COLOMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000200220004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of See.
Intelligence 25X1
Colombia:
Prospects for Peace
-sftTee-
ALA 85-10054
May 1985
copy 3 7 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Colombia:
O Prospects for Peace
This paper was prepared byl (Office 25X1
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and questions are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division,
ALA, on 25X1
Secret
ALA 85-10054
May 1985
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Colombia:
Prospects for Peaces 25X1
Key Judgments President Betancur, in a departure from the heavy reliance that most of his
Information available predecessors put on military force, is struggling to negotiate an end to the
as of 26 April 1985 political violence that has plagued Colombia for nearly four decades. Over
was used in this report.
the past year this effort has produced cease-fire agreements with three of the
four major guerrilla organizations and led to formal discussions on a number
of possible political and socioeconomic reform measures such as extensive
land redistribution. In essence, the guerrillas and the government are in a
holding pattern in which the idea of cease-fire simply means trying to avoid
sparking major armed clashes. More low-key guerrilla-sponsored violence-
especially kidnaping and extortion-has not abated significantly, and we
believe this type of activity has eroded popular enthusiasm for the Betancur
approach
In our judgment, the cease-fires have served the insurgents' short-term
interests by affording them an opportunity to rest, regroup, and recruit new
members relatively free from harassment by government security forces.
Indeed, over the longer term the insurgents' strong ideological conviction
and an apparent preference for a life of combat probably will, in our view,
limit the number of guerrillas willing to abandon the revolutionary struggle.
Although Betancur seems determined to prevent the truce accords from
unraveling before his term expires next year, we believe he will be increas-
ingly constrained in his ability to make concessions to the insurgents. There
is growing congressional and popular opposition to many guerrilla demands,
including such basic changes in the structure of the current political system
as direct election of mayors. Moreover, we expect the worsening economy to
compel the President to backtrack on promises of far-reaching economic and
social reforms that would have appeased the insurgents.
In our view, there is a slightly better-than-even chance that the cease-fire
accords will hold at least for the next several months, but that they almost
certainly will collapse by the time Betancur leaves office in August 1986.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the accords will come from attempts by one
party to force the other to negotiate more seriously.
Secret
ALA 85-10054
May 1985
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We believe the military would be able to contain a renewed outbreak of in-
surgency if the pre-cease-fire situation were reestablished, with insurgent
groups operating independently. However, there is an outside chance-
perhaps 1 in 10-that the guerrilla groups would unite in a centrally
coordinated organization. If this occurred, we judge the armed forces
would be hard pressed to maintain government authority in rural areas and
simultaneously counter the terrorist challenge in major cities.
over the last several years
Cuba has provided significant arms, training, and funds to one Colombian
insurgent organization (the M-19), while urging all groups to unify. The
formation of a new, amalgamated rebel organization, therefore, would
fulfill a longstanding Cuban policy objective and, in our view, probably
would prompt a significant increase in Havana's support. We believe that
Havana would take such action even at the risk of dashing the rapidly
improving prospects for normalizing diplomatic relations with Bogota.F-
We expect that any return to full-scale guerrilla warfare would result in in-
tensified targeting of US businessmen and US diplomatic personnel.
Failure of Betancur's peace program almost certainly will prompt Bogota
to look to Washington for increased security assistance, and we believe that
any perceived reticence by the United States to respond favorably and
swiftly would adversely affect the morale of the Colombian military. It also
might embolden the rebels to expand their operations in the belief that
logistic shortfalls would seriously constrain government troops.
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Key Judgments
Motives of the Major Insurgent Groups
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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
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The 19th of April Movement (M-19)
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The People's Liberation Army (EPL)
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The Army of National Liberation (ELN)
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Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
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and Nev s d; Dominica
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Ncagua Grenada
Boundary representation is
not necessadty authoritative.
