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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000100020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iraq: Implications
of a Change in Regime
NESA 85-10002
January 1985
Copy 3 5 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iraq: Implications
of a Change in Regime
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by f the Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.n
on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10002
January 1985
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Iraq: Implications
of a Change in Regimen 25X1
Key Judgments The removal from power of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn almost
Information available certainly would be detrimental to US interests in the region. The severity
as of 18 December 1984 of the damage to US interests would range from mild if the ruling Bath
was used in this report.
Party retained power, to severe if Iranian-backed Shia radicals were to
seize control.
Any successor regime, particularly one following a coup, probably would
face greater internal instability because it would lack Saddam's firm
control of the levers of power. A new government would have to deal with
infighting among the ruling elite, renewed fighting by Kurdish rebels, and
the growth of subversive political movements, including the Communist
Party of Iraq and Shia fundamentalist groups. The unrest would provide
ample opportunities for exploitation by foreign states, including the USSR.
In the event of Saddam's natural death or assassination-the greatest
threat to the Iraqi President-a collegial type of leadership would initially
emerge because no leader has a sufficiently strong power base to rule alone.
Saddam's successors, if civilian and Ba'thist, probably would retain his
main policy goals of ending the conflict with Iran and increasing oil exports
to finance economic development. Under a civilian regime:
? Iraq would maintain good working relations with the United States to
ensure Washington's continued support for curtailing arms sales to Iran
and Iranian oil exports. Saddam's successors, however, probably would
be wary of vigorously pursuing his policy of seeking improved ties with
the United States because of criticism from ideological hardliners in the
party.
? Baghdad probably would continue close military and economic relations
with the USSR, Iraq's principal arms supplier, but suspicion and
resentment of the Soviets will encourage continued purchases of Western
arms and a gradual reduction of dependence on the USSR.
? Ba'thist military officers would regain much of the political influence
they lost under Saddam.
Secret
NESA 85-10002
January 1985
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If Saddam is ousted by a coup, the new leadership-heavily military-is
likely to follow policies more adverse to the United States than those of ci-
vilian Ba'thists:
? It probably would advocate military rather than political means to bring
Iran to the bargaining table.
? A military regime probably would be less interested in improving or even
maintaining good relations with the United States and might find the
United States a convenient scapegoat for Iraqi problems.
? Soviet influence might increase because of the weakness of the regime,
but Iraq would still seek alternative arms suppliers.
A revolution is unlikely unless Iran wins a decisive military victory. In that
event, Tehran probably would impose a Shia-dominated puppet govern-
ment in Baghdad based on the Iranian model. The new government would
depend upon Iranian occupation forces to survive and would probably face
considerable armed resistance. Strong differences also are likely to emerge
among Iraq's radical Shia leaders, undercutting the effectiveness of an
Iraqi-Iranian alliance.
A Shia-dominated state would at least initially follow policies dictated by
its masters in Tehran:
? The two countries would try to subvert moderate Arab regimes allied
with the United States, particularly Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
the smaller Persian Gulf states.
? Iraq would also put increased pressure on Syria to take a more aggressive
posture toward Israel.
? Ties with the United States almost certainly would be severed, and those
with the USSR greatly weakened.
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Dynamics of a Ba'thist Succession 2
Effect on Iraqi Policies 2
Implications for the United States 3
Implications for the United States 5
Policies of a Shia Regime 7
Implications for the United States 7
Leading Personalities 11
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Distribution of Major Religious and Ethnic Groups in Iraq
N
MANA1
`KUWAtV
Kuwait
Saudi
Arabia
Sunni Kurd I Sunni Kurd and
Sunni Arab
Tripoli"
Leba on
Mediterranean f3E1RU
Sea
Sunni Arab and
Shia Arab
- Oil pipeline Oilfield
Note: Pipeline alignments are approximate
*RIYADH
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Iraq: Implications
of a Change in Regime
The relative stability that Iraq has enjoyed for the
past 10 years rests largely on one man-President
Saddam Husayn. We believe that his skillful manipu-
lation of the dominant Bath Party, security services,
Army, and government bureaucracy has given him a
firm grip on power. Saddam has ruthlessly quashed
challenges to his rule, and potential opponents have
been largely intimidated by his effective security
forces, according to the US Interests Section. He so
far has weathered the four-year-old conflict with Iran,
a war that he initiated and that for a time appeared to
pose a major threat to his survival. Instead, the
conflict has strengthened his position.)
We believe that, even if faced with an Iranian mili-
tary victory, Saddam will not voluntarily relinquish
the political power he has fought so hard to obtain.
Illness is not likely to sideline him, since he is only 47
and appears to be in good health. He works long hours
despite occasional flareups from a ruptured disc that
causes severe pain in his lower back and weakness in
his legs. In recent years, a back brace appears to have
corrected many earlier problems. F_~
Assassination
The greatest threat to Saddam's rule, in our judg-
ment, comes from assassination.
Saddam's half-brother Barzan, former head of the
Iraqi Intelligence Service, publicly acknowledged in
1981 that there had been seven attempts on Saddam's
life since the Ba'thist coup in 1968.
In the most recent incidents, the Dawa Party, the
main Iraqi Shia dissident organization, tried to kill
Saddam in May 1981 and July 1982,
While Saddam escaped
Saddam has not named a successor, nor has he
signaled a favorite publicly. If Saddam is assassinated
or dies of natural causes, Iraq's Constitution specifies
that the nine-member Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC), Iraq's highest ruling body, is to
appoint a replacement. The RCC is dominated by
civilian members of the ruling Bath Party.
