USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00443R000200370002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ,~ Tmp Secret
USSR Monthly Review
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USSR Monthly Review
September-October fl984
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome.
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Contents
Soviet Strategic Forces Perspective
for Intercontinental
Warfare in the 1990s We believe Soviet pessimism regarding prospects for a relaxation in
the superpower rivalry with the United States reinforces Moscow's
basic view that national security will continue to require strong
military forces and, at a minimum, strategic parity with the United
States. Moscow probably has concluded that, while arms control
efforts may.provide some limits on the strategic nuclear competition,
US strategic programs present a new challenge that will demand a
response regardless of the resource costs. As a result, we can expect
a new impetus over the next decade to already formidable strategic
research, development, and modernization programs.
US-Soviet Relations and Prospects for Arms Control
The Soviet view of long=term bilateral relations with the United
States is dominated by uncertainty.and pessimism. Despite this view
and the current hiatus in talks, the Soviets will attempt to limit US
strategic systems through arms control agreements, particularly in
the areas of space weapons and ballistic missile defense.
.Technology. Trends That Will Affect Soviet Strategic War-Fighting 9
Capabilities in the 1990s
The long leadtime required to develop and produce new weapon and
space systems means that the systems the Soviets will deploy
through the mid-1990s will be based largely on technology devel-
oped indigenously or obtained from the West in the 1975-85 period.
While the Soviets lead the West in some areas, the technology
available to the USSR for application to future military systems is
now generally about five years behind that of the West. Some
narrowing of this gap is expected by the end of the century. ~
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SOV UR 84-009JX '~
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Resource Implications of Soviet Strategic Force Modernization in 13
tLe 1990s
The programs we expect the Soviets to undertake in modernizing
their strategic forces in the coming decade will entail a sharp
increase in spending. In addition to difficulties with the design and
manufacture of complex weapon systems incorporating Soviet state-
of-the-art technology, the Soviets may find the economic require-
ments for this effort far more burdensome than in the past. Because
they are confronted with a declining rate of economic growth, a .
major increase in spending on strategic programs would necessitate
cuts in other military programs or an increase in the share of the
economy going to defense.
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Changing Soviet Doctrine in Central Europe and US War-Fighting 37
Plans
Soviet force developments over the past few years appear to
undercut key assumptions of new US operational conce tl n s for
defeating a Warsaw Pact offensive in Central. Europe.
a realignment of forces
suggests that the Soviets are.changing t eir offensive operational
concepts~ither in reaction to, or coincidental with, the develop-
ment. of new US doctrine and in ways inimical to it.
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Soviet Transportation: ALook at Its Improved Performance
The performance of the Soviet transportation sector continues to
improve. The recovery of the railroads is largely the result of a
program prescribed by Brezhnev in 1979. The benefits of the
program were delayed by its unbalanced and unenforced implemen-
tation in the early 1980s and by a series of external disruptions to
rail transportation from 1979 through 1982. The performance of
other carriers has been mixed: gas pipeline traffic was up 15 percent
in the first half of this year, but highway and river traffic declined.
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Briefs Soviets Expand Industrial Management Experiment
Major. Siberian River Diversion Project
Another Soviet Retail Price Reductiogl
Guineans Grant Soviets Fishing Port
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Soviet Strategic Forces for
Intercontinental Warfare in the 1990s
Perspective
We believe Soviet pessimism regarding prospects for a relaxation in the
superpower rivalry with the United States reinforces Moscow's basic view
that national security will continue to require strong military forces and, at
a minimum, strategic parity with the United States. Moscow probably has
concluded that, while arms control efforts may provide some limits on the
strategic nuclear competition, US strategic programs present a new
challenge that will demand a response regardless of the resource costs. As a
result, we can expect a new impetus over the next decade to already
form strategic research, development, and modernization programs.
Missions and Objectives
We expect little change over the next decade in the missions and objectives
that guide the development, procurement, and employment of Soviet
strategic forces. There is a standing requirement-almost irrespective of
the particular US administration,. policy framework, or military programs
facing the USSR at any given time-for strategic forces that can mount
effective attacks to cripple US military potential and national resolve.
These forces also must provide active and passive defenses to help limit
damage to the Soviet homeland and protect and sustain a command and
control capability as well as the leadership required to direct and coordi-
nate military operations and the eventual reconstitution of the country.
The Soviet approach to nuclear strategy has been inherently inhospitable to
Western notions that place a sharp distinction between "deterrence" and
"war-fighting" requirements. Moscow has consequently been unresponsive
to calls for restraint in the buildup of strategic forces and in the
.deployment of counterforce and various defensive systems that the West
has claimed to be unnecessarily provocative.
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SOV UR 84-009JX
. October 1984
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It is doubtful that the Soviets are counting on arms control initiatives to
play a significant role in managing the arms competition over the next
decade. The Soviets seem to view arms control as a supplement to-not a
substitute for-a strong strategic arsenal. They are likely, therefore, to
value arms control agreements and adherence to the ABM Treaty as only
one means of trying to head off the more threatening US programs, such as
the Strategic Defense Initiative and antisatellite weapons. Negotiations
also provide the opportunity to propagandize the Soviet "peace" image and
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to undercut popular support for Western military programs.
A strong strategic force posture also underpins an assertive Soviet foreign
policy in peacetime. Such a force is most likely to impress-and, if possible,
intimidate-foreign audiences. Moscow is likely to continue to appreciate
that, while it has fielded large conventional forces throughout the postwar
era, it acquired true superpower status only when, by the late 1960s, it had
registered major achievements in its strategic nuclear capabilities.
Soviet Perceptions oJthe Nuclear Threat
The Soviets believe that, despite the unprecedented destructiveness of
nuclear war and determined efforts to avoid it, an all-out nuclear war
between the United States and the Soviet Union remains a distinct
possibility. We believe, however, that-recent "war scare" rhetoric not-
withstanding-the Soviets see little likelihood that the United States would
initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a peacetime posture. Instead, they
believe NATO most likely would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to
prevent a conventional defeat by the Warsaw Pact. In turn, we judge the
Soviets would prefer to count on the numerical preponderance of Warsaw
Pact conventional forces to achieve their military and political objectives.
Moscow would be unlikely to initiate nuclear conflict unless Pact conven-
tional forces were faced with a major defeat or unless they detected signs
that. NATO was preparing to use nuclear weapons.
The Soviets have tried in recent years to achieve greater survivability and
more operational flexibility in their force structure and control mechanisms
for fighting a nuclear war. Although military writings
indicate that they would prefer to seize the initiative and launch a
large, preemptive strike, they have worked to diversify their employment
options, developing alaunch-on-tactical-warning (LOTW) capability. They
have sought to reduce vulnerability by emphasizing mobility for their
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) forces as well as their command and control assets. They
also have created bastion areas to protect their ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) from attack. Such developments are responses, at least in part, to
the inherent uncertainties in nuclear warfare, including the possibility of
having to fight a protracted, all-out nuclear war.
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Strategic ~Oeaddenges
Soviet' military planners must contend with various ongoing or projected
military efforts by the United States and NATO that challenge the
USSR's ability to continue to meet its strategic force objectives in the
1990s.; These challenges include:
The ;Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM, which, depending on the extent of its
eventual deployment, will enhance the US counterforce threat against
the USSR.
