NUCLEAR FUEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00303R000500700033-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 23, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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NuclearFuel
SSTAT
A biweekly report from the editors of Nucleonics Week
A U.S. INSPECTOR FAULTS IAEA
ON SAFEGUARDS
prompting one critic to wonder
whether U.S. workers at the agency
know how the agency works
THE REACTION AND THE REPORT ? page $
OTHER HIGHLIGHTS
REAGAN ORDERS A LOOK AT
PRIVATE ENRICHMENT ? page 2
Coteau takes the Industry by =prise
? Pate 2
NRC takes over Will regulatitat In four
sogreenteat states' ? ? Pate 3
EPA gives in situ miners a break pege 4
NRC usurped EPA's tailhpis responsiMERN,
Industry argues in Denver ? page 5
Senators- tryapia to gat Edge:nest
clessolup ? Page 5
&ad moves foraard on 1F6 plant
-r Pate 7
PNCreprocesiing fee beets the coats(
reprocapalmg in, Europe by about
$2.40,000/to4*ite for tallith' is the
haled -page 15
TICKE'IS ON URANIUM'S ROLLER
AMOS& seen good through the year
alf100 ?page 16
DOE takesa beck seat to industry ta rod
consolidation ? Pate 17
Gulf glows down at Mount Taylor
? page 18
Vol. 6, No. 24 ? November 23,1981
EEC UTILITY SEEN AS SOUTH AFRICA'S SUPPLIER
Amid speculation that South Africa obtained enriched uran-
ium for ICoeberg-1 from the USSR or China, U.S. and French gov-
eminent officials are certain it WU ob ippeiEut1lity,1 ?
prbly within tWEuropean Economic Co unity. "This was
not something specially enriched for South Africa," a State Depart-
ment source told NuclearFuel. "There was no new supply contract."
The US. has refused permission for export ofnariched uranium
because of South Africa's refusal to place its aatiOlunent plant un-
der safeguards, although officials say progresakbeing made in that
area. South Africa, meanwhile, has laid off a "inall amount" of its
enrichment obligation to DOE by selling to a Japans utility.
HOUSE JOINS SENATE IN BUDGET CUT
DOE SEES AS A THREAT TO KILL GCEP
Meeting Nov. 18 to iron out differences between House and Sen-
ate versions of the FY-82 energy and water development appropria-
tions bill, House conferees agreed to a reduction of $86-million in
TIOE's enrichment program. That's just $4-mill1on less than the Sen-
ate wanted to cut and enough of a cut, accordhig to DOE, to kill the
agency's gas centrifuge enrichment plant.
DOE officials had said that $70-million of the $90-million re-
duction passed by the Senate would have to come out of GCEP. It
would push FY-82 funds for the project down to $530-million, DOE
said, causing another year's delay which might drive key contractors
away from the project. To make the cut mom palatable to GCEP
beaters, the conferees instructed DOE to sirre the general re-
duction is prudently allocated so there is ImPact on Produc-
tion schedules. Said a DOE source: "Isn't peat directive ? take
a cut but don't let it have any impact."
DOE AGREES TO RETHINK ITS PROPOSED FEE
FOR EXPORT OF GAS CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY
DOE officials are telling about 15 U.S. companies involved
in construction of the Portsmouth, Ohio gas oenhifuge enrichment
plant (GCEP) the ground rules for preparing proposals to Australian
companies considering building a 1-million ewnipear enrichment
plant in Australia. Most important, the complaint are told, is that
they may not transfer any classified techisolopy natil the U.S. nego-
tiates an amended agreement for cooperation nith Australia.
DOE tentatively proposes to assess a linnieing fee to reim-
burse the federal government for development otIthe centrifuge
technology. The fee would add about 5% to the costs of building
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the Australian plant, DOE sources say. The companies have
asked DOE to reconsider. DOE, which does not want to render
any U.S. proposal noncompetitive, agreed to consider alterna-
tive approaches to obtaining compensation for its advancement
of the technology.
Competition to provide Australia with enrichment tech-
nology heated up in 1979, when Australia asked a number of
foreign governments if they were willing to participate with a
private Australian group in a multinational enrichment ven-
ture. Late that year, the Australian government encouraged
the development of the Uranium Enrichment Group of Aus-
tralia (Uega), a consortium of the Western Mining Corp., Peko
Wallsend Ltd., the Broken Hill Pty. Ltd. and CSR Ltd. Uega
undertook a prefeasibility study, to which the U.S. contribu-
ted unclassified information, and concluded early this year
that indeed, enrichment is a desirable commercial develop-
ment. It then announced its intention to do a two-year feasi-
bility study.
At the end of 1981, Uega said that it would like to
choose between centrifuge and chemical exchange technolo-
gies. Sources now say that selection is likely to come in mid-
1982. According to other sources, however, the feasibility
study will last through 1983.
Knowledgeable sources say that gas centrifuge is Uega's
preferred technology so the U.S. companies' main competi-
tion is from Urenco, which has had a proposal before Uega
for at least a year. If Urenco were chosen, then the 1971
Treaty of Almelo between the governments of the Nether-
lands, the U.K. and West Germany would have to be amend-
ed to include Australia, sources say.
The lead for developing proposals rests with the three
centrifuge manufacturers ? Goodyear Aerospace, Boeing, and
Garrett AiResearch, sources say. For the moment at least, those
three companies are expected to submit separate proposals. A
source at one of the companies, though, says cooperation
among the manufacturers might improve the chances of US.
technology being selected. "The Australians are not interest-
ed in seeing a bunch of carpetbaggers," he says. He adds,
though, that such collaboration, when the companies are com-
peting for future work at GCEP, could pose serious antitrust
problems. And he says it is likely the Justice Department will
be asked for an opinion in the near future.
In addition to the three centrifuge manufacturers, it
would be necessary to form a loose consortium with architect,
engineering and construction companies to share the risk of
the Australian venture. Sources familiar with Uega's plans say
the group is looking to the technology supplier to have an
equity in the plant. In addition, the sources say, Uega is look-
ing for a third partner ? probably a potential customer like
Japan ? who would also have an interest in the facility.
? Michael Knapik, Washington
REAGAN WANTS REPORT BY YEAR'S END
ON PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATE ENRICHMENT
President Ronald Reagan has ordered an interagency re-
view, to be completed by the end of this year, of prospects of
turning over some or all ofZg's uraniimignrichment enter-
prise to the private sector and of impacts such a move might
e...e ense, rummvrr 4rima I on, and other toreign
2 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
policy interests.
t would have been inconsistent of us if we didn't look
at greater private sector involvement in the U.S. enrichment
enterprise at the same time we're allowing private U.S. com-
panies to bid on becoming a partner in an Australian enrich-
ment enterprise," saida White House source.
A DOE source said the review will incorporate ongoing
work that had been done over the summer in response to re-
quests for a look at privatization by the Office of Management
& Budget and the Office of Science & Technology Policy. He
said DOE efforts to date have raised many of the same ques-
tions that occurred during two previous attempts ? in the late
1960s and the mid 1970s ? to turn over some or all of urani-
um enrichment capacity to the private sector. Some of those
questions, this source said, are:
? Will the government sell its existing plants to a private
group or just allow a private group to build any new capacity
needed to service world enrichment markets?
? If private firms build only new capacity, how will they
and DOE compete in the enrichment market?
? How will U.S. defense needs for enriched uranium be
met?
? And what types of financial guarantees will private en-
richers require from the federal government before they are
willing to construct a new plant or take over existing ones?
"In other words," the source said, "there were a whole
host of problems in the past which are only compounded by
the decline in enrichment demand in recent years." It is un-
likely that private U.S. companies pushed for this review, he
said. "What's driving this is the consistent Republican Party
philosophy that private enrichment is the ideal way to go."
INDUSTRY WATCHERS GROPE FOR UNDERSTANDING
OF COGEMA'S PLAN TO PURCHASE PATHFINDER
Cogema's purchase of 80% of Pathfinder Mines took the
U.S. uranium industry by surprise, and left many uranium men
perplexed. Some said the purchase made sense, while others
questioned what the French company would do with more
uranium.
Cogema, a wholly owned subsidiary of the French
Atomic Energy Commission, said it would not be making maj-
or managerial or operational changes after negotiations are
completed. Existing contracts also are not expected to be af-
fected. Neither Cogema nor Utah International, parent to
Pathfinder, would disclose the purchase price, although a
French newspaper said it was $200-million, a price sources
described as reasonable. Negotiations are expected to be com-
pleted by the end of the year.
Pathfinder currently operates three uranium surface
mines and two mills in Wyoming, although its work force
has dwindled from a peak of about 1,600 employees in 1980
to about 775. Its reserves are estimated at 30,000 tonnes
U308.
The company's 2,800-ton/day mill in the Gas Hills min-
ing district near Riverton is fed from the Lucky Mc mine near-
by and from the Big Eagle mine near Jeffrey City. The Shir-
ley Basin mine/mill complex, south of Casper, is licensed to
operate at 1,800 tons/day.
While the French are believed by some to be following
a route similar to the one they have taken with coal, by buy-
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'MOVE *MATES.9 APRIL 29 29 30
They are the Wednesdays Thursday an4 FAiday fastened on by the McGraw-Hill publications NuclearFuel,
Nucleonics Week and hiside N.R.C. for aeonforance, Nuclear Commerce in the '80v Who Will Be the Buyere,
Who WM Be the Sellers. lr
Attendance is to be sharply limited so as trov1di an atmosphere conducive to registrahltsl, participation in
lively discussion. 1,
The conference will be held at the Pheasant Run resort hotel (complete with golf courselardlennis courts),
near St. Charles, M., a 35-minute drive *nit riptil Chicago's O'Hare Airport.
John Gray, president of International Energy Associates Ltd.; W.B. Behnke, vice chairmanier Common-
wealth Edison, and Marcus Rowden of the Washington law firm Fried, Frank, Harris, Shifter& Kampehnan
will be the chairmen.
Among the topics to be discussed are: status of the:utility industry and what about it no
demand for equipments fusi and sersical,Ned factors htfluenchis that &Maud; the Nies
dors, architect-engineers and servicessuppliersi aOltles of major divisions of the
industry needs of government and genrernment semis of industry:
Further details will be forthcoming soon` hUt sive those dates.
structuring;
NSS$ van-
;and what
ing up inventory and property when prices are locos* source
said that route doesn't necessarily make sintseiwi far' asusewit,
ium is concerned. "1 am surprised to me Pathfinder Withdraw-
ing and Cogema taking over. If it does not make sensetor '
Pathfinder or Utah, why does it for the French?"
U.S. coal reserves are "very huge and cheap to mine,"
he said, but uranium reserves are higher cost than anywhere
in the world. "I guess the French are looking more at the Ai-
ture of the industry, It means Corona is betting more on the
future of uranium and thawed** industry than GE (Gisler**
Electric), which makes sense." GE is parent to Utah Itittatt*
tional, but allot PathfittderltiOMMOit stock lidbpoirted in a
separate voting trust as partotAt iipleehiait Notarial Gekitit
the U.S. Department of Justicirat thothrs GE bciliglitiBah
In 1976. '
Another source, knowledgeable of thwindustry; said,
"I have no idea what the French are up to," but he speculated
it might be for "insurance."-They -could buy-into the spot mar-
ket to fulfill **tin ennrriP941114.1?1-fzthfinder
for the French program,"for another day," he said.
News of the Purcasf 4440 fOrne Pathfinder em-
ployees and the local indastiyAlYyumius- ;,10-
clear program is 'iota wia44,149e,94* hatter than in most other
countries and certaMlybettertlkii the US.," *IRO
source. "Pathfinder wilj $io.ocwe ab?14.' the fu"'"'
he predicted, because the tztjue looki a JAW" More capita.",
GAC WINS B4.2411 WON PORTS? UTILITIES
IN URANIUM SETTLIMIENTWITHRMIRRIMOIL
Gulf States Utilitiaaindatiladelphia Electric will split,
S4.2-million in lieu oriketilionfpounds ofetaniunt ata
suit of a settlement between General Atornicf.C.o. (GAC) -
and the Ramat 004 MinersinCAtrp., sad Standard into.
(Ohio). The settlement canoelen,1973 Gonne* ander Which
Reserve and Sotto were .to thillter ,S.5anilliort pounds of unto,
Ti'd, ri
tuanto GAC from the jointlyfocammILI4istr operationin New
Mexico. .w?