Brazil
North
Atlantic
Ocean
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Colombia:
Prospects for Peace
Since assuming office in August 1982, President
Belisario Betancur's actions have underscored his
commitment to making peace between the govern-
ment and Colombia's four principal insurgent groups
a major domestic policy objective. In our judgment,
the uniqueness of Betancur's approach lies in his
emphasis on dialogue, rather than force, as the princi-
pal vehicle for ending nearly 40 years of intermittent
rural violence. This paper reviews the peace process
under Betancur and analyzes his strategy toward the
insurgents. It also examines the responses and objec-
tives of the major guerrilla organizations and high-
lights the key role of the armed forces. Finally, the
paper presents likely future scenarios, assesses the
prospects for peace, and discusses the implications of
future guerrilla actions for the United States' rela-
tions with Colombia.)
Colombia's current insurgent groups perpetuate a
history and tradition of political violence and common
banditry that have plagued the country throughout
most of its modern era. Rural bands identified with
the two dominant political parties-the Liberals and
the Conservatives-have warred with each other for
regional control since the 19th century. At its height,
partisan violence, commonly referred to as la violen-
cia, resulted in a civil war (1948-53) that claimed
some 200,000 lives. The strife only ceased when the
two sides agreed to share power in a National Front,
dividing pattronage evenly and alternating the presi-
dency every four years. Although this formal political
pact expired in 1974, its most important features have
been preserved in constitutional amendments.F___1
This solution ended the worst excesses of la violencia,
but longstanding political resentments persisted and
in some cases were heightened by growing economic
disparities between lower and upper classes. Since the
early 1960s, according to academic and press sources,
the growth of large, poorly managed cities has provid-
ed a fertile breeding ground for urban revolutionaries,
while conditions in isolated and neglected rural areas
generated similar recruitment opportunities for guer-
rilla bands. Radicalized young people proved especial-
ly susceptible to leftist charges that the National
Front arrangement, by relegating power to the two
established parties, perpetuated an elitist system that
condemned the majority of Colombians to a life of
poverty and denied legitimate dissenters a role in the
political process.
Betancur's New Approach
Before 1982, the public record shows that most
administrations adopted variations of one basic coun-
terinsurgency strategy-ignore guerrilla activities
during periods of relative calm and vigorously pursue
the insurgents following any marked, but usually
temporary, increase in violence. In contrast to most
earlier presidents, who did not assign the problem the
highest priority, Betancur publicly announced at the
outset of his term that achieving a lasting peace with
the guerrillas was of paramount importance. More-
over, he dramatically broke with his predecessors by
playing down the use of force in favor of a negotiated
peace.
In our view, Betancur's motives reflect a mixture of
genuine commitment to peace and politically motivat-
ed image building. As a former labor lawyer, Betan-
cur believes in conciliation and consensus, according
to the US Embassy, and sees this approach as the
most promising avenue for ending the country's pro-
tracted civil strife.
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Principal Insurgent Organizations
25X1 FARC
With between 2,500 and 4,000 armed members,
25X1 the FARC is the
largest and most powerful insurgent group. It was
organized in 1966 as the paramilitary arm of the pro-
Soviet Communist Party of Colombia (PCCJ, but this
link, according to the US Embassy, became clandes-
tine in order to protect the party's legal status. Its
senior leaders-including the notorious "Tirofijo "-
have spent two decades in the hills, and, based on
their actions, are as much attracted to rural banditry
25X1 as to ideologically inspired causes. Nonetheless, in-
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uggests the FARC is a well-disciplined orga
nization whose members are committed to a long-
term revolutionary struggle.
M-19
The M-19, which is Colombia's second-largest guer-
rilla group with approximately 850 to 1,000 armed
supporters,
government regarding the peace process.
rose to prominence as an urban-based group
appealing to disaffected members of the middle class.
