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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Directorate of in Developing Countries Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence A Research Paper Sec- - GI 85-10076 March 1985 555 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Directorate of Secret Intelligence Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries A Research Paper This paper was prepared b Office of Global Issues, with the assistance of Donna Goble, Office of Central Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, OGIF--~ 1:7eR. GI 85-10076 March 1985 225X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Summary Information available as of 1 March 1985 was used in this report. Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries F_ to 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are KGB. key Third World countries. ? Placing KGB operatives overseas as "correspondents Soviet success in establishing relationships with Third World media has yielded substantial payoffs including: ? Significantly influencing the editorial line or placing its own stories in more than 50 major Third World newspapers. ? Recruiting important editors, publishers, and information ministers in veloping country media. Media relationships are developed through one or more of the following techniques: ? Extensive development assistance to fledgling wire services, print media, and government information ministries. ? Journalism training for veteran and apprentice newsmen. ? Cultivating individual newsmen with cash, entertainment, scholarships, duty-free goods, and free vacations. ? Supporting the expansion of regional wire services in South Asia, Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. ? Maintaining visibility at UNESCO as an advocate of a larger role for de- the Western media. These approaches are working. The Soviet overseas media has over 260 correspondents in 71 developing countries; TASS alone has acquired 18 new clients since 1982. The Soviets' international front for journalists, in turn, claims to have trained over 300 newspersons in recent years. Working through UNESCO, Moscow has sponsored new regional wire services and shifted the debate on a "new world information order" to alleged abuses of newspaper to use TASS news items in each edition. Soviet ability to use this influence is evidenced, in turn, by the success of specific media placement efforts: ? The spate of reporting of US involvement in Indira Gandhi's assassina- tion required the State Department to publicly deny any US role. ? Nigerian press reports in 1983 that the United States was intervening in the Nigerian elections prompted the US Ambassador to protest directly to the Soviet Ambassador in Lagos. ? Reports of alleged coup plotting by the United States in Ghana in 1984 compelled the US Embassy to issue a denial. ? The Guyanese Information Minister recently instructed the state-owned Secret GI 85-10076 March 1985 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Moscow's efforts have been unsuccessful in Cameroon, Colombia, Djibouti, Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia-countries reportedly more sensitive to Soviet abuses of press access or concerned over Soviet media serving as ha- vens for KGB operations. We expect Moscow's effort to build an overseas media presence to continue expanding. Novosti inaugurated a special wire service for developing- country news agencies just last year. The Soviet Central Committee considers Novosti's grant program for foreign journalists to visit the USSR a success and plans to expand it with a larger budget. A Soviet front has built a new school to train Latin American journalists, reflecting the high priority Moscow has placed on Soviet media objectives in this region. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Contents Summary ? Pattern of Coverage Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media 3 Media Development Assistance 3 Cultivation of Journalists 6 Support for Independent Regional News Services 6 UNESCO Visibility 7 Program Effectiveness 8 Public Perceptions 10 Constraints 14 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Figure 1 TASS and Novosti News Services in Developing Countries Afghanistan Guinea-Bissau Nigeria Algeria Guyana Pakistan Angola India Panama Argentina Indonesia P.D.R.Y. (S. Yemen) Bangladesh I ran Peru Benin Iraq Philippines Bolivia Jordan Senegal Botswana Kenya Sierra Leone Brazil Kuwait ?I ? Singapore Burma Lebanon 07 - Sri Lanka Cameroon Liberia Sudan C.A.R. (Central Afr. Rep.) Libya Suriname Colombia Madagascar Syria Congo Malaysia Tanzania Costa Rica Mali Thailand Cyprus Mauritania Togo Dominican Republic Mauritius Tunisia Ecuador Mexico Uganda Egypt Morocco Venezuela Ethiopia Mozambique Y.A.R. (N. Yemen) Gabon Nepal Zambia Ghana Nicaragua Zimbabwe Guinea Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries The USSR is undertaking a sustained effort to gain access to the media of developing countries and expects significant payoffs at relatively little cost. Specifically, the Soviets hope their efforts will: ? Help place Soviet propaganda in host-country media. ? Encourage anti-West coverage. ? Provide cover for KGB operations. Pattern of Coverage The Soviets have a substantial media presence in the Third World-over 260 Soviet correspondents in 71 developing countries (table 1). TASS, the government news agency, and Novosti, the Central Committee news and features agency, have the largest represen- tation. Eight other Soviet media organizations have limited but direct representation in developing country capitals (table 2). Moscow has posted the largest number of Soviet correspondents to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, and Peru-which together account for over one- fourth of Soviet media representation in developing countries: ? Eight Soviet news organizations have a total of 15 correspondents in Afghanistan. They not only pro- vide Soviet domestic audiences with war news, but also service Afghan media, all of which are govern- ment controlled, with foreign news and feature materials, according to US embassy reporting. 