LEBANON'S HIZBALLAH: THE RISING TIDE OF SHIA RADICALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000400440002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of TOp Secret
Intelligence
Lebanon's Hizballah:
The Rising Tide of
Shia Radicalism
Top Secret
NESA 85-]0194C
October 1985 25X1
r,,.,,~ /1 (1 ~
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Shia Radicalism
Lebanon's Hizballah:
The Rising Tide of
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution by the Political Psychology
Center of the Office of Scientific and Weapons
Resarch. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
This paper was prepared by
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
NESA 85-]0194C
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October 1985
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The Rising Tide of
Shia Radicalism
Key Judgments Shia radicalism in Lebanon is a long-term problem crippling the political
In/ormation available process and impeding reconciliation among the country's warring sectarian
as q/'ll September 1985 factions. Shia extremist groups have the capability to prevent the Lebanese
was used in this report.
Government or any of the factional militias from reestablishing effective
authority over West Beirut, Al Biqa` (Bekaa Valley), and probably
southern Lebanon. Armed radical Shia fighters have created a potent
underground organization that will, at a minimum, play a spoiler role in
Lebanese politics. The extremists will also pose a problem for any foreign
power that attempts to exercise influence in Lebanon.
The Shia fundamentalist movement in Lebanon, known as the Hizballah
(Party of God), is driven by a fanatic ideology that is inspired by the
Iranian revolution and aims ultimately to establish an Islamic republic in
Lebanon. The immediate objectives are to remove all vestiges of US,
Western, and Israeli influence from Lebanon and to challenge the
leadership of the more moderate Amal movement in the predominantly
Shia areas of West Beirut and southern Lebanon.
Hizballah is both an increasingly well-organized network of paramilitary
and terrorist groups and a grassroots movement that has political, social,
and religious dimensions. The influence of the Hizballah has grown
dramatically during the past two years, and it almost certainly will thrive
as long as political and social chaos pervades the country. Events in
southern Lebanon-a traditional stronghold of Amal-will play a critical
role in determining the long-term prospects for the Hizballah. Amal is
trying to resist Hizballah efforts in the south but has thus far failed to turn
the fundamentalist tide.
The Iranian Government has accelerated the development of militant Shia
fundamentalism in Lebanon and has influence in nearly every area of
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Hizballah activity in Lebanon.
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NESA 85-10194C
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The Syrian Government allows the Hizballah to operate from bases in the
Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley despite President Assad's strong opposition
to the ultimate goals of the Shia fundamentalists. Syria, however, is
gradually moving toward confrontation with them. Political, economic, and
security considerations thus far have prevented the Syrians from cracking
down on the Hizballah network in Lebanon, despite increasing disputes
between Syrian and radical Shia leaders. Direct Syrian military interven-
tion could significantly weaken the radical Shia network, but Assad does
not perceive the Hizballah as an immediate threat to Syrian efforts to
stabilize Lebanon. Assad, however, may underestimate the capabilities of
the Hizballah network and the dynamic potential of Shia fundamentalism
in Lebanon.
Hizballah terrorism, which has included extremely lethal suicide car
bombings as well as assassinations and kidnapings, will pose a serious
threat to US personnel and installations in the Middle East and Europe as
long as the United States maintains an Embassy in Beirut. Radical
Lebanese Shia terrorists can operate much more effectively in Lebanon
than elsewhere, but their capabilities outside of the country will increase
over time as the Hizballah network grows in size and sophistication. Some
Hizballah fighters will try to carry their campaign of violence into northern
Israel.
Further successes of the Shia fundamentalist movement in Lebanon could
weaken some US alliances in the region. Moderate regimes such as Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would view the political and military ascendancy
of the Hizballah as an indication of the potential danger that Islamic
fundamentalism represents to their grip on power. They probably would
alter some of their domestic and foreign policies-including the visibility of
their relationships with the United States-to appease indigenous funda-
mentalist sentiments.
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Key Judgments
iii
The Hizballa
h Network
1
Islamic Amal
3
Husayni Suicide Forces
3
Muslim Students Union
4
Hizballah Militias
4
Assembly of Ulama
4
Amal-Hizballah Rivalry
6
Social and Religious Activities
10
Terrorism: A Key Hizballah Weapon
12
Hizballah in the South: Threat to Israel
16
Growing Disillusionment and Independence From Iran
Syrian Displeasure
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
Shia Distribution in Lebanon
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Syria
*DAMASCUS
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Lebanon's Hizballah:
The Rising Tide of
Shia Radicalism
Islamic fundamentalist groups, collectively known as
the Hizballah (Party of God) movement, are attract-
ing considerable support in Lebanon's large Shia
Muslim community. Radical Shia leaders, supported
by Iran, have transformed a handful of relatively
insignificant fringe groups into a fairly well-organized
and growing network that has become an important
factor in the Lebanese political equation.