Under the leadership of Jaime Bateman, its charis-
matic founder who was killed in an airplane crash in
April 1983, the M-19 portrayed itself as a nationalis-
tic, non-Communist organization. It sought to gain
public support through such activities as redistribut-
ing stolen food among the poor and by linking
kidnapings to demands for improved working condi-
tions for the oppressed, according to the US Embas-
sy. The death of Bateman, however, prompted a
protracted leadership struggle that we believe contin-
ues to complicate the group's dealings with the
EPL
With an estimated 300 to 600 armed members, the
EPL is the smallest of the four major Colombian
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armed wing of the pro-Beijing Communist Party of
Colombia/Marxist-Leninist (CCP/ML) and retains
that afiliation. About half of the EPL's members
belong to its urban branch, while the remainder
operate largely in the cattle and farming regions of
Antioquia and Cordoba departments. In addition to
raising operating funds through kidnapings, bank
robberies, and extortion rackets against both promi-
nent local individuals and narcotics tro ickers, the
group has begun demanding payments from customs
officials involved in lucrative contraband smuggling
operations,
ELN
The ELN-the group currently most active in target-
ing US interests in Colombia and that has not agreed
to the truce-has only about 300 to 800 armed
members, but it has won the grudging respect of the 25X1
Army, which regards it as one of the country's best
trained and motivated insurgent movements,
Founded in 1963 as a pro- 25X1
Cuban Marxist-Leninist movement espousing anti-
US and anticapitalist rhetoric, the group suffered a
series of reversals at the hands of the military in the
1970s that forced it to retreat and rebuild. What
emerged, is 25X1
a more tightly compartmented organization led by a
cadre of former student radicals and peasants with
extensive combat experience. The ELN has been
particularly active on both sides of the border in the
region abutting
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Figure 2. President Belisario
Betancur-7
that Betancur probably calculates that bringing an
end to the violence in Colombia would give a powerful
boost to a reelection bid in 1990, when he is again
eligible to seek the presidency.
Problems With the Guerrillas
Notwithstanding his motives, Betancur has been
handicapped in his pursuit of domestic peace by
guerrilla intransigence. After less than three months
in office, the President persuaded the Congress to
approve a generous amnesty law that included a full
pardon for all politically motivated crimes except for
non-combat-related murder. According to US Embas-
sy reporting, he also promised economic aid both to
facilitate the reentry of guerrillas into society and to
address their concerns about promoting rural develop-
ment. Nevertheless, the four principal insurgent
groups openly rejected the entire package.F__~
Undaunted, Betancur created a highly publicized
presidential Peace Commission, which began meeting
regularly with guerrilla representatives in late 1982.
Managing the Truce
Betancur's efforts finally yielded tangible results last
year with the well-publicized signing of a cease-fire
accord with three of the four principal insurgent
groups. Agreement was reached with the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in May, and
similar accords were concluded in August with the
19th of April Movement (M-19) and the People's
Liberation Army (EPL).' The Army of National
Liberation (ELN) is the only major guerrilla move-
ment that has refused to sign a peace accord. The
agreements, as reported in the press, call for each
insurgent group to renounce terrorist activities, but no
specific provisions were made for the guerrillas to
surrender their arms. In return, the government
promised to enact legislation pardoning the insurgents
and to seek congressional approval for extensive re-
form measures.
Last December, the President ordered government
spokesmen to begin a "national dialogue" with the
various insurgent leaders. The ongoing discussions
since then, according to the US Embassy, are focusing
on proposals for direct election of municipal officials,
agrarian reform, and increased government attention
to improving education, labor conditions, public
health, and public services in rural areas.
In managing the peace process, the US Embassy
reports that Betancur has had to balance criticism
from important interest groups that are distressed by
continuing insurgent-inspired violence against his con-
cern that heightened military pressure would cause
the guerrillas to renounce the truce. To try to avoid
antagonizing the guerrillas, Betancur generally has
played down the festering security situation and has
avoided blaming specific guerrilla groups for continu-
ing acts of violence, according to the US Embassy.
Nonetheless, when the President has judged his credi-
bility threatened, he has not hesitated to react to
guerrilla-instigated provocations. He has emphasized
publicly the need for law and order and,
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saries to warn the insurgents to curtail their activities.
has used personal emis-
principal guerrilla holdout from the cease-fire-has
accelerated its activities, possibly in hopes of laying
claim to vanguard status if the peace process collapses
completely
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political aspirations.