15 correspondents in Cairo. Within broad con- straints, Novosti and TASS can issue press releases, disseminate feature materials, and cultivate Egyp- tian journalists, civic leaders, and government officials. ? India accommodates the Soviets' largest overseas press contingent: 18 correspondents representing at least four news organizations. Soviet media have developed close working relationships with Indian wire services, urban dailies, and the vernacular press. ? Twelve Soviet correspondents from six news agen- cies are in Peru, a disproportionately large contin- gent for a small country. The contingent's size is a legacy from the period of leftist military rule (1968- 80) when friendly diplomatic relations prevailed between Peru and the USSR, according to US embassy reporting. Soviet media representation in developing countries has expanded significantly in the last 15 years. The number of news bureaus operated by TASS in devel- oping countries has risen from 46 in 1970 to 66 in 1985. Novosti has 47 news bureaus in those countries compared with 16 in 1970. The Soviets now have TASS or Novosti bureaus in 67 developing countries altogether, 24 more than in 1970. More bureaus have been added in Africa than in any other region, increasing the number from 16 in 1970 to 31 in 1985. The Soviets have added five news bureaus in Latin America in the same period. ? Six Soviet press agencies with 15 correspondents are resident in Algeria. Although the Algerian Govern- ment departs substantively from Soviet views on many international political issues, the US embassy accounts for the large Soviet media presence by suggesting that compatible ideologies and common rhetoric facilitate media exchanges. ? Mubarak has allowed a sizable Soviet press contin- gent to return-six Soviet media agencies maintain Soviet media personnel in developing countries are directed not only by their Moscow offices, but also by Central Committee advisers at Soviet embassies. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Table 1 Soviet Correspondents Posted to Developing Countries (10 Soviet Media) a Afghanistan 15 Algeria 15 Angola 4 Argentina 1 Central African Republic 1 Chad 1 Colombia 1 Congo 2 Egypt 15 Equatorial Guinea 1 Ethiopia 6 Fiji 1 Lebanon 10 Liberia 2 Libya 2 Madagascar 4 Nicaragua 5 Nigeria 7 Pakistan 10 Panama 1 Singapore 3 Sri Lanka 2 Sudan 3 Suriname 1 Yemen, Arab Republic 2 Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 2 Zambia 4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Table 2 Soviet Overseas Media TASS, government news agency 90 Novosti, Central Committee's news and features agency 55 Izvestiya, government daily 10 Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), armed forces' daily 2 Moscow TV 6 Novoye Vremya (New Times), Central Committee's world af- fairs weekly 3 Pravda, Party daily 21 Radio Moscow, all union radio 14 Trud, Soviet trade unions' daily 2 Zhurnalist, Soviet journalists' 1 monthly Unidentified media organiza- 62 tion Developing Countries Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media The Soviets are using five principal approaches to nurture their relations with the media of developing countries: ? Development assistance. ? Journalism training and recruitment. ? Cultivation of Soviet-friendly journalists. ? Support for independent, regional news services. ? UNESCO visibility Media Development Assistance The Soviets are vigorously competing with Western media services by providing the print and broadcast media of developing countries with services and equip- ment at little or no cost.' In Liberia, for example, the In addition to developing direct ties with Third World media, the USSR publishes and broadcasts extensively in developing countries. Novosti, by its own account, produces 60 journals in 45 languages along with foreign-language books and films. Over 70 percent of Soviet international radiobroadcasts, con- ducted in 38 languages, are directed toward develop- ing countries, principally toward East and South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, according to USIA. Radio Moscow's world service in English broadcasts 24 hours a day on all shortwave bands. Radio stations of the Soviet Asian republics broad- cast to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Radio Peace and Progress, sponsored by the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace, broadcasts to developing countries on Radio Moscow frequencies. national news agency can subscribe to TASS for $1,000 per year as compared with Agence France Presse for $23,000 per year, according to USIS. TASS pronouncements and US embassy reporting indicate that the standard TASS aid package for developing-country news agencies currently includes: ? A subscription to TASS world or regional news service. ? Installation of radio receivers and radio photocopiers. ? Maintenance and spare parts provided