SAUDI AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A REGIONAL POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200180003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Saudi Air Force
Modernization: The Emergence
of a Regional Power
Secret
NESA 85-10082
May 1985
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f E,~f Directorate of
of a Regional Power
Saudi Air Force
Modernization: The Emergence
Gulf Division, NESA
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution from Office of
Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian
This paper was prepared by
Secret
NESA 85-10082
May 1985
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Saudi Air Force
Modernization: The Emergence
of a Regional Power
Key Judgments Saudi officials view the Air Force as the mainstay of their country's
Information available national defense. The Air Force has received more than half of the $110
as of I March 1985 billion spent by Riyadh on military programs over the last decade and has
was used in this report.
become the second-largest and one of the most capable air forces in the
Persian Gulf:
? The Air Force has nearly tripled in size since 1973, from approximately
80 combat aircraft to almost 200-including 60 F-15 fighters.
? The shootdown of at least one Iranian aircraft in June 1984 and the
Saudi ability to sustain extensive combat air patrols during much of the
year demonstrated the improving capability of the Air Force.
Although the Air Force is capable of defending Saudi Arabia against air
attacks from Iran, Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), and People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), it cannot sustain high-
intensity combat against a major regional power such as Israel or Iraq. Nor
will it be capable of operating effectively outside of Saudi Arabia in the
near term. Facilities needed to support Saudi Air Force operations over
Jordan, Iraq, or Syria are inadequate and vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes.
equipment and doctrinewill limit the Saudis' ability to coordinate
operations with other Arab air forces.
The Air Force's ability to conduct effective limited air defense reduces the
likelihood that Riyadh would immediately request US military assistance
in the event of a crisis with Iran or South Yemen. The large, modern Saudi
Air Force, supported by the United States, also reduces the likelihood that
these regional opponents would risk a military confrontation with Saudi
Arabia. US AWACS and tanker support will remain vital to this deterrent
and for Saudi air defense operations over the Gulf until at least 1988 when
the Saudis begin operating their own AWACS and associated tankers. The
Saudis will continue to be cautious in confronting Iran with their airpower,
however, lest they provoke Tehran to undertake sabotage and subversion
within Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia plans to enlarge and modernize its Air Force further over the
next 10 years. Even if oil revenues remain depressed, the Saudis are likely
to spend billions of dollars to acquire more F-15s, an integrated air defense
command and control system, and West European fighter aircraft. The Air
iii Secret
NESA 85-10082
May 1985
a lack of combat experience, and differences in
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Force will be able to train sufficient numbers of new pilots and absorb this
new equipment with continued reliance on foreign advisers and techni-
cians-including over 1,700 US Air Force personnel and contractors-to
provide critical maintenance and operational skills.
US sales of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia are a highly visible and
prestigious sign of US support to Riyadh and help maintain US influence
in the region. In addition, Saudi equipment and facilities are essentially
com atible with those o
Although the Saudis prefer US equip-
ment, Riyadh will not hesitate to buy aircraft and equipment from Western
Europe if its wants are not met by the United States.
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Key Judgments
Pilot Training and Proficiency 4
Expansion and Modernization Programs: Plans for the Next Decade 6
Implications for the United States
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Saudi Air Force
Modernization: The Emergence
of a Regional Power
In the mid-1960s the Saudi Air Force was a small,
poorly equipped force with only marginal combat
capabilities. With the massive increase in oil revenues
in the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia could afford to
embark on a major program to expand and modernize
its armed forces. Faced with scarce manpower re-
sources and the need to deter potential threats on
widely separated frontiers, Riyadh has based its de-
fense strategy on building a well-equipped, highly
trained air force. We estimate that since 1973 the Air
Force has received at least half of the more than $110
billion spent by the kingdom on military moderniza-
tion. Because of the Iranian Air Force's combat losses
since 1980 and the general decline in its operational
readiness, the Saudi Air Force now ranks second in
size only to that of Iraq in the Persian Gulf.
