(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000200230002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Islamic Revival in West Africa:
Update on Nigeria and Senegal
ALA.85-10055
May 1985
Copy 3 6 5
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Secret
ALA 85-10055
May 1985
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Islamic Revival in West Africa:
Update on Nigeria and Senegal
This paper was prepared by I lof the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.F--]
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
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Islamic Revival in West Africa:
Update on Nigeria and Senegal) 25X1
Key Judgments Islam is the fastest growing religion in Sub-Saharan Africa, numbering
Information available some 80 million followers in West Africa alone. The Islamic revival has
as of 15 May 1985 been felt most strongly over the past three years in Nigeria and Senegal.
was used in this report.
Indeed, in both countries Muslim communities now comprise a majority of
the population. In Nigeria, Islamic fundamentalism is gaining strength
against the traditionally powerful Sufi brotherhoods in the Muslim com-
munity. In Senegal, the traditional brotherhoods themselves have adopted
some fundamentalist trappings, and independent fundamentalist associa-
tions have increased their recruitment efforts.
The Islamic communities in Nigeria and Senegal have been exposed
increasingly during this period to radical and fundamentalist theologies
from abroad:
? Iran has emerged as the revival's principal source of inspiration, building
networks of sympathizers among Muslim fundamentalist groups, expatri-
ate Lebanese Shiite communities, and university students.
? Libya, buoyed by military successes in Chad, is redoubling its efforts to
use Islam as an entree to Nigeria and Senegal. To date, most inroads
have been made in Nigeria where northern-based Muslims have proved
the most receptive.
? The Saudis continue to provide vital economic assistance to Muslim
communities, in part to counter Iranian and Libyan influence.
In our judgment, the stridency and effectiveness of Muslim proselytizing
will make it all the more difficult for West African governments to manage
their economic crises and defuse rising levels of public frustration over
living conditions and social changes. In 1980, for example, 7,000 members
of an outlaw Muslim organization were killed in a violent uprising in
Nigeria. Last year, 2,000 deaths occurred in similar violence in the
northeastern portion of the country. In recent months, over 100 lives were
lost in Gombe as violence flared again.
Moreover, given each group's single-minded belief in its own cause, we
expect that tensions between and among fundamentalist and traditional
Muslim organizations in Nigeria, for example, will challenge government
control despite the regime's attempts to preempt some aspects of Muslim
reform and to control religious violence. Although Senegal has intervened
iii Secret
ALA 85-10055
May 1985
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forcefully to restrict extremist fundamentalist activity, we believe Dakar
will find it more difficult-as its economy contracts-to maintain the
necessary loyalty of brotherhood leaders whose support is purchased by
government patronage.
If recent history is any guide, we can also expect that anti-Western bias
will increase as militant followers of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary
ideology now in the universities eventually fill positions of influence in the
bureaucracies and cabinets that traditionally have been friendly to the
West. In the longer term, as numbers of fundamentalists grow, national
political leaders will come under pressure to incorporate Islamic institu-
tions into what have so far been secular state structures.
Over time, the growth in Islamic influence will provide opportunities for
Iran and Libya to extend their activities in the region. In our estimate, Ira-
nian and Libyan support for terrorism, utilizing Islamic fundamentalist
cells and targeting US embassies and diplomats, is likely to develop into a
more serious threat than at present.