1970s changed the outlook of many Shias. Resent-
ment of their political and economic situation
mounted as the charismatic Musa Sadr demanded
reforms to redress Shia grievances. The political-
military organizations that he founded encouraged
the Shias to abandon their traditional passivity and
try to improve their situation by whatever means
necessary.
Hizballah leaders are attempting to create abroad-
based political, social, and religious movement that
will dominate the Shia community and pave the way
for the eventual realization of fundamentalist goals in
Lebanon. The Hizballah is determined to eliminate all
Western and Israeli influence from Lebanon as a first
step toward Islamic revolution and the ultimate estab-
lishment of an Iranian-style Islamic state. We believe
that Hizballah radicals represent a grassroots move-
ment that is gradually gaining ascendancy in the Shia
community. In the past year, the Hizballah has
become the principal competitor of the more moderate
Amal organization for the loyalty of Lebanon's Shias.
The trend toward radicalism has been incubating
within the Lebanese Shia community since the 1960s.
Many Shias are receptive to extremist ideologies
because they believe they have been denied their fair
share of power and wealth. The National Pact of
1943, upon which the Lebanese political system is
based, distributes most influential positions in govern-
ment to Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. The
Shias are the largest religious community in Lebanon,
but they are at the bottom of the political and
economic ladder. Many Shias, particularly those in
the slums of southern Beirut, live in poverty compared
to the relative affluence of the Christians and Sunnis.
Three events have served as important catalysts in the
development of Shia radicalism in Lebanon:
? The rise in prominence of Imam Musa Sadr, an
Iranian-born Lebanese cleric, in the 1960s and
? The Iranian Revolution contributed to the radical-
ization of the Shias by providing swell-formulated
extremist ideology and a model for Shia fundamen-
talist activism. The Ayatollah Khomeini became a
strong leadership figure whom the Shias could
idolize. The stationing of an Iranian Revolutionary
Guard contingent in the Bekaa Valley in the sum-
mer of 1982 opened up a new era of Iranian
influence with the Lebanese Shias, many of whom
have family ties to Iran.
? The prolonged Israeli occupation of southern Leba-
non after its invasion in 1982-which devastated
much of the economy-infuriated many Shias and
gave the extremists an issue around which to rally
the Shia population. The occupation radicalized
many formerly passive Shias and increased popular
discontent by demonstrating the inability of the
central government in Beirut to defend Shia inter??
ests.
The Hizballah Network
Radical Shia leaders have transformed a collection of
rival factions into a highly structured, cooperative
individual organizational identities are becomin sub-
merged in the broader Hizballah network.
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Hizballah leaders published theirjirst comprehensive
political platform in Beirut newspapers last Febru-
ary. The 45 page document lays out the ideology and
objectives of the fundamentalist movement.
We, the son of Hizballah's nation, consider
ourself a part of the Islamic nation in the world,
which is facing the most tyrannical arrogant
assault from both the East and West.
Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of
Jihad demands it.... we are moving in the
direction of fighting the roots of vice, and the
first root of vice is America. America and its
allies in the Zionist entity that has usurped the
Islamic land of Palestine engage in constant
aggression against us and are working to con-
stantly humiliate us.
They have attacked our country, destroyed our
villages, massacred our children, violated our
sanctities, and installed over our heads criminal
henchmen who have perpetrated terrible massa-
cres against our nation. Their bombs fell on our
kinsmen like rain during the Zionist invasion of
our country and the Beirut blockade.
We appealed to the world's conscience but heard
nothing from it and found no trace of it.
Our people could not withstand all this treason
and decided to confront the infidelity of Ameri-
ca, France, and Israel. The first punishment
against these forces was carried out on 18 April
and the second on 23 October 1983.
We have risen to liberate our country, to drive
the imperialists and the invader out of it and to
determine our fate by our own hands.... we
declare that the sons of Hizballah's nation have
come to know well their basic enemies in the
area: Israel, America, France, and the
Phalange.
Our sons are now in a state of ever-escalating
confrontation against these enemies until the
following objectives are achieved:
? Israel's final departure from Lebanon as a
prelude to its final obliteration from existence
and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem
from the talons of occupation.
? The final departure of America, France, and
their allies from Lebanon and the termination
of the influence of any imperialist power in the
country.
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The Hizballah Manifesto (continued)
? Submission by the Phalange to just rule and
their trial for the crimes they have committed
against both Muslims and Christians with the
encouragement of America and Israel.
? Giving all our people the opportunity to deter-
mine their fate and to choose with full free-
dom the system of government they want,
keeping in mind that we do not hide our
commitment to the rule of Islam.
It is not important that military parades be
held.... what is important is to increase opera-
tions against Israel. It is not important that we
draft statements and call for conferences .. .
what is important is that we turn Lebanon into a
graveyard for American schemes.
