ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000300370003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Argentina: Prospects
for Military Intervention
in Politics
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
?Secret--
ALA 85-10089
August 1985
Copy 289
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Argentina: Prospects
for Military Intervention
in Politics
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions by
of the Office of Central Reference, and the
Political Instability Branch of the Office of Global
Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 85-10089
August 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as af 6 August 1985
was used in this report.
Argentina: Prospects
for Military Intervention
in Politics
Secret
One of President Alfonsin's fundamental goals is to promote political
stability and democracy in Argentina by ending his country's tradition of
military intervention in politics. After taking office in December 1983,
Alfonsin frontally challenged the military. He prosecuted top generals for
human rights abuses committed during the counterterrorist struggle of the
late 1970s, slashed the services' budgets, and purged most generals
promoted under military rule. Although he also took steps to placate the
military, his relations with the armed forces have deteriorated steadily.
We believe that the military is once again asserting itself politically and
now views the government as an adversary. The armed forces complain
that the human rights trials have become a direct attack on military honor
and fear they will eventually include junior and middle-level officers.
officers feel the budget cuts have prevented 25X1
them from carrying out their minimal national security functions. The
military is also agitated by what it sees as resurgent leftist subversion and
influence in Alfonsin's Radical Party.
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To intervene successfully in politics, the military, in our view, must
overcome its internal divisions and acquire influential civilian allies and
public support. Although plagued by interservice rivalries and disputes
between conservative, pro-American senior officers and more nationalistic,
anti-US junior officers, the military's institutional solidarity in the face of
an unfriendly civilian government and its basically authoritarian, anti-
Communist outlook serve as uniting forces. Acquiring civilian allies and
popular support poses a greater problem. At present, the armed forces,
according to the US Embassy, have only the backing of several marginal
political factions. The military remains discredited by human rights
abuses, the 1982 Falklands debacle, and past economic failures. Moreover,
Alfonsin's popularity is high, and we believe that only a severe deteriora-
tion of the political and economic climate could garner the military the
popular support?either active or tacit?it would need to mount a coup.
In our judgment, the odds are roughly 4 in 5 that Alfonsin will stay in pow-
er over the next year. Given his track record, the President probably will
not mishandle key issues so severely as to provoke a coup. Buenos Aires'
new austerity measures, in our view, stand a good chance of reducing
inflation and keeping the danger of economic collapse and massive social
disorder at bay. US Embassy sources report that
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Alfonsin will probably end the trials of military leaders once a few
symbolic convictions have been obtained, and that he recognizes he cannot
cut the armed forces budget further with impunity. There is little serious
leftist subversion at present, and the government would probably counter
any resurgent violence before it threatened political stability. Isolated
garrison uprisings or abortive coups may occur soon, but we judge that
Alfonsin can probably contain such threats.
The key risk on the downside would be an unraveling of Alfonsin's
economic program, leading to hyperinflation, a severe recession, and a
break with the IMF. This probably would set the stage for widespread
social disorder, growing leftist and rightist violence, and a sharp decline in
the government's popularity. Given the lack of any credible civilian
alternative to the President's Radical Party, we believe that the military
would meet little resistance if it moved to seize power under such
circumstances.
Any kind of military regime could adopt policies directly harmful to US in-
terests. Nevertheless, we believe that a government backed by moderate
generals would probably be basically pro-American, pursue orthodox
economic policies, and try to avoid the human rights abuses and foreign ad-
venturism that discredited past military rulers. There is a good chance,
however, that an ultranationalist military regime would refuse to repay or
renegotiate the foreign debt, make a military move against the Falklands,
purchase arms from the USSR, expand military-related nuclear programs,
and engage in massive human rights violations.
A military government in Buenos Aires, however, would represent a severe
setback for the US goal of fostering stable democratic institutions in
Argentina and throughout South America. The damage to Argentine
democracy could be especially great if the coup was bloody or was followed
by a prolonged period of military rule. The ensuing legacy of bitterness and
strife would hinder future efforts to restore democracy and to extricate
Argentina from its endemic political instability and economic decline.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
The President Versus the Military"
1
Military Fears
3
Military Cohesion and Factionalism
6
Civilian Allies and Popular Support
10
Outlook
11
The Most Likely Case: Military's Influence Remains Limited
11
An Alternate Scenario: Military Intervention
12
Implications for the United States
13
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Argentina: Prospects
for Militar Intervention
in Politics
Introduction
The euphoria following President Alfonsin's election
in October 1983 led many Argentines to predict that
the cycle of unstable civilian and military regimes
that had plagued their country for 50 years was over.