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In our judgment, the most likely candidates to suc-
ceed Saddam are Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the
RCC, and First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin
Ramadan, RCC member and leader of the Bath
Party militia. Each would have a strong claim to
leadership because of his years in high government
and Bath posts:
? We believe that Ibrahim, number two in the party
structure, is a primary contender because other
Ba'thist leaders probably view him as more amena-
ble to collegial rule and less likely to build a
personal power base than Ramadan. Ibrahim is
widely known for his devotion to Sunni Islam, a
factor that may appeal to Ba'thists seeking to blunt
criticism of their secular rule. The US Interests
Section reports that Ibrahim has a chronic heart
problem, but this may be a factor in his favor. In our
judgment, his poor health may make him an attrac-
tive candidate to other Ba'thist leaders hoping to
build their power base while Ibrahim serves as a
weak interim ruler.
injury, several of his entourage were killed in each
attempt. With Iran apparently preparing for a drawn-
out war of attrition, Dawa or other Iranian-backed
dissidents probably will redouble their efforts to assas-
sinate him, in our judgment. Saddam rarely appears
in public and then only in settings carefully screened
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by his bodyguards and security forces. A recent
Western interviewer of Saddam was struck by the
tight security surrounding him and the almost obses-
sive concern with possible assassination attempts.
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? Ramadan I is the second most
powerful man in the government. He is the most
publicized personality in Iraq after Saddam. His
command of the People's Army, the Bath Party's
militia that has about 200,000 troops on active duty
and a much larger number of reserves, gives Rama-
dan additional weight if the succession struggle
turns violent. The militia, however, is no match for
the armed forces or the security services, in our
judgment. Ramadan, who is from Mosul, has strong
political ambitions that we believe other leaders
distrust. Tikritis, the President's clan, are probably
particularly suspicious of Ramadan. Many Tikritis
hold important security posts and could be expected
to oppose him.F-7
Minister of Defense Adnan Khayrallah, deputy com-
mander of the armed forces and RCC member, is a
darkhorse candidate. His strength lies in his member-
ship in the Tikriti clan and close ties to Saddam, who
is his cousin and brother-in-law. Khayrallah is unpop-
ular among military personnel who view him as a
theless be preferred by other Tikritis, who would hope
to manipulate him and deny the office of president to
anyone not from their clan.
Dynamics of a Ba'thist Succession. Whether the
successor is Ibrahim, Ramadan, or Khayrallah, no
single leader is likely to emerge with sufficient power
to rule independently of the others, in our judgment.
Saddam's several purges have removed potential chal-
lengers from the party and the military. In a post-
Saddam era, the leadership almost certainly will be a
coalition of Ba'thist civilian and military leaders. Gen.
Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri, a leading Iraqi military
commander with longstanding Bath Party connec-
tions who is now Deputy Chief of Staff for Army
Operations, probably will play an important role. We
believe that important Tikritis, such as Sa'dun Shakir,
the Minister of Interior; Fadhil al-Barraq, head of the
Iraqi Intelligence Service; and Ali Hasan al-Majid,
Chief of the Directorate of Public Security, could be
expected to maneuver for power as well.F--]
25X1 Members of the Tikriti clan would resist efforts to
wrest from them the security forces that are the key to
their influence, in our judgment. Even if a non-Tikriti
like Ramadan were to head the government, the
Tikritis probably would continue to exert considerable
influence. The Tikritis, however, are far from mono-
lithic and probably could not agree on a single leader
to represent them. In that event, we believe that
Saddam's half brothers, Barzan and Sab'awi al-
Tikriti, who were purged from the Iraqi Intelligence
Service in 1983, might try to reexert their authority.
In the absence of a united civilian Bath Party
leadership following the assassination of Saddam, we
believe the military would gain increasing power,
particularly as long as the war with Iran continued.
Iraqi military officers played significant roles in na-
tional leadership until Saddam gradually assumed
control, leading to the resignation in 1979 of President
Ahmad al-Bakr, an Army general. Saddam has care-
fully worked to put the military under civilian control,
and the RCC now contains no career military officers
except for Minister of Defense Adnan Khayrallah.
This is likely to change should Saddam be assassinat-
ed, and we would expect the military to gain increased
influence in policy decisions.
Uect on Iraqi Policies. In our judgment, Ba'thist
successors such as Ibrahim or Ramadan initially
would follow the general thrust of Saddam's current
foreign and domestic policies. They share Saddam's
concern about maintaining internal stability, ending
the war, and resuming oil exports to finance economic
development. Baghdad would continue diplomatic ef-
forts to curtail Western military and civilian trade
with Iran. The influence of the military probably
would increase, expressed in a more aggressive pursuit
of military options.
military officers are upset that Iraq is relying
on diplomatic initiatives. We believe that Baghdad
might accelerate the rate of attacks on Iranian oil
shipping and on land facilities, possibly including
Jazireh-ye Khark (Khark Island). Iraqi civilian lead-
ers also might be tempted to go along with a hardline
military policy to end the war and shore up their
political position.
