IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000100100002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Iraq's Nuclear Program:
Acquiring a Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Top Secret
NESA 85-10023C
February 1985
Copy 7 h A
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Iraq's Nuclear Program:
Acquiring a Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Operations.
This paper was prepared byl the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Top Secret
NESA 85-10023C
February 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 18 January 1985
was used in this report.
Fuel Cycle
Acquiring a Nuclear
Iraq's Nuclear Program:
support nuclear weapons development.
Israel's destruction of Iraq's principal research reactor in 1981 and war-
related economic difficulties have not dampened Iraq's interest in enhanc-
ing its nuclear capabilities, skills, and facilities. Iraq, however, is still at
least a decade away from having nuclear facilities with the potential to
Israel.
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has long advocated the development of an
"Islamic bomb" that would give the Arab states strategic leverage over
vengeful Iran.
In our view, Saddam also believes that development of a nuclear weapons
capability would advance Iraq's security interests in the region. A nuclear
capability would further Baghdad's goal of becoming the preeminent Arab
state in the Persian Gulf and might serve as a long-term deterrent to a
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Despite Baghdad's interest in pursuing nuclear research, Iraq will have to
depend on extensive foreign assistance and technology to master virtually 25X1
all aspects of the nuclear cycle. Fear of losing access to vital foreign
technology should inhibit any desire to violate international safeguards.)
expect Baghdad to continue using these methods.
We anticipate that, when its war with Iran ends, Baghdad will accelerate
its efforts to complete a nuclear fuel cycle. Until then, we expect Baghdad
to try to exploit the "gray market" to acquire nuclear materials and
technology. Since 1980, Iraq has concentrated on using European interme-
diaries to buy otherwise unavailable US technology and on breaking down
orders for equipment into subcomponents not subject to export controls in
the European vendor countries. Although results have been mixed, we
iii Top Secret
NESA 85-10023C
February 1985
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Defenses around the Tuwaitha nuclear center have been greatly strength-
ened since 1981, but Israeli or Iranian military action could still retard
Iraqi nuclear goals. Another Israeli raid on Tuwaitha would embroil the
United States in an Iraqi-led campaign to expel Israel from the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and damage US relations with moderate
Arab states.
Iraq's dogged pursuit of a nuclear fuel cycle will also impinge on US
interests by:
? Demonstrating that the gray market can be used to evade US efforts to
promote tighter international controls over nuclear trade.
? Circumventing US export controls and policies by employing West
European intermediaries to obtain US-origin goods.
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Developing the Nuclear Program: The Search for Aid
1
The Early Days: A Frustrated Bid for the Direct Route
to Plutonium
Italy: Fuel Cycle Facilities on the Installment Plan
2
Training
3
Working the Nuclear Marketplace: Iraq's Procurement Strategy
7
Exploiting the Black and Gray Markets
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Figure 1
Iraqi Nuclear Facility
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
703956 1-85
Ira n
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Iraq's Nuclear Program:
Acquiring A Nuclear
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Fuel Cycle
Despite its war with Iran, economic difficulties, and
Israel's destruction in 1981 of its principal research
reactor, Iraq has not lost interest in nuclear research.
Baghdad continues to collaborate with foreign suppli-
ers to expand its fuel cycle capabilities.
Although we lack firm evidence of Iraq's weapons
goals or of its strategy to attain those goals, Iraq's 10-
year search for foreign nuclear assistance provides
many indicators of a long-term desire to acquire a
complete nuclear cycle. On the basis of our analysis of
Iraq's nuclear procurement strategy and on the steps
taken by other would-be proliferant countries, we
believe that Iraq's course points to a two-stage strate-
gy for attaining fuel cycle capabilities that could be
used to recover plutonium suitable for nuclear weap-
ons from spent reactor fuel:
? In the short run, Iraq will probably try to gain as
much experience in fuel-cycle-related technology as
possible with currently available facilities. For ex-
ample, Iraq could gain experience in handling irra-
diated fuel and conducting reprocessing-related re-
search on a laboratory scale.
? In the longer term, we would expect Iraq to attempt
to secure a reactor and perhaps a larger scale
reprocessing facility more directly suitable for the
production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons
than its present laboratory-scale facilities.