Under contracts with GAC, Phitedelphia was owed 1-
is 600,000 pounds.
,delivery and differ-
? was prepared to set-
t for Gulf Oil
Nuclear inc.
any.shigationby.
CAC ,0 and at the same
GAC'sobliption to
million pounds of uranium and Gulf
But "there were different tiniefraI
ent price mechanisms so that each
tie for the same amount of money,"
Corp. said. Gulf is a partner in
The lawyer said the settlement,
Reserve and Sohio to deliver
timeoblipted them top:rash,*
thentilitiss.
by the. Constildated Relit
that railroads may not charge higher
fuel. ThatapPeals court decision
13) affirmed a ruling of the
that special train service was ant
and. that, therefore, chug* *her
unreasonable.
fa
to haul spent *WINO
yea/0E016 March,
Common
,aefotylmeesure,,..
or such 11111Vint was
NRC TAKES CONTROL OVEN
FROM POUR STAtItit,
,
NRC took legal control of mill
agreement states this month, and al
ington, Coloradnud Temp
thority within the next few Mend*
is not newly so close and the
the uranium-producing states oolid
company licensee come up for
NRC issued uranium miff
general license Nov. 10 to sate thorn
license to passes mill tailings tit*
Atomic Energy Act. NRC says the f
regulating in four
It looks as if Wash-
MPSIA.
IPPel*A..... F./
biggest of ali
complitated as.
NuclearFuel
In the fourstates a
.beintwithout any
violation of the
ua of the agreement
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November 24.1981 ?3
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states to execute amended licensing agreements by the Nov. 8
deadline set by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) automatically ended the states' regu-
latory authority.
In the Federal Register notice announcing the general li-
cense, NRC says the license is conditioned on the operators
complying with all conditions in the agreement state licenses
they held before Nov. 8, which regulated the management and
disposal of mill tailings. It "continues the status quo and im-
poses no added burden on agreement state licensees."
NRC also says the general license will terminate when
NRC and a state enter into an amended agreement.
NRC says it expects to enter into such an agreement with
Washington by the end of November, with Colorado sometime
in December, and with Texas in early 1982. "Since complete
amendment documentation has not yet been received from
New Mexico, it is not possible to forecast when an amendment
can be executed," NRC says.
Robert L. Fonner, an NRC attorney, told NuclearFuel
that "as long as New Mexico is proceeding in good faith to de-
velop a program, the commission will not terminate (the gen-
eral license)." No date was given for final compliance with the
terms set down by NRC.
The commission notes that the general license "is a temp
orary measure to fill a legal void and not a validation of state
programs for mill tailings or rejection of existing state pro-
grams."
According to Al Topp, chief of the radiation protection
bureau for New Mexico's Environmental Improvement Divi-
sion, "There's lots of work back and forth with our staff be-
fore New Mexico is ready to submit a final proposal." Topp
went on to say that he felt NRC exercised its authority in
"the mildest possible way" by issuing the general license.
According to an NRC lawyer, the agency's action in mak-
ing its general license effective immediately on issuance has
drawn criticism from at least one industry lawyer who main-
tained that the commission could not assert authority over
mill tailings in agreement states without first granting the state
a hearing. The NRC attorney called this theory "flat-out
wrong."
Paul Robinson, director of the Southwest Research &
Information Center (SRIC), an Albuquerque-based environ-
mental group, charged that by making the general license effec-
tive immediately ? instead of providing a notice period and
opportunity to seek a public hearing ? NRC was "precluding
public participation". in its decision. Robinson added, however,
that SRIC does not plan to challenge the legality of that ac-
tion. He said that "the real test" of New Mexico's amended
regulations will occur when Sohio's L-Bar uranium mill and
United Nuclears Church Rock mill come up for license re-
newal early next year.
UNC RESOURCES AND FARRIS MINES INC. DROPPED
DAMAGE SUITS against each other last month after UNC
agreed to pay Farris "a small cash settlement," a UNC spokes-
man says. Farris had sued UNC in a federal court in New Mex-
ico asking for $15.5-million in damages and alleging that UNC
broke an oral contract under which Farris was employed to
strip overburden from UNC's St. Anthony uranium mine. UNC
in turn sued Farris for $2.5-million for failing to fulfill certain
obligations.
4 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
EPA IN SITU MINING AMENDMENTS
GET WARM RESPONSE IN DENVER
Changes proposed by the Environmental Protection
Agency in underground injection control regulations, espe-
cially affecting in situ mining, were strongly endorsed by in-
dustry groups at an EPA hearing in Denver Nov. 5. Standing
alone in opposition to the changes was the Colorado League
of Women Voters which said the amendments would weaken
controls over uranium solution mining as well as in situ recov-
ery of oil shale, tar sands, lignite and coal.
The proposed amendments were described by EPA as
an effort "to increase the flexibility of state programs, reduce
paperwork and reporting burdens and solve some problems
which would have made compliance difficult for specific in-
dustries." They also will help settle out of court a 1980 chal-
lenge by mining and oil companies.
"It has been called to the agency's attention," EPA geo-
logist Francoise Brasier said, "that requiring no movement of
containments after closure may not be technically or econom-
ically feasible to achieve in at least some abandoned mining
well sites. It may be extremely difficult to remove all residues
of the mining activity from the mine site. For example, am-
monia in the case of a uranium mining operation using am-
monia in the lixiviant. As the natural flow of the aquifer is
re-established after abandonment, such residues may be car-
ried into protected portions of the aquifer. The original regu-
lations required the permittee to demonstrate that no move-
ment of containments from the mined zone into an under-
ground source of drinking water would occur. Under the
change the permitting authority could prescribe whatever
aquifer cleanup and monitoring are necessary for an ade-
quate level of protection for the underground source of drink-
ing water."
EPA estimates that its revisions of its regulations under
the Safe Drinking Water Act will result in savings of $70-million
over the next five years for owners and operators of injection
wells. The agency said the changes would save the states about
$1.4-million in the same period by reducing their work load.
EXXON PROSPECTING PLAN CALLED 'OBNOXIOUS'
Plans by Exxon Minerals to prospect for uranium in a
Utah wilderness-study area are being opposed by the Wilder-
ness Society, which calls the proposal "rather obnoxious."
The Bureau of Land Management district office in Cedar
City says it expects to rule Dec. 14 on Exxon's application to
drill eight holes on about 20 acres and to build 5.1 miles of
road to reach the drilling sites. Meanwhile, Gulf Minerals Re-
sources, which also had applied for exploration rights on 21
acres in the same section of the Fifty Mile Mountain Wilder-
ness Study Area, has withdrawn its application. A spokesman
says the withdrawal was not because of opposition by the Wil-
derness Society but stemmed from the company's decision
last month to curtail uranium exploration because of depressed
market conditions.
BLM's environmental assessment of the two proposed
exploration projects near Escalante, Utah, says that less than
0.1% of the wilderness study area, about 100,000 acres, would
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be affected by the exploration. BLM said the Exxon project's
impact would be "substantially unnoticeable" once the com-
pany 0)**00 fOrrtaA144101443 lictu44$ .40V
planting grasses and shrubs.
i( 'Pleiv4U4ettleaS Societtf *Itnnr, knelaYettattOr rt;
spokesmen says there is "a high likelllt " that the sociery,
wiil appeal either through adminiattagef qhanttela 9F, 4. Word
court If Exxon's application is approved. The redesiAltd,,,
Policy Management Act, that spokesman
tors to prow that the impact uf,0440#414:11P11 ?
will not impair the character of 0114,1 t?r twildernesscond-
deration. "The environmental, easessinent points 0%0 ;a*"
directly there will be impairment * the area," he Aye-
. 1
NRC UNAPINfl- EPA TARII,WM PEPON418441Nraf
AND Dana ABAaii089, LT.a NIXISTRY *WRNS
fl, ,,,i'
The. EnvirournantaltPrOtectital ASOWN,i*Ot RCN*
authorized by Conareasitoprontulptirmlationswallortthe
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978olindus-
try lawyers argued last Tuesday (Nov. 17).
Counsel for the American Mining Congress (AMC) and
five uranium producerrtold the US. 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals in Denver that "NRC is unlawfully doingivb.at EPA
was authorized to do." The attorneys presented oral argu-
ments,hefore a three-judge panelheeringf,,l!koledOetfX chal-
lenge to NRC's mill tailings regu*tions- The)ic ,000,40s con-
solidated into One case after three separate suits-ivere filed
against NRC by Kerr-McGee Nuclear, United Nuclear, West-
ern Nitcliar, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Phillips theiftitiand the
AMC. The National Wildlife Federation and other environ-
mental groups have entered the litigation at frieWAISOf the
court.! ,.
"NRC unlawfully rushed into a void when EPA failed
to ineeti its obliptions;" said Pete; Nickles, representing Kerr-
McGee; United Nuclear and Western Nuclear. ilBiais an Loriiat-
tempt by 'NRC to push everyone out of the Wit"',7-: the EPA
and,deistates:" Nicklet,said. "NRC# "Yin*, ' NO have
the atithiirity to proiett public health' and stafeti, ? prefer
EPA."
' "We take the position," Nickles reeprondedito indge Wil-
liam Doyle's question of why the companies prefer NRC,
"that Efit is more sensitive to coatrbenefit enakyaia. The EPA
has more expertise in assessing risks and costs. Nat should
implement and enforce."
Nieldestold the court NRC had Weed thireations
"on assumptions" and "has been hypothesizing risks." He
asserted, "Wpcannot have aiemeifilccOeiditiratiOtbanviek , -- ?
the in4usia01 dead." Nickles saldamPlawitileathall.rof Pawed
NRC regulations would cost uranium producers "hundreds of
milliqns, more than Sl-billion."
*Ariother industry lawyer, 'Anthoni''fltompagiii, argued
that NRC "did not make a determination of significant risk.
Instead it subitituted assumptibio ind IV/plata &int to zero
risk. The absence of a determination of significant risk invali-
date',Oese regulations:' - 1,''
Thompson, representing the AMC, Phillips Uranium and
Fenew Fuels Huclear,,was particularly critical PkwAat he
Celled "the inflexibleitandards ter radon entistioni and tail-
ings cover." NRC requires tailings piles to be stabilized to pre-
vent radon emanation of no more than two picocttries per
square meter per second and the tains to be covered by at
*a!! Ottele4neterf of aetth.lieempsotelantended NRC had
based its risk assessment on stidisticslof radiation exposure
fortis entire UL population. "The NRC cannot accurately
mitintetz the risk of nearby population(to tailings) let alone
continental population," Thompson isid. "This de facto risk
assessment is totally ineffective.
Sheldon Trubatch, a Departme t of Justice lawyer re-
presenting the NRC, said the Mill Control Act "pro-
vides the NAC with specific an promulgate regula-
tions to protect health and safety.' d the purpese of the
act is to elnate the radon hazard, tailings piles and that
NRCladtilitiOntwill achieve
TrUbatch laid that costs (of compli-
ance) are reasonable. The eves the most reason-
able way to prevent rad from around is to keep
the tailings in place." ver
SENATORS KAN Apsoiekii4 f?.g
TO GET SOMEONE TO CLEAN UP
Language giving DOE clear authority to clean up mill
tailings at Edgemont, S.D. will be added to NRC's FY42 au-
thorization bill when that bill rea the Senate floor, accord-
a,
, jog to congressional sources. Alth ' the House version of
the bill is silent on the issue, the is expected to accept
. , the Senate amendment, the sources say.,
The tidlinp, contaminating mono than 60 structures in
i ?', dolma, came front a uranium mill by the,Tennes-
see Valley Authority. TVA pur mill in 1974 from
. , the Sthiquehanna Corp. but decided 11978 putting it back
Wow/ice would not be feasible. Because it
also picked up a mill license in the ' IVA could not get
its property added to the list of i te be decontantinated
' by DOE. 'Mat left no one respo ? ter decontamhuting off-
dte inuctures.
, NRC officials believe off-site cleanup should have a high
priotityibut who should do it has been in doubt for over a
year (NF, 18 Aug., 4). To date, NRCihas been directing sasnpl-
big and engtheedng assasentents of properties under au
-
*catty of its FY40 supplemental dons act. *hough
NRC officials assumed they would t the cleanup,
, INIC lawyers said the agency lacked ority and precluded
any action.
