FRANCE'S CHANGING ROLE IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Directorate of
Intelligence
Role in Africa
France's Changing
ALA 85-10097
September 1985
ropy 3 61
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Role in Africa
France's Changing
contribution by
This paper was prepared by the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis with a
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALAS
Secret
ALA 85-10097
September 1985
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
France's Changing
Role in Africa
Key Judgments President Mitterrand's decision in August 1983 to send troops to Chad to
Information available counter Libyan intervention there, only to be followed 15 months later by
as q/'ll September 1985 the abrupt withdrawal of French forces, illustrates some of the constraints
was used in this report.
that complicate France's African policy. France wants to maintain a high
profile in francophone Africa, where it enjoys substantial economic and
strategic advantages and has longstanding cultural and sentimental ties.
But France's limited resources constrain its involvement and assistance at a
time when the francophone community's needs are soaring. The Chad
imbroglio has been a sobering turning point at which the French realized
the limits of their ability to control events in Africa.
To maintain "great power" status in the region without ruinous expendi-
tures, the French Government is mixing highly visible diplomatic gestures
such as state visits with a variety of helpful but limited assistance
programs. Over the past two years, budgetary difficulties have forced Paris
to allow-and even to seek~ther Western and multinational donors to
share the burden of keeping its jealously guarded sphere of influence
afloat, while trying to keep policy decisions in its own hands.
President Mitterrand appears to be committed to preserving France's role
as the principal Western actor in Sub-Saharan Africa. The French
Government, we believe, continues to view its extensive involvement in
Africa-including specifically its political role-as vital to its interests and
prestige. Although a change of government in Paris seems likely after next
year's legislative assembly elections, there are virtually no major differ-
ences between Mitterrand's Socialists and France's conservatives on
African policy. We believe a new government, even if led by conservatives,
is likely to follow the same fundamental policy line in dealing with African
problems.
We believe the Mitterrand government is intensifying efforts to expand
financially profitable relations with African countries outside the French
community total French trade with 25X1
Nigeria an out rica, or examp e, now exceeds the volume of trade
with all of Paris's former African colonies, and access to strategic minerals
in Nigeria, Zaire, and South Africa is of particular importance to Paris.
Secret
ALA 85-10097
September 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Continuing problems in the French economy, however, have forced France
to reevaluate the levels and recipients of French economic and military
assistance to Africa. We believe France's evident inability to maintain
support to its African clients commensurate with their rapidly growing
needs will present serious problems, particularly for the francophone states
that depend on French financial support to keep their economies afloat.
We believe that France, over time, will be less inclined to commit troops to
Africa-particularly in areas of little or no economic interest such as
Chad-except under extreme provocation such as a direct attack on
French personnel and property. The French Government plans cuts of 8 to
10 percent in its military assistance programs for Africa, although it still
maintains approximately 13,000 troops in seven African countries to
protect French personnel and economic interests in the region.
Such a scaling back of French security involvement in Africa is likely to
cause Africans increasing concern. As it is, Mitterrand's decision to
withdraw French troops from Chad without consulting his African allies
already has caused many African leaders to question French resolve to
check Libyan expansion in Africa. Moderate leaders such as Senegal's
Diouf and Ivory Coast's Houphouet Boigny have made it clear that they re-
gard anything less than wholehearted French security support as a clear in-
vitation to Libyan expansion throughout the region. Indeed, France's
failure to counter Libyan expansion probably will increase domestic
political pressures on African governments to seek accommodation with
Tripoli.
We expect Mitterrand, as well as African leaders, increasingly to look to
the United States to supplement declining French economic and military
assistance. Cooperation with the United States will have built-in elements
of stress, however, as France's attitudes toward a US presence in its sphere
of influence remain ambivalent. Indeed, many French officials and expatri-
ate businessmen fear that Washington intends to supplant rather than
supplement France's role in Africa, according to US Embassy reporting.
Under a more conservative and nationalistic regime in Paris, we believe
there would be an even greater danger than at present that France would
become intransigent and less cooperative with US regional activities out of
fear that US firms would take lucrative contracts away from French
businesses.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
We believe there is little doubt that France in the next few years will
attempt to keep intact the essential elements of its traditional policy and
role in Africa. In the most likely circumstances, therefore, Paris will cut
back only marginally its military and economic aid, adding minimally to
the burdens the United States might have to shoulder. In a less likely
scenario, however, it is possible that France's limited retrenchment in
Africa could turn out to signal along-term reduction in its role in Africa.
This would leave the United States some stark policy choices as the only
Western power able to offer significant military and economic support to
the weak regimes in the area.
We believe that, if Paris were to make along-term decision to cut
significantly its financial and military commitments in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Libyans and Soviets would attempt to take advantage of
politically and economically weak countries in the region-especially those
with sizable Muslim populations. Libya has already made clear by its
actions to date that it intends to expand its influence and replace the
French presence in Africa. The Soviets are in no position to match or outdo
the French in providing economic assistance to these increasingly vulnera-
ble states, but they probably can be expected to offer modest increases in
military assistance to ingratiate themselves and promote Soviet interests.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
iii
Mitterrand's African Policy ...
1
...And the Africans' View of Paris
2
Enduring Economic Ties
Examples of Interdependence
4
Emerging Economic Strains
6
French Expatriates in a Bind
Wooing Non-Francophone Africa
Nigeria
A Continuing Military Presence
Implications for the United States
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Figure 1
Franc Zone States and French Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa
iNorrh
Ail~,nic
Ocean
Mauritania
Cape Verde ~*NOUakchotl
o
~~Praia ^ ~1
?Dakar 6 A y
`Banjul "'enegal
The Gambia
G?uinea~.