We are convinced of Islam as a faith, system,
thought, and rule, and we urge all to recognize it
and to resort to its law. If our people get the
opportunity to choose Lebanon's system of gov-
ernment freely, they will favor no alternative to
Islam. We declare that we aspire to see Leban-
on.... ruled by Islam and its just leadership.
As for Israel, we consider it the American
spearhead in our Islamic world.... a usurping
enemy that must be fought until the usurped
right is returned to its owners. Therefore, our
confrontation of this entity must end with its
obliteration.
Through their Islamic resistance, the strug-
glers-the women with rocks and boiling oil for
their weapons, the children with their shouts
and their bare fists for their weapons, the old
men with their weak bodies and their thick
sticks for their weapons, and the youth with
their rifles and their firm and faithful will for
their weapons-have all proved that the na-
tion.... is capable of making miracles and to
change the imaginary fates.
As for the Arab regimes falling over themselves
for reconciliation with the Zionist enemy, they
are decrepit regimes incapable of keeping up
with the nation's ambitions and aspirations ... .
We urge the peoples to unite their ranks, to
chart their objectives, and to rise.... and to
overthrow the agent governments that oppress
them.
As for those who reject us, we will endure until
God issues his judgment on us and the oppres-
sors.
Islamic Amal. Husayn Musawi withdrew from Amal
because of its weak resistance to the Israeli invasion in
1982 and founded this extremist organization, which
is the largest radical Shia group. Its membership may
total between 1,000 and 1,400, but the number of
active, full-time members probably is somewhat less
at any given time,
Islamic Amal quarters and trains its mem-
bers at several different locations in the Bekaa Valley.
Husayni Suicide Forces. Another member of the
Musawi extended family-Abu Haydar Musawi-
leads this loosely organized subgroup of Islamic
Amal, which is based in Beirut. The Husayni Suicide
Forces probably do not function as a permanent 25X1
organization but consist of individuals recruited for
specific operations. The group's membership fluctu-
ates but probably numbers fewer than 100 at any 25X1
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Figr~re 3. Portraits ctl'Iran's Ayatollah Khomei-
ni are increasingly common in the predominantly
Subhi Tufayli, Abbas Musawi, Abd al-Karim Ubayd,
and other clerics command radical Shia militia con-
tingents in the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and the south.
Figure 2. Shia militiamen beneath a poster q/'
Lebanese Shia leader Imam Musa Sadr, who
disappeared in 1978.
time, Mem-
bers of this group can sometimes be recognized in the
southern slums of Beirut~espite attempts by Amal
to arrest Abu Haydar's followers-because they often
wear yellow headbands, according to press reports.
iliaries" of the Guard.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard works closely with
these organizations, which may be organized as "aux-
Assembly oJ: Ulama. Several assemblies of fundamen-
talist clerics-mostly Shia but including some Sun-
nis-have sprung up in the Bekaa, West Beirut, and
Muslim Students Union. Muhammad Husayn Fad-
lallah controls this fundamentalist group based in
southern Beirut. It is intimately involved with the
other radical Shia groups. We believe the Muslim
Students Union serves as a front for the Lebanese
branch of the clandestine Da`wa Party, from which
many Hizballah leaders emerged. The Muslim Stu-
dents Union probably has fewer than 500 full-time
members, but Fadlallah commands the loyalty of far
greater numbers of Shias in the southern slums of
is to increase the ranks of the "faithful" and to recruit
as many young Shias as possible into the Hizballah
network.
Relatively few individuals are full-time members of
the groups that comprise the Hizballah network, but
the groups operate effectively because the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard supports them and because they
have the sympathy and tacit cooperation of a signifi-
cant segment of the Lebanese Shia population. The
collective membership of the groups has grown from
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Figure 4. Islamic Amal leader Husayn Musawi
surrounded by bodyguards at his headquarters in
several hundred to several thousand during the past
two years,
A large part of the Hizballah network functions as an
organization along conventional military lines, with
officials responsible for operations, logistics, commu-
nications, intelligence, training, and recruitment.
Figure S. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah at-
tending ajuneraljor victims q/'a car bomb near
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Aural-Hizballah Rivalry
Hizballah leaders are challenging the more moderate
Aural movement for dominance in the Shia communi-
ty. The fundamentalists scorn the secularist approach 25X1
of Aural, which seeks redress of Shia grievances
through negotiation with other factions in the Leba-
nese political system. Radical leaders advocate a more 25X1
simplistic, less compromising strategy-"jihad" (holy 25X1
war~to accomplish their goals.
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The Hizballah is gradually eroding Amal's support
throughout Lebanon. many 25X1
Shias who belong to Aural have become sympathetic
to the Hizballah and no longer fully respond to Aural
authority. 25X1
trol.