Next the House Appropiations.COmmittee, in its report
On an PY-81 supplemental *pm ,..,,:. bill, directed DOE
to do the cleanup (NF, 11 May, 4)- "IrT .
. bill.bowever, DOE lawyers raised a .04, . saying-that the
Isportianguags by itself was net sufficient to confer authority.
Although sampling and detail engineering assessments.
. of homes and vacant lots willootbe - . y plated until the fall
'of 1982, NRC ofticialsoow elfin** about 63 properties
will require remedial action at a cost Of 'about $11,000for each
'property. NRC-ind DOE officials say, though, that liteY ex-
pect those estimates to be lowered 0 the Environmental '
. ,Protection Agency revises its demo cdteria. NRC at Edge-
mont and DOE in its remedial action . 4 m have beenoval-
uating,properties based minted:It , published in April
1980. EPA is reassessing titbit ancl is expected to relax
them so that less remedial action wi be needed (NF, 12 Oct., 1).
NudeFUef ?November 23, 1981 ?5
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Approved For Release 2008/04/10: CIA-RDP86T00303R000500700033-6
NUCLEAR FUEL EXPORT LICENSE ACTIONS PENDING BEFORE U.S. NRC
This is NuclearFuel's tabulation of nuclear fuel export
licensing actions pending before NRC. The intent is to provide
quick reference for those interested in tracing the progress of
particular licenses through the approval process. For this pur-
pose, we have retained for today's listing those applications pre-
viously listed for which licenses have been issued. (The most
recent tabulation was in the NuclearFuel issue of Oct. 26,
pages 6-7.)
The table is arranged alphabetically by country of export
destination; it includes NRC's license application number and
the date on which NRC logged receipt of the application, as
well as time elapsed (to the nearest month) since that receipt;
it lists either the reactor for which the uranium will be used as
fuel or the purpose (e.g., fabrication) for which an export li-
cense is sought; and it gives the status of the application (as of
our press time), together with the date on which that status
was attained. Unless otherwise noted, the quantities are given
in kilograms of uranium as UF6, and enrichment percentage is
noted.
Status of applications being considered by the State De-
partment is reported to Congress periodically as required by
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. State explains that the ex-
ports to South Africa are delayed "pending the outcome of
certain ongoing discussions with the South African government."
Exxon Nuclear has requested an export license for 2,275
kg of uranium enriched to 33%; the material will be used in
the first Electricite de France reactor that becomes available as
part of EDF's effort to diversify fuel fabricators (NF, 9 Nov., 2).
Transnuclear's request to export 23.285 kg of uranium
enriched to 93.3% for use in the Saphir research reactor in
Switzerland has been amended because of the Swiss program
to reduce the enrichment of Saphir fuel. Transnuclear is now
requesting 15.208 kg of 93.3% enriched uranium and 21.213 kg
of uranium enriched to 45.4%.
Destination:
reactor or
purpose
Quantity (kg U
as UF6 unless
otherwise stated)
U-235
(percent)
Applicant
License number
and date
application received
Elapsed
time to date
(months)
Status
(see key)
and date
ARGENTINA
RA-3
12.03
90.4
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1496(4/12/79)
31
C - 4/13/79
RA-6
50.13
19.9
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1587(9/7/79)
27
C - 9/24/79
BANGLADESH
Triga Mark II
55.4
19.9
General Atomic
XSNM-1669(3/28/80)
20
C -4/2/80
BRAZIL
Angra-1
1,726
3.45
Westinghouse
XSNM-909(8/24/79)
27
C - 9/6/79
Angra-1
16,242
3.35
Transnuclear
XSNM-1629(12/3/79)
24
C - 12/10/79
FRANCE
Orphee
15
93.3
Transnuclear
XSNM-1543(7/17/79)
28
F - 10/23/81
Rapsodie
60
93.3
Transnuclear
XSNM-1544(7/17/79)
28
C - 12/10/79
Siloe
26
93.3
Transnuclear
XSNM-1545(7/17/79)
28
F - 10/23/81
EDF
2,275
4.05
Exxon Nuclear
XSNM-1882(10/5/81)
New
C - 10/6/81
GREECE
GRR-1
7.018
933
Euratom
XSNM-1848(7/6/81)
5
C - 7/7/81
INDIA
Tarapur
19,858
2.71
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1740(9/25/80)
14
C - 10/14/80
Tarapur
19,858.8
2.71
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1872(9/8/81)
3
C - 9/10/81
INDONESIA
Janus-3
54.135
19.95
Transnuclear
XSNM-1855 (7/21/81)
4
C ? 7/22/81
JAPAN
- -KUHFR
-934
Arnefie-a-
XSM-1-274043/80)-
License issued
- -Shiffiane4
3,7-23
1.42-
Marubeni Affiefiee-
XSNM-I-864-8464-1*
License issued
MEXICO
Laguna Verde-3, -4
620,000
4.0
General Electric
XSNM-1814(5/8/81)
7
C - 5/14/81
NETHERLANDS
HFR (Petten)
38.095
93.3
Transnuclear
XSNM-1824(5/21/81)
6
C - 6/1/81
PERU
RP-0
31.45
19.9
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1588(9/7/79)
27
C - 9/20/79
RUMANIA
Triga
37.2
19.77
DOE
XSNM-1749(10/7/80)
14
C - 10/10/80
6 - NuclearFuel - November 23, 1981
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Iltry to Stamm of Application
? application is incomplete, awaiting reply to NRC E ? letter returned from DOE, routine reload, in pro-
request for more information.
? being prepared by NRC for transmittal to State F ?
Department. G ?
C ? sent to the executive branch agencies.
D ? letter returned from State Deportment* being H ?
prepared for NRC comniksion WSW* I ?
D* ? letter returned from State Deportment* routine
reload, in process of being issued. I ? amendment only, executive *MO itimieW not
E ? letter returned from executive branch, in process required, in process of bein0'
of being issued.
cons of being issued.
under review by commission.
special case requiring further review by NRC staff
Ot -executive branch.
case ritarned'from State DePartitieeOriihrint
action.
Destination:
reactor or
purpose
Quantity (kg U
u UF6 unius U-235
otherwise added) (Must) APPekant
Limnos number
and date
appliution teddved
key)
SOUTH AFRICA
Safari-1
26
93.3
Koeberg-2
75,431
3.15
Koeberg-1
75,431
3.15
SPAIN
Sayago
88,636
3.25
Vandellos-2
73,173
3.15
Lemoniz-1, -2
2,774
3.2
Asco-2
2,774
3,2
Asco-1
2,774
3.2
Cofrentes
115,000
3.7
Valdecaballeros-1
,-2 239,500
3.9
SWED4N
Oskushamn-2
102,000
4.05
Barsebaeck-1
84,000
4.05
Barsebaeck-2
96,000
4.05
Forsmark-1
1,230
445
Forsmark-2
34,135
4.05
Saphir
21213
45
Saphir
15.208
93
WEST GERMANY
GETR
55
93.3
THTR-300
10326
93.3
FRM
7.994
93.3
US. Nuclear
Transnuclear
Transtiuclear
Westinghouse
Westinghouse
ouse
Westinghouse
General Electric
General Electric
XSNM-690(4/4/75)
XSNM-1552(8/1/79)
XSNM-1553(8/1/79)
XSNM-1169(7/19/77)
XSNM-1185(8/12/77)
XSNM-861(11/8/77)
XSNMe865(9/10/79)
XSNM-866(9/10/79)
XSNM-1630(12/3/79)
XSNM-1644(1/14/80)
c ?5/14/75
C 8/I0/79
C 8norm
Edlow Intl
XSNM-1886(11/9/81)
Edlow Intl
XSN11-1887(11/9/81)-::
Edlow Intl
?
XSNM-1888(11(9/81)???
Edlow Intl
?
XS1411-1403(11/6/81):
Edlow Intl
XS141114752(11/6/81),',
Transtiuclear
XSNM -1840(6/18/87)
'Franonuclear
XSNIA-1840(6/111,81)':
Gmateil Electric
XSNM-1204(9/27/77) .
Transnuclear
wai.loas(5ilaigo)
Trananuclear
mm-18210/21/81I!
BRAZIL MOVES FORWARD TOWARD UFO PLANT
Uranium Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann (UPK) officials said
the Nudebras UF-6 conversion plant, to be built with UPK
tedmical assistance, is now scheduled to be on line in 1985.
In recent interviews with NimlearFuel, company sources
said training of Brazilian engineers In France began this year
as did work on a conceptual design for the plant. UPK's agree-
ment with Nuclebras dates back to 1978, but execution was
held up while e sefePettle sveensot between Fame sad Bra-
zil could be reached. UM and NpFlebras also had Protracted
negotiations on the terms of the technology* transfer.
Under the agreement readied, UPK will play a role of
?.?
Mew
G 542/80
G ? 342/110
G N22/80
.,? ;5/22/80,
C 9/24/79
C 12/10/79
C ? 1/23/80
C
11112/81
C
11/12/81
C
11/12/81 ?
C
11/12/81
C
11/12/81
C ? 6/23/81
C ? 6/23/81
1
C 10/3/77
5123/80
C'?'6/3/81
,
manager-consultant in the project. Tlio
providing training, design engiamdug,t
sion license and conversion services to
before the plant is put on line.,
civllengineering and procurement",
city of the plant have been set ym
cost of a typical conversion**.
francs ($44.4-million at cumuli,
The plant will be situated in
tion for an ensemble of fuel cy
being planned under the
development with West GennasiE
cord does not prevent the Bilidigallik
elsewhere. "It is not a question of
;each company is
comurhtut convex-
*Wiwi needs
masa. the
Coat Nor WI'
tRIChut the
2$441Wkel FrAuch
*Se*
,the chosen loon. ,
? the others
nueleu power
mkt that Isc,
sonte tweineas
iman ;Mirth-
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tion," said a UPK official, noting that 25-30% of the world's
conversion capacity is based on the Comurhex process. More-
over, the West Germans were not offering a conversion tech-
nology.
Construction of the facility is scheduled to begin in
early 1983.
LATEST CRITIQUE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IS SEEN
CAUSING A STIR BUT FALLING SHY OF ITS MARK
A report some sources say will damage the IAEA and
safeguards would have the opposite effect if Sen. John Glenn
(D-Ohio) has his way. The report, prepared at the request of
NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky by a former IAEA safe-
guards inspector, describes technical difficulties of safeguard-
ing nuclear facilities under the agency's aegis.
"We've long known that the IAEA is the only thin line
of protection we have against diversion," Glenn said. He said
he has "consistently advocated more support for safeguards"
both in terms of numbers of inspections and in terms of re-
search toward better monitoring methods, and "the report
clearly points out the need for both."
Glenn, a Senate leader on nonproliferation issues jjd
he is "disappointed" that following a Senate resolution in July
caling on the Reakan Administration to engage in discussions
with leacrers of other countries about improv21, sarestuards,
'lie had received "no substantive response' from the President
that such discussions former _
with a long background in non-
proliferation issues called the report "pretty weak," and "noth-
ing really different than the rumblings of people for years." He
said the report failed to explain why certain problems were
necessarily problems, in some cases, and in others, why those
problems couldn't be solved. The paper's biggest shortcoming,
however, was its limited scope since its focus was essentially
on technical rather than political problems of safeguards, he
said. "All this fellow does is point to fly droppings on the win-
dow. He doesn't say there are so many on there you can't see
out. He doesn't come close to that."
That source, however, also cri
"a bit blind" for vie pectors as "mternationar?-?
servants who o .1 glance to an international entity rather
than to ? 0.S." Other inspectors "know why they're there,"
he , -:.. To the extent the U.S. Imdsnut disturhine rhinos
? sot nuclear mamas. it conies through our owp hitelli-
ence. et or " and'our people in Washington should be feed-
ing nnformation back" through appropriate channels to US.
inspectors. While this may occur to some extent, "we
greater lengths to observe this notion these mspec-
rs) are autonomous."
part should seek to determine "how
far the system will let you push it. That information is inval-
uable." At the same time, he added, they should keep that
type of information "from getting broadcast" if they feel it's
important to end the type of harrassment described in the
report.
