PROSPECTS FOR ANTI-US TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
.2L. E Central
Intelligence
Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders
NI JIM 84-10015
November 1984
`??y 356
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Information available as of 31 October 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 9
Developments of the Past 15 Months .............................................. 9
Events in 1983 and First Three Quarters of 1984 ..................... 9
Activities of Groups and Responses by Governments ................ 11
State Support for Terrorism ............................................................. 13
Anti-US Terrorist Threats in the Period Ahead ............................. 14
Middle East ................................................................................... 15
Western Europe ............................................................................ 16
Central America ............................................................................ 17
South America ............................................................................... 17
In the United States ...................................................................... 17
oi
SECRET
 This Memorandum to Holders is the second update of NI IIM 82-
10002, Prospects for Anti-US Terrorism, issued 26 March 1982. Last
year's update reviewed significant anti-US terrorist developments from
the time of the issuance of this Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
through the middle of 1983. In this second update we examine anti-US
terrorism through September 1984 and suggest what level and kind of
terrorism Americans are likely to experience in various regions of the
world over the next year or so.
In our discussion of anti-US terrorism within the United States, we
include only those incidents that involve acts against Americans under-
taken or sponsored by non-US citizens or entities.
Note. This Memorandum to Holders was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence
Council. It was coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
1
SECRET
 Two events in 1983-the suicide vehicle bombings of the US
Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut-caused more casualties (271
dead and 116 wounded) than the United States had suffered from
terrorists in the previous 15 years combined. However, the number of
significant terrorist attacks Americans abroad experienced last year
(about 75) was almost identical to the number that occurred in both
1982 and 1981.
As compared with 1983, the rate of significant terrorist attacks
against US targets has risen in 1984-to 64 incidents in the first nine
months-and geographic trends have changed. The most notable of
these 1984 attacks was the vehicle bombing of the US Embassy Annex
in East Beirut in September. The number of attacks rose fairly sharply
in the Middle East in 1983, and the rate climbed even further in the
first nine months of 1984. In Western Europe, however, the number of
attacks dropped in 1983 as compared with 1982, and it remained down
in the first three quarters of 1984. Changes have also taken place in
Central America, where the number of attacks against Americans has
dropped in the last 12 months, and in South America, where they have
increased. While US casualties worldwide so far in 1984 have been
lower than in 1983, American losses this year are higher than those
experienced in most prior years.
Activities of Groups and Responses by Governments
The increase in terrorism against US interests in the Middle East,
most of which occurred before the withdrawal of the US Marines from
Lebanon, was a predictable response by various opponents of US
Lebanon policy. This increase was facilitated by the breakdown of local
security in Beirut, the large number of Americans present until the
Multinational Force departed in March 1984, and the existence of a
number of Iranian-backed radical Shia groups committed to eliminating
US influence in Lebanon and driving out all Americans. Palestinian
groups have been active against other nationalities, but, with the major
exception of the Abu Nidal Group (also known as the Black June
Organization), a non-PLO organization largely controlled by Syria, they
did not attack US interests either in the Middle East or elsewhere.
3
SECRET
 The campaign against INF deployments did not take on the violent
orientation that we predicted in last year's Memorandum to Holders, a
circumstance that probably contributed to a lower number of terrorist
attacks against US personnel and property in Western Europe than we
had anticipated. In addition, West European governments have been
even more successful in countering terrorists than we had estimated
they would be.
In general, the terrorists in Western Europe most active against US
interests continue to be those small, autonomous organizations interested
primarily in scoring propaganda victories with homemade bombs. One
worrisome development, however, is that such hardcore, dedicated
terrorist groups as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, the
Red Brigades in Italy, and the Revolutionary Organization of 17
November in Greece (which killed CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in
1975) have shown new signs of life: the Red Brigades claimed credit for
assassinating an American official of an international organization in
February 1984; seven members of the RAF were recently arrested with
detailed casing reports of various NATO and US installations in their
possession; and the 17 November group attacked two US military
officials in the last year. The problem in Greece is particularly serious,
largely because the Greek Government, unlike virtually all other
governments in Western Europe, has shown little perseverance or skill
in countering international terrorism on its territory.
State Support for Terrorism
The roster of those governments that, directly or indirectly, use
terrorism as a foreign policy tool remains unchanged. Iran, Syria, and
Libya head the list. Iranian involvement with international terrorism is
of particular concern because it has risen dramatically in the last two
years. The most prominent Iranian-backed attacks against Americans
were the three vehicle bombing episodes in Beirut.
Syria almost certainly backed some terrorist attacks against Ameri-
cans while the US Marines were in Beirut. It also assisted and probably
instigated three or four bombing attacks by the Abu Nidal Group
against US diplomatic facilities in Amman, Jordan, in 1984. Libya's
terrorist activity surged in 1984, along with Qadhafi's rhetoric against
the United States. No Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans took
place in 1983-or so far in 1984-however, probably because Libyan
assets were generally employed in a wave of attacks against Libyan
dissidents abroad, and because Qadhafi may fear the US retaliation if
he goes after Americans. Tripoli did encourage non-Libyan groups to
attack US targets in Chad and Sudan, but none were successful.
4
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
The attitudes and activities of the USSR, the East European states,
Cuba, and Nicaragua with regard to revolutionary violence and terror-
ism have remained unchanged. That is, their governments continue to
provide regimes and groups that use terrorist tactics with funds,
weapons, supplies, and training. Their anti-American rhetoric also helps
stir sentiment against the United States, which helps create a fertile
environment for anti-US terrorism in such areas as the Middle East.