Continuing violence has eroded public support for the
President's approach, -however, and raised larger ques-
tions about his ability to maintain order, according to
the US Embassy. A growing public perception that
the cease-fire accords have not appreciably curtailed
guerrilla-sponsored terrorism-especially acts of kid-
naping and extortion-probably will result in a con-
tinuing loss of popularity for Betancur. Consequently,
we believe the President probably will be forced
increasingly to weigh his desire for recognition as a
man of peace against the likelihood that a reputation
for coddling the guerrillas will tarnish his future
Motives of the Major Insurgent Groups
For their part, the insurgents have motives that mesh
well with Betancur's conciliatory approach.
the three guerrilla organizations that signed
cease-fire agreements with the government are inde-
pendently pursuing a two-pronged strategy. On the
one hand, they are holding peaceful rallies throughout
the country and are otherwise seeking peacefully to
disseminate their message of protest in an effort to
enhance their appeal to those Colombians who are
dissatisfied with the established political system and
the country's dimming economic prospects. At the
same time, all three groups are using their rural
strongholds to provide training to new recruits and are
engaging in kidnapings and other revenue-generating
purchases-funded mainly by terrorist acts-continue
suggests that all of the key groups anticipate an
eventual return to armed struggle. The ELN-the
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
The leaders of the FARC-the largest guerrilla
group-apparently view the cease-fire as part of their
long-term revolutionary strategy. Last December, the
FARC and the government publicly agreed to convert
the cease-fire accord signed in May into a one-year
truce. FARC leaders promised to use the year to
transform their organization into a viable political
party, and indicated that if the truce held they would
sign a formal peace agreement with Betancur on
1 December 1985. F____1
The US Embassy reports that the FARC hopes to
spearhead the Communist Party's plans to unite the
country's leftist forces into a strong political front for
the elections in 1986 and to woo away disgruntled
voters from the two traditional parties. In return,
the Communists
apparently plan to reward several FARC leaders by
listing them as congressional candidates. On 30
March, the FARC formally launched its overt politi-
cal movement, the Patriotic Union (FARC-UP), and
the Communist Party publicly announced it would
coordinate with this group to sponsor a national
convention this summer at which a leftist presidential
candidate would be nominated.
Despite these attempts to achieve legitimacy within
the political system,
FARC leaders have no intention of
abandoning the armed struggle. The US Embassy
reported last October that
25X1
2 A11
FARC plans to expand dramatically the number of its
fronts and convert the eastern mountain range of 25X1
Colombia into a guerrilla bastion. Moreover, flareups
between FARC troops and government forces occur
on a fairly regular basis. In January, for example,)
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is using at least some
of the funds derived from its kidnaping, robbery, and
extortion schemes to finance its new political activi-
25X1 ties.
Nor have the peace accords altered the group's in-
volvement with Colombia's illegal narcotics industry.
According to the US Embassy, the FARC for some
years has cultivated its own illicit crops. It also
receives "protection" payments-in money and
arms-from drug traffickers within its operational
boundaries.
Army
57,000
Navy
6,200
Marines
2,800
Air Force
4,200
FARC
2,500 to 4,000
M-19
ELN
EPL
850 to 1,000
300 to 800
300 to 600
of a Navy base on the Magadalena River in north-
eastern Colombia. In our view, the attack underscored
the aggressive tactics the group is prepared to use to
maintain continuing dominance in its stronghold
areas. F__~
Moreover, in addition to antigovernment attacks, the
FARC continues to mount terrorist operations de-
signed simply to generate revenue. The organization,
Based on the FARC's stated goals and the group's
actions since the cease-fire, we judge that, even if
aging senior FARC leaders-all whom are in their
fifties and sixties-renounced armed struggle in favor
of a more comfortable life in the political arena, the
younger, more militant hardliners almost certainly
would push to carry on the fight. One FARC splinter
group, the Ricardo Franco Front, appeared in public
just days after the parent organization signed the
cease-fire agreement.
(Other more militant
splinter groups may emerge in coming months if
FARC leaders continue formally to honor the truce,
and we believe this will strengthen pressure from
rank-and-file members to resume full-scale guerrilla
war.
The 19th of April Movement (M-19)
As far as the second-largest insurgent group is con-
cerned, the M-
19 hierarchy is divided over whether to continue the
armed struggle. Hardliners within the M-19's top
leadership have been using their strongholds in Cauca
department and elsewhere to train new members,
In addition,0
successful in recruiting former Army officers and
enlisted men to serve as paramilitary instructors.
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By contrast, moder-
ates within the group favor gradually turning the
organization into a legitimate political organization.