The military was internally divided, discredited by
defeat in the Falklands as well as by human rights
abuses and failed economic policies, and eager to
return to the barracks. Polls showed that the armed
forces had achieved a state of public disrepute un-
equaled in Argentine history.
Now, after almost two years of civilian rule, it appears
that expectations of a decisive break with the praetori-
an past in Argentina were misplaced, or at least
premature. Alfonsin has remained popular, according
to opinion polls, but his government has brought the
country to the brink of domestic economic disaster
and?at least until recently?has been viewed by
many Argentines as weak and vacillating. Although
the armed services have not recovered their prestige
and influence, they are asserting themselves political-
ly by seeking civilian allies and trying to limit govern-
ment control over the military. This paper examines
civilian-military relations under Alfonsin, analyzes
the factors that unite and divide the armed forces, and
25X1 discusses the prospects for military intervention in
politics over the next year.
The President Versus the Military
Alfonsin has publicly declared that his main political
goal is to end military interference in politics and
consolidate Argentine democracy by serving a full six-
year term and handing power to a freely elected
civilian successor. During the 1983 campaign, Alfon-
sin?unlike his Peronist opponent?hammered at the
evils of military rule. He singled out the armed forces
as responsible for the human rights abuses of past
25X1 counterterrorist campaigns and as the cause of Argen-
tina's perennial political instability.
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Upon taking office in December 1983, Alfonsin and
his Radical Party administration quickly confronted
the armed forces. A review of the public record as
well as US Embassy and defense attache reporting
shows that, during its first few months in power, the
new government took a variety of measures to cut
military power and influence:
? Prosecution for human rights abuses. Congress
repealed a law promulgated by the previous regime
that had absolved all military personnel of responsi-
bility for human rights abuses. Alfonsin then named
a commission to investigate the fate of some 9,000
persons who "disappeared" during the "dirty war"
of the late 1970s. Members of the juntas that ruled
from 1976 to 1983 were put on trial, first in military
and then in civilian courts, for their role in organiz-
ing the repression of those years.
? Massive budget cuts. The government cut military
service budgets in half by slashing weapon procure-
ment programs, reducing conscript intake by over
50 percent, and limiting training exercises to a bare
minimum.' These drastic actions, in our view, were
taken partly out of financial necessity but mainly to
reduce the weight of the military in Argentine
politics and society.
? Purging the officer corps. Alfonsin began staffing
the general ranks with officers of his choosing?
mainly, in our view, to protect himself from a coup.
He ordered a rash of forced retirements during his
first months in office. By March 1985, he had
removed from active duty all but two of 53 Army
generals promoted under the military regime.
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The Legacy of Military Rule
Argentina's tradition of military intervention in poli-
tics began in 1930 when the Army overthrew Presi-
dent Hipolito Yrigoyen, the founder of Raul Alfon-
sin's Radical Party. Since then, the armed forces
have mounted five successful coups against constitu-
tional presidents and launched innumerable abortive
uprisings. The military has held power for all but five
of the last 20 years. Only one freely elected presi-
dent?Juan Peron?has completed his term of office
in the past halfcentury, and he was an Army colonel
who first achieved prominence through a coup. The
armed forces have toppled nearly every variety of
administration: conservative, Peronist, radical, and
military. In recent decades, moreover, the duration of
military regimes has increased while the lifespan of
the civilian governments separating them has become
shorter and more tenuous.
The responsibility for this pattern, in our view, rests
not only with the military but with Argentine politi-
cal culture in general. Academic studies have con-
cluded that the armed forces have become accepted
by the public and the politicians as one among many
political power brokers, barely distinguishable in this
regard from the parties or labor unions. Recourse by
politicians to the military as a source of power has
become a tacit rule of the Argentine political game.
The services have worked in tandem with virtually
every significant political force over the last 50 years.
Few of the country's politicians can truthfully claim
never to have knocked on the barracks door.
