CONVERSATION WITH MARGUERITE HIGGINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080076-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: March 9, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080076-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: 9 March 1959
SUBJECT : Conversation with Marguerite Higgins
PARTICIPANTS; Miss Marguerite Higgins, Herald Tribune, and Mr. Robert W. Komar, CIA
COPIES TO ; DEA, Colonel Grogan, R. W. Koster
1. Mims Higgins was transferred to me when the DD/I was not here this
afternoon. Her opening gambit was that she was "damned confused" by the
press reports on Khrushchev's remarks in Berlin yesterday. Apparently AP inter-
preted Khrushchev to mean that the troops of the Four Powers would remain in
Berlin as a whole (i.e. some Western troops inIisat Berlin and some Soviet
troops in East Berlin) whereas UP had the troops remaining in their present
locations (or vice versa - she didn't indicate which side UP took and which side
AP took).
2. I told her that I had only seen one ticker report and it was highly
unclear on this subject. I doubted that Khrushchev had himself been very explicit.
When pressed for which interpretation I would make I pointed out that all we had
was the press ticker of this afternoon which was Inconclusive, but that py awn
guess would be that he was not suggesting that 'Western troops be stationed in
East Berlin.
3. She then went on to ask how one should view these indications of
Khrushchev's flexibility. Did we feel that Khrushchev felt be had to get "off
the hook" in Berlin. I said ,that one should always keep in mind the war of
nerves on the part of the Soviets, in which they alternated suggestions flexibility
with very tough talk. As for Khrushchev being on the hook it was hard to believe
that he was panicking in the absence of any developments on our side which would
FORM NO. 1132
FFR 57
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080076-5
(11 23-36)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080076-5
compel him to do so as yet. On the other hand should keep in mind that Soviets
presumably had maximum and minimum objectives on Berlin and difficult to say
that Khrushchev necessarily felt he had to get whole loaf this time. Entirely
possible that Soviets viewed Berlin problem in long-range context and would
settle for a substantial weakening of our position as a result of current crisis,
which would set Berlin up for further weakening later. .
/3/
R. W. KOUER
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080076-5