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has long advocated
the development of an "Islamic bomb" that would
give the Arab states strategic leverage over Israel.
In our view, Saddam also probably believes that
development of a nuclear weapons capability would
advance Iraq's security interests in the region. A
nuclear capability would further Baghdad's goal of
becoming the preeminent Arab state in the Persian
Gulf and might serve as a long-term deterrent to a
vengeful Iran.
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Developing the Nuclear Program: The Search for Aid
The Early Days: A Frustrated Bid for the Direct
Route to Plutonium
Iraq acquired a small research reactor and isotope-
production facility from the Soviet Union in the late
1960s, but its major effort to obtain foreign nuclear
aid began after several dramatic events in 1974:
? The Indian nuclear explosion in May.
? The announcement in June by the Shah, a tradition-
al rival, that Iran planned to build several power
reactors.
? The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74, which
permitted Iraq to finance expensive development
projects.
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France: The First Patron
France has helped Iraq master reactor operation and
design. Since the Israeli raid in June 1981, however,
France has progressively tightened safeguards.
French companies are probably already doing limited
the outer wall of an experiment hall
surr~g the remains of the Tammuz 1 reactor
and an underground experimental chamber adjoining
According to Embassy reporting, the bilateral agree-
ment, signed in 1976, that called for French contrac-
tors to build a reactor and laboratory complex at
Tuwaitha was a compromise reached after Paris
rejected Iraqi requests for the same type of reactor
used in the French nuclear weapons program and a
reprocessing plant to extract plutonium from its spent
negotiate a bilateral agreement with Baghdad, a
requirement for implementing the commercial con-
tract. Pending such an agreement, we believe that
Paris is allowing CERBAG to make limited prepara-
tions for the reconstruction project.
We believe the restrictions that France has placed on
its assistance will prevent the production of weapons-
grade plutonium from the reactor unless Iraq violates
safeguards and French limitations on reactor opera-
tions. French officials told US representatives in July
1983 that they would provide fuel containing only
low-enriched uranium (which is not suitable for use in
nuclear weapons) and match fuel deliveries to a
reactor operating schedule that would make undetect-
ed plutonium production more difficult. Furthermore,
France said in 1983 that it would require the spent
fuel to be returned to France. The French also said
that they were studying the possibility of reprocessing
Tammuz fuel in France. Nonetheless, Iraqi involve-
ment in a rebuilt Tammuz facility would be of value
in enhancing their understanding of reactor engineer-
ing and materials testing.
Italy: Fuel Cycle Facilities on the Installment Plan
Italy has provided training and technology in nuclear
fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and radioisotope pro-
duction. The Italian-Iraqi nuclear relationship is long-
standing, extensive, not well regulated by Italian
authorities, and tainted by Iraqi bribery of Italian
officials. Cooperation dates back to the mid-1970s
when Italy agreed to
build a major laboratory complex at Tuwaitha. Italy
also agreed to provide training and aid in designing
the facilities if its industrial firms received construc-
tion contracts.
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turned over to Iraq in February 1983 completed
laboratories for nuclear fuel fabrication, materials
testing, chemical engineering research, and the pro-
duction of isotopes.
SNIA-Techint, an Italian contractor,
E
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Iraq will probably try to gain as much experience as
possible from these facilities, including handling irra-
diated fuel and conducting reprocessing-related re-
search on a laboratory scale. Such research can be
done legitimately as long as the safeguards arrange-
ments associated with the equipment are observed.
We cannot confirm that the Italian laboratories cur-
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to recover plutonium, but
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Baghdad has taken steps, with
the help of SNIA-Techint, that could lead to such a
reprocessing capability:
EUREX reprocessing facility in Italy.
who visited Tuwaitha were surprised to find that the
equipment in the labs, although incomplete, was
comparable to that in the most advanced reprocess-
ing laboratories in Western Europe.
Iraq has already
acquired or installed equipment for handling the
highly radioactive materials encountered in reproc-
essing spent fuel. These include a remote mainte-
nance capability for hot cells where radioactive
materials could be handled; sealed glove boxes
suitable for handling plutonium; and a highly so-
phisticated chopping machine used to cut up spent-
fuel elements in the first stage of reprocessing.