The projected US small mobile ICBM, which will pose additional and
more complicated targeting requirements for Soviet forces.
The Trident II/D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) sys-
tem, ,which will give the United States a genuine sea-based counterforce
capability-one Moscow could not effectively counter with its current
LOTW and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
The US B-1 B and advanced-technology (Stealth) bombers along with
deployments of ground-, air-, and sea-launched cruise missiles, which
pose substantial air defense challenges for the USSR.
Deployment in Europe of Pershing IIs, which can threaten important
strategic assets in the western USSR, such as key command and control
installations. They also have a short flight time, which would complicate
a Soviet LOTW effort. The Soviets also may believe that either current
or follow-on systems could threaten key command installations in the
Moscow area.
The US Strategic Defense Initiative aimed at eventually providing a
space=based defense nullifying (or at least reducing) Moscow's longstand-
ing strength in counterforce capabilities. Such US advances could nullify
also the USSR's near monopoly in strategic defenses.
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? Improvements in British and French nuclear forces, which, by the mid-
1990s, could result in a combined total of around 1,000 reentry vehicles
for use against the USSR.
? Advances in US/NATO concepts and capabilities for conventional
warfare in Europe, such as conventionally armed, long-range cruise
missiles, that would enable the Alliance-without resorting to nuclear
weapons-to strike the Soviet homeland and reduce Soviet strategic
forces before they can be used.
Technological and Economic Factors
To develop and produce weapons for the 1990s capable of sustaining the
growth of Soviet military power and countering Western progress will
require advances in carious technologies, many of which the Soviets will
need to import from the West
working on advanced technologies or weapon app ci ations, but they will
particularly need to improve their capabilities to mass-produce such
technologies to match the challenges of the 1990s.
The Soviets are likely to find the resource requirements for the moderniza-
tion of their forces more burdensome than in the past. The two previous up-
swings in strategic expenditures-in the late 1960s and mid-1970s-
coincided with periods of steady growth in the economy. In contrast, an up-
swing beginning in the late 1980s would correspond with what we believe
will be a period of relatively slow or declining rates of economic growth.
Although we estimate that the Soviet economy is large enough and strong
enough to support a major strategic modernization effort, such an effort
could hinder the improvement of overall industrial productivity and may
require cuts elsewhere in the defense budget. ~~
Forces Expected in the 1990s
Soviet military planners currently are preparing the 1986-90 five-year
defense plan and are making decisions that will determine to a significant
degree the capabilities, size, and composition of the USSR's strategic
forces in the 1990s. They will strive. to keep US and NATO military
programs from undoing and perhaps even reversing their hard-won strate-
gic gains of the last two decades
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The major trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces in the early
19906 probably will include:
Continued reliance on the ICBM force as the backbone for intercontinen-
tal strikes and on the IRBM force for meeting nuclear mission require-
ments on the periphery.
Advances in ICBM accuracy and increases in the number of hard-target-
capable warheads.
Efforts to achieve increased effectiveness and enhanced survivability
through the deployment of more warheads on SLBMs and mobile
ICBMs.
A more diversified attack force through the deployment of long-range
cruise missiles and advanced bombers.
Improved command, control, and communications capabilities through
increased hardening and the deployment of mobile systems.
Increased emphasis on air defense to counter aerodynamic targets that
fly at low altitudes and those that have very small radar cross sections.
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The Soviets could pose significant challenges to the United States later in
the 1990s if they succeed in making technological breakthroughs in the
application of lasers and directed energy to such tough areas as space and
ballistic missile defense. Similarly, any breakthrough in the creation of an
effective ASW capability could provide the Soviets with a significant gain
over their current capabilities
we judge that there is little possibility that t ey wi e a e
to ep oy a sys em that could reliably monitor US SSBNs patrolling in the
open ocean.
The articles that follow discuss major trends in Soviet strategic forces in
the 1990s that will affect their nuclear war-fighting capabilities.
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US-Soviet Relations and
Prospects for Arms Control
Soviet Leadership Perceptions
The Soviet leadership is less certain today than it was
a decade ago about the long-term course of US-Soviet
relations. In the early 1970s the Soviets probably
hoped that detente would become the dominant influ-
ence on the bilateral relationship, limiting new US
strategic programs while allowing the USSR to build
up its own strategic arsenal and to expand its relations
with Western Europe and its influence in the Third
World without serious challenge from the United
States.
This Soviet perception was jolted by a series of events,
including Congressional insistence that US trade con-
cessions be conditional upon an improvement in Soviet
human rights performance; growing US reaction to
Soviet interventions in the Third World, particularly
Angola and Ethiopia; US nonratification of the SALT
II agreement; the NATO decision to deploy new US
intermediate-range missiles in Europe in response to
Soviet deployment of SS-20s; and US sanctions re-
sulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
from Moscow's role in suppressing the Solidarity
movement in Poland.
The election of a US administration with the stated
resolve to challenge the USSR globally while substan-
tially modernizing US strategic forces further deep-
ened Kremlin concern that US policy had taken a
fundamentally anti-Soviet turn. Indeed, Soviet com-
mentary on the current US election~campaign has
charged that the Democratic Party platform offers no
real alternative to the current administration's poli-
cies, despite its criticism of them.
Not surprisingly, this political assessment triggered a
reassessment by some Soviet officials of the implica-
tions of US policy for Soviet national security. As
early as June 1980, a Central Committee resolution
asserted that US actions had increased the danger of
war and that this required strengthening Soviet de-
fense capabilities.' In recent months, Defense Minis-
ter Ustinov has accused the United States of prepar-
ing for war and affirmed that the USSR will not allow
the military "equilibrium" to be upset. Meanwhile,
Politburo member and party secretary Gorbachev has
stated that "mounting aggressiveness" from the West
requires the USSR "more than ever" to strengthen its
There appear, however, to be variations in the degree
of urgency the Soviet leaders assign to the US
military threat and to the need for measures to
counter it. General Secretary Chernenko stated on 29
April that the worsened international situation does 25X1
not require extending the workweek, setting up a
special fund for the defense of the country, or delay-
ing implementation of programs to raise the living
standard of the Soviet people. Gorbachev, even while
calling for strengthened defenses, denied that detente
has been "irreversibly undermined." In June, the
elite-oriented newspaper Literaturnaya Gazeta pub-
lished afictional dialogue by the influential political
commentator Fedor Burlatskiy arguing that, although
"some people" might disagree, the threat of war is less
now than in 1939 or in the 1950s.
Moreover, while the Soviet view of long-term relations
with the United States appears to be predominantly
pessimistic, there are voices arguing that "objective
factors"-particularly US budget deficits and the
allegedly growing "peace movement"-will force
changes in US policy independently of any Soviet
action.2 The continued airing of these views suggests
that the Soviets have yet to determine the extent of
increase in their strategic programs for the 1990s.
Although the advanced age of current Soviet leaders
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of the Politburo during the next few years, one tenet
of Soviet policy will not change-Moscow's determi-
nation not to allow any deterioration in its strategic
position vis-a-vis the United States.