Some scholars and Argentine politicians have specu-
lated that Alfonsin 's election marked a decisive shift
from military intervention in politics. They argue
that the systematic and massive counterterrorist
campaign launched by the preceding military regime
involved a degree of repression and violation of
constitutional liberties unprecedented in Argentine
history. This, combined with the Falklands disaster
and the military's economic failures, uniquely dis-
credited the armed forces, according to these observ-
ers. The result, in their view, has been a salutory
affirmation by Argentine society of democratic pro-
cesses and the rule of law.
We agree with much of this analysis, but hesitate to
conclude that Argentina's basic political dynamics
have changed. The armed forces, in our view, remain
key players, and the political impact of their human
rights abuses will fade in time. The Argentine press
still lavishes attention on the political views and
maneuverings of the officer corps, and reporting from
the US Embassy indicates that
politicians, labor leaders, and businessmen are culti-
vating military contacts as eagerly as ever. Most of
the underlying causes of past coups?the absence of a
powerful conservative party, labor's recourse to polit-
icized strikes and protests, and the confrontational
style of the political parties?continue unabated. We
believe that, at a minimum, Alfonsin needs to com-
plete his term and hand power to an elected successor
before the revolving door of military and civilian
regimes in Buenos Aires will begin to close.
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? Civilian control over the armed forces. The Presi-
dent increased the authority of the newly civilian-
controlled Defense Ministry over the individual
services, and loosened the military's grip on the
extensive government-owned armaments industries.
? Symbolic gestures. The government also instituted
some changes that we believe were designed in part
to propagate the notion that the military's days as a
political power were over. Among these was disman-
tling the 1st Army Corps in Buenos Aires?a nexus
for coup plotting in the past?and the transfer of its
units away from the capital.
Alfonsin's treatment of the military, though designed
to curb its power and influence, was not wholly
punitive. According to press reports, the government
decided early to limit prosecutions for human rights
abuses to top generals and to a handful of subordinate
officers accused of especially egregious acts of
wrongdoing:
? Congress, according to the US Embassy, amended
the military code of justice to protect most junior
and middle-level officers on the grounds that they
were only "obeying orders" during the "dirty war."
Alfonsin made other efforts not to alienate the armed
forces as a whole. According to the US Embassy, he
limited forced retirements to flag ranks to assuage
junior officers' fears of a wholesale purge. Moreover,
once the housecleaning of top military ranks was
under way, he publicly identified with and praised
Argentina's "new" and "democratic" military and
repudiated the vociferous antimilitary sentiments of
some human rights groups that were clamoring for
the virtual abolition of the armed forces. Most impor-
tant, in our view, Alfonsin's government prosecuted
leftist terrorists accused of capital crimes in an effort
to demonstrate evenhandedness and to show that it
was not carrying out, as some critics asserted, a
vendetta against the uniformed services.
3
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo protest military
human rights abuses
Military Fears
Notwithstanding these efforts to deal with the officer
corps in a relatively balanced way, civilian-military
relations have degenerated sharply since Alfonsin
came to power. When he was inaugurated, the armed
services, according to US Embassy officials, were
exasperated with politics and eager to focus on their
military tasks. Now, however, we believe the military
views the government as an adversary that is attempt-
ing to destroy what remains of the armed forces'
influence and public standing.
One of the military's main complaints, according to
US Embassy is that the
human rights trials have become a forum for attack-
ing military honor in general and the services' record
in the war against subversion in particular. Despite
the government's decision to limit prosecutions to the
military elite, press reports state that junior and
middle-level officers still fear they will be held ac-
countable in civilian courts for their role during the
repression of the late 1970s.
struggle as an unmitigated success; they maintain that
only a few individuals committed excesses, and that
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Discontented military officers
those people have already been punished through
military channels.
Officers also fear the consequences of Alfonsin's
massive military budget cuts.
military morale is at an alltime
low and that cadets and NC0s, frustrated by low pay
and seeing no future in the military, are leaving the
Army in droves. In addition to being concerned for
their professional and financial well-being, disgrun-
tled officers have publicly complained that current
funding levels do not enable the services to carry out
their minimal national security functions, let alone
modernize and retain trained personnel.
The military, according to the US Embassy, is also
agitated by the specter of resurgent leftist terrorism.
We believe that there is currently little threat from
the left, and that the security forces could quickly
suppress efforts by the radical Montoneros or other
groups to resume the violence of the mid-1970s. The
armed forces, however, tend to believe unsubstantiat-
ed reports of leftist activity and blame the civilians for
not stemming the perceived rising tide of subversion.