The Iraqis have also obtained additional laboratories,
technology, and equipment from the Italians that
would, in our judgment, assist them in making test
fuel elements and samples for irradiation in their 25X1
research reactor. In late 1981,
the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
(IAEC) asked SNIA-Techint to supply laboratories
for refining uranium ore, making uranium hexafluo-
ride (which is the chemical form for the enrichment of
uranium), fabricating reactor fuel and fuel-element
parts, and making natural uranium metal, a preferred
material for irradiating in a reactor to make plutoni-
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Iraq showed a strong interest in
purchasing a CIRENE reactor, a heavy-water-moder-
ated reactor suitable for plutonium production that is
under development by Italy. Although Italian officials
told US representatives in late 1981 that the vendor
had completed a feasibility study on plant construc-
want to resume talks for fear of Israeli reprisals. The 25X1
US Embassy in Rome, moreover, has reported that
the CIRENE currently exists only as an uncompleted 25X1
training
that Italy provided for approximately 100 Iraqis
between 1979 and 1980 further support our conten-
tion that Baghdad is interested in acquiring the
technology to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Our analy-
sis of the training program shows that it was directed
toward nuclear fuel fabrication, production of reactor
parts, reprocessing, and the testing of materials used
in building and operating nuclear fuel cycle facilities
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Table 1
Foreign Training of Iraqi Nationals
in Sensitive Technologies a
Reprocessing Nuclear
Fuel
Fabrication
Materials
Testing
Isotope
Production
Maintenance
Reactor
Operations
Nuclear
Science
Total
16
32
25
6
21
250
64
Managers
5
3
5
None
d
d
d
Supervisory scientists and
engineers
1
1
6
Scientists and engineers
4
9
11
2
1
d
d
Technicians
6
15
3
3
18
d
d
Equipment operators and
skilled workers
None
4
None
1
2
d
d
e Grand total (all fields)-414.
b Italy (subtotal-all fields)-100.
c France (subtotal-all fields) -314.
d Level unknown.
(table 1). We believe that
the trainees took part in EUREX
operations and reviewed the operating manual of the
25X1 EUREX reprocessing plant similarities
between this facility and the laboratories at Tuwaitha
Center.
fuel cycle objectives. In early 1984,
The Soviet Union: Limited Technical Aid
The USSR, Iraq's oldest nuclear partner, has thus far
played a limited role in Iraq's nuclear development,
confining its activities to fueling and maintaining the
IRT-5000 research reactor that it supplied in the
1960s. Soviet assistance has not contributed to Iraq's
like to get such an agreement soon for its commercial
benefits and to strengthen political ties. If the Soviets
eventually build a power plant, it is not likely to pose a
serious proliferation threat, because they have tradi-
tionally required tight IAEA safeguards on their
exported reactors, including the return of spent nucle-
ar fuel to the USSR.
Other Suppliers
25X1 reactor in conjunction with completion of its refur-
bishment by a Belgian firm.
25X1 In March 1984, however, Iraq and the USSR signed a
contract for a feasibility study for construction of a
power reactor in Iraq. A Japanese company estimates
that it would take the Soviets two years to select a site
and another two years to prepare it for construction.
It is unlikely that Baghdad will conclude a contract
for construction of a power reactor before the Iraq-
Iran war ends, but in our opinion the USSR would
our analysis of Iraq's imports of
nuclear products show that Austria, Switzerland,
Japan, the Netherlands, and West Germany have
been important suppliers of laboratory equipment,
technology, training, and components for the French
and Italian facilities at Tuwaitha Center. Firms in
these countries have supplied lasers and other equip-
ment that may be related to uranium-enrichment
research as well as computers and reactor control
equipment (table 2).
US Embassies I have reported that
Iraq bought large quantities of ore and natural urani-
um in the late 1970s and early 1980s from Brazil,
Portugal, Spain, and Niger.
