MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND MATERIEL IN THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000100040006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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JV..~o~ P~
DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Mobilization of
Manpower and Materiel
in the Non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact Countries (U )
SEPTEMBER 1982
SECRET
DIA review completed.)
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MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND MATERIEL IN
THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES (U)
Information Cutoff Date: 15 May 1982
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DB~1F
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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PREFACE
(U) This study examines the role of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)
military commissariats in the overall process of force generation. To this
end, attention is focused on such key commissariat functions as manning the
active forces through conscription, improving the quality of a large reserve
pool through training, and mobilizing both the manpower of that pool as well
as transport assets from the civilian economy in the event of war. Because
of their strategic importance, the study concentrates in particular on com-
missariats in Pact countries in the NATO Guidelines Area.
(U) Each classified title and heading in this study has been properly
marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.
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Page
SUMMARY ................................................................
vii
1.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................
1
2.
SUBORDINATION AND ORGANIZATION .....................................
1
a. Subordination ..................................................
1
h. Organization ...................................................
4
3.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................
6
a. Premilitary Training ...........................................
6
b. Reserve Training ...............................................
7
c. Conscription ...................................................
10
d. Mobilization ...................................................
10
(1) Manpower ...................................................
14
(2) Materiel ...................................................
17
4.
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................
APPENDIXES
19
A.
Patterns of Personnel Dispersal During Mobilization Exercises
in East Germany ....................................................
21
B.
Dispersal Patterns of Some Mobilized East German and Polish Motor
Transport iJnits ....................................................
ILLUSTRAT
N
25
1.
IO
S
Chart - Command Structure of NSWP Canmissariats ....................
3
2.
Chart - Organization of Commissariats .............................
TABLES
S
1.
Estimated Number of NSWP Ground Units ..............................
2
2.
Disposition of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe ......
2
3.
Designation of NSWP Commissariats ..................................
2
4.
Major Premilitary Training Organizations of NSWP Countries.........
8
5.
Length of Obligation of Warsaw Pact Reservists .....................
8
6.
Prescribed Tours of Active-Duty For Class I Reservists .............
9
7.
Length of Obligatory Service for Conscripts (Months) ...............
11
8.
Estimated Net Augmentation of Armed Forces from NSWP Reserve
Pools in the Event of War/General Mobilization ...................
15
9.
NSWP Potential for Creating New Units ..............................
16
10.
Estimated Strength of NSWP Militias ................................
16
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SUMMARY
(C) As in the USSR, military commissariats in NSWP countries play a
crucial role in the system of force generation. Commissariats have no coun-
terpart in the US. Their activities, in fact, combine those of t~nerican
draft boards, Armed Forces Reserve Centers, and the Veterans Administration.
The primary mission of the commissariats in peacetime is conscription and
the training of reservists and youths. Their mission in wartime is the
mobilization of reservists and transport assets from the civilian economy in
accordance with the needs of the NSWP Armed Forces.
(S) Relative to the size and populations of the countries involved, the
reserve forces at the command of NSWP commissariats are very substantial.
NSWP countries have a total of 7.3 million reservists. This is more than
sufficient to raise the NSWP peacetime manning level from 1.3 million to an
estimated wartime strength of 2.4 million. Depending on particular circum-
stances, it would also be more than sufficient to enable NSWP planners to
create new formations or replace large losses. Albeit little is known about
total NSWP civilian vehicle assets, they also are believed to be sufficient
to meet the mobilization requirements of NSWP planners, at least during the
initial stages of war.
(S) Although this study is concerned with the system of force generation
in the DISWP countries, focus is on those Pact countries in the NATO Guide-
lines Area (NGA), namely, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In a
conflict against NATO, it is from these three countries--also referred to as
the "Northern Tier"--that the m ajor assault would come and through which
enormous numbers of men and quantities of materiel would move. NSWP forma-
tions in the NGA would comprise--in terms of divisions--m ore than half of
the first operational echelon of the Western Theater of Military Operations,
and the countries themselves would lie across the axis of advance of the
second operational echelon. Currently, 52 percent of all NSWP active
ground units and 87 percent of Soviet ground units in Eastern Europe are in
the NGA. This represents a total of 33 NSWP and 27 Soviet major ground
units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Additionally, these NSWP
countries control approximately 62 percent of NSWP active armed forces
personnel and nearly 60 percent of NS4JP reservists. This represents a total
of 812,000 active armed forces personnel and 4.3 million reservists.
(C) Although the role of NSWP commissariats in the system of force
generation is very similar to that of commissariats in the Soviet Union,
same areas, nevertheless, deserve close attention. In Eastern Europe, for
example, and particularly in the Northern Tier countries, response time as a
factor in mobilization planning appears to be especially critical.
Geography, the proximity to NATO Forces, and the key role NSWP armed forces
play in Warsaw Pact contingency plans, account for this. As a result, and
to a greater extent than even in the Soviet Union, reserve assigrnnents and
motor transport unit missions in the Northern Tier countries (and probably
also true for most other NSWP countries) are based on the principle of ter-
ritoriality. That is, reservists are normally assigned to local units, with
motor transport units usually designated to cover only short distances.
Moreover, mobilization designation assignments similar to those in the US
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are employed to at least some extent, and, once mobilized, sane reservists
are even scheduled to be picked up at hone by their units. Many reserve
officers keep uniforms and some equipment at home and--to accelerate loca-
tion of unassigned reservists--m obilization notifications are delivered by a
variety of means to include the use of postmen, local government officials,
commissariat personnel, and radio broadcasts.
(S) The ability of NSWP commissariats, especially those in the Northern
Tier, to mobilize men and materiel has been well demonstrated in practice
alerts and exercises. This is seen from the data presented in appendixes A
and B. Use of computer technology, highly developed telecommunications and
lines of communications, and a specialized system for locating unassigned
reservists facilitate commissariat efficiency.
(C) In spite of these positive features, however, there are sane un-
certainties regarding system performance as well. Notably, NSWP systems--
like their Soviet counterparts--have never been tested wholly in peacetime,
an undertaking prohibited in all but the most threatening of crises by the
enormously disruptive nature of general mobilization. In time of war, given
the destructiveness of modern weapons, the ability of the commissariats to
generate large manpower and material resources and themselves to survive
must remain open to question. This is especially true for assets in the
Northern Tier which would become high priority NATO targets. Again, with
the exception of those with designated mobilization assignments, there is
evidence that the training of NSWP reservists is not systematic and that
once called up such training is also both perfunctory and haphazard. Con-
sequently, in the event of full mobilization, for_nations would probably need
extensive training prior to commitment if a high level of combat effective-
ness was seen as essential or desirable. Finally, a general European war and
the attendant threat--or employment--of nuclear strikes could im peril the
extent to which NSWP nations would carry out the extensive (and possibly
protracted) mobilization of manpower and materiel demanded in Warsaw Pact
contingency planning.
(C) In conclusion, it can be stated that the strengths of the NSWP
system of force generation are very im pressive. However, the system
possesses endemic weaknesses as well, which--when coupled with the problems,
stresses, and demands of large-scale mobilization and/or massive losses--
could gravely affect mobilization performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
(S) The purpose of this study is to examine the system of force genera-
tion of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. However, because of
their strategic locations and the key roles played in Warsaw Pact contin-
gency planning, emphasis throughout the study will focus on those NSWP
countries in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA), namely, the Northern Tier
states of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In a war against NATO,
it is from these three countries that the major assault would come and
through which the bulk of men and m ateriel would be channeled. Currently,
52 percent of all NSWP active ground units and 87 percent of Soviet ground
units in Eastern Europe are in the NGA. This represents a total of 33 NSWP
and 27 Soviet major ground units, respectively. Additionally, the three
countries canbined control approxim ately 62 percent of NSWP active armed
forces personnel and nearly 60 percent of NSWP reservists. This represents
a force of 812,000 active armed forces personnel and 4.3 million reservists.
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated numbers of NSWP ground units and the dis-
position of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe. Of the units
shown in both charts, all Soviet units and 40 of the 64 NSWP units are
designated as Category I by NATO.*
(C) The system of force generation in NSWP countries closely resembles
that of the Soviet Union. Crucial to the process is a military organization
responsible in peacetime for, among other things, conscription, training of
youths and reservists, and managing the nations's reserve pool. In wartime
this organization is responsible for mobilizing reservists and transport
assets from the civilian economy. This organization is known in the USSR as
a military commissariat. Its counterparts in the NSWP countries are identi-
fied in table 3. For purpose of sim plicity, however, the term "military
commissariat" will be used throughout this study. Also throughout this
study, differences between Soviet and NSWP commissariats will be highlighted
and similarities synopsized.**
a. Subordination
(C) Like those in the USSR, commissariats in the various NSWP coun-
tries are widely dispersed and function under a dual system of command. In
all these countries, and as shown in figure 1, the commissariats are ulti-
mately under the operational control of the Organization and Mobilization
Directorate of the General Staff through the Organization and Mobilization
* (C) Category I units have a full canplement of combat equipment and are
manned at levels between 75 and 100 percent of wartime-authorized
strength. Category I units are considered ready for deployment in a few
hours.