Anti-US Terrorist Threats in the Period Ahead
Looking at the prospects for anti-US terrorism over the next year,
as detailed in the paragraphs that follow, we conclude that the number
of attacks likely to be directed against Americans will remain at about
the same overall level as that experienced in 1981-83. Our confidence in
this judgment is not high, however, because terrorism trends are
difficult to forecast. There are a number of dangerous terrorist actors
intent on attacking US targets. Their success in doing so, however, will
depend on several currently unknowable future developments: changes
in the extent of US exposure and vulnerability, political developments
in regions with serious terrorist threats, changes in perceptions of US
policies, and ups and downs in local security practices.
Middle East. The most dangerous area for Americans is likely to
remain the Middle East because of the fanaticism, intensity of anti-
American feelings, and willingness of many of the terrorists to accept
high personal risk. The main such threat will continue to come from
Iranian-backed groups, such as the Hizballah in Lebanon and the Dawa
Party in the Persian Gulf. The United States will continue to be at
greatest risk in Lebanon, but its interests in the Persian Gulf face a grad-
ually growing danger from local Shias trained or inspired by Iran.
Syria will remain willing to use terrorist violence as a tool of state
policy, but we believe it will not encourage attacks on American targets
in Lebanon as long as leaders in Damascus believe Syria's national
interests are protected in whatever political arrangements evolve there.
Moreover, some evidence suggests Syria has imposed constraints on
Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon that would threaten Damascus's
ability to control events in that country. Syria, however, may direct its
surrogates to attack targets in Jordan, including US facilities, especially
after Amman's renewal of diplomatic relations with Egypt.
A potential threat against Americans from radical Palestinian
groups within the PLO continues to exist, but it may not be as high as
we have assumed in the past. The 1974 ban by the PLO against terrorist
attacks on non-Israeli targets generally is holding. The non-PLO 15 May
5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Organization, however, may pose a threat in the next year. Despite
Iraqi Government efforts to control its activities, it still has plans to
place bombs on commercial airliners flying to Israel. With respect to
Libya, we will probably continue to receive alarming reports about
Libyan intentions during the next year, but the main direct Libyan
terrorist threat is likely to remain focused on anti-Qadhafi exiles.
Tripoli's efforts to encourage anti-US attacks by non-Libyan groups,
however, remain a matter of concern.
Western Europe. The most frequently experienced terrorist threat
the United States will face over the next year in Western Europe will al-
most certainly continue to be the bombing of property for propaganda
purposes. We do not foresee, however, any significant rise in the
number of such attacks in the next year. US personnel are in danger
from occasional armed attacks by such hardcore groups as the Lebanese
Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) in France, the 17 November
group in Greece, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the RAF in West
Germany, These groups, however, seem to be capable of only a few at-
tacks each year, and the RAF is under enough government pressure that
it may not be able to regroup until early next year. We expect that
strong government efforts to suppress terrorism will continue in most of
Western Europe, with the notable exception of Greece.
Latin America. A sharp rise in the level of terrorism against US in-
terests in Central America is not likely to occur, because most guerrilla
groups are concentrating their resources on insurgency, and local
security forces are developing increasing competence. Nonetheless, the
situations in Honduras and El Salvador bear watching. There are a large
number of official Americans in Honduras who make tempting targets.
In addition, some dissident guerrilla factions in El Salvador may turn to
urban terrorism in an effort to undermine recently announced guerrilla-
government talks.
In South America, terrorist attacks against US targets could
increase in the next year, particularly in Colombia and Peru. In those
countries, narcotics traffickers are incensed at US efforts to persuade the
government to crack down on drug activities, and local terrorists/insur-
gents increasingly are targeting US installations.
In the United States. The number of successful foreign terrorist
attacks in the United States remains relatively low compared with those
in other regions of the world, and we see little reason for it to rise over
the next year or so. Nonetheless, the United States continues to be
vulnerable to terrorist operations because of its porous borders and open
society. Potential terrorist support networks are in place, and a number
of groups have the motivation to commit terrorist acts here, either
6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
because they intensely oppose US foreign policy or hate particular
ethnic groups resident in the United States.
Of greatest concern are the large number of Iranian students,
particularly those who are members of the Islamic Society, a student
group with chapters throughout the country that could provide the
infrastructure for terrorist acts. Libyan students are also present in the
United States in large numbers and, under the right circumstances,
could represent a terrorist threat. Both Iran and Libya are more likely
to attack the United States abroad rather than here because attacks
elsewhere probably are easier. But developments in the Middle East,
such as a perception by Qadhafi that the existence of his regime was
threatened by the United States, could cause a change in this
calculation.
With regard to separatist/irredentist ethnic groups, the major
Armenian terrorist groups-the Armenian Secret Army for the Libera-
tion of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG)-present the greatest danger. The threat from
ASALA is diminished, however, because its ranks are fragmented, and
the JCAG so far has attacked only Turkish interests.
7
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Developments of the Post 15 Months
Events in 1983 and First Three Quarters of 1984
1. The most dramatic contrast between terrorism in
1983 and that in all previous years is the number of
terrorist-caused casualties sustained by Americans last
year. By yearend, 271 US citizens had been killed and
116 wounded, figures vastly exceeding the combined
totals for the previous 15 years. All but 15 of these
1983 victims (four killed, 11 wounded) were caused by
two vehicle bombs set off in Beirut, Lebanon-the 18
April attack on the US Embassy and the 23 October
assault on the Marine barracks. Both suicide attacks
were carried out almost certainly by radical Lebanese
Shias, operating with Iranian support and encourage-
ment from Syrian-controlled territory.