(postponed
Aural politburo elections last March because he was
afraid that Hizballah-backed rivals might seize con-
Increasing unpopularity and dissatisfaction with
Aural also help the Hizballah. Nabih Barri, despite
his position as Minister of Justice and Minister for the
South, has failed to obtain significant political or
economic gains for the Shia community. In the view
of most Shias, he has provided no evidence that
moderate policies can produce results or improve their
situation, while the Hizballah has undertaken ahigh-
visibility campaign to achieve its objectives. Many
Shias are also disillusioned with Aural because of
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rampant corruption within the organization,
parts of Beirut, especially the southern slums. Radical
Shia elements have proven their ability to operate
virtually at will throughout the Muslim quarters of
The Hizballah has succeeded in replacing Amal as the the city.
dominant Shia organization in the Bekaa Valley, and
the network is rapidly expanding its influence-at Hizballah leaders are now focusing their efforts and
Amal's expense-in West Beirut and the southern resources on the extensive Shia-populated areas of
suburbs of the capital.
the Hizballah has grown stronger than Amal in many
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southern Lebanon from which the Israelis have with-
drawn. Hizballah adherents there have to operate in
Shia villages where loyalty to Amal has always been
strong and where Amal still provides patronage and
controls local services. Southern Shias have tradition-
ally been more affluent and less prone to religious
extremism than their coreligionists in the Bekaa
Valley or the southern slums of Beirut. Nonetheless,
popularity and support for the
Amal has responded to the Hizballah challenge in
southern Lebanon by attempting to crack down on
fundamentalist activities there.
Armed confrontations have
occurred between militiamen from the two organiza-
tions in recent months.
Social and Religious Activities
The exponential growth of the Hizballah network has
resulted in large part from a grassroots movement
toward Islamic fundamentalism that is taking place
within the Shia community. A decade of civil war has
torn apart the fabric of Lebanese Shia society and
prompted many Shias to turn to religion as a panacea
for their suffering. Economic and political grievances
have made the Lebanese Shias more susceptible to the
galvanizing effect that the Iranian revolution has had
on Shia communities throughout the Muslim world.
Many uneducated Shias are falling under the influ-
ence of clerics who advocate a return to the Koran
and Islamic values. Since the mosque is the focal point
in their lives, they are particularly susceptible to
political rhetoric couched in religious terms. Several
militant clerics have risen in prominence-the most
important is Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah-who are
strong orators and who attract increasingly large
audiences. Cassette tape recordings of sermons by
Lebanese and Iranian fundamentalist clerics, includ-
ing Ayatollah Khomeini, are becoming increasingly
common in Shia areas of Lebanon.
The intensity and size of the Ashura demonstra-
tions-in which Shias publicly perform ritual self-
flagellation-in Beirut and other Lebanese cities this
year illustrate the growing appeal of fundamentalist
ideology. Hizballah leaders have organized public
marches that drew thousands of their supporters into
the streets. Another indication of the intimidating
power of the fundamentalists is the increasing reluc-
tance of Muslims in West Beirut and elsewhere to
serve liquor, gamble, partake of Western-style enter-
tainment, or allow women to be seen in public without
a veil. Hizballah gangs often march through the West
Beirut commercial district vandalizing bars and clubs
suspected of catering to "Western" vices.
margin Amal's newspaper,
Hizballah leaders are cultivating and capitalizing on
this fundamentalist mood to build their base of sup-
port within the Shia population and transform the
Hizballah into a mass movement. A key element of
their strategy is religious and political propaganda.
The Hizballah newspaper, al-Ahid, outsells by a wide
The fundamentalists broadcast their
views to the Shia community through a radio sta-
tion-"Voice of the Oppressed"-set up by Iran last
year in the Bekaa Valley.
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Figure 10
Key Shia-Controlled Neighborhoods in South Beirut
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implicates the Hizbal-
lah in the continuing violence against US and other
Western personnel and facilities in Lebanon. Its mem-
bers, operating under the covername "Islamic Jihad,"
carried out the devastating car bombings of the US
and French Multinational Force installations in 1983
and the US Embassy annex in East Beirut last year.
Hizballah elements are also responsible for the kid-
naping and continuing detention of US citizens.
Small cells of Hizballah militants committed to ter-
rorism coalesce around individual clerics or paramili-
tary leaders.
Figure 11. Hizballah fighters patrol Shia
neighborhoods in southern Beirut.
The fundamentalists also use social programs to im-
prove their public image and attract recruits. Hizbal-
lah charity projects, funded largely by Iran, give
financial assistance to poor Shia families.
that provides money for hospital care and academic
scholarships to lower-class Shias and has set up
community service projects, such as rebuilding homes
and mosques destroyed in the war, that create jobs for
the young.
