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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000100080004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Angola:
Prospects for MPLA-UNITA
Reconciliation F1
ALA 85-10017L
February 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Angola:
Prospects for MPLA-UNITA
Reconciliation F-1
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Africa Division, Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Regional Issues Branch, ALA,
Secret
ALA 85-10017L
February 1985
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Angola:
Prospects for MPLA-UNITA
Reconciliation F I
Key Judgments In the last two years, UNITA's military successes have forced the Marxist
Information available MPLA regime in Luanda to consider whether to end the fighting through
as of 28 January 1985 negotiations. Although the MPLA has maintained a rigid public stance
opposing them, considerable ferment
continues within the party supporting national reconciliation. Many in the
regime apparently view reconciliation as a device that at once would end
the civil war, lessen Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba,
and open the country to greater Western aid.
The internal pressure for negotiations has long existed, however, and does
not yet appear to have reached a critical mass sufficient to overcome
opposition. We are unsure of the magnitude of the opposition to talks, but
it appears to come from mulatto-led hardliners who persist in the belief
that UNITA can eventually be defeated in the field despite the failure of a
much ballyhooed regime offensive in 1984. Moreover, the mulattoes and a
sufficient number of their black supporters in the party, military, and
government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA, especially
one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic leader Jonas
Savimbi, could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover and their own physical
demise.)
In weighing the question of reconciliation, the regime is aware of the keen
interest in the subject among its allies and adversaries.
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the Soviets and Cubans have finally come to grips with the scale 25X1
and long-term nature of the UNITA problem, but they do not appear to
have budged from their staunch opposition to talks. On the other hand, the
MPLA has been repeatedly advised to negotiate by various African
leaders, by countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, and by South
Africa. We believe that Pretoria is an especially strong booster of
reconciliation because it assumes Savimbi would quickly dominate the
regime once he gained entry. 25X1
For its part, UNITA claims that it remains willing to negotiate with the
MPLA, but just what Savimbi would accept in a compromise is unclear.
His demands probably have grown following his rapid expansion into
northern and eastern Angola over the last two years.
Secret
ALA 85-10017L
February 1985
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The prospects that the MPLA leadership would initiate reconciliation talks
any time soon with UNITA are, we believe, slim. The overwhelming
problem for the MPLA of Savimbi's popularity, which stands in sharp
contrast to its own popular disfavor, appears insurmountable. Were he
removed from office, however, the prospects that Luanda would consent to
talks would increase. If talks do occur, we believe they might come under
several circumstances:
? The regime may see negotiations-aimed primarily at a cease-fire-as a
needed tactical pause that would allow Luanda to regroup its forces and,
perhaps, assassinate Savimbi.
? President dos Santos, who has occasionally been
said to favor talks, may become convincing enough to sell the MPLA
leadership on negotiations as a tactical maneuver or as a way to reduce
Angolan dependence on the USSR and Cuba.
? There is the outside chance that a coup of disgruntled officers, perhaps
acting in the wake of embarrassing military setbacks, might overcome
the almost inevitable opposition of the Soviets and Cubans to a coup and
replace the current leadership and then sue for peace.
Even if talks should occur, the prospects that they will lead to peace are
poor. Savimbi's demands in any power-sharing scheme-say, for example,
the interior portfolio- are likely to be more than the MPLA will be able to
stomach. A somewhat more likely form of settlement would be a federation
that granted UNITA control of much of the southern half of the country; 25X1
Yet, even if a federation were put in place, we
believe it would only be a short time before the civil war resumed, with
both parties seeking total power.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Military Setting
MPLA's Stance on Negotiations
2
Those Favoring Talks
3
Opposition to Negotiations
5
Other Negotiation Boosters
7
Soviet and Cuban Opposition
8
Prospects
8
How Talks Might Occur
9
A Move by dos Santos
9
Coup d'etat
9
Implications for the United States.