Toward this end, the moderates have successfully
directed the M-19 to participate in the "national
dialogue," trying to strengthen the movement's in-
roads in the Confederation of Colombian Workers
(CTC)-the country's third-largest labor movement-
and promising to convert the M-19 into a legal
political party. M-19 moderates may also be responsi-
ble for the group's promotion of rural civic action
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Figure 3
Rural Fronts of Principal Colombian Insurgent Groups
%-'La
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tioquia \
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urndr \ ~1 \~~..~.
Corinto
Hu
KDistrito
Expecial
tBonave
Caqueta
c
tumayo
FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia)
M-19 (19th of April Movement)
EPL (People's Liberation Army)
ELN (Army of National Liberation)
-?- Departamento-level boundary
Note: All principal groups also have
an urban front in Bogota as
well as other major cities.
Mitti
'` Vaupes
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25X1
M- 19 leaders apparently are also split over whether to
establish closer ties with Colombia's illegal narcotics
industry.
Marino Ospina-in February, following his public
endorsement of threats by drug traffickers to murder
US Embassy personnel, indicates that the moderates
have gained the upper hand on this issue at least
temporarily.
key insurgent groups,
The People's Liberation Army (EPL)
The EPL-the country's smallest insurgent group-
appears to have the least popular support of the four
Nonetheless, government forces have had
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little success against the EPL in recent years. Since
1983, EPL-inspired terrorist actions have increased
considerably, and the US Embassy recently stated
that the group now controls the entire southern half of
Cordoba department.
Apparently believing that the Army is limited in its
ability to move against the group because of the
cease-fire accord, the EPL has become increasingly
brazen in forcing rural landowners off their property,
openly recruiting, and exacting large sums of money
the organization's illegal
activities grossed over $1.6 million in Cordoba alone
last year.
Unlike the FARC and the M-19, the EPL barely has
maintained even the pretense of forsaking the armed
struggle. Rather, it has played an obstructionist role
in negotiations with the government by mixing threats
to return to full-scale warfare with frequent public
criticism of Betancur's peace program. Last winter
the EPL withdrew from the national dialogue "inde-
finitely," publicly citing an alleged lack of seriousness
on the government's part and military harassment of
the group's members. F___1
We agree with the US Embassy's assessment that in
coming months the group probably will remain on the
negotiating sidelines, rejoining the national dialogue
only if its leaders conclude that progress has occurred
that is particularly beneficial to the organization. We
believe that no one in the EPL's hierarchy is seriously
considering participating in the 1986 elections. In-
stead,
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25X1
the EPL is only participating in the peace process in
order to help assure that its lucrative terrorist opera-
tions are relatively free from interference by govern-
ment security forces.
dealings with Colombia's narcotics traflickers.l
reported last summer, for exam-
ple, that Army troops captured 24 ELN guerrillas
guarding a cache of marijuana with a street value in
excess of $200,000.
The Army of National Liberation (ELN) More than just finances are behind the group's refus-
Among the four insurgent groups, only the ELN has ing to agree to any cease-fire. Over the last two years
not entered into a cease-fire accord with the Betancur the ELN has revised its basic strategy in a manner
regime. Funding needs may in part explain their that precluded the movement from signing a cease-
decision to stand alone. fire accord with the government. In mid-1983, the
ELN's national directorate approved an ambitious
its plan that envisioned overtaking its two larger rivals-
military setbacks during the 1970s an a genera the M-19 and the FARC-by late 1985 or early 1986,
retrenchment in Cuba's policy of subversion caused according to the US Embassy. Ultimately, the ELN
Havana to withdraw its support. In its place, the
organization apparently has turned increasingly to
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hoped to spark a mass uprising that would culminate
in the creation of a new revolutionary government,
but a series of public relations blunders cost the
movement any chance of achieving a substantial
increase in popular support. Most notably, in Novem-
ber 1983 an ELN-directed kidnaping of President
Betancur's brother, which we believe was designed to
demonstrate the group's power, instead sparked un-
precedented public criticism.F_-]
We judge that ELN leaders, stung by the failure of
