SYRIA'S OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000400550004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
Top Secret
NESA 85-10220JX
SW 85-10129JX
1985 25X1
November
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
This paper was prepared by I Office
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of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and
Office of Scientific and Weapons
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Research. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
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Operations.F
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 85-10220JX
SW85-10129JX 25X1
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Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability 25X1
Key Judgments We believe Syria has developed a substantial chemical weapons stockpile
Information available of indigenously produced binary-type chemical munitions, principally
as of 15 October 1985 aerial bombs and warheads. We assess that Syria could produce 7.8 metric
was used in this report.
tons per month of the nerve agent sarin. We believe Syria could produce 10
Scud missile chemical warheads and 60 500-kilogram chemical bombs per
month.
Within the next five years we believe Syria will develop a more persistent
chemical agent, such as soman or VX. Either of these could be used to neu-
tralize enemy rear areas that the attackers do not plan to occupy
immediately. Syria probably is also experimenting with chemical warfare
applications for conventional artillery systems
We believe that only President Assad can order the use of Syria's chemical
weapons. In our view, he would authorize their use only if Syria's defeat or
an enemy chemical attack appeared imminent or in retaliation for a
chemical attack. In the event of Assad's death or removal from power, this
policy would change little, if at all.F_~
An embargo against shipments to Syria of Western equipment, precursor
chemicals, and technical support would not slow Syrian production of
chemical weapons.
We have no evidence of Soviet provision of the production facilities,
chemical precursors, or scientific expertise that would aid nerve agent
research.
iii Top Secret
NESA 85-10220JX
SW 85-10129JX
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The relatively muted public reaction to Iraq's use of chemical weapons
against Iran and the proliferation of these weapons in the region suggest a
lower threshold for the use of chemical weapons in future Middle East
conflicts. Syria is the fourth Middle Eastern nation, after Egypt, Iraq, and
Israel, known to produce chemical weapons. Iran and possibly Libya are
also trying to develop these weapons. Other countries in the region, such as
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait, are concerned about their inadequate
chemical defense capabilities and are taking steps to enhance them.
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Key Judgments
Stockpile and Delivery Means
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Chemical Warfare Planning 11
Regional Implications of Syrian CW Production Capability 11
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Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
We believe Syria emerged from the 1973 Arab-Israeli The Army's Defensive
war determined to develop an independent capability Chemical Units
to produce chemical weapons.
Concern in Damascus over Israel's chemical warfare
program probably further spurred Syrian chemical
weapons research
Since the 1960s, Syria has considered the prospect of
chemical warfare a serious threat. The measures it
has taken to provide its troops with defensive training
and equipment laid the foundation for development of
an offensive capability. The Syrian Army has worked
closely with Soviet military advisers to train and
equip defensive chemical units that are assigned to
all of its major elements. Most Syrian military
personnel probably have at least a basic understand-
ing of the uses and effects of chemical weapons and
how to protect themselves against them.
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Units of the Army's 28th Chemical Regiment are
assigned to the Army General Headquarters, the
divisions, and maneuver brigades. These elements are
officially charged with providing smoke concealment
for maneuvering forces and destroying enemy forces
and materiel with flamethrowers. Below the brigade
level, chemical units are assigned as needed by the
brigade commander (see figure 3). 25X1
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Analysis based on the expected production rates,
and the assump-
tion that full-scale production began in early 1985-
by which time all the equipment purchased in 1983
would be installed-indicates that Syria's chemical
weapons stockpile could consist of as many as 70 Scud
missile warheads and 560 500-kilogram bombs. If
Syria produced these munitions at maximum produc-
tion capacity-l0 Scud missile warheads and 60
bombs per month-its munitions stockpile would
grow dramatically.
(Syria may be
stockpiling chemical agents as a safeguard against
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destruction of some of its CW facilities
We suspect that Syria has selected the Scud as a
primary means of launching a chemical attack be-
cause it has a much greater range than the Frog or
SS-21, the only other SSMs in Syria. Israeli cities and
military installations-the presumed targets of
Syria's CW program-are well within the Scud
missile's 300-kilometer maximum effective range.