10
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Figure 1
Angola
Cabir#da
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Kinshasa
Zaire
Congo
Brazzaville
-.a _o;
Mbundu i$
tribes
Catete
Ovimbundu
tribe
Selected Economic Activity
Coffee Petroleum
D Diamonds Petroleum refinery
UNITA Headquarters
ambia
Okavango
-z- Swamps
Boundary rapresentatlon Is
not necessarily authoritative,
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Angola:
Prospects for MPLA-UNITA
Reconciliation F I
The question of reconciliation with the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) has long been a contentious issue in Ango-
la's ruling Marxist party, the Popular Movement for
the National Liberation of Angola (MPLA). To some
in the regime, negotiations with the insurgents hold
the potential for an end to a civil war that has plagued
the country since independence in 1975,
With peace, they hope, Luanda could
reduce its dependence on the Soviet Bloc and Cuba
and obtain greater aid from the West. To hardliners
in the party, talks with UNITA would at a minimum
only enhance the insurgents' status and possibly lead
to the party's rapid loss of power and the personal
demise of its leaders.
The reconciliation issue, although not yet placed on
the bargaining table, also appears to be emerging as
critical to the prospects for ongoing regional negotia-
tions. Some Western observers argue, for example,
that, without a reconciliation agreement, the MPLA
could not agree to a substantial Cuban troop with-
drawal. Others believe that South Africa will not
agree to withdraw from Namibia until UNITA's
equities have been protected in a reconciliation agree-
ment.
This paper reviews briefly the military setting that
would condition any talks between the MPLA and
UNITA, the ambiguities in their respective stances
toward negotiations-emphasizing the evidence for
division on the issue in the MPLA-and the external
pressure on both sides to talk. It assesses the chances
that negotiations will occur and, if they do, the
possibility for their success, the two most likely
settlement scenarios, and the implications for the
United States.
southeastern corner of Angola, which it used as a base
to stage a low-level insurgency in the central high-
lands, the home of Savimbi's Ovimbundu tribal group.
In late 1982, however, Savimbi, most likely with
heavy logistic support from South Africa, began
expanding his area of control and now dominates
almost the entire southeastern quadrant of Angola,
His area of m uence-territory
where insurgents have self-sustaining underground
organizations-now extends northward to another
third of the country. UNITA guerrillas have also
demonstrated an ability to stage hit-and-run opera-
tions in much of the rest of Angola.
Savimbi's guerrillas also have increased the number
of raids on economic targets and acts of sabotage in
large population centers. In August 1983, for exam-
ple, UNITA captured Cangamba, the first Angolan-
and Cuban-manned fortified garrison to fall to the
insurgents. UNITA subsequently has laid siege to an
increasing number of well-defended outposts, con-
ducted sabotage operations in or near Angola's largest
cities, ended any hope of resuming large-scale coffee
production, shut down most diamond production, and
now for some time has threatened publicly to disrupt
the country's vital oil industry in Cabinda.
The MPLA and its Cuban and Soviet backers re-
sponded to UNITA's expansion-which, until 1984,
had been accompanied by repeated South African
incursions into southern Angola-with a significant
military buildup. Luanda has acquired advanced early
warning radar systems, sophisticated antiaircraft mis-
siles and artillery, 18 MIG-23s, about 60 more MIG-
21s, at least 24 MI-25 attack helicopters, at least
eight SU-22 ground attack aircraft, and a wide
variety of support equipment
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The number of Cuban military personnel in
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Angola has increased to a total of approximately
35,000. MI-
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For about six years after the end of the Angolan civil
war in 1976, UNITA was confined largely to the
25s are flown by Cuban pilots and Angolan copilots.
Cubans also fly MIG-23s and some of the MIG-21s.
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The Soviets maintain Angolan aircraft and naval
vessels and also fly a fleet of AN-12 transport aircraft
that provides logistic support to Cuban and Angolan
forces.
From August through October 1984, the Popular
Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA)
conducted an ambitious offensive against Savimbi,
designed, we believe, to cut off his supply line to the
north and deal a punishing blow to his home base in
the southeast. One major thrust,
was a sweep from the
Angolan concentration near Munhango on the Ben-
guela railway toward the southeast; if successful, the
move would have cut UNITA's area of control in half.
A second push, from the embattled town of Cuito
Cuanavale, was supposed to recapture Mavinga and
then move on UNITA headquarters in Jamba.F_
The combat phase of the offensive apparently began
in mid-September. We believe Angolan forces were
able to make brief penetrations into UNITA-con-
trolled territory but found further progress blocked.