The Saudi Air Force has grown in size from 80
combat aircraft and 5,500 personnel in 1973 to almost
200 combat aircraft and 17,000 personnel today. In
1973 the Air Force was equipped with US F-86 and
British Lightning fighters and light counterinsur-
gency aircraft. Over the last decade, it has taken
delivery of over 170 advanced fighters and fighter-
bombers-60 F-15s and 114 F-5s-greatly increasing
both the size and capabilities of its force. The Air
Force now consists of eight combat squadrons-one
Lightning, three F-15, and four F-5 squadrons-a
reconnaissance squadron, two transport squadrons
equipped with C-130s and KC-130 tankers, a VIP
transport squadron, two utility helicopter squadrons,
and two training squadrons (see appendix A).
In addition to acquiring new aircraft, the Air Force
has completed six well-equipped airbases and a num-
ber of secondary military and civilian airfields. The
largest airbases-among the most modern in the
Middle East-are equipped with hardened multiple-
bay aircraft shelters, multiple runways and taxiways,
underground fuel lines, ammunition bunkers, and
Air Force Effectiveness
Enhanced Operations in 1984. Increased air attacks
on shipping in the Persian Gulf by Iraq and Iran in
the spring of 1984 and the failure of Saudi F-15s on
ground alert to intercept Iranian aircraft attacking
tankers in the northern Gulf near Saudi Arabia led
the Saudis to institute daylight combat air patrols
near Dhahran on 25 May. These airborne patrols-
consisting of two or more F-15s or F-5s-significantly
improved the Saudi capability to respond to Iranian
antishipping strikes in the northern Gulf. On 5 June
two Saudi F-15s used AIM-7F radar-guided air-to-air
missiles to shoot down at least one Iranian F-4 on a
bombing mission over the northern Gulf.
The Air Force continued daily daylight combat air
patrols through mid-December, according to
AWACS reporting, significantly enhancing the expe-
rience and confidence of Saudi pilots and mainte-
nance crews. The Saudis flew as many as 22 sorties a
day and maintained an additional four to 10 aircraft
on ground alert, F_ -1
The combat air patrols were flown at low levels-
generally more strenuous to pilots and aircraft than
high-altitude flying-to avoid Iranian radar detec-
tion.
During this time, the Saudis did not lose any aircraft,
and no serious accidents were reported.
command bunkers.
Although the increased operational levels improved
Saudi air defense capabilities, they also taxed Air
Force personnel and equipment. Within a month of
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instituting combat air patrols, the operational readi-
ness rate for Saudi F-15s temporarily declined from
about 80 percent to just over 50 percent,
Nevertheless, Air Force flightline maintenance
crews-including seconded Pakistani personnel-
successfully coped with the increased demands on the
aircraft, and F-15 operational readiness rates in-
creased to 70 percent by early July
(began
flying combat air patrols in late June and by Decem-
ber were flying approximately 45 percent of the
sorties.
Other significant Air Force operations in 1984 includ-
ed an airlift of air defense equipment to augment
defenses along the Gulf in late June.
~a distance of more than 700 nautical
miles-according to defense attache reporting. Dur-
ing the two-week airlift, the two Saudi transport
squadrons operated from six different airfields and
flew 47 C-130 sorties.
The Saudis also conducted at least four major exer-
cises involving the forward basing of combat aircraft
in 1984. These exercises demonstrated the growing
operational flexibility of the Air Force and its capabil-
ity to deploy quickly and operate from airfields
anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula. We believe the
Saudis can reinforce quickly any of the member states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)' with a
limited number of combat aircraft during a crisis.
' The Gulf Cooperation Council includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
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All of the exercises involved the deployment of part of
a squadron-usually eight to 10 aircraft-to a sec-
ondary airfield within Saudi Arabia or to an airbase
in Kuwait or Oman, where they conducted fighter and
fighter-bomber training missions for up to two weeks,
according to defense attache reporting. These deploy-
ments were supported by C-130 flights airlifting
maintenance crews, equipment, and, on at least one
occasion, aviation fuel. At least four of the Air Force's
eight combat squadrons participated in these exer-
cises, including two of the F-5 squadrons, the Light-
ning squadron, and one of the F- 15 squadrons.
Pilot Training and Proficiency. The proficiency of
senior Saudi pilots contributed significantly to the
effectiveness of Saudi air operations over the last
year. Virtually all of the pilots are Saudis-fewer
than 12 Pakistani pilots are flying in the C-130 or F-5
squadrons-and all new pilots are trained in US Air
Force tactics by Saudi instructors in Saudi Arabia.