Hizballah propaganda and religious indoctrination
appeal especially to young Shias who have come of
age in the turbulent and anarchic environment of the
from Shia leaders.
ist cells are usually subject to influence by the broader
Hizballah network, but they almost certainly carry
out some operations without seeking formal approval
Hizballah terrorism poses a greater danger and is
often more destructive than attacks by other groups
because Hizballah recruits are willing to sacrifice
their lives in their operations. This fanaticism distin-
guishes the Hizballah from most other groups that use
violence as a calculated political weapon. Shia suicide
terrorists believe that dying in the name of Islam will
guarantee them a place in paradise. Most other
groups limit themselves to assassinations, kidnapings,
and boobytrapped and timer-activated vehicle bombs,
which are less effective than a car bomb that is
Many Shia youths are attracted to the Hizballah
largely because they are out of school, unemployed,
and frustrated with their current situation.
Terrorism: A Key Hizballah Weapon
Many Hizballah leaders are committed to terrorism
as a means of eliminating Western influence from
Lebanon and achieving other radical Shia goals. ~
actually driven into the target.
Hizballah terrorism against US targets is driven by
radical Shia leaders' visceral hatred of the United
States. Shia terrorists see themselves as "true believ-
ers" involved in a holy war to force all Americans,
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Figure 12. The car bombing ct/'the US Embassy
in Beirut in April 1983 marked the beginning ct(
the Hizballah terrorist campaign against US
Europeans, and Israelis out of Lebanon. The funda-
mentalists believe that Western influence-especially
American-is the primary obstacle to the eventual
establishment of an Islamic republic and that terror-
ism will force the US and European governments to
withdraw their representatives from Lebanon.
A more immediate goal of some elements of the
Hizballah network is to secure the release of the Shia
terrorists-three of whom are Lebanese-in prison in
Kuwait. the leader
of the Hizballah faction holding the US hostages,
Imad Mughniyah, has close family ties to the prison-
ers in Kuwait, and their release has been the principal
condition levied by the Hizballah for the return of the
kidnaped Americans.
Hizballah elements also target US personnel as a
means of indirectly challenging the other factional
militias and the Lebanese Government. Successful
terrorist attacks enhance local perceptions of the
strength of the fundamentalist movement and demon-
strate its ability to operate with impunity even in
areas under the nominal control of other groups, such
as Amal. The US Embassy in Beirut reports that most
Lebanese Government and traditional sectarian lead-
ers are afraid to speak out or act against Hizballah
terrorism.
Figure 13. The destroyed US Marine headquar-
ters at Beirut airport in which 141 died-Hizbal-
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The Hizballah Terrorist Campaign
Against US Targets
(Incidents known or suspected to be Hizballah-di-
rected)
14 June 1985
10 June 1985
29 May 1985
28 May 1985
18 Apri 1 1985
16 March 1985
10 February 1985
22 January 1985
8 January 1985
22 December 1984
4 December 1984
30 November 1984
25 November 1984
S June 1984
8 May 1984
28 March 1984
16 March 1984
7 March 1984
S March 1984
10 February 1984
18 January 1984
8 January 1984
23 October 1983
Fall-Winter 1983
18 Apri 1 1983
TWA flight 847 hijacked; one American killed.
American University in Beirut (AUBJ Prof Thomas Sutherland kidnaped.
AUB Prof. David Hill shot dead.
AUB Dr. David Jacobsen kidnaped.
AUB Vice President kidnaped, released.
AP Beirut bureau chief Terry Anderson kidnaped.
Two AUB doctors kidnaped, released.
Bombing attempt at AUB.
Catholic priest Lawrence Jenco kidnaped in Beirut.
Car belonging to US Embassy Beirut employee bombed.
Kuwait Airways Flight 221 hijacked; two Americans killed.
AUB librarian Peter Kilburn disappears.
Seven Hizballah members arrested in Italy and one in Switzerland with plans and
materials to blow up US Embassy in Rome.
US Embassy annex in East Beirut destroyed in suicide car bombing; two
Americans killed.
AUB classroom bombed.
Presbyterian minister Benjamin Weir kidnaped in Beirut.
AUB building bombed.
US Embassy officer William Buckley kidnaped in West Beirut.
Cable News Network Beirut bureau chief Jeremy Levin kidnaped in West Beirut.
US defense attache in Beirut wounded in assassination attempt.
AUB Prof. Frank Regier kidnaped, later released.
AUB President Malcolm Kerr shot dead.
Marine guards at US Embassy red upon; one Marine killed.
US Marine barracks at Beirut airport destroyed in suicide car bombing; 241
killed.
Numerous incidents of sniping against US Marine contingent in Beirut.
US Embassy in West Beirut destroyed in suicide car bombing; 17 Americans
killed.