Bissau- ~!ssau
`Guinea
`\ Conakry*
1Freetowrt*
Sierra Leone t
Monrova*
Li~eria
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Mali
A_
Malabo ~[~* t
'~ YaoundA
Equatorial Guinea~~r ?Kribi
Sao Tome and Principe }'
~# I ihrnvilln
West African Monetary Union (UMOA)
Bank of Central Africa (BEAC)
French Military Presence
French base ,
~ Defense agreement
Major Shipping Route
Central African
0~ Republic
Zambia
Lusaka't
Gaborone*
Bountlary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
orbevyl ~u
(,yt)jibout
Indian
Ocean
Reunion O
(France)
0 500 1000 Kllomelera
0~500~1000 Mllea
d~ga5C8~ Port Louis
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
France's Changing
Role in Africa
Without Africa there will be no history ojFrance in
the 21st century.
Initial indications in 1981 that a Socialist government
led by Francois Mitterrand would abandon the activ-
ist, interventionist role in Africa of previous French
administrations raised serious concerns among franco-
phone leaders. Mitterrand and his top advisers quickly
decided to follow the precedents established by con-
servative French governments and committed them-
selves to increasing economic and military assistance
in Africa.'
The Socialists' willingness to continue the role played
in Africa by previous governments was put to the test,
in our view, by the 1983-84 crisis in Chad. Chad has
no economic interest for France, but Paris views a
stable, pro-West Chad as a barrier to Libyan expan-
sion into areas of strategic and economic importance
to France, according to a variety of published state-
ments. US Embassy reporting has indicated that
France's substantial-if somewhat tardy-response to
the Libyan invasion of Chad in 1983 allayed the fears
of some francophone African leaders that France
would no longer protect them from external aggres-
sion.
Paris's decision to withdraw from Chad in September
1984, leaving Libya in control of the north, reawak-
ened African leaders' worst fears that France was not
prepared to "stay the course." The Africans' concerns
were echoed in the French press, including papers
normally sympathetic to Mitterrand. The influential
daily Le Monde, for example, asserted that, because
' In this paper francophone Africa includes the former French
colonies of Benin, Burkina, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The ex-Belgian
colonies, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi, though French speaking, are
Paris allowed itself to be duped by Libya, francophone
Africans probably would turn to either the United
States or the USSR for their security needs.
In considering the question of France's future role,
this paper looks at the effects of the events in Chad on
broader French interests throughout black Africa. It
discusses developing trends that could jeopardize
Franco-African ties, the French role in the political
and economic life of francophone Africa, and the
implications of these developments for US interests in
the region and for US-French bilateral relations.
President Mitterrand's policies generally have fol-
lowed the policy fundamentals established since the
de Gaulle era, but with acost-consciousness more
recently imposed by France's increasingly tight bud-
get. US Embassy reporting indicates that the French
Government continues to view its extensive involve-
ment in francophone African affairs as vital to its
interests and prestige. High levels of French economic
and military aid to Africa bear witness to Mitter-
rand's often stated conviction that France must un-
dertake aleading role in Africa if it is to play a
prominent role in world affairs.
Mitterrand is convinced
that expanding markets in the Third World are
essential to French economic recovery and that Soviet
and Libyan gains in Africa can be halted or even
reversed by subtle diplomacy backed by carefully
tailored economic support and military assistance.
To reestablish confidence at home and abroad in its
determination to remain a major power in Africa, the
Mitterrand government has increased its diplomatic
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
activity to supplement its development and military
assistance. There has been a flurry of official visits
over the past year by top French officials to stalwart
allies such as Ivory Coast and Senegal.
Besides reaffirming old ties, the Mitterrand govern-
ment has taken steps to broaden its contacts with
Africa's left-leaning regimes-Angola, Benin, Guin-
ea, Congo, Seychelles, and Mozambique-where, ac-
cording to US Embassy and press reports, the French
believe there are opportunities to reduce Soviet influ-
ence. Thus, for example, the French Government is
actively seeking to improve long-troubled relations
with Guinea where, except for the language, French
influence was virtually excluded after President Se-
kou Toure broke with France in 1958. Since Toure's
death last year, according to US Embassy sources, the
French have allocated $3 million to support efforts to
restructure Guinea's financial and educational sec-
tors.2 Similarly, the US Embassy reports that over the
past year the French have been using additional
economic aid as a lever to moderate the behavior of
the Sankara regime in Burkina.
Paris is emphasizing its support for the francophone
African position on a number of issues. Mitterrand
has publicized widely his support for Western aid to
Africa and for a settlement in Namibia, and his
opposition to South Africa's racial policies. While
carefully insulating its established economic relations
with South Africa, Paris's recent recall of its Ambas-
sador and imposition of economic sanctions have won
praise even from critics such as Burkina's President
Sankara, according to press reports.
Nevertheless, we believe that French domestic eco-
nomic problems make it increasingly difficult for
Paris to back up its political goals in Africa with the
economic and military support proportionate to Afri-
can needs. The French economy has ground virtually
to a halt over the past year with annual GNP growth
projected at 0.9 percent for 1985. Rising inflation and
a soaring current account deficit have forced the
Mitterrand government to abandon expansionist eco-
nomic policies. As part of a governmentwide austerity
program, Paris has had to cut back on economic
assistance to Africa-although it still provides more
aid overall than any other Western donor-giving
first priority to a few of its traditional French-
speaking partners and moderating some of its ambi-
tious plans to develop ties to English- and Portuguese-
speaking African countries, according to US Embassy
sources.
We believe that economic considerations will be criti-
cal if France is called on again to intervene militarily
in Africa. We expect that Paris will resist being
drawn into such interventions in the future, particu-
larly in areas of little or no economic interest, such as
Chad. With diminishing resources at their disposal,
French officials are likely to give first consideration to
the security needs of countries where France has a
relatively high economic stake, such as Cameroon,
Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Gabon. If trade with franc
zone countries continues to decline, however, France's
need for export markets and sources of raw materials
will fuel expanding commercial relations with Nige-
ria, South Africa, and Libya-now a potential market
for French arms and other goods. We believe these
broader ties will at times run counter to the desires or
best interests of France's francophone partners.