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Key Judgments
Reaction to the Fundamentalist Revival
3
Senegal
Reaction to the Fundamentalist Revival
5
Libya
7
Saudi Arabia
8
Prospects
9
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Figure 1
NIGERIA: Muslim Distribution
- - Selected state
boundary
TIV Selected tribe
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
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Islamic Revival in West Africa:
Update on Nigeria and Senegal
According to a variety of published sources, Islam is
the fastest growing religion in Sub-Saharan Africa
and gains new adherents each year at the expense of
Christianity and African tribal religions. Muslims in
West Africa number some 80 million people-out of a
total population of some 170 million-and, on the
basis of US Embassy and academic sources, we
believe they are becoming more receptive to militant
25X1 forms of Islam. Muslim communities in Nigeria and
Senegal now compose the majority of both countries
and are in the vanguard of Islamic revival in West
Africa
On the basis of a review of US Embassy and press
reports over the past several years, the Islamic resur-
gence in West Africa is spread by an effective Muslim
missionary effort involving local fundamentalist lead-
ers as well as emissaries of Iran, Libya, and Saudi
Arabia. According to our embassies and press reports
from West Africa, proponents of Islamic fundamen-
talism hope ultimately to establish Islamic institutions
on a national and regional scale. Embassy reporting
suggests that Islamic proselytizers find a receptive
audience among many Nigerians and Senegalese
alienated by the forces of modernization and rapid
urban growth, and disillusioned with entrenched
Western-oriented elites who are faulted for corruption
and deteriorating living conditions.'
US Embassy reporting indicates that Islamic funda-
mentalism is growing more rapidly than any other
section of the Nigerian Muslim community. Most
adherents seek Islamic reform at the expense of the
traditional brotherhoods (darika), who are character-
ized by mysticism and a pragmatic mixing of Islamic
and local tribal custom. In their public statements, the
fundamentalists espouse easily grasped prescriptions
for national renewal and, according to Nigerian press
accounts, are drawing thousands of young people
away from the brotherhoods. Nevertheless, we believe
the fundamentalists have yet to come up with a leader
or doctrine that will overcome the ideological divisions
within Nigerian Islam and enable them to produce
religious or political change on a national scale=
Among the most politically influential, in the opinion
of US Embassy officials, are two separate fundamen-
talist groups, the Izala and JNI. Both are directed by
the same leader-Abubakar Gummi-but serve dif-
ferent purposes: the Izala operates at the local level,
while the JNI aims to promote Islam at the national
levels of government. According to US Embassy
reporting, Abubakar Gummi, a Muslim lawyer and
preacher at Kaduna city mosque, has established
himself as the intellectual and spiritual leader of
Islamic reform in Nigeria, and comes the closest to
exercising nationwide leadership within the diverse
Nigerian Muslim community. US officials character-
ize Gummi as an Islamic purist and political moder-
ate who is willing to sacrifice immediate political
gains for the sake of Islamic principles. He has
alienated many influential supporters, for example, by
his outspoken criticism of corruption and the custom-
ary, non-Islamic ritual practiced by traditional lead-
ers in northern Nigeria
The Izala. The most influential fundamentalist orga-
nization at the local level is the Jama'atul Izalatul
Bid'a (Izala), founded in the 1970s by Gummi's
followers. Its religious orientation is Wahabi-the
200-year-old form of Islamic revival that originated in
Saudi Arabia-and the group receives substantial
financial and moral support from the Saudis, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports.
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Islam in Nigeria
Nigeria's Islamic community of nearly 50 million
embraces over half the population and is one of the
larger Muslim communities in the world. Its origins
can be traced to a jihad (holy war) in northern Nigeria
waged early in the 19th century, which also contrib-
uted to the rise of Islam in parts of neighboring
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. A militant tradition has
continued in Nigeria where Muslims are prone to
violent means of settling disputes.
The majority of Nigeria's Muslims claim member-
ship in one of the principal Sufi brotherhoods,
including:
? The Qadiriya to which most northern local tradi-
tional leaders and many senior governmental offi-
cials belong. It was founded in the 19th century by
the jihad leader, Usman dan Fodio, who is still
perceived as the source of political and spiritual
legitimacy in the northern region. The present
Sultan of Sokoto, dun Fodio's titular descendant, is
aged and infirm, according to US Embassy report-
ing, and unable to fulfill his role as the titular
leader of all northern Nigerian Muslims. Intense
jockeying is under way to succeed the Sultan after
his death. The most likely successor, according to
US Embassy reporting, is Ibrahim Dasuki, a 62-
year-old Oxford-trained businessman born in So-
koto. A high-ranking federal civil servant in the
1960s, he is now secretary general of the Jama atul
Nasril Islam, holds a traditional office in Sokoto,
and is well known and respected in northern politi-
cal circles and Lagos. Since Nigeria's last military
coup in 1983, Dasuki has been the northern-
Muslim-dominated government's chief intermedi-
ary with northern civilian elites and has direct
access to Head of State Buhari and other senior
regime officials.