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Relations with Syria are likely to improve somewhat
upon the removal of Saddam, Syrian President Hafiz
al-Assad's archrival. Iraqi leaders lacking Saddam's
intense personal animosity toward Assad are more
likely to paper over differences with Damascus and
perhaps persuade it to reopen Iraq's oil pipeline across
Syria, which has been closed since 1982. The im-
provement of ties with Syria would probably lead to a
sharpening of Iraq's position on the Arab-Israeli
dispute as Baghdad provided greater diplomatic and
propaganda support for Damascus. Still, suspicions of
the rival Syrian Bath Party run deep in Iraq for its
support for Iran and past efforts to stage coups in
Baghdad. So long as the threat from Iran continues,
we would expect the Iraqis to be careful not to
alienate the United States.)
We believe that Iraq would seek continued good ties
with the USSR, especially if Deputy Prime Minister
Ramadan becomes President. US diplomats believe
that he favors closer ties to the Soviets. Ramadan
frequently serves as Saddam's special emissary to the
USSR and has had only limited exposure to the West.
Ramadan held his first meetings with US officials last
year. The greater influence of Iraq's military over
policymaking probably will also be reflected in in-
creased demands for Soviet arms.)
Ramadan, however, is a strong nationalist and tough
bargainer who probably would maintain Iraq's inde-
pendent policies. The Iraqis are at odds with Moscow
over Soviet support for the outlawed Iraqi Communist
Party and Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.
We believe that these differences will continue under
a successor regime. Baghdad also harbors consider-
able mistrust and resentment toward the Soviets
because of their refusal to supply arms during the first
year of the Iran-Iraq war
In our judgment, Iraq is likely to
clearly prefer Western equipment
resume efforts to diversify its arms suppliers once
increased oil sales replenish its treasury. Ramadan
also has been in charge of Iraq's economic develop-
ment for much of his career, an area where the Iraqis
Iraq and setting back, at least temporarily, the trend
toward improved US-Iraqi relations. The weaker a
successor regime, the more likely it would be to avoid
actions that could be construed as collusion with the
United States. Our knowledge of the highly secretive
Ba'thist hierarchy is sketchy, but we see indications of
longstanding opposition within the party to moderat-
ing Iraqi policy. We would expect hardliners among
the new leaders in time to espouse policies directed
against Arab moderates in the region with strong US
ties.0 25X1
Until the war with Iran ends, however, a Ba'thist-
ruled Iraq probably will continue to view as vital US
support for its diplomatic efforts to curtail Western
arms sales to Iran. We would not expect a significant
decline in relations with the United States unless the
Israelis performed an act, such as an airstrike against
an Arab state, that greatly angered the Arab world.
Iraqis would see the United States as behind the
incident, and the Ba'thist leadership probably would
prefer to put distance between itself and the United
States. Similarly, until the war is over, Baghdad will
want to maintain reasonably good working relations
with Jordan and its other moderate Arab allies.
After the war, relations with the United States will
face greater obstacles because Iraq will have less need
for US support, and US backing of Israel will loom as
a larger obstacle to improved relations, in our judg-
ment. Moreover, Iraq's ambitions in the Gulf and
efforts to claim a greater leadership role in the Arab
world and the Nonaligned Movement are likely to
increase friction with the United States. We believe
that less secure Ba'thist leaders would be unlikely to
risk increased domestic criticism by advocating signif-
icantly improved relations with the United States.
Iraqi moderation is in large part the result of obtain-
ing increased internal stability, according to a US
diplomat. We believe that, faced with greater opposi-
tion at home, the Ba'thists, who achieved power as a
25X1 Implications for the United States. We believe Sad-
dam's replacement by another Ba'thist would harm
US interests in the region by increasing instability in
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clandestine party in a ruthless fight against Commu-
nist and government opposition, will revert to the
tactics that brought them success. We would expect
the new leaders to employ terrorism and even greater
repression of their foes to retain power.F__-]
Coup
We believe that a. Bath Party or military coup-a
frequent route to power in Iraq-is the next most
likely threat. Such a takeover is unlikely so long as the
war continues, unless senior Ba'thist leaders conclude
that Saddam's removal is necessary for their own
survival and would satisfy Iranian conditions for a
cease-fire. So far, Iran's insistence that the entire
Bath Party, not just Saddam, would have to go has
caused the party leadership to draw closer together
rather than single Saddam out as a scapegoat.' F_
We believe that disgruntlement over Saddam's pre-
eminence and the consequent erosion of Bath Party
authority is not sufficient to spark a coup.
resentment in Ba'thist ranks
brother Barzan, of disloyalty,
over the concentration of power in the hands of
Saddam, his relatives, and other clansmen from his
hometown of Tikrit. In 1979, however, Saddam exe-
cuted 21 Ba'thist "plotters" and imprisoned 33 more
for allegedly advocating democratic party elections
for the presidency, according to the US Interests
Section, and this ended open opposition to Saddam
within the party. In 1983, Saddam also purged Iraq's
main security service, the Iraqi Intelligence Service,
in part because he suspected its former chief, his half
Saddam's tight control of the country's numerous
25X1 security services makes a successful coup extremely
difficult.
Saddam loyalists include the following: Minister of
Interior Sa'dun Shakir; head of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service, Fadhil al-Barraq; Director of Military Intelli-
gence Mahmud Shakir Shahin; Director of Public
' Senior Iranian Government officials occasionally suggest that the
removal of Saddam alone will suffice to end the war. A careful
reading of the statements of senior Iranian clerics-who hold the
real power over Iranian war policy-indicates they have never
changed their basic condition for ending the war-destruction of
the Iraqi Bath Party and establishment of an Iraqi Islamic
republic.0 25X1
Security Ali Hasan al-Majid; Director of the Presi-
dential Intelligence Service Husayn Kama] al-Majid;
and Izzat Ibrahim and Adnan Khayrallah, who run
the powerful Military Bureau of the Bath Party's
Regional Command. We believe that Saddam uses
the various security services to check on their political
ambitions and reporting accuracy.