Where conflicts of interest occur-in Chad, along the
Cameroon-Nigerian border, or in connection with
South African policies-we believe that Paris will be
reluctant to take any action, even under pressure from
francophone leaders, that will substantially endanger
its economic interests elsewhere in the region.
In our judgment, the withdrawal of French troops
from Chad, leaving the northern region to Libya and
effectively partitioning the country, has severely dam-
aged France's credibility, which had until then sur-
vived the crises of decolonization, economic decline,
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
Battleground for Co~tllicting
French Interests in Chad
We believe France's intervention in Chad placed
Paris squarely between a loyalty to its traditional
~gfrican partners and its need to develop profitable
markets elsewhere. In our judgment, French interven-
tion in Chad in 1983 was designed to reassure
~rican leaders that Paris will honor its defense
agreements against external aggression. Paris's sup-
port of the Habre government in its conflict with
Libyan-backed rebels temporarily reassured thelran-
cophone states that fear Qadh~ s expansionism. It,
however, disrupted potentially prof table Franco-
Libyan trade, particularly in arms. Paris has main-
tained diplomatic ties and some commercial ex-
changes with Tripoli throughout the past two years,
hoping to use them both to temper Qadha>i s behavior
and to safeguard France's markets. Indeed, high-
level French Government officials as well as French
businessmen involved in trade with Libya lobbied
throughout the conflict for accommodation with
Tripoli, according to US Embassy reporting from
Paris. Libya continues to provide about 4 percent of
France's oil imports, while it purchases 10 percent of
its weapons from French manufacturers. Although
France partially suspended its arms trade with Libya
at the beginning of the Chadian crisis, refusing to sell
new and sophisticated weapons to Tripoli, it has
continued to train Libyan pilots and repair Libyan
aircraft.
During the past year, US Embassy reporting from
Paris indicates that officials of both countries have
and the Socialist party victory. According to US
Embassy and press reporting:
? President Houphouet, long one of Mitterrand's clos-
est African allies and a personal friend, was out-
raged over the French withdrawal.
? President Mobutu, who had sent his own troops to
support the N'Djamena government, openly re-
buked Mitterrand during the French President's
visit to Kinshasa in December 1984 and was an-
gered over not having been consulted before the
French withdrawal was announced.
discussed future possibilitieslor wide-ranging ex-
changes in the fields of energy, agriculture, heavy
industry, arms, and nuclear technology. In our judg-
ment, Qadh~ is anglingfor more sophisticated arms
systems from France while Paris would welcome the
lucrative commercial and arms deals.
Thus, when faced with the costs of its IS-month
stalemate in Chad-over $SO million in operating
expenses in 1984 alone-and a setback to potential
arms sales to Libya, the French decided to cut their
losses in September 1984 in much the same way as in
1980. This left manylrancophone leaders wondering,
whether France's old
loyalties were not being replaced by newer, more
lucrative connections.
ment or compromise leader for Chad.
In our judgment, despite divisions within the French
Government on how much support to give Habre,
Mitterrand still appears committed to thwarting a
Libyan takeover of N'Djamena. To protect the integ-
rity of its security agreements with otherjrancophone
states, Paris is likely to intervene if'Libya were to
send troops across the 16th parallel. As time passes,
however, we believe that economic considerations will
make the French Government reluctant to send back
troops or planes. Instead, Paris will try to arrive at a
political solution in the form of a coalition govern-
? President Biya of Cameroon has complained pri-
vately that the impression of diminished French
security support would clearly invite Libyan expan-
sion throughout the region.
? To underscore these concerns, some francophone
leaders boycotted last year's Franco-African sum-
mit in Burundi, according to press reports, and
President Kountche went to Washington instead of
to Bujumbura.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
? President Kolingba of Central African Republic has
publicly chastised Mitterrand for the tragic conse-
quences of Paris's abandonment of northern Chad
to Libya.
Now keenly aware that the Socialists are unlikely to
win a parliamentary majority in the elections sched-
uled for next March, most francophone African lead-
ers appear to be letting their relations with the
Mitterrand administration drift. According to US
Embassy reports, Presidents Diouf and Houphouet
urged fellow delegates at a recent meeting of franco-
phone heads of state to play down contacts with the
Socialists until after the elections. Some African
presidents, such as Houphouet and Gabon's Bongo,
are hedging their bets, according to press reporting,
maintaining close contact with conservative leader
Jacques Chirac and other rightist candidates to suc-
ceed Mitterrand. US Embassy sources in Paris report
that there are even signs that the old network of
conservative interests in Paris, francophone leaders,
and the rightist French expatriate communities in
Africa, is again coming to life.
Examples of Interdependence
In our judgment, both France and its African partners
continue to profit from the complex web of their
economic relationships despite African political con-
cerns. It is widely known that commercial distribution
channels, sources of financing, product standards, and
long-established personal ties tend to keep Franco-
African economic and commercial relationships mov-
ing along awell-established track profitable to French
businesses. Frenchmen in senior positions in many
francophone governments traditionally use their influ-
ence to assist French firms in obtaining contracts. In
Gabon and Ivory Coast, for example, French advisers
use their influence to block non-French contracts,
according to US Embassy sources. French companies
frequently have as partners senior African govern-
ment officials to ensure that their interests are pro-
tected. French import-export firms, shipping compa-
nies, and financial institutions are generally known to
work together in francophone Africa for their mutual
benefit. French investors receive substantial support
Figure 2
French Trade With
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-84
from Paris in the form of government guarantees by
the French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade
(COFACE) and access to substantial amounts of
concessional money. About half of all official French
aid goes to African subsidiaries of French firms,
according to press reports.
