CHINA'S POLICIES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000801250002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1983
• Content Type: SNIE

Approved For Release 2009/08/11 :CIA-RDP86T00302R000801250002-7
E ~""~F Director of SeCI'et
~, Central
~-"-~ ~ Intelligence
China's Policies Toward the
United States and the USSR:
Short-Term Prospects
Secret
SN/E /3-9-83
/4 January 1983
Copy 3 9 4
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 Approved For Release 2009/08/11 :CIA-RDP86T00302R000801250002-7
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 CHINA'S POLICIES TOWARD THE
UNITED STATES AND THE USSR:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Information available as of 13 ]nnnarv 1983 was
used in the preparation of [his Estimate.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of The Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
 This Estimate examines recent shifts in China's policies
toward the United States and the USSR. It focuses on the
implications of these changes for the United States over the
next several months.
A mix of factors-some of which have been debated in 13eiiing for
several years-was behind the emergence over the past two years of
policies that put some distance between Washington and Beijing and
that opened the door to a reduction of tensions with the Soviet Union.
Deng Xiaoping was attempting to establish a stable political environ-
ment for his successors and, we believe, wanted to remove foreign
policy as a potentially contentious domestic issue. Longstanding Chinese
skepticism about the value Washington placed on its China connection
and about US intentions toward Taiwan was reinforced by a growing
sense of nationalism about foreign issues in general. Bening saw signs
that Moscow, because of domestic economic difficulties and foreign
burdens, was seriously interested in resuming a dialogue with China.
Some Chinese argued that reducing tensions with the Soviets would
enable China to devote more resources to the modernization effort.
Finally, some in the leadership also believed that an excessively close
identification of China's interests with those of the United States was
undercutting China's credentials in the Third World.
This web of interlocking factors, in our view, has produced policy
shifts that Beijing hopes will maximize its bargaining power with both
the United States and the Soviet Union. It has not, however, altered
Beijing's fundamental global balance sheet. The Chinese still regard the
USSR as their main threat and the United States as the only viable
counterweight to Soviet expansionism, in Asia and around the world.
The Chinese also believe that continued access to US trade and
technology are very important to their modernization goals. We believe
Beijing's current tactics are intended in part to gain a stronger
commitment of support from the United States. This objective has been
frustrated by what they see as continuing US reluctance to make as
clear as China would like that solid relations with Beijing are more
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 important than maintaining a highly visible relationship with Taiwan
authorities. This perception appears to persist in Bening, despite
repeated US reminders that the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act
obligate the United States to a certain level of support to Taiwan.
We believe the key implications for the United States of these
adjustments in Chinese policies are the apparent depth of Beijing's
skepticism about US intentions toward China and its new willingness to
play off its links with Washington against Moscow, and vice versa. The
Chinese already have demonstrated to the United States that they are
not afraid to deal independently and directly with the Soviet Union.
Chinese perceptions of US attitudes toward China and Taiwan will, in
our view, be a maior influence on Beiiing's foreign policies for the
remainder of this year.
In our view, some important constraints create a floor beneath
which the Chinese do not wish their relations with the United States to
erode. China's bargaining power with the Soviet Union is derived from
Beijing's relationship with Washington; by the same token, the Chinese
recognize that their value to the United States comes from a common
interest in halting Soviet expansionism. Moreover, China's development
strategy is keyed to good relations with the United States, Japan, and
Western Europe, thus setting some limits on any improvements in Sino-
Soviet relations.
Even if the Sino-US relationship improves, we do not expect the
Chinese to quickly abandon their efforts to reduce tensions with the
Soviet Union. Any negotiations on the key security issues that have long
divided the two countries will be protracted and contentious, but eve
cannot rule out the possibility of significant progress if the Soviets make
major concessions or Sino-US relations remain unsettled.