? The Tijaniya was established in Kano city by
Islamic missionaries from Senegal early in this
century. The sect is holding its own as the largest
and most aggressive of the Nigerian brotherhoods,
Thousands of Tijani make their way weekly to a
small town near Kano for Friday prayers led by the
elderly ex-Emir of Kano. The Tijani have drawn on
the considerable financial resources of the wealthy
Kano merchant class to create a paramilitary group
known as the Army of God (Jundul-Lahi), made up
of young men among the urban unemployed, ac-
cording to US Embassy sources. The Army of God
last December threatened to burn down the Kaduna
state radio station that broadcasts fundamentalist
preaching, according to US Embassy reports.
? The Ansar al Islam predominates among Yoruba
tribesmen living in southwestern Nigeria, nearly 40
percent of whom are Muslim, although ethnic and
sectarian differences separate them from northern
coreligionists. The Ansar al Islam, led by educated
southern elites, is the recognized representative of
southern Muslims. The Buhari regime's Chief of
Staff and second-ranking official, Tunde Idiagbon,
is a Muslim Yoruba who regularly prays with an
Ansar al Islam group in Lagos. Nevertheless, US
Embassy reporting indicates that the Ansar's lead-
ership has begun to criticize Nigeria's northern-
dominated military government, reflecting festering
discontents that now prevail in southern states over
the favor shown northern interests and senior-level
corruption.
The Izala is the fastest growing Islamic group in
Nigeria, according to US Embassy sources. Once an
obscure sect, it has begun to be featured prominently
in Nigerian press and academic publications over the
past few years, and its meetings are said by Nigerian
press observers to attract thousands of participants.
According to Nigerian press accounts, the group is
intensely involved in proselytizing members of other
Muslim groups and nonbelievers. Late last year, US
Embassy reporting indicated that the Izala organized
a large meeting in Kano city that the Kano state
military governor agreed to attend before the rally
was canceled for security reasons. In the view of US
Government officials, by trying to involve a state
government figure, the Izala sought to claim official
sanction for its challenge to the Tijaniya brotherhood
in the latter's stronghold.
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The JNI. While Izala has developed a base of grass-
roots support in northern Nigeria, another fundamen-
talist organization, the Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI),
which also is heavily backed by Saudi Arabia, has
tried to gain influence from within the government,
the media, and centers of economic power, according
to US Embassy sources. Nigerian press reporting
indicates that the JNI was established by Abubakar
Gummi. in 1962 and that the group has both religious
and political objectives. According to Nigerian press
accounts, the JNI draws its membership from north-
ern elites and speaks through the semiofficial regional
newspaper, the New Nigerian, and the regional radio
station in Kaduna. The US Embassy reports that the
brotherhoods claim Gummi is using the organization
to seek national political power under the cloak of
Islam. Gummi's influence within the government
gives some merit to that claim-Head of State Buhari
sent him on several important missions abroad after
the 1983 coup, including Nigeria's first mission to
Saudi Arabia.
Accounts of JNI activities in the Nigerian press
indicate that the group has close ties with influential
northern Nigerian political and commercial leaders.
We, and the US Embassy, believe that JNI's underly-
ing goal is to bring all Islamic activity in the country
under the control of a small group of northern
religious leaders, senior civil servants, and business-
men led by Gummi. The Nigerian press reports that
the JNI directs the annual pilgrimage, the hajj, to
Mecca of some 20,000 Nigerians.
Many Muslim students seek ties with fundamentalist
groups outside the universities-particularly the
Izala-according to US Embassy sources, who esti-
mate that nearly one-third of northern Nigeria's
Muslim students now belong to the Izala. These
sources also indicate that a student-Izala nexus could
provide a flashpoint for civil unrest in the north in the
future.