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Arms Control Outlook
In an attempt to avoid competition in areas where the
United States enjoys a technological advantage, the
Soviets almost certainly will continue to attempt to
limit US systems through arms control proposals,
notwithstanding the current hiatus in talks. The
scheduled completion of NATO cruise missile and
Pershing II deployments in Europe by the end of this
decade is likely to result in an intensification of Soviet
efforts in the INF field toward restricting US for-
ward-based aircraft and limiting the modernization of
US and allied systems, especially those including new
technologies such as stealth. They probably believe
there is at least some chance over the longer term that
political pressure in the United States or Western
Europe will compel US leaders to alter some arms
control positions and perhaps curtail some military
programs. Moreover, portraying, themselves as advo-
cates of arms control is almost certain to remain a
central theme of Soviet propaganda.
Although arms control initiatives may provide the
Soviets new opportunities, they probably believe that
the strategic environment in the 1990s may make
reaching arms control agreements even more difficult
than in the past. The modernization of British and
French nuclear forces along with the expansion of
Chinese strategic forces makes any agreement limited
only to US and Soviet forces potentially more prob-
lematic. These difficulties are likely to be further
compounded by the rapid pace of technological ad-
vances in weapon system development. The Soviets
are likely to increase their efforts, therefore, to re-
strict the expansion of third-country forces through
regional arms control proposals. They are also likely
in any future negotiations with the United States to
place even more stress on their demands for compen-
sation for non-US forces.
Soviet arms control proposals will continue to allow
for deployment of new Soviet strategic offensive sys-
tems likely to begin in the mid-to-late 1980s. Indeed,
the Soviet START proposal appears intended to
protect those key strategic development programs for
the remainder of the decade. In contrast, the Soviets
view the US START proposal as threatening both
their existing strategic force posture and their planned
force improvements-particularly in the field of
ICBM deployments.
A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy in the
years ahead also will be its emphasis on limiting
ballistic missile defense and space weapon systems-
areas where the Soviets believe they are at a long-
term technological disadvantage despite their current
lead in deployable systems. They will continue to
support adherence to the ABM Treaty as long as they
believe it serves their efforts to deter or postpone
deployment of US systems while proceeding with
their own research. Unless they achieve a major
developmental breakthrough, they will oppose any US
effort to modify the Treaty to allow for new ABM
defenses.
Perceiving an across-the-board US technological lead
in the space weapons field, the Soviets will seek as
broad a ban as possible on the testing and deployment
of weapons in space and on earth-based weapons for
use against space targets. They will not necessarily
maintain their current insistence on a comprehensive
ban on space weapons. They may demonstrate some
flexibility, which could result in the acceptance of
mutual capabilities against low-altitude satellites in
return for a ban on high-altitude antisatellite
weapons.
Whatever direction US-Soviet relations and arms
control negotiations take over the next decade, the
Soviets will continue to rely primarily upon their own
military might to maintain strategic parity with the
United States. Whenever they conclude that their
position is threatened by US advances, or see opportu-
nities for advances of their own, they will introduce
new programs or accelerate those already in train.
Their bleak portrayals of the state of bilateral rela-
tions may be intended in part to justify the additional
investment this will require.
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The long leadtime required to develop and produce
new weapon and space systems means that the sys-
tems the Soviets will deploy through the mid-1990s
will be based largely on the technology developed
indigenously or obtained from the West in the 1975-
85 period. In general, the technology available to the
USSR for application to future military systems is
about five years behind that in the West. Some
changes to systems. under development may be incor-
porated in midstream, but the Soviets usually institute
a technology freeze early in a program. They evident-
ly believe that a stable development process using
relatively proven technologies limits the risks entailed
in new programs. Nevertheless, the USSR is now
moving toward greater efforts in developing complex
multimission weapons that can compete with Western
systems, rather than the traditional emphasis on those
with design simplicity and. a single mission.
Research and Development
Fielding more capable systems has required the Sovi-
ets to increase resources for research and development
(R&D). Over the past 20 years, they have doubled the
number of research institutes, including increases in
those dedicated to defense, and
~ave increased defense-re ate tasking of
institutes outside the defense industry. The steady
expansion of their existing design bureaus is also an
indicator of their efforts to incorporate new, more
complex technologies. All this expansion has allowed
them to continue to support simultaneously the num-
ber of programs that they have conducted in the
past-about 200.
Of equal importance, the Soviets have pursued awell-
organized national program for acquiring Western
technologies in an effort to reduce costs and develop-
ment time. They are especially dependent on Western
technology for computers, microelectronics, and auto-
mated production technologies. They also face major
limitations in signal processing technology and in
precision test equipment. Their lag behind the West in
key technologies will continue to hamper many pro-
grams, including those for antisubmarine warfare
(ASW ,aircraft, and command and control systems.
Despite their many problems, the Soviets currently
lead the United States in several key technologies
ovie s wi mcreasmg y emphasize advanced radar
and electro-optical sensors in an effort to counter US
stealth technology.
Prior to the mid-1960s, the Soviets attempted to
accelerate the introduction of technological advances
into some new weapon systems, but these efforts
proved largely unsuccessful. Responding to these fail-
ures, the Soviets began to add new technologies to
weapon designs at a more measured pace, incorporat-
ing advances only after the completion of applied
research. This approach has resulted in a persistent
modernization effort that has been characterized by
gradual improvements to systems and that has com-
pensated somewhat for Soviet production weaknesses
as well as for the attendant technological lag behind
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Prordaection
The Soviets have had some success in reorganizing
industries and modernizing facilities to hasten the
assimilation of new technology into production. They 25X1
have been less successful in producing weapon systems
that rely on substantial advances in technology. Prob-
lems in system integration, production engineering,
and quality control frequently result in prolonged
startup times as well as slow rates of production for
high-technology systems. A combination of other fac-
tors-more multipurpose weapons, higher costs, and
more difficult and costly maintenance requirements=
is likely, in many cases, to cause the Soviets to
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produce new and more technically advanced systems
more slowly and in smaller quantities than weapon
systems based on evolutionary advances in technol-
ogy.
Projected Soviet Advances
We base our projections of Soviet weapon systems of
the 1990s on evidence of programs now in develop-
ment and technology trends. However, our under-
standing of specific Soviet technologies is not
uniform.'
Strategic Ojlensive Systems. Soviet emphasis in the
development of new strategic offensive systems will be
on greater payload capabilities that will result in
increased numbers of reentry vehicles, as well as on
improved accuracy. We expect that by the early 1990s
the Soviets will develop ICBMs with CEPS of about
lthough we expect them also to pursue
the development of maneuvering reentry vehicles
(MaRVs) for ICBMs, they probably will not master
required sensor technologies in time to begin deploy-
ing ICBM MaRVs before the early-to-middle 1990s.
We also expect the GLONASS global positioning
satellite to provide continuous, precise navigation to
military users, thereby increasing the accuracy of
mobile delivery systems.
Other accuracy improvements on systems fielded in
the 1990s probably will incorporate autonomous posi-
tion update systems to correct navigation errors for
their long-range, land-attack cruise missiles. Both
active and passive sensors probably will be developed
for the missiles' terminal flight phase to improve their
accuracy. Such developments will permit use of small-
er nuclear, or even conventional, warheads against
hardened or small targets.