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Figure 14. Hizballah supporters storm the Sau-
di Embassy in West Beirut in the summer Qf
The capability of the Hizballah to act independently
ensures that radical Shia terrorists will pose a serious
threat to US personnel and facilities as long as their
two basic motivations-the continued US official
presence in Lebanon and the detention of their Da`wa
Party comrades in Kuwait-remain unchanged. The
success of major Hizballah terrorist operations during
the past two years has emboldened the Shia radicals,
Hizballah terrorists, however, will pose a much great-
er threat inside Lebanon than elsewhere in the Middle
East or in Europe. Hizballah members are effective at
carrying out destructive terrorist acts in Lebanon
largely because they have awell-developed support
network in their native country. Their proven terrorist
capabilities in Lebanon do not necessarily extend to
operations elsewhere. Most Hizballah volunteers are
poor, uneducated youths with little or no experience
outside Lebanon. Unlike many leftwing European and
Palestinian terrorists, they generally do not speak
foreign languages and cannot easily blend into the
population of a European capital.
Despite these limitations, we believe they are deter-
mined to strike US targets in Europe-especially as
US security precautions in the Middle East are
strengthened. Their capabilities almost certainly will
improve over time as the Hizballah organization
grows and trains more sophisticated fighters. Radical
Lebanese Shias have already been involved in two
successful skyjackings and the 1983 bombings in
Kuwait, although in none of these incidents did it
appear that the Hizballah leadership had planned or
sponsored the operation. In our judgment, anonymous
callers claiming Islamic Jihad responsibility for recent
terrorist attacks in Madrid, Paris, and Copenhagen
did not represent the Hizballah.
the radical Shia network is escalating its paramilitary
operations against the Israeli forces remaining in
southern Lebanon and their surrogates, primarily the
Army of South Lebanon (ASL). We believe that some
Hizballah elements will try to carry their campaign of
violence into northern Israel. Radical Shia leaders
stated as early as last September that they were
cultivating a capability to launch offensive attacks in
Hizballah paramilitary operations in southern Leba-
non are facilitated by the willingness of local Shia
communities to support or at least tolerate the activi-
ties of the radicals. The US Embassy in Beirut reports
that open resentment of Israel is almost universal in
the south. The often heavyhanded Israeli occupation
radicalized the political attitudes of southern Shias,
transforming formerly passive farmers and merchants
into activists. Large numbers of Shias have participat-
ed in demonstrations and strikes protesting the Israeli
occupation.
The Hizballah network is unlikely to end its guerrilla
war against Israel even if all Israeli troops withdraw
from their "security zone" in southern Lebanon.
Although their immediate objective is to end the
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Israeli occupation of the south, the Hizballah mili-
tants have declared themselves to be Islamic warriors
involved in a long-term struggle against Israel itself.
Fundamentalist fighters, encouraged and to some
extent indoctrinated by Iran, believe their proximity
to Israel places them in a unique position to lead the
Muslim struggle against Zionism. Hizballah leaders
publicly describe their campaign of violence as the
first stage in a battle to "liberate" Jerusalem.
Hizballah leaders probably believe that cross-border
attacks-which would provoke Israeli retaliation in-
side Lebanese territory-would accelerate the radi-
calization that has been taking place in southern Shia
villages. The Hizballah movement has profited from
the rising tide of extremism in the south and has a
vested interest in perpetuating it.
The Hizballah will concentrate on targeting Israeli
and ASL troops on Lebanese soil as long as the Israeli
"security zone" remains in existence. Assassinations,
car bombings, and guerrilla-style ambushes will re-
main common. Rocket attacks into northern Israel,
however, are also likely because they can easily be
launched from Shia-held territory.
Amal leaders have publicly expressed their determi-
nation to prevent cross-border provocations, but we
doubt they will be able to exercise more than nominal
control over Hizballah activities. The same factors
that have made it nearly impossible for Amal to
control the growing Hizballah underground in Bei-
rut-public sympathy for the fundamentalists, in-
creasing Hizballah capabilities and weapons stores,
and Amal military ineffectiveness-are likely to ham-
per Amal efforts in the south. Moreover, militias
rarely exercise complete control over their areas-
especially in an area as large as southern Lebanon-
and small-scale Hizballah rocket attacks or other
operations across the border would be extremely
difficult to detect.
In the event of a complete Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon, at least some Hizballah adherents
almost certainly would try to send terrorists across the
Israeli border. Although the Amal militia and the
Shia population of the south probably would not
participate directly in cross-border violence, elements
of both would provide indirect assistance to the
Hizballah fighters could eventually pose as great a
threat to northern Israel as the Palestinians did before
the invasion. Hizballah "true believers" have demon-
strated their willingness and ability to mount spectac
ular suicide operations that are nearly impossible to
defend against. The southern Lebanese population
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Figure 17. Radical Shia clerics lead Iuneral
prayers Jor victims 4f gu~ghts with Israeli
provides a large pool of potential Hizballah recruits
who, unlike the Palestinians, are native to the area
and therefore difficult to isolate.