Reaction to the Fundamentalist Revival
The brotherhoods have reacted violently to the erosion
of their influence at both the leadership and grass-
roots levels because of the growing fundamentalist
revival. Vigilante groups of young militants from the
brotherhoods have attacked fundamentalist mosques
and Abubakar Gummi's house in Kaduna, according
to US Embassy reports. Nigerian press reporting
indicates that hostility to their common enemy has
made the Tijaniya and Qadiriya brotherhoods draw
closer together, playing down differences of ritual and
practice that caused bloody infighting between them
during the 1970s and early 1980s.
For., its part, the government has reacted to the
fundamentalist revival by closer association with the
brotherhoods and by occasionally attaching Islamic
ideals to government policies. The government has
used the Islamic brotherhoods, particularly the con-
servative Qadiriya, to rally support for its policies and
to control northern populations during the past year,
according to US Embassy reporting. In addition, the
Nigerian press indicates that the regime has sought to
associate its campaign against corruption, the so-
called War Against Indiscipline, with Islamic reform-
ist ideals in an effort to rally support at mass meetings
on northern university campuses and among funda-
Islamic fundamentalism is spreading rapidly on
school and university campuses in northern Nigeria,
according to US Embassy reporting. Many students
express disapproval of the Westernized culture of
Nigeria's ruling elites and idealize the values of
village life and purified forms of Muslim asceticism.
Embassy reporting indicates that members of the
Muslim Student Association, most prominently at
Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria and Bayero Uni-
versity in Kano, publicly espouse the most radical
fundamentalist theology in Nigeria, and have staged
demonstrations to extoll Iran's revolution and to
demand a purge of Nigeria's political and religious
leadership. Islamic student radicals have attacked
police and members of conservative Islamic groups
25X1 and have created tensions between Christians and
Muslims both on campuses and in surrounding com-
munities, according to Nigerian press accounts=
mentalist groups.
The brotherhoods and the government are not the
only Nigerian groups affected by the rise in funda-
mentalism. The revival has nurtured the growth of an
outlaw organization of heretical Muslims called the
Followers of Maitatsine Marwa. The group, which the
Nigerian press reports has caused thousands of deaths
in several incidents of major violence that have re-
quired Nigerian Army intervention to suppress, is
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banned by the government and is universally con-
demned by other Muslims. According to its adherents,
the Maitatsine criticize the corruption and ostentation
of Nigeria's elites and the effects of Western technol-
ogy and education on Nigerian society. They offer
their disciples an austere lifestyle and a xenophobic
theology that incorporates unorthodox magical ritual
and local custom. Some members publicly equate the
founder, Maitatsine Marwa-a fugitive Muslim
preacher from Cameroon-with the Prophet, which is
anathema to mainstream Muslims.
Based on their stated beliefs and goals, the Maitatsine
appeal to foreign migrants in Nigeria who are young,
rootless, and unemployed. We believe many Maitat-
sine left Nigeria during Lagos's mass expulsion of
foreign Africans in 1983. The Buhari government
recently ordered thousands more illegal West African
immigrants to leave by mid-May, which will further
reduce Maitatsine strength
Maitatsine leader Marwa, and an estimated 7,000 of
his followers, were killed during the Kano uprising in
1980. Last year, a rampage by Maitatsine members in
Gongola state in northeastern Nigeria caused some
2,000 deaths, according to Nigerian press accounts.
This year, an outbreak of rioting at Gombe, in
northeastern Bauchi state, took over 100 lives but was
quickly suppressed by police and Army troops. The
Nigerian press claims that Maitatsine cells have
reappeared in virtually every major city in the north,
as well as Lagos and other coastal cities. Originally,
US Embassy reporting estimated the group's mem-
bership at around 10,000. By now, with so many
killed and the group outlawed in 1980 and forced
underground, we believe it has broken up into largely
independent cells whose members number for the
most part in the hundreds.