** (U) See the canpanion study, Soviet Military Commissariats:
Organization and Capabilities (U), DDB-2680-159-82, for a detailed
assessment of Soviet commissariats.
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Table 1
Estimated Number of NSWP Ground Units IU1
Mtz Rifle/
Mech
DIVISIONS BRIGADES
Assault
Landing
Tank (Amphib) Artillery Airborne Inf Tank
TOTAL
DIVS/BDES
Mtn
Bulgaria
6'
- - - - - 5
- 11
Czechoslovakia
5
5 - 1 1z - -
- 12
Ger. Dem. Rep.
4
2 - - - - -
- g
Hungary
5
1 - - - - -
- g
Poland
8
5 1 - 1 - -
- 15
Romania
8
2
-
- 1z -
-
3
14
Total 3
6
_
_ _
__
_
15 1 1 3 - 5
_
3 64
'Includes one training MRD.
' Denotes airborne regiment.
Table 2
Disposition of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe IU)
COUNTRY
MRD
TD
ARTILLERY
DIVISIONS
TOTAL
LINE
East Germany
10
9
1
20
(GSFG)
Poland INGF)
-
2
-
2
Czechoslovakia
3
2
-
5
ICGF)
Hungary ISGF-
2
2
-
4
Total
15
15
1
31
Table 3
Designation of NSWP Commissariats IU1
COUNTRY
TERM
ENGLISH EQUIVALENT
Poland
Sztab Wojskowy
Military Staff
Czechoslovakia
Vojensko Sprava
Military Administration
East Germany
Wehrkreiskommando
Military Area Headquarters
Hungary
Megyei Kiegeszitoe
County Induction Center
Parancsnoksag
Romania
Comisariatul Militar
Military Commissariat
Bulgaria
Okruzhie
Military Commissariat
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Ministry
of
Defense
General
Staff
Organization
and
Mobilization
Directorate
Military
District
Commander
* Republic/Province
Region Commissariat
Organization
and
Mobilization
Department
County
Commissariat
City
Commissariat
Ward /Village
Commissariat
* Czechoslovakia only Chain of Command ---- Technical Cognizance
FIGURE 1. (U/ COMMAND STRUCTURE OF NSWP COMMISSARIATS
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Department of the local Military District (MD).* For purposes of daily
routine and administration, however, control is exercised according to civil
territorial subordination. Each commissariat is responsible to the
commissariat at the next higher level. In NSWP countries the smallest
territorial subdivision is the equivalent of the city ward or rural
community. It is at this level, moreover, that most commissariats and
related activities are found. The highest territorial level of m ost NSWP
countries is the equivalent of the province or district. The exception is
Czechoslovakia, which consists of two, naninally autonomous, republics.
(S) The number of territorial subdivisions in each NSWP country,
however, is not necessarily a reflection of the total number of
commissariats in that country. Demographic considerations play an important
role in the creation of commissariats. In sparsely populated areas, for
example, one commissariat may supervise more than one territorial
subdivision. Because of lack of data, it is not possible to determine the
total number of commissariats in each of the NSWP countries nor the number
of personnel that staff them. For example, it is estimated that East
Germany maintains some 14 regional-and 226 county-commissariats.** These
are manned by a total of nearly 5,500 military personnel (to include
reservists) and 8,400 civilians. However, the number of commissariats
serving the more than 7,600 East German urban/rural communities remains
unknown.
b. Organization
(S) As in the USSR, the organization of NSWP commissariats is func-
tional and reflects their basic missions. Commissariats normally have a
command element and four departments. A fifth department responsible for
premilitary training may also be standard in Czechoslovakia. In some of
the other countries, at county level and above, separate departments are re-
ported to exist for finance, security, and communications. The standard
departments and their functions are shown in figure 2 and will be discussed
in the next section of this study. Although little is known about the type
of communications equipment and systems linking the commissariats with one
another, alerts and field exercises in the NGA indicate communications are
rapid and reliable. Linkage within the military net is not only with the
local MD Headquarters but also with active units.
* (C) Although differing slightly from that in use in Romania and
Bulgaria, to prevent confusion the term '4ilitary district" is used to
designate the highest form of military, territorial subordination for
all NSWP countries. In Romania the counterpart of the military district
is called "territorial command"; in Bulgaria it is called "district
military administration." Hungary has no such structure. Military
administration in Hungary is exercised through defense commands at the
county level.
** (U) For a detailed look at the East German mobilization system see,
USAREUR Intelligence Study: The East Germ an Reserve and Mobilization
System (U), EUR-1100-UISI-80, SECRET.
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Command
Element
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(S) In the event of general mobilization, it is not clear to what
extent NSWP commissariats would relocate to alternate locations. However,
some hardened relocation sites for commissariats have reportedly been
observed in East Germany. The special importance of Northern Tier countries
to Pact military planners is also revealed by the fact that many Northern
Tier commissariats are reported to have their own arms rooms and that some
East German, Czech, and possibly also some Polish reserve officers with
designated mobilization assignments keep their uniforms and some equipment
at home.* Both practices are unknown in the Soviet Union.
3. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
(C) Of the numerous duties performed by commissariats as combined draft
boards and reserve and veterans centers, the most important are those in-
volving force generation. In peacetime this involves training youths and
reservists; conscription; and managing the nations's reserve pool. In war-
time it involves mobilizing reservists and transport assets from the
civilian economy. These activities will now be examined in some detail.
a. Premilitary Training
(C) The scale of youth involvement in some form of military training
in NSWP countries is enormous. Millions of youths are involved and training
is both basic and specialized. Basic premilitary training is generally
given in secondary schools and, as in the USSR (but with the curious excep-
tion of Bulgaria), is mandatory. In some countries, such training begins as
early as ages 13-14, and takes the form of classroom instruction in such
subjects as: military regulations, map reading, first aid, civil defense,
and small arms instruction (often including firing at a local military
installation). Such training, normally provided by reservists activated for
that purpose by the commissariats, is probably a responsibility of the Con-
scription Department. Specialized training, on the other hand, is usually
voluntary and provided by organizations often associated either with the
armed forces or the Communist party.
(C) In East Germany, the only NSWP country with a tradition of pre-
military training prior to World War II, specialized training is the re-
sponsibility of two mass groups: the Free German Youth (FDJ) and the As-
sociation for Sports and Technology (GST). The latter organization has a
membership of approximately 500,000 youths. The number of East German males
reaching draft age each year is only 29 percent of this total. Both
organizations offer training in such skills as: radio, photography, aero-
nautics, parachuting, topography, civil defense, diving, driving, small arms
firing, and squad-level tactics. In East Germany, the role of premilitary
training has become increasingly important. In fact, East Germany is the
only NSWP country with a premilitary training program as comprehensive and
intensive as its Soviet counterpart, DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Co-
operation of the Army, Air Force, and Navy).
*(C) Arms and equipment in one Czech commissariat included: 7.62-mm rifles,
M58P assault weapons, pistols, R-109 type radios, Praga Y35 trucks, GAZ 69
jeeps, and CBR-related equipment.
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(C) If perhaps less systematic and well organized, premilitary
training in the other NSWP countries is essentially the same as in East
Germany. Poland has at least 10 organizations offering specialized pre-
military training and appears to be the only country making membership in
such organizations mandatory. One of the largest of these organizations is
the Association of Scouts with a membership of 2.5 million youths. The
number of Polish males reaching draft age each year is only 11 percent of
this total. Of interest is development of premilitary training in that
maverick nation of the Pact, Romania. Prior to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Romania had no uniform policy or program for training its
youth. Since that time, Romanian leaders have established a nationwide
training program to involve all youths. They have also let it be known, not
always subtly, that the purpose for creating this additional source of
trained manpower is to discourage intervention in Romanian affairs from
whatever quarter.
(C) It is not the purpose of this study to examine the quality of
premilitary training in NSWP countries. Although the quality and intensity
of training undoubtedly varies from country to country, its existence has
two salutary effects for all the countries: it provides an additional pool
of manpower familiar enough with basic military skills to serve in some
defense/support role if necessary; and it enables the armed forces to spend
less time teaching such basic skills to conscripts. Table 4 identifies the
most important premilitary training organization in each of the NSWP
countries.
b. Reserve Training
(S) Upon completion of mandatory active duty, conscripts of all NSWP
countries are automatically discharged into the reserves. There are, how-
ever, no special command structures of reserve forces in NSWP countries (or
the USSR) similar to the US. Reserve units as Americans know them do not
exist. In the event of mobilization, reservists would be activated indivi-
dually either to bring active units to wartime strength, to replace battle-
field casualties, or to create new units.
(C) By law, training and career monitoring of reservists are re-
sponsibilities shared by the Mobilization, and Officer/Enlisted Records
Departments of the military commissariats. To enable control, all con-
scripts upon discharge are required to register with their local commis-
sariat. Moreover, and as they occur, all changes of location, employment,
family status, and other vital statistics must be reported to the commis-
sariats. The length of reserve obligations in each of the NSWP countries
are shown in table 5.