France, in turn, is dependent on the raw materials,
strategic minerals, and oil it gets from its ex-colonies
and other Sub-Saharan countries, according to US
Embassy reports. Conflicts in the Middle East have
prompted France gradually to seek other sources of
petroleum, and by 1984, according to press reports,
Africa furnished over a third of France's oil needs.
More than 50 percent of this petroleum comes from
the Sub-Saharan region, principally from Nigeria,
along with Gabon, Cameroon, and Congo. In 1983,
France imported over 80 percent of its copper and
nickel ores, over 60 percent of its manganese, and 45
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
The organizations within the French Government
responsiblelorjoreign assistance are complex and
often overlap. Although this contributes to bureau-
cratic i~ghting, I1S Embassy sources in Paris indi-
cate that it also creates a flexibility unparalleled
among other donors. Most bilateral aid is disbursed
through three channels: the Fond d'Aide et de Coop-
eration (FAC), the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation
Economique (CCCEJ and the French Treasury. With-
in budgetary limits set for the FAC and CCCE, hinds
can be shiJ'ted between countries and projects at the
discretion of the government with no accounting to
Parliament. There are other sources that also can be
tapped on occasion. For example, according to US
Embassy reportingjrom Paris, part ojthe French
military operations in Chad were financed from the
Prime Minister's special fund, and the President's
African adviser was able to give Air Madagascar $2
million from an unknown government source.
percent of its uranium from African countries, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting from Paris. Most of
its bananas, cocoa, peanut oil, and substantial
amounts of its cotton, coffee, and wood came from the
zone as well. According to the most recent trade
statistics, purchases of these commodities are on the
rise. In exchange, France markets machinery and
electrical appliances, transport equipment, chemicals,
iron and steel, textiles, and other manufactured
products.
We believe that the Mitterrand government appreci-
ates that France's trade with francophone Africa is
directly related to levels of French economic assis-
tance. In our judgment, France's aid ultimately pays
for imports of French goods by these states and for
many years has, in effect, financed France's positive
trade balance with the region.
French financial assistance is crucial to sustaining the
fragile economies of many African states. According
to OECD statistics, France is still by far the largest
single source of aid-excluding emergency food assis-
tance-for Sub-Saharan Africa. These figures show
that Paris provides nearly twice as much aid as the
United States, although French GNP is only one-sixth
that of the United States. In 1983-the latest year for
which data are available-55 percent of all French
bilateral aid went to Africa south of the Sahara. Over
half of this aid was given for technical and cultural
assistance-that included partial support for some
12,000 French technical assistants-a third supported
investment, and the rest went for economic and
financial aid that included nonproject assistance,
balance-of-payments subsidies, and food assistance.
The economic relationship between France and Africa
is most fully realized in the franc zone-in our
judgment, one of the few relatively effective experi-
ments in international monetary and economic inte-
gration anywhere and one of the principal factors in
the good economic performance of some of the franco-
phone states. The zone provides a common monetary
system for its members, overseen by French personnel
and guided by French expertise through direct links
with the French Central Bank and Treasury. The
monetary system is administered jointly by two Afri-
can monetary unions-the West African Monetary
Union (UMOA) and the Bank of Central Africa
(BEAC). Members of the franc zone can borrow from
the French Central Bank at a token 1-percent interest
and may in practice exceed their nominal lines of
credit. The franc zone countries have overdraft privi-
leges with the zone's central banks that show up as
charges on the French treasury but not as budgetary
expenditures. Any franc zone balance-of-payments
deficits with the outside world are automatically
folded in and financed along with the French balance-
of-payments deficit. Furthermore, the franc zone
states share acurrency-the African Financial Com-
munity franc (CFAF)-that is fully convertible with
the French franc (FF) and guaranteed by the French
Government at a fixed rate of 50 CFAF to 1 FF. The
convertibility of the franc zone currency facilitates
international trade and foreign private investment.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Figure 3
Major Western Donors to
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-83
0 1980
Figure 4
Distribution of French Aid to
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1983
United States
West Germany
United Kingdom
Japan
Italy
Most of France's concessional assistance abroad goes
to members of the franc zone, according to US
Embassy reporting. Of the 96.8 percent of project
loans that went to Sub-Saharan Africa between 1980
and 1984, 66.8 percent went to franc zone countries.
a Economic and financial aid includes non-project assistance, balance of
payments support, and food aid.
b Technical assistance includes support, shared with host countries, for French
technical advisors and teachers.
~ Investment aid supports rural development projects and infrastructure.
federation with Senegal. Discussions between Cona-
kry and Paris have focused so far on the need for a
thorough economic housecleaning as a precondition
for joining the zone-beginning with devaluation and
reorganization of Guinea's Central Bank, according
to US Embassy sources.
These benefits have prompted several African states
during the past two years to consider joining the zone.
Mali became a member in 1984 and, according to
press reports, was able to write off a substantial debt
to France as part of its initiation into the union
because the French Treasury was anxious to shift the
responsibility of keeping Mali's economy afloat to the
franc zone collective. Gabon and Cameroon sponsored
Equatorial Guinea's membership in 1985, hoping to
facilitate regional trade and promote political stabil-
ity. Press and Embassy reports indicate that Mada-
gascar and Zaire have debated joining the communi-
ty, and Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome, desperate for
financial support, have considered membership. The
Gambia also is considering entry as part of its nascent
Emerging Economic Strains
Despite the considerable benefits shared by both
France and its francophone partners, the economic
ties between them-like their political relations-
have undergone unprecedented stress over the past
few years. On the commercial side, the record shows
that French investment and trade with Sub-Saharan
Africa have fallen off during the last few years.