by TASS engineers. ? Journalism training for news agency personnel. F underwritten by Moscow. The Soviets subsidize the entire package, and negoti- ate a formal aid agreement with the client, either through TASS representatives or the Soviet Ambas- sador. The agreement usually leads to an exchange of correspondents between capitals, with the cost of a client news agency's Moscow bureau, in some cases, 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 The KGB has co-opted Soviet overseas media offices either by placing its own people with journalist cover or by requiring the cooperation of legitimate Soviet journalists. KGB officials use their journalist cover to access political leaders in developing countries, recruit agents in the government and media, and promote Soviet perspectives of international political issues. A veteran journalist observes that many legitimate So- viet journalists are posted to obscure capitals of little news value to service KGB disinformation require- ments. Most commonly, the KGB uses TASS, Novosti, and Novoye Vremya (New Times). portedly is a preferred KGB cover, possibly because TASS does not require correspondents to byline stories, a practice enabling the lack of journalistic productivity by KGB "correspondents" to go unob- served. KGB both at the managerial level in Moscow and at foreign news bureaus in the field. TASS has negotiated news exchange agreements with 71 developing countries, 18 just since 1982, the UK Foreign Office reports. The July 1984 agreement with Sierra Leone is typical. According to US embassy reporting, TASS agreed to provide its English- language African news service to the Ministry of Information in Freetown and to furnish free radio receiving equipment. The Soviet State Committee for Vocational Training will train an unspecified number of Sierra Leone journalists in the USSR. All Novosti personnel in a news bureau, if not KGB themselves, are expected to facilitate KGB recruitment efforts, The KGB originally staffed Novoye Vremya overseas bureaus in their entirety. In the 1970s the Central Committee posted some legitimate journalists to The KGB also uses the foreign news bureau of Izvestiya, Trud, and Soviet radio for cover, although not as extensively as it uses TASS and Novosti. It does not use Soviet TV because Soviet TV correspon- dents'faces are well known by television audiences in the USSR, and these correspondents must be techni- cally proficient in electronics. It rarely uses Pravda to avoid embarrassment to the party in the event of exposure Journalism Training and Recruitment Extensive training programs for developing-country journalists teach the Soviet model of journalism- serving state interests, politicizing the news, and expecting an ideological commitment from journal- ists. One program is administered by Soviet embas- sies, which offer scholarships for journalism studies in the USSR. Nominations are made by Ministries of 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Figure 2. IOJ training forjour- nalists of developing countries attending the Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin Education. The Soviet Government pays all expenses except transportation, which the Ministries are ex- pected to sponsor, according to US embassy reporting. Another program is contained in the TASS media aid package. US embassies also report a third program of short-term training in developing countries for jour- nalists in print media and electronic journalism. F_ The Soviets also use the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) to train developing-country journal- ists. The IOJ has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and Cuba: ? The IOJ Center of Professional Education of Jour- nalists in Budapest for radio and television journalists. ? The Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin for print media journalists. ? The Georji Dimitrov International Institute of Jour- nalists in Sofia for journalists in economic and agricultural reporting. ? The Julius Fucik School of Solidarity in Prague for newscasters. ? The Jose Marti International Institute of Journal- ism in Havana for apprentice journalists. The IOJ also operates a cooperative program with a journalism school in Bucharest and a training center for Arab journalists in Baghdad. The IOJ further attempts to cultivate media organiza- tions and Ministries of Information directly through "world conferences" attended by editors, publishers, heads of news agencies, radio station managers, and ministers of information. These meetings publicize Soviet policies on world issues and promote the Soviet model of journalism with an elite media audience. The conferences also help the IOJ Secretariat make contacts, possibly leading to TASS development assis- tance, Novosti influence in the local media, or candi- date students for IOJ schools. Nationals of 90 developing countries responded to IOJ invitations to the most recent conference cosponsored Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 How the IOJ Attempts To Influence Third World Journalists Geza Rybka, Director of the IOJ Center in Budapest, describes the Center's methodfor posing Soviet news stories as alternatives to Western news reports, in e, fect placing propaganda on a par with news: Every student knows that there are four or five big news agencies that have monopolized the news flow all over the world. The students are usually aware of the fact that, until now, especially in foreign matters, they used to think the