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Officers also worry that the ruling Radical Party?
which we view as basically moderate?is being taken
over by "leftists." This charge is particularly grave, in
our judgment, because past coups have often been
justified by claims that the government was being
infiltrated by the left.
Military Cohesion and Factionalism
Although these attitudes toward the Alfonsin admin-
istration appear to be widely shared within the mili-
tary, the armed forces are not monolithic. In our view
there are three major rifts within the military:
? Interservice rivalries. The longstanding animosity
among the Navy, the Air Force, and the politically
and militarily dominant Army was highlighted by
the Falklands defeat, where the services proved
incapable of mounting joint operations. According
to the US Embassy, the war worsened existing
divisions by letting each service highlight the others'
failures and by driving a new wedge between the
Air Force?which believed that it alone had fought
creditably?and the Army and Navy. Alfonsin's
appointment this year of an Air Force general (in
lieu of the customary Army man) to head the Joint
Chiefs of Staff has probably aggravated interservice
rivalries, in our view.
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Austerity and the Military
After Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict in
1982, the armed forces, anticipating that the military
would soon be yielding control of the government to
civilians, moved quickly to purchase as much foreign
military equipment and technology as possible before
giving up power. When President Alfonsin took office
in late 1983, his administration was faced with a long
list of weapon contracts negotiated by the military
government. Alfonsin considered canceling many of
these, but provisions for penalties made this an
unattractive option. He decided instead to delay
deliveries of equipment and extend payment dead-
lines as much as possible. These economizing mea-
sures were not enough, however, and Alfonsin ordered
a 50-percent cut in the 1984 defense budget. His 1985
budget envisages an additional reduction of 10 per-
cent.
reporting, Alfonsin 's spending reductions have had a
sharp impact on military salaries and benefits, and
have raised considerable grumbling among junior
officers and noncommissioned personnel. Military
pay increases have not kept pace with inflation, and
the government is often late in making salary and
pension payments. These cuts in pay and other bene-
fits have prompted an exodus of personnel from all
three services. Ten percent of the Army's noncommis-
sioned officers resigned or requested early retirement
in 1984, and the Navy lost a third of its noncommis-
sioned officers and about one-fourth of its officer
corps. The Air Force is coping more successfully with
25X1 the cutbacks, but many servicemen have taken second
jobs to make ends meet
The budget cuts have also had a severe impact on
operational readiness. According to the press, many
Army posts have closed down, and equipment mainte-
nance has declined sharply because of the shortage of
spare parts and technical personnel. The Navy has
ordered two exercise slowdown periods in 1985, and
restricted training
Combat systems aboard
naval vessels are deteriorating rapidly, and the Navy
has been forced to forgo participation in joint exer-
cises during the past year. The Air Force has reduced
flight training to minimal levels.
sources report that in late 1984 some
personnel were refusing to fly, fearing that the danger
of malfunctions was increasing because of mainte-
nance cutbacks.
The Alfonsin government is trying to generate funds
for the armed forces by seeking export markets for
Argentine-manufactured weapons and foreign-made
equipment in the Argentine inventory, but this effort
has been largely unsuccessful according to US Em-
bassy In our view, the 25X1
military budget squeeze will continue for the next few
years at least. Military manpower levels will proba-
bly continue to decline as low salaries and depressed
living conditions encourage more retirements and
discourage new enlistments. Equipment maintenance
will continue to deteriorate, further reducing opera-
tional capabilities. The proficiency of pilots and other
skilled personnel will suffer further as more training
restrictions are imposed.
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.
Intraservice disputes. A welter of bureaucratic and
personality-related rivalries weaken solidarity with-
in each service. Perhaps the most crippling,
is the rivalry between
the infantry and cavalry. This struggle goes back for
decades and persists?although less acutely, accord-
ing to defense attache reporting?today.
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? Junior versus senior officers. Growing differences
between flag officers and lower ranks have been
aired in the press, which has carried articles in
which junior officers have denounced their superiors
for failing to stand up to the military's enemies.
US Embassy officials have reported that
officers below the rank of colonel generally are more
willing to confront the government, are more anti-
American, and are more receptive to radical politi-
cal and economic prescriptions than their seniors.
