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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 Guatemala: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction Secret ALA 85-10099 CR 85-13566 October 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Directorate of Intelligence and Their Interaction Guatemala: Significant Political Actors Division, ALA, coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean of African and Latin American Analysis, and Office of Central Reference. It was This paper was prepared by Secret ALA 85-10099 CR 85-13566 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Summary Information available as of 26 August 1985 was used in this report. Guatemala: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction Guatemala will elect its first civilian government in 19 years on 3 November 1985. The country's gradual evolution toward democratic rule has improved its image abroad, diminished its sense of international isolation, and-from the standpoint of US interests in Central America- increased Guatemala's potential as a strategic player. Nevertheless, the military-which retains a decidedly rightist viewpoint and has dominated the political system for much of this century-will remain the final arbiter on most policy issues. The armed forces, however, are helping in the transition and appear committed to free and open elections. Until recent years, the frequently repressive military has had little incentive to relinquish its control over the country. Guatemala has been racked by decades of violence and a 25-year-old insurgency that stimulated the armed forces' accumulation of power and resources. In March 1982, however, a group of young Army officers, concerned over Guatemala's growing isolation and escalating rebel activity and numbers, toppled the regime and installed retired General Rios Montt to broker military and political reforms. Under Rios Montt, a new counterinsurgency strategy was formulated that attempted to address the socioeconomic causes of the insurgency. At the same time, the administration tried to open a fledgling political process to participation by moderate parties and new or previously excluded groups. Although Rios Montt was ousted after 17 months in part because he miscalculated the strength of opposition to his reforms, he established a new democratic direction for Guatemala, which his successor, Chief of State Mejia, has largely followed. Central to this effort was the Constitu- ent Assembly election in July 1984, in which moderate parties made an es- pecially strong showing. We believe that the center will again prevail in the election scheduled for November and in a possible runoff in December. Some trends likely to shape the country's short-term political future are becoming apparent: ? The center-leftist Christian Democrats and moderate National Centrist Union are the frontrunners, and either party's presidential candidate is acceptable to the military. ? The ultrarightist National Liberation Movement remains a potent political force, but its propensity for violence and coup plotting has contributed to a stormy-and increasingly violent-campaign period that is dimming its electoral prospects. iii Secret ALA 85-10099 CR 85-13566 October 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 ? The balloting is likely to erode further what popular support remains for the radical left, which is divided over how it should respond to the electoral process. Mejia's generally conciliatory policies have encouraged Guatemala's vari- ous interest groups to cooperate in the transition. Catholic Church leaders, for example, while increasingly outspoken on human rights issues, have generally attempted to avoid provocative actions so as not to imperil the de- mocratization process. Nevertheless, because of the diversity and conflict- ing priorities of the various interest groups, we expect periodic-and sometimes serious-confrontations to continue. Government attempts to institute badly needed austerity measures in 1985, for example, met strong opposition from the business community, ultimately forcing retraction of the measures. Even so, the confrontation seemingly is leading to stronger private-sector involvement in the government's search for solutions to the country's worsening economic situation. The opening of the political process takes place at a time of diminishing fortunes for the extreme left. ideological and other differences continue to limit guerrilla effectiveness and to frustrate Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to unify the four rebel groups. In addition, a burgeoning civilian defense program and civic action initiatives have helped reduce insurgent ranks, according to our estimates, to about 1,500 full-time combatants-roughly half their force level in early 1982. For now, however, the military's limited air and ground transport and other logistic problems will make further reductions difficult, and we believe the guerrillas will continue small-scale ambushes and economic sabotage in the countryside and engage in sporadic terrorism in the cities. Over the near term, the country's general volatility, diverse political groupings, and serious economic problems are likely to complicate the efforts of the new civilian government to consolidate a power base. As a re- sult, competing interests and lack of political direction are likely to preclude a dramatic or quick improvement in relations with the United States, although many Guatemalans see the installation of a civilian-led government as essential to eliciting increased US support. Within this framework, centrist elements will look to the United States for material assistance and political protection as a means of gaining leverage with the armed forces, while rightists will resist any conditions-especially involv- ing human rights demands-attached to such aid. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Summary iii Recent Political History 1 Role of the Military 2 Moving Force in the Transition Process 2 Improving Political Climate 4 The Constituent Assembly and National Elections 5 The Guatemalan Political Spectrum 6 National Liberation Movement (MLN) 6 Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG) 9 Revolutionary Party (PR) 9 The Emerging Center 10 Major Insurgent Groups Outlook and Implications for the United States Politically Significant Organizations Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Figure 1 4 Honduras Guatemala-_._/t..t El Salvador tiNicagagua tom.. Panama Costa Rica Tly Mexico ,,.Huehuetenango 1 ~ y%94 San o'. Marcos li Totonicap Alta Verapaz Gug-tem ro reso AGuatemalal- ~- GUATEM/ALA Jalapa Secatepeque: Santa - \ Jutiapa Rosa { / Izab%a I 1r3 (Os SIERRA DE ~A Chiquimula , 'f , ELMOPAN Belize Gulf of Honduras i Honduras ----) r ? El Salvador Kilometers -VUILI! - - - I Pacific Ocean 5o too SAN SALVADOR"' L C) ; \r Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Guatemala: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction Guatemala, which has been beset by more than three decades of violence from extremists on both the left and the right, is making a transition to civilian rule for the first time since the administration of President Mendez Montenegro (1966-70). The transition re- flects a gradual but pivotal change in the role of the military and other traditional political actors, and has led to the emergence and strengthening of moderate groups that favor democratic solutions over violence. The transition is fragile, however. Initially, it depends on continuing cooperation from the military, as well as on the commitment from moderate and other key political sectors to peaceful and democratic balloting during national elections scheduled for November 1985. Even with a smooth election, however, Guate- mala will face additional challenges because of the country's political diversity, lack of experience with the democratic process, weakness of democratic insti- tutions, economic problems, and the general volatility of Central America itself. This paper, the third in a series of reference aids on the Central American nations,' provides a broad- based description and analysis of Guatemala's politi- cal spectrum, as well as the principal political actors and their interaction. Like its predecessors on El Salvador and Nicaragua, it offers in appendixes A, B, and C capsule summaries of the key political groups and major leaders, and a listing of politically signifi- cant organizations currently or recently active.' The Roots of Violence Violence, armed revolt, and a rigid political structure have been endemic to Guatemala for decades. Much of the violence has its origins in the 1944 revolution, which cast out the last in a line of traditional military dictators. Although the government under the highly personalistic rule of Jorge Ubico (1931-44) had re- filled treasury coffers, balanced the budget, and built more roads and hospitals than all of its predecessors combined, it also relied on ruthless repression of all political opposition. In addition, Ubico's economic policies-based on the exploitation of Indian labor and extravagant concessions to foreign businesses- alienated and politicized large segments of the middle and lower classes, while his tolerance of military corruption antagonized some reform-oriented Army officers. Following Ubico's forced resignation on 1 July 1944, the tenures of President Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-5 1) and his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54), were characterized by widespread reforms that sought to enfranchise the country's large Indian population, promote social and labor legislation, and redistribute the earnings of a plantation-based economy. As presi- dent, however, Arbenz allowed members of a small Communist group-the Guatemalan Labor Party-to entrench themselves in the government and register their organization as a legal political party. His land reform policies also angered key sectors of society, including much of the military and many of the largest landowners. Claiming that the reforms were Communist inspired, the oligarchy-aided by disgruntled former Army officers-ousted Arbenz in early 1954. The coup, ' There is a foldout table, A Guide to Key Political Groupg, at the end of the paper containing a list of the political organizations, with their abbreviation and orientation, discussed in the text. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 which brought to a close Guatemala's "decade of revolution," reversed many of the reforms enacted by Arevalo and Arbenz, and propelled the country into an intensely anti-Communist phase that grew increas- ingly violent. In the ensuing counterrevolutionary period, the rightwing governments of Carlos Castillo Armas (1954-57)-who had led the revolt against Arbenz-and Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-63) an- nulled land reform laws, outlawed leftwing parties, removed restrictions on foreign investment, increased police powers, and repressed or executed thousands of politicians, labor leaders, and peasants. The cycle of violence intensified in the 1960s and 1970s. In November 1960 a large group of young Army officers, who resented what the public record shows as US involvement in the 1954 coup and Guatemala's cooperation in the training of Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion, staged an unsuc- cessful revolt against the government, and some fled to the mountains. Later they formed the first of several leftist guerrilla groups that remain active today. The Army's response was indiscriminate re- pression, and vigilante groups-the precursors of death squads-assisted in the counterinsurgency function. In the two decades since 1963, virtually all sectors of Guatemalan society participated in-and were victimized by-political violence. Role of the Military Preeminent Political Institution. The insurgency pro- vided the military with an added sense of purpose, forced it to grow professionally, and reinforced insti- tutional identity and loyalty. As the Army expanded its presence into isolated guerrilla-infested areas, it could justify command of more national resources and became the fastest growing component of an other- wise small public sector. As a result, the armed forces consolidated their position as the preeminent power in virtually all Guatemalan affairs. With the exception of the Montenegro government, which was forced to sign a pact that explicitly subjected its policies to military veto, all Guatemalan chief executives since 1963 have been active-duty or retired Army officers. During this period, the hold of the officer corps on key executive and administrative posts-including lucra- tive directorships of burgeoning state-owned corpora- tions-has allowed it to accumulate wealth while also enjoying virtual immunity from civil judicial author- ity. As military influence rose, traditional civilian struc- tures and institutions fragmented. Most significantly, the economic elite, once a tightly knit group of plantation owners, became increasingly diversified with the emergence of modern business entrepreneurs and manufacturers, while rising expectations and growing political awareness among the middle and lower classes made these sectors increasingly less responsive to the will of the oligarchy. Public restive- ness reinforced the military's conservatism and its view of itself as guarantor of security, thereby en- abling it to rationalize the use of fraud to keep civilian politicians out of office and justify its indiscriminate repression against moderate reformists and radical revolutionaries alike. Under the Lucas Garcia regime (1978-82), for example, there were 400 to 500 politi- cally related deaths monthly during January-March 1982, according to US Embassy estimates. By early 1982, the country's polarization into extreme rightist and leftist camps had caused the exodus and decimation of moderate elements, inflated guerrilla ranks, and further undercut Guatemala's already tarnished international image. Determined to reverse these trends and galvanized by reports of fraud in the 7 March presidential election, a group of young Army officers toppled Lucas on 23 March and installed a three-man junta headed by retired Gen. Jose Efrain Rios Montt. A highly respected former Armed Forces Chief of Staff with a reformist reputation, Rios Montt had been a victim of electoral fraud as the Christian Democratic presidential candidate in 1974 and, as such, was perceived as an honest broker for the reforms being pushed by junior and middle-level officers. Moving Force in the Transition Process. Although of relatively short duration, Rios Montt's tenure as president provided Guatemala with a new direction in terms of the counterinsurgency campaign, the role of the military in politics, and evolving options for new political entities. His counterinsurgency strategy' em- ployed innovative political, military, and psychologi- cal measures that sought to gain the confidence of the peasant and Indian populations, particularly in the ' The country's various guerrilla factions and the impact of the government's counterinsurgency effort on them are discussed be- 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret contested Western Highlands. For example, our ex- amination shows that small patro s were use o increase e Army's presence in remote areas, to inculcate a sense of trust in the local populace, and to help guard against the indiscriminate actions attendant in larger Army sweep operations. Civilian militia forces also were organized to give villagers a stake in their own defense and provide an intelligence and early warning function for the armed forces, while amnesty and civic action programs helped undercut popular support for the guerrillas. In our view, a major impulse for the new direction in the counterinsurgency effort was the perception by the armed forces that an improved human rights image for which was cut off in 1977. During Rios Montt's tenure, the Army increasingly attempt- ed to win the support of the local populace by offering protection to villagers, who previously might have had their homes burned or been executed for alleged cooperation with the rebels. nel were warned to honor human rights during mili- tary operations, and several hundred policemen were dismissed in an attempt to curb the activities of quasi- official, rightwing death squads. As the. government's carrot-and-stick strategy helped the military regain control