Radical Islamic revival has been slower to develop
and spread in Senegal and has taken different forms
than in Nigeria. The US Embassy reports that the
Senegalese Muslim community is highly organized
and continues to be dominated by the traditional Sufi
brotherhoods. Until recently, according to the Embas-
sy, the principal brotherhoods-the Muridiya and
Tijaniya-have been able to exclude the fundamen-
talist revival from Senegal because of the tight hold
they maintain over their followers. Within the last two
years, however, academic sources indicate that small,
politically radical, fundamentalist groups are appear-
ing in Dakar. Backed by Iran and Libya, an extremist
group of fundamentalists within the Tijaniya has
established a cultural center in Dakar and publishes
several journals,
Principal figures are Sidy Laraine
Niasse, his brother Ahmed-the self-styled "Ayatol-
lah of Kaolack," and 'Abd al-Mun'in al-Zayn, the 25X1
leader of the Lebanese Shiite community in Dakar.
Their followers include students and teachers at the
University of Dakar and civil servants who resent the
brotherhoods' economic conservatism, according to
According to US Embassy reporting, the brother-
hoods still dominate the daily lives of the majority of
Senegal's Muslims. In addition to offering their mem-
bers devotional activity, the brotherhoods organize
agricultural production and marketing, provide access
to political patronage and financial credit, and repre-
sent their members to state authorities. So far, the
fundamentalists, lacking the size and organizational
capabilities of the brotherhoods, cannot begin to
deliver equal services.
Recently, however, the fundamentalists' revival has
begun to affect the mainstream leadership of the
brotherhoods themselves. According to academic ob-
servers, the Muride leader Lahat Mbake, for exam-
ple, has begun to incorporate aspects of the funda-
mentalist revival into the brotherhood's religious
observances, requiring his followers to purify their
practices and enforce prohibitions on alcohol and
tobacco. Mbake is building a university devoted to
Arabic studies at Touba, the Muride's principal city.
Scholarly sources report that Muride students at the
university and secondary schools in Senegal's princi-
pal towns have formed an association for the purifica-
tion of Islam along fundamentalist lines. The aggres-
siveness with which the Murides proselytize provokes
resentment among other religious groups, according
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Figure 2
SENEGAL: Distribution of Muslim Brotherhoods
80 and
above 80-60 60-40
less
than
40
Percent
of total
population
less
than
Muridiya
Brotherhood
100 Kilometers
100 Miles
Reaction to the Fundamentalist Revival
President Diouf-an adherent of the traditional
Tijaniya-has tried to restrict both extremist Tijaniya
splinter groups and Muride militants, according to
US Embassy reports. He has imprisoned both the
Niasse brothers for subversion and personally warned
the large community of Lebanese Shiites in Senegal
that ties with Iran and Libya will not be tolerated. He
also has tried to restrain Muride aggressiveness,
^
meeting frequently with the brotherhood's leaders,
according to US Embassy and press reporting. Never-
theless, in our view, greater religious activism and
competition between Senegal's Muslim groups pose a
growing threat to Senegal's fragile political order as
the government seeks to impose an economic austerity
Boundary representation is 25X1
not necessarily authoritative.
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According to US Embassy reports, Senegal-with
Muslims comprising over 80 percent of the 6.8 mil-
lion population-has the most highly organized Is-
lamic community in West Africa. Senegalese Islam is
dominated by the traditional Islamic brotherhoods.
The two largest and most important sects, the Muri-
diya and the Tijaniya, grew out of successive move-
ments for Islamic reform during the last century
when Muslim religious teachers (marabouts) assumed
the authority exercised by traditional tribal leaders.
The Muridiya has attracted, by a narrow margin, a
majority of the Islamic population and has built up a
formidable financial empire in Senegal based on the
commercialization of the peanut trade and a shrewd
investment of the brotherhood's communal assets,
according to US Embassy reports. Its members come
mainly from the peasantry, but US Embassy sources
report that university students and young intellectu-
als are now joining the brotherhood, as a rebellious
gesture both against modernization and their parents'
Tijani affiliations.