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 STriving for Maneuverability
1. Significant changes in China's foreign policy,
especially toward the United States and the USSR,
have emerged over the past two years. The key
ingredients have been an attenuation of diplomatic
and strategic relations with the United States, an
attempt to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, and
a renewed emphasis on relations with the Third
World. The Chinese have described these changes as
tactical moves necessary to underscore the independ-
ence of their foreign policy, which some Chinese
apparently believe is threatened by an excessively
close relationship with Washington. We believe, in
fact, that a mix of factors, some of which are closely
related, went into the decision to put some distance
between Beijing and Washington, and to resume a
dialogue with Moscow. These factors were:
- A iudgment that Moscow, because of increasing
economic difficulties at home and growing bur-
dens overseas, was prepared to seriously explore
the possibility of reducing tensions with China
and a desire to explore the possibility of obtain-
ing from the USSR technological assistance in
upgrading China's aging industrial plant and
expanding mutually beneficial trade.
- A trend toward more conservative domestic poli-
cies and a desire to remove potentially conten-
tious foreign policy issues that might complicate
the succession prospects for Deng Xiaoping's
heirs.
- China's adverse reaction to trends in US policy
toward China and Taiwan, especially regarding
arms sales to Taiwan and technology transfer to
China, and the consequent conclusion that the
United States was placing decreased value on
China as a strategic partner.
Concern that a widespread perception that Chi-
na was too close to the United States was under-
cutting its credentials and influence in the Third
World.
- A iudgment that reduced tensions with the USSR
would enable China to divert resources from the
military to the modernization effort.
2. In our view, these considerations led the Chinese
to begin adjusting their policies in ways they hoped
would enhance their flexibility and leverage with both
Washington and Moscow. The Chinese leaders hoped
at the same time to reduce their vulnerability to
charges of being too close to the United States at the
sacrifice of their national interests. The domestic
priorities of the Dengists-which include reducing the
influence of the military, preparing the ground for a
major party purge, and managing criticism of the
social effects of China's opening to the West-also
probably reinforced the leadership's inclination to
pursue a more cautious foreign policy.
3. The extent to which domestic political impera-
tives have affected China's foreign policy course dur-
ing the past two years is unclear. Foreign policy
reviews over the last few years have occurred at a time
when Deng's overriding concern has been to strength-
en the political base of his handpicked successors and
to promote his comprehensive reform program. We
believe China's foreign policy direction over the com-
ing months will continue to be influenced by the
domestic political jockeying associated with Deng
Xiaoping's attempts to ensure a stable political envi-
ronment for his successors.
4. From the outset of Sino-US relations, there have
been elements in the leadership who, citing widely
held reservations about relying on a foreign power,
have argued for a more independent, balanced course.
We believe that skepticism about the benefits China
will gain from its relations with the United States is a
factor with which the leadership has had to reckon
and that this factor becomes particularly important
when the leadership perceives Sino-US relations to be
strained. The Chinese repeatedly stress their sensitivity
to what they perceive as affronts to their national
dignity, and a highly nationalistic tone has marked
their complaints about US policy on Taiwan. Moves
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during the past two years in the direction of a more
balanced posture toward Moscow and Washington
complemented other policy compromises such as
tighter controls over Western influences on Chinese
society.
5. When relations are strained, concessions by any
leadership to the United States could became a politi-
cal liability. We do not have reliable indications that
policy toward the United States has been a maior
domestic political issue in which key leaders are
adopt a cautious, skeptical approach toward both
Washington and Moscow. We believe Deng's succes-
sors would seek to maintain the current consensus
while consolidating their authority. Nonetheless, we
cannot rule out the possibility that Deng's departure
would create disarray in the policymaking establish-
ment and that strains with the United States would be
more difficult to manage. Although we believe there
are no strong pro-Soviet elements in the leadership,
pressures could build on Deng's successors to under-
take ales inhibited approach toward Moscow if Sino-
US relations remain troubled and the Soviets demon-
strate increased flexibility.