Equally important, the security services have created
an atmosphere of fear and suspicion that has intimi-
dated the populace and weakened opposition to
Saddam's rule, according to US diplomats.
he Directorate of
Political Guidance in the Ministry of Defense, which
we believe is controlled by the Military Bureau of the
party, ruthlessly weeds out suspect military officers
and rotates and transfers officers every few years to
prevent commanders from building a personal follow-
ing. political guidance
officers bypass the normal military chain of command
and report directly to the Directorate of Guidance.
Within the Bath Party, Saddam has assigned security
Military officers probably are reluctant to move
against Saddam during the war because they fear that
a coup would weaken Iraq's ability to resist an Iranian
invasion and lead to their ouster, too. Taking no
chances, Saddam has'launched an elaborate personal-
ity cult to identify himself with the war effort and
personify Iraqi nationalism against the traditional
Persian threat.)
military officers
from the Mosul area as a potential political threat.
These officers include two Army deputy chiefs of staff
and at least two division commanders.
the director of Saddam's Presi-
dential Guard said that several prominent Sunni
citizens from Mosul had spoken openly against
Saddam in early 1982 when the war was going badly
for Iraq. The director, a Tikriti, said that security
officials had previously considered Sunni leaders in
Mosul to be solidly behind the regime.
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some military officers be-
lieve that their counterparts from Mosul are more
loyal to other members of their clique than to the
military command structure or the ruling Bath Party
to which they belong. We have no evidence that these
officers are disloyal to Saddam, but they could play a
role in a coup attempt if Deputy Prime Minister
Ramadan, who also is from Mosul, were to make a
bid for power.
Policies. A successful coup would probably result in a
more radical break from Saddam's policies than if he
died naturally or were assassinated. The drastic move
of replacing Saddam during the war probably would
reflect profound dissatisfaction with its conduct and
concern that the lives of the coup plotters were at
stake. If the coup were led by middle-level, profession-
al, non-Ba'thist military officers, Iraq might sharply
escalate its pressure on Iran in the Gulf. On the other
hand, should the coup be led by senior civilian Bath
Party officials and senior Ba'thist military officers, we
believe Baghdad probably would press hard for peace
negotiations in the hope that Saddam's removal would
satisfy Tehran.F---]
Although Iraq's new leaders probably would be long-
time Ba`thists familiar with the party's blend of
ideology and pragmatism, they would lack experience
in foreign affairs. They probably would proceed cau-
tiously and would not immediately change Iraq's basic
alignments with the superpowers or Arab moderates,
particularly during the war. A military-led govern-
ment is likely to have mixed feelings toward the
Soviet Union. Thousands of Iraqi officers have been
trained in the USSR, and most middle-level Iraqi
officers have been subjected to heavy propaganda
depicting the United States as the enemy of Iraq. At
the same time, Iraqi military officers are strongly
nationalistic, and they are
resentful and suspicious of the Soviets. The likely
instability of a military regime probably would make
it susceptible to pressures for a more pro-Soviet
foreign policy and more concessions to the Communist
Party of Iraq. Iraq's military also will seek to main-
tain good relations with the Soviets to assure the
continued flow of modern arms.)
balance against the Soviets. It would be unlikely to
improve the relationship and probably would autho-
rize more hostile coverage of the United States in
Iraqi news media.F_-]
We believe that Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf
states, and Jordan would fear that Iraq might revert
to its old radicalism. Syria, Libya, and South Yemen,
on the other hand, would seek to improve relations for
the same reason. The military wing of the Syrian
Bath Party that rules in Damascus would be encour-
aged that Iraq's military was dominating the civilian
wing of the Bath Party for the first time since the
mid-1970s. In our judgment, should Damascus reopen
the Iraqi pipeline across Syria and permit Iraq to
import supplies through Syrian ports, Iraq's depend-
ence on financial and logistic support from Arab
moderates would be reduced, permitting a further
radicalization of Iraqi foreign policy.FI
We believe that coup plotting and coups-endemic in
Iraq before Saddam gained control-would continue
and perhaps escalate unless Saddam's successor
proves to be his equal in ruthlessness and cunning.
The new leadership probably would have to deal with
increased subversive activity by civilian and military
Ba`thists, as well as non-Ba'thist dissidents embold-
ened by Saddam's overthrow. We believe that the
regime would respond with brutal repression. None-
theless, Kurdish nationalists, Shia and Kurdish Com-
munists, and Shia fundamentalists would benefit from
infighting in the security services and armed forces
and from intrigues among leading Ba'thists. The
unrest would probably be considerably greater follow-
ing a coup because the security structure would be
weakened by purges of Saddam loyalists. We believe
that Iraq's Communists, now almost moribund, and
Shia fundamentalists both might be able to begin
making inroads among lower-class Iraqis if there were
a weak government in Baghdad.F--]
Implicationsfor the United States. A military regime
in Baghdad probably would be more damaging to US
interests than a civilian succession because Iraq's
domestic situation and foreign policy would reflect its
The new Iraqi leadership probably would retain a
working relationship with the United States as a
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greater weaknesses and insecurity. Increased instabil-
ity would provide greater opportunity for Iranian,
Soviet, and Syrian exploitation. We believe that gov-
ernment repression would not be as effective because
of greater infighting among the ruling elite and
widespread opposition.