their efforts, opted to continue the armed struggle in
hopes that in so doing they would have an advantage
in attracting violence-prone activists. The group's
revolutionary commitment probably will prevent it
from altering its policy for the remainder of Betan-
cur's term. In view of its penchant for going after US
diplomats and US business facilities and employees,
we believe that the ELN probably is the greatest
threat to US interests of any insurgent organization in
Colombia today.F__-]
In our view, Colombia's armed forces play a dual role
in the peace process. As the administration's main
bulwark against the insurgents, the institution is the
prime guarantor of civil order. At the same time, the
military is the single most important brake on Betan-
cur and, as such, indirectly defines how far he can
take his peace initiatives.F__-]
Although the military has fought rural insurgents
since they first took up arms against the government,
it has not been able to bring them to heel. This is due,
we believe, largely to a number of handicaps that
greatly reduce the institution's operational effective-
ness. The 57,000-man Army is hampered by rugged
terrain to which the guerrillas have long since adapted
and in which they operate freely. The absence of a
well-developed ground transportation system and
shortage of aircraft-particularly modern helicopters
and transports-restricts the access of military units
to remote areas and hinders the resupply of men in the
field, The close air
support operations that do take place often are severe-
ly circumscribed by the age and inadequacy of much
of the Air Force's equipment and by a lack of trained
forward air controllers,
Weaponry in general is frequently obsolete and diffi-
cult to maintain because of the variety of models,
makes, and origins,
Drastic budget cuts are compound . nthe military's
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gasoline, and ammunition for troops in combat and
forced a postponement of needed equipment repairs.
Similar problems are plaguing the Air Force's heli-
copter fleet, which is often used to support ground
forces in their encounters with the insurgents. Indeed,
only about a third of the Air Force's 64 helicopters
are operational and very few of these would be
From a political perspective, the military's responsi-
bility to protect Colombia from the insurgent threat
also gives it a voice in Betancur's peace initiatives.
The prevailing view in the military,
is that the insurgents are using the
opportunity to rest and regroup-at a time when the
Colombian military's capabilities are suffering due to
budget cuts-and that they will be stronger than ever
when full-scale fighting resumes. According to the US
Embassy, some senior officers argue that at the
beginning of Betancur's term the military finally had
all the insurgent groups except the FARC under
control despite the logistic difficulties the armed
forces faced. In the view of these officers, therefore,
the truce has cost the military a major tactical
advantage. There is also widespread resentment in the
armed forces that many insurgent leaders freed under
Betancur's program-some of whom took years to
capture-have since rejoined their old combat units.
Nevertheless, early criticism of the President's peace
program by the military has given way to public
expressions of support, coupled with stern warnings to
the insurgents to abide by the cease-fire. We believe
that this reflects in part the armed forces' firm
support of the country's democratic tradition, which
has seen the military intervene in the political process
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only once this century. In addition, we believe Betan-
cur's decision to sack the Minister of Defense in
January 1984 following his public criticism of the
President's peace efforts almost certainly left an
indelible. impact on the high command
For his part, Betancur-a veteran politician who was
forced into exile after the Army's coup in 1953-
almost certainly is acutely aware of the need to avoid
unnecessarily provoking the military. He has tried to
preserve harmony by publicly praising the armed
forces on numerous occasions for their role in preserv-
ing law and order. The President has also reassured
the military by supporting counterinsurgency opera-
tions against those guerrilla groups that refuse to
those who favor continued dialogue with the insur-
gents and others who argue for a tougher government
line in negotiating with the guerrillas and sterner
measures against subversion.
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come to terms with the government and,
green light to attack any insurgents who blatantly
violate the truce. Finally, he has consistently refused
by giving the Army a
rebel demands for a withdrawal of the military from
regions dominated by the guerrillas,
Beyond the armed forces' respect for the political
process, however, we believe there are practical mo-
tives for the military to acquiesce in the peace process.