According to customs' figures, France's balance of
trade with francophone Africa that traditionally has
shown a healthy surplus, declined during 1983 and
1984, and recorded a deficit for the first five months
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
Figure 5
France: Aid and Trade With
Former French Colonies, 1980-83
1980 81 82 83 0 1980 81 82 83
of 1985. This downward trend, we believe, is worri-
some for the French, and points to slower African
markets for French-manufactured goods as well as
increases in French purchases of African agricultural
products and oil.
As commercial ties have declined, continued problems
in the French economy have also forced Paris to cut
back its financial outflows at a time when franco-
phone Africa's financial needs, aggravated by
drought, famine, unstable world markets, and escalat-
ing debt, are accelerating. Although aid totals report-
ed by the OECD, expressed in French francs, in-
creased between 1980 and 1983, the real value of
French assistance rose only moderately between 1980
and 1982 and declined in 1983, the latest year for
which there are published figures. According to US
Embassy reporting from Paris, the real level has
dropped even further in 1984-85. Moreover, the de-
cline of the French franc has created problems for the
zone in importing commodities, such as oil, that are
denominated in dollars. For example, even though
dollar oil prices dropped somewhat, the cost of a
barrel of oil in francs rose from 121.1 FF in 1980 to
259.6 FF in 1985.
Figure 6
Value of French Aid to
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-83
1980 French
francs
1
~ ~ ~
0 1980 81 82 83
As a result of France's inability to maintain assistance
and financial flows proportionate to its African
clients' needs, Paris is adjusting and refining its aid
programs to maximize their benefits for French politi-
cal and commercial interests, according to US Em-
bassy sources. For example, Paris is considering:
? A more flexible application of assistance, including
budgetary aid and increasing use of structural ad-
justment loans.
? Cutbacks over the next three years estimated at
10 to 15 percent in the number of teachers and
advisers jointly paid by France and host countries.
The French will try to hold on to higher level
positions where possible and will pay a larger por-
tion of these salaries in order to do so.
? Softer terms for mixed credit loans-which combine
government financing with that of private French
banks-used to support French business ventures in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Africa. In the past, such loans generally went to
large investment projects in the wealthier develop-
ing countries. Since 1981 there has been a shift
toward programs for the poorer LDCs, particularly
in Africa. This type of assistance helps boost
French trade by stipulating that necessary materiel
must be procured in France or a franc zone
country.
? Greater reliance on the overdraft account at the
French Treasury for CFA countries to finance
French imports and investments
As a result of diminishing resources, the French
Government also is targeting its assistance more
narrowly and is focusing on countries that have strong
commercial assets, according to US Embassy sources
in Paris. Almost all are in the franc zone, notably
Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Cameroon. Others include
Zaire, Mozambique, Madagascar, and recently,
Guinea.'
French Expatriates in a Bind
Cutbacks in French technical assistance programs,
lower levels of trade between France and the franco-
phone African countries, and world recession and the
declining value of the French franc have taken their
toll of France's prosperous expatriate communities in
Africa. Although we do not have precise figures,
several published sources indicate that the number of
French living in Africa peaked around 1982 and since
then has dropped sharply: For example, there were
about 60,000 French citizens living in Ivory Coast
three years ago. Today, the US Embassy reports, the
French community has fallen to about half that
number. According to press and US Embassy report-
ing, several thousand advisers and technicians have
been repatriated during the past two years. Hundreds
of French teachers and advisers returned from this
year's long vacation in France to find pink slips on
' Direct economic considerations are not the only criteria for
assistance, however. Djibouti, for example, is the fourth-largest
recipient of French aid in francophone Africa, although its trade
with France is negligible because of its location on Africa's east
coast and proximity to the Middle East. France will increase this
year's economic assistance program to Ouagadougou in an effort to
forestall Soviet- and Libyan-backed subversion against Ivory Coast
and other francophone states, according to US Embassy sources.
their desks. Private businessmen also have left be-
cause of the worldwide recession in recent years that
wiped out many small businesses and because of
greater state control of the economy. By the end of
last year, morale in the Ivorian French community
had slumped so drastically that France's Minister of
Cooperation, Christian Nucci, was sent to Abidjan to
reassure the expatriates that Paris was mindful of
their concerns, according to US Embassy sources.
This Africanization to a large extent has been encour-
aged by the French Government, according to US
Embassy sources, both for reasons of economy and
security. Paris hopes to lower the French profile in
Ivory Coast because popular resentment over the
French community's prosperity might surface when
new leaders attempt to cope with financial pressures
and declining living standards.
Nevertheless, the expatriate communities continue to
play their traditionally important role in maintaining
close French economic ties to the region. On the basis
of press and academic publications, we estimate that
about 200,000 French citizens-a fifth of all those
living abroad-still live in Sub-Saharan Africa, with
the largest concentrations in Ivory Coast and Gabon.
We believe that the cumulative day-to-day influence
of the French communities, particularly in the eco-
nomic sector, still plays a substantial role in African
governments' policies.
Wooing Non-Francophone Africa
As levels of trade with francophone Africa decline,
France has been aggressively pursuing financially
profitable relations with other areas of the continent,
a policy begun during the Giscard era. OECD figures
indicate that within the last decade Nigeria and
South Africa have become France's most important
trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, because of
French imports of Nigeria's high-quality oil and of
Pretoria's strategic minerals, particularly manganese,
titanium, coal, uranium, and chrome. French firms
are also active in Angola, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
Mozambique and are expanding French access to
Zaire's mineral wealth. In a sense, French interests
are shifting to countries offering potential economic
profit and away from states that are dependent on
France for financial assistance.
This shift has not gone unnoticed among France's
francophone allies. For example, according to press
reports, francophone leaders attending the Bujumbu-
ra summit did not hide their irritation at the partici-
pation of English-speaking countries in what was
billed as a Franco-African forum.