The US Embassy indicates that the Muridiya has
undertaken an active political role in Senegal, under
the leadership of Lahat Mbake who claims to speak
program that has brought its popularity to an alltime
low. As the Senegalese economy contracts, we believe
Diouf will find it more difficult to control intergroup
conflicts and maintain the loyalty of brotherhood
leaders whose support is both necessary and depen-
dent on government patronage. US Embassy report-
ing suggests that divisions between Muslim groups
have sharpened during the past few years as militant
fundamentalists have sought a following, and as the
memberships of the Muridiya and Tijaniya have
reached a rough parity. We believe intergroup vio-
lence becomes increasingly likely, particularly in Da-
kar where the brotherhoods' capacity to mobilize the
population for strikes or rioting could threaten the
central government itself.
for the Murides' estimated 1.5 million adherents and
monopolizes relations between the government, and
the brotherhood. Embassy sources report that he is
consulted by the Senegalese Government on most
issues of internal policy and that he has blocked
agricultural reform because he views social and
institutional change as a threat to the special privi-
leges Muride leaders receive from their peasant fol-
lowers. To protect smuggling of peanuts across the
border with The Gambia, which pays higher producer
prices for this cash crop, Mbake has tried to prevent
unification under the nascent Senegambia confedera-
tion that would jeopardize this lucrative operation.
Until recently the Tijaniya was the largest Islamic
group in Senegal, with membership estimated at
about 1.3 million, according to US Embassy report-
ing. The brotherhood's traditions emphasize medita-
tion and religious orthodoxy. Like the Muridiya, it
has attracted a cross section of the population-from
rural herders and small shopkeepers to university
professors and government officials. President Diouf
is a Tijani. The Tijaniya is divided into three,
virtually independent subgroups, and is less aggres-
sive than the Muridiya, exercising a moderating
influence in Senegal.
We believe that competition for influence among the
Muslim communities of West Africa between Saudi
Arabia, Libya, and Iran has intensified the exposure
to fundamentalist theologies. In our judgment, Iran
has emerged as the Islamic revival's principal source
of inspiration in the region. Moroever, we note that
Libya-buoyed by its success late last year in getting
France to withdraw militarily from Chad-has redou-
bled its efforts to establish the Islamic Call Society-
in practice a subversive, intelligence-gathering
organization-and rename their diplomatic missions
in West Africa "Peoples' Bureaus.'
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talist theology
Nevertheless, the Iranians and Libyans confront im-
portant barriers that slow and frustrate their efforts.
According to US Embassy reporting, still-powerful
traditional Muslim leaders and conservative govern-
ment officials in both Nigeria and Senegal are hostile
to outside radical influences and seek to limit inroads
by the Iranians and Libyans. Moreover, we assume
both countries realize that Western and moderate
Arab governments, which are important sources of aid
and investment for Nigeria and Senegal, vigorously
oppose the adoption of Iran's and Libya's fundamen-
Iran
We believe that longstanding rivalry between the
Saudis and Libyans for influence in Nigerian and
Senegalese Islamic communities has been partially
superseded over the past three years by an increasing-
ly active Iranian presence.'
Tehran appears to have assigned a
ence.
high priority to carrying its brand of Islamic funda-
mentalism to both Nigeria and Senegal because of
their large Muslim populations and regional influ-
ence. In our judgment, the increase in Iranian activity
reflects Tehran's determination to spread its revolu-
tionary ideology and enhance its international influ-
During this period, the Iranians have built networks
of sympathizers in Nigeria and Senegal among Mus-
lim fundamentalist groups, expatriate Lebanese Shiite
communities, and university students. US Embassy
sources in northern Nigeria report that Iranian dele-
gations and embassy personnel are recruiting candi-
dates for military and religious training in Iran and
introducing propaganda at universities.
the Iranians plan to
establish a cultural center in northern Nigeria that
would give them direct access to the local Muslim
community. In Senegal,
the Iranians have developed a small, but
active, group of sympathizers among members of the
Niassene branch of the Tijani Islamic brotherhood,
among students and teachers at the University of
Dakar, and within the Lebanese Muslim community
in the capital. Tehran has given generous amounts of
financial support to Senegalese Muslim brotherhoods
and, according to the Senegalese press, has brought a
number of brotherhood members to Iran to meet with
Ayatollah Khomeini and visit the Iran-Iraq
battlefront.