The high command probably judges-correctly, in
our view-that the military's stature will be enhanced
if the insurgents break the truce. Growing public
anger over insurgent violations of the cease-fire ac-
cords already is fostering a more sympathetic view of
the armed forces and their mission, according to the
US Embassy and the Colombian press. A collapse of
the truce probably would further strengthen the mili-
tary's image by vindicating its earlier contention that
the insurgents do not genuinely desire peace
The Party Perspective
The military's assessment of the peace process finds
support in both major parties, but the US Embassy
reports that most civilian politicians have hesitated to
state their views publicly. Because many Liberal party
leaders called for a blanket amnesty for the insurgents
when their party was in office, they have apparently
found it difficult to fault the incumbent administra-
tion for pursuing a similar tack. The US Embassy
reports that the Liberals are now divided between
The US Embassy notes many Conservatives also do
not support the current peace process, but they have
remained silent to preserve party unity.
Over the Near Term
We believe that there is a slightly better-than-even
chance that the current pseudopeace will hold for the
next several months, but prospects for the truces to
collapse will steadily increase, in our view, as the end
of Betancur's term in August 1986 approaches.
Despite his commitment to sustaining the peace pro-
cess, we believe Betancur probably has offered the
guerrillas all the inducements he can politically af-
ford. Determination by Congress to protect its legisla-
tive prerogatives already has restricted the President's
ability to grant concessions to the rebels, and Colom-
bia's worsening economic situation almost certainly
will further hamstring proposals for rural develop-
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The presidential and
congressional election campaigns next year probably
will further limit Betancur's flexibility as opposition
politicians try to exploit the electorate's growing
disenchantment with the President's failure to bring a
halt to violence.
fields and processing factories
Cooperation between the various insurgent organiza-
tions and domestic narcotics traffickers also poses a
potential threat to the cease-fire agreements. The
murder in April 1984 of Colombia's Minister of
Justice-almost certainly by the drug mafia-caused
Betancur to launch an unprecedented campaign
against the country's illicit narcotics industry. His
decision to put the military at the forefront of the new
enforcement effort has strengthened the prospect that
government forces may come'into conflict with guer-
rillas working in league with the traffickers. This
possibility is most pronounced in areas such as Ca-
queta where units of the FARC, according to the US
Embassy, are paid by drug dealers to protect their
We believe the chance that this or any other armed
encounter may escalate to a point that would imperil
the truce is increased by the military's underlying
skepticism about the truce and its interpretation of its
continuing mission.
the military not only hopes to
take advantage of its new role as an antinarcotics
force to attack the insurgents but also plans to take no
prisoners for fear that another presidential amnesty
will be granted that would free the rebels to fight
again.
The most
dangerous threat to the accords, however, stems from
a decision in April by the high command,
to seek a confrontation with a
large guerrilla force in order to inflict a major defeat
on the rebels that would either force them to negotiate
in earnest or formally break the truce
From the insurgents' perspective, the longer the truce
lasts the better the opportunity to regroup, prosely-
tize, and build support networks. Nonetheless, we
doubt that a long-term cessation of hostilities will
prevail because the insurgents' revolutionary goals are
unchanged. Moreover, we believe that, because of
ideological conviction, preference for a life of combat,
or fear of retribution by their comrades, few guerrilla
cadre are attracted by government entreaties to sur-
render their weapons. Moreover, the vast majority of
guerrilla leaders probably doubt that they could com-
pete successfully for office against the more experi-
enced members of the traditional parties.-]
Other evidence points to a risky truce as well. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy, militants in each of the
guerrilla groups are showing increasing impatience
with the government's lack of progress in responding
to insurgent demands for sweeping socioeconomic and
political reforms. They probably also point to efforts
by the government to restrict such rebel propaganda
extravaganzas as the M-19's proposed national con-
gress last February as indicative of the diminishing
benefits of the truce. We judge that another critical
short-term question affecting whether the insurgents
choose to resume full-scale armed struggle is how far
the armed forces are prepared to go in adopting more
aggressive tactics. The FARC, in our view, probably
would be the most reluctant to abandon the truce
because of its leaders' purported desire to establish a
legal political front capable of competing with the two
traditional parties. Nevertheless, even that organiza-
tion would likely return to full-fledged guerrilla war if
the military moves decisively against its base areas.