Nigeria
Nigeria is now the principal site of new French
investment in black Africa, and France has replaced
Britain as Lagos's largest trading partner, according
to British and French trade statistics. Nearly 200
French firms are active in Nigeria, and over 4,000
French expatriates are living there. The US Embassy
indicates that France is one of Nigeria's best custom-
ers; it bought $2 billion worth of goods, mainly oil, in
1984, and is the second-largest supplier of Nigerian
imports. A French company was the first European
firm to negotiate a lucrative countertrade deal for a
half billion dollars' worth of Nigerian oil, according to
US Embassy sources. France also supplies military
arms to Lagos. Nigerian Army Chief of Staff Baban-
gida and Nigeria's Minister of Trade visited Paris
earlier this year to discuss the further expansion of
commercial relations and of the modest French mili-
tary assistance program, according to press and US
Embassy reporting.
In our judgment, Franco-Nigerian political relations
have not kept pace with the surging economic rela-
tionship. Anumber of outstanding political issues
between the two countries remain unresolved. Resent-
ment lingers in Nigeria's dominant northern region
over France's support for Biafra during Nigeria's civil
war in the late 1960s. Lagos still considers France its
chief competitor for regional influence, and the two
countries have taken conflicting positions over Niger-
ia's border quarrels with its francophone neighbors.
Nevertheless, we believe Lagos regards France's mili-
tary presence in West Africa as an effective brake to
Libya's expansionist ambitions in the area and, as a
result, has dropped for the present its usual com-
plaints about French neocolonialism. We believe that
Lagos also appreciates France's usefulness as a major
customer for its oil while Nigeria desperately seeks
export revenues to bolster its staggering economy.
South Africa
We believe the continuity of French policies toward
South Africa with those of past French governments
has been particularly striking. As in Nigeria, political
relations are poor while economic ties flourish. De-
spite criticism by French officials of South African
racial policies, US Embassy reporting shows that
Paris until recently has carefully insulated substantial
French-South African commercial ties-presently es-
timated in the press and US Embassy reporting from
Paris at $1.6 billion-from political fallout. Although
in 1983 the Mitterrand government banned new
nuclear contracts to South Africa, it has defended
French companies' participation in the controversial
Koeberg nuclear reactor construction project under
old agreements and approved large purchases of
South African coal and uranium by state-owned
companies to meet French energy needs, according to
press and US Embassy reporting. We believe that, in
spite of the UN arms embargo, South Africa has been
able to obtain spare parts for its Mirage fighters and
French-built helicopters on the international market.
France's freeze on new investments in South Africa,
announced in July, is unlikely to have significant
impact on either economy, according to US Embassy
reporting from Pretoria. The size of French invest-
ment is small-between 5 and 7 percent of total
foreign investment in South Africa. Although local
South African operations of one or two large French
companies may lose some business, the US Embassy
believes trade between the two countries will be
unaffected, in particular French coal purchases.
Zaire
US Embassy reporting from Kinshasa indicates that,
despite his anger at France's precipitous withdrawal
from Chad last year, President Mobutu has welcomed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
an increasingly active French presence in Zaire.
French trade and financial support serve to reduce
Zaire's dependence on Belgium-the former colonial
power-and Paris's military support is a significant
factor in maintaining the stability of Mobutu's re-
gime. The French Government has wooed Mobutu in
order to assure access to Zaire's mineral wealth-and
because it recognizes Zaire's importance to the stabil-
ity of central Africa. Over the past two years, French
Government-financed exports to Zaire have been
growing steadily
A key element in the Franco-Zairian relationship,
according to US Embassy reporting, is French com-
mand of Zaire's 31st Parachute Brigade, one of two
elite units in the Zairian armed forces. In September
1986, the French are scheduled to form and start
training another parachute unit. There are over 100
French military advisers in Zaire, although the mili-
tary budget is modest-10 million FF in 1985-and
the French rely heavily on equipment and support
provided by the United States and other donors. ~
A Continuing Military Presence
As France's traditional economic and financial link-
ages with francophone Africa have declined, changes
also have occurred on the military side. Perhaps the
biggest jolt to these relations over the last few years
was Mitterrand's withdrawal of troops from Chad last
year without ensuring Libya would do the same.
Despite French officials' efforts to reassure the Afri-
cans of their continuing support, doubts remain both
in Africa and France-in view of France's handling of
the crisis in Chad-about the Socialist government's
willingness or even capability to respond decisively to
a major military challenge in Africa. A variety of
press and other published accounts indicate that many
francophone Africans are coming to view France's
military role in Africa as inadequate to the region's
security needs. The governments of Ivory Coast and
Cameroon, for example, fear for their security, partic-
ularly because of Libyan ambitions in the area,
according to US Embassy and press reporting.
In our judgment, although it will continue to have a
substantial military presence in Africa for the near
future, financially strained Paris is in the process of
lowering its costs in the region. Increasingly, this will
limit the possibilities for direct military intervention.
Although we believe a direct military threat to Paris's
economic and strategic interests, such as an attack on
French personnel and property, would provoke the
French to a limited military response-namely, a
police action or temporary increase in military assis-
tance-we believe the French will try at all costs to
find political solutions to the region's security prob-
lems, even at the expense of traditional ties and
loyalties.
Since its ex-colonies became independent, France has
carefully limited the scope and objectives of its inter-
vention capability in Africa. As US Embassy report-
ing from Paris indicates, military intervention has
been regarded as a limited tool to be used sparingly,
not as a normal means of policy implementation. The
objectives of a military intervention have been nar-
rowly defined by conservative governments as well as
the Socialists, and precise time limits set to avoid
open-ended situations. Following these prescriptions,
military intervention can be used only to stabilize a
situation, not impose solutions. Furthermore, al-
though on paper France's 47,000-man Rapid Deploy-
ment Force (FAR) is ready for deployment in Africa,
its effective strength consists of one parachute and
one marine infantry division. These units are ham-
pered, according to US officials, by a lack of logistic
support that would take time and as yet unavailable
financial resources to assemble.