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Iraqi agents negotiated joint ventures in uranium
mining during the same period with Tunisia and
Morocco. Iraq may have acquired some processed
uranium dioxide from Brazil in 1981 and 1983.F-
Working the Nuclear Marketplace:
Iraq's Procurement Strategy
Our analysis shows that Iraq has used a combination
of tactics to promote its long-term objective of closing
the nuclear fuel cycle. Judging from our review of
past procurement actions, Iraq adopted a new strategy
in the mid-1970s after it had failed to acquire sensi-
25X1 tive facilities directly. it
resorted, with mixed success, to bribery of nuclear
officials in Italy, threats against Italian contractor
companies, attempts to buy uranium and nuclear-
related equipment through front companies controlled
by Iraqi intelligence, and direct contacts by Iraqi
intelligence officers with potential sellers.
Exploiting the Black and Gray Markets
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shows that Iraq is actively involved in what we define
as the "gray market" (those transactions that do not
violate the letter of supplier state export controls but
appear to violate the intent) to secure nuclear materi-
25X1 als and technology 0 Gray market transac-
tions are much easier to facilitate than those on the
open market because sales can be arranged on a
component-by-component or subsystem-by-subsystem
basis that would be strictly regulated or not allowed at
all if sold on a total system basis.
Iraq has been most
successful when it has used European firms as inter-
mediaries to evade US or other supplier state export
controls. Firms in Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland,
Lichtenstein, and West Germany have ordered
nuclear-related equipment from the United States
that has been transshipped to Iraq. Among the items
that Iraq has acquired in this manner are computer-
ized reactor control equipment for Tammuz 1 (1982),
a multichannel analyzer (1982), and remote manipula-
tors for handling highly radioactive materials (April
1981).
One example illustrates how the "European connec-
tion" works for Iraq. In May 1982, the US Embassy
in Switzerland reported that the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission placed an order with the Swiss subsidiary
of a US firm for computer reactor control equipment
that we believe was intended for use in rebuilding
Tammuz 1. The United States had denied permission
for the parent company to export the equipment.
the Iraqis issued a letter of credit to the Swiss
Iraqi attempts to
organize clandestine procurement operations through
front organizations or intelligence operations have
had only modest results and have often been spectacu-
larly unsuccessful. For example:
subsidiary for the equipment.
? The IAEC used the Arab Mining Company
(ARMICO), normally a joint stock company owned
by several Arab countries with headquarters in
Jordan, to negotiate uranium mining and purchase
agreements in North and Central Africa in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Former IAEC Vice Chair-
man and Minister of Education Abd al-Razzaq
Qasim al-Hashimi has been identified in the Iraqi
press as ARMICO Chairman. Even while he was
serving as IAEC Vice Chairman, Hashimi traveled
to Brazil in 1981 in his ARMICO role to discuss
nuclear cooperation with the Brazilian Government.
In our view, the ARMICO connection may have
allowed Iraq to disclaim a direct role in some
negotiations.
we believe the IAEC's main achievement
through the ARMICO cover is a joint venture with
Morocco for extracting uranium from phosphates,
which began operation in 1983.
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European suppliers, for instance, have been subjected
to economic pressures:
in 1981 that Iraq
Economic Leverage: Diminished, but Not Forgotten
Iraq has a history of promising oil deliveries, arms
purchases, and other economic incentives in exchange
for transfers of nuclear technology and materials.
in return for uranium ore.
agreed to supply 60 percent of Portugal's oil needs
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Baghdad's leverage, however, has not entirely disap-
peared. Prospects for completion of pipeline projects
that would boost Iraq's oil export capacity point to a
renewal of Western interest in securing a long-term
trade position in Iraq. Any significant increase in
Iraq's oil export capacity would improve the chances
of a resumption of at least some stalled economic
development projects. Moreover, potential nuclear
partners such as France and Italy are well aware of
the Ba'thist regime's history of rewarding friends that
stick by it in times of stress. Such energy-deficient
industrial states would be attracted by the long-term
outlook for Iraqi oil exports; reserves are large, and
Baghdad could sustain petroleum production of at
least 4 million b/d well into the next century.
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We believe that the IAEC, before 1981, attempted to
use its purported interest in buying a power reactor to
induce foreign vendors to make other technology
transfers. French and
Italian Government and industry representatives be-
lieved in the late 1970s, when the agreements for the
construction of the Tuwaitha Center were being
signed, that offering research facilities at small profit
margins or even below cost would give them advan-
tages in bidding on a potentially profitable power
reactor project that Iraq advertised from 1975 to
offer the CIRENE reactor to stay in the competition.