2. Except for these two suicide attacks, however,
the kind and number of significant' terrorist attacks
worldwide against Americans in 1983 were very simi-
lar to what was experienced in the two preceding
years. There were about 75 significant attacks against
US citizens or their property last year, a number
almost identical to those in 1981 and 1982. In each of
these years, as indicated in table 1, there have been a
small number of assassination attempts (usually fewer
than 10), a small number of kidnapings (again, under
10), and a relatively large number of incendiary or
explosive bombing attacks.
3. The rate at which terrorist attacks against Ameri-
cans are now occurring is up in the first nine months
of 1984 as compared with recent years, as we indicat-
ed might happen in last year's Memorandum. In this
period, there have been 64 attacks against Americans,
including five assassination attempts and 10 kidnaping
incidents. Armed attacks are running double the num-
ber experienced in 1983, while significant bombings
are happening at about the same rate. Ten Americans
The category "significant" includes all attacks that cause-or
were clearly intended to cause-casualties, plus hijackings, kidnap-
ings, barricade situations when hostages are taken, major sabotage,
terrorist robberies, and explosive and incendiary bombings that
could cause $10,000 worth of damage or more. Excluded are threats
and hoaxes, minor bombings and vandalism, and conspiracies to
commit an attack
The statistics used for the years 1981-83 in this
Memorandum to Holders differ substantially from
those used for these years in last year's Memorandum,
although the changes do not seriously affect the trends
reported there. All of the modifications stem from
revised coding procedures for deciding whether a ter-
rorist incident is significant. The overall effect of the
changes is to lower the number of events in 1981, 1982,
and 1983 that are considered "significant." The changes
are as follows:
-Last year we included in the count of "signifi-
cant" bombings (damage of $10,000 or more) those
for which there was damage but the monetary loss
was unknown. Those have now been removed
from the count in the belief that, if the amount of
damage is unknown, it is more likely to have been
minor rather than major. This causes about a 40-
percent drop in significant incidents for 1981 and
1982, and a much smaller drop in 1983 when the
new coding criteria went into effect.
- We have also dropped from each year skyjackings
that were clearly criminal acts of extortion, the
work of mentally deranged persons, or attempts to
find rapid transportation across national bound-
aries that would otherwise be closed. Eliminating
such events with no larger political purpose cuts
sharply the number of terrorist skyjackings for
each of the three past years.
- We have added to the count of significant terrorist
acts for each year barricade incidents when hos-
tages were taken, large-scale sabotage when car-
ried out by a terrorist group, and major thefts (for
example, of weapons) by terrorist groups. This
change added very few events.
- We have added to the count for the first half of
1984 a few unsuccessful bombings or armed
attacks that were clearly intended to cause casual-
ties. We cannot add them to the count for earlier
years, because this intent variable was not previ-
ously coded.
9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Table 1
Significant Anti-US Terrorist
Incidents, 1981-84: Major Types
1981 1982 1983 Jan-Sep 1984
Armed attacks 16 9 10 16
8 1 1
40 54 48
Assassination attempts (also 15
included in armed attacks
and bombings above)
a See inset on page 9 for explanation of differences from last year's
categories.
n Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate.
Intended to cause casualties or resulting in damage worth $10,000
or more.
have been killed by terrorists in the first nine months Table 2
this year, and 27 have been wounded.2 Significant Anti-US Terrorist
4. One recent shift of interest in the geographic Incidents, 1981-84: Selected Locales
pattern of terrorism against Americans is a rise in
significant attacks in the Middle East and a drop in Number of Incidents
Western Europe. (See table 2.) In the Middle East
significant attacks jumped from four in 1982 to 14 in
1983, and 13 have already occurred in the first nine
months of 1984. This region also remains the most
lethal for Americans-75 percent of US casualties in
1984 have occurred there. In Western Europe, how-
ever, significant attacks-most of which were propa-
ganda-style bombings intended to cause major proper-
1981
1982
1983
Jan-Sep 1984
10
24
11
2
2
7
2
2
2
4
2
1
3
4
6
1
4
2
1
3
1
2
3
9
10
2
3
3
3
5-
--
1
9
3
2
8
4
1
1
3
1
12
12
9
2
5
2
6
West Germany
Italy
Greece
France
Turkey
Spain
ty damage but not cause injury-declined from 43 in Lebanon
1982 to 26 in 1983, about the same number as in 1981. Jordan
The rate dropped even further in 1984, with only Kuwait
seven such attacks recorded in the first nine months.
Changes in the amount of terrorism against Americans Honduras
have also taken place in Central America, where the El Salvador
Guatemala
number of attacks declined in the last 12 months, and
in South America, where they have increased, espe- Colombia
cially against US private-sector facilities and persons. Peru
(See table 3.) Chile
the Middle East, have risen even more sharply. The French have a Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate.
suffered 69 significant attacks in the first three quarters of 1984, as
compared with only 24 in all of 1983. This table is Confidential.
