THE OUTLOOK FOR SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R001001640005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 16, 1983
• Content Type: SNIE

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1
Director
Central ~ 2 5 X 1
Intelligence
The Outlook for Sudan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
Secret
SN/E 78-82
16 November 1983
~oPy 2 8 7
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
SNIE 78-82
THE OUTLOOK FOR SUDAN
Information available as of 10 November 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The fol%wing intelligence orgpnizations participated in the preparation of the
Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ v
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
Significance for the United States ..............................:...................................... 3
Maior Changes in 1983 ....................................................................................... 3
Problems in the South ......................................................................:................. 4
Domestic OPPosition .......................................................................................... 5
The Role of the Military .................................................................................... 5
ThP Frnnnmir 4itttatinn ...................................................................................
Outlook/Succession ............................................................................................. 7
INSTABILITY INDICATORS .................................................................................. 9
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SCOPE NOTE
The purpose of this Memorandum to Holders is to assess develop-
ments in Sudan this year and evaluate the threats to President Nimeiri's
continued rule over the next six months. Nimeiri's coming meeting with
President Reagan occurs at a time of serious political difficulty in
Sudan. Nimeiri has made controversial mayor changes in the political
landscape of Sudan this year, most notably the division of the Southern
Region into smaller .administrative units and the imposition of Islamic
law. Moreover, chronic problems, including Libyan-backed subversion,
shortages of consumer commodities, and low morale and coup plotting
in the Army, present continuing challenges for the regime.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
President Nimeiri has made a number of controversial decisions
this year that could generate a serious challenge to his position. Two
moves-the declaration of Islamic law and the division of southern
Sudan into three administrative regions-have been especially divisive.
Nimeiri now faces a broader array of serious problems than at any time
since he seized power in 1969.
The vigor with which Nimeiri attempts to implement Islamic law
and his actions in the coming months regarding southern Sudan will be
crucial in determining the future level of opposition to his government.
We believe that Nimeiri's strong personal and political motivation is
leading him to act without sufficient regard for the consequences of his
policies, and his ability to survive in office will be seriously threatened
if he continues on his current path.
Banned political parties and southern opposition groups are making
new attempts to organize national and southern fronts against the
regime. Personal, ethnic, religious, and ideological rivalries, however,
are likely to impede the effectiveness of such coalitions.
Libya and Ethiopia are continuing efforts to destabilize the
Nimeiri government. Realizing the ferment Nimeiri's actions have
caused in the south, they are encouraging southern dissidents based in
Ethiopia to launch larger and more f requent raids into southern Sudan.
The controversial measures imposed this year have added to
chronic disgruntlement in the armed forces over economic hardships
and old equipment. The recently discovered coup plot in the military
heightens concern over the loyalty of the armed forces. We consequent-
ly believe that many in the armed forces would not wholeheartedly
defend Nimeiri in the event of a coup attempt or popular uprising.
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Sudan's serious political and security problems are compounded by
chronic economic difficulties. The country is struggling with a serious
debt problem. Sudan will have to come to terms with the International
Monetary Fund not only fora 1984 standby but for the next several
years to avoid defaulting. The chances of implementing the structural
changes needed for long-term economic recovery are dim; in part
because Nimeiri has little interest in or understanding of economic
matters.
Nimeiri's sudden demise could lead to a serious political struggle
since there is no clearly acceptable successor on the scene. The President
is not grooming First Vice President Umar al-Tayyib as his heir
apparent, and he has retired many top officers in the Army over the
past few years, especially those who appeared politically ambitious or
who disagreed with his policies.
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DISCUSSION
Significance for the United States
1. Sudan, the largest country in Africa, occupies a
strategic position in the Middle East and the Horn of
Africa. In recent years the government of President
Gaafar Nimeiri has played an important role that
supports US efforts to prevent the further growth of
Libyan and Soviet influence in the region and to
protect US access to vital oil supply routes.
2. In March 1981, the Sudanese Government of-
fered to allow the United States the use of military
facilities in Sudan. The Sudanese this year formally
agreed to permit the United States to .pre-position
military equipment in Port Sudan for the US Central
Command. President Nimeiri also allowed US
AWACS to deploy to Khartoum International Airfield.
during the crisis in Chad this summer.
3. Nimeiri has been supportive of US political goals
in the area as well. He supported the Camp David
agreements and in September 1982 publicly endorsed
the US Middle East peace initiative. Sudan has wel-
comed private investment from the United States, and
American firms are deeply involved in exploration
and development in the petroleum sector.
populace that he is capable of providing effective
leadership for the country.