way UPI or Reuters thought. We simply try to open their eyes to the fact that there is another side to the story, there are other parts of the world, and that there are also other sources of information in the world that one can use for journalistic work. The teacher tries to suggest ideas like this: Did you hear a week ago what BBC said? And do you know what TASS wrote then? Try to compare it all-and you will get a basis for writing a good article. We introduced a new practice recently that every day the students listen alternately to Radio Mos- cow and BBC news. They compare the two, draw their own conclusions, and then report on some internationally important subject. So we try very tactfully, if I may say so, but very honestly to explain to students that a new informa- tion order is necessary and that it means also not accepting one agency exclusively as a source of information. The Democratic Journalist April 1984 with the North Korean Journalists' Union in 1983, the "World Conference of Journalists Against Imperi- alism and for Friendship and Peace" in P'yongyang, North Korea. The Pyongyang Times reported a large attendance from developing countries represented by: ? Thirty-one dailies and weeklies. ? Nine news agencies. ? Twenty-two Ministries of Information. ? Twenty-eight radio stations, publishing houses, in- stitutes of journalism, and universities. Cultivation of Journalists The Soviets take pains to follow up the ties developed in training programs and otherwise ensure that Soviet-supplied news is actually placed in the print media of developing countries and, where possible, in the broadcast media. Novosti correspondents pay salaries or subsidize vaca- tions, cars, or duty-free goods to induce reporters, editors, or publishers to print unattributed stories and features favorable to Soviet points of view. The Soviets also attempt to dissuade news agency editors from using Western wire service releases. The Novosti grant program for foreign journalists subsidizes two- or three-week visits to the USSR. The Novosti overseas correspondents who administer the program invite relatively young influential journalists, politicians, and artists who could not be considered While in the USSR, grantees meet selected Soviet Government officials and are entertained lav- ishly. They travel to Moscow, Leningrad, and another Soviet republic. Not extracting any firm commit- ments, Novosti nevertheless reportedly expects grant recipients to take away a more favorable impression of the USSR. Support for Independent Regional News Services Moscow has also supported regional news agencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for displacing the Western press. Soviet media endorsed the appearance of the nonaligned news agency pool in 1976 (now 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Figure 3. Opening of the IOJ Forum for Peace in Paris on thefifth anniversary of the UNESCO Declaration on Mass Media. From left to right, Kaarle Nordenstreng, IOJ pres- ident; Jiri Kubka, Secretary General; and Gerard Gatinot, called NAMEDIA), the Pan African News Agency (PANA) in 1979, the Organization of Asian News Agencies (OANA) in 1981, and the Latin American Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI) in 1983. The IOJ endorsed the Association of ASEAN News Agencies as well. Moscow News, a Novosti publication, alleges that these regional news services are "breaking the monopoly" of the "big four" West- ern wire services. The Soviets offer substantial material aid to the nonaligned news agencies. TASS provides communi- cation links to NAMEDIA and OANA. The PANA director general, having heard of TASS aid deliveries to other African news agencies, probably neighboring Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, reportedly hopes that TASS will provide news services and office equipment to his agency, Soviet fronts are directly involved in establishing some of these agencies. For example, the Federation of Latin American Newsmen (FELAP), regional affili- ate of the IOJ Mexico City. ALASEI currently has contracted with 19 Latin American newspapers and news agencies to provide news services and information. UNESCO Visibility The Soviets have used UNESCO to demonstrate their support for the aspirations of developing countries in the media field.' Specifically, the Soviets have pro- moted their model of journalism at UNESCO, at- 25X1 tempted to discredit Western media, and cultivated the caucuses of developing countries that parallel their views, according to US embassy reporting[ 25X1 Moscow regards UNESCO as one of its most impor- tant ideological targets, The Soviet delegation, in observing an exponential growth of the UNESCO publications mation services as a vehicle for disseminating Soviet 25X1 budget in recent years, targeted the UNESCO infor- 2 UNESCO sets standards and guidelines for the development of new media organizations in developing countries, funds confer- ences, and publishes studies and reports, several of which recently have encouraged realignment of world news production and dissem- 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 propaganda to developing countries In 1972 the Soviets were the first to propose a so- called New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in a UNESCO General Conference. NWICO, as defined in UNESCO studies, would require governments to take responsibility for news printed or broadcast on their territory which, in turn, would lead to licensing journalists working in their countries. Under