Many of the senior pilots-originally trained in the
United States or the United Kingdom-have more
than 1,500 hours of flight time and are highly regard-
ed by their US Air Force counterparts.
Overall pilot proficiency, however, especially in the
F-5 squadrons, is only moderate
The
defense attache reports that Air Force exercises are
not overly demanding, except when US Air Force
"aggressor" teams deploy to Saudi Arabia and fly
realistic exercises against the Saudis. Moreover, Air
Force training tends to concentrate on air defense and
airstrike missions, and few close-support training ex-
ercises are conducted with the Army.
The lack of standardized squadron operating proce-
dures limits the ability of squadrons to operate togeth-
er effectively and prevents the rotation of pilots and
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key personnel between squadrons during a crisis. In
addition, Saudi pilots tend to be loyal to their squad-
rons to the point that they do not share their training
experiences with pilots from other squadrons, which
diminishes the effectiveness of training exercises.
Saudi Rapid Deployment Forces
Air Force Leadership. The Air Force is led by well-
educated, competent, and professional officers who
are aggressive proponents of modernized Saudi air-
power. Many commanders are members of the royal
family, and several of these are experienced fighter
pilots. Princes also command several of the major
fighter bases.
Air Force participation in Saudi- and GCC-sponsored
exercises over the past two years demonstrates a
growing capability to airlift Saudi forces quickly to
the Arab Gulf states. In the event of an Iranian-
sponsored insurrection or coup attempt in one of the
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, we
believe Saudi rapid deployment forces-large, by
regional standards-could be decisive in restoring
internal security in the threatened state. Saudi troop
and aircraft deployments, with support from the
other Gulf states, would also be a factor in deterring
Iranian military intervention in behalf of dissident
elements.
Arab Emirates.
Saudi rapid deployment forces consist of an airborne
brigade and the two Air Force C-130 squadrons.
During the GCC exercise in 1983, the Saudis airlifted
the airborne brigade-approximately 1,000 para-
troopers, including their crew-served weapons and
light vehicles-over 800 nautical miles from north-
western Saudi Arabia to an airfield in the United
In the future, these Saudi forces could be augmented
by Gulf state contingents that will be part of the joint
rapid deployment force. The GCC plans to base this
force at Hafar al Batin, in northeastern Saudi Ara-
bia, near the Kuwaiti border. The planned force will
contain two infantry brigades-one brigade composed
of units from the five smaller GCC member states
and a Saudi infantry brigade. Although these forces
will have only a nominal conventional combat capa-
bility, we believe they would constitute sizable rein-
forcements for local internal security forces.
their private business in the afternoon.
even if they are junior, in ran
oreover, daily operations are affected by the ten-
dency of some junior and middle-ranking staff officers
to work half a day in the Air Force and then work at
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Maintenance and Support Capabilities. The Air
Force currently maintains a high (70 to 80 percent)
aircraft operational readiness rate. Saudi F-15 main-
tenance efforts, however, ultimately depend on US
contractor support. In our judgment, the operational
readiness of these squadrons would decline signifi-
cantly if US support were withdrawn. More than
1,700 US personnel-108 Air Force personnel and
1,618 contractors, equivalent to 10 percent of Saudi
Air Force manpower-are involved in supporting Air
Force programs, according to defense attache report-
ing.
We believe that the Air Force is capable of maintain-
ing moderate-to-high readiness rates for F-5 and
C-130 aircraft without US support as long as Paki-
stani maintenance crews are available. US contractors
are only present at the depot level to monitor work on
these aircraft. Withdrawal of the large number of
seconded Pakistani Air Force personnel would sub-
stantially diminish Saudi capabilities to maintain
their F-5 and C-130 squadrons. Approximately 1,500
Pakistanis serve in the Saudi Air Force and perform
much of the aircraft flightline maintenance
visors or tend to let the Pakistanis do the work
when present on maintenance teams, are either super-
Air Force Command and Control. The Air Force has
a nationwide command and control system that di-
vides the country into five air defense sectors. The
system consists of aging British and US ground radars
and six command centers. Each air defense sector has
its own command center, which, in our view, gives the
Saudis a better capability to cope with simultaneous
operations in different sectors without overwhelming
Air Force headquarters in Riyadh.
it is the most complete
Expansion and Modernization Programs:
Plans for the Next Decade
Air Force modernization will remain a high priority
for Riyadh, in our view. Riyadh plans to allocate more
than $9 billion during the next five years to new Air
Force programs. The Saudis intend to replace aging
aircraft with more modern fighters, complete the most
advanced air defense/command and control network
in the region, continue to upgrade and harden air-
bases, and acquire significant quantities of advanced
munitions.