of the countryside, Rios Montt also attempted to use the Army to weed out administrative corruption and set the stage for a return to civilian rule. Seeing the vulnerability of the judicial system to extreme rightist and leftist threats, Rios Montt established special secret tribunals to remove large numbers of corrupt officials who had operated under the Lucas regime, and to prosecute captured insurgents and other antigovernment opposi- tion. The Army was also concerned that radicals might exploit the planned political liberalization, and expanded its administrative districts from nine to 22 separate military zones plus the northern department of El Peten, while local military commanders received wide authority over nearly every facet of community life in their zones, including political party activity. On 23 March 1983, Rios Montt lifted the state of siege he had imposed and announced the first steps of the transition to civilian rule, especially encouraging participation in the electoral process by moderate leftist parties and new organizations representing previously excluded social groups. He also took steps to reduce the power of the traditionally predominant rightist parties such as the National Liberation Move- ment, whose programs and policies, we believe, were viewed by reform-minded officers and civilian leaders as unrepresentative and a continuation of the status quo. Moreover, he delayed the announcement of an election timetable to allow emerging political groups time both to organize and to draw support away from the established rightist parties, which historically have had the money and organization that almost certainly would have given them an edge in any early vote. Revamped party registration procedures, imple- mented largely as a means to eliminate existing -and often fraudulent-voter lists, also helped to buy time for the newer parties. Nonetheless, in carrying out his political reforms, Rios Montt managed to alienate nearly every influen- tial sector of Guatemalan society. The Roman Catho- lic hierarchy, publicly charging that the regime was responsible for the growing militarization of the coun- try, was particularly critical of the obligatory nature of the civilian defense program and its alleged exploi- tation of the Indian population. Similarly, the special courts-whose membership and proceedings were kept secret to protect judges from assassination-were singled out by the Church and human rights groups for violating due process. More directly threatening to Church leaders, however, was the evangelical fervor of Rios Montt, who promoted Protestantism and his own religious beliefs by means of Sunday radio "sermonettes." Business and industrial groups grew uneasy over tax reform plans that included a 10-percent value-added tax needed to help Guatemala meet guidelines set down by the International Monetary Fund and other international financial agencies. Although many large Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 landowners supported the tax proposals because agri- cultural exports were excluded, rumored government plans to institute modest land reform were vociferous- ly opposed. Rightist political parties, perhaps sensing that they could capitalize on their lead over moderate parties in organizing for the elections, also soon joined in the criticism of government policies by demanding an early election. If other key sectors of Guatemalan society found Rios Montt's policies controversial, so too did a majority in the military. betrayed by the President's increasing reliance on civilian advisers drawn from his small "Church of the Word" sect and the junior officers who had brought him to power. While more moderate-minded members of the armed forces became fearful that his idiosyn- cratic behavior was endangering the reforms sought by the majority of the officer corps, still others- especially those associated with the extreme right- believed that the changes went too far. Finally, after surviving several coup attempts, Rios Montt was ousted on 8 August 1983, and Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores was installed as Guatemala's new Chief of State. Improving Political Climate. Mejia shares Rios Montt's goal of opening up the political system, and is less encumbered with personal idiosyncracies and controversial policies than his predecessor. Neverthe- less, Mejia's efforts to foster the democratization process must balance a variety of competing interests, foremost among them the institutional prerogatives and integrity of the armed forces. We believe that there are limits to the military's tolerance of civilian rule. The armed forces, for example, are unlikely to permit any new government to investigate past abuses of power, corruption, and other wrongdoing. In addi- tion, in our view, the Army will strongly resist any attempt to diminish its control over the civilian de- fense patrols, military spending, and institutional matters, including officer promotions and the naming of the defense minister. Nonetheless, Mejia's generally conciliatory policies have had some success in encouraging Church, uni- versity, and political leaders to cooperate in the transition. For example, underscoring the govern- ment's commitment to improve its human rights image, Mejia in mid-1984 pardoned scores of prison- ers convicted by the now-defunct special tribunals established by Rios Montt. Subsequently, some 400 policemen were indicted for various crimes, and more than 300 Treasury Police members