The Soviets could increase the payload capabilities of
their liquid-propellant missiles. For example, they
could achieve an improvement of about 20 to 30
percent by increasing rocket engine chamber pres-
sures. By the early 1990s the use of advanced propel-
lants could yield another 15- to 30-percent improi~e-
ment
target in which 50 percent of the attacking weapons are expected to
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There is an extensive body of literature dating from
the 1960s demonstrating Soviet knowledge of, and
research in, stealth-type techniques to achieve weapon
survivability. Aircraft and cruise missiles retrofitted 25X1
with radar-absorbing paints or structural materials
could be deployed by the early 1990s. Further reduc-
tions of radar cross sections could be achieved after
the mid-1990s by incorporating body shaping along
with radar-absorbing materials in new systems. In
their ICBM force, however, the Soviets will continue
as they have since the 1950s to stress mobility and
alternative basing options to reduce vulnerability. ~ 25X 25X1
Strategic Defensive Systems. The Soviets' growing
problems in strategic defense also will require some
technologically advanced systems.
Moreover, the Soviets are undoubtedly concerned that
rapid US advances in ballistic missile defense could
eventually put them at a relative disadvantage if
either side abrogated the ABM Treaty. Their vulnera-
bility to low-altitude bomber and cruise missile pene-
tration will be extended as more air- and ground-
launched cruise missiles are fielded and especially as
stealth bombers and advanced cruise missiles become
operational in the 1990s.
ABM radar improvements allowing the Soviets to
detect reentry vehicles accompanied by penetration
aids are likely. ABM interceptors will be more ma-
neuverable and may incorporate a homing guidance
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These Soviet subma-
Targets with
very small radar cross sections, such as the supersonic
AGM-69 short-range attack missile (SRAM), will
continue to be beyond Soviet capabilities. We are
uncertain, as to the future operational effectiveness of
Soviet air defenses against a coordinated US attack,
given their current limitations in communication .and
data systems for coordination of air defense assets as
well as their problems in training and operational
procedures.
New land-based air defense and ground-controlled-
intercept radars with better signal. processing capabili-
ties will allow detection of some targets with small
radar cross sections. SAM. systems with greater fire-
power, mobility, and flexibility-possibly supplement-
ed by air defense lasers for close-in attack-will allow
simultaneous engagements of aircraft, cruise missiles,
We expect aircraft to carry advanced infrared electro-
optical sensors and imaging radars. They probably
will also have a number of advanced electronic war-
fare systems including highly capable jamming sys-
tems. High-speed computers and high-capacity data
links will provide the potential for a more highly
automated command system to coordinate various
Soviet defense assets.
Work in underwater acoustics as well as digital and
optical signal processing will result in ship, subma-
rine, aircraft, and limited-coverage shore-based ASW
detection systems by the 1990s that have essentially
the same technical characteristics as those deployed
by the United States today. Soviet nonacoustic sen-
sors probably will have limited capabilities. One
system using airborne radars to detect submarine
wakes may become operational, but detection would
be possible only under certain favorable oceano-
graphic and submarine operational conditions. Space-
borne systems will still tie under research.
rines probably will have improved hull material and
structures that will make them capable of diving to
.greater depths. Moreover, Soviet activity in the design
and testing of advanced submarine propulsion systems
may allow sustained speeds for some classes in the 40-
to 45-knot range or may allow very large fractions of
the submarine's weight to be devoted to nonpropulsion
purposes. If the United States continues to improve its
ASW capabilities, however, the Soviets probably will
remain at a significant disadvantage.
ous, secure, and reliable communications.
Space Systems. Space systems improvements in the
1990s~wi11 provide the Soviet leadership with a more
effective worldwide command, control, and communi-
cations capability and a more extensive attack-warn-
ing capability approximating that which the United
States achieved over five years ago. Soviet geostation-
ary communications satellites will provide command
and control communications on a global basis, serving
a greatly increased number of fixed and mobile
military users with-at least in peacetime-continu-
Soviet spacecraft will provide much more timely
intelligence in the 1990s for use in indications and
warning and in determining the status, composition,
and disposition of forces to support strategic planning
and operations. The expected satellite data relay
system will allow near-real-time passage of data from
a number of satellites in low Earth orbits. Their
developmental electro-optical imaging system, for ex-
ample, will provide worldwide near-real-time imagery
of targets. The new manned space stations and the
manned space plane could provide important supple-
mental reconnaissance coverage.
We believe current and prospective US antisatellite
capabilities will stimulate the Soviets to increase the
survivability of their satellite systems. Various meas-
ures, such as maneuvering to avoid interception and
hardening to protect against nuclear or laser damage,
could be taken. The Soviets might also use techniques
to reduce the detectability of their spacecraft.
The USSR may begin to field advanced ASAT
systems in the mid-1990s. The first operational space-
based lasers will probably have an ASAT mission
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against low-altitude targets. Near the end of the
century, directed-energy ASAT systems for use
against high-altitude space systems may be tested.
Military Implications
Despite these anticipated advances, we project that
the Soviets will generally remain behind the West in
the development of most new technologies. The cur-
rent and prospective upswing in US military research
and development commitments will pose a major
challenge to Soviet military R&D and make it more
difficult for the USSR to close existing technology
gaps, even though its military R&D will continue for
some years to benefit from the large investment that
characterized the past.
As a result, we see the Soviets continuing to rely on-
and probably having to increase-their massive effort
to acquire foreign technology. They also are likely to
continue conducting extensive research programs to
demonstrate the feasibility of new technologies before
proceeding into development.
Technological strengths in several areas=such as
storable liquid-propellant rocket engines, titanium
alloy fabrication, and liquid-metal-cooled nuclear pro-
pulsion systems-reflect design choices different from
those of the United States and, although providing
some unique weapons capabilities, do not necessarily
Persistent inadequacies in production technologies
and test equipment will continue generally to hamper
the availability and reliability of deployed military
systems. The initial production startup of new high-
. technology systems has often encountered problems.
The Soviet Union is beginning to develop more techni-
cally complex multimission weapons and space sys-
tems. Many systems for the mid-1990s will, however,
incorporate technologies that are currently in US
systems or will be designed to counter the current LJS
threat. The Soviet acquisition process does compen-
sate somewhat for this lag by placing technological
advances more frequently into modernized versions of
deployed systems than does the United States. In a
few cases, this has resulted in advanced technologies
entering Soviet forces before they were incorporated
in US systems. In the late 1990s and beyond, some
military systems will include a number of military
technologies that lag the' West by no more than three
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provide clear-cut military advantages.
Although the Soviets have made important gains in
recent years, serious shortcomings in computer tech-
nologies will hamper their programs in antiballistic
missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and com-
mand and control systems. Limitations in signal pro-
cessing technology will seriously impede their capabil-
ities to defend against US stealth technology in the
1990s. A key to their success in this area is whether,
in the near term, they can improve their ability to
produce high-quality microelectronics and optical
components in quantity or make major advances in
the linking of their analog, optical, and digital pro=
cessing capabilities.