6. Chinese attempts to insulate Sino-US trade and
access to US technology from the vicissitudes of
triangular politics would also suffer under these cir-
cumstances. While there have been some tensions in
the trade sector over the past year, we believe these
were due to Beiiing's efforts to reduce the large deficit
it had with the United States and to obtain access to
the largest possible share of the lucrative US textile
market. In our view, political difficulties have not so
Ear significantly influenced Beijing's approach to these
problems. Over the longer run, if the Chinese continue
to perceive an unstable relationship with the United
States, we expect political problems will begin to affect
other sectors of the relationship. At the same time, of
course, Beiiing's current determination to enhance its
access to US trade and technology provides the United
States with some leverage in the political as well as the
economic aspects of the relationship.
8. US attitudes toward China, especially future
actions toward Taiwan, will play a crucial role in
determining the extent to which Beijing pursues these
new policy directions. We believe the Chinese have no
clear-cut, long-term expectations Eor their talks with
the USSR. In fact, they clearly still consider the USSR
the principal threat to China, and they have done
nothing over the past two years to suggest they are
likely to change that view. In any event, the conditions
the Chinese have set Eor substantial progress in the
talks-Soviet withdrawal of support for Vietnamese
expansionism, removal of the Soviet military presence
in Afghanistan, and a substantial drawdown of Soviet
troops along the Chinese border-ensure lengthy ne-
gotiations, which we believe the Chinese will use to
maximize their bargaining position with the United
States.
9. The Chinese want to use the discussion with
Moscow, in part, to try to influence US policy on
important bilateral and other issues. If, for example,
the Chinese conclude that the qualitative or quantita-
tive levels of US arms provisions to Taiwan are
inconsistent with the 17 August communique-and
especially if it is done in a highly visible manner-we
believe Beijing will increase the tempo of its contacts
with Moscow. In short, we believe the Chinese will
exploit continued talks with the Soviets to make it
appear that the United States will pay a geopolitical
price for not actively seeking improved Sino-US ties.
The Chinese also are likely to seek to make the United
States appear out of step with its allies on the China
question and will continue to court broad support
from the Third World, including criticism of US
policies in various regions.
10. We believe, however, that there are important
considerations that currently serve to constrain China's
indicates that the Chinese want to protect and
en ance the bilateral Sino-US relationship. In our
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 view, the Chinese also recognize that some sort of
reasonably solid relationship with the United States is
necessary iE they are to have any significant leverage
with the USSR. By the same token, Beiiing's aspira-
tions as a Third World leader fighting the "hegemonis-
tic" activities of both superpowers would be seriously
undercut by too quick a reconciliation with Moscow.
On the other hand, the Chinese have demonstrated a
desire to keep Washington guessing about the depth of
any warming trend in Sino-Soviet relations. ~
11. There are other important factors that add
uncertainty to Beiiing's future policies. The extent to
which the USSR is prepared to propose significant
concessions, for example, could affect the tempo of
improvement in Sino-Soviet ties. Should the Soviets
offer troop withdrawals, we believe the Chinese would
respond favorably to the inevitable Soviet demands for
counterconcessions, such as a Chinese troop pullback.
Here, too, the degree to which the Chinese publicly
portray them as a substantial move toward normaliza-
tion of Sino-Soviet relations would, in our view, de-
pend at least in part on the status of Sino-US relations
at the time.
Chinese Attitudes Toward The United States
12. For more than a decade, there have been three
fundamental considerations in China's US policy-
Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and trade, including tech-
nology transfer. Chinese obiectives in these key areas
have been to obtain US recognition of Beijing's sover-
eignty over Taiwan and to induce the United States to
end its military support to Taiwan, to establish a
"strategic" relationship with the United States that
would serve as a counterweight to the Soviet threat to
China, and to utilize US technological expertise to
support China's modernization effort.