Nevertheless, President Mitterrand has gone on re-
cord that France will honor its existing military
agreements. We believe France's economic interests,
large French expatriate communities, a nostalgic
pride in its great power status in the region, and
compelling strategic concerns continue to dictate a
significant military role for French military assistance
training in Africa. Furthermore, the French Govern-
ment depends on its African air and naval bases to
protect and service its fleets in the South Atlantic and
Indian Oceans. The French Indian Ocean Squadron,
based at Djibouti and Reunion, is the largest perma-
nent Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
The French use facilities both in Djibouti and Dakar
to monitor Soviet activities in the region, and Djibouti
is a vital connecting link between France's Mediterra-
nean forces and the sophisticated communications
center at its base on Reunion.
Francophone Africa also has an important stake in
the military relationship. The French security umbrel-
la has protected ruling African elites and extensive
French commercial interests since independence from
both domestic dissidents and the ambitions of neigh-
boring governments.? Influential members of African
military establishments still welcome the presence of
French troops as a deterrent to security threats and
support to the local military command. France main-
tains 1,500 troops in central Africa to back up its
pledge to limit Libyan expansion in the region. In
Ivory Coast, the French military presence serves as a
deterrent to politically ambitious Ivorians-among
them the military-who might wish to challenge
Houphouet's prolonged rule.
About 13,000 French military personnel are stationed
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority at military bases
in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central African
Republic, Djibouti, and the Indian Ocean territories
of Reunion and Mayotte. Military assistance missions
are located in 23 African states. Although the number
of French military advisers in Africa has declined
from nearly 3,000 in 1960 to some 1,300 today, this
has been offset by the presence of nearly 3,000
Africans training in France. An extensive network of
personal contacts between African and French mili-
tary personnel that developed during the postindepen-
dence period remains strong, solidified by training
and joint maneuvers held at regular intervals in the
' French forces have intervened in Africa more often than those of
any other outside power-at least 19 times in the past 28 years,
according to academic sources. These interventions have occurred
where French economic or strategic interests are strongest. The
French have been called in by host governments to repel invasions
from neighboring countries (as in Chad in 1984 and Zaire in 1978);
to protect Western nationals and business interests (in Chad); to
mount air operations against insurgents (in Mauritania and Chad);
and to provide a government with security protection at the time of
independence (Djibouti in 1977). Paris, however, acted on its own
initiative, engineering the overthrow of Emperor Bokassa of the
Central African Empire in 1979-probably as much because of
Bokassa's flirtation with the Libyans as the savagery of his rule,
African states. The emphasis of French military
assistance has shifted from day-to-day command and
basic training to provision of advanced training in
France, often related to sales of complex hardware to
the African states. France provides major weapon
systems to Zaire and most of its former colonies
except Benin, Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, and Mali,
which are supplied by the Soviet Union.
Until this year, the Mitterrand government has
steadily increased military aid to Sub-Saharan Africa
in absolute terms and as a proportion of Paris's total
foreign assistance budget. Although information is
still incomplete, the 1985 budget cut military spend-
ing for Africa by about 8 to 10 percent as part of a
general government austerity program. According to
US Embassy sources, cuts are being made by reduc-
ing equipment deliveries rather than the numbers of
French military personnel in Africa and Africans 25X1
training in France.
In our judgment, the francophone African states have
little choice but to continue to look to Paris as a
principal source of military and economic support.
French financial aid to the poorer francophone coun-
tries, such as Niger, the Central African Republic,
Burkina, and Djibouti, will remain vital to their
survival. We see no other Western donor at present
willing to step in and assume France's role in propping
up some of the world's poorest countries. For the
wealthier states, such as Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and
Gabon, we believe the need for a French military and
economic presence will remain strong. Ruling elites
will continue to worry over the Libyan threat to the
region's stability. We judge they would oppose any
effort by Paris to reduce the presence of French
troops, which the African leaders view as an impor-
tant deterrent to local unrest. Although French in-
volvement in these more developed economies has
diminished, we believe they will still be expected to
play an essential role, given the lack of adequate
African capital or skilled personnel.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Figure 7
The French Military Presence in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa
Former French French Bases Defense
Colonies Agreements
We expect France will continue to place priority on
economic concerns, even if it means reducing its
pressure on Libya to honor its commitment to with-
draw from Chad. Both Mitterrand and Qadhafi prob-
ably will move to expand their mutual economic and
arms supply relationship for commercial benefit and
in order to increase the political leverage each hopes
to establish over the other. We believe France's
principal concern now is to deter Qadhafi from in-
creasing his challenge to French interests elsewhere in
Africa, in the Caribbean, and in the South Pacific.
Joint Military Assistance Military Advisers
Maneuvers Agreements
As a result, we believe that France in time could drop
withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad as a precon-
dition for expanding relations with Tripoli-unless
Qadhafi offers a flagrant provocation. Both Mitter-
rand and Foreign Minister Dumas have insisted pub-
licly that France will intervene if Libyan troops cross
the 16th parallel in Chad. Other possibilities, how-
ever, remain open to Qadhafi that might not require a
French response, including subversion of the Habre
government by Libyan-backed rebels moving in from
the north, south, and east.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
We do not expect major shifts in France's current
African policies if a government of the right or a
centrist coalition wins next year's legislative assembly
elections. Public opinion polls indicate that a Socialist
victory is unlikely. A consensus seems to be forming,
according to press reports, that the centrist Union
Pour la Democratie (UDF) of ex-President Giscard,
together with the rightist Rassemblement pour la
Republique (RPR), led by Jacques Chirac and favored
by conservative French expatriates in Africa, proba-
bly will achieve a working majority in parliament.