We believe that Iraq's foreign policies would be
similar to those under civilian rule but somewhat
more adverse to the United States. The military
leadership would be more likely to escalate the war in
the Gulf to bring Iran to the peace table. The United
States could be drawn into the conflict if Iran re-
sponds by attacking the oil facilities of Iraq's Gulf
allies or closes the Strait of Hormuz. Internal weak-
ness would impede stronger ties to Washington, par-
ticularly after the war, when US support would not be
so critical. A weaker Iraq would be less of a counter-
weight to Iranian efforts to dominate the Gulf.F_
A Shia-Based Revolution
In our judgment, no group outside the security ser-
vices, military, and Bath Party has the strength and
cohesion to stage a successful uprising.' Iraq's security
services have effectively quelled disturbances and
placed agents throughout society. The regime has
arrested or deported many suspected Shia sympathiz-
ers of Iran and in 1980 executed the leading Iraqi
Shia clergyman, Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. It also
arrested the ringleaders of Kurdish student demon-
strations against military conscription in June 1984,
Shia slum in Baghdad,
They also have refurbished important Shia religious
shrines in southern Iraq.'n
We believe that a decisive military defeat would open
the way for Iran to impose a Shia-controlled govern-
ment in Baghdad patterned after the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Senior Iranian religious leaders have indicat-
ed that, in the event of an Iranian victory, Iran and
Iraq would remain separate countries, but both would
follow the "line of the Imam." Moreover, because the
major Shia shrines are in Iraq, we believe that many
Iranian clerics would move there and would become
involved in Iraqi politics.F_~
Tehran has established the Supreme Assembly of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), an umbrella
organization for Iraqi Shia opposition groups head-
quartered in Iran that functions as an Iraqi govern-
ment-in-exile. SAIRI
is controlled by representatives from the Iranian
President's office, the Revolutionary Guard, the
Prime Minister's office, and the Ministry of Interior.
Tehran has pressed Iraqi opposition groups based in
Iran to accept control by SAIRI. Opposition groups
that fail to join are denied access to military training
and cannot gain permission to print propaganda,
Moreover, the Iranians are
trying to form new organizations of dissident Iraqi
Shias to supplant recalcitrant groups opposed to Irani-
demonstrations are futile.
Dawa Party believe that their clandestine organiza-
tion is so thoroughly penetrated that attempts to plan
members of the Shia
25X1 Saddam employs an economic carrot to complement
the regime's repression. Iraq's per capita income has
risen by 700 percent since the Bath Party takeover in
1968, and oil-financed development projects have
benefited all classes, in our judgment. Shias have
enjoyed special attention. The Ba'thists greatly im-
proved utilities and educational facilities in the large
an domination,
A Shia fundamentalist regime in Baghdad, in our
judgment, could remain in power only through the
presence of large numbers of Iranian troops. Unlike
the Iranian revolution, the takeover in Iraq would not
have the broad support of the population. In addition
to resistance from Iraqi Sunnis,
widespread opposition among Shias in Iraq
to the doctrine espoused by Iran that Ayatollah
Khomeini is the supreme religious and secular guide
of all Shia believers. The enmity of many Iraqi Shias
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pendent oppositionists.
toward Iran also has been heightened by their partici-
pation in military service and the fact that Iranian
Shias are Persians, while Iraqi Shias are Arabs. We
believe that Iraqi Shias would see a new regime led by
SAIRI spokesman Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim or
another pliable Iraqi cleric as an Iranian creation.
Moreover, Shia opposition activists are factionalized
among Iraqi loyalists, supporters of SAIRI, and inde-
years.
Even if Iraq's Shias proved quiescent, the new govern-
ment probably would face considerable armed resist-
ance from the outset. Remnants of Iraq's military
would join forces with Sunni civilians in major cities,
in our judgment. Secular political groupings, includ-
ing Kurdish factions, Ba'thists, and Communists,
would oppose the regime clandestinely and conduct
guerrilla actions. Small arms would be readily avail-
able from the disintegrating Iraqi Army, and arms
long have been abundant in Kurdistan. We believe
that the Iranian-supported Shia regime probably
would establish popular paramilitary organizations
modeled after the Revolutionary Guard in Iran to put
down the dissidence, but resistance could continue for
Policies of a Shia Regime. We believe that, at least
initially, policies of the new government would reflect
those of its Iranian neighbors. Iraq would become
stridently anti-US and hostile to US friends in the
Middle East. We believe that Baghdad would join
forces with Iran and seek to install Islamic republics
throughout the Muslim world, concentrating first on
the smaller Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The new
regime, however, probably would expend limited ener-
gy and resources in the effort, at least initially,
because of the strong armed resistance it faced at
home.
25X1 Iraq and Iran probably would concentrate their initial
efforts against Kuwait to exploit the large Shia
community there-30 percent of the native popula-
tion. We believe that Kuwait would try to accommo-
date Iran and Iraq by becoming increasingly anti-US
while trying to draw closer to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh
would be faced with either coming to the defense of
Kuwait and the other Gulf states or standing by as
Iran and Iraq subverted them.F---]
In our judgment, Iraq's new leaders also would turn
their attention to Israel. Tehran has declared that
Iraq is on the road to Israel and that Jordan and Syria
are the next steps on that path. The Shia governments
in Tehran and Baghdad would call on Amman and
Damascus to oust the Israelis and would seek to
undercut their Islamic credentials for failing to com-
ply. They probably would back dissident Islamic
groups seeking to overthrow Syrian President Hafiz
al-Assad and Jordan's King Hussein. The Iraqi and
Iranian armies, however, probably would be in no
shape for battles requiring lengthy supply lines. More-
over, Tehran's revolutionary doctrine calls for Muslim
masses, not armies, to oust un-Islamic rulers.