Aircraft Modernization. The Air Force intends to
acquire 80 to 100 advanced aircraft over the next five
years to replace its aging Lightning and early-model
F-5 fighters, according to defense attache reporting.
The Saudi request to purchase 40 additional F-15
fighters from the United States is designed to meet
part of this requirement. The Saudis also are negotiat-
ing with France to purchase 40 Mirage 2000s and
with the United Kingdom for 40 Tornados. We
believe that Air Force officials prefer the F-15s to the
European aircraft, but Riyadh is likely to purchase as
many as two squadrons of advanced West European
aircraft-probably the Mirage 200
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The Peace Projects: Major Saudi Air Programs
four F-5 fighter-bomber squadrons constitute the
primary striking power of the Air Force. The F-5E 25X1
fighter-bombers are air refuelable and are armed
with precision-guided munitions, including the Mav-
erick air-to-ground missile and Paveway laser-guided
glide bombs, according to defense attache reporting.
The Air Force also uses the F-5E armed with the
AIM-9P air-to-air missile as backup air defense
fighters. 0 25X1
The best of the Saudi F-5 pilots were chosen for the
F- 15 program,
~By early
1984 the Saudi F-15 pilots had an average of 500
hours offlight time. In mid-1984 the Saudis had
approximately 55 fully trained F-15 pilots, still less
than a 1:1 pilot-to-aircraft ratio. The Air Force is
graduating an additional 20 to 25 F-15 pilots a year.
The first F-15 squadron-the 13th-was formed as a
conversion training unit in 1983 and is based at
Dhahran on the Persian Gulf. The remaining two
F-15 squadrons, the 5th and 6th, were formed in
early 1984 as additional aircraft were delivered and
These
two squadrons are still undergoing training and at the
end of 1984 were not fully operational. The 6th
Squadron at Khamis Mushayt is conducting ground
attack training using modified F-5 bomb racks.
Peace Hawk-The F-5 Program. The Saudis took
delivery of over 100 F-5s between 1973 and 1982. The
Air Force officials also plan to improve electronic
countermeasures (ECM) and reconnaissance capabili-
ties. The Air Force is taking delivery of a squadron of
10 RF-5E aircraft and plans to equip them with the
AN/ALQ-171 ECM pod and improved sensing sys-
tems, according to defense attache reporting. The
AN/ALQ-171 also can be used on Saudi F-15s.F_
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The Saudis are inten-
sively training new F-5 pilots, however, and the Peace
Hawk program remains one of the most successful
Air Force programs of the last decade. The F-5
squadrons remain almost fully manned, are self-
sufficient in base-level maintenance, and are the most
operationally flexible squadrons in the Air Force.
Peace Sentinel-The AWACS Program. Saudi Ara-
bia, in a major effort to upgrade its air defense
capabilities, purchased five E-3A AWACS aircraft
and eight KE-3A tanker aircraft from the United
States for $3 billion in 1981. No aircraft have been
delivered, but Saudi crews are training on the US
A WA CS in the Elf One contingent that has been in
Saudi Arabia since 1980. The first Saudi A WACS is
scheduled to be delivered in late 1986
In addition, the Saudis will receive their first
AWACS in 1986. Delivery of the five E-3A AWACS
and the eight KE-3A tankers on order will continue
through the end of the decade.
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Command and Control Modernization. Peace Shield
is a five-year, $4 billion program to modernize the
Saudi air defense/command and control network,
which, when completed, will be the most advanced
system in the region. Current plans call for a nation-
wide series of hardened command and control bun-
kers, automated ground radar sites, and ground entry
stations that will receive AWACS data and fully
automate the flow of information between command
centers
and construction is continuing on the others. Final
design and partial contract awards were decided in
February 1985, with completion of the project sched-
uled for the early 1990s.