13. For Bening, US intentions toward Taiwan have
always been the most important obstacle to the devel-
opment of Sino-US relations. The emotionalism of
Chinese attitudes about sovereignty cannot be overem-
phasized, and some Chinese leaders have always ques-
tioned US intentions regarding Taiwan. China's objec-
tives regarding Taiwan, in fact, are bound to create
tensions with any US leadership. Chinese officials over
the years have been advised by leaders of both US
parties that no US administration will guarantee a
termination of arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing's flexibili-
ty on the issue has fluctuated over the years, in our
view, depending on its perception of US attitudes and
intentions toward the issue. When the Chinese have
concluded that the United States was mindful of their
sensitivities on Taiwan and moving toward their posi-
tion-regardless of the pace-Beijing has been gener-
ally upbeat about the overall nature of the relation-
ship. On the other hand, periods during which the
Chinese perceived "backsliding" on Taiwan have been
accompanied by stagnation or tensions in other aspects
of the relationship.
14. In the euphoric atmosphere that followed nor-
malization of relations in 1978, the Chinese clearly
believed that progress would be made in all aspects of
the relationship in more or less equal fashion. While
the Chinese almost certainly were not entirely satisfied
with the letter of the normalization agreement-
especially on the knotty question of US arms sales to
Taiwan-their expectations for further progress were
high, and in retrospect excessive. During 1981 and
1982, however, the Chinese undertook a series of
foreign policy reviews that reflected, among other
considerations, a iudgment that the short-term pros-
pects Eor accomplishing their goals toward the United
15. After several months of discussion, some of it
apparently contentious, a leadership consensus on poli-
cy toward the United States-as well as the Soviet
Union-began to emerge in 1982. Criticism of US
policies in other parts of the world was stepped up.
This approach reflected Chinese resentment over what
they perceived as an attempt by the United States to
offer a security relationship in exchange for Chinese
acquiescence in US arms sales to Taiwan. At the same
time, senior Chinese officials intensified their com-
plaints to US officials and others about the US failure
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 to honor earlier "commitments" to transfer technology
to China. On the other hand, Chinese officials went
out of their way to assure US officials and businessmen
that trade should not be affected by the tensions in
other aspects of the relationship.
16. The signing of the ioint communique in August
1982 has not substantially altered Beijing's tactical
approach to the United States. Despite the difficulties
of the past two years, we believe China's long-term
objectives in its US relationship remain basically un-
changed Erom those described earlier in this Estimate.
The Chinese have done nothing either with the United
States or with the USSR that would close the door to a
resumption of closer ties in the Future. In fact, Huang
Hua's statement to the Council of Foreign Relations in
early October 1982 that China and the United States
share "many things in common" in the international
arena suggests to us that Bening remains deeply
interested in resuming-at some point-the strategic
dialogue and that his remarks reflect some optimism
about the long-term prospects for the relationship.
17. On the other hand, we believe the Chinese may
be far less sanguine about any significant improve-
ment in bilateral ties in the short run. The principal
obstacle to a resumption of forward movement in the
relationship, in our view, is Beijing's perception that
the United States underestimates the importance to
China of Taiwan. Indeed, Huang's contention at the
private and influential Council of Foreign Relations
that "some people" in the United States are seeking to
use Taiwan to undermine Sino-US relations and that,
as a result, the relationship could "go down the drain"
is a clear reminder that the Taiwan issue remains the
key irritant in bilateral relations.
18. Huang's remarks and other similar comments
by top Chinese leaders over the past several months, in
our view, also suggest that the Chinese believe there is
some political advantage to implying that China can
be "lost" again. Remarks such as Huang's, therefore,
are designed to imply that the Chinese are prepared to
restrict their approach to the USSR if the United States
takes what Beijing regards as the proper steps in the
Sino-US bilateral relationship. It also suggests, we
believe, that the Chinese judge that there is a receptive
audience to this suggestion in the United States.