A congressional source predicted the paper would raise
"all over again" the debate on US. nonproliferation policy,
particularly with respect to NRC's role. "There is nothing in
here that is a surprise to me," said the source. "What's differ-
ent is some of the details." He predicted it would have a "rip-
ple effect because it's going to raise the whole issue of what
NRC should do in terms of safeguards." In other words,
"should NRC act as a rubberstamp to executive branch agen-
cies on export licenses or independently assess each case?" An-
other source predicted that critics of nuclear power "are going
to try to publicize it (the report) as much as they can," and he
said it could raise the question of whether "the agency is worth
anything at all."
IAEA safeguards is just part of the nonproliferation pic-
ture, said the U.S. State Department. However, "the U.S. has
been engaged in extensive efforts to improve the technical,
legal and conceptual aspects of the safeguards regime to keep
it abreast of changing conditions and technology. Important
progress has been made and those efforts are continuing."
Also, said State, the U.S. "continues to regard the in-
ternational safeguards system of the IAEA as playing an essen-
tial role in our effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear
weapons." At the same time "it is important to note" that
other elements of the policy include "addressing the security
concerns that might motivate some nations to seek a nuclear
explosives option; working with other nuclear suppliers to in-
hibit export of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, espe-
cially to volatile areas; and increasing U.S. participation, and
thus influence, in nuclear affairs by re-establishing a leadership
role for the U.S. in nuclear commerce."
Apart from that official statement, State Dept. sources
d shock and concern over ?ublic disclosure of the resort,
- . .
but said they e)Tected to "weather" the storm.
"That aortal thmg doesn't help the agency, the govern-
ment or the cause of safeguards because it causes people to
spend a lot of time arguing about how the report got out and
how good it is when they ought to be spending energy getting
safeguards improved," said one official. "If one is really inter-
ested in improving safeguards I don't see that as the best
approach."
Said another: "If we start compiling all of the stories
that come out of the IAEA from former staff members and
particularly safeguards staff members, this is going to have a
very damaging effect in the long run on the IAEA." He pre-
dicted that while "we'll have some rough sledding" as a result
of the report's release "we'll weather the storm because peo-
will realize that while IAEA is not perfect it's the only
thi going so we should work to strengthen it, not weaken
it."
ile one State Dept. official called the report "over-
st and unfair," a former department official said its author,
anuel Morgan, hadn't "even taken his shirt off." In that re-
spect, the report's summary is perhaps "appropriate," because
"it says there are problems, we need to work on them and
there are no simple solutions," he said.
The paper is "typical of the attitude most American types
come away (from IAEA) with. They're disgruntled. They feel
they're not truly appreciated." But the report fails to "go to
the heart of the system," he said, by stressing only technical
difficulties that on the face of it appear resolvable.
For example, in the section on fuel fabrication, conver-
sion and unirradiated scrap recovery facilities, the author de-
scribes difficulties encountered in obtaining material samples
and cites an instance when an operator wanted $1000 per sam-
ple from the agency. "What he's saying is we had this rule or
framework of modus operandi and this country was giving us
a hard time.... I don't see where this big problem presents
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you with an indication that the system doesn't work. He is say-
ing there is trouble getting people to do what you would Ike
but that's been true since the beginning."
That difficulty, he added, does not ,n., sbem from
,
an operator's intent to "cheat." So** Inspect* ow,? l pow.
what they're doing." Operators resent the interference and
"fear that some of these people would be smart enough or
dumb enough to talk about what (technology) they've seen."
Also the "ground rules" on inspections are continually chang-
ing, he said.
In the section on the difficulties in getting design informa-
tion "he implies if we aren't able to check othlesian there's
no other way of dete tisere a
oesn t say , an? s one o t tes over flirt."
Morgan doesn't say that withotit inch InforinatiOn the situ'.
tion is "hopeless," the source said. file giveS you Tot inetanfin
but doesn't bring out that the item, he was complaining ebott:
went to the heart of the system such that you couldn't tiller-
ate any deviations."
The Nadu, embeds on numbers and the technological
means of making the system work" ie a problem with the agen-
cy as a whole, he said When the System was establhhed in the
early 19601 the agency "wanted to mechanize thMgIc . :They
wanted an agreed-upon roadmap;They wanted to draiv *
list of what it was responsible for doing and that they could
get high marks on. They wanted to depoliticize the operation."
The thinking of some U.S. officials at the time was that
inspectors "were not just supposed to be bookkeepers. They
were supposed to do more thanmy whether the books were
balanced.. . . When we shifted over to the international sys-
tem we sacrificed an awful lot because we no longer relied on
the people element. You took **reliance on whatever type '
of personnel other countries Mitred* for inspectors."
Nevertheless, he said, at the time the French and Canad-
ians, in particular, were "undercutting the rtiattitt by offering
safeguards deals that were better-6mi what ,the U.S. offered,"
to "unless you.got some internaticinalletion. going you didn't
really have a floor on thinp: What *SOU did fix us Is at
least head off the einadietit frotniteing dells on safeguards
In order to sill their reaftrirs,"
. At the some time, though, "there were some People
'red with the ktesnationaldridt
? into thinking they'll work thrugi
quoin*, tended to suppreis.Orftiehic
Pe# Much from reports like thesi:
.who blinded them-
and,as a come-
result, [never ex-
rievier pt to the real
"T? he fact that agency Inspectors get *hard time when
they get out is to be anticipated," he said. Ibe question is
"how you can get back to a regime that ghim you pretty much
the same confidenceas if you had your Oon people running it.
on a bilateral basis. Very simply, one fotebt do something like
that by running a two-track system. That lay you'd have both
your floor and your ceiling." I
Other than that, inspectors should i be encouraged to look
for "fishy sips" ? like detennirdng htit# t apower.
grid is on a particular facility, or facility is linked
to it grid at ell. Also, he said ? insPect d kick at how
long material is being stored, whore firellitiesSO lecated
? generally, "how does the tilitto " Emphaiis should
be an "what situations deserve motel
That type of "olouthing" Shy, acCord-
is near
big to a U.& official who wake on
provides only for containment and efe Tmsarss h""liaL"lind
nuclear materials accounting. "I ovide for deuth-
Whe difficulty is that the t :r "Fr) --71;77r
way allowed," he said.
An NRC staff review of the paper also concluded that
as long as safeguards approaches for pa type fiCilitiee
continue to develop in the direction of equipment and
more detailed information, while many continue to
Weit
take a very narrow legalistic View oiactorded the
,kf;
IAEA in safeguards agreements aitd sttachments, old
sometimes render safeguards inedreeth, safeguards and
agreements will constrain the s
. Morgan, a domestic safegua* before his tour
as an IAEA inspector from May ,1971 1980,1eft
NRC this summer to start a business,' at.his home, he
told NuclearFuel that he would "hie. how the thing de-
velops" before deciding whether he fOrnment on the
report. At present, he said "I don't would be in my
interest to comment on it in spite of t fct that it has been
received by various people and there ny ?ontroversy."
Gifindcy would not comment on the reekert ? Stephanie Cooke
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGU ,
The following ls rigor( .10C C:onunkslontir Victor Wonky by former IAEA Inepactor Erhanual
INTRODUCTION
The Purpose ot,this Mort is to Provide an inspector's insight
Into IAEA sufoguirdsa bafid upon Wen years as a domestic
safeguards *peat?, with the U.SMcfnic EitaSY. Commis-
sion's Division of Nuclear, Mat Safeguards and the succes-
sors of that organization in the AEC and VAC, three years as an
International safeguards inipectocefith the IAEA. and. 44 addi-
tion, :eve* years as an NW headquarters staff member.
The concept has been advanced at blgh levels thst a coun-,
tire signature of the NPT (N1* **proliferation Treat/ I
is the pstncipie isic) aia of IAEA iffilesmada. *VOA h
only concerned, with the technical-Upsets of IAEA safeguards
Inspection . activities, and does not, addseas such broad ,issues.,
The concept his also beeia4vanced that IAEA...ate-
guards are of more value than Is apparent by virtue of their
NIOValk ?
,
technical value per se. This may be true Wliere a state does not
are apphed. inY
te systems and the
bo vi 'effective inter-
ional safeguards
the technical cepa-
understand the means by which safegu
experience, the representatives of the
operators of the installations know e
national safeguards are and how the in
system can be defeated. I can only a
bility to safeguards nuclear materials.
ORGANIZATION OF IAEA
The Board of Governors of the
are represented, is the principal
policy of the agency. Voting is on a
so that less populous countries hev*
populous ones. In terms of budget, hu
of funding is provided by the U.S., an
on which 34 states
Influences the
her OnelVOte basis,
Influence as more
, a large proportion
U.S. also provides
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additional monies and technical assistance to the agency.
The agency's Inspectorate is very responsive to concerns
of the countries which it inspects. A complaint via the Board
of Governors can end or alter the career of an agency employee.
Thus, the Inspectorate is controlled by the inspected. A "diplo-
macy above all else" or "don't push your luck" mentality
prevails.
Another point of interest about the IAEA organization
in the Department of Safeguards is that nationals of the coun-
try inspected have access to inspection reports, seals, seal re-
cords, etc., that concern their own countries. For example, I
once had to explain a report that I had written to an individual
responsible for clearing it from the country that the report
concerned. Although the IAEA takes modest steps to avoid
this, it is unavoidable under the present controls.
Finally, it should be noted that the IAEA does not teach
languages to inspectors and does not assist inspectors to learn
the language of the country which he inspects. The IAEA op-
erates in four official languages of the United Nations. and on
a semiofficial basis in German. Often the inspector cannot com-
municate with the party being inspected, except via a represen-
tative of the national authority or Euratom, who is conduct-
ing a parallel inspection. This occurs more often than not, I
would estimate. A result of language difficulties is poor com-
munications. For example, failure of an operator to carry out
a commitment made to an inspector may be blamed on not
having understood.
MISSIONS TO THE AGENCY
Member countries of the agency provide liaison to the
agency by way of their missions to the agency. Some countries
have a special staff for this purpose, such as the U.S. One of the
comments one hears in Vienna is that "You can't get anything
done around here without going to your Mission." As an ex-
ample of this, I witnessed a case where a non-U.S. inspector
was promoted to P-5 (ca. $55,000 p.a. tax free) while I was on
inspection travel with him. He received two telegrams of con-
gratulation concurrently. One of these came from his section
head at the agency; the other came from his Mission. In my
experience, I discerned inadequacy in the safeguards area.
Most U.S. inspectors did not feel supported by the U.S.
Mission.
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
A country that has signed the NPT in time concludes an
agreement with the IAEA modeled after INF/CIRC 153. This
agreement specifies in greater detail than that found in the NPT
how safeguards are to be applied in the state. In addition to
this agreement, subsidiary arrangements are concluded which
specify how safeguards are to be applied. These subsidiary ar-
rangements consist of a general part and of detailed attach-
ments which specify how safeguards are to be applied to
"facilities" and to "other locations" where nuclear material
is present in small quantity.
Design Information
The facility attachments are concluded on the basis of
"design information" (DI) submitted by the state. In my ex-
perience, the headquarters review of the DI and its field verifi-
cation has been inadequate.
The agency has the right to carry out DI verification,
but often only three weeks notice may be required to be given
before an installation receives nuclear material from the time
the DI is submitted. Thus, a review of the 13I may not be pos-
sible and may not be permitted. Such a review is important in
many types of installations, to assure that there are no unde-
clared diversion routes, connections to sampling stations, by-
pass lines, etc. For example, once a reprocessing plant becomes
10 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
radiologically contaminated, there is no further chance for a
DI review. I am not aware of any DI review of any reprocess-
ing plant.
Also, many tank calibrations in a reprocessing plant can
be performed only before an area becomes contaminated. Al-
though verification and witnessing of tank calibration is not a
design information review activity per se, it can only be per-
formed before nuclear material is introduced. Due to the short
time interval between the submittal of the design information
and the introduction of nuclear material, as well as because
the plant operator simply does not permit the witnessing of
calibrations, the verification activity is only rarely carried out
by the IAEA. This lack of assurance of tank calibrations in-
troduces an additional uncertainty in the quantities of nuclear
material, transferred and in inventory.
In the case of facilities involving sensitive information,
such as reprocessing plants and enrichment plants, DI review is
typically not permitted, although newsmen may be given tours.
This shows the seriousness with which the IAEA is regarded in
the real world.