Airbase Improvement. The Air Force is continuing a
$1 billion program to build hardened hangarettes to
shelter F-15s
These hangarettes-designed to withstand a direct hit
by a 1,000-pound bomb-have been completed at
Dhahran, and construction is planned for 60 each at
the F-15 fighter bases at Khamis Mushayt and At
Ta'if. When the hangarettes are completed, Saudi
aircraft will be significantly less vulnerable to a
preemptive airstrike, in our analysis
The defense attache reports that the Air Force is also
upgrading selected secondary airfields throughout the
kingdom. Airfields at Ha'il and Hafar al Batin can
now sustain limited F-5 operations, according to
imagery. Facilities and runways have been expanded
at both bases, and multiple-bay hangarettes have been
constructed at Ha'il. The upgrading of additional
bases will increase Saudi flexibility in responding to
threats and increase their capability to disperse air-
craft quickly, in our view
Advanced Munitions. The Saudis are seeking to add
to their already considerable stock of advanced muni-
tions. This program is driven, in part, by a desire to
reduce Riyadh's vulnerability to a Western arms
embargo during a crisis, a concern about the large
number of armored vehicles in the inventories of
potential opponents, and a realistic Saudi assessment
that the Army could not adequately defend against a
ground attack, in our view.
more advanced models of these weapons,)
which would give the Air Force a
standoff capability against surface-to-air missile sites.
Constraints to Modernization. The greatest obstacle
to completion of Air Force modernization plans is the
shortage of qualified personnel. The continued Air
Force expansion we anticipate over the next five to 10
years will aggravate traditional Saudi military prob-
lems such as manpower shortages and overdependence
on foreign personnel. Although we believe that the
Saudis probably can train sufficient pilots to man the
new advanced fighters we expect them to receive, this
probably will reduce the number of pilots available to
man the F-5s. In any event, if Air Force expansion
continues, the Saudis are unlikely to achieve a pilot
ratio of much better than I to 1, even for their
advanced fighters. As a result, the cadre of experi-
enced pilots will not be large enough to sustain high-
intensity combat. Shortages of qualified native man-
power for key support slots such as navigators,
loadmasters, air controllers, and mechanics could
become even more acute in the near future, forcing
greater reliance on Pakistani military personnel and
foreign contractors
The Air Force has a comprehensive system of military
schools designed to train career technicians and me-
chanics Still,
shortages of qualified manpower entering the service
and limited numbers of flightline personnel-partly
caused by the low prestige Saudis associate with
manual labor-seriously hamper Saudi efforts to be-
come self-sufficient in maintenance crews,F_
Should expatriate personnel return home or refuse to
serve in wartime, the operational readiness of the Air
Force's advanced equipment would decline dramati-
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Saudi officials believe that a modern Air Force is vital of aviation fuel in depots inside mountains,
to national security, and funding of Air Force mod-
ernization programs will remain a high priority. Even
in the event of a serious economic downturn, we is likely to be curtailed or
believe critical programs-AWACS, additional
F-15s, and Peace Shield-will be fully funded, even at
the expense of Army or Navy programs. Funding for
some of the more ambitious Air Force programs,
however, such as the proposal to maintain large stocks
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attacking across the northern Persian
Gulf. Continued US AWACS and tanker support is
vital, however, to successful Saudi air defense efforts.
Since the shootdown on 5 June, Iranian airstrikes on
shipping in the Gulf have been outside areas patrolled
by the Saudi Air Force, indicating an Iranian effort to
avoid another clash and to husband dwindling air
assets. The Iranian Air Force is likely to continue to
suffer from serious equipment deficiencies as long as
the Iran-Iraq war continues and equipment embar-
goes remain in effect.'
The Saudi Air Force will probably continue to main-
tain a numerical and technical advantage over the
Iranian Air Force for at least several years after the
end of the Iran-Iraq war. After the war ends, we do
not expect the Iranian regime to restore the Air Force
to its prewar capabilities and size because of distrust
of the regular military and the high cost of acquiring
large numbers of advanced aircraft.