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Resource Implications of
Soviet Strategic Force
Modernization in the 1990s
The modernization of Soviet strategic forces in the
coming decade will probably entail a sharp increase
in spending. In addition to difficulties with the
design and manufacture of complex weapon sys-
tems incorporating Soviet state-of-the-art technol-
ogy, the Soviets .may find the economic require-
ments to be more burdensome than in the past.
Unlike previous strategic modernization efforts,
which coincided with periods of steady growth in
the economy, this one will occur during a period of
declining economic growth. A major increase in
spending on strategic programs, therefore, would
necessitate cuts in other military programs or an
increase in the share of the economy going to
defense.
Similar Spending Upswings in the Past
The resource implications of future strategic force
modernization can best be understood when placed
in the context of two previous Soviet modernization
efforts (see. graph). The first began in the mid-
1960s and was characterized by a physical expan-
sion of strategic offensive and defensive forces.
Expenditures for strategic forces grew at about 10
percent a year during this period. A second spend-
ing upswing, which began in 1973, was largely due
to qualitative improvements and an increase in the
number of warheads on strategic ballistic missiles.
Growth in Soviet spending during the second period
was not as rapid as during the first. Indeed,
spending on strategic programs plateaued after
1974 and declined as a share of total defense
spending-from about one-quarter in the mid-
1970s to less than one-fifth in the early 198Us~
Soviet Investment and Operating
Expenditures for Strategic Programs,
1965-83
4
3 ~ 1
i
Other
1 i~~~~l~~~~l~~~~l~~~
0 1965 70 75 80 83?
a Our estimate for 1983 is influenced by lead costs associated with weapons
expected to be deployed in the succeeding two to three years. It may
change as we collect additional information on Soviet activities.
high levels of series production because the more
sophisticated technology of newer systems requires
high-quality machinery for manufacturing and
testing materials and components as well as for
precision processing.
The slower growth pattern of spending for strategic
forces in the 1970s was consistent with the pattern
of total defense spending during that period. In
part, it reflects Soviet policy decisions to adhere to
arms control agreements concluded in the 1970s. In
addition, the Soviets encountered technical prob-
lems that may have significantly delayed the start
of series production of some weapon systems. They
may also have encountered problems in achieving
OutlookJor Strategic Force Expenditures
The leveling off of Soviet investment in weapons and
military facilities and operating costs for strategic
programs since the mid-1970s was a major contribu-
tor to a slowing in the rate of growth of total defense
expenditures-from the historical rate of about 4
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percent a year to about 2 percent. Unless the upcom-
ing modernization of the strategic forces is accompa-
nied by offsetting reductions in spending for nonstra-
tegic military programs, an increase in the growth of
total defense spending seems likely. We do not know
how fast the Soviets plan to modernize their strategic
forces,. but growth in spending between 4 and 7
.percent is likely, given Soviet military requirements
and the number and type of weapon systems in
research, development, and testing.' This assessment
assumes that no new unforeseen technological or
manufacturing problems arise. These rates of growth
would accelerate total defense spending from the
current 2 percent to between 2.5 and 3 percent a year,
even if spending on,nonstrategic military programs
were limited to about 2 percent. ~~
We believe that the Soviets would find a sharp
upswing in strategic expenditures and the more mod-
erate acceleration in overall defense spending more of
a burden than in the past. Since 1965, growth in the
economy has matched growth in total defense spend-
ing, so the defense share of GNP has remained fairly
constant at about 13 to 14 percent. The two previous
upswings in spending on strategic programs coincided
with periods of steady growth in the economy-5
percent in the late 1960s and 4 percent in the mid-
1970s. In contrast, we project that during the upswing
in the late 1980s the economy will grow at only about
2 percent a year. If so, the defense share of GNP in
the late 1980s will exceed the current level. For
example, if the annual rate of growth in defense
spending increased to 3 percent, the defense share of
GNP would be about half a percent larger than the
current share.
replication needed for the production of pulse Doppler
radars and onboard computers for the new air defense
interceptors require precision machinery-computer-
ized timing and control devices and wafer-handling
equipment-that are necessary for the mass produc-
tion of advanced microelectronics and that are in
short supply in the Soviet economy.
On balance, therefore, the potential for economic
problems is likely to increase over the next decade.
Moreover, problems with the design and manufacture
of advanced weapons, which we believe have contrib-
uted to a recent plateau in weapons procurement,
probably will increase over the next decade, especially
as the number of new weapon systems incorporating
Soviet state-of-the-art technology grows. Neverthe-
less, we believe that, as before, the Soviets are
unlikely to constrain efforts to modernize their strate-
gic forces solely on the basis of resource consider-
ations.
Even though the Soviet economy has proved to be
strong enough to support major strategic moderniza-
tion efforts, such efforts now more than before would
hinder attempts to improve industrial productivity. A
sharp upswing in investment in new plant and equip-
ment for strategic weapon production, for example,
would absorb chemicals and high-strength steels that
could otherwise be used in the production of turbine
components and cutting tools for the civilian econo-
my. Moreover, the finer tolerances and consistency of
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~?vne~ Ann' IID~ff~n~~ Avn~gn?n:
~~~~lbnllnln~? ~~~~u~
l~evff?u~~n~nc~ nn I-n~ Il~~?~
Improvements in Western offensive air capabilities
since the 1970s have challenged the Soviets to field
a national air defense that is responsive to the
evolving threat. They will have to cope with sys-
tems such as new NATO peripheral strike aircraft
and long-range cruise missiles, as well as the
prospect of intercontinental bombers with signifi-
cantly reduced radar signatures. To do so, they will
increasingly need defensive aviation that is charac-
terized by flexible control and operations,
independent pilot judgment, and an ability to oper-
ate in forward areas at some distance from the
Soviet Union. Three new aircraft currently in the
early stages of operational deployment or late
stages of testing will be key to the attainment of
these capabilities through at least the next decade.
They are the MIG-29 Fulcrum A, SU-27 Flanker
A, and IL-76 1Vlainstay airborne warning and
control system (AWACS). The potential benefits of
these aircraft and other possible technical improve-
ments that may be made to Soviet national air
defense, however, will not be fully realized unless
the Soviets change a number of longstanding opera-
Soviet fIliv lD~jertse fflviation Today
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Since 1960 the number of Soviet interceptors assigned
to a national air defense role has declined from about
4,900 aircraft to about 2,300, with a gradual improve-
ment in quality. If this trend continues as we estimate,
Soviet air defense aviation could decrease by about 8
percent by the mid-1990s as older aircraft are re-
placed with more capable aircraft on a less than 1-for-
1 basis. If the Soviets replace most of their YAIC-28
Firebars, TU-128 Fiddlers, and SU-15 Flagons now
in the operational inventory with Flankers, Fulcrums,
and Foxhounds, the number of aircraft comparable to
modern NATO weapon systems could increase to
more than half the force by the mid-1990s. Virtually
all of Soviet air defense aviation could be modernized
by the end of the 1990s.
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Potential Intprovernents
Early-to-lVlid-1990s. Because of the long leadtime
required for the development, testing, and deployment
of major new weapon systems, programs now in
evidence reflect the most likely advances that the
Soviets will incorporate into their defensive aviation
through the mid-1990s. We do not expect deployment
of any completely new fighters that represent radical
change in design philosophy during this period. The
Soviets, however, probably will incrementally improve
aircraft now entering service in successive models. In
some cases, what may appear to be a completely new
aircraft actually will be an extensive modification of
an older system-such as occurred with the Fox-
hound, which was developed as a highly modified
version of the older MIG-25 Foxbat A interceptor.