Government forces abandoned the overall offensive in
mid-October, and pulled
back to their garrisons. Government sweeps through
other parts of the country also wound down in Octo-
ber.
During and after the regime's offensive, the insur-
gents conducted several offensives of their own.=
they have staged further
dramatic sabotage operations, including twice cutting
off power and water to Luanda. By the end of the
year, both sides appeared to be preparing for still
more intensified conflict in 1985.
UNITA has long maintained publicly that it is willing
to negotiate with the MPLA, but only on equal terms.
Since breaking out of its base in the southeast, its
demands appear to have increased, although precisely
what they are is not clear.
in mid-November, an UNITA offi-
with the MPLA, as did Savimbi in a speech later in
the month. Savimbi, however, added that, following
"such a significant evolution on the battlefield,"
UNITA now preferred the Angola problem to be
solved "in the context of peace for the whole of
We doubt that Savimbi and his senior advisers have
fully sorted out the position they might take in
negotiations, but we suspect they will no longer be
satisfied to settle for the role of simply a regionally
and ethnically based.political force. Savimbi appears
to take seriously his claim to represent a broad-based
opposition movement to the MPLA and, in our view,
will insist on being a key actor in any regional
settlement.
The MPLA has opposed negotiations with UNITA
unambiguously in almost all of its public statements.
When the Angolan Ambassador to Portugal, a mem-
ber of a moderate faction in the MPLA, publicly
suggested in 1982 that talks might be desirable, he
was soon recalled and the government repudiated his
statement. Before and since then, President dos San-
tos and others have stated adamantly and often that
they would not negotiate with the "South African
puppets."
The regime's public front, however, masks an ongoing
insurgents.
muted debate over the wisdom of talking to the
Although the negotiations
proved brief and fruitless, competing factions in the
MPLA have since continued to argue the wisdom of
talking to UNITA,
cial abroad reiterated UNITA's willingness to talk
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of the faction's attitude was the view expressed by
some of its members that the 25X1
"Europeans"-a derisive reference to both whites and
mulattoes in the regime-should go "home" (meaning
Portugal) and let the Africans settle their problems.2
The Catete faction's influence declined precipitously
in the early 1980s-we are unsure it continues to
exist-but many of its ideas still appear to have
appeal at senior levels of the MPLA. According to
press accounts President dos 25X1
Santos has deprived some, although by no means all,
of the faction's key leaders of their party and govern-
ment posts and, in some cases, sent them into internal
exile or diplomatic posts abroad. Dos Santos, however, 25X1
has also diminished the powers of the hardline mulat-
to faction on the left, according to press sources=
and has subsequently 25X1
built up his own core of followers, including former
members of the Catete faction. Some of the members
of his grou suggests dos Santos
himself-continue to be interested in a rapproche- 25X1
Those Favoring Talks
25X1 the group within the
party that has most ardently championed negotiations
has been the "Catete faction"-a loose collection of
black nationalist "moderates," most of whom were
born in the town of Catete near Luanda. In the early
25X1 1980s, the fac-
tion was openly hostile to Moscow, Havana, and the
hardline mulattoes who held key party, government,
and military positions. A major element in the infor-
mal Catete platform was a negotiated settlement with
25X1 UNITA, the
group also favored strong ties with the West. Typical
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MPLA-UNITA relations are largely a saga of bitter-
ness, mutual recrimination, and struggle. Each side
has accused the other of selling out its rival to the
Portuguese during the anticolonial struggle (we sus-
pect both charges may be accurate), and there are
rumors that the MPLA executed UNITA's negotia-
25X1 tors in 1975 when the struggle escalated into civil
war.
After the MPLA's victory, the new regime found that,
while one of its rivals-the Front for the National
25X1 Liberation of Angola-began to fade into oblivion in
the north, UNITA would not go away.