10
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Table 3
Types of US Targets Attacked,
January-September 1984
Total
US
Official
US
Military
Private
Corporation
P
C
rivate
itizen
Europe
7
4
2
1
Middle East
Central America
13
5
5
1
3
1
1
4
South America
25
7
Africa
Asia
Activities of Groups and Responses
by Governments
5. Increased terrorism against US interests in the
Middle East was a predictable response by various
opponents of US policy in Lebanon and on the Arab-
Israeli dispute. The increase was facilitated by the
nearly total breakdown of local security in Beirut, the
large number of Americans present in the Multination-
al Force (MNF) until March 1984, and the existence of
a number of Iranian-backed terrorist groups trying to
eliminate US influence in Lebanon and drive out all
Americans. We believe radical Shia groups have been
responsible for nearly all anti-US violence in Lebanon
in 1983 and 1984. Iran has inspired and in some cases
directed these groups, and Syria probably provided
them with some support until the withdrawal of the
MNF in March 1984. Continuing Syrian acquiescence
in the presence of members of the Iranian Revolution-
ary Guard in Lebanon after that date has allowed
additional attacks to occur, including the vehicle
bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut in
September 1984. Several reports of varying reliability
have suggested that radical Palestinian groups may be
surveilling US facilities and persons, but to our knowl-
edge only the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group (also
known as the Black June Organization) has conducted
significant anti-US attacks in 1983-84. This group set
off or attempted to set off three or four bombs near US
facilities in Jordan between November 1983 and Au-
gust 1984.
6. The apparent main reasons for the drop in
terrorist activity against Americans in Western Eu-
rope have been:
- The failure of the campaign against INF deploy-
ments to take on the scope or violent orientation
that might have encouraged terrorists and pro-
vided them with an environment more condu-
cive to their activity.
- The continued success of several West European
governments in arresting terrorists and suppress-
ing their activity.
7. In 1983, as in the year before, the most active
terrorists in Western Europe, including those who
attacked US interests, were mainly members of small,
autonomous organizations who were interested mostly
in scoring quick propaganda victories with homemade
bombs. (See table 4.) These groups were less active
than in 1982, however, primarily because West Euro-
pean governments were more successful in combating
them than we had anticipated in writing last year's
Memorandum to Holders. Particularly in West Ger-
many and Italy, the governments surrounded anti-INF
demonstrations with high levels of security. which
prevented terrorists from taking advantage of them. In
addition, these governments used information gleaned
from earlier arrests and from their increasing under-
standing of the ways terrorists operate to make new
arrests and to disrupt, at least temporarily, efforts by
terrorist groups to recover from previous counterter-
rorist successes. The Spanish, French, Austrian, and
Turkish Governments also scored individual counter-
terrorist successes. Moreover, cooperation increased
among a number of West European governments
against cross-border activity or the use of another
country's territory for safehaven.
8. Despite the overall success of government coun-
terterrorist programs, one potentially worrisome devel-
opment in Western Europe is the fact that such
hardcore, dedicated terrorist groups as the Red Army
Faction (RAF) in West Germany and the Red Brigades
11
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
Table 4
Significant Anti-US Terrorist
Incidents: Selected Groups a
Red Army Faction (RAF) 2 2
RAF Sympathizers 2 3
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) 8
Indeterminate Leftists
Popular Revolutionary 1
Struggle (ELA)
17 November Organization
Italy
Red Brigades 1 1
France
Lebanese Armed Revolu- 1
tionary Faction (LARF)
Spain
Islamic Jihad Organization
Other Radical Shias
Abu Nidal Group (formerly
Black June Organization)
Farabundo Marti National 1
Liberation Front (FMLN),
Popular Liberation Forces
(FPL)
Other Member Groups 3
Army of National Liberation 6 4
(ELN)
Movement of April 19th 1 1
(M-19)
Revolutionary Armed Forces 2 8
of Colombia (FARO)
Peru
Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path)
a Responsibility for terrorist incidents has been attributed on the basis of credible
claims or other available evidence.
n Because data may not be complete, all numbers are approximate.
12
SECRET
 SECRET
in Ital have shown new signs of life, as we predicted
last year. In February 1984, for example, Leamon R.
Hunt, the American civilian head of the Sinai Multina-
tional Force and Observers, was assassinated in Rome
by a wing of the Red Brigades. Although massive
arrests and seizures of weapons and equipment by the
Italian authorities in 1982 and 1983 clearly have
diminished the size and capabilities of this group, this
assassination, Rome's failure thus far to find key
figures involved in this attack, and other reporting on
its efforts to reorganize indicate that the Red Brigades
group remains a force to be reckoned with. The
murder of Hunt and an examination of captured
internal Red Brigades documents also show that the
group intends to continue to pursue "international"
targets, such as NATO installations, even though its
main focus probably remains on attacking domestic
political and economic targets.
9. The RAF in West Germany has also demonstrat-
ed strong recuperative powers. Recent arrests of seven
RAF members, three of whom had not been so
identified previously, and the discovery that they
possessed detailed plans and casing reports of various
NATO and US military installations indicate that the
group is still active and extremely dangerous. Even
though the RAF probably has fewer than two dozen
members, the bombings and assassinations they
planned would not have required a large number of
participants.
10. The West European government that has shown
the least zeal in combating terrorism directed at
foreigners is that of Greece. Partly for this reason, that
country has continued to serve as a haven and an
operating ground for foreign-based terrorists. Under
the Papandreou government, sympathy for leftist
causes, tolerance of leftist extremists, and strident anti-
American rhetoric also have created an inviting envi-
ronment for attacks on Americans by Greek terrorists.
The most alarming of such attacks were two assaults
by the Revolutionary Organization of 17 November
group, the organization that assassinated CIA Station
Chief Richard Welch in 1975 but which had not
attacked Americans since then. The 17 November
organization killed a US Navy captain in November
1983, seriously wounded a US Army sergeant in April
1984, and has pledged to continue its attacks in
opposition to the US presence in Greece.