Dakar has reacted to these Iranian inroads. Early this
year the Senegalese Government shut down the Irani-
an Embassy in Dakar because of alleged subversive
activity, according to the Senegalese press. Since
then, sources in the Muslim community report that
Iranian activity has receded somewhat. Nevertheless,
several Iranian-sponsored publications continue to
appear and
Dakar still functions.
Libya
Libya has become much more active in West Africa
over the last three years after having been diplomati-
cally isolated and on the defensive following wide-
spread African condemnation of its invasion of Chad
in 1980 and its drive a year later to rename its
embassies in West Africa "Peoples' Bureaus."' In
Nigeria, the Islamic Trust, a northern-based Muslim
association that has channeled funds from Saudi
Arabia for welfare needs, is negotiating with the
Libyans for aid in excess of $1 million to support
projects within the Muslim community,
The group is led by members of the
northern elite, including former government officials
and the present Minister of Commerce. Furthermore,
General
Buhari's northern Muslim-based military government
has acceded to a Libyan request to open an Islamic
religious studies center in Kano. The city, in the heart
of Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north and the site
in recent years of frequent doctrinal disputes and
' Although Libyan Peoples' Bureaus are accredited as diplomatic
missions, with full rights of immunity, their avowed purpose is to
bypass host governments and deal directly with "the people." As
the Bureaus have no formal organizational structure, no one is
officially accountable for the group's actions, and, without defined
roles, members find it easier operate outside the boundaries of
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clashes between rival Islamic sects, has a long-
established community of Libyan traders. The center,
will be headed by a
former Libyan Ambassador to Nigeria who has close
family and political ties with the Kano Muslim com-
munity. We believe the center will offer Tripoli
opportunities to exploit local Islamic rivalries, develop
contacts with Islamic student radicals, and assist
Chadian dissidents in northeastern Nigeria opposed to
Dakar reports that the location of such a Libyan base
of operations in Banjul is worrisome to the Senega-
lese, who suspect it will be used to step up funding and
support for radical Islamic fundamentalists in Sene-
gal. We note, however, that Senegal still maintains
troops in The Gambia-introduced to suppress a coup
attempt by radicals in 1981-which should enhance
Dakar's ability to keep close watch on Libyan
activities.
Chadian President Habre.
In our view, Nigeria is willing to gamble on an
expanded Libyan presence in the north, perhaps in
part because Buhari is being pushed by radical ele-
ments in the Muslim community to develop ties with
the Libyan Government . We believe Lagos also may
hope that Tripoli will breathe life into an agreement
signed last year that calls for the establishment of a
joint bank and holding company, thereby providing
Nigeria with much needed financial aid.
Saudi Arabia
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Saudis now
regard Iran as a greater threat than Libya to their
interests in West Africa. We have no evidence, how-
ever, that Riyadh plans to step up its activities to
counter either Iran or Libya. Instead, the Saudis
appear to be continuing support at previous levels to
both the moderate Muslim-based governments and to
politically conservative Islamic groups in Nigeria and
Senegal.
For its part, Senegal has kept Libya at arm's length.
The US Embassy reports that Tripoli is pushing
Senegal to accept some form of renewed official
representation after having successfully convinced
The Gambia-Dakar's reluctant partner in the na-
scent Senegambia confederation-to accept a Libyan
presence last March. Senegal and The Gambia both
broke relations with Libya in 1980, charging Tripoli
with fomenting subversion. Unable to exploit any
official connections, Tripoli continued to provide fi-
nancial support to Senegal's small Niassene Islamic
fundamentalist movement, according to US Embassy
sources, and has established ties with the Murides.