The Saudis have a decisive technical and numerical
superiority over both North and South Yemen. The
Yemeni air forces-equipped primarily with aging,
early-model MIGs-suffer from poorly trained pilots
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and support personnel, vulnerable facilities, and inad-
equate air defenses, in our analysis. Either air force
would suffer heavy losses in a clash with Saudi F-15s.
We believe that it is unlikely that either North or
South Yemen will acquire sophisticated aircraft capa-
ble of challenging Saudi F-15s within the next five
years. Neither country can afford to expend the
billions of dollars needed to expand and modernize
their air and air defense forces, and both countries
will continue to suffer from shortages of qualified
personnel, especially pilots.
In a major sustained confrontation with Iraq, the
Saudis could not overcome the more than 3-to-1 Iraqi
edge in aircraft, and attrition would eventually seri-
ously degrade Saudi capabilities. In a short clash,
however, we believe that Saudi equipment, training,
and tactics would give them an advantage, and they
could inflict significant losses on the Iraqis. Saudi
F- 15 pilots are likely to be more aggressive than their
Iraqi counterparts, and Saudi tactics and command
and control flexibility would also give them advan-
tages in a conflict, in our view. The long-range radars
and air-to-air missiles on the Saudi F-15s would give
Saudi pilots greater weapons range and firepower over
Iraqi fighters. Moreover, hardened Saudi facilities
near Iraq would be difficult for the Iraqi Air Force to
neutralize.
The balance between the Iraqi Air Force and the
Saudi Air Force will remain essentially unchanged
over the next decade. The Iraqi Air Force will retain a
commanding advantage in numbers over the Saudis,
but the Saudis will probably still have superior fighter
aircraft and a more flexible command and control
system. Moreover, the Saudis will be able to operate
from additional upgraded and hardened airbases near
Iraq, increasing their operational flexibility and fur-
ther decreasing Iraq's capability to neutralize Saudi
facilities, in our analysis.
pilots would be at a marked disadvantage flying
against combat-hardened Israeli pilots, and the Saudi
Air Force does not have the necessary equipment or
training to function effectively in a high-intensity
ECM environment. Saudi personnel losses could not
be replaced, and the effectiveness of Saudi units
sustaining even moderate casualties would be immedi-
ately and significantly degraded.
Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli Air Force's command
and control system can effectively collect and dissemi-
nate threat data to friendly combat aircraft on a near-
real-time basis. Moreover, the Israelis are very famil-
iar with the tactics and aircraft capabilities of their
opposition and have a relatively large, skilled, and
aggressive cadre of pilots who are trained to act
autonomously. Israel's active electronic warfare capa-
bility is second to none in the region-the result of
superior equipment, a well-formulated tactical doc-
trine, and extensive combat experience. Saudi Arabia
cannot begin to match these capabilities, which pro-
vide the Israelis with a significant force multiplier
against the large air forces of their Arab neighbors.
Other airfields in the area
have poor support facilities and could, at best, serve
only as dispersal strips. Because of the lack of aircraft
shelters and air defense units, aircraft staging from
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them would be highly vulnerable to Israeli attack. The
Saudis, moreover, have little rapid runway repair
capability and no experience supporting extended
high-intensity combat operations.
Because of the Air Force's logistic problems and the
vulnerability of such a contingent to Israeli attack, we
doubt that the Saudis would send fighter aircraft to
either Jordan or Syria. The Air Force can deploy an
F-5 squadron to neighboring friendly countries as
demonstrated during exercises with Oman and Ku-
wait in 1984. Saudi F-5s in Jordan or Syria would be
almost useless against Israeli F-15s or F-16s, however,
and also would be vulnerable to destruction on the
ground. We believe that, for at least the next five
years, the Saudis will be unable to send F-15 fighters
outside the kingdom without substantial US support.
Even within Saudi Arabia, deployments of F-15s
away from their home bases at At Ta'if, Dhahran,
and Khamis Mushayt are rare. In the air intercept
role, however, Saudi F-15s with conformal fuel tanks
or air refueling can reach Jordan or southern Syria
from airbases deep inside Saudi Arabia. Still, in
operations over these countries,
Moreover, the Saudis
have never conducted training exercises with Syria,
Jordan, or Iraq.