Incremental improvements to the Mainstay AWACS
could include enhancement of its radar, data links,
and computer-steps that would make the aircraft
better able to perform autonomous control of multiple
intercepts. We speculate that the Soviets also could
field during the next few years a system somewhat
smaller and less complex than the Mainstay to in-
crease the number of.airborne radar aircraft that
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Concomitant with improvements such as these, the
Soviets probably will seek to enhance the interaction
of components within their air defense system as a
whole. Such efforts could include deployment of early
warning and ground-controlled intercept radars with
improved low-altitude capabilities. The Soviets proba-
bly also will institute improved procedures and deploy
better equipment for passing data between ground
Mid-to-Late 1990s. We estimate that the Soviets
could develop and possibly deploy a fighter designed
"from the ground up" by the second half of the 1990s,
if they choose to do so. Such an aircraft could be an
advanced tactical fighter or interceptor optimized for
defense against cruise missiles. Although any descrip-
tion is highly speculative in the absence of a test
program or known Soviet requirements, we believe it
could have some of the following features:
An airframe that could consist of 40- to 60-percent
composite material, for structural integrity as well
as for reduced observability.
A radar cross section substantially less than a
square meter for some azimuth angles.
Improvements to air-intercept radar that could re-
sult in higher power and better detection of targets
that present extremely small radar returns.
A multiband infrared search and tracking system
and, possibly, spread-spectrum coding for communi-
.Spread-spectrum coding enables signals to be transmitted and
received on rapidly changing frequencies. It greatly increases the
difficulty of detecting and jamming radar and other forms of
electronic communication.)
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Continuing Challenges
The development and deployment of the Fulcrum and
Mainstay AWACS aircraft, the impending operation-
al deployment of the Flanker fighter, and the ongoing
test programs all reflect a Soviet emphasis on technol-
ogy and qualitative factors and a corresponding at-
tempt to deal with past inadequacies in the quality
and performance of equipment in the field. Nonethe-
less, deployed Soviet defensive systems have histori-
cally lagged the air threat from the West, and
operational training has lagged the introduction of
new technology. These trends are as much in evidence
today as they have been in the past.
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threats.
Outlook
Even with substantial changes to their air defense, the
Soviets still face many of the basic problems that have
plagued them for years. In addition, they face the
prospect of targets (such as the advanced-technology
bomber) with significantly reduced radar signatures
and even longer range cruise "missiles. A major prob-
lem for them in the future, thus, will be how well they
can adapt their air defense doctrine, training, and
operational practices to meet these present and future
gress in air defense modernization.
The Soviets may be unwilling in some cases, however,
to take appropriate risks in radically changing long-
standing practices to take advantage of technological
advances. Greater pilot initiative probably will not be
accomplished without some difficulty, particularly in
light of the strong historical Soviet orientation-both
military and,cibilian-toward reliance on centralized
control.- Successful integration of complex air defense
operations in unanticipated or rapidly changing situa-
tions is likely to remain an elusive goal. Thus, despite
the Soviets' best efforts, the mismatch between the
use of technology in the field and the evolving threat
probably will continue, offsetting much of their pro- 25X1
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Changing Soviet Doctrine
in Central Europe and
US War-Fighting Plans
Soviet force developments over the past; few years
appear; to undercut key assumptions of new US
operational concepts for defeating a Warsaw Pact
offensive in Central Europ
a rea ignmen o orces
suggests t at t e oviets are changing their offen-
sive operational concepts-either in reaction to, or
coincidental with, the development of new US
doctrine and in ways inimical to it.
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The developments in- Soviet forces
will have the effect of "front loading" Pact as-
saults-making the first echelon stronger and more
versatile, thereby reducing reliance on a second
echelon. These changes apparently apply to "strate-
gic" concepts-the way the Soviets would array
and support their own and East European fronts for
a massive offensive in Central Europe-and also to
the "operational" level assault concepts of individ-
There are several possible explanations for
increased "Sovietization" of the first strategic ech-
elon. Soviet planners may have considered that the
combination of strengthened NATO defenses and
the lagging modernization of NSWP armies re-
quired more Soviet forces in the first echelon to
avoid an early stalemate in Central Europe. Also,
the Soviets probably were aware at least by the
early 1980s that the United States was examining
concepts and developing weapons for cutting off the
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first echelon from early reinforcement and defeat-
ing it in forward battles. Stiffening the first echelon
with one or more Soviet fronts that had formerly
been considered part of the second echelon would
make this more difficult
Early forward deployment of one or more fronts from
the western USSR would also lessen the chance that
the movement of such forces would be subject to the
intense interdiction called for by the new US con-
cepts. Once deployed forward, such forces could be
used either in the first echelon or in more traditional
second-echelon roles. In either case their availability
would be more certain than if they remained in the
USSR until hostilities began and their forward move-
ments and transportation routes came under strong
NATO air attack.
Equipment modernization in the traditional second-
echelon forces also suggests a more important opera-
tional role for these forces in Pact planning. Over the
past few years, low-strength divisions in the western
USSR have been receiving firstline combat equip-
ment-particularly modern tanks and air defense
systems. Such systems made up less than 20 percent
of the Carpathian Military District's inventories in
the mid-to-late 1970s, for example, but now account
for more than half.
Although not related-at least at its inception-to
new US operational concepts, the Soviets' forward
logistic buildup supports subsequent Soviet develop-
ments that reduce their vulnerability to US interdic-
tion efforts. It may receive additional impetus from
the US concepts because:
? Pre-positioned stocks would facilitate the movement
of combat forces from the USSR before hostilities
to reinforce the first echelon-either as part of the
GSFG front or as a separate front.
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? After a war started, pre-positioning of stocks would
ease clogged supply lines from the western USSR,
freeing transportation to speed the movement of
additional combat forces.
? Even if these stockpiles are intended for forces
already in place in Central Europe, they would
considerably reduce the reliance of the first-echelon
forces on early resupply and reinforcement from the
USSR.
w en as ce a out ikely
oviet responses to the Airland Battle doctrine, cited
options that are quite similar to some of the develop-
ments noted above although they almost certainly
were not in a position to be aware of them. The
suggested options included reinforcing the first eche-
lon, altering deployment practices for the second
echelon, and establishing special reserves. The sources
opined that the Pact would have to compress the.
depth of the first echelon and strengthen it with
armor-heavy units. They also noted that the second-
echelon fronts should be moved to forward assembly
areas before hostilities to reduce NATO opportunities
to separate them from the first echelon and defeat
both echelons separately by ground action orinterdic-
tion. To support these changes they believed addition-
al stockpiles of key supplies would need to be posi-
tioned forward.