Another shortcoming in the design information is its
completeness. For example, in comparing the information on
piping and tanks available at one [pilot] reprocessing plant,
WAK [at Karlsruhe], with that provided for another, the PNC
[Japan's Power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Development Corp.'s
Tokai] reprocessing plant, one finds that the PNC informa-
tion is orders of magnitude more detailed than in the WAK
case. In comparison, the WAK data is scant and probably in-
adequate. This is because the diversion paths and falsification
scenarios possible in a reprocessing plant can only be addressed
with complete knowledge in hand regarding by-pass and recycle
routes, and storage locations.
In spite of, or without regard to, the adequacy, complete-
ness, or examination of the design information, negotiations
are conducted to conclude a facility attachment, to specify
how an installation will be safeguarded. The country may,
however, fail to agree with the agency on the facility attach-
ment. Years may pass.
Facility Attachment
When the facility attachment (F/A) is concluded, it is a
consensus document which may permanently emasculate efforts
to safeguard the installation. For example, the "actual required
inspection effort" (arie) agreed to may be barely enough to
cover scheduled visits and may leave no time to resolve discre-
pancies or complete tasks that took longer than anticipated.
And arie is taken very seriously. Quite often, arie is about 10%
of "maximum required inspection effort" (MRIE), which is
specified in the "Blue Book."
Another area, particularly in the case of bulk handling
and reprocessing plants where the F/A falls short is not requir-
ing that a "tag list" or "list of inventory items" showing the
gross, tare, net, element, and fissile isotope weights be made
available after the "physical inventory taking" (PIT) of the
operator of the installation. This tag list would be used by the
inspector in his physical inventory verification (PIV). Since
a tag list is often not required, very often the inspector is left
to take the inventory, rather than to verify it. This is an often
imposible task for the inspector, due to his limited time and
manpower.
When a tag list is required by the F/A, the specific bits
of information required, such as element and isotopic weights,
are not called for. Again, the inspector is defeated. The reason
the inspector is defeated in such circumstances is that where
the operator provides the tag list only after the inspector com-
pletes his verification activities, the operator is in the position
to correctly report those items that he observed the inspector
to have verified, but to falsify the reporting of those items
that the inspector did not verify. Thus, the operator is in a
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poidtiOlt to falsify the material balance. ?
Tfpically,it stratified list of items on Iseentory isrei
quire l print to the PIT, for planningpurposis, itivAtted of ac-
tion, *entering the physiedineenetriPtileiridhlguilstef
batch' ad le requited. The list Of Oita tits need tat
able at the Ply, and further, is usually inadequate as abatis r
for verification, because individual items aroposally notlisted.
Unfortunately, the distinction between PIT and ITV Is often
not comprehended.
Another shortcoming of the F/A s that it usually in-
cludes a clause such as, "inspection shall be toY obibrvikuoi
the state authority'a inspection only, Sid* ois in-
adequate to permit the dm of)dcped?.
This clause frequently leads to lind:1610"6 'reit*
time during the inspection as to
Permitted by the Flit, and often, the feMite pf,?1.11,44P, PTF-
tor to carry out necessity Windt% -
The shortcoming meritionitabinto are not an exhaust
we list, but should aerie to illustrate that **pectotie Often
doomed from the ;tart by an iadEquately negotiatedattachment. fwlllty
Subsidiary Amusements -- Genital zt.. ,
,-Thie put of-the subsidiary enassementa specifies how a
state formally reportithe inveneeryland transfer activity to
the IAEA. There are venous categuito of linirentotythanses?
permitted. One of these is the "nreatereddierind."
Usually there it a specified-Mit On the antatuat of Maar
ured discards which may be diacardedby the operthitlridir
limit may be, for example, 0.01' kgriftective per month per -
bulk handling or reprocessing hirtallation; of mitestritthatis '
"disposed of in such a way that is not suitablelorfuttlier nu-
clear use." 'Menthe amount ex0redsthe limit; theetatehr6..-
qutred to consult withthe agency before discardinstakes place.
Since the quantities and physical-ferns of nuclear aratedid Ts-
ported, to have been disposed of eft typically not Mified be'
cause the discardt occur at times when flo inimector is present,
a credible diversion path it constituted by measured discards.
This situation Is compounded in severity, it would seem, in a
country such as FRG, whet* ell Waite is transferred to a cen-
tral waste handling facility, which is not subject to IAEA safe-
guards. Once the Waste goes tense-cattail facility, pending
resolution ot the ultimate dispoiritetsvaite *Se, it is "out of
sight, out of mind." Why IMIA Isnot permitted to inspect
such a waste handlingtheinty litunthear. At the time-that the
nuclear materials sent to aught friday, *Often laseitable
for further nuclear use:
Another category of wasteratiosni is 'retained waste."
Retained waste isdefissed as "nutfleirtinatenal which Jags,
elated frourproomingor an apeirgicerill aeoidentorthintis,
deemed-to bentstecenerable for the terse being, butwhietrie
?stored." Waste iitthisuatesorn intime rigid to galuttity, ?
may be tsansfereedrout othurentont.luelf Waste no tosser
appears in the Operstorthoolt Inventoryinleords antis not
reportsetolMin, in* physicalluventory list after the oper-
ator's physical inventory taking. Only by Searching back tb the
time the transfer to retained waste occurred would a record
be fciund. It is, therefore,'Potstet AO, out of mint," Coati.--
derable quantities of "retainetweitele0-itored atome bulk
handling installafiOns, but ere not petiodicallY wined bran
IAEA inspector.
RECORDS AND REPORTS
-Under this heeding, I dimes, the records of the Isstilli0 -
tion and the /sports that areastbsoitted by the installetlenvis '
the state (or regibnal authority kith as Burstein) to leihney.
Records
The' agency requires a system of records and reports in
the facility attachment. The records m of two kinds, namely,
(1) accounting records and (2) opmt*4 !records.
I saw peat differences between 00 quality of the account-
ing records from state to state and, within a state, from Instal'
latleortohntallation.
ifinind, for example, that in the records were not
orgisitet conveniently in the MUM is order for the in-
speetirto perform a simple audit of S records, consickrible
timited io be Wasted to surnmedie *activity that occurred
since the gotten visit. For enrage, e major facility, the
records Were kept according to t. There were
&bola 300 of these. There was no ledger summarizing
activity in the Several hundred there were num-
erode transactions within and Ms. I found that
to effectively carry Out my studlt,1 create my own gen-
eral ledger. During eachinspectethlI several days in
this ictinty: The facility 'simply ft* to keep a gen-
eral ledger, for its Ottrposes. The point I t the Operator or
the state can Cause the inspector to thine a lot of his limited
time.
With regard- to operating reeordis!, I also found deficit's-
cies. For example, in one facility, there was no record kept
of thistinal disposition of plutonhunsingles. Such samples
were said to be returned to the-precut/Alit, one would ex-
pect a record kept showing date, tinsti*d identity of the re-
introduced samples. The stencil not concern it-
self with material control at that level Of detail.
Reports
I noted that neither in FRG nor
as far as I know, did a system of ma
exist, such as does exist in the U.S.
741. This system is effective, in that
are issued by the shipper of nuclear
ledged by distribution of return OM
forms are matched by computer in *
material missing in transit and to flag
aloes. In the absence of such a systern
sit or shipped to an unauthorized
The agency system, however,
trinsactions to the agency one in
the/fomented. One Way to deteet
or riot shipped to the stated teeigetrt
shipped to an unauthorised or
pare each shipment declared ax.
with each shipment declared as
When larrivedat the agency,*
was being done in summary form,
clerk, in the case of Japan undo; the
ever, with the advent of magnetic
January 1978, this comparison,
accounts," became the responsibility
processing operations, Division of $af
Treatment, in the Department of Sal
responsibility for all NPT reporting. *
impossible to run the transit accounts
sign information for all installation:
ecteelliel of reports had not been
Thus, the emphasis changed from,
of the computer as a device of inter
At a later date, it was claimed
not be run because batch numbs**
not always the same as batch nentbutit
Another problem, In the can, ot
France did not report to the apreergr
under safeguards, so that transeetione
other Euratom country could SO be
iety of reasons, I was repeatedly told
!pan, nor elsewhere
ction reports
form NRC/DOE-
numbered forms
and are acknow-
the reenter. These
S.'system to detect
Iver differ'
Item mng in tran-
could go undetedted.
the reporting of
the month 1* which
missingin transit
the fact (but rather
'recipient), is to corn-
the monthly report
7,1 found that this
the fact, by a
liectios. How-
wAthNPTin
the transit
he section for data
Information
. This section has
claimed that it was
sufficient de-
't preliminary error
by the inspectors.
to that of the use
own right.
t accounts could
by shippers were
by receivers.
Melting. was that
asse facility
France and an-
Thus, for a var-
the transit accounts
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could not be run.
It was our belief, in Euratom section of IAEA, however,
that transit accounts were run by Euratom, EEC, Luxembourg
?rior to the dispatch of the monthly reports to the agency. On
one occasion, I was granted a special, nonroutine check of tran-
sit accounts, due to absence of supporting records. At that
point, DIT was willing to entertain a special request. Several
months elapsed in the course of running transit accounts for
a single installation. I learned that there were shipments and
receipts that did not match. We informed Euratom, Luxem-
bourg, who replied that they had not detected this due to a
computer malfunction. This episode lead [sic] me to believe
that Luxembourg was not running transit accounts either.
Thus, the agency had, and presumably still does not have,
any routine assurance that a stated shipment to an installation
within a state or a group of states, such as Euratom, ever arrived.
That is, with limited exception, when the agency checks the
reports of installation X, it does not compare those reports
with the reports of other installations which reported trans-
actions with installation X. Thus, it only verifies the internal
arithmetic consistency of installation X's reports, in effect,
treated in isolation.
Another problem area for the agency has been its Advanct
Notification of Intemation Transfer reports. These are not al-
ways reconciled either. And, when they are reconciled, they
often don't agree, due to inability to match shipper's and re-
ceiver's reports.
Finally, the DOE sends copies of Form NRC-DOE-741
for international transfers to the IAEA. These also are grace-
fully allowed to pile up "in the comer." It seems that the
IAEA does not need them.
INSPECTIONS
Although I have discussed inspections in other sections
of this report, I will provide some background here as to what
an inspection consists of and what it can and cannot do for
various types of facilities.
During my employment with the IAEA, the types of in-
stallations that I inspected included reprocessing plants, con-
version and fuel fabrication facilities (bulk handling facilities),
reactors and critical facilities of various types, and laboratories.
The approach that I will employ here is to explain first
how IAEA safeguards generally, comment briefly on the gen-
eric safeguards techniques, and then explain how safeguards
are applied at various types of facilities.
How NRC Safeguards Generally
INF/CIRC 153, The Structure and Content of Agree-
ments Between The Agency and States Required in Connec-
tion With the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Wea-
pons, popularly known as the "Blue Book," articles 28, 29,
and 30, provides the following statement:
28. The Agreement should provide that the objective of
safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear
explosive, devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of
such diversion by the risk of early detection.
29. To this end the Agreement should provide for the use
of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamenta
importance, with containment and surveillance as important
complementary measures.
30. The Agreement should provide that the technical
conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a
statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the
amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period,
giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.
It is important to note that in the context of article 28,
12 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
"diversion" should not be equated with "removal." This is an
important distinction, because typically, an agency inspector
is concerned with diversion in the narrow sense as removal.
With regard to article 29, one sees that the basis of IAEA
safeguards is: material accountancy, containment, [and] sur-
veillance.
Material Accountancy
In practice, "material accountancy" refers to the means
by which the agency verifies the presence of nuclear material
that should be present at an installation based upon records
and reports. This system is, in itself, made difficult because
the reports occur several months after the actual movement
of nuclear material. Thus, the agency's material accountancy
typically consists of verification of the arithmetic correctness
of the operator's records, verification of the authenticity of
the records by means of shipping documents and the like furn-
ished by the operator, and several months after the fact, cross-
comparison of this information with reports of the same oper-
ator, which he sent via his national system to the agency on
magnetic tape. As mentioned previously, the agency has thus
far found it virtually impossible to inter-compare an operator's
reports with reports of any other operator, to verify the vera-
city of the reports, especially in the case of states under NPT.