The importance of rifts within the military should not
be overstated, however. Indeed, in the past, internal
divisions have not impeded political action by the
military. Academic studies reveal that the services
were even more disunited during the 1960s and
1970s?an era of recurring coups and almost continu-
ous military rule. Above all, institutional solidarity in
the face of a perceived external threat?the Alfonsin
administration?has enabled the military to keep
internal disputes under control.
Another force for military unity is the authoritarian,
anti-Communist, and pro-US outlook shared, accord-
ing to the Embassy, by most senior officers. Even
where ideological and partisan differences exist within
the officer corps, we believe they are less acute than in
recent years. Numerous academic studies have high-
lighted the fact that, in the past, internal struggles
between liberals and nationalists or Peronists and
anti-Peronists split the military in half and affected
officers of all ranks. Present-day divisions between the
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minority of ultranationalist and anti-American junior
officers and the conservative, pro-American majority
are not so deep, affect fewer officers, and consequent-
ly are not nearly as debilitating.
Considering all the countervailing forces, we conclude
that the military on balance is more united than
divided. Most of the internal quarrels that currently
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preoccupy the services would, in our view, be subli-
mated if enough officers came to believe that Argenti-
na faced a political and economic crisis that only they
could resolve.
Civilian Allies and Popular Support
We believe the major factor that limits the military's
ability to influence democratic institutions is its lack
of powerful allies within the major political parties,
trade unions, and other interest groups. According to
US Embassy and press reporting, the armed forces
are more isolated from civilian society now than at
any time in recent Argentine history. The ruling
Radical Party, most factions of the splintered opposi-
tion Peronists, the Peronist-dominated labor move-
ment, and the minor parties on the left are openly
opposed to any political role for the military.
This is not to say that the military is completely
without influence. US Embassy reporting
for example, indicate that individual politi-
cians, labor leaders, and businessmen are cultivating
military connections as eagerly as ever.
We believe that these
contacts between the military and some of the follow-
ing groups, if maintained, could lay the groundwork
for more substantial and wide-ranging plotting at a
later date, assuming external conditions proved
favorable:
? Rightwing Peronists. This faction of Peronism sel-
dom pledges even verbal allegiance to democratic
legality
Herminio Iglesias, the leader of the
Peronist right, publicly lauds the armed forces for
the Falklands invasion, echoes their fear that leftist
subversion is reemerging, and, according to reliable
press and US Embassy reporting, is cultivating both
retired and active-duty officers who are eager to
move against the government.
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? Arturo Frondizi and the MID. Ex-President Frondi-
zi, who heads the small, center-right Movement for
Integration and Development (MID), has told US
officials that he is working with Iglesias, several
small conservative groups, and unnamed military
figures to oppose Alfonsin. While Frondizi claims to
abhor extraconstitutional measures, he admits that
some of his military colleagues are not so squea-
mish.
? Rightist elements in the Church. The Church as an
institution officially supports the Argentine Consti-
tution, but a few rightist priests have publicly urged
the military to abolish the "pornographic democra-
cy" inaugurated by Alfonsin. Academic studies
reveal that, although these clergymen are bereft of
significant influence beyond the barracks, they are
respected by some senior officers who have used
rightwing Catholic ideology to help legitimize past
military governments.
The military's ability to act either within or outside of
the system will, in our view, be tempered by the level
of perceived public support. We believe that public
clamor for a military government is unlikely; the
armed forces could act, however, if there was a
widespread popular conviction?expressed through
polls, the press, and the general tenor of public
25X1 debate?that there was no credible civilian alternative
to a vitiated Radical Party government.
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We agree with the US Embassy's assessment that the
overall political and economic climate would have to
deterioriate considerably before the public would tol-
erate a military regime. Memories of the services'
human rights abuses during the "dirty war," of the
Falklands debacle, and of the military's economic
failures still outweigh unhappiness over the inadequa-
cies of Alfonsin's government. The President remains
highly popular, according to opinion polls. Even as
inflation raged at nearly 1,000 percent annually last
May, over half of the country gave Alfonsin a positive
11
rating, and since he decreed a new economic adjust-
ment package in June his standing in the polls has
risen sharply.
We do not believe, however, that the failures of the
last military regime have inoculated Argentina
against the threat of military rule. The public still
views the services as political actors. A recent poll, for
example, revealed that almost 60 percent of Argen-
tines believe the military is willing?although not
currently able?to mount a coup. Finally, the main
bulwark against renewed praetorian activity?Alfon-
sin's popularity?could, in our view, quickly collapse
in the event of a severe political and economic crisis.