(C) Reserve training takes such forms as refresher courses and lec-
tures conducted by the commissariats and local garrisons; alerts; active
duty tours; and field exercises. Table 6 shows the legal provisions for
reserve training in each of the NSWP countries. It is to be emphasized,
however, that, as in the USSR, statutes regarding reserve training are con-
sidered enabling rather than mandatory. This is probably because of a
Warsaw Pact-wide perception that the relatively large reserve pools that
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Table 4
Major Premilitary Training Organizations of NSWP Countries
COUNTRY
ACRONYM
NAME
ENGLISH EQUIVALENT
GE
GST
Gesellschaft fur Sport and Technik
Association for Sport and Technology
CZ
SVAZARM
Svaz pro Spoluprace s Armadon
Association for Cooperation with the Army
PL
ZHP
Zwiazek Harcerzow Polskich
Association of Polish Scouts
HU
MHSz
Magyar Honvedelmi Szovetseg
Hungarian National Defense League
RO
UTC
Gata pentru munca mi aparare
For Work and Defense
BU
VTO
Voenno-technicesko obucenie
Military Technical Individual Training
Table 5
Length of Obligation of Warsaw Pact Reservists IU-
Officers
60
60
60
fi0
fi0
5E-60"
Non-Commissioned
50
50
50
55
60
55
Officers
Enlisted Men
50
50
50
56
50
55
" Depends on Grade
Company Grade to - 56
Field Grade to - 60
Flag Rank to - 65
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exist in each country, as well as the accumulation into them each year of
thousands of trained conscripts, provide a large enough base from which to
draw adequately trained manpower. Consequently, reserve training in NSWP
countries is neither as systematic nor as intensive as in the US. In most
Pact countries, however, reservists with critical specialties, especially
officers, are called up more frequently than other reservists.
(C) The data shown in table 6 pertain to Class I reservists. This
is the group first to be called-up in the event of mobilization. Enlisted
Class I reservists have usually completed mandatory service and are 35 years
of age or under. Officer Class I reservists include all ranks ranging from
40 to 60 years of age.
c. Conscription
(C) Military service is compulsory in all NSWP countries. With the
exception of Poland, males in these countries are drafted at age 18. In
Poland the draft age is 19. The length of service for conscripts, by
country and component, is shown in table 7. The regimes of all NSWP
countries stress that military service is an honorable, even sacred, obliga-
tion and few males escape some form of service. Deferments are granted only
in cases of extreme hardship (defined by law) or for purpose of attending an
institution of higher education. Unless granted for permanent disability,
however, all deferments are considered temporary, and mandatory service must
be completed by a certain age, usually 27.
(C) As its name indicates, conscription is the function of the
Second Department of the commissariats. The process is actually begun one
year before induction, during the required and so-called "pre-induction
registration." At this time, potential inductees are queried regarding
their interests, given a physical examination, and encouraged to participate
in premilitary training programs. Actual conscription in all countries is
conducted semiannually. With one notable exception, induction procedures in
NSWP countries are the same as those in the USSR. The exception concerns
the assignment of conscripts. Normally, and whenever possible, inductees in
NSWP countries are assigned to local units. In the USSR, on the other hand,
conscripts and reservists often train with units in military districts
other than those in which they reside. In the case of conscripts, especial-
ly, this often involves assignment to units in areas of the Soviet Union far
removed from the conscript's home.
d. Mobilization
(C) Mobilization is probably the most crucial of commissariat func-
tions. Over the years it has been practiced many times in all NSWP
countries in the form of periodic alerts, training exercises, or actual,
albeit partial, mobilization. Although mobilization procedures are virtual-
ly the same in all NSWP countries, data on performance is more readily
available for those Pact countries in the NGA than elsewhere. Of the numer-
ous reports and activities surveyed for this study, it can be stated that
mobilization capabilities of Pact nations in the NGA are impressive and
their systems highly efficient. Of caurse, in view of the envisioned role
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Table 7
Length of Obligatory Service for Conscripts (Months) IUI
~ For shipboard duty.
Territorial Defense Force 1071
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of these Northern Tier states in any future war with NATO, and given their
highly developed economies, this is not surprising. Indeed, because of the
smaller manpower base to be managed and the generally higher technology with
which it is done, it might even be argued that mobilization in the Pact
Northern Tier states is more efficient than in the USSR. Com puter tech-
nology, for example, appears to be far more prevalent in Northern Tier com-
missariats and military commands than in the Soviet Union. With the excep-
tion of Bulgaria, computer technology for mobilization is also used exten-
sively in the other NSWP countries.
(S) Mobilization in all Pact countries is the ultimate responsibi-
lity of the Mobilization and Organization Directorate of the various General
Staffs. The responsibilities and activities of these directorates include
the following:
-- Planning, directing, and coordinating all m obilization mea-
sures of the Ministry of Defense.
-- Preparing schedules of the size, type, and composition of
military units to be activated during mobilization.
-- Preparing manpower quotas from the reserve base to flesh out
activated units.
-- Procuring and storing of mobilization supplies.
-- Controlling and supervising of subordinate mobilization de-
partments.
(C) Another im portant activity of the Mobilization and Organization
Directorate is coordinating mobilization plans with the central economic
planning agency and other government ministries. Given the highly centra-
lized economies and rigid production quotas of Pact countries (with less
stringency perhaps in Hungary and Ranania), and the perenniel manpower
claims of the Armed Forces, this is an extremely im portant function. For
this reason, peacetime military activities in Pact countries are usually so
planned as to have a minimum impact on the respective economies. This is
true of such activities as test alerts, reserve training, and military exer-
cises. To this end also, certain occupational specialties and positions in
all NSWP countries have been exempted from mobilization.
(C) The functions of the Mobilization and Organization Directorate
of the General Staffs are performed at lower levels by the Mobilization and
Organization Department of the Military District staffs, by the Mobilization
Department of the local military commissariats, and by civilian enterprises.
It is at these lower levels that relations between commissariats and mili-
tary units become particularly active.
(S) Although a comparison of Soviet and Northern Tier mobilization
procedures again reveals many similarities, there are, nevertheless, some
areas that deserve close attention. To begin with, response time as a
factor in mobilization planning appears to be especially critical in
Northern Tier states. This is borne out by the following:
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-- In assigning reservists to units, Northern Tier countries
(if not all NSWP countries) adhere strictly to the principle of territorial-
ity. If a Northern Tier reservist relocates and his new unit has no need of
his MOS, the reservist often will be trained in another MOS. He will not be
sent to a unit that might need his old skills but which is considered to be
"out of territory." Policy is to assign reservists to units as close to
home as possible.
-- Mobilization designation assignments akin to those in the US
exist for the Northern Tier nations.
-- Many reserve officers (and possibly NCOs) in mobilization
assignments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland reportedly keep
uniforms and some equipment at home.
-- In the event of mobilization some reservists with critical
skills would be notified and picked up at home by their units.
-- Units and their location are actually identified in the
military service booklets of some East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak
reservists (especially true of Poland).
-- In East Germany, assembly areas are selected so as to be no
more than 20 kilometers away from the home of any reservist. It is also
expected that reporting time to such areas will never be more than 2 hours.
In addition, as appendix B shows, the missions of mobilized civilian trans-
portation assets in Czechoslovakia and East Germany are limited to rela-
tively short distances and therefore accomplished within minimum time. As
with reserve personnel, the principle of territoriality is also employed in
the use of civilian transportation assets.
-- In Czechoslovakia, unassigned reservists are expected to be
readied by commissariats for transport to selected units, in uniform, no
more than 4 hours after alert notification. Integration into units is to
take place within 24 hours.
-- To accelerate notification and facilitate contact, alert
notifications in East Germany are delivered by postmen and in Poland by
local government personnel. Relieved of such chores, commissariats can
expedite the actual processing and assignment of reporting reservists.
(S) Mobilization exercises appear to meet NSWP expectations on the
whole. For example, during the Czech crisis in 1968, some Polish reservists
from one military district were alerted, transported to a local airport,
outfitted, armed, briefed, flown to Prague, and integrated into Polish units
in less than 24 hours. Instances of Polish reservists integrated into
mechanized cadre regiments within 12 hours have also been noted. Appendix A
tabulates patterns of personnel dispersal during mobilization exercises held
in East Germany from 1971 to 1979.
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(1) Manpower
(S) As previously stated, NSWP nations have no reserve units
comparable to those in the US. In the event of mobilization, reservists in
these countries would be mobilized individually to bring active units to
wartime strength, replace battlefield casualties, or to create new units.
Augmentation of standing units would be primarily in the ground forces. The
relatively smaller naval, air, and air defense formations are in large
measure at, or near, wartime strength. As indicated in table 8, the avail-
ability of reservists beyond those required to fill out standing forces is
substantial and would support a wide range of force creation or replacement
options. Moreover, as columns VII and VIII in the table show, a significant
number of these reservists would have had some recent training. Owing to
lack of data, however, the table is necessarily based on one, somewhat prob-
lematic assumption. It is assumed that reservists with the m ost recent
training would be the first to be mobilized. While this is generally true,
it is not invariably the case. According to a number of sources, during
mobilization exercises reservists may be called up regardless of age or
status of military training. This is especially true of reservists with
professional skills, most notably doctors and engineers. Consequently, the
percentages in column VIII are undoubtedly sanewhat higher than shown.
(S) In exercising the force creation option referred to
above, it is estimated that during the initial stages of war NSWP planners
could create from their respective manpower pools--and within the limits of
available equipment--the number of divisions shown in table 9.