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attempted as early as April 1976 to
negotiate with the insurgents and offered to incorpo-
rate UNITA officials into the government-with the
exception of Savimbi and two other top leaders. By
early 1978, Neto was said to be interested in reconcil-
iation even with Savimbi,
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been growing sentiment for talks with UNITA, but
backers of negotiations cannot decide how to deal
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with the charismatic insurgent leader. Moreover,
consensus within the party that his potential populari-
ty, even among the Mbundu who dominate the Luan-
da area, frightens the leadership, which is aware of its
own unpopularity. In our view, many in the party who
might otherwise be willing to negotiate with UNITA
balk at the prospect of dealing with its leader.
there is a broad
Opposition to Negotiations
Despite some sentiment within the MPLA for recon-
ciliation efforts, those in the party who oppose talks
under any condition short of total surrender by
UNITA still appear to have the upper hand.
least three important mulattoes:
the opposition is led by at
? Lucio Lara, a Politburo member and the party's
chief ideologue, has long been identified as a leader
of a faction determined to fight on against UNITA
and to continue full support for the insurgent activi-
ties of the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO).
victory over UNITA in late 1982, and
e still strongly
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? Henrique Carvalho "Onambwe" Santos, alternate
Politburo member and Minister of Industry, also is
staunchly opposed to negotiations,
Former de facto boss of the secret
police, he is, hated
and feared by many in the regime. Given his
extensive association with Soviet Bloc security ser-
vices in the past, we suspect-although there is no
evidence to confirm it-that he does their bidding,
either for pay, or by inclination, or both.
? Paulo Jorge, who lost his job as Foreign Minister in
late 1984 but still retains his seat on the Central
Committee, also has strongly onnosed talking with
UNITA,I I In
May 1984 he said that UNITA was a military
problem, not a political issue. Although the MPLA
Central Committee occasionally discussed the possi-
bility of reconciliation, he dogmatically asserted
that the leadership was largely united on its decision
not to talk with UNITA and the outcome was
25X1 always the same.
Figure 3. Lucio Lara, key
MPLA hardliner, opposes rec-
onciliation.n
Reporting on the views of other important figures in
the regime toward reconciliation has been mixed.
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ever, we believe he is likely to resist negotiations until
he is convinced that Angola's continuing military
buildup will not lead to a decisive victory against the
insurgency.
the party leadership may have reached a
temporary compromise on the issue of negotiations in
mid-1984. Several key party leadership figures, in-
cluding "Kito" Rodrigues, argued for opening of
negotiations with UNITA at a Central Committee
meeting in June, while others, including Lara, Jorge,
and "Onambwe" Santos, balked,
Minister of State Security and Politburo
member "Dino Matross" Paulo reportedly broke the
deadlock by proposing that talks take place only if
UNITA agreed to cease all hostilities and to integrate
with the MPLA. The Central Committee then accept-
ed the "compromise"-in effect a call for UNITA's
surrender-but postponed action until after the then-
25X1 forthcoming military offensive to determine if there
was an UNITA left with which to deal.
Intraregime agitation for talks with UNITA contin-
ued during and after the offensive of August-October
1984. An amorphous group of officers in FAPLA
known as the Young Captains personally lobbied dos
Santos to open talks with UNITA,
Although there are occasional rumors of talks occur-
ing in Lisbon or in other European capitals, there is no
credible evidence available to us that indicates talks
are under way or that the MPLA has decided to begin
we believe, in fact, that the
regime may be planning another major military push
against the insurgents. The government may try to cut
the insurgents' supply line to the north through
increased ground operations along the central portion
of the Benguela railway. Similarly, according to
public statements by UNITA officials, the insurgents
plan to increase pressure on Luanda and other major
cities and to expand operations in the northern part of
the country. We doubt, however, that either side will
strike a decisive blow against the other in 1985. F_
over the past year indicates that the
MPLA has considered the reconciliation issue with
the benefit of considerable foreign advice-much of it
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unsolicited. In our view, most foreign observers recog-
nize, however, that the subject is sensitive in Luanda
and that, if it is broached, it must be discussed with
25X1 considerable discretion. The advice, in addition to
pressure, has come from various quarters.
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South Africa
Pretoria has been the most forceful advocate of
reconciliation. Of all outside powers, it has been
Savimbi's chief backer since the late 1970s.
we believe most key officials
in the South African Government are determined that
Savimbi eventually will take power in Luanda. Savim-
bi's triumph would at the same time eliminate one of
the regimes most hostile to Pretoria in the region and
serve as part of a ring of "moderate" buffer states
surrounding Namibia. To the South Africans, Ango-
lan national reconciliation offers a possible shortcut
for Savimbi's taking power, a goal they believe he
would eventually gain in any event by fighting to the
bitter end.