Possible Warning Implications
In addition to their implications for developing US
and NATO doctrine, the force developments noted
will have an impact on the problem of warning of a
Warsaw Pact attack. As NATO defenses improve- .
through a combination of increasingly lethal weapon-
ry and greater urbanization of the German country-
side-Pact planners have had to strengthen their
attack forces. This effort may have been given added
impetus by the" evolving-and publicly debated-US
concepts. In any case, the increased force require-
ments may be forcing the Soviets to return to their
reinforcement concepts of the 1960s. Then, expecting
that a war in Europe would be nuclear from the
outset, they intended to move fronts in the western
USSR forward prior to hostilities so they could not be
interdicted by nuclear weapons.
They may now consider that stronger NATO de-
fenses, and an expressed US intention to devote
considerably greater effort to interdiction, again ar-
gue for prehostilities reinforcement. This would in-
crease the warning time of NATO forces, but we
estimate that Soviet planners believe that the require-
ments to strengthen the first strategic echelon with 25X1
additional Soviet forces and the increased risk of
interdiction outweigh the former consideration.
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Topr Seeret
~?yn~>t '~'u~~un~~?n~~~ffn?n:
A ]f.??1~ ~Q III
d~n~~?y~aIl ]~~~if?~u~u~ns~
During 1983 and so far in 1984 the Soviet transport
system has made a substantial, if not spectacular,
recovery from its especially poor performance in
1982 (see table). The recovery of the railroads,
which carry almost 70 percent of nonpipeline traf-
fic-and most industrial materials-is the most
important development. IVluch of the responsibility
for the drop-off in industrial performance in the
Soviet Union during the late 1970s and early 1980s
can be traced to the railroads. In turn, the railroads
can be credited with a major part of the upturn in
industrial performance since 1982. The perform-
ance of other transportation sectors has been
mixed. The amount of gas transported by pipelines
has experienced double-digit growth, but the vol-
ume of traffic carried on highways and rivers has
declined.
Railroaels
Recovery Factors. The main themes of the current
plan to improve rail transportation-strengthening
discipline, improving the repair of freight cars, and
reducing turnaround times for freight cars-were
all presented directly or indirectly by Brezhnev in
his 1Vovember 1979 plenum speech. Indeed, the
deterioration in key performance indicators for rail
transportation appears to have been arrested by
1980 (see graph): The benefits to the economy were
delayed, however. First, the measures implemented
in the early 1980s were not well balanced. For
example, programs to reduce turnaround times for
freight cars and thereby increase their availability
resulted instead in a reduction in the working fleet.
Higher rates of freight car damage resulted from
more intensive use, and this was not offset by
improvements in freight car repair recommended
by Brezhnev. Freight car shortages persisted. Sec-
ond, asuccession of outside influences after No-
vember 1979-the invasion of Afghanistan, the
crisis in Poland, and the extreme winter of
1981-82~ach in turn disrupted normal rail ser-
vice.
The improved performance of rail transport in 1983
and so far in 1984 resulted mainly from the easing
of external factors-border tensions and bad
USS1R: Aeeeage AnnuaY ~row~th off
]Feelgllnt Trafffflc In 'li'on-1);filo~ete~
weather. However, Andropov can be credited with 25X1
providing a rebalancing of Brezhnev's measures to
improve rail transportation backed up by concrete
guidelines and enforcement power.
The Record in 1983 and 1984. The 4-percent
growth of rail turnover in 1983-the highest since
1975-reflected recovery from a downturn of more
than 1 percent in 1982. Disruptions stemming from .
the frigid winter of 1982 cascaded through railroad
operations during the rest of the year. IVlajor high-
level interventions were required to help clear
backed up industrial shipments. To spur the recov-
ery, the Kremlin-under Andropov's leadership-
made high-level changes in railway management
and introduced a new array of punitive measures,
rewards, and guidelines for the rail ministry. In
1Vovember 1982, Andropov fired the rail minister,
Ivan Pavlovskiy. The new minister, IVikolai Kon-
arev, immediately put rail system heads on notice
that the firings would continue if performance did
not improve. Geydar Aliyev, a noted management
specialist and newly appointed member of the
Council of 1Vlinisters, was tasked with overseeing
transportation-a major move that underscored the
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USSR: Key Performance Indicators
for the Railroads; 1970-83
but these appear to reflect localized problems rather
than overall system stress. The Soviets still report
good results from their measures to improve efficiency
indicators. For example, freight car turnaround time
reportedly was reduced by an additional six hours
Average train speed
Km/hour
30 1970
I
75
Freight car
tumarouud time
Hours
Kremlin's commitment to relieving transport prob-
lems. By December 1982, wage bonuses were au-
thorized to supplement the new discipline cam-
paign, adecentralized freight car repair program
was approved, and the main performance indicators
were changed to stress shipments (tons originated)
and freight car turnaround times instead of the
standard traffic measure (turnover measured in
ton-kilometers). These discipline and reform meas-
ures contributed to an improvement in the efficien-
cy,indicators for the railroads. For example, freight
car turnaround times dropped by 4.5 percent in
1983.
With the effects of outside influences largely reversed
in 1983, rail turnover has dropped back to a slower
rate of growth-2 percent so far in 1984. The current
rate is probably appropriate for the planned output
growth rates of the railroad's main customers in the
industrial materials industries. The Soviets reported
some underfulflllment of .rail shipments in the first six
months of 1984 (for coal produced by the Ministry of
Coal and selected building materials, notably lumber),
(roughly 4 percent) in the first half of 1984.
Looking Ahead. The Kremlin's strategy for improving
railroad performance-although more effectively or-
ganized and implemented than in the past-does not
improve the longer range prognosis for the railroads
markedly. The railroads are still congested. Moscow
must eventually marshal more resources behind ex-
pansion of track and modernization of rolling stock
and traffic control before the railroads can cope with
the requirements of much higher rates of industrial
growth. So far, the capital demands of other economic
sectors continue to take precedence over the railways.
Even over the short run, the recovery of the railroads
may be interrupted because the railroads remain
vulnerable to the effects of border tensions and bad 25X1
weather. The Soviet formula for improving railroad
performance has not been effective in combating the
effects of these obstacles in the past.
Other Transportation Sectors
Growth of pipeline traffic, following trends in gas and
..oil production, continues to ease the energy transport
burden on the railroads. Rapid growth of gas pipeline
traffi~up 15 percent in the half year--continues to
pace the growth of overall freight traffic. Oil pipeline
traffic was up only 2 percent in the first half of 1984
because of a sluggish production performance in the
West Siberian fields.
Freight traffic carried by the centrally directed river
and highway fleets, the so-called common carriers,
remains small, accounting for less than 10 percent of
all transport turnover. The decline in river traffic of 7 25X1
percent in the first half of 1984 is not unprecedented
and probably reflects a difference in the length of the
shipping season between 1983 and 1984. An early
opening of the shipping season helped river transport
in 1983, but conditions were more normal in 1984.
Rivers in any case account for only about 4 percent of
all freight traffic in the USSR.
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The declines in highway traffic-by 0.4 percent in
1983 and 4 percent so far in 1984-have no precedent
in the last 10 years. The Soviets had hoped to draw
down irrational hauls and curb overstatements on
mileage logs-used by truckers to pirate fuel-in
order to boost the efficiency of the sector. Ideally this
would have resulted in better performance in terms of
shipments (measured in tons) relative to turnover
(measured in ton-kilometeis). Declines in turnover
could be equated with increases in efficiency as long
as shipments fall less or rise. So far in 1984, however,
shipments have fallen by Spercent-faster than the
decline in traffic. Consequently, although we have not
identified the reasons for the decline in traffic, we do
not believe that it results from increased efficiency.