Outlook
The Most Likely Case:
Military Influence Remains Limited
We believe that the odds are roughly 4 in 5 that
Alfonsin will stay in office over the next year and that
the military's political influence will remain limited.
The fundamental basis for this judgment is our
conviction?shared by the US Embassy and most US
academic observers?that the President probably will
govern well enough to prevent the emergence of a
consensus against him, either among military and
civilian power brokers or among the public at large.
Alfonsin, in our view, is unlikely to seriously mishan-
dle the key issues that might provoke a move by the
military:
? The economy. The austerity measures launched by
the government in June stand a good chance, in our
judgment, of reducing inflation and enabling Bue-
nos Aires to meet its commitments to the IMF and
foreign creditors in the short term. For the time
being, the danger that hyperinflation will spark
political instability, a deep recession, and massive
social disorder appears to have receded.
? Human rights. Alfonsin remains aware of the threat
that wholesale trials of the military for human
rights abuses could present to his government. For
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President Alfonsin with military
example, US Embassy sources have
reported that he may grant immunity to most of the
officer corps once convictions have been obtained in
the ongoing trials of former junta members.
? Military austerity. All three services will continue
to suffer from low funding, but Alfonsin and his
Defense Minister appear to realize that not much
more can be cut from the military budget. The
President, according to the US Embassy, has even
contemplated a wage hike for officers, and the
Defense Ministry plans a general reorganization to
enable the military to use its financial resources
more efficiently.
? Subversion. Leftist terrorism, in our view, is unlike-
ly to take on major proportions over the next year.
Alfonsin almost certainly would let the security
services nip in the bud any resurgent leftist violence.
This scenario, however, does not preclude military-
inspired violence in the form of garrison uprisings,
abortive coup attempts by junior officers, or an
increase in terrorist acts by military-linked rightist
squads. Nevertheless, we believe that Alfonsin can
contain the political repercussions of such actions,
which would probably be committed by extremist
elements bereft of significant military and civilian
support. The armed forces as a whole will almost
Secret
certainly remain disgruntled, but their political isola-
tion, combined with adroit maneuvering by the Presi-
dent, will probably keep them in the barracks.
An Alternate Scenario: Military Intervention
In our view there is about a 1-in-5 chance that the
armed forces will intervene over the next 12 months.
The most likely precipitant of military action would
be an unraveling of Alfonsin's ambitious austerity
program, resulting in hyperinflation and a severe
recession. This would almost certainly cause Buenos
Aires to fall out of compliance with IMF guidelines
and lose access to foreign funds, while strengthening
politicians within and outside the government who
favor a debt moratorium. Such economic reverses, in
our view, could set the stage for widespread social
disorder, growing rightwing and leftwing violence,
and a plummeting of Alfonsin's popularity leading to
Radical Party losses in the legislative elections sched-
uled for November.
We judge that the political chaos engendered by an
economic collapse might alone suffice to discredit
Alfonsin completely and spur a military response. The
chances for rapid military intervention would rise
further in the event that the government slashed the
military budget again, or failed to control resurgent
leftist terrorism.
"Constitutional Coup." The most likely form of
military intervention, in our view, would be what the
Argentine press has dubbed a "constitutional coup"
that would use quasi-legal means either to force
Alfonsin from office or to surround him with military
and other conservative advisers. Such a move would
almost certainly have to be backed by top military
leaders in conjunction with parts of the conservative
and moderate Peronist political opposition, and might
also include disgruntled elements in Alfonsin's own
party. A "constitutional coup" would give de facto
power to the military and its allies, while preserving a
facade of constitutional legality that would probably
lessen the stridency of domestic and international
opposition to the move.
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Full-Fledged Coup by Senior Officers. A constitu-
tional coup would require the active participation of a
large sector of the political elite. It is possible, howev-
er, that economic and political conditions could de-
generate to a point at which the Joint Chiefs decided
to intervene but could secure only passive acquies-
cence from the public and the politicians. The military
then would probably mount a genuine coup. It would,
however, lack the legitimacy granted by formal com-
pliance with the Constitution and would almost cer-
tainly generate more internal opposition and interna-
tional criticism than a regime born of a constitutional
coup.