11. Terrorism against Americans in Central Ameri-
ca was at a low ebb in 1983 and has remained low so
far in 1984, despite reports that various insurgent
groups continue to plot anti-US acts. We believe this is
primarily because the guerrillas in El Salvador have
continued to focus on domestic targets, rather than
undertaking a terrorist campaign against US interests
as we had thought they might. In addition, local
security services in all Central American countries
have scored a number of successes against insurgents,
thereby diminishing local terrorist capabilities- In
Honduras, where the American presence is the largest
in the area because of US military training activities,
the security services have demonstrated particular
competence, especially against the main potential
terrorist threats there, the Cinchoneros and the Popu-
lar Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR-LZ),
12. In South America, terrorism against Americans
rose, taking the form primarily of kidnapings and
bombings in Colombia and small bombings early this
year in Chile. The main perpetrators in Colombia
have been several guerrilla groups, especially the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
the Army of National Liberation (ELN), which regu-
larly use terrorist tactics. In recent months, the Colom-
bian Government has succeeded in negotiating cease-
fire agreements with most of the groups, with the
notable exception of the ELN. This has not yet
dampened the terrorist threat to Americans and oth-
ers, however, because some of the bombings have been
carried out by a dissident faction of the FARC as an
internal protest against the willingness of the main
part of FARC to suspend guerrilla operations. The
bombings in Chile are part of a wave of terrorist
violence by several groups of leftist revolutionaries,
including a new faction directed by the Communist
Party. The Chilean Government has reacted by adopt-
ing a number of stringent antiterrorist measures. Some
anti-US terrorism has also occurred in Peru by narcot-
ics traffickers against American-sponsored drug eradi-
cation programs and by the newly formed terrorist
group, Tupac Amaru.
State Support for Terrorism
13. The roster of those governments that, directly or
indirectly, support or use terrorism as a foreign policy
tool remains unchanged. Iran, Syria, and Libya head
the list, as they did last year. Iranian involvement with
international terrorism is particularly worrisome, be-
cause it has risen dramatically in the last two years.
Iranian operatives have gained considerable experi-
ence in organizing support elements and in planning
and carrying out terrorist operations in foreign coun-
tries, particularly in the Middle East and Western
Europe. In many cases, Iran uses Revolutionary Guard
members to support foreign terrorist surrogates acting
on Iran's behalf. The Department of Investigations
13
SECRET
 and Studies of the Foreign Ministry also provides
support and sometimes controls terrorist operations
directly. In addition to broad Iranian Government
involvement in radical Shia terrorism in Lebanon,
Iranian embassies in Paris, Vienna, Damascus, and
Kuwait and the consulate in Karachi at one time or
another have been important centers for support of
terrorist activities. In addition to attacks against US
targets, Israeli, Lebanese, Iraqi, moderate Arab, and
French interests have also been attacked in Lebanon,
Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Western Europe by radical
Shias under the direction of the Iranians. We have
good information indicating that Iranian Government
agents recruit widely in Muslim communities through
indigenous Shia organizations and Islamic cultural
centers, sending the recruits to Iran for politico-
religious indoctrination, basic military training, and,
for a carefully screened group, specialized guerrilla
and terrorist training. Training of foreign recruits is
conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and is
funded partly out of both Ayatollah Khomeini's office
and that of his heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri.
14. Syria actively supported terrorist attacks against
the United States in Lebanon during 1983 and the
early part of 1984 until US Marines withdrew. In
addition to suspected involvement in the attack against
the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, there is
evidence that Syria cooperated with Iranian-backed
terrorists who attacked US targets in Lebanon before
and after the October 1983 bombing of the US Marine
barracks. In Jordan the Syrian Government instigated
and assisted the bombing attacks by the non-PLO Abu
Nidal Group against the home of a US official in
Amman in November 1983 and the Intercontinental
Hotel there in March 1984, in which two Americans
were wounded in what may have been an anti-British
attack. Besides their use of the Abu Nidal Group, the
Syrians have employed or are in a position to employ a
number of other groups for terrorist attacks on their
enemies, including four elements of the PLO: Saiqa,
the Fatah rebels, the Palestinian Struggle Front, and
the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command). Only Saiqa may have
attacked US interests in this period by bombing an
unoccupied classroom at American University in Bei-
rut, but all the groups have some capability to do so,
some of them (such as the PFLP-GC) in countries
outside the Middle East.
15. Libya's terrorist activity surged in 1984, but so
far no attacks attributable to Tripoli have occurred
against US targets. Libyan terrorism has focused pri-
marily on anti-Qadhafi exiles residing in Western
Europe and the Middle East and, secondarily, against
France and other nations opposing Libya in Chad and
Sudan. We believe Americans have not been targeted
directly by Qadhafi, despite his strident anti-American
rhetoric, because his assets seem generally involved in
the antidissident campaign, and because he may fear
the US response should such attacks occur. Neverthe-
less, reports indicate that Libya has directed its surro-
gates in Chad and Sudan to attack US targets, so far
unsuccessfully. Libya's ties with these and other ter-
rorist groups, such as the PFLP-GC, place official US
personnel and facilities located in Western Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa at some risk, however, partic-
ularly if Qadhafi becomes convinced that US support
for his opponents is threatening the existence of his
regime.