The sharp drop in Iraqi oil exports-from over 3
million barrels per day (b/d) in 1979 to about 900,000
b/d now-following the start of the Iraq-Iran war
greatly reduced Baghdad's economic leverage with its
nuclear suppliers. Iraq's influence has been further
reduced by the slack world oil market.
the US Embassy in Paris reporte
in May 1984 that France believed that the Soviet
Union was expanding its commercial role in Iraq at
Paris's expense, particularly in arms sales.
Baghdad has exerted pressure on some of the
firms selling nuclear services and equipment to Iraq to
act as agents or brokers for obtaining nuclear-related
training, technology, and equipment from third par-
ties. In other instances, the
Iraqis have used bribes or threats to secure coopera-
tion from the vendors or their governments. We
believe that these relationships have assisted Iraq in
establishing what appears to be an extensive procure-
ment network run directly by the IAEC.
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element in accomplishing both the long- and short-
term goals. We expect that this same dependency will
also force the Iraqis to continue to observe interna-
tional safeguards.
Iraq delayed payments
to SNIA-Techint in 1982 and, on one occasion,
withheld exit visas for SNIA personnel working in
Iraq. the company agreed to
complete the laboratories and to provide additional
training partly as a result of such coercion.
According to I the US Embassy in
Rome, Iraq has used bribery to facilitate its relation-
ship with the Italian Atomic Energy Commission:
? In 1979, US Embassy officials in Rome learned that
IAEC personnel had given expensive gifts to their
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? In 1983,1 (Italian
officials investigating alleged corruption in their
nuclear program believed that the Iraqis had bribed
several officials, possibly to facilitate the transfer of
sensitive technology related to reprocessing. F__1
it even further.
We expect Iraq to continue pursuing a two-tiered
objective-fuel cycle technology and creation of an
experienced work force in the short term, and acquisi-
tion of larger fuel cycle facilities ultimately capable of
producing plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons in
the long term. We believe that Iraq is at least a
decade away from accomplishing this long-term ob-
jective. Israeli or Iranian military action could retard
Baghdad's dependence on foreign assistance will con-
tinue to make its foreign procurement strategy a key
In the short run, we believe Baghdad will focus its
efforts in the following areas of its nuclear program:
? Training its nuclear work force at the Tuwaitha
Center as well as in Western Europe. The work
force is not capable of operating sophisticated fuel
cycle facilities without outside assistance.
? Rebuilding the Tammuz 1 reactor as soon as possi-
ble, even if this means submitting to French de-
mands for enhanced international safeguards and
controls over the operation of the reactor.
? Developing reprocessing-related technology by ac-
quiring and using additional components and equip-
ment for the Italian laboratory complex for limited
"hot" work. These activities would be conducted
within the provisions of Iraq's safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, but the experience would help close
the gap in Iraq's knowledge of the fuel cycle.
Iraq's persistent search for foreign nuclear assistance
poses a challenge to US nonproliferation and foreign
policy interests:
? The indirect transfer of US and other equipment
and technology to Iraq through European interme-
diaries could become a contentious issue in US
relations with Iraq and nations that tolerate this
trade. Iraq may respond to tougher control meas-
ures by channeling more of its purchases into gray
market operations.
? Other potential proliferants could become convinced
that Iraq's success in acquiring nearly all of the
facilities it needs for laboratory-scale reprocessing
clearly demonstrates that the international gray
market can be used to evade national export con-
trols in the major supplier states. This development
would complicate US efforts to promote tighter
supervision of such trade.
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? The spread of sensitive information through training
programs poses a serious challenge to US efforts to
control the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.
-,We speculate that Israel or Iran at some time might
regard the emerging reprocessing capabilities at the
Tuwaitha Center as an intolerable security threat.
Reconstruction of the Tammuz 1 reactor would, in
our judgment, tempt either Israel or Iran to attack
Iraq's nuclear facilities. If Israel were to attack the
Tuwaitha Center again, other Arab or Muslim
countries probably would accuse the United States
of complicity, as they did in 1981. We expect that
such an attack would damage US relations with
moderate Arab states and give new life to the stalled
Iraqi campaign to expel Israel from the IAEA.
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