Faced with a hostile Iran and Iraq, Syria and Jordan
probably would paper over their differences and draw
closer. Syria might harbor and support Iraqi dissi-
dents seeking to overthrow the pro-Iranian govern-
ment in Baghdad. Syria probably would move to
undercut Iranian-backed Shia elements in Lebanon.
We believe, however, that strong differences between
Baghdad and Tehran would eventually emerge. Iraqi
animosity toward Iran is deeply rooted, as are the
essentially Arab character and orientation of the
Iraqis. In our judgment, even a pro-Iranian govern-
ment in Baghdad would chafe under strict direction
by Iran's clerics. many 25X1
Iraqi clerics already resent Tehran's pretensions to
leadership of Iraq. Iraqi leaders would oppose some
Iranian policies, if only to blunt criticism for being
Iranian cat's-paws.
Implicationsfor the United States. An Iraqi Shia 25X1
regime, working with Iran, would directly challenge
the interests of the United States and pro-US moder-
ate Arab states in the region. US relations with
Baghdad's clerical rulers would resemble those now
existing with Tehran. Baghdad would be hostile to the
United States and would encourage-or at least not
restrain-mob violence against any US presence in
Iraq.
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Iraq's predominantly Muslim society is characterized
by deep ethnic and sectarian divisions. Arabs, 71
percent of the population, inhabit the central and
southern plains, and Kurds, 20 percent of the popula-
tion, live in the northern mountains. Turkomans and
Arab Christians make up the remaining 9 percent.
The Arabs are divided between the Sunni and Shia
sects of Islam, and the Kurds are split by longstand-
ing tribal enmities.
Shias
Shias are in the majority, constituting some 55
percent of the population. We estimate that Shias in
the military account for 80 percent of Iraqi enlisted
men and perhaps 60 percent of the junior officers.=
The Shias have long resented political and economic
domination by Iraq's Sunnis, according to academic
sources. Despite Ba'thist efforts to direct greater
economic and educational opportunities to the Shia
community, Shias remain disadvantaged,
Shiasfeeing poverty
in rural areas have swelled Baghdad's population to
3.5 million. Over one-third of Baghdad's population,
they are straining social services. Reduced govern-
ment oil revenues from the war have kept the govern-
ment from expanding Iraqs welfare programs at the
pace of the late 1970s, according to the US Interests
Section. F-1
Iraqi Shias have no single leader and are factiona-
lized by the practice of following rival "mujtahids, "
or spiritual guides, according to scholars of Iraq. The
government executed the most respected Shia clergy-
man, Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, in 1980. Many
remaining prominent clerics give at least lipservice to
Saddam's regime, and all are paid directly by the
government.
Iraq's Shias seem more secular than their Iranian
coreligionists, according to most scholars. They have
largely ignored Iran's call to overthrow the Ba'thist
regime. Iraqi Shias have a strong sense of Arab
nationalism, and the government has played skillful-
ly on the centuries-old Arab animosity toward Per-
sians. 7_1
Shia opposition groups are weak and divided. The
largest grouping, the Dawa Party, is headquartered in
Tehran, led by Murtadha Askari. Dawa is a member
of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq, an umbrella organization of Shia and secular
opposition groups. Tehran sponsors the Assembly and
hopes to establish it as the basis for a government in
occupied Iraq.
The Iraqi Government has dealt harshly with those
who have responded to Islamic radicalism. Security
forces arrested and executed hundreds of Shias and
deported thousands more to Iran following a series of
sabotage and assassination attempts against Iraqi
officials in 1980,
Kurds
Iraq's 2.6 million Kurds are in continual rebellion
against Baghdad's authority, which they regard as
illegitimate. They seek greater autonomy and a larg-
er share of revenues from northern oilfields. Revolts,
met by force, are often followed by cease-fires and
power-sharing agreements that so far have always
broken down, leading to more cycles of violence. C
Violence has increased since August as the dissident
Kurdish Democratic Party, led by Mas'ud and Idris
Barzani, has fought against both government forces
and the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by
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Jalal Talabani. Talabani concluded a cease-fire with
Baghdad in December 1983, agreeing to release gov-
ernment prisoners and form a border guard of up to
40,000 men, releasing Iraqi regular troops for duty on
the front. The agreement with Talabani broke down
in October 1984. Talabani's forces have retreated to
the mountains and have resumed skirmishing with
government forces. 0
25X1 We believe that the Kurds lack the arms and man-
power to overthrow the government even if the Syri-
ans, Iranians, and Libyans were to increase substan-
tially their support for the rebels. The Kurds,
however, could contribute to a weakening of the
government that other power centers in Iraq could
exploit. Kurdish revolts were instrumental in the
overthrow of several Iraqi regimes in the 1960s.F_
25X1 Arab Sunnis
In our judgment, the Arab Sunnis are least likely to
rise against a government that they dominate and
that favors them. Separate Sunni interest groups,
however, are the most likely to stage coups to
enhance their power. Regional, tribal, and family ties
are stronger than ethnic bonds among most Sunni
Arabs.
the regime of the Arif brothers (November 1963-July
25X1 1968) depended heavily on fellow tribesmen and
residents from their home region. The Ba'thist lead-
ers who replaced them draw heavily on fellow Tikri-
tis. The Tikritis, in turn, are concerned over the
cohesiveness of military officers from the Mosul
region,
Iraq would support radical Islamic causes in the
Middle East but probably would be at odds with other
Arab radicals, including Syria and Libya, who oppose
a Shia regime in Baghdad. The United States and
Iraq would often be at loggerheads over Iraq's more
militant stance toward Israel. Iraqi-backed terrorism,
this time Shia in nature, would threaten US installa-
tions and personnel in the Middle East, in our judg-
ment.