Article 30 refers to the so-called MUF statistic, which
is the operator's statement of the amount of nuclear material,
based upon his physical inventory taking, that is apparently
discrepant from the amount that is supposed to [be] present, based
upon his records over a period of time. The LE (MUF) is typi-
cally not calculated, although the agency has good intentions
of calculating an approximate LE (MUF) in the future.
Very rarely the agency calculates a D statistic, which is
the inspector's MUF, based upon his verification of the oper-
ator's statement. This is typically incomplete, because the in-
spector rarely, if ever, measures all components of the opera-
tor's material balance closure and does not possess the informa-
tion necessary to perform a realistic calculation. The agency
just does not have the manpower to do much verification and
often does not have time to take as many samples, even with
a willing operator, as it believes necessary, of even the ending
inventory component.
In the best of all possible worlds, the MUF statistic is
the closest that the agency verifies the material balance. In
reality, it falls very far short of what is intended, because of
holes in the system which provide the MUF.
Because of the inherent difficulties of the MUF statistic,
the agency has attempted to implement a system of "timely
detection" at sensitive facilities. Such implementation is, at
the present time, far beyond the capabilities of the agency to
implement and beyond the willingness of the countries to un-
dertake. It goes beyond the Blue Book, some believe, and
would require massive amounts of sampling and verification,
and real-time knowledge of the amounts of nuclear material
moving between installations, rather than after the fact noti-
fication. At the present time, such efforts are only in their
early stages.
Containment and Surveillance Measures
Article 29 also refers to containment and surveillance
measures. At the present time, this refers primarily to seals
in the containment category, and cameras in the surveillance
category.
In the case of seals, the agency mainly uses the so-called
"IRS Type-E" seal. This seal has been around for a long time,
and as early as about 10 years ago, efforts were underway by
at least one foreign government to "break it." The seal has
been "beefed up" by the agency, but is basically an old de-
vice that requires labor intensive "post-mortem" examina-
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tion, which verifies that the seal removed is the same one
that was originally emplaced, rather thins counterfelt- The
post-mortem m examination is not necessarily capabloof de-
termining whether thew* um ennvePtialenalY opened and
then reassembled.
The agency also uses paper seals. According to expert
authority, these seals are useful for only a few hours at best,
because they can be removed and replaced, and also because
they can be duplicated by a good printer.
There are several ether seals around, but none of these
have been used, except in limited tests.
In any case, a second basic shortcoming of the use of
seals is that the item sealed can often be accessed by bypass-
ing the seal.
Camera surveillance is of two types. One is the film
camera, such as an 8mm Minolta. These are typically used
in pairs in a sealed enclosure. They are set, in a power reac-
tor, to each snap a picture at If; or 20-minute intereds, so
that, at best, there is only 7 to 10 minutes between snaps:
These are intended to detect movements of large items, such
as a cask bearing fuel assemblies.
The other type of camera is the TV camera, which turns
on at predetermined intervals and snaps 8 or so frames.
Generally, the quality of pictures obtained is extremely
poor. Further, there have been numerous failures. There have
been significant Improvements recently in reliability,
urea still occur at an alarming rate.
One scenario, which has appeared in several literary
sources, is the placement of a photograph of the viewed scene
in front of the camera. This is plausible, because the illumi-
nation level normally changes as lights are turned off and on,
and the frames typically jump around. But there are also more
sophisticated ways to defeat the camera.
A basic difficulty associated with containment and sur-
veillance devices is that the device is not under the continuous
observation of the inspector, as would be an alarm system in
an industrial setting.
In my experience, another basic difficulty with both
film type and TV type surveillance is that the image is often
typically not clear enough to be meaningful.' Typically, many
activities occur on the fIlm that are rather baffling. Also,
people stand in front of the camera and barriers are erected
that block the view. The camera may be moved. The light"
may go out. And, often, the camera simply fails. Further, the
interval between pictures is intended to protect against a.
known scenario, such as a cask movement to remove fuel,
where it is assumed that the agency realb, knows how long
the activity will take, so that the movement would be caught
on film, whereas it might not 'really be known.
Safeguards at Specific Types of Installations
Reprocessing Plants
During my employment with the IAEA, I inspected at
the reprocessing plant! of PNC at Tokal Mura in Japan, GWX
(WAX) at Karlsruhe in PIG, and once, Coserna at Cap de Is
Hague in France. The first two facilities were under "contin-
uous" inspection regimes. The latter facility only stored fuel
under safeguards, but had not reprocessed any of it. Basically,
uncertainties associated with reerbcessing plants involve, at
best, a several per cent uncertainty of MUF. At worst, slot
of other pessililittles open up, including the possibility that
an installation might reprocess undeclared irradiated fuel, or
understate the phitenfunt content of the declared 1be1. One
installation wu rumored to haVe*noised lel an undeclared,
never used, natural uranium storage pond, for Wimple. In a
reprocessing plant, therefore, one should look for hidden fuel
as well as account for declared fuel. But the agency does not
attempt to find undeclared fuel. For example, if a plant opera-
tor says that no fuel will be prooeseedlor one month, the
agency will stop sending inspeetora tori month.
In the case of understating the, glutoniuni content of the
input dissolver solution, the suited?, would entail diverting
some of the input dissolver solution to avoid measuring it in
the input accountability tank. At a later time, the diverted
solution would be transferred from ita Oution in, say, a tank
of the rework system, where it had boWetored, to the ta-
to extract the plo-
d "down" and
needed to mike
the divertered bit)
uranium in storage,
fuel element Mato
traction and purification systems, in
tonium, at a time when the plant 'WU d
not under inspection. The uraniumt
up for the diverted uranium con
dissolver solution would be replaced
since uranium quantifies are known
facture?. data.
This type of scenario is simply Covered by MBA
safeguards. IAEA rather bunks primarily on op-
erator's data eupplemented ce. I know of
no case where recycle acid wet *ample, or where
valves were seeded to prevent transfers. flantPles
are taken of the input and ou , but are drawn
from sample ports that byre no* by &Win In.
formation review, so that one omit where the
sample came from. Further, the ere handled in the
plant by the operator and marbe by theoperator,
before shipment to Vienna. Inoue operator and
country refused to allow shipment. for a year on
the grounds that it wee illegal due Omen of an ap-
proved shipping container. Plnai1y the samples had been
In the operator's control fora year, y was asked If-
they could be discarded, because Ihegr been standing so
long. The agency agreed.
In addition, because the be diluted before
shipment, analytical accuracies' Seibusiorf.
In the Me of the Capitol Owe ia no input ac-
countability tank, so that 'mien will.probably
have to be based on reactor data., t ? 1
An independent means the plutonium con-
tent of spent fuel is by burnup and isotopic cor-
relation techniques. Unfortunately,
which require verification of relic
even done on an occasional b
isotopic correlation techrdqu
takes the word of the operatoial
of the spent fuel and checkS
reprocessing plant, subject, of
that finding.
Op cril4 Iati,Irti
to not
. Neither are
SOW slinigY
content
t it finds at the
IhnitatiOnil Of, ,
Research Reactors
In the case of research reactor'
the potential exists for undeclared
and/or U233. In the research reactor,
which there were several, duce
veillance memos provided to
am I aware of any measures which
Typically, research reactosurtiinep
haps once annually. The agesiqrs
be unable to distinguish between
ial samples to produce plutonium
medical samples, for example, "011:
serviced for one year.
One medical use of research
irradiation of highly enriched
num-99, which is extracted and
Tc-99 is used for medical
tion, most of the U-23$ stilt
typically mixed in concrete,
highly enriched uranium could be
Power reactors,
of plutonium
I inspected, of
tainmeat or sur-
nor
have been effective.
infrequently, per-
aiuveillasce would
of fertile meter.
and irradiation of
earners could run un-
incidentally, is
Produce molybde-
tsciuMisium-99. The
Aftorirradia-
tssilstrithich Is
te disposal. The
,however, as a po-
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tentially attractive source of kilogram quantities of weapons
grade material prior to the mixing with concrete. This extrac-
tion would probably not be detected by IAEA safeguards,
since an IAEA inspector may only visit such an installation
annually for one day.
Critical Facilities
One critical facility which I visited contained hundreds
of kilograms of low exposure, weapons grade plutonium. A
facility of this type is sensitive from the abrogation scenario
standpoint where, under some sort of immediate threat, the
country simply takes possession of all the nuclear material for
immediate manufacture into nuclear weapons components.
About 100 kg of this material was under IAEA seal. During
biweekly "time detection" inspections, the inspectors would
visually check the type E seals on this material, in spite of the
fact that these seals can be counterfeited, so that only post-
mortem examination at headquarters is meaningful.
I once demonstrated to the operator and the inspection
team leader that, due to the absence of some needed holes in
the lid and body of the container, the sealing system was in-
adequate; the containers could be opened, the material re-
moved, and the lid replaced simply by removing two bolts,
without disturbing the seal. I also brought up this problem
in Headquarters upon return from mission. However, this
situation was not corrected, possibly because agency per-
sonnel had collaborated with the operator on the method by
which the seal would be applied in the first place and felt
partially obligated to go along with the outcome, when the
operator said that the holes could not be drilled.
The method of safeguarding a major critical facility en-
tails monthly sampling and remeasurement of unsealed fuel
plates. The fuel plates can be remeasured to within about 3%
by NDA [Nondestructive Analysis] . Perhaps 1% of the mater-
ial could be removed by, say, drilling or remanufacture of the
plates, without detection likely but this type of scenario is
considered unlikely. Chemical analysis by the agency for high-
ly accurate measurement of a suspect fuel plate is not foreseen
in the usual facility attachment.
Power Reactors
Power reactors are of various types, and can be classified
according to whether on- or off-line refueled, types of moder-
ator and coolant, whether natural or enriched uranium, etc. On-
line refueled reactors are considered more sensitive and safe-
guarding was primarily by counting all fuel elements and check
of serial numbers against the invoice of unirradiated fuel ele-
ments. Identification of serial numbers on spent fuel is usually
impossible. Although there is work underway, especially in
Canada, to automatically count fuel elements, this was not
done in my experience. Counting of power pulses on a chart
was the means of verifying the number of fuel elements changed
in the core in one instance, but "noise" pulses on the chart made
this of dubious value. Camera surveillance was intended for
loadout pond, to detect undeclared loadout of irradiated fuel
by that route.
In the case of off-line refueled reactors, camera surveil-
lance was used in the spent fuel pond area to detect undeclared
loadout and seals were employed on the reactor head and/or
at the entrance gate to the spent fuel pond between refuel-
ings. Fuel elements were counted and serial numbers on unirra-
diated fuel elements were verified at inspections. In both cases,
physical inventories occurred at annual to 18-month intervals.
Nondestructive assay verification was permitted at that time.
Inspection frequency ran from 3-month to 6-month intervals.
Verification of reactor operating history was by review-
ing strip charts of power, steam flow, temperature, or neutron
flux. Typically, a maximum of two charts were permitted to
be reviewed. Access to the control room was not permitted.
Rather, the charts would be removed and brought to the in-
spector for review in a meeting room.
The possibility of irradiation of additional fuel con-
tained in normally nonfuel-bearing structural components of
the fuel assemblies was not covered by the inspection approach
of power reactors, although this has been discussed in a report
on technical assistance to the agency by the U.S. The possibil-
ity of an adaptation to facilitate the irradiation of fertile fuel
by other means was also not covered. For example, there is no
close inspection of the reactor vessel prior to operation or at
the time of maintenance to detect a shuttle system. Burnup
calculations to determine the amount of plutonium in spent
fuel were not verified, nor were power monitoring devices
verified.
Fuel Fabrication, Conversion, and Unirradiated Scrap Recovery
This part of the fuel cycle centers around the fabrication
of fuel for the various types of reactors and critical assemblies.
In larger facilities, the IAEA makes approximately month-
ly inspections of one day duration, performs an annual physi-
cal inventory verification of several days' duration and, where
large quantities of direct use material are present, more fre-
quent inspections may be made. A basic difficulty that I ob-
served here are unwillingness to take samples and ship them to
the agency's Seibersdorf Laboratory, on the grounds of cost
or shipping regulations. In one European installation that I
was aware of, the operator wanted $1000 per sample from
the agency. A problem that I encountered was unwillingness
to allow the agency to use nondestructive assay equipment
that required small radioactive sources in their operation. The
operator claimed that national regulations did not permit the
presence of those particular sealed sources in his plant, in
spite of the presence of large quantities of plutonium.
