BRIEFING OF BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES BY BORIS KLOSSON, 11 AUGUST 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000700150013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 11, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000700150013-7
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
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11 August 1961
SUBJECT: Briefing of Board of National Estimates by
Boris Klosson, 11 August 1961
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1. Mr. Klosson did not give a talk but used all of the time to
answer questions.
2. The Embassy has very little evidence regarding the reaction
of the Russian public to the President's speech on Berlin since the,.
public is very reluctant to talk to US Embassy personnel. There Var
however, no extra crowds around the newspapers posted on walls and
no talk of war in Moscow as there was in London. Mx. Klosson observed
that for the average Russian the recent watershed in history is the
last war and not, for example, the death of Stalin. The average Russian
simply can't believe that there will be another war and puts such
thoughts out of his mind. When they see Khrushchev in uniform, however,
the public gets a bit nervous. Generally speaking, the Soviet regime
wants to hold down internal tension.
3. The bulk of the Soviet public goes along with Khrushchev on
Berlin in the sense that they believe in the righteousness of the
Soviet cause, but they do not want war.
4. The main interest of the people is in getting things for
themselves?in getting a,car and becoming bourgeois. The'Fssian public
very seldom criticizes its government, or at least not in the presence
of Embassy personnel. There was, however, a sharp reaction to the
proposed export of \ragas to the US. Why, Ethbassy personnel were asked,
do you want all these cars when you have so many of your own?
5. The Soviets are not afraid of West Germany per se. But they
do fear that Adenauer may precipitate something which will involve the
US, i.e. attempt to unify Germany by force.
6. On Berlin the Soviets are waiting for a proposal from us.
Khrushchev believes that the boundary problem is more important to the
Soviets than Berlin, although they do want to tidy Berlin up.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000700150013-7
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7. Mr. Klosson was asked whether the elements of a bargain
existed in which we would give some kind of tacit recognition to
East Germany and the Soviets would leave Berlin pretty much as it is.
Mr. KIosson did not think that the Russians would be willing to leave
Berlin as it is and that they would insist on some changes there.
Khrushchev's prestige is too committed for them to do otherwise.
8. Khrushchev probably believes that he can control the situa-
tion and that the question of whether the West would fight is not a
real issue because it will never come to that. He probably leans
in the direction of believing that we will not fight over Berlin.
This view could change, however, now that the US has started moving.
9. Khrushchev would fight if he had the choice of seeming to
capitulate or to fight, and he would do so largely for psychological
reasons--because of pride and a desire that Russian strength should be
recognized and respected. Given this fact, he has probably gone as
far as he has in putting himself out on a limb because he is confident
and because he believes that if he did not throw things around the
West would drag its heels.
10. The Party Program and the 10-20 year economic projections
will sound terribly hollow at the Party Congress if the real worry
becomes whether war will break out in the next few weeks. They will
also sound hollow if Wcan't announce to the Party Congress that there
will be negotiations. Khrushchev is completely wrapped up in the
Congress, which he hopes will help him to go down in history. He was
already working on his speech in July. He told Klosson that he wanted
it to present a clear picture to the Soviet people.
11. Chinese in Moscow always act like Stalinists. They travel
in pairs and stand in a corner at parties where nobody talks to them,
not even the Russians. The Soviets will quip about the Chinese. The
Chinese students do such things as forego lunch in order to send money
home. This attitude is very definitely non-Slavic and among the
Soviets the "Nichevo" spirit is still strong. As a result antipathy
is built up. In addition, the Chinese are very arrogant.
12. In terms of the Communist movement or the problem of opposi-
tion to Khrushchev internally, some of the tougher positions taken by
Khrushchev have probably been influenced by the need to answer the
Chinese.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000700150013-7
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13. Klosson believes that there is internal opposition to
Khrushchev, although there is no firm evidence of it. Its existence
has been deduced from continuing arguments in the press over such
things as heavy versus light industry. Khrushchev has done something
for every segment of Soviet society but he has also done other things
to hurt them too. This is particularly true of the elite whose dachas
are under fire and whose salaries have been cut. There are many of the
more privileged who would like the dialectic to stop at socialism because
they fear that under Communism their privileges will end.
14. LumuMba University students have their problems with the
Russians and we often gain by its existence. Many of the students
get fed up. One Nigerian student told Klosson that his clothes had
been stolen (the Russians paid him off but he then had to buy Russian
clothes that he didn't like), and the Russians are annoyed when the
students go out with Russian girls. The students mail and papers are
read and the students know it. 10% of the students are from the USSR
and they keep their eyes on the non-Soviet students. The students
also hold the Russians to their promises, and the Russians don't like
this. The students learn about the Russian system even better than
Embassy personnel do and they don't like it. The Nigerian student
told Klosson that he ".would rather live in the bush than in this bureauc-
racy."
15. Koslov was pasty-faced after his recent heart attack and
had lost much of his bounce. Mikoyan and Khrushchev treat each other
as equals, e.g. they tease each other, but Koslov is deferential to
Khrushchev. Prior to his appointment as Party Secretary other Party
functionaires would both greet and talk to Koslov. Now they greet
him and go. He is apparently tough with the members of the apparatus
On one occasion he chewed a Party official out for coming to a recep-
tion without shaving.
16. Klosson did not do any forecasting on the possible successor
to Khrushchev. He feels, however, that Koslov is not another Khrushchev,
and if he became part of a triumvirate he would not emerge as Khrushchev
did. Mr. Klosson added that he could be wrong and that Koslov simply
might be submerged now by the stronger personality of Khrushchev.
17. Mr. Klosson noted that he had a "distorted" view of
Khrushchev--had never seen him drinking heavily or with his shoes off.
Khrushchev has been drinking only light wine if anything at all. He
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still has a large front porch but is on a diet. His breathing is not
labored, however, nor does he show any other external signs of serious
disability. On the last occasion that Mr. Klosson saw him, Khrushchev
said that he was tired but did not look tired. He is still a dynamic
and vital person, but he conserves his energies--he will sit and listen
with his pudgy hand on the table, he will start talking slowly at first,
and then begin to warm up, gesticulating and bouncing around. Khrushchev
recently described to Klosson how he shot the bear whose skin graced
his dacha floor. Klosson was amazed at how quick and graceful he was
in bringing his arms up to show how he held the gun, in spite of the
big front porch.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000700150013-7