster, Counselor for Administrative Affairs, Manila
(March 17)
Mr. Carl H. McMillan, American Embassy, Manila
(March 14-17)
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
Mr. Millard I" Kenestrick, Administrative Coordinator
Mr. Keirn C. Brown, Security Officer
Mr. Howard J. Brandli? Communications Officer
Mr, John Jo Bolinski, General Services Assistant
Mr. Robert N. Barkman, Security Ehgineer
Miss Mary Ann Mulligan, Communications Clerk
Mr. Tralliam E. Johnson, Communications Clerk
Miss Irene Lindstrom, Secretary to Ambassador
Mrs. Katherine R. Sternberg, Stenographer Supervisor
Miss Louise Hufford, Stenographer
Miss Linda Hyslop, Stenographer
Miss Elaine Kickham, Stenographer,
Miss Jacqueline M. Rubenic? Stenographer
Marine Guards (7)
UNOtAMTIED
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
UNCLASSIFIIID
CONFERENCE COMMITTPTS
Committee No. 1: Conclusions & Recommendations
Chairman-: Ambassador Johnson
Ambassador McConaughy
Consul General Holmes
Committee No. 2g Communique
Chairman: Ambassador Nickerson
Ambassador Smith
Ambassador Sebald
Committee No. 3: Correspondence
Chairman: Ambassador MacArthur
Ambassador. Durbrow
Ambassador Russell
rtNCLASSIFIE;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
SECREI'
-101-
XV. D. PROBABLE TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA DURING THE NEXT: DECADE
Ambassador Drumright
I. LEADERSHIP AND OBJECTIVES
The continuity and unique cohesion of the regime.ts_leaderShip
are likely to re:nein intact. Liu will succeed if Mao ,passea. Accordingly,
Chinese Communist objectives are likely to remain substantia.11y as.they:
are at present.
The regime gs major objectives may be defined as:
1. Consolidation of a strong, unified China allied ideologically
and through mutual interests to the Soviet Union. Communization of the
people and industrialization are major, elements in the.regime.ls internal
program.
2. Establishment of a situation of Chinese Communist paramountcy
in the East and South Asian area preliminary to the establishment of a
Communist world order in conjunction with_the Soviet Union. .
To facilitate attainment of the foregoing_ohjectivest, the regime
considers it necessary to remove what it believes. to..be chief
impediment: the United States. A wide range of politioal.,_ economic,
psychological and perhaps even military tactics will be used. flexibly in
the attempt to attain the foregoing objectives. The _regime. believes_that
the U.S. will become exhaus_ted or the U.S. people.will_weary of_current
official policy and. compel_a change. '
IL INTERNAL
The regime will seek to consolidate its ideological guid.economic
hold over the Chinese people through adjustment and perfection of its
collectivization (commune) system. This att empt t o. tighten _control, of
and extract greater efforts from the masses. will generate increased, tensions
between the regime and the people. But ruthless application of fear and'
force through reliably indoctrinated instrumentalities will probably ensure
maintenance of the regimegs hold over the people. However, excessive
exploitation of the people or natural calamities could. conceivablY genera.te
disturbances or uprisings, at least of a, local character'. Party differences
over collectivization, rectification and economic policy, already_ evident,
may grow with the passage of time.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86100268R000600030011-3
SECRET
Apart from from securing its total hold on the peoples the regime will
press ahead with utmost speed to create a heavy industry base and develop
the economy., Progress s already considerable, will probably advance at a
slower rate as the economic base broadens. In spite of forceddraftmethodss
by the end of the next decades, China will probably remain inferior to Japan
in all-around industrial capacity. Probably the next decade will witness
a substantial diversion of investment to the agricultural sector (chemical
fertilizer) lest agricultural output develop inade.cptately to feed. the
growing...population_ and.. provide_the... surpluees_ xteeded. t ....finance.. further
development._ ?. The regime. milleundoubtedly findeit.necessary .tn . have:, a
further look at the population. problem._ ..Food. and papule-hi on...wille_remain
formidable problems even if eubetantial._progrese . is...made. ineindustriaiiziation.
Irc 0 FOREICE RELATIONS AND POLICIES.
The Sino-Soviet alliance will remain.. the. the... regime n
foreign policy.; the alliance will remain firmly. joined..againet....t.hey.WeSt.