(C) Another manpower resource available to NSWP planners are
the militias that exist in all of these countries, except Bulgaria. The
term "militia" should be understood to mean a force made up of volunteers,
organized on a territorial principle, and directly under the control of the
Communist party.*
(U) Militias are actually the creatures of NSWP Communist
parties and came into being for one of two closely related reasons. In some
countries, they were created to enable the party to consolidate its power
base in the aftermath of World War II. In other countries, they came into
being years later to provide the party with an independent and reliable
means for suppressing rebellion. For example, because of the poor support
given it by the military during the revolution in 1956, the Hungarian Com-
munist Party created its militia shortly after the USSR had crushed the
uprising. It was also because of events in Hungary that Romania created its
own militia at the time.
(S) The fighting quality of the various militias is diffi-
cult to assess. Little is known of the quality and effectiveness of the
training they receive. However, militias do have their own uniforms, arms-
* (C) The one exception is Poland whose militia is under the immediate
control of the Ministry of the Interior.
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m ~ ? ?
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East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Table 9
NSWP Potential for Creating New Units IUI
Five infantry type divisions. These divisions would have fewer
personnel and smaller equipment holdings than an MRD.
Two MRDs
One TD
Four divisions
No known force expansion plans
Two divisions
No known force expansion plans
Table 10
Estimated Strength of NSWP Militias IUI
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and supply-systems, training facilities, and exercise areas. Their tactics
and loyalty to party are currently exemplified in Poland where the militia
has been extensively used to enforce martial law. Although their mission in
wartime is heavily scenario dependent, their strength relative to the
countries they represent, as shown in table 10, is indeed formidable.
(2) Materiel
(C) Supplying the armed forces with materiel, primarily
transportation assets, is another responsibility of the mobilization depart-
ment of NSWP commissariats. Although active units, even those at reduced
strength, possess much of their canbat equipment, in the event of war the
ground forces, and to a lesser extent the air and naval arms, would require
sane augmentation of transport and engineer vehicles. Such assets will cane
from the civilian economy and will be used to augment divisional motor
transport as well as to expand or create nondivisional combat and canbat
service support units. They will also becane part of newly formed line
units, or will be used to replace losses. Such vehicles include general
purpose cargo trucks, tractors, cranes, graders, fuel- and water-trucks,
buses, ambulances, passenger cars, and even taxis.
(C) In peacetime, these transportation assets belong to
state enterprises, collective farms, and transportation conglomerates, and
perform civilian tasks. However, certain of the vehicles and their drivers
are selected by the commissariats and organized into motor transport units
for mobilization in the event of war. These vehicles are maintained accord-
ing to military specifications, are inspected yearly by personnel of the
mobilization departments of the commissariats, given specific mobilization
assignments, and usually manned in peacetime by reservists. In addition, the
transport units undergo periodic alerts, often in conjunction with mobiliza-
tion exercises. Deployment of vehicles, if involved, is usually to a field
assembly point for the actual or simulated pickup of reservists; to a
storage depot to practice loading and unloading supplies; or to an active
unit. The condition of these vehicles is reported as ranging from poor to
good. As in the Soviet Union, lack of spare parts, especially for the older
vehicles, is a perennial complaint.
(C) Most of the information available about NSWP transport
units concerns those in the Northern Tier Pact states. Analagous units are
known to exist in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and procedures are believ-
ed to be similar. However, some notable differences between Northern Tier
mobilization procedures of transport assets and those employed in the USSR
have been observed:
-- To expedite mobilization, some reservist-drivers of
mobilized vehicles keep their uniforms at hare.
-- Same transport enterprises designated for mobilization
have small supply- and arms-rooms for vehicle drivers. These rooms contain
ammunition and automatic weapons.
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-- Unlike the USSR, during mobilization exercises drivers
of mobilized vehicles frequently draw weapons and ammunition prior to
deploying to assembly areas.
-- To accomplish their missions, transportation units drawn
from civilian enterprises generally need travel only short distances. In
East Germany and Poland, with exceptions to be sure, it is policy to limit
such distances to 100 kilometers.
-- During alerts for mobilization exercises or partial
mobilization, military and civilian police in East Germ any have been known
to establish road-blocks, stop private vehicles, transport their drivers to
commissariats for mobilization, and impound the vehicles for military duty
for the duration of the exercise. Although the potential for such pro-
cedures exists in the Soviet Union as well, so far as can be determined they
have never been observed in that country.
(C) Appendix B tabulates dispersal patterns and missions of
some 19 East Germ an/Polish motor transport units over the past 12 years.
Additional comments about .motor transport units are provided in the
appendix.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
(C) As in the USSR, military commissariats in NSWP countries play a
crucial role in the system of force generation. Although patterned after
those in the Soviet Union, there are, nevertheless, some procedural varia-
tions between Soviet and NSWP commissariats, especially in the Northern Tier
states. Such variations are dictated both by geography and the strategic
role to be played by NSWP countries in the event of war.
(S) Relative to the size and populations of the countries involved, the
reserve forces at the com*_nand of NSWP commissariats are very substantial.
NSWP nations have a total force of 7.3 million reservists. This is more
than sufficient to raise the NSWP peacetime manning level from 1.3 million
to an estimated wartime strength of 2.4 million. Obviously, and depending
on scenario, it would enable NSWP planners to implement a broad range of
force augmentation, replacement, and creation options. The principal con-
straint on the creation of new units would be materiel. Although data on
total NSWP civilian vehicular assets is limited, available information
suggests that they are more than sufficient to meet the mobilization
requirements of NSWP planners, at least during the initial stages of war.
(S) The ability of the NSWP commissariats, especially those in the NGA,
to m obilize reservists and transport assets has been well demonstrated in
practice alerts and exercises and is judged as being both very rapid and
efficient. Use of computer technology, highly developed telecommunications
and lines of communications, and a specialized system for locating
reservists, undoubtedly account for this. The capability for rapid and ef-
ficient mobilization is particularly crucial for the Northern Tier countries
from which many of the initial assault forces would be drawn and through
which enormous numbers of men and quantities of materiel would move in time
of war.
(C) In spite of these positive features, however, there are some uncer-
tainties regarding system performance as well. To begin with, the system
has never been tested as a whole under conditions of m odern warfare.
Indeed, given the destructiveness of modern weapon systems, the ability of
the commissariats to replace vast losses of manpower and themselves to sur-
vive must remain open to question. And for reasons already indicated,
assets in NSWP nations would become particularly and extremely vulnerable
to NATO strikes. Again, with the exception of those with designated
mobilization assignments, NSWP reservists are not called up for training
with any degree of consistency. Former reservists have also reported that
even when called up, training has often been neither systematic nor inten-
sive. Consequently, in the event of full mobilization, some expanded as
well as new formations would need extensive training prior to commitment if
high levels of combat effectiveness were seen as necessary. Finally, in
any assessment of NSWP force generation capabilities and perform ance, the
problem of Pact solidarity must at least be mentioned. There has been
periodic unrest as well as violent uprisings in NS?nIP countries since World
War II. Consequently, the stresses of a general European war and the
accompanying threat--or actual employment--of nuclear strikes could limit
the extent to which NStdP nations would carry out the extensive, and possibly
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protracted, mobilization of manpower and materiel integral to Warsaw Pac*
contingency planning.
(C) In conclusion, it may be stated that the strengths of the NSWP
system of force generation are very im pressive. However, the system posses-
ses endemic weaknesses as well, which--when coupled with the problems,
stresses, and demands of large mobilization and/or massive losses--could
gravely affect mobilization perform ance.
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Appendix A
Patterns of Personnel Dispersal
Durin Mobilization Exercises
in ast exm any U
(S) The accanpanying table is a collation of data from a sampling of
numerous intelligence reports. Columns A, B, and C, respectively, indicate
the type of activity and date; the military district in which participating
organizations were located; and (as available) the approximate number of
reservists m obilized. Column D identifies some of the participating
organizations or assembly areas to which reservists reported and their
locations. Column E shows two time categories: designated reporting time
and approximate integration time. Designated reporting time indicates the
time required for reservists to report from the location shown in column D
to an initial operational site. These locations are usually shown as X-1.
Approximate integration time indicates time to complete activities shown at
location X-1, or subsequent operational sites; e.g., location X-2 or
location X-3. Item 15, column F, shows two initial operational sites, X-1
and X-2. The average designated reporting time for the activities shown in
the table is 3.4 hours. Approximate integration times are actual and are
not based on averages. Columns F and G, respectively, identify the initial
operational site and subsequent sites, as previously explained; and the dis-
tance fran the location reported in column D to the initial operational
site. Where applicable, and unless otherwise designated, distances shown
are those between operational sites. Finally, column H indicates the length
of time reservists remained mobilized. The following points are emphasized:
-- The participating organization may be an active unit or a
commissaz?iat. In those instances where commissariats are receiving
organizations, the processing of reservists may be done at the commissariat
by personnel of gaining units and deployment may be directly to the unit
exercise area. As noted earlier, in the Pact Northern Tier states some
reservists are picked up at home by their units.
-- So far as can be determined, transportation to initial
operational sites is invariably accomplished by mobilized civilian
transportation assets. On those occasions where distance between the
participating organization and the operational site is particularly long, a
combination of motor and rail transport may be employed.