19. Continuing Chinese protestations that the Unit-
ed States does not intend to live up to Beijing's
interpretation of the August communique suggests to
that the United States was determined to
maintain its support to Taiwan. The Chinese want to
be reassured about both the form and the substance of
the US link with Taiwan. They have shown particular
sensitivity to the "quality and quantity" provision in
the communique, and have warned that they will
watch carefully for a bona fide decline in US sales to
Taiwan. Chinese leaders cite US unwillingness to
specify a precise turning point Eor such reductions as
demonstrating a lack of US sincerity toward fulfilling
provisions of the August communique. At the same
time, their concerns about US intentions mount when
the United States displays public, official interest in
20. We believe that one of China's immediate
objectives is to persuade the United States to reduce
the publicity of its arms sales to Taiwan and of its
overall links with Taiwan. Not only would this remove
the need Bening feels to react publicly, but it would
diminish the opportunity for domestic critics to fuel
anti-US fires in Beijing. In our view, another Chinese
objective in the coming months is to engage the Uni[ed
States in ongoing consultations on arms sales, a move
that would help the leadership, if it chose, to interpret
any future sales in the best possible light for the
domestic audience. Over the longer term, the Chinese
almost certainly believe such consultations would en-
hance their ability to ensure diminishing sales.
21. There are important constraints on how far the
Chinese want distancing from the United States to go.
A sharp deterioration in Sino-US relations almost
certainly would undercut China's relations with Japan
and other Western countries, a prospect that Bening
clearly wishes to avoid. Chinese officials in the past
have attempted to assure Japanese leaders that prob-
lems with Washington would not impair ties with
Tokyo. Chinese leaders understand that China's ability
to acquire high technology from Japan could be
complicated by a serious downturn in Sino-US
relations.
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 22. Despite their public rhetoric about China's abil-
ity to deal "independently" with the Soviet threat, we
believe most Chinese leaders still value the United
States as the only real strategic counterweight to the
USSR and are trying to establish a floor below which
they do not want the US relationship to go. Clearly,
the Chinese have reduced-to a more realistic level-
their expectations about the degree to which the
United States and China are likely to cooperate in any
military sense against the USSR. Nonetheless, in our
view they recognize that without some form of reason-
ably solid US relationship their flexibility to deal with
the Soviet Union would be reduced sharply. Moreover,
Beijing's position and influence in areas where US and
Chinese interests coincide-such as Indochina and
Afghanistan-would also be reduced.
23. Finally, we believe that the Chinese recognize
that over time their access to US technology and
markets would be adversely affected, despite Beiiing's
attempts to protect it, if the relationship is not put on a
more solid footing. Imports of US high technology,
especially in areas such as energy development and
aircraft, are crucial to China's long-term moderniza-
tion plans. Moreover, the United States-now China's
third leading trade partner, after Hong Kong and
Japan-will remain an important target market in
China's long-term export planning. Even currently,
the Chinese are deeply concerned that growing pro-
tectionist sentiments in the United States and the West
will hamper their modernization effort by preventing
them Erom earning the foreign exchange required to
pay Eor their large capital import needs.
24. In the final analysis, however, we cannot rule
out the possibility that a downward spiral in Sino-US
relations will continue well past any floor that Beijing
hopes to set for it The US relationship with Taiwan, as
well as Beijing"s own growing contacts with Moscow,
will make it difficult for China to stabilize what, from
Beiiing's viewpoint, is currently an unsettled relation-
ship with the United States, and one that is politically
charged at home.
Beijing's Approach to Moscow
25. Over the past decade, China's main Foreign
policy goal has been to construct political alignments
and strategic counterweights against the Soviet Union.
In Beijing's view, Moscow has been, and remains, an
aggressively expansionist power which seeks to expand
its political and military influence as a "hegemonist'
throughout the world. Countering Soviet designs while
avoiding the kind of provocation that could bring a
confrontational response from Moscow have set the
limits on China's policy.