16. Soviet, East European, Cuban, and Nicaraguan
attitudes and activities with regard to revolutionary
violence and terrorism remain unchanged. They con-
tinue to provide governments and organizations that
use terrorist tactics with funds, weapons, supplies, and
training. Bulgarian gray-market sales of weapons that
end up in terrorist hands are particularly noteworthy
in this regard. The anti-American rhetoric of these
governments also helps stir sentiment against the
United States, which helps create a fertile environ-
ment for anti-US terrorism in such areas as the Middle
East. In the case of Cuba, besides its support for groups
that conduct terrorism in Central America, it is also
stimulating such groups in South America. Cuban
pressure, for example, was probably the deciding
factor that led leaders of the Chilean Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) recently to decide to reiniti-
ate armed activities in Chile. The MIR was one of the
most active terrorist groups in Chile in the past. Cuba
may also be backing the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front, a shadowy group that has claimed responsibility
for numerous recent bombings in Santiago. Cuban
officials have also been implicated in facilitating the
efforts of the Colombian FARC to sell narcotics for
money with which they purchase weapons and in
helping to move those weapons to Colombia.
Anti-US Terrorist Threats in the Period Ahead
17. Looking at the prospects for anti-US terrorism
over the next year, as detailed in the sections that
follow, we conclude that the number of attacks likely
to be directed against Americans will remain at about
the same overall level as that experienced in 1981-83,
although our confidence in this judgment is not high
because terrorism trends are extremely difficult to
14
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
predict. Three analytical problems greatly complicate
forecasting on this subject:
- Terrorism is in part a reactive phenomenon. That
is, surges in the level of terrorist effort against the
United States in any area are often closely related
to terrorists' perceptions that the United States
has taken policy initiatives they consider inimical
to their cause or has taken an action, such as the
deployment of US forces, that gives them an
unusual opportunity for publicity or an expand-
ed US target to attack.
- There is a large element of luck involved as to
whether a government counterterrorist program
can prevent any particular terrorist act. Terrorist
groups are usually small, have very limited capa-
bilities, and can be drastically affected by a
single government counterterrorist success. More-
over, the limited resources of terrorists may
become absorbed in attacking the interests of
some states other than the United States, as has
happened to the French in the Middle East. In
this regard, it is worth noting that there are no
terrorist groups (with the possible exception of
the LARF in France) that conduct the majority
of their attacks against Americans. Nonetheless,
it takes only a few dedicated people and a small
amount of explosives or arms to mount a poten-
tially high-impact attack.
- The number of casualties that any particular
terrorist attack may cause also is subject to a
large element of chance. Because perceptions of
how significant the terrorist threat is at any
moment frequently turn on the number of dead
and wounded caused by a single attack rather
than the trend in number and frequency of
attacks, this also complicates forecasting.
18. These caveats notwithstanding, we estimate that
the most dangerous area for Americans over the next
year, with regard to the deadliness of terrorist attacks,
will remain the Middle East. This judgment is based
on the intense anti-American sentiments there, the
fanaticism, and the willingness of many Middle East-
ern terrorists to accept high personal risk, including
participation in suicide attacks. Moreover, the increas-
ing spillover of Middle East terrorism into Western
Europe and Africa could pose an expanded threat to
the lives of Americans in these regions as well.
19. The number of attacks against US interests in
Western Europe has declined since 1982, and we
doubt that a sharp increase will occur in the next year.
We believe, however, that some of the more deadly
terrorist groups there will continue to mount occasion-
al assassination attempts and lethal bombings against
Americans in several of these countries. We are also
concerned that some members of the radical fringe of
the peace movement may turn to terrorist violence in
frustration as INF deployments advance.
20. In our estimation, terrorism against the United
States in Central America is likely to remain at a fairly
low level, at least through the end of 1984. We believe
the revolutionaries there will concentrate their re-
sources mostly on insurgency against domestic targets,
and their primary foreign backers-Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and Nicaragua-may not want to risk precipi-
tating greater US intervention in the area.
21. The number of terrorist attacks against US
targets in South America is likely to remain at a high
level, especially in Colombia, and could even grow in
the next year. The level of political volatility is
increasing in such countries as Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
and Bolivia, and American interests might be struck
more frequently as part of a general rise in violence.
Generally, these attacks probably will continue to be
nonlethal bombings of property, particularly the
premises of US businesses.
22. Americans will occasionally be the targets or,
perhaps more often, incidental victims of terrorist
violence in Africa and South Asia. Direct attacks on
US personnel, property, and interests will be less
frequent there than in other regions, but we believe
the threat to Americans in southern Africa, Sudan, and
Sri Lanka is increasing as domestic violence in these
areas grows.
Middle East
23. The main threat to US persons and facilities will
continue to come from Iranian-sponsored groups, such
as the Islamic Amal in Lebanon and the Dawa Party, a
group with members in several Middle East nations.
The Iraqi Dawa Party, which was responsible for the
bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait in December
1983, and the Hizballah in Lebanon, which almost
certainly carried out the September bombing of the
US Embassy Annex in East Beirut, are especially
dangerous. The United States will remain at greatest
risk in Lebanon, but its interests in the Persian Gulf
face a gradually rising danger from local Shias trained
or inspired by Tehran, as long as radicals remain
influential in Iran. The threat to US facilities in several
Persian Gulf nations may become especially intense if
Iraq carries out major attacks on Iran's oil facilities or
cities. More generally, Iranian hostility toward the
15
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
United States will persist as long as Tehran sees its goal
of installing Islamic governments throughout the Mus-
lim world impeded primarily by the influence and
presence of the United States.
24. Syrian Government motivation to encourage or
sponsor terrorist attacks against US interests in Leba-
non dropped when the US contingent of the Multina-
tional Force was withdrawn from Lebanon in March
1984 and the 17 May accord between Israel and
Lebanon was abrogated. For example, of the 24
significant attacks against US interests in Lebanon in
the 33-month period between January 1982 and Sep-
tember 1984, 17 occurred during the eight months the
US Marine force was in the country. Syria remains
willing to use terrorist violence as a tool of state policy,
but we believe it will not encourage attacks on Ameri-
can targets in Lebanon as long as leaders in Damascus
believe Syrian national interests are protected in what-
ever political arrangements evolve in that country.