Syria would use
fighter-bombers, such as its SU-20/22 or MIG-23
(Flogger F) aircraft, to deliver chemical bombs. We
doubt these would be used as readily as the Scud
missiles because of the greater vulnerability of air-
craft to enemy fire
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Extensive Soviet assistance since the early 1960s in
developing Syria's defensive chemical warfare regi-
ment suggests that Syrian chemical warfare doctrine
is modeled on Soviet doctrine, which regards chemical
weapons as weapons of mass destruction. We believe
Syria would use chemical weapons against such tar-
gets as the enemy's major troop concentrations, air-
fields, and command and control facilitiesF___-]
Syrian ability to wage chemical warfare will raise the
level of tension between Syria and Israel and between
Syria and moderate Arab states such as Jordan. 25X1
Chemical weapons production by Syria and Iraq has
increased the likelihood of Israeli airstrikes against
their suspected storage and production facilities
Israeli
military actions to reduce Syrian chemical warfare
capabilities probably would result in retaliatory Svri-
an attacks and could lead to war. l 25X1
The nerve agent sarin is particularly well suited to the
small theater of operations that would be the setting
for another war with Israel. Sarin is a "nonpersistent"
chemical agent that dissipates within a few hours of a
chemical attack, allowing advancing troops to enter
the affected area without great risk. In the confined
geographical area where future Syrian-Israeli battles
might take place, only a nonpersistent nerve agent
would allow the user to overcome rapidly enemy
troops and occupy enemy territory.F___1
If Assad contemplated launching a chemical attack
against Israel, he would have to consider wind condi-
tions over Israel and western Syria. During the sum-
mer and early fall, prevailing surface winds in Syria
are eastbound and can gust in excess of 17 knots,
greatly increasing the danger that chemical agent
would be blown toward Syria's civilian population and
troops. Wind conditions during the rest of the year
generally are more favorableF_~
Regional Implications of Syrian CW Production
Capability
Syria's development of a CW production capability
and the absence of a major international outcry over
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran suggest a
lower threshold for the use of chemical weapons in
future Middle East conflicts. In addition to Iraq and
Syria, Egypt and Israel are known to produce chemi-
cal weapons. Iran and possibly Libya are also trying
to develop these weapons. Other countries in the
region, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait,
are concerned about their inadequate chemical de-
fense capabilities and are taking steps to enhance
them.F---]
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probably could slow, but not stop, Syria's CW pro-
gram. The production and storage facilities almost
certainly are not colocated, and destroying all of the
facilities would be difficult. Moreover, we believe
Syrian chemical experts could design and build new
facilities without outside assistance
Efforts to gain acceptance for an international treaty
banning chemical warfare may prove futile in the
Middle East. Middle Eastern states would be unwill-
ing to forgo newly acquired CW capabilities if they
believe that their hostile neighbors will not accede to
or comply with a treaty banning chemical weapons.
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Israel almost certainly will increase pressure on the
United States to convince its West European allies to
control exports of chemical warfare materiel to Syria.
If recent experience is an accurate guide, most Euro-
pean governments will attempt to cooperate but will
have difficulty imposing embargoes unless they have
proof that their nationals are aiding Syria's CW
program
In any case, an embargo on all Western-origin materi-
el with chemical warfare uses probably could not
slow, much less stop, Syria's production of chemical
weapons.
In our view, moreover,
Syria's stockpile of surplus chemical precursors and
the expertise of its scientists would ensure that the
CW program continues despite embargo efforts.
We believe Syria would use chemical weapons as a
last resort in an all-out war with Israel when its own
defeat appeared imminent or if it believed an enemy
was about to launch a chemical attack. As long as 25X1
Iraq is engaged in war with Iran, Syria will not be as
concerned about Iraqi CW capabilities.
As long as President Assad is in power, there probably
is little chance that Syria would try to surprise Israel
by using chemical weapons early in a war because of
the certainty of massive Israeli retaliation. We do not
believe that Assad will relinquish his strict control
over the chemical weapons program because of the
danger that unauthorized individuals would misuse
the weapons. In the event of Assad's death or removal
from power, a successor regime-eager to establish its
legitimacy and authority-probably would maintain
strict control over chemical weapons.
Syria's intentions regarding its stockpile of excess
chemicals and chemical weapons are unclear. Assad
probably views them as a safeguard against interna-
tional trade restrictions on the sale to Syria of chemi-
cals and materiel with CW-related uses. Syrian scien-
tists may also intend to use some of the excess
chemicals to produce other types of nerve agents. We
do not believe Syria would provide chemical weapons
to Lebanese militias and Palestinian organizations
because it has only limited control over such groups.
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Syrian desire for an Iranian victory in the war with
Iraq, however, may persuade Assad to offer chemical
weapons to Iran.
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would provide an opportunity to test the weapons in
combat.
Syria probably will apply its chemical weapons re-
search to conventional artillery systems within the
next five years. CERS may already have done this
with the Soviet-made BM-21 multiple rocket launcher
(MRL), which has twice the range (20.5 kilometers) of
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Syrian Regular Army Chemical Warfare Organization
1st Armored Division
3rd Armored Division
9th Armored Division
11th Armored Division
569th (Assad) Division
5th Mechanized Division
7th Mechanized Division
10th Mechanized Division
Chemical company
FlIpmlethrnive/
$co y
28th Chemical Regiment
Regin"t
headquarters
Chemical
maintenance unit
Smoke battalion
LFFI.-.thwoiver
battalion
ei
co
lion
company
Chemical
re ace
company
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