The Gambia, a weak ministate enclosed within Sene-
galese territory, is particularly vulnerable to Libyan
activity, in our view. Although the Gambian Govern-
ment recently turned down Tripoli's request to open a
Peoples' Bureau in Banjul, it accepted a Libyan-
staffed Islamic Call Society office that will serve
Tripoli as a liaison with religious organizations,
according to US Embassy sources. The Libyan-
sponsored Islamic Call Society has grown out of a
mandate by the Organization of Islamic States in
1970 to promote Islam through peaceful means. Lib-
yan leader Qadhafi uses the society to support subver-
sion and intelligence activities, according to US Em-
bassy sources in North Africa. The US Embassy in
Despite budgetary constraints caused by the soft oil
market, press reports indicate that the Saudis contin-
ue to provide vital financial assistance to Senegal,
including $86 million last year, that helps Dakar
comply with its tough IMF program of economic
adjustment and recovery. In addition, the Saudis
provide the Muslim community with scholarships to
universities in Mecca and Medina, and sponsor Tijani
mosques and Koranic schools throughout the country,
according to Senegalese press reports. Furthermore,
the Saudis assist financially many of the more than
3,000 Senegalese pilgrims making the hajj to Mecca
each year, according to the Senegalese press.
The situation with respect to Nigeria, however, is not
as friendly. Relations between Riyadh and Lagos are
strained, according to US Embassy reporting, because
of Lagos's recent recognition of Western Sahara's
Polisario Front and its refusal to abide by OPEC
production guidelines. The Embassy reports that
Riyadh nonetheless continues to support Nigerian
Islamic organizations such as the JNI and the Izala-
whose leadership is sympathetic to the regime and to
Saudi foreign policies. The JNI works particularly
closely with Riyadh in organizing the annual hajj to
Mecca, according to the Nigerian press.
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stem deteriorating living conditions.
In our judgment, more radical forms of Islam will find
fertile ground in the poor economic conditions likely
to pertain in West Africa over the next several years.
While economic recession per se is not necessarily
destabilizing, the impact of government austerity
measures on important political groups-such as the
Muslim communities-will give wider scope for politi-
cal instability in countries beset by such problems as
corruption, mismanagement, and ethnic and religious
cleavages. We believe that the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism, with its simplistic promises of eco-
nomic and political recovery, will increase the appeal
of radical ideologies, particularly in Nigeria and
Senegal, if Western-oriented leadership elites fail to
talist Muslims increase.
Economic conditions are not the only catalyst for a
fundamentalist revival. As in the Middle East, we
expect fundamentalist Muslims to rail against West
African governments for following essentially a West-
ern-style modernization path, which they view as
religiously and socially decadent. The fundamenta-
lists' intense commitment to proselytization will likely
result in increased violence on the local and regional
levels. As other, more traditional, Islamic groups
shrink in size and as fundamentalist numbers rise, we
believe national leaders will come under increasing
pressure over the next few years to incorporate Islam-
ic institutions, such as Islamic courts, into secular
political structures. Eventually, in our view, support
for the transformation of Nigeria and Senegal into
Islamic states-which is the militants' announced
ultimate goal-will grow as the number of fundamen-
From the perspective of foreign relations, we believe
Islamic radicals are likely to regard their countries'
political, economic, and military dealings with the
West as unwholesome. The Islamic revival is usually
characterized by antimodern and anti-Western think-
ing, although only the fringes go as far as the
extremes adopted by Iranian and Libyan. sympathiz-
ers. The probability of growing anti-Western bias will
increase as militant followers of Khomeini's revolu-
tionary ideology now in the universities eventually fill
positions of influence in bureaucracies and cabinets
that traditionally have been friendly to the West.
The Islamic revival will provide greater opportunities
for Iran and Libya to extend their activities in the
region. In our estimate, Iranian- and Libyan-support-
ed terrorism, utilizing Islamic fundamentalist cells
and targeting US Embassies and diplomats, is likely
to develop into a more serious threat than it is now.
Moreover, as Islamic radicals in West Africa acquire
international contacts and expertise, they will be able
to advance their interests by initiating clandestine
activities with expert Iranian and Libyan support.
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