Moreover, some evidence suggests Syria has imposed
some constraints on Iranian-backed terrorism in Leba-
non that threatens Damascus's ability to control events
there. We are concerned, however, that Syria will
continue to direct its surrogates to attack targets in
Jordan, including US facilities, especially after Am-
man's sudden renewal of diplomatic relations with
Egypt. A factor that may weaken Syria's terrorist
capability in Jordan is the splintering of its major
surrogate, the Abu Nidal Group, due to the incapaci-
tating illness or death of its leader. We believe,
however, that at least part of the group will continue
to operate at the behest of Syrian intelligence and that
such other groups as Saiqa or the PFLP-GC are
potentially available to pick up the slack.
25. Radical groups within the Palestine Liberation
Organization, such as Saiqa and the PFLP, generally
continue to observe the 1974 PLO ban on terrorism
outside Israel and the occupied territories. In the past,
we believed that Chairman Arafat might lift this ban
if necessary to retain control of the PLO. This did not
happen in 1983 when his control was severely chal-
lenged, however, and this issue may be less relevant to
the leadership struggle than we once thought. We
therefore judge the probability of PLO terrorism
against the United States to be low in the short term,
but the leadership struggle is not yet over. Some
reporting indicates more breakaway factions may be
plotting a return to international terrorism, including
attacks on US targets. Most of the energies of these
groups, however, will probably continue to be ab-
sorbed over the next year by their internecine struggle
for influence within the PLO, and in increasing
attacks against their primary enemy, Israel. Outside
the PLO, the 15 May Organization may pose some
danger to US interests. In December 1983 and again in
early 1984, it tried unsuccessfully to place suitcase
bombs on airlines serving Israel, and it continues to
pose a threat to international aviation, as well as to
Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide.
26. We will probably continue to receive alarming
reports about Libyan intentions to attack US targets
especially diplomats and diplomatic facilities-during
the next year, but it is much more likely that the main
direct Libyan terrorist threat will continue to be
against anti-Qadhafi dissidents and Libya's immediate
opponents in Africa and the Middle East. Qadhafi
continues to dispatch agents to assassinate dissident
Libyans, particularly in Western Europe. Attacks may
also be attempted on dissidents in the United States,
although the more lax security conditions in countries
such as Greece probably are more conducive to Qa-
dhafi's assassination attempts. Tripoli's efforts to en-
courage anti-US attacks by non-Libyan groups, al-
though unsuccessful up to now, also remain of
concern.
Western Europe
27. US interests face two kinds of terrorist threats in
Western Europe over the next year. The most fre-
quent type of attack almost certainly will continue to
be bombings of property for propaganda purposes
with no apparent intent to harm persons. At this point,
we do not forecast any significant rise in the number
of such terrorist incidents, because we do not antici-
pate any sharp change in the perceptions of radical
leftists in Western Europe of their political situation,
or of US or Allied policies. Without such a change we
doubt that anti-US terrorist attacks of this kind will
rise substantially or suddenly. With such a change,
they are almost certain to increase, although the
counterterrorist capabilities of most West European
governments are improving steadily enough possibly to
prevent attacks of this kind from reaching the propor-
tions they did in 1982.
28. The other kind of terrorist threat is the more
carefully planned, sophisticated attack that is intended
to be lethal, of the kind mounted in the past by the
RAF in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) in
France, and the 17 November group in Greece. We
believe recent government successes against the RAF
will keep it off balance for the next several months;
however, the extent of its current ability to reorganize
is unknown and the group may still be capable of
16
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
mounting isolated, although spectacular, operations
against US targets. Clearly, both the RAF and the Red
Brigades have indicated they fully intend to include
US and NATO targets in future operations, and there
is no reason to think their targeting will change.
Nonetheless, both the West German and Italian Gov-
ernments have demonstrated in the last two years good
capabilities against these two groups, so there is at least
some possibility that they will be able to interrupt any
new attempts.
29. The LARF and 17 November represent consid-
erably more immediate threats. French security offi-
cials know very little about the membership or goals of
LARF and have had little success in countering it.
LARF claimed credit for the attempted assassination
of the US Consul General in Strasbourg in March, and
it is responsible for three other attempted or successful
assassinations of US officials in 1981 and 1982. There
is a strong possibility that it will try again in the next
12 months. The 17 November Organization is also
likely to continue to attack Americans, as it pledged to
do in a recent communique. No arrests have been
made in connection with its previous attacks, and
there are no indications that the Greek Government is
making any progress in its investigation of this group.
In Turkey the recent increase in terrorist attacks
against local targets suggests that the threat to Ameri-
cans-particularly US military-may also grow there
in the period ahead.
30. Even though the current level of terrorism
against Americans in this region is quite low and
probably will not rise substantially, the situations in
Honduras and El Salvador bear watching. The threat
in Honduras is magnified by the large US presence
there and the consequent large number of targets
available. So far, Honduran security forces have done
a good job of suppressing the two main Honduran
groups that have terrorist inclinations, and we see no
signs the guerrillas are developing the capability for
major actions. Nonetheless, we expect that Cuba and
Nicaragua will continue to support various insurgent
groups in Central America and will continue to en-
courage them to undertake violent activity. In El
Salvador the threat comes from both the extreme left
and the extreme right. It is possible that some guerrilla
factions that oppose the recently announced negotia-
tions with the Duarte administration might, in the
near future, resort to sporadic urban terrorism in an
effort to undermine those talks. A greater risk of a
serious rise in terrorism, however, would be created by
a more widespread guerrilla decision to turn to urban
terrorism in the event that the negotiations break
down and the guerrillas see themselves as unable to
regain the initiative in the countryside. This kind of
development, however, is unlikely to occur before the
opening months of 1985 at the earliest. The extreme
right might also resort to terrorist tactics in an effort to
undermine US support for the Duarte administration,
particularly if government negotiations with the guer-
rillas seem to be succeeding.