We believe the military would be able to contain a
renewed outbreak of insurgency if the pre-cease-fire
situation were reestablished, with guerrilla groups
operating independently. Nevertheless, the armed
forces would be at an initial disadvantage because of
guerrilla recruitment and reorganizational efforts
throughout the cease-fire period as well as the budget-
ary cuts the armed forces are absorbing. Counterbal-
ancing these negative factors would be the strong
public support for tough counterinsurgency measures
that almost certainly would accompany the break-
down of the truce. In any case, the resumption of full-
scale guerrilla warfare probably would doom any
"peace through dialogue" initiatives for years to come
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because Betancur's successor-regardless of which
party he represents-would be compelled by public
opinion to move aggressively against the guerrillas.
Chances for Guerrilla Unity
There is an outside chance-perhaps 1 in 10-that
those guerrilla groups that are now party to the
various accords not only would return to full-scale
warfare but also would unite in a centrally coordinat-
ed organization. We view such a development as
remote because similar attempts in the past all foun-
dered due to ideological differences and power rival-
ries among insurgent leaders. Such divisiveness has
not abated in recent months,
despite continuing unity
efforts by the FARC and the Communist Party. In
our view, broad-based insurgent cooperation probably
would come about only if most moderates in the four
key movements either were pushed aside or agreed to
accept the government's peace terms. In such an
event, hardliners would be left in control, and they-
like their counterparts in several dissident splinter
groups-might be more receptive to coordinating
operational plans. A gradual expansion of already
existing cooperation between the various insurgent
groups at the local level probably would be a key
indicator that such a significant change in overall
rebel organization and strategy was beginning to
occur.
We judge that the military would be hard pressed to
contain an amalgamated insurgent organization, espe-
cially if the new hardline-dominated rebel entity
struck a deal with the narcotics mafia. The armed
forces' lack of mobility would be a major handicap as
it struggled to fight a multifront battle against a well-
funded, well-armed, and rested guerrilla organization.
The most likely result would be a loss of central
government authority in many rural areas. The gov-
ernment also would face a formidable terrorist chal-
lenge in urban areas. Moreover, such a consolidation
of guerrilla forces would fulfill a longstanding Cuban
policy objective and might prompt Havana to increase
its assistance to the rebels significantly, even at the
risk of destroying the friendship that has arisen over
the past three years between Betancur and Castro and
with it the rapidly improving prospects for normaliz-
ing diplomatic relations with Bogota.F---]
Notwithstanding Betancur's peace efforts, terrorism
in Colombia has become an increasing threat to US
interests. The Embassy believes that a splinter group
of the FARC was responsible for a bombing in the
parking lot of the US Embassy in May 1984, and,
the ELN
enlisted the support of other terrorist organizations
last summer for a possible attack against the US
Ambassador.
~ Several
insurgent groups have carried out terrorist attacks in
recent months against US companies in various Co-
lombian cities. US citizens also have been victims of
guerrilla-sponsored kidnaping efforts. Such acts occa-
sionally have been designed to protest US policies in
Latin America, but more often they have been staged
to raise money for needed arms and equipment,
according to the US Embassy.
At a minimum, US Mission personnel will be increas-
ingly at risk if the cease-fire unravels.
We share the US Embassy's judgment that, in a more
general sense, an intensification of terrorism by the
radical left would threaten economic stability. In our
view, the collapse of the truce would result in intensi-
fied targeting of US businessmen as the insurgents
sought quickly to raise additional funds. It probably
also would accelerate a trend begun in 1983 when, in
response to M- 19 threats against multinational corpo-
rations, several major US firms began withdrawing
management personnel. Finally, a return to full-scale
guerrilla war probably would discourage US compa-
nies from new or expanded investment, a development
that would undercut a valuable source of new funding.
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On the domestic side an intensification of guerrilla-
sponsored kidnaping and extortion threats would cer-
tainly tempt some Colombian entrepreneurs to trans-
fer their assets abroad or even to flee the country.
This, in turn, would fuel unemployment, which, at 14
percent, is already at unprecedented levels, and slow
economic growth even further than the roughly
2-percent rate that private forecasters projected for
1985. As far as political stability is concerned, an
intensification of insurgent attacks could also prove a
real setback. The US Embassy, for example, notes
that a failure of Betancur's peace plan probably would
further erode public confidence in the government's
ability to protect its citizenry. It might also increase
public apathy and contribute to the trend-noted by
academic observers and the Colombian press-of
declining participation in the political system. F_~
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