-- Time factors, of course, are relative and scenario dependent.
For example, the mobilization exercises shown in the table generally assume
a situation in which the NSWP countries are either under attack or
anticipate one and so minimum response time for mobilization is crucial. On
the other hand, time as a factor might be of much less significance even
during what might be termed a prolonged crisis. During such situations NSWP
countries might choose to augment their forces incrementally and over longer
periods than those indicated typically in exercises. The deployment of
m obilized units and any postmobilization training required are, of course,
among those additional factors that bear on a unit's availability for
commitment.
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Activity
Military
Approx
Participating
Designated
Initial
Distance
Tour Length
(Region/District)
No. Reservists
Organization or
Reporting Time
Operational Site
From Field
for Reservists
City
Assembly Area
or Approx
Assembly Area
Integ Time
(Cottbus)
1. Mobilization Exercise
COTTBUS
?
U I I tank unit
1 + hours
U I I tank unit
-
3 days
June 1972
(5146N-1420E)
COTTBUS
COTTBUS
(Luebben)
2. Mobilization Exercise
RUHLAND
?
Market square
4 hours
Unknown
-
3 days
June 1972
(5128N-13 52E)
RUHLAND
(Luebben)
3. Mobilization Exercise
UHYST
?
Gasthaus in LOHSA
5hours
Unknown
-
?
June 1972
(5122N-1431 E)
(5123N-1424E)
(Frankfurt)
4. Mobilization Exercise
FINOWFURT
?
WKK EBERSWALDE
6 hours
Unknown
-
?
June 1972
(5251N-1341E)
(5250N-1350E)
(Magdeburg)
5. Mobilization Exercise
HALBERSTADT
?
Assembly area
3 hours
Unknown
-
2 days
June 1972
(51 54N-1103E)
HALBERSTADT
(Karl-Marz-Stadt)
6. Mobilization Exercise
KOTTENGRUEN
?
Assembly area
5hours
Unknown
-
3 days
June 1972
(5026N-1217E)
NEUSTADT
(5129N-14 27E)
(Dresden)
7. Mobilization Exercise
DRESDEN
Numerous
WKK /Sports
1 + hours
RIESA
47 km NW
3 months (?)
Ju1y1974
(5103N-1345E)
Stadium
22(?)hours to
(5118N-1317E)
(First time construction
DRESDEN
form Engr Bn.
equipment moved to Field
(5103N-13 45E)
Assembly Area by civilian
firms and not reservists)
(Dresden)
8. Mobilization Exercise
DRESDEN
2 U l l MR
Sports Stadium
Overnight warn-
-1 GROSSERK MANNS-
15 km E
10 days
July 1971
(5103N-13 45E)
Divisions
DRESDEN
ing to report next
DORF, (Reception i
day at 10:30 AM
Screening center)
12 + hours
(51 05N-13 56E)
-2 GROSSERK MANNS-
DORF. (Uniform issue
point) -1000 meters
from K-1
X-3 Training Exercise
55 km NE
BAUTZEN
(51 11N-14 26E)
(Gera)
9. Mobilization Exercise
GREIZ
2,000+
High School
Overnight warn-
X-1 MOHLSDORF
5 km NE
8 days
August 1914
(5039N-1212E)
GREIZ
ing to report next
(5040N-1216E)
day at 0600 hrs
(uniform and arms issue
10 hours
X-2 NOCHTEN
210 km NE
(5126N-14 36E)
Training area
(Cottbus)
10. Mobilization Exercise
KOTTMARSDORF
Not stated
CUNEWALDE
7 hours
GROSSDUBRAU
30 km NE
17 days
August 1971
(5102N-1438E)
(5106N-1431E)
(5115N-1428E)
Clothing issue and
exercise area
X-1 =Initial Operating Site (s)
WKKIWBK =Military Commissariat
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Activity
Military
Approx
Participating
Designated
Initial
Distance
Tour Lengfh
(Region/District)
No. Reservists
Organization or
Reporting Time
Operational Site
From Field
for Reservists
City
Assembly Area
or Approx
Assembly Area
Integ Time
(Dresden)
11. Mobilization Exercise
DRESDEN
Form new Engr
"Otto Grotewohl Hall"
1-4 hours
X-1 "Otto Grotewohl Hall"
-
6 months
September 1974
(5103N-13 04E)
Bn of 280 men
DRESDEN
2-12 hours
DRESDEN
X-2 u I i MRR
RIESA
47 km NW
(51 18N-13 17E)
(Neubrandenburg)
12. Mobilization Exercise
SCHWERIN
800
Apprentice School
3 hours
X-1 Agri Co-op
15 km SE
14 days
June 1978
(53 38N?1123E)
SCHWERIN
13 hours
PLATE
(53 32N-11 29E)
uniform issue
25 km NW
X-2 uii Kasern
STERN-BUCHHOLZ
(53 34N-11 27E)
13. Mobilization Exercise
PLAUEN
at least 40
Banquet Hall
2 hours
X-1 WALDKIRCHEN
25 km NE
8 days
Fal 11975
(50 30N-12 08E)
PLAUEN
(50 63N-12 22E)
uniform issue
X?2 ulitransport Bn
DAENKRITZ
55 km N
(5046N?12 25E)
(Leipzig)
14. Mobilization Exercise
LEIPZIG
Numerous
WKK (?)
7 hours
EILENBURG
23 km NE
4 weeks
1914
(51 19N-12 20E)
LEIPZIG
(5127N-12 37E)
(Leipzig)
15. Mobilization Exercise
COTTBUS
6,000
WBK
3 days instead of
X?1(a) GUTTAU-67 MRR
65 km SE
4 weeks
(Prueffeld) July 1971
(5145N-1419E)
COTTBUS
24 hours
(51 16N?14 35E)
uniform larms issue
Not stated
X-1(b) RAUSCHWITZ
70 km S
65 MRR(51 12N?1408E)
From Cottbus
uniform 1 arms issue
Not stated
X-1(c) u I i 66 MRR
-
X?2(a) NEUSTADT
28 km N
(5129N-1427E)
From Guttau
67th MRR maneuver area
(Leipzig)
16. Mobilization Exercise
LEIPZIG
Numerous
WKK(?)
2 hours
IRFERSGRUEN
90 km S
12 days
(4th MRD)
(51 19N-12 20E)
LEIPZIG
48 hours
(50 36N-12 26E)
September 1974
MOHLSDORF
85 km SW
(5040N?1216E)
From Leipzig
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Activity
Military
Approx
Participating
Designated
Initial
Distance
Tour Length
(Region/District)
No. Reservists
Organization or
Reporting Time
Operational SNe
From Field
for Reservists
City
Assembly Area
or Approx
Assembly Area
Integ Time
(Leipzig)
(Karl-Marx-Stadt)
17. Mobilization Exercise
KARL-MARX-STADT
2,000 (at least)
GLAUCHAU
1-10 hours
POEHL
55 km
2-7 days
August 1974
(5050N-1255E)
(5049N-1232E)
(5033N-1211E)
GERA
WILKAU-HASSLAU
(50 52N-12 05E)
(5040N-12 31E)
GRIMMITSCHAU
HOHENSTEIN-ERNSTTHAL
(NCA)
(50 48N-12 43E)
THEUMA
LENGENFELD
(5102N-12 38E)
(50 34N-12 22E)
IRFERSGRUEN
(Gera)
(50 37N-12 26E)
GERA
WEISWASSER
(50 52N-12 05E)
(5131N-14 38E)
GREIZ-POHLITZ
WERDAU
(50 40N-1213E)
(50 44N-12 23E)
ZWICKAU
(5044N-12 30E)
ALTENHAIN
(51 18N-12 42E)
All located in the
Districts of Karl-
Marxstadt and
Gera
(Neubrandenburg)
KLEIN-
18. Mobilization Exercise
BRANDENBURG
1,000-1,400
Three u /i areas in
1 hour (?)
KREUTZ
5 km NE
2 weeks
April 1975
(52 24N-12 34E)
BRANDENBURG
1 hour
(52 26N-12 37E)
(Neubrandenburg)
19. Mobilization Exercise
NEU-BRANDENBURG
900-1,000
1. Sportsplatz
1 hour
X-1 KLEIN?KREUTZ
175 km SW
2 weeks
Spring 1974
(5333N-1316E)
2. Puschkinplatz
(5226N-1237E)
3. Neustadter Markt
X-2 Area between
65 km S
(all inNEU-
WITTENBERG
BRANDENBURG)
(5152N-12 39E)
and
TORGAU
109 km SW
(5134N-13 OOE)
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Appendix B
Dispersal Patterns of Some Mobilized East
German and Polish Motor
Transport Units (U)
(S) The accompanying table identifies 19 motor transport units by name,
location, subordination, and mission. Acronyms and terms appearing in
columns A and B are defined as follows:
Acronym/Term
German Polish English
Equivalent
VEB People Owned Enterprise
Kraftverkehr Motor Transport
Kombinat Combine
Kraftverkehrsbetrieb Motor Transport Company
PKS State Transportation
Enterprise (County level)
WPKS State Transportation
Enterprise (Provincial level)
(S) As columns D and E indicate, not all vehicle assets of an enterprise
are designated for mobilization; however, and if necessary, they could be.