In that installation, the operator and state had refused
to permit the agency to apply timely detection continuous in-
spection at the facility by virtue of its contention that inspec-
tion was limited by the Blue Book to flow and inventory key
measurement points. As a result, the agency "punished" the
state by reduced inspection to 2- or 3-month intervals. In this
case, the state did agree after several years to the timely de-
tection inspections on a trial, informal basis to parts of the
facility. But, without full cooperation and a serious invest-
ment in computer hardware and extensive accurate measure-
ments, which I have yet to see, timely detection is of limited
value.
The agency's approach to verification is based upon a
report, BNWL-1852, "Example of Verification and Accept-
ance of Operator Data ? Low Enriched Uranium Fabrication
Plant," Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Wash-
ington, August 1974. This report provides the framework
for the concept of verification of strata of flows into and out
of the plant, as well as in beginning and ending physical in-
ventories. A material balance for a period of time is formed
by the plant operator from the following components on the
right side of the equation: MUF = BI + A - R - SR - EI, where
MUF is material unaccounted for, BI is beginning physical in-
ventory, A is additions to inventory, R is removals from in-
ventory, SR is shipper-receiver difference [and] EI is ending
physical inventory.
If everything could be measured perfectly and there
were no mistakes or unaccounted for losses or diversion, MUF
would come out equal to zero for a material balance period.
But due to normally occurring errors of measurement, MUF
is typically not zero, but indicates apparent "loss" or "gain."
The idea is to determine whether the MUF is only due to mea-
surement error or also due to unaccounted for loss, diversion,
or a mistake.
Normally, the components of the material balance will
14 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
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be composed of several strata each. For example, SI may be
composed of good substrate material, the product material
which it manufactured from the substrate, scrap and inane.
The agency, ideally, verifies es* stratum of eackcomponent
of the'material balance. In reality, it seldom it *blot? verity
each component. In any case, it attempts to detect a diversion
of a significant quantity of nuclear material by verifying *suf-
ficient number of items in each stratum to provides desired.
,
power of detection, (1-B), of the loss of a significant quantity
with a tolerable false alarm rate, cc. A theorem is derived
which addresses the problem of whether the diversion of a sig-
nificant quantity, if "partitioned across" (took place in) more
than one stratum, would be detected with adequate power.
The theorem shows that, if diversion were partitioned across
more than one stratum, the power of detection would be m
great as or greater, by virtue of a defect being found in at least
one stratum, than if the diversion of the significant quantity
had occurred all in one stratum.
The fallacy inherent in this approach is that there will
often be at least one defect due to a mistake. Thus, if any mis-
take is found, the agency must alarm to the hypothesis of di-
version by Partitioning. And there are often false alarms (mis-
takes). This is even more serious when one condders +hit the
country is the advenary, so that partitioning across all Installa-
tions in a country must be assumed it any alarm occurs. Sue
it is patently not feasible to alarm to the possibility of diver- s
sion by partitioning across the state whenever a mistake is
found, the conclusion that one reaches is that the agency is in-
capable of detecting the diversion of a aignificant quantity or
of several significant quantities, by pardtioning, in any state
with a moderate to large nuclear energy establishment.
What Materials This Report Has Concerned
IAEA safeguards are aimed at the control of certain
direct-use materials, namely: high enriched uranium, U-233,
and plutonium; and certain indirect-use materiels, namely:
low enriched, natural, and depleted uranium and thorium
which can be converted to direct-use Materials. IAEA safe-
guards do not control uranium ore, neptunium, and a num-
ber of other materials which are controlled in the United
States by DOE end/or the NRC. Uranium ore, for example,
can be converted rather simply to uranium in a form that is
an indirect-use material. Absence edits control is probably
one of the glaring weaknesses of international safeguards
today.
A larp LWR produces roughly 15 kg of neptunium-237
per year, according to the Naaap [DOE's Nonproliferation Al-
ternative Systems Assessment Program) study . The =moderated
spherical, critical mass of neptUtdam-237 is roughly 60 kg. Its
control will probably be reqUirtitin the furare.
In this report 1 have attempted to describe how IAEA
safegutirds work and some of their weaknesses. I have not ad-
dressed all lames; there are many which are presently the sub-
ject of rad efforts by several countries, for example. But I hope
that I have identified some of them. I think that it is clear at
this point that there are not many simple solutions and that a
great deal of effort and commitment of all parties will be re-
quired to address these issues.
PNC TO REPROCESS 200 TONNES IN TWO YEARS,
AT SESSMOITONNE IN PACT WITH UTILITIES
Japan's Power Reactor &Nuclear Fuel Development
Corp. (PNC)isacheduled to reprocess 200 tonnes of spent
fuel for seven utilities throughOctober 1983. The eight par.
ties agreed to set that total volume and the fee at $586,900
per tonne of spent fuel, up front S341 ?
The PNC plan is kept intast the agreement be. ?
tween Washington and Tokyo all utilization of the
700 keday reprocessing plant at T through the ,
end of 1984. PNC admits that libel impossible to
fully utilize the design capacity (210 *cashes a year) because ?
of longer shutdown periods for mainteualue than had been
anticipated years ago. I
Recent years of operation have formed a rough annual
pattern of the plant running from to June, being shut
down misty and August, and September-Octo-
ber. As if to confirm the difficuitiew 210 tonneiyear re-
processing, PNC reprocessed a cumulskissi total, of only 106.
tonnes through June this year (NF, 6 Jely, 14), compared to
149 tonnes allowed until June (99 t ,ss agreed upon in
1977, and another 50 tonnes a February). The
scheduling assumes no plant p ? marked the
Japanese reprocesifng operation' describes even
the 200-tonne schedule as "a target.'
The 200-tonne total is broken do** into: Tokyo Eec-
tric Power Co., 41.3 tonnes (with 43.4,totmes allowed to be
carried to PNC's cooling pools); Japan Atintnic Power Co.,
40.2 tonnes (44.4 tonnes); Kansa' Elaine ,Power Co., 38.7
tonnes (40.8 tonnes); Chugoku EPC, 24 tonnes (26.6 tonnes);
ambit EPC, 20.6 tonnes (25.6 tam* yuthu EPC, 18-8
tonnes (22.4 tonnes); and Shikoku EPC; 6.4 tonnes (16.8
tonnes).
The latest reprocessing agreemeit
science & technology minister and c
the Japanese Atomic Energy C
statement, admitting that Japan
hate the time limit but welcoming'
the Reagan regime as one with"
improved from the 1977 agreement
Carter's government.
liedescribed the new pact as
tion at the present time," partly bet*
Mike Mansfield, the U.S. ambasitdor
three-year period for further negothtti
tinue its efforts to realize elindnatio*
in Nakagawa's words is "a permanent'
reprocessing question.
Utilities accepted PNC's
Ing fee apparently with no fuss. The
said, is "for us to recover only the
the cost recovery (with no profits fist
tion), there is a reason for utilities not
dustry sources agree that, despite a vitt
cant fee differences between PNC afld
PNC should spell favorable total colts;
transportation. It costs between $782;
Ichiro Nakagawa,
tiy chairinan of
issue a special
tried to elim-
agreement with
that have been
then-President
Oat practical solu-
f his agreement with
okyo,"to use the
Japan will con-
limits', which
don* to the Tokai
taisethe reprocess-
fee; a PNC source
costs." Besides
t corpora-
te the fee hike. In-
lack of any "'gni&
ape, the deals with
g spent fuel
/tonne and
$869,500/torme (at a rate of 230 yen to the dollar) to have
Europe reprocess Japanese spent fuel,' hicluding transportation.
Not surprisingly, coastal lion inside Japan is
believed to cost far less than the t transportation to
West Europe. "The only major *tor differences is
transportation," one of the soureellh says. Nuclear
Transportation Service Co. (NTS), a um of nine re-
gional utilities and Japan Atom*, handles spent
fuel transportation to PNC's Tokid W4tha 1,290 gross
ton venal, /Snouts Maru, chartered ' $ppon Expreu Co.
Although designed to carry four asks' OM time, the ship
NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981 ? 15
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actually transports only two at a time because NTS has only
two casks each for BWR and PWR spent fuel.
PNC and utilities decline to divulge details on the cost
for plutonium nitrate paid for by PNC for production of MOX
(plutonium-natural uranium mixed oxides fuel) for the Fugen
advanced thermal (heavy water) reactor. For the initial pro-
duction (NW, 15 Oct., 9), PNC purchased and consumed
about 200 kg of plutonium nitrate. One source speculates
that utilities chose to get rid of their plutonium nitrate at
fairly low prices "rather than maintain it by paying storage
cost." The nitrate moved inside PNC's Tokai works from the
reprocessing plant to a plutonium fuel development labora-
tory. ? Shota Ushio, Tokyo
TICKET ON URANIUM'S ROLLER COASTER
IS GOOD THROUGH 2000, ANALYSTS SAY
Instability will continue to be the dominant character-
istic of the uranium market into the next century, say the
Colorado Nuclear Corp. and Pickard, Lowe & Garrick Inc. in
the 1981 version of their annual report on uranium supply,
demand and prices.
"Through the entire period of the projections (to 2000),
there is an upward trend in average price," the companies say.
"However, continuing price oscillations are expected about
this average trend." And those oscillations could be severe; in
January 1981 dollars, the companies project prices of $30-
50/pound in 1985, $30-70/pound in 1990, and $45-100/pound
at the turn of the century.
That trend will continue in spite of "appreciable quanti-
ties of imports" to the US. ? 40% to 50% of U.S. demand ?
and "reflects the general effects of producing from more ex-
pensive (lower grade, deeper, and smaller) deposits as time goes
on. Under all conditions examined, the market remains un-
stable. Essentially all projections indicate that price rises will
be followed by some overall expansion and subsequent price
drops. The price drops prevail until the projected supply/de-
mand imbalance again becomes relatively significant and an-
other price rise follows," the report says.
A price rise is projected to begin by the end of 1982 "if
many of the utilities that have intermediate-term uranium re-
quirements begin purchasing activities in the near future" and
don't rely solely on the spot market.
That rise will be "relatively short-lived," peaking before
1985, because of near-term inventory levels, and will be follow-
ed by a mild price drop, the report predicts. But, "by the late
1980s the indications are that the price may average substan-
tially higher than today's value; including the possibility of a
rather strong price peak before 1990." Thereafter, the trend
is upward.
The "envelope" of price variations applies to both U.S.
and non-US. sources of uranium, although it is based on US.
demand projections as well as a number of other factors which
could influence the market, such as demand variations, uncer-
tain production capacities, producer and buyer attitudes and
policies, inventory policies and imports.
"The proper interpretation of the overall envelope is that
it represents the approximate bounds within which the price
may oscillate. The closer the price approaches the lower boun-
dary at a point in time, the higher the probability it will ap-
16 ? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
proach the upper boundary at a later point in time (and vice
versa)."
After the late 1980s, "there is a large uncertainty in the
projected year by year prices," the report says. "In particular,
price peaks and valleys tend to get out of phase for projections
based on different sets of assumptions. Thus, the most that
should be concluded from the price projections after the late
1980s is the general magnitude of the upward price trend and
that the market will be unstable."
In the U.S., demand estimates are based on projected
nuclear plant capacities climbing to 130 Gw in the low case,
160 Gw in the mid case and 200 Gw in the high case by the
year 2000. In 1990, 109 Gw, 121 Gw and 136 Gw are pro-
jected for the low, mid and high cases, respectively. The high
case is similar to DOE's high-case projection, but the mid case
"runs close" to the DOE low case, and the low case "is sub-
stantially lower than the DOE low case," the report notes.
Uranium demand is figured in the low case to rise from
about 22,000 tons in 1990 to 24,700 tons in 2000. In the mid
case, it climbs from 24,300 tons to 33,000 tons. In the high
case, demand is 27,700 tons in 1990 and 43,100 in 2000. Ex-
cess inventory of 34,300 tons is projected to start declining by
1982. Unfilled demand "is projected to build up steadily
through the 1980s, from about zero today to 4,000 tons per
year by 1985 and to 12,000 tons per year by 1990."