The Soviets in December 1983 showed their concern
over the faltering performance of common carrier
trucking by issuing a decree on highway transport.
The decree underscored the need to increase the use
of common carrier service and threatened the use of
enforcement measures, including the centralization of
some trucks owned by industrial enterprises. Traffic
hauled by trucks owned by industrial enterprises is
roughly two and one half times that of the common
25X1
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Briefs
Soviets Expand The Politburo announced on 23 August that the "Five Ministry" experiment in in-
Industrial Management dustral management would be expanded to additional enterprises in the machine-
Experiment ~ building, ferrous metallurgy, food, and light industries and consumer services 25X1
beginning next January. The announcement noted the need for "perfecting" the
experiment but expressed satisfaction with preliminary results in improving
fulfillment of contractual sales obligations-a major "success indicator." It also
claimed improvements in product quality and productivity, reduced production
costs,;and more rapid introduction of technologicaTinnovation in enterprises under
the experiment. 0 25X1
Official commentary since the Politburo announcement indicates that preparations
are under way to add other enterprises in the original five ministries (two all-union
industrial ministries and three republic ministries in the food, light; and local
industries) and enterprises in 15 new ministries. With these additions, participating
enterprises will, supposedly account for 15 percent of industrial production in 1985.
The expansion suggests that the leadership views the experiment as the major
innovation in industrial management for the 12th (1986-90) Five-Year Plan. It
appears, however, that the Soviets will continue to settle for marginal change-
greater, though still limited, enterprise control over wages and investment, and use
of fewer and more rational success indicators. Despite the generally upbeat tone of
Soviet commentary on the experiment, there liar' been a steady undercurrent of
skepticism and criticism. For example, A. N. Aganbegyan, a prominent Soviet
economist; recently noted that incentives provided under the experiment to
managerial and technical~workers have little, if any, effect on the productivity of
the average worker. He suggested enhancing the incentive role of wages by linking
them to fulfillment of the deliveries plan and the volume of sold output, minus ex-
penditures on materials.
Major Siberian River According to a Soviet press report, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) has
Diversion Project0 ordered the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources to complete plans 25X1
"as early as 1986" to divert water from Siberian rivers to water-short Central
Asia. The project, probably the~most ambitious of its kind in the world, calls for
construction~of a 1,500-mile canal to link Siberia's Ob' and Irtysh Rivers with the
Aral Sea- Basin and other Asian regions of the USSR. The report said the project
will take 12 years to complete but did not say when construction will begin. (u)
51 Top Secret
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The merits of this project have been debated in the USSR since the 1930s. In re-
cent years Central Asian leaders have sought to make the project a symbol of the
central leadership's commitment to the development of their region. The decision
to push ahead now apparently stems in large measure from an exhaustive study
that supposedly lays to rest fears that the project would cause damage to the
environment. Indeed, proponents argue that the project will avert an ecological
catastrophe. The Aral Sea, the world's fourth-largest lake, is drying up rapidly,
largely because water from the two rivers feeding into it has been diverted for irri-
gation. Supporters also argue that waters from the canal will:
? Lead to a large increase in the amount of land devoted to grain and other
foodstuffs growing in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
? Stimulate exploitation of other resources and industrial development that will
ease the underutilization of manpower in the region. ~
Opponents of the project have cited not only possible environmental damage but
the enormous expenditures the projecYwill require. Although the press report did
not give a cost estimate, earlier Soviet statements indicated that outlays could
exceed $35 billion. Funding for the project is still not assured. Competition for in-
vestment resources is now especially intense in the USSR. The food and energy
programs, fOr instance, are currently consuming a huge share of Soviet investment
resources, and further large demands for a program with a payoff delayed until the
1990s would surely be controversial.
Another Soviet Retail The Soviet Politburo recently announced the fourth reduction in prices of
Price Reductio~'J- ~I consumer goods in 18 months. The latest cuts, effective 1 September and ranging
from 17 to 30 percent, mainly affect children's clothing, synthetic fabrics, and
certain types of medicine. The Soviets claim that the move will save consumers 2.2
billion rubles (about $2.5 billion. at the current official exchange rate) a year. This
is somewhat less than 1 percent of total annual sales in state retail outlets. The
items affected fall largely within the category of "essential goods," defined as
those .that should have low and stable prices to ensure equal access by all strata of
the population.
Many of these "essentials," however, are goods that Soviet consumers in the past
have found undesirable, such as clothing and fabric items made from artificial
fibers and~children's clothing trimmed with artificial fur. Thus, the Soviets appear
to have slashed prices primarily to help reduce stocks of slow-moving goods. This
was true of many past reductions, including those of April, September, and
December 1983. As was the case with the three previous rounds of cuts, however,
the Soviet leadership proclaimed its action with considerable fanfare as part of a
program to raise living standards and improve the lot of the consumer.
Top Secret
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25X1
25X1
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Civil Defense Failure A civil defense alert in Murmansk and Severomorsk in response to the Severo-
at Severomorsk? 0 morsk naval base explosions in May showed the cities' civil defense programs to be
ineffective, according to military attache in Moscow. The alarm
and the noise of the explosions generated widespread panic, with fatalities
resulting from citizens stampeding into flooded shelters. Other shelters were found
to be inaccessible because doors had rusted shut or because they were in use as
warehouses. The incident reportedly prompted a major reexamination of Soviet
civil defense procedures.
Guineans Grant Soviets
Fishing Port
and the citizenry organized.
Although we are unable to confirm the activation of the alert system, the report
probably is indicative of problems encountered during the explosions. The Soviets
"have contingency plans for a surprise attack, but civil defense plans usually are
predicated on a period of strategic warning during which shelters can be readied
25X1
25X1
In July President Conte's government acceded to Soviet proposals for establishing
a fishing port on the island of "Kassa off Conakry and renovating the port of Fotoba 25X1
on the island of Tamara for exclusive docking of Soviet-manned Guinean patrol
boats The proposals call for Moscow to 25X1
provide loading cranes, a refrigerated warehouse; and an ice factory and to sell
10;000 tons' of the fish catch per year: Earlier Soviet requests to build a naval facil-
'ity or a port were rejected-by former President Toure: The Guineans have also
agreed to grant the Soviets fishing rights over the next three years in exchange for
financial compensation and 'training for Guinean personnel. 25X1
The Soviets probably view an expanded role in Guinea's fishing industry as a
means of building influence with the new military regime and of furthering their
effort to gain a naval facility in Guinea. Conakry's dependence upon Soviet fish
was underscored earlier this year, when the USSR suspended deliveries because
renegotiation of the fish accords had stalled; Conakry subsequently extended the
old accord. Conakry probably agreed to Moscow's recent proposals because of the
prospects of increased funds, infrastructure improvements, and personnel training.
The Guinean leadership, which has sought to balance its ties to the East and the
West, is unlikely to grant the Soviets a naval facility. 25X1
Top Secret - 54
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Top Secret
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