Columns K and L show the primary mission of the transport units and the time
within which such missions are to be accomplishe3. The times shown are
believed average for the types of missions reported. Times indicated in
column L, as applicable, may or may not include vehicle preparation time.
Vehicle preparation time is that time needed to convert an average-size
truck from civilian to military use. Procedures involved in East Germany
and Czechoslovakia include: checking the lighting system; mounting two fuel
canisters on the side of the vehicle; placing two supports inside the
driver's cab to hold two carbines; affixing another support atop the cab to
mount a machinegun; and painting military license numbers on the side of the
cab and on the tailgate. Fuel tanks are routinely topped and first echelon
maintenance is conducted daily. Finally, and unless otherwise stipulated,
column M of the table indicates the distance traveled from the location
shown in column C to the initial deployment site in column K. Columns L and
M in combination indicate the distances traveled and times involved to
accomplish the mission.
25
(Reverse Blank)
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A
Name
DISPERSAL PATTERNS OF SOME MOBILIZED EAST GERMAN AND POLISH MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS (U)
8
Subordination
C
Location
STRAISUND
(5418N?1306E)
D
Approximate
No. of
Autobase
Vehicles
E
Approximate
No. of
Mobilized
Vehicles
F
Condition of
Mobilized
Vehicles
G
Problems
N
I
)
K
Types of Vehicles
Comments
Frequency
Deploy io
of Alerts
IDbuses
AIX?2issued:
Not stated
X-1 Sports Grounds
26 dump trucks
Fieldunitorm
STRAISUND
4heavyloaders
Field cap
(Pickup reservists)
Bpick-up vans
1.62mmKAlASHNIKOU
X~2FRANZBURG
13JELCZIorrles
Boots
(6411N?1263E)
10 motor cycles
Blanket
Uniform&armslssue
Steel helmet
X?3 BUCHHOLZ
Gas Mask
(NCA)
Webbing Equipment
Overnighihalt
Exercise lasted
X 4GREIFSWALD
VEB
Kralfverkehr
?
LEIPZIG
(5120N?1320E)
?
25
Notsfated
None mentioned
VEB
VEB
R1ESA
90.100
40
Noi slated
None mentioned
Kraftverkehr
Kraftverkehrs
(6118N-1317E)
buses
Kombinat
Kombinat
DRESDEN
VEB
?
ZWICKAU
IDO+
10
Poor to Fair
PuelcrRical
Kralfverkehr
(50 43N?12 28E)
alter Jan 1976
(Load reservists)
H6lrucks
5400 trucks
CHEBELtrucks
PHAENOMEN trucks
Section MB-1 ~ 20 IFA W-50
trucks with202-axle trailers.
01 the 20 trucks, five were
1916 models and 16 were
1910 and 1971 models.
Section MB-2: 14 SKODA,
models between 1962 and
1972, and 6 MAZ models be?
tween 1970 and 1972
Section MB-3~~ 201FAW50
trucks,1970and 1911
models.
Seetion MB-4.101FA W50s of
which 4 or 5 were 1916
models and the remaining live
or six were 1974 and 1976
models; 7 MAZ 1974 and 1975
models, and 2 JELCZ 1976
models.
VEB
Kraftverkehrs?
betriebe
VEB
Kraftverkehrs
Kombinat
KARL MARX?
STADT
150 50N?12 55E)
PLAUEN
(50 30N-12 08E)
(Load reservists)
400 (rucks
50 buses
400 trucks
50 buses
L
M
N
D
Time Limit
Distance From
Break
DOI
Original Location
Downs?
Notsfated
None reported
1974
1'/z hours
X~210kmSWofX~1
1'hhours
X~3 6kmSEo1X~2
Next day
X-4 30 km SE of X?3
3-3'h hours
2 hours
None reported
1969
NolStated
X~2 55 km NE of X-1
Not stated
X-16 km NE of RIESA
None reported
1911
Not stated
65 km N
None reported
1971
Not stated
20 km NW
None reported
Sept 1914
27
SECRET
A total of 100 trucks
were mobilised from the
Leiptig area.
Trucks were driven to
assembly area and given
to NUA.
Exercise lasted
1 week
Exercise lasted
2 weeks.
(54 06N?13 23E)
Exercisearea
X1 VEB Kraftverkehr
LEIPZIG
(Pickup some reservists)
(5120N?13 20E}
X-2 TORGAU
(5134N?13 DOE)
Support U l l Reserve
Arty Regiment
X-1 ZEITHAIN
(6120N?13 20E)
X~2 RIESAICANITZ
Airfield (5119N?1314E)
Vicinity of LEIPZIG
(5120N-12 22E)
PAUSA
(50 35N?1159E)
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DISPERSAL PATTERNS Of SOME MOBILIZED EAST GERMAN AND POLISH MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS
A
B
C
D
E
F
Name
Subordination
Location
Appro>mmaie
Approximate
Condition of
No. of
No. of
Mobilized
Autobase
Mobilized
Vehicles
Vehicles
Vehicles
State Transpor?
PKS
SWIDNICA
340
120
Apparently good
tation Enterprise
Central Depot
(50 50N?16 29E)
(trucks)
(PKS)
WROCLAW
State Transpor?
PKS
GLIWIGE
160
180
Poor
fation Enterprise
KATOWICE
(5017N?18
40E)
(PKS)
(5014 N?18 59E)
State Transpor?
Nqtrs
KOLOBRZEG
11
33
Good
tation Enterprise
KOS2ALIN
(5411N-15
35E)
(PKS)
(6411N?1611E)
Slate Transpor?
?
OLSZTYN
200
30
Best vehicles
tation Enterprise
(53 41N-20
29E)
mobilized
(PKS)
G
Problems
Excessive drink?
Ing in general
among Palish
drivers
Spare parts and
pilfering of parts
Lack of spare
parts
H
Types of Vehicles
STAR-28, 29, 200
JELCZ 315, 316
ZILs
IFAs
80 buses
100 trucks (urombination of STAR
and JELCZ vehicles). Only 60?/0 of
vehicles were operable most
times
ZILs 130, 133,130G
STAR-25
JELCZ trucks
STAR~21, 29
NYSA?501
70-1FA trucks
20 u'i frocks
5 STAR-25
5 STAR-28
50-STAR 28, 29
7 GAZ?51
3 JELCZ
50 JELCZ buses - 51-seat
capacity plus driver
14 SANDS buses - 56-seat
capacity plus driver
16 AUTOSAN buses - 51-seat
capaoity plus driver
100 SAN buses - 48-seat capaci~
ty plus driver
30 Polish; Czech-made trailers
with a 32-seat capaeity
NOTE: The JELCZ and SAN buses
were Polish models, the SANDS a
Yugoslavian model, and the
AUTOSAN was a PoIIshlCzech
model on a SKOT frame.
28
SECRET
I
Comments
Uniforms, helmets, gas
masks, back-pack, boots,
entrenching tool issued
at Autobase.
Uniforms kept at home;
gear at Autobase.
Approximately 20% of
non-mobilized vehicles
constantly deadlined~
All vehicles carry a large
first aid kit and a com?
plete set of maintenance
tools At the beginning of
an alert, mobilization
vehieles also load a kit
containing a pick, a
shovel, an axe, a saw,
fire chains, and a towing
chain, but they do not
carry a spare parts kit.
Drivers were reservists
who had uniform and
packs at home.
All vehicles had to be
topped with enough gaso-
line at all times to travel
600 km.
All vehieles (o be radio-
equipped beginning in
1976. All of the reser?
vists stored their equp?
ment at home, except for
helmets and weapons.
When alerted they put
their uniforms on and
took their entire equp-
mentwith them, so that
by the time they reached
the motor pool they were
completely dressed. Soon
after their arrival, they
were equipped with
weapons, and broken
down into squads and pla-
toons. Each reservists
received a PMK weapon,
six magazines of live am-
munition (one magazine
was then inserted in the
weapon), Weapons came
from the weapons depot
within the motor pool
1
Frequency
of Alerts
Six to eight
times yearly
2.3 times
yearly
Every three
months
K
Deploy To
Autobase, then to
BOLKO-CASERN far weapons,
Then to training area be?
tween MODLISZOW
(50 47N-16 23~ and ZLOTY
LAS (50 46N?16 23E)
Assembly area near STANICE
(50 42N?20 29E)
U!I (8th MRD?) MR unit at
Kos2AUN
(5412N?1611E)
Autobase, then to POL Depot
in MARCINKOWO
(53 41N-20 40E). Off load
POL drums at distribution
point'm GUTKOWO
(53 48N-20 24E)
U.I Military Installation 3 km
SE of TRZEBIATOW
(54 04N-1516E)
U ll Military unit in BRZEG
(50 51N?17 26E)
Exercises held in an area
known as "RUDNIK,?which
was about 6 km S o1 GRU4
ZIADZ. This area was about
20 hectares in size and was a
military restricted zone. This
area served as an assembly
area for reservists and the
PPA units from GRUDZIADZ,
SWIECIE, CHELMNO and
BRODNICA, A number of
buildings served as control
centers for the exercises.
Within the buildings, military
equipment was stored.