NWICO, journalists would be guid- ed by codes of conduct prohibiting stories offensive to host governments. UNESCO's International Program for Development of Communications (IPDC) is particularly important to the Soviets. TASS Deputy Director Geperal Krasi- kov, in a 1983 Pravda article, stated that the IPDC is useful to them for monitoring mass media in develop- ing countries as well as the alleged intrusion of the Western press in those countries, for helping to shape developing countries' information policies, influencing the allocation of multilateral aid, and creating a "new world media order" on an "anti-imperialistic founda- tion." IPDC provides seed money for developing news agencies at the regional level. Both NAMEDIA and PANA are partially funded by UNESCO. USIS reporting indicates that, aside from subscribers UNESCO currently is PANA's only patron Program Effectiveness The Soviets' methods and approaches for acquiring access to local media in the developing world have proved effective. In the formal aid agreements of 1984, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau agreed to restrict Western wire service reporting on the Soviet Union in favor of TASS reporting on the subject. Guyana and Suriname, additional aid recipients, have experienced a noticeable increase in the volume of Soviet press material appearing in local print and broadcast media, according to US embassy reporting. TASS's offers of a world news service at little or no cost have been particularly successful in Africa in cases where media cannot afford the cost or do not have the foreign exchange for a Western wire service. USIS reporting indicates that a considerable portion of African print media, as well as a few radio stations, use TASS in combination with Western services. F_ State Department and USIS post observers suggest the Soviets can place stories in more than 50 non-Communist dailies and weeklies in developing countries. These outlets range from leftist newspapers in Mexico City, El Dia (circulation 75,000) and Uno Mas Uno (circulation 70,000), used occasionally, to the pro-Soviet, Indian newspaper Blitz (circulation 350,000) and the magazine Link (circulation 12,000), used frequently (see table 3). Some are published by national liberation fronts. Several print Eastern Bloc and Cuban material as well as Soviet. The Soviets have access to all of these by having cultivated individual journalists who usual- ly print what is asked of them Soviet recruitment of individual senior journalists has enlisted some important people: ? Bargis Hamud Bargis, Director General of the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), works closely with the KGB resident in Kuwait, the US embassy reports. He supported the Soviet position in the international debate over the US embargo of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, arguing, for example, that the Soviets, by contrast with the United States, never mix politics with sports. His agency is influen- tial in the Gulf states as a news source: USIS reporting from Bahrain indicates that KUNA's Moscow bureau often carries Soviet stories that circulate in the Gulf. ? Yvonne Harewood-Benn, Minister of Public Service and Information in Guyana, has instructed editors of the state-owned Guyana Chronicle, the country's only daily, to use at least three or four TASS and Cuban Prensa Latina news items in each edition, allegedly to balance AP reports. She has apparently also urged the editors to use AP for "disaster news" or for quoting critics of US foreign policy, according to US embassy reporting. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Table 3 Pro-Soviet Print Media in Developing Countries and Estimated Circulation a Bahrain Al-Faqir Malaysia Chung Kuo Pao Al-Jamahir Al-Shabiba Al-Sharara Mali L'Essor Bangladesh Mauritius Horizons Nouveaux 4 500 Gonokantha 5 000 , , Nouveau Militant 10 000 to 15 000 Sangbad 30,000 , , Brazil Mexico El Dia 75 000 Correio Brasilense El Nacional , 80,000 Cameroon El Sol de Mexico 95,000 Cameroon Tribune El Universal 200,000 Cyprus Excelsior 184,000 Ta Nea Uno Mas Uno 70,000 Dominican Republic La Noticia Nepal Naya Samaf 3,000 Samaya 18 000 Ecuador The Commoner , 7 000 Periodico Del Mediodia Siempre Nueva Nicaragua , Ghana Barricada Ghanaian Times 150,000 Peru Independent Echo 30,000 El Diario de Marka 90,000 People's Evening News 40,000 El Observador 100,000 La Republica 200 000 Guyana Chronicle Cartel , 10,000 initially India Philippines Business Day 31 000 Blitz 350,000 Evening Post , 70 000 Bombay Daily 140,000 , Business Standard 21,000 Seychelles Hindustan Times 250,000 Nation Link 12,000 Sierra Leone News Today Patriot NA 34,000 For Di People New Times RaJasthagPatrika 120,000 Syria Statesman 220,000 Al Ba'th 25 000 Indonesia Tishrin , 35,000 Merdeka Tanzania Jordan Daily News 39,000 Ad-Dustur Uhuru 100,000 a Excluding pro-Soviet Communist Party and "vanguard" ruling revolutionary party publications. Source: The Europa Yearbook, 1983. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Figure 4. Bargis Hamud Bargis, Director General, Ku- ? Aruna Asaf Ali, editorial board chairman of the Indian newspaper, Patriot, is closely associated with the Soviets in New Delhi. In December 1984 she reportedly collaborated with them in publishing articles on the Hardgrave Study, allegedly a "se- cret" study by a US academic on the future of India without Indira Gandhi, completed eight weeks be- fore the assassination. Publication of the articles is part of recent Soviet disinformation efforts to impli- cate the United States in Gandhi's death. ? Ahmedul Kabir, owner and editor of the Bangla- desh daily, Sangbad, reportedly has acquired a fortune through lucrative business contracts with the USSR. He follows Moscow's media line includ- ing the Gandhi assassination disinformation. Sang- bad is a daily supporting the political left in Bangladesh. ? Junius Lubis, the pro-Soviet managing editor of Merdeka (circulation 130,000), an Indonesian daily, recently reacquired this position after being relieved of it in the early 1980s when he was accused of accepting fees for placing Soviet stories in the paper. The paper itself has a history of financial problems, relieved in the 1970s by a loan from the Moscow Narodny bank in Singapore. The Soviets have helped to shape the UNESCO debate over realignment of international news services to focus almost exclusively on the alleged "colonial mentality" and "disaster news" orientation of the Western media and diverted attention from their own politicized, censored press. Successive Soviet draft resolutions at UNESCO General Conferences appeal Figure 5. Yvonne Harewood- Benn, Minister of Public Ser- vice and Information, Guyana to the pride of developing countries in establishing independent news agencies. Since several delegations represent governments that exercise political control over their domestic media, the Soviet resolutions, coupled with active lobbying in the corridors, win support, according to US embassy sources. 25X1 Public Perceptions In terms of effectiveness with respect to a particular country, one of the clearest payoffs for the Soviets is Peru. US embassy reporting indicates noticeable Sovi- et access to the Peruvian media. The Soviets have invested heavily in Peru; they have 12 correspondents from Soviet print media, radio, and television in Lima in addition to a large Novosti bureau, said to be their best in Latin America. They entertain local journal- ists regularly and offer them "fees" to use Soviet stories and features. They are particularly influential in three Lima dailies and a weekly, all of which are financed by a Peruvian construction entrepreneur friendly to the Soviets: ? El Diario de Marka. Although editorially indepen- dent as a leftist paper, it is the most outspoken and effective anti-US element in the Peruvian news media and consistently supports Soviet propaganda themes in its news coverage. the paper is not doing well financially ? El Observador. The Novosti bureau gave it special attention during a period of financial difficulty in 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret 1983, providing free East German newsprint and cash channeled through Bulgarian intermediaries the paper reciprocated with blatantly pro-Soviet stories. The director of the paper previously worked at IOJ headquarters in Prague. ? La Republica. It frequently publishes pro-Soviet stories and is the most widely read daily in Peru, the US embassy reports. The same Peruvian magnate reportedly asked the Soviet Ambassador for finan- cial assistance to purchase additional shares of La Republica stock, however, to allow him to preserve a particularly leftist editorial line. ? Cartel. It has a hardline, pro-Soviet orientation and is intended to answer Caaretas, a popular non- Communist Peruvian weekly It draws on Novosti telex services and specially written stories for weekly publication. Writers cultivated through the Soviet-Peru Cultural Association publish anti-US features. The Soviets have been successful in Congo. During the 12 years when the United States had no diplomat- ic relations with Congo, 1965-77, Soviet and Eastern Bloc access to the Congolese media grew noticeably, according to the US Embassy. Currently, Congolese journalists accept IOJ scholarships to the East Berlin school for print media journalists, East German jour- nalists conduct seminars for them in Congo, and the Ministry of Information employs Soviet media advis- ers. The national news agency subscribes to TASS and ADN, the East German news service. Coverage of US social issues and foreign policy is highly selective and critical. French satellite TV news and nearby Zairean programing help correct the Soviet version of world news, but Congolese print media frequently use Soviet stories. USIS post observer reporting suggests several other Soviet successes: ? The Botswana news agency used free TASS stories to reduce operating costs. The Soviets have relatively greater access to print media than to radio and TV in developing countries. Host governments tend to treat radio and TV as more valuable political resources and reserve them for their own use. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates, for example, ban Soviet me- dia from using their radio and TV but will allow them to print stories in local newspapers. African countries generally have the same attitude. In India, the Soviets can access the independent print media more handily than they can access government- controlled radio and TV. However, a few countries are exceptions: Syria and North Yemen allow the Soviets access to all media; both countries take direct news feed from Soviet TV. Radio Mali and Burundi 25X1 radio also accept stories and features from resident 25X1 Soviet correspondents. 