Implications for the United States
The growing capability of the Air Force to operate
effectively in the Persian Gulf reduces the likelihood
that Riyadh will immediately request US military
assistance during a crisis, in our view. The Saudi
Government, as demonstrated in the shootdown of the
Iranian fighter last June, is willing to allow the Saudi
military to try to handle a low-level challenge from a
regional opponent before requesting US military in-
tervention. A large, modern Air Force
Arabia.
~ Saudi air-
craft, spare parts, and airbases are essentially compat-
ible with the US Air Force. The large Saudi stocks of
munitions and parts would provide a supplemental
logistic base for US Air Force operations and would
facilitate a rapid US deployment into the region, in
our view.
We believe that the Air Force's growing size and
capabilities could make it difficult for Riyadh to avoid
being drawn into a future Arab-Israeli war. If such a
conflict looks likely, Riyadh's Arab neighbors would
urge it to commit its airpower, especially the F-15s
and AWACS. In previous wars, the Saudis have sent
only a token force of ground units and have never
contributed air units.
Continued US sales of advanced aircraft to the Saudi We judge, however, that
Air Force are a highly visible and prestigious sign of
The Saudis view the Air Force
as the most vital component of their national defense
and realize that US support has been essential in its
development. As the Arab Gulf states expand regional
military cooperation and pursue the goal of compati-
ble equipment, a US-equipped Saudi Air Force-the
dominant air force of the GCC states-would encour-
age additional purchases of US military equipment in
the region. Even though Saudi officers prefer US
equipment, we judge that Riyadh will continue to
purchase some equipment from Western Europe and,
if turned down by the United States, will not hesitate
to buy the needed aircraft and equipment from West-
the Saudi political leader-
ship will attempt to sidestep Arab calls for significant
Saudi involvement. Several important factors would
influence Riyadh's decision:
? The Saudis almost certainly realize that their mili-
tary forces would be quickly overwhelmed by Israel.
ern Europe.
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? In the eyes of its leaders, Saudi Arabia continues to
face potential threats from Iran, the Yemens, and,
over the long term, Iraq. The Air Force is the
kingdom's first line of defense and its only truly
effective military force. Substantial losses of air-
craft and pilots in a general Arab-Israeli war would
cripple Riyadh's ability to respond to threats from
other regional powers.
Despite these considerations, we believe that Israeli
military planners view the Saudi Air Force's contin-
ued modernization with alarm. The Israelis could
decide to launch an overwhelming preemptive strike
on key Saudi facilities during the opening stages of a
future war if they believed Saudi Air Force participa-
tion was probable or to avoid having to hold aircraft in
reserve to meet a potential Saudi threat)
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Appendix A
Aircraft Role
45 F-15C Fighter
15 F-15D Trainer/fighter-bomber
62 F-5E Fighter/fighter-bomber
37 F-513/F Trainer/fighter
10 RF-5E Reconnaissance/ECM
24 Lightning Fighter/fighter-bomber
5 E-3A AWACS-on order
8 KE-3A Tankers-on order
30 C-130 Transport
7 KC-130 Aerial refueling for the F-5s
Precision-Guided Air-to-Ground Munitions
AGM-65A Maverick TV-guided air-to-ground
missile-1,648 in stock
AGM-65B Maverick TV-guided air-to-ground
missile-916 in stock
AGM-65D Maverick TV- and infrared-guided
air-to-ground missile-1,600 requested
GBU-12 MK 82 500-pound laser-guided glide
bomb-10,000 in stock
GBU-10 MK 84 2,000-pound laser-guided glide
bomb-4,000 in stock
GBU- 15 2,000-pound long-range glide bomb-800
requested
Harpoon air-launched antiship missile-100
requested
Air-to-Air Missiles
AIM-7F radar-guided air-to-air missile-900 in
stock
AIM-9L infrared-guided air-to-air missile-260 in
stock, 1,712 on order
AIM-9P infrared-guided air-to-air missile'-2,000
in stock, 1,200 on order
US Air Force Elf One Contingent'
4 E3-A AWACS
3 KC-135 tankers
2 KC-10 tankers
' Rear aspect only.
' Based in Riyadh since 1980; KC-10 tankers arrived in 1984.
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