L
Time Limit
In 19)3, during
an alert at which
officers Irom
WROCLAW act?
ed as observers,
the enterprise
was commended
for the short
preparation time
until departure,
Alert was called
at 1400 hours
and at D200
hours in the
morning, all
uehicles and
drivers were
ready to depart
(three groups
with 30 trucks
exh were in?
valved),
Ready to deploy
In 3 hours
Under 4 hours to
Autobase
Between 4-6
hours
Report to unit in
less than 1
hours
Ready fo deploy
in 2 hours
M
Distance From
Original Location
N
Break
Downs?
0
DOI
Many break
downs
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A
8
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
1
K
L
M
N
0
Name
Subordination
Location
Approximate
Approximate
Condition of
Problems
Types of Vehicles
Comments
Frequency
Deploy To
Time Limit
Distance From
Break
DOI
No, of
No. of
Mobilized
of Alerls
Original location
Downs?
Autobase
Mahilited
Vehicles
Vehicles
Vehicles
Transportation
Enter
rise
?
GDYNIA
5
N
200
200
Nelsfated
None mentioned
STARtrucks
Uniiormkep(athome~
Not stated
Assemblyareaat
?
35kmNW
None
1919
p
(
432
?0182E)
Spray painted numbers,
POlC2YN0
Loaded fire hoses,uli
(5435N~0162E)
metal pipes, and fuel
canisters from nearby
warehouse
Construction
Main Transport
RACIBORZ
180
180
Good
None mentioned
3 ZUK 4x2 box-body trucks
Z1L~1304~ 2 dump trucks
Not stated
Either
?
86 km NW
Not staled
1976
Transport
Enterprise
(5005N~1613E)
2521L~1304x2platformtrucks
were equipped withraket
U~IunitinPRUDNIK
Enterprise
KATOWICE
20TIL~1304K2dumptrucks
launohers~
(5019N?1134E)
(5014N-19 01 E}
40 MAT 500A 4 x 2 dump trucks
Oc POL depot in
112 km SE
15 JELCZ?315 4 K 2 dump trucks
BORONOW
3 JELC2~315 4 K 2 platform
(50 40N~18 56~
trucks
14 JElCZ315 4 K 2 semi tractors
5 MA1500A 4 x 2 semi tractors
20 JELCi-316 6 x 4 platform
trucks
6 STEYER 6 x 4 platform bucks
22 STEYER 6 x 4 dump bucks
1 JELC2.5914 z 2 tank truck
semidrailer
6 STAR~29 4 K 2 trucks with ben?
ches, capacity 34 persons.
TOTAL:180 vehicles
In Dee 78 the IIL~130 4 x 2 plat?
form trucks and dump (rucks were
eKChanged for KAMAI trucks.
Opole Public
?
OPOLE
500
500
Fair
Shortage of
200SKODAbuses
PPS and PPSH submachine
Three times
U ~ I unit in OPOLE,
2 hours far 100
None
1919
Transportation
(500.1N-175JE)
spare parts,
150STAR66s,JELCis
guns,helmetsandmasks
yearly
or Ammo storage Depot
truekstoload
(POLtrucks
Authority
especiallytires
150?GAZ~66s,63s,21~s~131s,
storedinarmsroomat
1kmSoiJASTRZEBIE
ammo
53 km NW
accompanied
and batteries
MAZ~200traciors
Autobase, One full round of
(5101N-1145E)
columns)
(PKSOPOLEI
YAZ,SKODA,JELCttrailers
ammo per weapon also
(loadedammoontrucks
stared. Radios and
and then unloaded)
camouflage paint also
stored, Uniforms kept in
homes
City Taxi
?
POZNAN
1,000
1,000
Good
Nonereported
300-NYSATaxis
1D%oidriverswerere?
Notstated
VariovsU,lassemblypoints
Nofstated
NiA
Not staled
1978
Enterprise
(5224N-1655E)
300?"S2UKI"tails
servistswhokepitheiruni?
mP02NAN
0.00?JELCllrucks
formsandequipmentat
home
Transportation
PKS Admin Office
BYTOM
240
60
Dnly vehicles less
Shortage of
SKODAdump (rucks
Approz 100 vehicles were
Onee every
From Autobase to wooded
3 hours
60 km NW
None reported
1979
Enterprise
KATOWICE
i5020N?1854~
than3yearsoldare
spare parts,
STAR~125
usuallydeadlinedbeeause
2~3years
areaNofTARNOWSKIEGORY
(PKS)
(5014N?1901E)
LAGIEWNIKI
mobilized
especiallytires
STAR~210
of shortageoispareparts
15021N-1852E)
(5019N-1854E)
JELCZ~412
TUKS-11113s
Unilorms and M43i 52 submachine
guns Issued reservists at
autobase.
Motor Transport
Enter
rise
?
GLIWICE
5017N
1840E
236
236
Not stated
None mentioned
130 JELC254~seaterbuses
Reservistswereissued
Once to
Onmobiliiation,theHQelthe
lapseoi12~24
Nonereport2d
]979
p
(
-
)
forregularbusroutes
uniforms and equipment at
twice yearly
newly-mustered transport regi~
hoursfromalert
5 JE~C18 t trucks
Autobase, Each of the
ment would be In GLIWICE. The
assembly area
2 JEICl 16 t trucks
drivers had a set of com?
echelon areas of the 3 conslitu-
NRAPKOWICE
93STAR25f28!29trucks
pletemilifaryequipment
entbattalionsoftheregiment
(5029N-1158E)
3 STAR 1,200 litre tanker
consistingof~~lielduniform
would belceatedasfollows:
trucks
onefieldcap,steelhelmet,a
1st Battalion(PKS~GLIWICE)
N'A
1 small bus
woolen cap (coveringhead
along forest road CA 212998
1 Volga car
and neck), one pair of brown
CB 208033
I Fiat car
calf~length combat boots, a
2nd Battalion (PHS ~ RYBNIK)
25 km SIN
Allvehielesatlhedepothada
shortwarmovercoat,two
along lorestroadCB208033~
mobiliiationtask~
undershirts, two pairs of
CB 245014
shorts, one warm under
3rd Battalion (PKS-MYSZKON~
68 km SW
shirt, onepairoilongunder~
alonglorestrcadC8245014-
pants,one gym suit, two
CA 212998
pairs of socks, foot~wraps,
Aviokolnna to report fo supply
mess kit, field pack, and
Depot in KRAPKDWICE, load
CBRequipment,consisting
supplies and equipment for
of protective suit, protea
cadre regiment and report to
tivemask,andgloves.The
areasabove~
equipment was kept in num?
tiered bags and stored in one
of the company's supply
rooms.
TRANSMAG
Ministryof
ZABRZE
165+
165+
Goad
None mentioned
Togetherwiththevehiclesonlaa-
la lieu of lrequentalerts,
Infrequent
The Enterprise's militaryequip?
Not stated
45 km SE
None reported
1978
Transport
Mining
(5018N-1841E)
lion at its branches, the enterprise
drivers participated in
ment was stored al its branch in
Enterprise
KATOWICE
in ZABRZE had a total of abou1300
reserve training each year
GLIWICE-SOSNICA. In the event
(5014N?1859E)
vehicles. In ZABRZE, the enter?
ton 1-3 months,
01 general or partial mobilisation
prise had the following vehicles:
drivers were to report to
40 STAR H-28, diesel engine, 5
GLIWICE~SOSNICA and draw
ton-trucks; 25 STAR Hd9, 5 ton?