31. Over the next 12 months or so. US interests in
South America will face their greatest threat in Co-
lombia-primarily from those dissident guerrilla fac-
tions that oppose their groups' participation in peace
negotiations with the government and from narcotics
traffickers who are incensed at US efforts to persuade
the Colombian Government to crack down on their
activities. This latter danger also exists in Peru, The
level of domestic violence in Chile, Ecuador, and
Bolivia may also rise, but the direct threat to US
interests will probably remain fairly loc. Terrorist
groups there show little inclination to expand their
attacks on US targets beyond infrequent harassment
bombings that are directed against businesses or diplo-
matic facilities and which cause only minor damage.
US personnel, however, may be in increasing danger
of finding themselves in the wrong place at the wrong
time, thereby becoming incidental victims of terrorist
violence.
In the United States
32. The number of successful foreign terrorist at-
tacks in the United States remains relatively low
compared with those in other regions of the world, and
we see little reason for it to rise over the next year or
so. In part, this is due to significant investigative and
prosecutive successes by US security organizations in
the last two years. The incarceration of the key leaders
of several groups and tight security at such events as
the Los Angeles Olympics have contributed to a
situation in which there was only one attack in the
United States by an international terrorist group in
1983-against a foreign national-and none thus far in
1984. Nonetheless, the potential for terrorist violence
in the United States should not be underestimated.
Because of its size, porous borders, open society, and
widespread involvement in global political matters,
the United States remains vulnerable to terrorist oper-
ations. Potential terrorist support networks are in
place, and certain groups have the motivation to
17
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
SECRET
commit terrorist acts here-either because they op-
pose US foreign policy or because they hate particular
ethnic groups resident in the United States.
33. The international groups and individuals most
likely to initiate terrorist attacks in this country are
those with strong ties to major state supporters of
terrorism-especially Iran and Libya-and those
separatist/irredentist groups with large ethnic groups
resident in the United States-primarily the Arme-
nians, Palestinians, and Cubans. Of those groups asso-
ciated with states that use terrorist tactics, Iranians are
present in the United States in considerable numbers,
often in student status, and pose the greatest potential
threat. While their past activities have been largely
restricted to internecine conflicts between pro- and
anti-Khomeini factions, we have some concern that an
Iranian terrorist threat could develop under the right
circumstances. The Islamic Society, a student group
with chapters throughout the country, provides an
infrastructure that could be used in terrorist acts if
Iranian leaders so chose. To date, Iran has elected to
attack the United States in other areas of the world,
and we believe that will continue to be Tehran's
preference because anti-US attacks elsewhere are
probably easier. Nevertheless, future events in the
Middle East could change these calculations.
34. Libyans are also present in the United States in
large numbers and, as with the Iranians, often as
students. Libya has no embassy here from which to
coordinate terrorist activity, but it does maintain a
student committee in McLean, Virginia, that appears
to monitor and direct the Libyan student population in
this country. While Libyan-sponsored terrorism in the
United States has been restricted to retaliating against
Libyan dissidents, it is possible that Qadhafi could
direct his assets to attack US domestic interests if he
felt the existence of his regime was threatened by the
United States or had some other reason for seeking
vengeance against Americans.
35. Cuba supports terrorist activity in other regions,
but we believe that under current conditions Castro
will be wary of sponsoring or initiating anti-American
terrorism in the continental United States. He does not
want to alienate US public opinion, and he is con-
cerned over what he perceives as the Reagan adminis-
tration's willingness-as demonstrated in Grenada-to
respond with direct action to any perceived aggression
by the Cubans. We believe this policy is likely to
change, however, if Castro concludes Cuba really is
under imminent danger of attack by the United States.
Cuba is in regular contact with Puerto Rican terror-
ists-the Puerto Rican Socialist Party maintains an
office in Havana-and would expect them to conduct
attacks inside the United States as part of a larger
Cuban effort to stimulate a worldwide wave of anti-
US violence to prevent or to retaliate for a US attack
on Cuba.
36. With regard to separatist/irredentist ethnic
groups, the major Armenian terrorist groups-the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG)-present the greatest danger. The
ASALA organization in the United States currently
suffers from fragmentation within its ranks over ideol-
ogy and is distrusted by elements abroad because of
fears that it has been severely penetrated. ASALA,
however, may retain the capability to conduct attacks.
The JCAG continues to pose a serious threat to Turkish
targets in the United States and can be expected to
recommence activities after a brief hiatus during the
trial in Los Angeles of five members. These individuals
were convicted in October 1984, thus removing any
disincentive to action that may have existed because of
a desire not to influence adversely the trial's outcome.
At present, neither ASALA nor JCAG poses a serious
direct threat to non-Turkish targets in the United
States, although ASALA's bombing attacks in the past
have been indiscriminate enough to harm bystanders.
The Palestinan groups in the United States have
generally chosen to avoid violence so as not to jeopard-
ize their efforts to establish a political base of support
here. Moreover, these groups-like their counterparts
abroad-are preoccupied with an internal power
struggle.
18
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/12/08 : CIA-RDP86T00303R000200240001-5
L3C%.I cL