Major Changes in 1983
4. President Nimeiri has made a number of contro-
versial decisions this year that hold the potential for
generating a serious challenge to his position. The most
divisive changes have been the declaration of Islamic
law; the ending of the special status of southern Sudan
as a single, autonomous region; and the unsuccessful
attempt to move some southern troops to the north.
Each change has been welcomed by some segments of
Sudanese society. These moves, however, also were
opposed by many Sudanese, especially in the south,
and may spur them into antiregime activity. The vigor
with which Nimeiri tries to impose Islamic law and his
future actions toward the south will largely determine
how severe the backlash against his policies will be.
Nimeiri also must prove to an increasingly skeptical
6. Southern Sudanese-largely animist or Chris-
tian-have been the most vocal opponents of the
Islamic measures. The decrees have revived age-old
fears of domination and discrimination by the Muslim
north. Many southern leaders, including those who
had supported Nimeiri's earlier policies toward the
region, have privately criticized Islamization, and in
October several thousand southerners participated in
protest demonstrations in Juba against the new laws.
Many northeners who are not religious are also
alarmed, but no public manifestations of their concern
have yet been noted. Secular Sudanese probably in-
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clude a significant proportion of the armed forces
officer corps, the intelligentsia, at least the upper ranks
of the civil service, and the intelligence and security
agencies. Even "quiet" opposition by them would
further undermine Nimeiri's position.
7. The Governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt are
both concerned that Nimeiri's Islamization campaign
will create political problems for him. Both, however,
are committed to a moderate and sympathetic govern-
ment in Sudan. Egyptian leaders were upset that
Nimeiri did not consult with them before suddenly
imposing Islamic law, but their commitment to defend
Sudan against outside aggression remains strong.
8. There have been some hints of moderation from
the President regarding the Islamic laws, including a
public statement that the bans and harsh punishment
on alcohol consumption and adultery will not apply to
non-Muslims. Nonetheless, Nimeiri has emphasized in
recent speeches the prominent role Islam is to play in
Sudanese affairs. Highly visible measures such as the
installation of Islamic fudges in the south or the
creation of Islamic consultative bodies in the govern-
ment would aggravate the situation.
Problems in the South
9. Nimeiri's decision in June to divide the Southern
Region into three smaller regions was described by
him as part of a nationwide program to decentralize
authority and make the government more responsive.
The plan, however, was opposed by the Dinka, the
largest tribe in the south, who had controlled most
regional governments since the end of the civil war in
1972. Some smaller tribes favor the proposal as a way
to end Dinka domination and gain power in areas
where they form a maiority. Other non-Dinka have
viewed the maneuver as an attempt by Nimeiri to
"divide and rule" the south by taking advantage of
tribal tensions. Many southerners view division as a
breech of the Addis Ababa accords which gave special
status to the south. Problems in staffing and funding
the three new regional governments in the south also
have caused a number of former proponents of the
plan to question its viability.
dered system. Some reportedly have made contact
with southern dissident` movements. Any future moves
by Nimeiri that are seen as harming the area's interests
are likely to push more southerners into the opposition.
11. Southern Sudan has been plagued by a series of
violent incidents in 1983, and the security situation
there could well deteriorate over the next several
months. American personnel and property in the
region may be targeted for attack by southern dissi-
dent groups. Responsibility for individual raids in the
south is often difficult to determine. Much of the
violence, especially in the Upper Nile Region border-
ing Ethiopia, can be attributed to any of several
southern Sudanese dissident factions. At least some of
the incidents, on the other hand, are the result of the
tribal skirmishing or banditry that is common in the
south.
12. Since Nimeiri's decision to divide the south and
an attempt by the government to force some southern
troops to serve in the north, southern oppositionists
have attempted to organize against the regime. Disaf-
fected southern politicians, leaders of southern dissi-
dent factions, .and southern officers who deserted
when Khartoum tried to force troop rotation have
reportedly met in Ethiopia on a number of occasions.
Tribal and personal rivalries, however, are likely to
impede efforts to forge a broad and cohesive southern
opposition front. Nonetheless, some factions may al-
ready be coordinating their activities to a greater
extent than before. Rebel groups may also be gaining
new recruits because of the increased opposition to the
regime's recent policies.
13. Libya and Ethiopia are aware of the ferment
Nimeiri's recent actions have caused in the south, and
probably view the current situation as an excellent
opportunity to destabilize the Sudanese Government.
14. The Sudanese armed forces and police in the
10. Division of the south has driven a number of south are poorly prepared to handle any maior in-
southern politicians who had served in the former crease in dissident activity. Troop morale suffered due
regional government to opt out of the new, Berryman- to desertions after the attempted troop rotations earlier
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this year. Southern units also are handicapped by
equipment and fuel shortages even more severe than
those elsewhere in the country.