African policy, however, is unlikely to be an issue in
the French elections, according to US Embassy re-
porting. Despite public criticism of Mitterrand's
abrupt withdrawal from Chad, French popular inter-
est in Africa is waning, and attention is focusing on
European politics and domestic economic issues, ac-
cording to the Embassy
We believe Mitterrand will try to work out a division
of authority that leaves foreign and defense policy to
the President and domestic affairs to the Prime
Minister. In any event, there are virtually no major
differences on African policy between the principal
parties, according to the US Embassy. US diplomats
speculate, however, that the election of a more conser-
vative government in Paris next year may increase
France's possessiveness toward its African sphere of
influence and might encourage a more confrontation-
al, nationalist rhetoric toward Libya in the Sub-
Saharan region. Such a posture, in our view, would
still be tempered by the domestic economic con-
straints and commercial ties to Libya that have faced
the Mitterrand government over the past four years.
In our judgment, the government's options will be
limited further by a lack of critical military equip-
ment-reconnaissance satellites and aircraft or heavy
transport-to back up a more aggressive stance to-
ward Qadhafi.
Over the coming months, francophone governments
will continue to allow their relations with France to
drift, in our view, hoping that a new government in
Paris will adopt new policies more favorable to their
interests. Additional French concessions to Tripoli
would further erode francophone leaders' confidence
in French resolve and increase pressures on African
governments in the region to seek accommodation
with Libya. The weakest regimes, particularly those
in the Sahel that are physically closer to Libya, are
likely to find Qadhafi's blandishments more difficult
to resist and may be less willing to support the West
on issues that might offend Tripoli.
African uneasiness over too great a dependence on
France is certain to increase as the present generation
of leaders committed to a French role in Africa passes
on and is replaced by a more nationalistic elite.
Economic problems in Africa and declining living
standards are likely to increase pressures for Africani-
zation as this new elite seeks the privileges and power
enjoyed by French expatriates.
In the economic sphere, as well as the military, we
believe, rising costs of French economic assistance will
be more difficult to sustain as Paris attempts to cope
with its economic slowdown. The French Government,
we believe, will continue to pare down its technical
assistance programs; and, because of uncertainty over
their long-term economic payoff, we believe France
will shy away from funding costly prestige develop-
ment programs, such as the Kribi liquefied natural
gas project in Cameroon and the Konkoure hydroelec-
tric project in Guinea.
Although the Mitterrand government has demonstrat-
ed its commitment to a French presence in Africa as
an essential element in preserving French prestige and
influence on the world stage, Paris is aware of its
inability to fund this presence alone. Increasingly, we
believe, French officials will invite US participation in
meeting the economic and military assistance needs of
the francophone states. Already they have sought US
help in Chad and in three of France's most important
African outposts-Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Djibou-
ti. In fact, we believe US and other Western assis-
tance is essential to the overall goals of the French
Government's African policies.
In our view, however, such cooperation with the
United States will have built-in elements of stress. We
believe that French attitudes toward the US role in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Africa remain ambivalent, and the government is
likely to keep a wary eye on US activities there. Many
French officials and expatriate businessmen suspect
that Washington intends to supplant France's influ-
ence in Africa. Aclear-cut victory of the center-right
might intensify French resistance to the access by
other states to commercial contracts and market
protection. In that case, Paris is likely to attempt to
diminish African dialogue with the United States.
Although these aspects of French thinking will contin-
ue to make France a demanding and often difficult
ally, they also are likely to have the more positive
effect of reinforcing France's willingness to maintain
its military and economic commitments to Africa.
The French suspect that any slackening of their
commitment would drive the Africans to look else-
where-to the United States or to Eastern Bloc
countries-for support.
In our view, the French Government probably will
continue to see both tactical and long-term advan-
tages to cooperating with the United States in Africa
but will look at each situation with a view to preserv-
ing the primacy of French interests. While welcoming
US support in many cases, French administrators in
Africa almost certainly will want to control decision-
making at the policy level. In Senegal, for instance,
the French have along-established interest in the
structure of centralized, state-run economy and are
resisting pressures from other donors for privatization
and dismemberment of state-run institutions.
Any decision by Paris to undertake fundamental cuts
in its financial and military commitments in Sub-
Saharan Africa would prompt an intensified cam-
paign by francophone leaders to find substitute part-
ners. Already they are looking to the United States
for substantial increases in its economic assistance. As
indicated by urgent appeals last year by Houphouet
and others for US military intervention in Chad,
Washington is very likely to be approached about
increasing its role in the region as well. The Africans
also will try to enlist US help in persuading the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to
increase their assistance programs and soften their
terms.
In fact, it is very likely that the Africans' needs and
expectations will exceed the abilities of France, the
United States, and the international organizations to
respond. In this situation, there will be growing
temptation for some frustrated African leaders to be
critical of US policy and business interests. To a
limited extent, this atmosphere will encourage and
facilitate non-Western activity in the region.
The Libyans, for example, are already trying to take
advantage of politically and economically weak coun-
tries in the region-especially those with sizable
Muslim populations. Libyan leader Qadhafi has em-
phasized publicly his view that France is "finished" in
Africa and that Tripoli will succeed Paris as the
principal source of influence in the region. Already
there are indications-such as Libyan Foreign Minis-
ter's visits to several West African countries and the
opening of Libyan Call Society offices in the region-
that Libya is using a more active diplomacy to expand
its influence. Moscow, for its part, might try to fill
any vacuum left by France with offers of military aid
on favorable terms. Soviet efforts, however, probably
will continue to concentrate on extending long-term
credits for weapons purchases and military training,
rather than trying to match the level of economic aid
now given by France.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Q
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/01 :CIA-RDP86T00589R000300410001-9