A Shia victory in Iraq would create serious problems
for the USSR. A religious leadership in Baghdad
would be likely to put distance between itself and
Moscow, although Iraq's current heavy reliance on
Soviet military and technical support makes a com-
plete rupture unlikely. Such a regime might attempt
to subvert the current secular leadership in Damascus
and, if successful, thereby reduce or eliminate Soviet
influence in a state vital to Moscow's position in the
Middle East.l
Furthermore, an Iranian leadership emboldened by
success in Baghdad and freed from a burdensome war
with Iraq might undertake other moves inimical to
Soviet interests such as becoming more active in
aiding Afghan insurgents. An increased Iranian
threat might cause the Arab Gulf states to be more
reliant on the United States for security assistance.
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Apppendix
Leading Personalities
United States and the USSR but is suspicious of both superpowers.
Saddam Husayn, President;
Chairman, Revolutionary
Command Council
Saddam Husayn, President of Iraq and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command
Council since 1979, is the primary architect of his country's domestic and foreign
policy. His political future is inextricably tied to the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war,
which he has portrayed in terms of national survival, according to US diplomats.
He adopts the "carrot and stick" approach in governing; he has implemented
major development projects designed to increase Iraq's standard of living but has
ruthlessly suppressed his opponents. Saddam has also fostered a personality cult
and a sophisticated propaganda campaign to solidify his hold on power. US
diplomats report that he has departed from Bath ideology to attain his goals,
which include winning Iraq a leadership role in the Arab world and the
Nonaligned Movement. He realizes the advantages of balanced ties with the
pragmatic, shrewd, charismatic, and opportunistic.
Saddam, 47, has been involved in politics for nearly 30 years. F~
Izzat Ibrahim, 25X1
Vice Chairman, Revolutionary
Command Council; Assistant
Secretary General, Bath
Party Regional Command
Izzat Ibrahim, a longtime Saddam loyalist, has occupied the second position in the
RCC and Regional Command since July 1979. US diplomats report that as Vice
Chairman of the RCC he is responsible for overseeing day-to-day Bath Party
affairs. They add that Saddam feels comfortable in placing him in such sensitive
positions. Ibrahim is respected by the Iraqi people but lacks the ambition,
charismatic personality, and independent power base to allow him to challenge the
President's rule. He has played a major role in the formulation of Iraq's Persian
Gulf policy. Ibrahim is chairman of the Election Commission, which determines
the acceptability of National Assembly candidates, and of the party Military
Bureau, which monitors military efficiency and loyalty. He has chronic health
problems. He is about 42 years old and is a devout Sunni Muslim from Samarra'.
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Taha Yasin Ramadan,
First Deputy Prime Minister;
Member, Revolutionary Command
Council; Commander in Chief,
People's Army
The second most important figure in the Iraqi Government, First Deputy Prime
Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan oversees the day-to-day operations of the govern-
ment. US diplomats report that since the late 1970s he has been responsible for de-
veloping procedures for implementing policy established by Saddam.
Ramadan enjoys the President's full confidence. He
plays a key role in economic and industrial affairs and often travels abroad as Sad-
dam's official envoy. We agree with the US Interests Section's assessment of
Ramadan as a crafty and ambitious politician who would like to be president. He
lacks a sufficient power base to challenge Saddam, although he has the support of
some sections of the Bath Party of Iraq, civil service, and People's Army (the
Bath Party militia). Ramadan has opposed close ties with the United States,
preferring relations with the USSR and its allies. He has been a member of the
Regional Command since 1966 and of the RCC since 1969. In 1975, he was
named Commander in Chief of the People's Army. He was appointed First Deputy
Prime Minister in 1979. Ramadan, about 46, is a native of Mosul.F---]
Adnan Khayrallah,
Deputy Prime Minister;
Minister of Defense; Deputy
Commander in Chief, Armed
Forces; Member, Revolutionary
Command Council
A cousin and brother-in-law of Saddam, Staff Gen. Adnan Khayrallah owes his
positions to his family connections. A US diplomat says that Khayrallah plays no
role in formulating military policy but instead ensures the military's loyalty to the
Khayrallah is not popular
He is also a symbol of political interference in military affairs because
of his appointments of Ba'thists and relatives to military commands early in the
Iran-Iraq war. Although Khayrallah is a career Army officer, his only unit
command was a tank regiment during the mid-1970s.
in Chief. Khayrallah, about 44, suffers from a chronic back ailment.
e prefers Western arms to Soviet-made weapons. He has
been Defense Minister and a member of the RCC and Regional Command since
1977. In 1979, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Commander
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Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri,
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations
Maj. Gen. Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri is one of the most powerful men in the armed
forces. As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations since January 1984, Fakhri
participates in strategic military decision making and enjoys Saddam's trust.
Considered a war hero by the Iraqi public, he is feared and respected by his staff,
Fakhri made errors that led to serious
mid-forties.