Iran: Aiding and Abetting
Iran has played an important role in the development
of the Hizballah network and is deeply involved in
almost every area of radical Shia activity in Lebanon.
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Growing Disillusionment and Independence From Iran
The Syrians have indirectly fa-
1983, but the radical Shia movement no longer 25X1
depends on Iran for its existence. Although the termi-
nation of Iranian support would hurt the Hizballah
and slow its progress, radical Shia leaders can satisfy
many of the movement's material needs through the 25X1
open market for arms in Lebanon or from other
Lebanese factions. Palestinian
guerrilla leaders, including Yasir Arafat, pay large 25X1
sums to the Hizballah in return for passage through
radical Shia territory.
support for granted.
Hizballah leaders almost certainly believe they will
continue to receive Iranian material support even if
they refuse to act as puppets of Iran. The Lebanese
fundamentalists, aware of the importance that the
Iranian Government attaches to exporting its revolu-
tion to Lebanon, probably take Iranian material
Syrian Displeasure
The Syrian Government tolerates Hizballah activity
but is gradually moving toward confrontation with the
fundamentalists. Damascus allows the Hizballah net-
work to operate from bases in the Syrian-controlled
cilitated terrorist operations by permitting the move- 25X1
ment of men and materiel through Syrian check-
Disruptive Hizballah activity suited Syrian interests
from 1983 through early 1984. During this period,
President Assad used military pressure to reduce US
influence in Lebanon and force the Lebanese Govern-
ment to cancel its accord with Israel, which moved
toward normalization of relations. Assad also almost
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Despite material support to the Hizballah, Iranian
officials often cannot control their Lebanese allies.
Iranian assistance may have been critical in 1982 and
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certainly believed that an aggressive Shia guerrilla
movement in the south would keep pressure on the
Israeli Army to withdraw.
Syrian and Hizballah strategies began to diverge
sharply in mid-1984 after Lebanese President Amin
Gemayel capitulated to Damascus and abrogated his
government's agreement with Israel. Since then, the
Syrians have been determined to stabilize security in
and around Beirut and strengthen the Gemayel gov-
ernment. Shia radicals, on the other hand, are trying
to disrupt the security situation and dispose of
Gemayel.
Assad has grown increasingly disenchanted with the
Shia radicals. Assad reacted angrily to the car bomb-
ing of the US Embassy annex in East Beirut and
strongly disapproved of a large Hizballah demonstra-
tion in Sidon last February, according to the US
Embassy in Damascus
Assad is frustrated by the refusal of Hizballah leaders
to accede to Syrian demands. The US Embassy
reports that Syrian officials spent 24 hours arguing
with the Hizballah over the hostages from the hi-
jacked TWA airliner.
The long-term objectives of Syria and the Hizballah
are fundamentally incompatible. Islamic extremism is
anathema to the secular Syrian regime, which has
dealt brutally with its own fundamentalists, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. The Hizballah commitment to Is-
lamic revolution in Lebanon dramatically contrasts
with the Syrian goal of a multiconfessional Lebanese
client state in which no faction dominates the others.
Assad's Ambivalence
Despite these disagreements, the Syrians have thus
far been reluctant to crack down on Hizballah or
Iranian activity in the Bekaa Valley.
have imposed restrictions several times on the free-
dom of movement of Hizballah members-provoking
clashes between Syrian troops and Shia gunmen-but
in each case these measures were dropped after a few
There are several reasons for the Syrian tolerance of
the Hizballah, in our judgment:
? Assad does not want to damage the Syrian-Iranian
relationship, which provides Syria with valuable
economic benefits, including high-quality crude oil
for which Damascus pays only a fraction of the
?Assad may worry that a total crackdown on the
Hizballah would prompt the terrorist network to
begin targeting Syrians or Syrian interests. Al-
though the Hizballah has tried to maintain friendly
relations with Syrian officers in the Bekaa Valley,
Assad almost certainly realizes that the radical Shia
movement could easily row hostile toward the
secular Alawite regime.
? The Syrians still prefer to try to co-opt the Hizbal-
lah rather than move against it militarily.0
Assad believes he can manip-
ulate the Shia radicals to Syria's advantage. He has
used the Hizballah in the past as a tool for putting
pressure on Amal leader Nabih Barri and almost
certainly believes that Hizballah paramilitary oper-
ations will eventually force the Israelis to withdraw
fully from Lebanese territory.
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Assad, in our judgment, does not yet perceive the
Hizballah as an immediate threat to Syrian policy
goals in Lebanon. He appears confident that Syrian or
pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon will be able to crush the
radical movement if and when it becomes a sufficient-
ly serious problem. Assad almost certainly sees the
Hizballah as another Lebanese faction that will be
susceptible to Syrian pressure when the time comes.