26. The Chinese see military power and military
assistance as Moscow's main, if not sole, instruments of
political influence in Asia. Moscow's efforts to trans-
late respect for its power into influence and its
provision of military aid to states around China's
periphery have remained the focus of concern among
Chinese leaders. It is Eor this reason that China has
been most preoccupied with Soviet influence in Viet-
nam and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan
and Mongolia.
27. The sustained Soviet military buildup along the
Sino-Soviet border obviously represents China's prima-
ry national security threat. Beijing has regarded this
buildup since the mid-1960s as Ear beyond the needs
for self-defense, as reason to hold overall Soviet mo-
fives in question, and as proof of Moscow's intentions
to use the threat of military force for political ends.
While the Chinese behave as if they do not expect the
Soviets to mount an attack on China unless there is a
severe provocation, we believe China's strategy and
military modernization are proceeding on the assump-
tion that Soviet capabilities will continue to improve-
a trend that can only widen the gap between the
quality of the two forces.
28. In addition to this growing sensitivity to the
continuing Soviet effort to encircle China, militarily as
well as through a worldwide political campaign, Bei-
jing's policy toward the USSR in the 1970s also
reflected the historical legacy of racial animosity,
political differences, ideological conflict, and national
resentment that had long animated Chinese percep-
tions of Russia and the USSR. As a global competitor
with the USSR and as an Asian power with close ties to
Japan, the United States played a central role in
China's anti-Soviet security calculus.
29. We have a limited appreciation of how the
Chinese assess the factors now shaping their Soviet
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guidance early in 1981 called for improving people-to-
people ties with the USSR. The guidance apparently
was based on a Chinese conclusion that the Soviets
were being impelled by difficulties at home and
abroad to seriously attempt some normalization in
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 relations with China. The Chinese, in our view, also
calculated that the Soviets' difficulties would allow
China to compete with them politically by improving
ties with some East European parties and pro-Soviet
Western Communist parties and by striking a more
independent posture toward the Third World. In
short, the initial Chinese response to Soviet overtures
for improved ties was couched in essentially competi-
tive terms.
30. By January 1982, the Chinese had begun to
view their relations with the Soviets from differing
perspectives. The Chinese concluded, we believe, that
their modernization effort required prolonged stability
on their borders-an objective that has been evident in
their initiatives to improve relations with North Korea,
India, and the Southeast Asian countries-and that
reduced tensions on the Sino-Soviet border would
allow a diversion of resources from military to nonmil-
itary purposes. At the same time, those voices arguing
that Sino-Soviet relations should be exploited for their
practical benefits, such as technological assistance,
apparently began to gain a more receptive hearing
among top policymakers. We believe this occurred
because the Chinese had begun to conclude that
further economic retrenchment was necessary and
that China would profit more from using all sources,
including Soviet, for refitting its existing industrial
base-much of it Soviet-built-than from seeking new
plants and equipment solely Erom Japan and the West.
31. In our view, Beijing's primary concern about
the future of Sino-US relations strongly influenced its
calculations about policy toward Moscow. Knowing
that the Soviet proposal in September 1981 to reopen
border talks was timed to exploit Sino-US differences,
Chinese officials deferred response, while informing
the United States of the offer as a reminder that
Beijing had other options. As Moscow pressed Beijing
with new overtures, Beijing delayed resumption of
political talks until after the August communique had
eased the Sino-US crisis. This reduced the potential for
negative effects on Sino-US relations and at the same
time allowed Beijing to address Moscow from a
strengthened position, enhancing prospects for exact-
ing concessions.
32. China's behavior is similar to its conduct in
1979 when the Chinese delayed opening talks with the
Soviets until after the visit of Vice President Mondale
to Beijing in August had satisfied the leadership about
US intentions. Judging by this 1979 pattern, we believe
Beijing hopes to make at least some progress during
Secretary Shultz's visit before resuming contacts to
explore improved ties with Moscow.