Iraqi defeats in 1982, but a year later he won two major victories along the
Doveyrich River. Since February 1984, Fakhri has also commanded the East of
Tigris Command, which halted the Iranian invasion north of Al Basrah but failed
to recapture the Majnoon Islands. A Ba'thist since the mid-1960s, he is the last
surviving active-duty Army officer who participated in the coup in 1968 that
brought the Ba`thists to power. He was elected to the Regional Command in 1982.
During late 1983, Fakhri served briefly as director of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service, presiding over its reorganization and purge. A native of Mosul, he is in his
Sa'dun Shakir,
Minister of Interior
A longtime Ba'thist, Sa'dun Shakir has been involved in Bath Party security
operations for nearly 25 years. As Interior Minister (since 1979), he oversees Iraq's
ubiquitous internal security apparatus. Saddam's trust
and confidence in Shakir date to their revolutionary days.
Shakir is virulently anti-Communist and distrusts the Soviets; he has close
ties with Palestinian terrorist groups. During 1968-77, Shakir directed the
Intelligence Service and its predecessor organization, the Public Relations Bureau.
He has been a member of the RCC and Regional Command since 1977. Shakir,
about 45, is of Tikriti origin and has a law degree.
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim,
Leader, Supreme Assembly of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
Hojat-ol Eslam Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim is the middle son of the Dawa Party's
founder, the late Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, and is the most powerful and
influential leader within the Iraqi Shia opposition movement. A middle-level
cleric, he seeks to establish an Iranian-style religious state. In December 1982,
Khomeini chose Muhammad to head the newly established Supreme Assembly of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq that Khomeini has picked to rule in Baghdad after
Saddam is defeatedd most Iranian
funding of the Iraqi opposition goes directly to Muhammad, thus increasing his
power and Iran's influence with Dawa. He also recruits Iraqi prisoners of war and
refugees in Iran to support his cause. al-
though Muhammad and Khomeini work closely, they have ideological differences.
Muhammad's belief that Khomeini is the supreme religious
guide of the Shias has cost him the support of other Iraqi Shias who demand that
the opposition movement be autonomous. Muhammad is in his late thirties and
resides in Tehran. 25X1
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Mahdi Abd al-Muhsin al-Hakim,
Leader of the Rabita Ahl al-Bayt
Mahdi Abd al-Muhsin al-Hakim is the elder brother of Muhammad al-Hakim,
the spokesman for the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
During the 1970s, Mahdi and his brothers, Muhammad and Abd al-Aziz, led the
Dawa Party. Mahdi, however, subsequently broke with the party and settled in
London, where he leads the Rabita Ahl al-Bayt, an Iraqi exile group advocating a
freely elected secular Iraqi Government dominated by Shias.
Mahdi believes that the Iraqi populace would not support
an Islamic republic similar to Iran's. He publishes anti-Ba'thist propaganda and
serves as the Shia opposition movement's liaison with foreign governments. Libya
and Syria aid Mahdi's organization, as do wealthy Shias in the Persian Gulf states,
Mahdi's political orientation, however, alienates
paramount actor. He is about 40.
him from the Iranian Government-the major supporter of Shia oppositionists-
and his operation in the United Kingdom is too far from Iraq to give him much ac-
cess to the Shia opposition's power base or to allow him to become the opposition's
Masud and Idris Barzani,
Leaders of the Kurdish
Democratic Party
Masud Barzani was elected head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Iraq's
oldest and largest Kurdish dissident group, following the death in 1979 of his
father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Idris, the second-ranking KDP official, acts as the
organization's spokesman and main contact with other Iraqi dissident organiza-
tions and the Governments of Iran, Syria, and Libya. The brothers are conducting
a guerrilla campaign to create an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq.
The Barzanis have collaborated with the Iranian Army in the Iran-Iraq war,
kidnaped foreign technicians in Iraq, and attacked loyalist Kurdish groups,
The US Interests Section reports that,
although the Barzanis are respected in rural Kurdistan, their actions have cost
them the support of anti-Khomeini Kurds throughout Iraq. Idris, about 40, is two
years older than Masud.
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Jalal Talabani,
Secretary General of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Intelligent and opportunistic, Jalal Talabani has led the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) since he broke from the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1975. ^
Talabani's lifelong ambition has been to become the
political leader of an autonomous Kurdistan within a federated Iraq. Although he
is a skilled and experienced military commander, Talabani believes that negotia-
tions with the Saddam Husayn regime are the only way to achieve Kurdish goals,
and he has been personally involved in talks with the government to that end. C
Talabani works closely with Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, a
major Iranian Kurdish rebel leader. Talabani, who is about 51, holds a law degree.
Aziz Muhammad,
Secretary General of the
Communist Party of Iraq
Aziz Muhammad, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Iraq since 1964,
leads the mainstream pro-Soviet faction of the party.
during the past year Muhammad has been preoccu-
pied with trying to balance conflicting factions within the party.
::]Muhammad wants to unite these groups to strengthen the party and
prevent the factions from collaborating with the regime.
however, Moscow is pressing Muhammad to reconcile with the govern-
chronically ill and divides his time between Moscow and Damascus.
ment. Soviet support and enthusiasm for
Muhammad have waned in view of the party's ineffectiveness and Moscow's
warming relations with Baghdad. Muhammad joined the party in the early 1940s
and has been a member of the Politburo since 1959. A Sunni Kurd, he works close-
ly with Kurdish Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani. Muhammad, 60, is
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