uniforms, gas masks, entren-
trucks, l3 JEICt, 8 tondrucks;ll
thing tools, sift'mg benches, tar-
JE~CZ, twaway dump trucks; 5
Paulin, and two gasoline coo-
JE~C2,10 ton~trucks~, 25 two-axle
tamers (each twenty liters) per
trailers; 1D ton, manufactured in
vehicle. Drivers ofSTAR H-28 (5
GDR; 12 STAR buses, 32~seaters;
ton) trucks were eKpecfed to
and28JELC2buses,54seaters
transport approximately 32
reservists each Only after draw
Ing this equipment were mis-
sions to beannounced
29
(Reverse Blank)
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C289
C 305
N124 I1FF NUCLEAR AGCY 0306
A132 DASD ISA/CASIARPAC (7) C309
A136 OASU ISA/TRATP 0348
A13Y DASD ISP/CUR-NATO C351
A 310 JCS/J-3(SP OP DIV) C412
A3S3 JSTPS (2) C414
A363 USN MR SUA PE C415
A 368 USRMC/NATO 0417
A704 SLD ILMIR C419
A 706 JLO NAPLES C428
0459
U1A 0461
C470
800; 01A/DR (PR017 lu V) 0500
Bonn ntn/ol-I c507
Du '7 ulA/ni-,; c;lz
L'f140 IllA/'110 0513
Dnsn u1n/Ol-nn c52z
rocs Din/I;T-ns cs23
11160 UTA/RTS-'IPS PLNT C535
Dn6N~ DiA/DT-4c cs38
I;nro oinisws c539
iil CO DIA/I'!; 0545
141;4 Dini uL-z cs47
111 SS DIA/RTS-2A4 PP cs5o
P,l EII 01 A/0T-I I; 0557
P~1 LS; UlA/UT-7(. C562
14 StS UTA/Uli-IFI
R Sf6 III A/DD-117
,71 nin/ue-4Gi
9574 JIA/DL'-4GS
~DS79 UTA/JS I-2fi
L'SNO olA/IAa-1 L'3
P,! '.7
USt;4
P. ` .;6
P. S'I I
141 ?9
B /P.7
8 7!5 3
R 17:4
Ii 7?5
L'a70
DIA/UB -4D1
171 A/I!I-5 (2)
UTA/DB-1 C7
DIA/DB-1[
DIA/DB-lf
01A/DB-1 G1
DIA/UC-I;A
urn/nB-n14
III A/UB-4G7
DIA/JSW-l
nin/nB-4r7
II[A/DB-6 C. AHS
ulA/RTS-214 (LI14) (5)
ILIA/JSI-~U
UTA/OD-1 C3
UTA/UO-1111
DIA/UB-lU7
UTA/~IS I-7
U[A/Il[A R[f' JCdC
corn Drs -uPS x PIANS (4)
C0 30 CII RD RA
u149 usnMnn (2)
0044 'J SAM RDC
C04S USAISC
l.f147 iIS ARI CMI7
CONS ITS AMSM
C09U TFCOM/BCCO
C'710 I1SA SOLO $I1P CiR
0777 101ST AIRB ORNI DIV
0731 7ND AKr4 IIIV
cr4n isr rnv Div
C73S 1ST INF ON
0241 FIRST IL`, Af2MY
0247 FO RSCOM
0743 IIFTII US ARMY
C24S OPPOSINGFO RCTNGOFT
0246 6TH CAV BDI (AC)
C2R6 417TH MIU
CS?;Y,
423RD MID (STRAT)
18TH ADN CORPS
82ND ABN DLV
500TH MIG
453D MID
10TH SFG(A13 W)1STSF
CISI GS EC SPBN PSF
4TH INF DIV
5TH INF DIV (M)
7r+ Ir{r Div
9TI{ INF DIV
OP TEST&EVAL AGCY
COM D-GEN STF COL
INFANTRY SCH
ARMY WAR COL
TRADOC (3)
USAITAC (GIPD)
IJA RCOM
A?12.1DCUM
YIIMA PG
C RADC OM/FI-A
AVRA DOOM/TSA RCOM
WII[TE >ANDS MSL RG
TRASnIVn
ARRC Oro
AMRY NUCRCHIM AGCY
F 2,'1111:UM/fI-M (3)
USAITAC (IIPO~
TRANS SCH
Dl;f'wAY PRV GRD
0591
FSTC (2)
C60S
JFK CTR MIL ASSIST
0617
CONCEPT AN LYS AGCY
0619
MIA RE DS TONC (4)
0620
USAITAC (SRD)
0624
USAOG DFT L
0637
CHEMICAL SCHOOL (2)
0633
ORDNANCE CTR & SCH
C635
AIR DEf AGCY
CG39
CMB TRTNG DEV D[R
C641
AviauoN crR R scl{
0644
LOG CTR
0646
CAC DA
0683
INTEL CTRRS CH (3)
Cf u4
USAISD (3)
0697
T FST
R CVAL COMD
C 715
ARMOR
CTR
C 748
I{Q DA
DAMI-FRT
C 757
SFD
C 763
HQDA
DAM[-FIT
0766
HQDA
DAM[-F[C
C76 Y,
USAITAC (LID)
Cf119
STH SFG(ABN)1ST SF
D002
OV-96 (DN M)
Do07 NIS HQ (coDE 22v)
D008 NISC
D039 FOURTH MAID/MARTC
Doss oP-65
D062 NISO CU ROPE
D080 OP-96N
D 150 C14C (L"JT)
D157 NISC CBD DET CIIJ03
0202 NA VIJARCOL
D217 NAVWPNCCN
D249 NAVPGSC OL
D261 NUSC NPT
D263 Nosc
D320 9SGA CD7ELL
D359 FLECOMBATRACENLANT
D447 NLON LAB NUSC
D503 JCMPO/OOY
D606 NAWTS-1
D766 NAV COASTSYSLCN
D900 NFOIO
D902 NF010 DLT NPT
D911 PJOSIC
D971 OP-009f
Eoln nFU/rnooc
C016 AFIS/INC
C017 AFIS/INSA (W)
F OIA AFIS/INSA (C)
E021 AFIS/OL-N
E046 AFSAC/]NOC
E062 HU USAF/INW
F063 HQ USAF/INET
IIISTRIBUTION LIST
E054 HQ USAF/INER
E100 TAC 460 RTS/INPPD (90)
E104 4513 TTG/[NOI
E200 AAC
E226 AFOSI/IVOA
E231 HQ USAF/LERX (CM)
E280 AFTAC/DOT
E303 HQ USAF/INEG
E310 HQ USAF/XOX
E317 HQ USAF/SAMI
E400 AFCC/XORI
E401 AFLC/IN
E 40R AFWL
E409 AMD/RDI
E411 ASD/FT D/NITS
C413 ESD/IND
E 415 OC-ALC/XRO
E4zo FTD/Nits (z)
F427 uADc
C429 HQ SPACE DIV/IND
E437 AFIS/INOI
E 430 34oJ TCHI f / rTVi
E465 USAF/ACADEMY
E 552 6911 ESG (M)
E554 6913 ESS
E556 6917 ESG
E560 6949 ESG
E563 6948 CSS (M)
E 564 6950 ESG
E566 69A1 ESS
F_568 6990 ESG
F 706 HQ CLECT STCY CMD
C J26 USAFTAWC/[N
E730 HQ USAF/X00[R
E451 AUL/LSE
U R S COMMANDS
FOIU ARRS/IN
G005 CINCAD
HooS usclNGEUR
11006 US EUCOM DE FA NA LCTR
U101 USAFC 497RTG (IRC)
H306 DCSI US COM f3FRLIN
H310 USASCTAF
~J317 439TH MID (ST RAT)
H 320 66 TII MI GP
H 336 404TH MID (ST RAT)
H 337 443D MID (ST RAT)
H600 CINCUSNAVEUR
H 511 COMSI XTH FLT
H524 HQ V CORPS
H525 HQ VII CORPS
H526 HQ 3RD INF DIV
II52B 1ST INF DIV (FWD)
H529 HQ 3RD ARMORED DIV
11530 HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV
J010 COMUS FORCA RIB
J5D2 coMSECOnDFLT
J575 fM FLANT
,1576 COMPHI6 GRU 7
J593 COr10PTEVFOR
K007 COMUSJ APAN
KO10 US FK (2)
K100 PACAF 548 RTG
K101 PACAF/irJAl
K118 61 COMPW(T)/D01
K201 13TH AF
K300 IPAC (LIBRARY)
K302 USAWESTC OM
K313 IPAC (CODE IA) (2)
K314 [PAC (CODE PT)
K315 IPAC (CODE IE)
K370 USA RJ APAN
K342 2ND INF DIV
K40f3 COMLATW INGPAC(42B2)
K415 r"AG 15 46C1
K500 CINCPACFLT
K505 FICPAC
K514 COMTHIRDFLT
K515 COMSEVENTH FLT
K525 COMNAVAIRPAC
K610 F[RS TIdA R'JN
K611 FI RSTrdA RB RIG
K612 TH IRDMARDIV
K679 FLTCORGRU 1
K710 FISC WESTPAC
K 842 COMCARGRU 5/CS F7FL
L005 CINCSAC
L040 SAC 544 SIW/DAA (4)
L042 544 IAS/TAE
L044 Ht, SAC/]NA
L101 1 STRAD/DOX
L102 2 BMw/IN
L703 5 BMW/IN
L104 6 SW/IN
L106 7 BMW/IN
L107 8 AF/IN
u n9 9 saw/INA
L110 15 AF/IN
L171 19 BMW/IN
Lll2 72 BMW/IN
L113 2b BriW/RJ
L114 42 RMW/IN
L115 43 SW/IN
L116 44 SMW/D0771
L117 55 SRW/IN
Lll8 6t4 BMW/IN
Lll 9 90 SMW/D0271
L170 97 SMW/D022]
L121 92 BMW/1N
L122 93 BMW/IN
L123 96 BMW/IN
L124 97 BMW/IN
L195 1D0 AREF.V/DOXI
L126 126 AREFW/DCXI
L127 126 AREFW/DOXI
L12?i 12A AREFG/DOXI
L129 134 AREFG/DOXI
L130 141 AREFW/DCXI
Ll sl l5l AREFG/DO XI
L132 157 AREFG/DOXI
L133 160 AREFG/DCXI
L134 161 AREFW/DOXI
L136 170 AREFG/DOX]
L136 171 AREf"',J/UOXI
L137 189 AREFG/DOX]
u 3H l9o nREFG/DOxI
L139 11 SG/DOX[
L140 305 ARE FW!DfiXI
L141 7 AD/IN
L142 306 SW/IN
L143 34 ST RAT SQ
L144 922 SS
L145 307 AREFG/DOXI
L146 308 SMW/D02~ I
L147 319 BMW/[N
L148 320 BtM!/IN
L149 321 SMW/D02~1
L150 340 AREFG/DOXI
L151 341 SMW/D02~[
L152 351 SMW/D02