Ultranationalist Coup. The least probable form of
intervention, in our view, would be a coup?presum-
ably violent?by ultranationalist, junior, and middle-
level officers and a handful of generals. We believe
that such a move could succeed only under extremely
volatile economic and political conditions and if a
group of these officers managed to steal a march on
25X1 the Joint Chiefs. The result would probably be a
populist and nationalist regime supported by the far
right wings of Peronism and organized labor.
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Implications for the United States
We believe that the first months of military rule in
Buenos Aires would be frought with uncertainty. The
armed forces would almost certainly come to power
only after the Alfonsin government had been thor-
oughly discredited and the economy had collapsed.
Under such circumstances any military regime might
take unusual measures to revive the economy and deal
with the foreign debt, adopt a belligerent stance on
the Falklands issue, or engage in anti-US rhetoric to
bolster its domestic support. Only after it was firmly
in power would a military government's long-term
intentions become clear.
Nevertheless, we believe that in the long run either a
"constitutional" or an overt coup led by the Joint
Chiefs would probably do less harm to US interests
than an ultranationalist junior officer revolt. Al-
though such a coup would be a setback for the
movement toward democracy in Latin America, the
economic and foreign policies of a government con-
trolled by moderate generals probably would not
13
directly challenge US interests and might be prefera-
ble to unchecked political and economic deterioration
under an unpopular civilian government. Such a
regime would probably be less prone to antagonize the
United States and other Western countries through
risky actions regarding the foreign debt, the Falklands
dispute, and human rights. It would also?perhaps
after an initial period of experimentation?probably
adopt relatively orthodox austerity measures to cure
the domestic economy.
If an ultranationalist coup succeeded, however, we
judge that the impact on Argentine-US relations
would be uniformly negative. A nationalist/populist
military regime would, in our view, probably engage
in extensive anti-US and "anti-imperialist" posturing.
Moreover, such a government might well move be-
yond bluster and take actions harmful to US interests.
These could include refusal to repay or renegotiate
Argentina's foreign debt, a military move against the
Falklands, arms purchases from the USSR, and ex-
pansion of military-related nuclear programs. Finally,
a regime of this type would probably have a stormy
tenure, committing serious human rights violations
and leaving the country's political and economic
structures in a shambles.
Any military government in Buenos Aires, however,
would, in our view, harm important US goals and
strain bilateral ties; the US aim of fostering demo-
cratic stability in Argentina would be directly under-
mined. Only if the coup was "constitutional," or the
interregnum of outright military rule very brief, could
the damage to Argentina's representative institutions
be at least partially contained. We believe it is more
likely that the coup would involve considerable blood-
shed or be followed by a prolonged period of military
rule, thereby generating widespread public discontent.
If such a regime made little headway in resolving the
country's pressing economic and political problems
and lost power under humiliating circumstances, we
believe that the resulting legacy of bitterness and
strife would seriously hinder future efforts to extricate
Argentina from its endemic political instability and
economic decline.
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A coup would also, in our view, fuel traditional
Argentine anti-Americanism. This would be most
dramatic in the case of an ultranationalist junior
officer coup, which would probably try to legitimize
itself through crude anti-US words and deeds. It
would also be the case following a coup led by
moderate officers or the Joint Chiefs. The left would
almost certainly portray such a coup as orchestrated
by the United States and would allege that austerity
measures taken by a military regime were implement-
ed at Washington's behest. Such accusations, however
unfounded, would, in our view, find a receptive audi-
ence in sectors of the Argentine public. When the
military left power, recriminations over supposed
American involvement could poison US relations with
a civilian successor government.
The regional implications of military rule in Argenti-
na would be varied. Major powers such as Brazil, or
stable democracies such as Venezuela and Colombia,
would, in our view, barely be affected by a change of
regime in Buenos Aires. The continent's dictator-
ships?especially those of Chile and Paraguay?
might be bolstered by the Argentine military's return
to power, but we believe this effect would be short
lived. The demonstration effect of a coup would be
greatest?and the impact on the US goal of promot-
ing democracy throughout the region most severe?in
Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay, where weak or untested
civilian governments are facing formidable political
and economic challenges. All three countries have
close ties to Argentina and possess politically active
armed forces that probably would take heart from a
coup in Buenos Aires when considering any move
against their own elected governments.
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