15. A sharp escalation of violence in the south in the
next several months could force the government to
send more northern units to the area. Such a move
would be risky, however, since southerners are ex-
tremely sensitive about the presence of Arab troops in
their region. Alarge-scale deployment of northerners
might be effective in securing maior towns or facili-
ties, but would cause still more southerners to loin
opposition ranks.
Domestic Opposition
16. None of Sudan's banned political parties is
strong enough individually to challenge Nimeiri seri-
ously. Since seizing power in 1969, Nimeiri has
watched closely parties on both the left and the right,
and has alternately suppressed them or sought
reconcilation.
17. The Ansar Muslim sect, with 5-6 million adher-
ents, is potentially the strongest opposition force.
Although its leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, was involved in
the 1976 coup attempt, subsequently he assumed a
lower profile and had become a "quiet critic" of the
regime. Sadiq's actions in the past year, however,
suggest he has been returning to a more active opposi-
tion role. In October 1982, he returned to Sudan from
self-imposed exile and began working to heal internal
splits within the movement. When Sadiq made public
statements highly critical of the government in Sep-
tember, he and his key advisers were imprisoned. The
failing of the Ansar leaders has left the sect organiza-
tionally adrift and may have lessened the threat of
action against the regime 'in the short term. If and
when Sadiq is released, however, he might intensify
his antigovernment activities.
18. Other outlawed opposition parties are in various
stages of disarray. Internal security services have kept
close watch on the leftist parties-the Sudanese Com-
munist Party and Sudanese Bath Party-and key
leaders of both are in jail. The National Unionist Party
has been floundering and consumed by internal squab-
bles since the death of its longtime leader in early
1982.
19. In recent months, some members of the Ansar,
Communist, Bath, and National Unionist Parties have
renewed efforts to reestablish a national front to
oppose Nimeiri.
these individuals may already be cooperating in a
coalition or coalitions known as the Sudanese Peoples'
Grouping or the Charter Group, which may have links
to Libya. A broad and cohesive national front could
pose a serious threat to Nimeiri, but the illegal parties
share few common goals besides Nimeiri's ouster and
probably will not be able to work together effectively.
20..Students in Sudan are often the first to react to
economic problems or unpopular actions by the gov-
ernment. Scattered student demonstrations took place
in late summer in reaction to the severe shortages of
food and fuel and the breakdown in public services.
Internal security services have moved quickly to con-
tain such protests. They are sure to react rapidly in the
future to prevent students from providing the spark
that ignites more massive demonstrations. However, if
a general uprising occurs we are uncertain that the
security services would be willing to suppress it.
21. Labor, cowed by the regime's crackdown on
striking railroad workers two years ago, has also
showed signs of renewed restiveness. Judges, lawyers,
university employees, and doctors have all gone on
strike, or threatened to, in 1983. The fob actions were
prompted by pay or parochial concerns in most cases,
but political grievances have also been raised. Leftist
parties have considerable influence in many unions
and would seek to exploit their grievances. If unrest
were to grow, some labor organizations with their
considerable membership might loin in to further their
own political goals.
The Role of the Military
22. The Sudanese armed forces reflect the diversity
.of the country's population, and many soldiers are
distressed over one or more recent developments in
Sudan. Because of the increased disgruntlement in the
military, we believe that many troops would not
wholeheartedly defend Nimeiri in the event of a coup
attempt. The arrest in September for plotting of
soldiers in the armored corps and the airborne bri-
gade-units with a countercoup mission-has caused
resentment in the armed forces to spread. Many
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military personnel believe that their colleagues were
arrested for nothing more than grumbling.
23. In the event of serious domestic unrest, Nimeiri
would rely on the Army to fulfill a critical internal
security role. For the most part, the armed forces are
professional and loyal to the chain of command, but
we are not certain of their reliability should such
unrest occur. The Army intervened in politics in 1958
and 1969, but in the last decade generally has re-
mained aloof.
24. Several divisive issues could further erode mili-
tary support for Nimeiri in the months ahead. The
armed forces appear split between those who favor the
forceful suppression of southern dissidents and those
who are concerned over taking any action that might
provoke another civil war. Some troops, especially at
the lower ranks, probably favor Nimeiri's Islamization
campaign, but others, particularly in the officer corps,
are no doubt disturbed by its potentially disruptive
impact on Sudanese affairs.
25. Even if there were no dissension in the ranks,
the armed forces' ability to contain external and
internal threats has been weakened by a number of
other factors. The military is under strength, and
equipment shortages and logistic problems have long
detracted from their capabilities. Recent unrest in the
south has forced Khartoum to move resources to that
region. Troops and equipment were already spread
thin and any new threats on the long border with
Ethiopia would compound the military's problems.