25X1 The Soviets do not seem to try as hard with TV as with radio. They have more competition on TV from 25X1 American entertainment programing and, in Africa, from the French overseas news service. TV audiences are smaller than radio audiences (with the exception of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Ma- laysia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have more TV sets than radios: see table 4). Soviet media agencies have relatively greater access in a few countries with radio than with TV, except possibly Syria and North Yemen. ? TASS provides Shihata, the Tanzanian news agency, with its world news service at a concession- ary price, which, together with the political inclina- tions of editors, produces more news of Soviet origin than Reuters-origin appearing in the press. 25X1 ? Soviet-attributed advertisements in daily papers have increased both in Costa Rica and Ecuador, which, in the post observers' judgment, affects public opinion toward US Central American policies. ? Radio Mali, the country's only station, takes stories directly from the resident Radio Moscow correspon- dent with what observers report is a significant impact on listeners. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Table 4 Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a Angola 130 22 Benin 68 13 Botswana 75 NA Central African Republic 85 NA Chad 75 NA Congo 96 5 Djibouti 18 11 Ethiopia 2,000 36 Gabon 100 20 Gambia, The 100 NA Ghana 2,000 71 Guinea 125 8 Guinea-Bissau 20 NA Ivory Coast 800 562 Kenya 580 75 Liberia 330 35 Madagascar 910 71 Malawi 500 NA Mali 102 NA Mozambique 275 1 Niger 160 11 Nigeria 5,800 457 Senegal 320 50 Sierra Leone 100 21 Somalia 95 NA Sudan 1,400 109 Tanzania 2,000 9 Togo 190 8 Uganda 280 75 Zaire 500 12 Zambia 150 76 Afghanistan 135 13 Bangladesh 770 252 Bhutan 12 NA Brunei 50 30 India 22,000 b 2,095 Indonesia 6,550 3,000 Laos 225 NA Nepal 300 NA Pakistan 1,500 1,000 Philippines 2,185 955 Singapore 490 421 Sri Lanka 3,000 50 Thailand 7,200 3,000 Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America Argentina 10,000 5,910 Bahamas, The 115 50 Barbados 191 52 Belize 71 NA Bolivia 480 386 Brazil 17,500 12,425 Chile 3,250 2,643 Colombia 3,025 1,800 Costa Rica 190 450 Dominican Republic 225 388 Ecuador 1,800 135 El Salvador 900 300 French Guiana 40 10 Grenada 50 NA Guatemala 500 202 Guyana 300 NA Haiti 120 30 Honduras 1,535 135 Jamaica 857 200 Mexico 21,000 7,550 Netherlands Antilles 175 57 Nicaragua 200 127 Panama 290 227 198 81 2,200 860 90 3 185 3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Table 4 Thousands Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a (continued) the Philippine press The Soviets have excellent access to the non-Commu- nist print media and news agencies of India. The Radio TV vernacular-language press is particularly vulnerable to Soviet influence because many of the papers are Caribbean, Mexico, Central and resource poor. The Soviets provide them with cash, South America (continued) entertainment, and paid advertisements from Indian Trinidad and Tobago 355 300 firms trading with the USSR. Other forms of induce- Uruguay 1,655 368 ment include scholarships to sons and daughters of Venezuela 5,000 2,000 low-ranking journalists for study in the USSR, prom- Middle East and North Africa ises of better paying jobs through Soviet and Commu- Algeria 3,500 1,325 nist Party contacts in India, and regular supplies of Egypt 8,000 3,850 The Indian wire service, Press Trust of India (PTI), Iran 7,500 2,000 has been called Press TASS of India because of Iraq 2,200 535 closeness with TASS both in Moscow and New Delhi Israel 1,050 600 as well as frequent association with Soviet disinforma- Jordan 546 201 tion. US embassy reporting indicates that a number of Kuwait 710 575 pro-Soviet journalists are present in PTI. Another Lebanon 1,500 450 wire service, India Press Agency (IPA), specializing in Libya 165 170 news features, frequently conveys Soviet disinforma- Oman 250 45 tion. IPA is managed and staffed with journalists Qatar 75 110 trained at Link and Patriot, two pro-Soviet publica- Bahrain 140 121 scotch, according to embassy reporting. Cyprus 400 111 Syria 1,800 405 1,124 291 In part because of the Soviets' co-opting some devel- United Arab Emirates 100 100 oping country media, US Government agencies as Yemen Arab Republic 110 27 well as private-sector firms face an increasingly hos- Yemen, People's Democratic 111 37 tile press in developing countries in which the Soviets a Estimated by World Radio TV Handbook, 1984. b Handbook figure may be low because of the absence of an official Government of India statistic. ? TASS and Novosti have close ties with the Syrian media which allow prominent play for Soviet stories, usually attacks on US Middle East policies, ? The pro-Soviet bias of North Yemeni editors, trained via scholarships to schools in the USSR, enables TASS to make front page news and commentary. have created working relationships with local and national media. India, particularly, has many newspa- pers hostile toward the United States editorially. The Soviet-aided print media of Congo-Brazzaville have produced distorted reporting about the United States for several years with the result that the Congolese public does not have an accurate or balanced under- standing of US domestic or foreign policies, the US Embassy reports. The Western wire services are experiencing rising competition from TASS in developing countries. Comparative costs of a subsidized service versus a Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 25X1 LOA-1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Moscow's effort to access the media in developing countries directly competes with the "big jour" West- ern wire services which, until the 1970s, were the sole source of foreign news for many such countries. The Associated Press (AP), in New York; United Press International (UPI), in Washington; Reuters, in Lon- don; and Agence France Presse (AFP), in Paris, have news bureaus in over 100 developing countries and are highly competitive. All but government-owned AFP are owned by cooperative press associations. The Soviets also compete with the Chinese agency, Xinhua, in several African and Asian countries and with the Yugoslav news service, Tanjug, which is influential in nonaligned regional news services.