The projections are based on the assumption that there
will be no reprocessing in the US. They also are based on en-
riching tails assays of 0.2%, 21/2-year lead times, conversion
yields of 99.5%, and a few other factors.
For demand in the Western world outside the US., esti-
mates by DOE's Energy Information Administration are used.
They are based on EIA's low- and mid-case nuclear generating
capacity projections of, respectively, 165-181 Gw in 1990 and
300-350 Gw in 2000. In the low case demand projections are
27,500 tons in 1990, and 42,700 tons in 2000. In the mid case,
with reprocessing, demand would be 31,600 tons in 1990 and
54,100 tons in 2000; without reprocessing, demand is figured
to rise from 39,300 tons to 69,400 tons.
Production estimates are less precise, the companies say.
Roughly, though, in the U.S., if prices remained at the current
level, production would drop from slightly under 20,000 tons
in 1981 to about 6,000 tons in 1990. If prices rose in 1983 to
a level of $40-50 per pound, production would rise to about
24,000 tons in the late 1980s, dipping slightly by 1990.
Non-U.S. production could rise from under 10,000 tons
in 1980 to anywhere between 20,000 and 60,000 tons in 1990,
depending on prices, which could be $20-50 per pound. By the
year 2000, the range is between about 25,000 and 75,000 tons.
Imports to the U.S. are expected to reach 40-50% of de-
mand in the 1990s, but "uranium prices may not be much low-
er than if use were restricted to 20% to 30% of total U.S. de-
mand," the report says. "The logic for this conclusion is that
the price of imports will be governed by the marginal producer,
and in order for foreign demand to be met primarily from for-
eign production, much higher cost foreign production must
be developed."
Of existing non-US. production capacity, about 20% is
from "economically favorable deposits in Saskatchewan and
Australia. Of the potential new production, about 40% is from
such low cost deposits. Some current high cost foreign produc-
tion capacity will likely be shut down if the current low market
price continues." ? Stephanie Cooke
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?
DOE TAKES A BACK SEAT OKROD STORADE.
WHILE INDUSTRY AND EIHU MOVE FORWARD
Utilities looking for support of. ro onsqllduIgn,ilearil-
ing programs ? not finding much at DOE ? are titroMt
the Electric Power Research Institute (Epd)instsad.,41:,ipittut-
pects to have about $200,000 to &matot anckatTurtakk 194
and "could easily double that in following years,'? *mottling, ,
to an Epri source. ,
Epri's involvement at this point is very preliminary ,that.
source said. So far three utilities ham approached the orpai! ,
zation for support and more are expected. TImitis IS Of ..
interest in a joint program," in which utilities, mil& pOoitheir, ,
efforts, but just how such a program would evolve 401, not deer,
he said.
What is clear is that, with limited budges.for its spent-,
fuel storage program, DOE Tal be oconeentranne hi efforts
on cask storage rather 4144 rod consolidation. Iq prat years,
the program had about $20rmillion pot year; the leVet now
is about $6-million per year, i DOE source
Earlier this year, Northeast Utilities approached *
agency for help. "We could possibly help them later, butt
would be a major strain ,on the budget now stul we just CM%
do it now. As we begin to getisomeOf them otherprogreme
behind us we can look forward to some of these other, thipas?.
Hopefully casks will be wrapped up in a year or two. As soon
as a couple of utilities have licenses on casks there will be no
other need for us to be Involved."
The extent of DOE involvement in rod consolidetion ?
at least for the immediate future ? was explained in a Nov. 6
letter from the agency's Office of Nuclear Energy to prospec-
tive participants in a rod-consolidation program. "We would
expect a major portion of the cost burden to be borne by the
utilities and by the manufacturer of the equipment which will
be demonstrated," the letter stated.
44Pcii our tiwnpiii** fiiivemileited a coitelnsion thk
the disassembly process lisated*dan important *erequistati
for storage of consolidated lade; it * Of giffidlent
to the Nuclear Regulatory. CO adthet the'
of Energy involvement would 40400 tkil,
have seen sufficient initiative and Capabilities InIfti,Prtiateiec-
tor to convince us that our involseitint in equm?eil.
opment Should be limited tOenguririg a viableCoMixistitive en-
vironment and to ensure that we have safe capabilities.
"The department's rolethouldithereforeAsiimitedFto
addressing the seismic response and pool loading =widow
tions whiCh do seem to be of morecoacern.the hope to ac-
complish this as a minor participant with utilities, their a-ei
(architect-engineers), and with Orifittindttstry suppliers Of
disassembly and storage equipment and settees."
A DOE source told NuclearFuel that its tod-consolida-
tion program with the Tennesiee valley Authority? a $1:1-
million effort to consolidate about a dozen assembilet
important because "it kicks off the work," but ".vs don't
have the flexibility to go tutifeni With anyone any ntotet" DO
involvement therefore will:be 4044t1 to. eriftWere,Nbaithe
agency might like to be involvedla shag With the WA pro-
gram, he said, is a rod-consolidation program for a PWR that
would involve placing consolidated rods (*.Waling siidatiess
steel racks instead of the high-density poison racks because it
would "allow us to test licensing hut not to the hilt" Such a
II I
program would likely not "tan* of leduudiugy *Ass?!
geld to being able to predict pool ;f!ind,761,11_01..
lytical techniques may be adequate.?,
The next step, if there is funding, would be "to go all
the way" with "all the rods in the pool mid high-density poison
racks," such as Northeast suggested, . I'm looking for some-
thing that fits in between and ISSOMiettereNTheite*
termediate step "might be befom 4. .Mee* to go go that way." Rod consolidadost ? hava4lowarpri, -
oritrthinlouf.quic program
he Ode& but "oelY POoPla.vAtli
dattUtt:'
Ankalustry source
Late step. He predicted Northeast
a complete pregteel *WM:4M
demonitration aides*
proceeds soon there wcn1d bi no
said. That suAteeeinl -501e0ectfel
is limited to seism*,
studies tend to he_SenegiOAR
must be "extremely plata
, A DOE loom conceded
but be 1844Nch sthdiesa$1!.:
list:1 end that the typsof
able." Meanwhile, an indmarit
there is enough interest On sP41.
to limit the need for DOE invol
reactor storage was abandoned, be
dation ,"got commercial reallast:
business include U.S. Tool 41Piek
Combustion Engineering *04W
ontefOre Auk,"
eteckW, PP**
geed forAklistarmed.
$0 *1St .44#0.41..
Anotalttrkf0 OP,*
ilk**
the middle stop, he
ft Doh if it
Stadies.,13013
WPC*: studies,
,
nProbblan theres"
lonthe priority
mar.41.4*110111-,
NI* POE that
lathe industry
Once awarifrom
?in ccasoli-
ffentetttoes for the .
AP40111Ce Corp.,
f 1981 were
oil a year lief
quarter
$Sit ed to a
to September 1980. or the
earnings were $287,000 on $83
to net iiinffiglof $2.8-million
1980. Thittlit
pounds of U308 Compared to
and 'produced aiits sequoyak Oldt
million kg cif UR conspired t04
months of 1980. Production Of
totaled 3.6-militonP041101/ dOWIL1,
MK ago because of "the
01 del* In nudes: poi/et
Berr-Me,w said.
rJul
owii
theofi 1 ; net
In sales, compared
055? ? -
h11980;-
loptembee k(11;44i
the MY lealed
r uranium caused
en4,110#0141'.
SOUTH AFRICANS' URANIUM
Two South African gold
land Harmony Mines, report
nye in the quarter that ended
Blyvooruitzicht's uranium
ter making $1,315,000 in the June
buted to a deferred sale. Uranium pr
from 85,294 kg in the June.
At
At Harmony, revenue fromi
ic acid ? which fall under one
RS PT..-
thyikesuitatcht
revenues from uran-
Or.
lott 41490 af-
The loss emeattri-
lion fell to 78,336 kg
?
PYriteuraniumendthendPburnisio;.,
NuclearFuel ? November 23,1981 ?17
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portion ? fell to $4,371,100 from $9,655,800. Production in-
creased slightly from 146,593 kg in the June quarter to 152,419
kg in the September quarter.
AMERICAN NUCLEAR REVENUE CLIMBS
BUT irs NOT COMING FROM URANIUM
American Nuclear Corp. continued its retreat from uran-
ium in its fiscal 1982 first quarter as activity by its contract
drilling division provided 96% of the company's $2,085,000
gross revenues in the period, up from a 46% contribution in
the comparable quarter a year ago. That revenue figure rose
13% from the previous year's $1,843,000, but net income in
the quarter, which ended Aug. 31, dropped from $220,000
to $149,000.
President John C. Ferguson told shareholders at the an-
nual meeting that he expects the American Drilling Co. divi-
sion to remain the corporation's primary source of revenues
and operating earnings for the near term. He said income from
uranium activities had decreased from the same period a year
ago, noting the Tennessee Valley Authority order earlier this
year to terminate operations at the Gas Hills uranium mining/
milling project of TVA and Federal American Partners (NF,
31 Aug., 2; 16 March, 15). American Nuclear owns a 40%
stake in FAP.
In line with this, uranium production at the 950 ton per
day Gas Hills mill, near Riverton, Wyo., was ended this month
by FAP, the contract operator under the partnership deal with
TVA. FAP laid off 22 mill workers but kept 70 others on the
payroll to clean up the facilities and "mothball" equipment.
Abiitit 30 of them will be discharged over the next few months.
The others will be assigned to monitoring interim reclamation,
stabilization of mine and mill properties, and security.
The FAP mine in the Gas Hills was closed last February
and the mill has been operating on stockpiled ore.
GULF SLOWS DEVELOPMENT AT MOUNT TAYLOR
Development of Gulf Mineral Resources' Mount Taylor
uranium mine, 60 miles northwest of Albuquerque, N.M., is
being slowed with the layoff of 100 of 700 employees. Gulf
officials say, however, that they remain optimistic on long-
term prospects for uranium and have no plans to stop
development.
Ken Barnhill, general manager of Gulfs New Mexico uran-
ium operations, says the mine will operate on a five-day work
week rather than the seven-day work week that has been in
effect. He adds that workers will continue to develop the mine
which now produces 300-500 tons/day of ore grading more
than five pounds of uranium oxide per ton.
Gulf, which started construction of the Mount Taylor
mine in 1974, had originally planned to reach maximum pro-
duction of 4,500 tons/day by the mid-1980s, but this sched-
ule is being adjusted because of the depressed uranium market.
Barnhill said he was not sure, because of economic conditions,
when the mine would reach planned capacity. Two shafts, one
24 feet in diameter and the other 14 feet, were completed to
the 3,300 foot level in 1979 after five years of construction.
The 4,500-ton/day capacity will be reached, Barnhill says,
"when the demand for uranium and the market price justifies
resuming significant capital expenditures." The Mount Taylor
mine and mill were estimated in 1980 to require an investment
of more than $500-million.
The Mount Taylor deposit is rated by Gulf geologists as
one of the major uranium deposits in North America, with more
than 128-million pounds of uranium oxide representing 22% of
known, low-cost U.S. reserves.
STUDIES OF URANIUM RESERVES IN THE HOGGAR
MOUNTAINS of southern Algeria should be completed by
the end of 1981. The government will then have to decide
whether to press ahead with development, a decision linked
with plans to develop a nuclear power industry. Reserves in
the Hoggar are estimated at up to 50,000 tonnes.
ELF-AQUITAINE AND THE FRENCH COMPANY GEOCON-
SULT are setting up a joint subsidiary in the U.S. specializing
in geophysical and geothermal mining techniques, Elf said in
Paris. The new company, Geoconsult Inc., to be based in Den-
ver, Colo., will be owned 60% by Elf Technologies Inc., the
Elf group's research and development subsidiary, and 40% by
Geoconsult France. Beginning late this year, Geoconsult Inc.
will offer North American clients geophysical and geothermal
mining services.
NuclearFuel is published every other Monday by McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020. Officers of
the Corporation: Harold W. McGraw, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; Joseph L. Dionne, President and Chief Operating Officer;
Robert N. Landes, Senior Vice President and Secretary; Ralph J. Webb, Treasurer.
Nuclear Publications' staff and primary responsibilities:
TELEPHONES Roger Newburger, manager Mickey (Madeline) Epstein, editorial assistant
Rob Laufer, chief editor (Nucleonics Week)
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18? NuclearFuel ? November 23, 1981
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