The regime will strive to increase_ its.....influence....an.d_power..within_and ?
without the bloc. The regime s external... appreach...ies. likely_ to...be ..dogmati' c 9
.overweening and increasingly.. assertive,. Growth. of._ the.....regimP s, power and
Influence :would increase prospects for discord_mithinet.he...bloce_...Differences
of viewpoint and frictions exist now between. the... regime and.the...Saviet. ..:Union.
The regime resents the niggardliness of Soviet, aid and...Sevi_et.. coolness
toward the commune system. The regime disapproves... of rush.s..attempts
to ereate a? detente because it implies at least temporary sanction of the
status atto, win:v.74rd make more di ffico.it the carrying out. of the, regime s
internal -Programs. It would also threaten to delay the regime's objective
of dominating East A,sia. The regime also resents Khrushehev's. arrogation
of authority to speak for the bloc. in world ceeuncile. Kh.rushchev, for his
parts resents Mao's pretensions of doctrinal superiority..?anclehefears
that an increasingly powerful mainland China will sometime...attempt. to...aFtaert
bloc supremacy or adopt a nationalistic and chauvinietic...attiturie...i.nimieal
to the interests of the Soviet Union. But the Chinese...are, unlikely, to
challenge Soviet predominance during the decades, and...the.. alliance., of
ideology and mutearf interest is unlikely to be breached.. .Ne-vertheless,
the regime will persist in following. internalepolicies which. contain...the
'Chinese conditions."
As the regime is able to consolidate its internal powers it will
almost certainly adopt a more truculent approach toward. its Yee. 'World
neighbors and the uncommitted states. There will, be. no turning, back in
Tibets and encroachments in the Tibetan ethnologinaleareas...of. Elhutans
Sikkim and Nepal are within the realm of possibility. The border...problem
with India will not be easily solved unless....Nehru.makes_major concessions.
The regime will exert pressures through its North Vietnamese.. satellite
to induce instability in Laos and South Viet-Nam. Relations with Indonesia
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3
1\--)
SECREr
.'103.'
will probably deteriorate further if the Indonesian authorities press their
present policies against the Overseas Chinese. The regime may eventually
return to a policy of blandishment toward Japan when it sees that its present
hard policy is counterproductive. Military efforts to seize Taiwan will
probably be withheld in the absence of a change in U.S. determination and
capabiTity to resist forcible attempts to seize the island. The possibility
of air clashes with the CAF will grow as the regime improves its air capability.
The offshore islands may be subjected to renew* military pressure at any
time - perhaps mainly for the purpose of creating Free. World_discord.
The regime probably considers international?respectability as
secondary in importance to the achievement of_its_immediate alma in;.Eastern
Asia. If so, the regime's actions_willuontinue_to_militataAgAin-st is
being. accorded.,& higher..degre.e?..of international.approbationthanAt_enjays
at present.
IV. MILITARY
The regime will continue to expand and modernize...its...military
power, but will remain dependent. on the Soviet.Union_fot..Much..atitsLneeded
complex equipment and technological assistande.... The_tegimela
to produce ordinary., hardware... in crease Substantially.. Subeirdinat*on-
of the military to politicaLand_economic donsiderations.will ntilitate against
maximum capability. The regime... is eagerAcA3btain_a_nuclear. capability -
and is attempting to train nuclear. experts.,.,Considetable_basic_technical
assistance and training are. being pravided,by.the,Soviet_Union,Gi7Ven
adequate Soviet help, the regime might possess a small nuclear weapon
capability-within ten years. The regime is notlikely to develop a significant
guided missile Capability within the decade, but may receive some simple
equipment from the Soviet Union. The regime will continue, to have_asUPerior
military capability, to any ofits neighboringpowers?.ineluding-Japak Or
India. This overwhelming Power is more likely,to_be_used_as_a_threat_than
as an overt instrument of force.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Free World must presume for the foreseeable future that. it
will be faced with an implacable,. growing and_hostile power_on,the_China
mainland. Flexibility. of tactics and a_broad.commaminfAutalitarian powers'
will insure the regime"e_continued. existence._ On balance?...wv,amlikelyjto
see more, rather than lees, of the range of pressures exemplified.,.in.-..l958
against Japan and the offshore islands, and now on,the_Indtma.bfirder14n
Laos, Viet-Nam and Indonesia. This means that a protracted...struggle?...actass
a broad front remains the unpalatable prospect_ahead., It.. calls for_redaubled
efforts on out part if Free Asia is to remain free. andAhe...balanae...af_world
power is not to be tipped against the .Free
SECRET
STATE - RD - Wash.DC
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP86T00268R000600030011-3