= service at market prices are a disincentive for develop- ing news agencies to use the Western wire services. The differential assures TASS of access to new clients. The Western wire services usually require payments in hard currency, which many developing countries lack Constraints The Soviets, however, have not had easy access to all developing-country media. Some countries have taken reprisals against the Soviet overseas media for fla- grant abuses of their trade: ? Zambia initially tolerated a Novosti correspondent's behavior in Lusaka in the late 1970s. He took a high-visibility approach in propagandizing Zambi- ans by mailing Soviet publications to educational institutions, holding lectures and discussions on Soviet propaganda themes, and instructing Soviet teachers in Zambian schools. He gave SWAPO and African National Congress offices in Lusaka type- writers, copiers, and editorial assistance for their monthly newsletters. Finally, Zambian authorities accused him of instigating student demonstrations at the University of Zambia, and expelled him, ? Cameroon limits importation of Soviet propaganda material, but the Novosti office smuggled Soviet magazines into the country via Aeroflot in disregard of Cameroonian regulations. In 1978, when Aeroflot delivered magazines in cartons marked "pharma- ceuticals," the Cameroon customs service confiscat- ed them, severely criticized the Soviets, and warned In addition, policy differences with host governments may limit Soviet media activity. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan forced the Soviets to close their Karachi information office, the US Embassy reported. Further, the Soviets some- times impede their own efforts with bureaucratic inertia. Nigeria recently abrogated a news exchange agreement with TASS because of Soviet bureaucratic delays in opening a Nigerian news agency bureau in Moscow. The reputation TASS and Novosti have as havens for KGB operations precedes them in some countries: the government in May 1984, ? Djibouti studiously ignored the TASS media aid package when the Soviet Ambassador offered it to ? Jamaica refused to allow TASS to establish an office in 1979 based on its belief that the designated chief was KGB, ? Mauritius refused TASS facilities in 1980 when the Soviet Ambassador requested them, according to US embassy reporting. Another limiting factor on the Soviets' ability to influence developing media is a lack of commitment by some journalists whom they have attempted to cultivate. Some of the senior journalists whom IOJ has entertained at its "world conferences" may have 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret accepted invitations simply to take advantage of the free airfare and accommodations. The Malian vice president of IOJ, for example, not only attended the P'yongyang conference in 1983, but also has accepted USIA travel grants, the US embassy reports. Similar- ly, trainees who enroll in IOJ or USSR schools for an education in journalism may be there because they lacked other scholarship options. We fully expect the Soviets to continue to increase their media presence in developing countries: ? TASS gained four new clients in 1984 for media development assistance and almost certainly will solicit additional ones in 1985. ? The Novosti visitor program for developing-country journalists will expand under the patronage of the Soviet Central Committee. ? Novosti has a new wire service, dedicated to devel- oping-country news agencies, inaugurated in 1983. ? IOJ programs appear to be slated for expansion; the Havana school, in particular, will increase the num- ber of its Latin American students; IOJ African members are lobbying for a new IOJ school in Africa, The Soviet effort occurs when several governments of developing countries are independently creating ob- stacles for Western reporters in their countries. Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda, and Zambia have denied visas to Western reporters assigned to cover wars, coups, or economic conditions in their countries within the last year, according to the West- ern press. If reporters are allowed entry, they are closely monitored. For example, Iraqi taxi drivers, working for the Information Ministry, have prevented Western press photographers from taking pictures of economic conditions suggesting poverty or backward- ness in Iraq. Iraq also has confiscated foreign journa- lists' typewriters at the airport. Western reporters' access to several African countries is encumbered with lengthy visa hassles. Latin American countries remain relatively open to the Western media, al- though Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador require for- eign reporters to register with government-sponsored journalists' organizations. Under these conditions, the Soviet effort creates additional obstacles for Western media access. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200240007-6