We believe that Assad underestimates the capabilities
of the Hizballah network and the dynamic of Shia
fundamentalism in Lebanon. In our judgment, funda-
mentalist ideology is already so deeply rooted in the
thinking of large segments of the Shia community
that the Syrians will be unable to eradicate it by any
means. Although Syrian troops could arrest some
Hizballah leaders and shut down Hizballah bases in
the Bekaa Valley, they have far less direct influence
in West Beirut and its sprawling southern slums. Only
a major commitment by the Syrian Army to reoccupy
West Beirut could turn the Hizballah tide there.
Similarly, Syria has only limited direct leverage over
the Shia network in the south.
Outlook
Shia radicalism is a long-term problem that will
further disable the crippled Lebanese political process
over the next few years and will impede reconciliation
among the warring factions. In our judgment, the
Shia extremists will prevent the Lebanese Govern-
ment or any of the sectarian militias from establishing
effective authority over West Beirut, the Bekaa, and
probably southern Lebanon. The armed Shia under-
ground will, at a minimum, play a spoiler role in
Lebanese politics.
Continued Hizballah expansion is likely but by no
means inevitable. Events in southern Lebanon over
the next year or two will have a decisive effect on the
long-term prospects for the fundamentalist move-
ment. Aural still remains strong there despite Hizbal-
lah gains, and Syrian moves to bolster Aural-for
example, the delivery of 50 tanks to the militia-will
improve the Amal's position. Aural almost certainly
will step up its resistance to the Hizballah and will
seek greater assistance from Syria and other Lebanese
factions.
Figure 18. Syria is bolstering with tanks the
Aural militia, the primary rival oJ'the Hizballah.
Despite this opposition, trends in the south favor the
Hizballah, which undoubtedly will intensify its polit-
cal, military, social, and religious campaigns there
and probably will continue to gain ground at Amal's
expense. Sustained radicalization in the south over the
next few years, in our judgment, would make it 25X1
possible for Hizballah elements to eliminate Barri and
seize control of Aural. If that happened, the Hizballah
almost certainly would turn its attention and re-
sources to challenging the Lebanese Government and
the Christians.
A dramatic improvement in the political and military
environment in Lebanon-such as a lasting cessation
of hostilities and the start of genuine national recon-
ciliation-would significantly weaken the radical Shia
movement. The civil war, however, has dragged on for
over a decade, and we see no evidence that the
Lebanese factions are prepared to make peace.
A gradual increase in Syrian military pressure would 25X1
hamper Hizballah activities and make it difficult for
the Shia radicals to operate in the Bekaa Valley. In
that event, Hizballah leaders probably would shift the
focus of their operations to Beirut and southern
Lebanon. We believe that the Hizballah movement
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would continue to grow, although at a slower pace,
even if the Syrians tried to sever the Hizballah-
Iranian connection by forcing the Iranian Revolution-
ary Guard to withdraw from Lebanon. In our judg-
ment, it has achieved sufficient momentum and
internal cohesion to withstand most forms of external
pressure.
We do not believe that a Shia fundamentalist revolu-
tion in Lebanon could succeed in the next few years.
The Hizballah is not strong enough to challenge the
Druze and Christian militias, and Sunni leaders
would bitterly oppose it. Over the longer term-
perhaps in the 1990s-the Hizballah could expand
beyond the Shia regions of the country. The Shia
community, if united behind the Hizballah, would
have sufficient numbers, political and economic griev-
ances, and religious motivation to attempt a major
uprising or revolution. A reoccupation of most of
Lebanon by the Syrian Army could stop a revolution
but would not end the underlying political and reli-
gious movement toward Shia radicalism.
Implications for the United States
The Hizballah poses a serious threat to US interests
both as an aggressive terrorist network and as a rising
fundamentalist political movement in Lebanon. The
determination and growing capability of the Hizbal-
lah to strike US personnel and installations will
hamper the conduct of normal US diplomatic, mili-
tary, and commercial business in the Middle East and
possibly Western Europe.
Attacks by Hizballah elements against northern Isra-
el will provoke Israeli retaliatory measures and revive
the cycle of cross-border violence that existed before
the Israeli invasion. A prolonged war between the
Israelis and the Shias in southern Lebanon almost
certainly would cause an angry backlash throughout
the Arab world and provide ammunition for oppo-
nents of negotiations with Israel.
The political ascendancy of the Shia fundamentalist
movement in Lebanon will indirectly damage US
relations with moderate Arab regimes. Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia, for example, would fear that the
success of the Hizballah increases the danger that
Islamic fundamentalism represents to their grip on
power. A Hizballah political victory in Lebanon
would represent the first radical Shia victory in an
Arab country. They may alter some of their domestic
and foreign policies to counter indigenous fundamen-
talist sentiments and almost certainly will be more
reluctant to moderate their policies toward Israel. The
threat of Hizballah violence probably would prompt
moderate regimes to reduce the visibility of their
relationships with the United States.
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