Looking Ahead
33. We believe that Beijing in the coming months
will continue on a course with Moscow that will:
-Improve Chinese flexibility in the Soviet-Chi-
nese-US triangle. The Chinese hope that dealing
more positively with Moscow will increase Chi-
na's short-term leverage with the United States;
they are probably even more hopeful that it will
work to their advantage over the longer run.
- Establish a permanent political channel to the
USSR to probe Soviet positions on basic issues.
We expect the Chinese to maintain pressure on
all key issues-Soviet forces on their border and
in Mongolia and the Soviet role in Afghanistan-
but to give the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance priori-
ty treatment.
- Reduce tensions and improve access to whatever
material benefits are available from expanded
trade, economic, academic, and technological
ties with the Soviets.
- Demonstrate that China is not intransigent in
dealing with the Soviets. Beijing especially wants
its image of coequality with Washington and
Moscow to influence views of the Sino-Soviet
relationship in Europe and the Third World.
34. Neither intelligence reporting nor official Chi-
nese statements indicate that Beijing expects rapid
progress toward a resolution of the basic issues. Beijing
has also shown in talks so far that it will push Moscow
to take the first step in dealing with Chinese security
concerns. We believe, however, that the Chinese are
prepared to strike some compromises with the Soviets
on the military situation alone the border
If the
Chinese made progress with the Soviets here, Beijing,
in our view, would not require immediate, similar
progress on Indochina and Afghanistan to keep the
dialogue going. But we would expect the Chinese to
keep pressing their case in these two areas. The
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 Chinese have solid incentives to maintain a hard line
on Afghanistan and to keep the Soviets' feet to the fire
on Kampuchea.
35. Even if Bening is flexible in dealing with Soviet
proposals on the military situation-by agreeing to
initially symbolic steps along their common border or
in Mongolia, for example-we do not believe the
Chinese will follow suit on the other key issues.
official Chinese statements
point out clearly that changes in the Soviet-Vietnam-
ese relationship are a priority for China. The tactical
benefits from this Chinese position are obvious-
Hanoi's distrust of Moscow is already evident in its
reaction to the Sino-Soviet talks. Moreover, China's
proposals on Indochina, which were tabled at the first
round of talks, directly serves ASEAN's interest in an
independent and neutral Kampuchea. A less adamant
stand against Vietnamese presence would, in the Chi-
nese view, threaten to undermine ASEAN's consen-
sus-backed by Bening-on the need for a full Viet-
namese withdrawal.
36. China does not expect the Soviets to negotiate
seriously about their presence in Aghanistan. Beijing
knows that the Soviets do not regard China's position
as a decisive factor in the situation, that Moscow has
demonstrated it is engaged in an extended anti-
insurgency effort, and that China can use its opposi-
tion to the Soviet presence to good effect in its anti-
hegemony effort in the Third World.
37. A failure to make progress on the basic issues
will not prevent Beijing from seeking improvement in
other aspects of relations with the Soviets, both for
their own sake and to cushion the dialogue. Moscow,
for example, is sure to push for an expansion of
mutually beneficial economic and cultural ties. The
Chinese are likely to be forthcoming on trade if
Moscow offers to fill Chinese orders for raw materials
and chemicals. The Soviets are willing to dispatch
advisers to China as well as to make Soviet technology
more available to China, but, except Eor the upgrading
of portions of China's aging, Soviet-designed industrial
plant, the political legacy of the 1950s and the more
attractive opportunities Eor technology transfer from
the West will place strict limits on how far China is
willing to go.
38. In the last year or so, Beijing's renewed
contacts with several pro-Soviet parties in Eastern
and Western Europe, including the French Commu-
^ists, have sent mixed signals. China's greater activi-
ty in the international movement appears to be
motivated by a desire to increase competition with
Moscow. It also reflects a general revival of China's
desire to pursue an independent line abroad, and in
selected areas-particularly in the Third World-to
refurbish Chinese ideological credentials. The Chi-
nese may flirt with Moscow's interest in party
dealings, but we do not expect them to reciprocate
soon.
9
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