South
Africa considers at least two reconciliation scenarios
acceptable for achieving its objectives. One option
would be for Savimbi to join a coalition government.
such a position would allow him
eventually to outmaneuver his MPLA adversaries
either through a coup or peaceful competition. The
chief risk in this course of action would be that
Savimbi might be assassinated in a hostile, Mbundu-
dominated Luanda. We doubt, however, that many in
25X1 Pretoria believe that this is a realistic option. F
A second alternative possibly acceptable to Pretoria
would be a de facto partition of Angola-something
UNITA still publicly rules out-in which UNITA
would dominate the lower half of the country and
serve as a buffer between a Marxist northern Angola
and an independent Namibia. In such a scenario,
Pretoria might calculate that Savimbi would be in a
good position to press for total victory over the north
25X1 once he established a secure base in the southern half
of the country.
ciliation in a variety of forums.
we believe it has attempt- 25X1
ed to enlist other African states as mediators, urged
the United States to press for reconciliation, and, we
believe, has recommended negotiations directly to the
Angolans. The importance South Africa attaches to
reconciliation suggests, at a minimum, that many in
Pretoria, in order to protect Savimbi's interests, be-
lieve that a regional settlement should not occur
without reconciliation.
Other Negotiation Boosters
Frontline colleagues and other African leaders to
negotiate his party's differences with UNITA. The
most ardent promoters of reconciliation appear to be 25X1
the Zambians, who had ties with UNITA before
Angolan independence and whose border with Angola 25X1
is controlled by the insurgents. Since the abortive
MPLA-UNITA talks in 1981-82
Countries in both Eastern and Western Europe ap-
pear to support reconciliation as well. F
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Soviet and Cuban Opposition
Moscow is still apparently adamant that there be no
compromise with Savimbi. In early 1984 a Soviet
foreign affairs official told a US diplomat that
UNITA's strength was illusory and would vanish if
South African aid were cut off. He asserted that a
coalition government with the insurgents would be out
of the question so long as Savimbi controlled UNITA;
were someone else in control, there was a possibility
for some power sharing. In June, another Soviet
official expressed Mos-
cow's determination to see the struggle through with-
out compromise with UNITA; this is the line custom-
arily taken by Soviet propaganda.
The Soviet position softened somewhat-at least
briefly-in the wake of Luanda's failed offensive in
late 1984. A Soviet ambassador in southern Africa,
after returning from a trip to Moscow and Luanda in
October, told that his
superiors might have begun to credit UNITA with
greater staying power and popularity. He said that the
MPLA would be unable to defeat the insurgents
militarily, and that Moscow believed there was no
alternative to a negotiated settlement.
More recently, however, Moscow has reverted to its
familiar hard line of opposing reconciliation under
any circumstances other than UNITA's surrender. A
Soviet diplomat made this point forcefully to a US
official in late December, and we have no reason to
doubt his sincerity or that it reflects his government's
policy
There have also been signs that Cuba mi ht be
looking on negotiations more favorably.
The prospects for the MPLA leadership initiating
reconciliation talks with UNITA are, we believe, slim.
The overwhelming problem for the MPLA of Savim-
bi's potential popularity with the masses appears
insurmountable so long as he heads UNITA. The
basic assumption of many of the MPLA's top leaders
appears to remain that, if Savimbi comes to Luanda
alive and not as a prisoner, he will succeed in taking
over the government. Consequently reconciliation is
tantamount to suicide.
In our view, most MPLA hardline leaders also believe
they can avoid talks through a military victory.
Hawks such as "Iko" Carreira are still seemingly
enthralled by the military hardware FAPLA contin-
ues to acquire and, we believe, assume that it will
eventually prove decisive against UNITA. Because
their confidence evidently has not been shaken by the
failure of FAPLA's offensive in 1984, it is difficult to
determine when they will come to grips with what, in
our view, is the reality of UNITA's slow but unrelent-
ing expansion.
to allow Luanda to continue the fight.