27. Sudan's external debt is approximately $9 bil-
lion-an amount exceeding one year's gross domestic
product. If Sudan were required to meet its existing
payments obligations, it would have to disburse close
to $1 billion yearly in principal and interest to credi-
tors, more than its entire export earnings. Previous
debt reschedulings in 1979 and 1982 were inadequate
because the full extent of the debt problem was not
correctly assessed.
28. Sudan is currently operating under a standby
agreement reached in February 1983 with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), and Sudanese compli-
ance with the terms has been acceptable to the Fund.
The negotiations in October fora 1984 standby stalled
when Sudanese negotiators were unwilling to accept
new IMF conditions. The IMF is seeking revenue
increases, expenditure cuts, slower monetary growth,
and a shift of export proceeds to the free market
exchange rate. In the months ahead, Sudan will come
under increased pressure from the IMF and maior
donors to privatize some inefficient government activ-
ities-especially petroleum importation and distribu-
tion and river transport.
29. Sudan will have to come to terms with the IMF
not only fora 1984 standby but for the next several
years to avoid defaulting. The chances of implement-
ing the structural changes needed for long-term eco-
nomic recovery are dim.
The: Economic Situation
26. Sudan's serious political and security problems
are compounded by chronic economic difficulties.
Because of insufficient funds, the government has
been unable to maintain basic public services or to
ensure adequate supplies of ~ consumer goods. The
country is struggling with a serious debt problem. The
real gross domestic product fell by 2 ,percent in the
fiscal year ending in June, but the performance of
some sectors of the economy has improved. The
government also made some progress controlling the
budget and current account deficits in the fiscal year
ending in June, and the real value of both deficits
declined. The inflation rate, however, rose to 41
percent.
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Outlook/Succession
33. Nimeiri's reputation as a political survivor is
legendary. He has faced many threats during his 14
years in power, including serious coup attempts in
1971 and 1976. In the past, when the going has gotten
tough Nimeiri has reacted vigorously. He has survived
through a combination of will, force, skilled negotia-
tions, and luck.
34. Nimeiri today faces a broader range of serious
problems than he has at any one time in the past. If he
cannot defuse the tensions now rending Sudanese
society-especially unrest in the south and unease in
many quarters over Islamic law-his position will be
seriously threatened. Nimeiri's task is all the more
difficult since concessions he might make to placate
one party in Sudan's diverse political mosaic would
probably agitate another. Backing off dramatically
from Islamization, for example, would probably thrust
the Islamic fundamentalists back into an active opposi-
tion role. The current ferment in Sudan, moreover,
raises the odds of an attempt to assassinate or over-
throw Nimeiri.
35. A number of possible developments in the next
six months would significantly increase the threat to
Nimeiri. Although there are factors that mitigate
against their ultimate success, there have been tenta-
tive indications of first steps toward:
- Meaningful cooperation between Ansar, Com-
munist, Ba'thist, and National Unionist Parties in
a national front.
- Broader coordination between southern insur-
gents, military deserters, and disaffected politi-
cians in a southern front.
- Serious coup plotting involving key units in the
capital area.
36. The most likely successors to Nimeiri remain
those discussed in SNIE 78-82, The Outlook for
Sudan. Under the Constitution, First Vice President
Umar al-Tayyib would become interim president.
Senior officers in the Army would be likely to play a
maior role in any future government.
37. Nimeiri's sudden demise, however, could lead
to a serious political struggle since there is no clear
successor on the scene. The President is not grooming
Tayyib as his heir apparent, and he has retired many
top officers in the Army over the past few years,
especially those who appeared politically ambitious or
who disagreed with his policies. The very qualities that
have permitted Tayyib and current military leaders to
retain positions of authority under Nimeiri-a lack of
both assertiveness and popularity-probably would
work against them if they gained power.
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INSTABILITY INDICATORS
-Increase in public protests in urban areas, partic-
ularly ' by student groups, directed against the
government.
- Indications of coup plotting among elements of
the military, particularly those units in the capi-
tal area charged with internal security.
-Consumer commodity shortages and govern-
ment-imposed austerity measures leading to pub-
lic unrest.
- Evidence of cooperation among key opposition
groups, ,such as the Ansars or the Muslim
Brotherhood.
- Growing labor unrest, especially in the critical
transportation sector.
-Increased acts of terrorism and sabotage inside
Sudan by Sudanese dissidents backed by Libya
and Ethiopia.
- Increase in north-south tensions and incidents in
the south that require the intervention of north-
ern troops.
- Increased concern by key Sudanese over Ni-
meiri's erratic behavior.
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