The hardliners, moreover, appear to have solid exter-
nal backing. There is no convincing evidence that
either Moscow or Havana is willing to endorse talks
with UNITA at this time. Like the regime's top
leadership, the Soviets and Cubans seem to believe
that the MPLA could not compete with Savimbi in a
nonviolent political contest. They also appear willing
Finally, I the regime's
actions so far convince us that those within the
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MPLA who are said to be willing to deal with
25X1 UNITA-even under Savimbi-lack sufficient clout
to force the government into talks.
How Talks Might Occur
Although the prospects for negotiations in the next
year or so do not appear bright, they cannot be ruled
out. If they were to occur, we believe they might be
conducted under several possible scenarios.
regroup as well.
Tactical Reasons. If the MPLA feels more hard
pressed militarily-for example, large units begin to
defect in the field or major towns fall and remain in
UNITA's hands-Luanda might stall for time by
seeking talks leading to a cease-fire. This option
might be especially attractive if it seemed likely to
expose Savimbi to an assassination attempt. It would
offer, however, the disadvantage of giving tacit recog-
nition to Pretoria's "puppets" and allow them to
A Move by dos Santos. Over the past few years dos
Santos has indicated his intense desire to
lessen An olan dependence on the Soviets and Cu-
bans, and a deal
with Savimbi would be a giant step in this direction.
Although he has, in our judgment, gradually en-
hanced his influence within the party-and thus
increased his ability to make important decisions-we
doubt he has the power alone to force through a
controversial decision to seek reconciliation. Even so,
one tactic he might try would be to sell the idea of
negotiations to the Central Committee as an ostensi-
bly tactical maneuver-and then proceed to negotiate
seriously. Alternatively, he might eventually amass
enough support in the party to force approval for talks
on their own merits.
Coup d'etat. This is perhaps the most unlikely scenar-
io, but it cannot be ruled out. Discontent among the
Young Captains and other groups within FAPLA
might lead to a forceful move against the widely
unpopular ruling clique, particularly in the wake of a
series of setbacks in the field or intensified terrorist
activities affecting the major cities. Cuban troops
already have saved the regime from a coup attempt in
1977, however, and they might do so again if the coup
were led by moderates.
Settlement Scenarios
Were serious talks to occur, we doubt they would
prove fruitful. UNITA probably would be willing to
make concessions if it were granted a recognized role
in the government, but it is likely to insist on a major
role unpalatable to the MPLA. The MPLA, which
has seen its dream of running a one-party state
emerge in the mid-1970s and then recede in the 1980s
in the face of UNITA's expansion, still finds the
prospect of power sharing repugnant. Moreover, the
historical enmity between the leaders of the two
parties, which dates from preindependence rivalries,
suggests that even discourse through well-intentioned
intermediaries would be rancorous and probably un-
productive. The chances of a coalition government
being created or-if it were-lasting more than a few
months or involving real power sharing thus appear to
be remote.
A more likely outcome to negotiations is partition or
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Implications for the United States
bors.
In our view, reconciliation between UNITA and the
MPLA could potentially unlock doors that so far bar
the regional settlement Washington seeks in southern
Africa. Without the UNITA insurgency and the
threat of further South African incursions, Angola's
need for Cuban troops recedes. Moreover, a govern-
ment of national unity would undoubtedly attempt to
reduce its political and economic dependence on the
Soviet Bloc and Cuba and turn more to the West for
technical assistance and aid. In addition, were the
MPLA regime leavened by an UNITA presence or
were UNITA to have uncontested control of southern
Angola, South Africa most likely would feel more
secure about turning Namibia over to a SWAPO
regime, which Pretoria probably would view as poten-
tially less radical if surrounded by non-Marxist neigh-
under seige from UNITA.
In the absence of an MPLA-UNITA rapprochement,
the prospects for a regional settlement diminish.
Although South Africa has not made reconciliation in
Angola an explicit condition in negotiations for Na-
mibian independence, most senior South African offi-
cials, in our view, believe that Luanda will not agree
to an acceptable formula for Cuban troop withdrawal.
Moreover, we believe that some of these officials will
not support a regional settlement that does not fully
protect UNITA's equities-a position that may rule
out any proposal acceptable to an MPLA regime
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Secret
Secret
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