were dismissed for corruption and other abuses, according to government statistics reported by the US Embassy. Responding to a request by Church leaders and a highly active human rights organization-the Mutual Support Group (GAM)-Mejia also established a government commission to investigate the unusually high number of disappearances plaguing the country. Mejia's conciliatory gestures are also directed at Guatemala's insurgents. In September 1983, he an- nounced an amnesty program-since extended to January 1986-designed to entice the guerrillas, as well as some 45,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, to return to their homes. Some 3,000 refugees, many viewed by the government as guerrilla sympathizers, had been repatriated by the end of 1984, according to US Embassy estimates. Encouraged by the growing numbers of returnees, the government has devised a model-town program-"Poles of Development"-by which it plans to reconstruct and resettle on or near their original sites some 19 villages destroyed by the fighting. Thus far, more than a dozen villages have been completed and are inhabited. Mejia also has used more conventional military meth- ods to continue the government's strong push to control the insurgency. In this regard, the prolifera- tion of civilian defense units is probably the single most important development in the counterinsurgency program. Growth of the defense forces has continued apace with the program numbering some 915,000 25X1 25X1 25X1 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret members in 1985 and slated ultimately to reach 1 million. The Guatemalan armed forces, including its various police organizations, also have continued to grow, and active-duty personnel now number 44,600, according to US defense attache estimates. As a result, the Army's General Staff estimates, that its coun- terinsurgency strategy has reduced insurgent ranks to some 900 to 1,200 full-time combatants. Correspond- ingly, popular support for the guerrillas has continued to plummet-a trend that, in our view, is likely to accelerate if a moderate civilian government is in- stalled in 1986. Despite noticeable counterinsurgency gains, the armed forces' continuing logistic problems-especial- ly the lack of air and ground transportation-and the country's stagnant economy are likely to hamper significant further advances against the rebels. The counterinsurgency effort depends heavily upon the government's ability to garner popular support by providing security and followthrough on promised developmental assistance and social services. In this regard, senior officers-weary of the military's pro- tracted involvement in formally running the govern- ment-accurately perceive that the armed forces lack the expertise needed to bring about an economic recovery. Economic data show that Guatemala has not rebounded from the recent worldwide recession as quickly as other Central American countries, in part because it has not had access to as much foreign assistance. The Armed Forces High Command is optimistic, that the planned return to civilian rule in January will help end Guatemala's international isolation and improve its chances of securing financial and military aid. Mejia's efforts to improve his government's image have already paid some dividends in the international arena. In September 1984, Guatemala was selected as a vice president of the 39th UN General Assembly, and diplomatic relations with Spain-which were broken in 1980 after Guatemalan security forces raided the Spanish Embassy to evict protestors who had seized the building-were formally reestablished. In December, Mejia further reduced Guatemala's international ostracism by his state visit to Costa Rica, where he met with exiled leaders of the Guate- malan Democratic Socialist Party and convinced them to return home and participate in the national elections. The Constituent Assembly and National Elections As the initial phase in his plan to return Guatemala to civilian rule, Rios Montt announced in mid-1983 that elections for a Constituent Assembly would take place in July 1984. Despite Rios Montt's ouster soon there- after, Mejia maintained his predecessor's electoral blueprint. Some 17 political parties and three civic comrhittees met the necessary registration guidelines, and the elections were held on schedule on 1 July 1984. Election results showed that more than 2.5 million of Guatemala's estimated 3.5 million eligible voters registered, with some 1,157 candidates compet- ing for seats in the 88-member body. Nearly 1.9 million voters-some three-quarters of the registered electorate-cast ballots. Three major parties-repre- senting the right, center, and left-received almost 45 percent of the vote and obtained the lion's share of seats in the new Assembly. Official and independent observers from the Organi- zation of American States, several foreign countries, and the various parties themselves agreed that the vote was conducted honestly and without interference from the military. Some critics initially tried to discredit the election by alleging that the large num- ber of null or blank votes-some 23 percent-was a protest against the regime. US Embassy reporting on the election indicates, however, that many of these appear to have been cast by illiterates, and they may also reflect a confusing two-ballot system and the inclusion of unused ballots among those voided by election officials. Indeed, the only specific charge of fraud-levied by perennial rightist coup plotter Leonel Sisniega-was quickly discredited. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 To ensure continued control over the transition pro- cess, the Mejia government has limited the Assem- bly's authority to writing a new constitution and associated laws regulating the judiciary and the na- tional elections. Moreover, the Assembly presidency has been rotated among the major parties-the Chris- tian Democrats, National Centrist Union, and the National Liberation Movement-to preclude one par- ty from using the Assembly to bolster its election prospects. These parties also chair the three main commissions developed by the Assembly to draft the new constitution, electoral codes, and civil rights legislation, but a power-sharing arrangement has permitted the smaller parties to chair several subcom- missions. Some parties have sought to delay the Assembly's progress to gain time to organize, raise money, and pursue coalitions or upset existing ones. Mejia, who initially resisted fixing a date for the elections and thus seeming to force the Assembly to speed up its work, apparently became concerned by February 1985 that excessive delay could destabilize his own regime; national elections are now scheduled for 3 November 1985, with an anticipated runoff election for president set for 8 December. Swearing-in ceremo- nies for the 100 congressional winners, as well as inauguration of the new civilian president and vice president, are set for 14 January 1986, when the current Assembly will be dissolved. The Guatemalan Political Spectrum Traditional Parties A review of their policies and pronouncements shows that Guatemala's many political organizations are generally personalistic without well-defined ideologies or programs. Most are new and not deeply rooted in society. In the past, expediency and the scramble to win government positions and favor with the military often dictated last-minute political realignments and discredited most party leaders. The country's three oldest groups-the ultrarightist National Liberation Movement and the center-leftist Christian Democrat- ic Party and the Revolutionary Party-thus far have been the only ones capable of maintaining any signifi- cant grassroots support. National Liberation Movement (MLN). Historically the strongest and best organized of Guatemala's traditional parties, the MLN has been openly de- scribed by its longtime leader, Mario Sandoval Alar- con, as the "party of organized violence." Repeated allegations by local politicians and other interest group leaders link the MLN and Sandoval-who has never denied the charges-with death squads such as the Organized National Anti-Communist Movement (MANO, Mano Blanca, or White Hand), the New Anti-Communist Organization (NOA), and the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA). Support for the party traditionally has come from the most conservative large landowners-especially coffee growers-and from small merchants and more business-oriented segments of the middle class. waning. The MLN allied itself in March 1984 with the rightist but less extremist National Authentic Central (CAN), with the coalition winning 23 seats and some 13 percent of the vote in the Constituent Assembly election. MLN President Hector Aragon Quinonez is one of the three rotating presidents of the Assembly. In late 1984, the alliance was joined by several lesser rightist parties, including the previously nonaligned Democratic Institutional Party (PID), which won five seats in the July 1984 Assembly vote. Even so, the MLN's ability to garner only 14 of the Assembly's 88 seats was seen by many observers as a poor showing by the party, whose longtime influence appears to be We believe Sandoval's continued refusal to relinquish control of the party to more moderate leaders and give up his claim to the group's presidential candidacy is likely to hamper the party's ability to contest the elections in 1985. Earlier this year, Sandoval's auto- cratic style led to the withdrawal of the CAN from the rightist coalition, with CAN leaders publicly criticizing Sandoval's unwillingness to apportion posi- tions more equally among the members of the alli- ance. =CAN's financial backers were withholding their support in the mistaken belief that they could pressure Sandoval to abandon his presidential plans. Ironically, 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Table 1 The March Toward Elections Party/Coalition Presidential Candidate Running Mate DCG/FCD-5 a Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo Roberto Carpio Nicolle UCN Jorge Carpio Nicolle Ramiro de Leon Carpio PDCN/PR Jorge Serrano Elias Mario Fuentes Pieruccini MLN/PID/FDP Mario Sandoval Alarcon Jaime Caceres Knox 8 December 1985 Presidential runoff election (if necessary) 14 January 1986 Inauguration of president and vice president; Constituent Assembly dissolved and National Congress sworn in; new Constitution enters into force Eligible voters 3.9 million c (3.5 million) d Registered voters c 2.8 million c (2.5 million) Registered parties 14 (17 parties, 3 civic committees) Congressional seats 100 (88) Governorships None (none) a Supports DCG but not in formal coalition. b Civic committee led by Quixtan; did not meet registration requirements. c Estimate. d Figures in parentheses are for July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. c Voting is mandatory for literates 18 to 70 years old; active duty military personnel are barred from voting. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Figure 2 The Political Spectrum' Extreme Left Center Center Center Right Extreme Left Left Right Right Parties PGT/O PSD DCG PR UCN PNR CAN MLN FUR FN PDCN PP FDP PID PUA FCD-5 FPO AD MEC FUN PUD CND Paramilitaries URNG ESA EGP b MANO ORPAb NOA FARb PGT/Db MRP PRTC Front groups FP-31e CR CDP CUC FERG NOR CGUPb FDCPb CCDAd Unions CONUS CUSG CTF CNTd FENATRAACf FENCAIGr FTQ FASGUAe FTGr FCGf FTR FCI f FTI f CNUS FENOCAM FTA Private FUNDESA CACIF Official bodies an GAM AGSAEMP social groups CDHG (nongovernmental) n For discussion of these and other significant organizations see appendix A. b Member of the URNG insurgent umbrella group. e Associated with the EGP. d Associated with the FAR. e Associated with the PGT/O. rAssociated with the CUSG. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret campaign contributions from less wealthy MLN mid- (FCD-5). The National Centrist Union (UCN), creat- 25X1 25X1 dle-class backers also had been dropping, because of objections to CAN's ties to the oligarchy. For their part, PID leaders have demanded a more equitable distribution of power and candidacies in exchange for their continued participa- tion in the coalition. Sandoval-who, according to various polls, appears to be running a distant third or worse in the campaign- seems increasingly concerned over his fading electoral prospects. The MLN's propensity for violence, elec- toral malpractice, and involvement in coup attempts, has contributed to an unsettled presidential campaign in which Sandoval, according to US Embassy sources, was implicated in coup plotting in April 1985. At that time several interest groups with strong ties to the MLN sought to capitalize on a dispute between Mejia and business leaders over highly contentious austerity measures. The MLN also employed its rightwing and media contacts to foment public unrest and antigov- ernment propaganda in 1983, when it contributed to the overthrow of Rios Montt. Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCGA Despite the decimation of its leadership by death squads during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the center-leftist DCG probably most closely rivals the MLN as a national organization. The party not only finished first on the national list in the July 1984 balloting with more than 16 percent of the vote, but it also garnered 20 seats in the Constituent Assembly. As the country's de facto voice for the legal left and the principal left-of-center opposition party, the DCG shares interests, objectives, and philosophy with numerous labor and student groups. Many Catholic Church leaders, according to US Embassy also quietly sympa- thize with the party's political orientation and ideolo- gy, which are largely consistent with those of other reformist Christian Democratic parties in Latin America. Like many Guatemalan parties, however, the DCG has suffered from publicly documented internal splits and personal rivalries. Before the Constituent Assem- bly election, several prominent party leaders-includ- ing former DCG Secretary General Danilo Barillas- quit the party to form the Democratic Civic Front ed in July 1983, also is a DCG offshoot. The DCG has attempted to rally support around its former secretary general, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, who was proclaimed the party's standard bearer at the national convention in July 1985. We believe Cerezo, however, may have already prejudiced the party's chances in the elections by his refusal to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with pivotal centrist par- ties. The wide range of groups present at a party gathering in February suggests that the DCG will seek the votes of the democratic left in the elections. 25X1 Cerezo, however, apparently has rejected a more formalized left-of-center coalition. Revolutionary Party (PR). Although for many years one of the most powerful political groups in Guatema- la, constant internal bickering and a leadership taint- ed by association with the corrupt regimes of the past have forced the PR to seek electoral help. According 25X1 to US Embassy widespread differences of opinion over which presidential candi- date would maximize the PR's electoral chances in November have caused further fragmenting, leading various PR leaders to support three separate presiden- tial nominees. The party's heterogeneous nature-with both left- and right-leaning wings-was evident in early 1985, when several longtime party leaders rejected the PR's formal alignment with the UCN-led centrist coalition. Those opposed to the alliance-mostly the "Old Guard" dissidents-were led by Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, who outmaneuvered party moderates to gain the secretary general post last March. In ex- change for delivering roughly one-quarter of the party's adherents to Jorge Serrano's centrist Demo- cratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN), Fuen- tes received the PDCN's vice-presidential spot. Ser- rano's following among evangelical and peasant groups, in our view, exceeds the recognition level of the PDCN, and thus his party's association with the more widely recognized name and symbol of the PR could make Serrano the campaign's darkhorse or perhaps its spoiler. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 The Emerging Center While rightist parties such as the MLN almost certainly will remain a potent political force, we believe the trend in Guatemala is increasingly toward the political center. The strong showing by both the reformist Christian Democrats and the moderate Na- tional Centrist Union, in our view, reflects popular rejection of years of military dominance, violence from both the left and the right, and extremist "solutions" to the country's ills. Indeed, these two largely centrist parties finished one and two with 30 percent of the popular vote and 41 seats in the 88- member Assembly between them. Despite these gains by the country's more moderate political elements, their need over the longer haul to accommodate a variety of competing sectors, including the wishes of the military, suggests the path to democratization will be slow. For the near term at least, the National Centrist Union (UCN) has emerged as a pivotal moderate political force. Following its securing nearly 14 per- cent of the vote on the national list and 21 seats in the Assembly, the UCN was perceived by many local political observers as the favorite in the 1985 elec- tions. The party's subsequent alliance with other centrist parties, together with a weakened left and the continued factionalization of the right, further boost- ed its early electoral stock. Polls taken earlier this year, for example, indicated that the UCN-led coali- tion was favored to win the November balloting, with the DCG close behind, and rightist hopefuls running a distant third. Nonetheless, the alliance-already weakened by the earlier "official" defection of the Revolutionary Party to the PDCN-collapsed in July this year when the UCN's other major electoral partner, the National Renewal Party (PNR), with- drew to pursue an independent candidacy. As a result, many of these same local observers now give Christian Democratic candidate Cerezo the nod as frontrunner. Despite these setbacks, we believe the UCN is rela- tively resilient. The extensive public relations machin- ery of UCN newspaper publisher and presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle apparently has helped the UCN campaign coffers remain solvent, while generating significant publicity for his campaign. Carpio still could be hurt, however, by numerous allegations that the UCN is the "official" party of the current de facto military regime. Although untainted by past connections with the armed forces, the UCN is heavily in debt to an Army-controlled bank and therefore presumably susceptible to military influ- ence. We have no evidence that the UCN has become Mejia's "official" choice to lead the new civilian government, but it is likely that the party's moderate platform, together with its largely business-oriented presidential slate, would provide the Army with the centrist victory that we believe it prefers. Contributing to centrist electoral hopes is the articu- late, professional leadership of the National Renewal Party. Supported by moderate industrialists and seg- ments of the middle class, and led'by its well-known secretary general, Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre, the PNR won some 7 percent of the vote and five seats in the Assembly last year. In exchange for his party's support, Maldonado had held the vice-presidential spot on the UCN-led ticket until mid-1985 when he withdrew his party to pursue his own candidacy, a move that precipitated the already described collapse of the UCN's centrist coalition. The decision to renege on the agreement, however, apparently was prompted by the adoption of a constitutional provision that prohibits the sitting vice president from seeking the presidency in the following term. Maldonado previously had shown vote-getting ability as the presi- dential candidate on a joint PNR-DCG ticket in 1982. Interest Groups Guatemala's key economic and social groups-busi- ness, labor, and the Church-are represented by a variety of competing organizations that share the military's disdain of the country's politicians, whom they regard as inept and disorganized. Although also sharing with the armed forces support for a free market economy and opposition to Communism, many business and professional leaders openly ac- knowledge their lack of contact with and understand- ing of the armed forces, whose members they regard as their social and intellectual inferiors. For labor's Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret part, private business hostility and government repres- sion have prevented the development of a strong labor sector. Despite choosing to remain largely on the periphery of political activism, Catholic Church lead- ers in recent years have become more outspoken than in the past on the military regime's human rights record. The Private Sector. Guatemala's economic elite- industrialists, retailers, financiers, and planters-are second only to the armed forces in terms of organiza- tion and political clout. The private sector traditional- ly has served as a key source of ideas and candidates for the government, even though the latter generally has been reluctant to consult with business leaders in an effort to limit their influence on economic policy. The most prominent organization is the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Chambers (CACIF). Although formed to coordinate the views of the private sector with those of the government, the diverse interests of the 14 different business chambers under the umbrella orga- nization make consensus rare, and members often operate independently on specific policy issues, ac- cording to the US Embassy. Their traditional individualism aside, however, pri- vate-sector leaders in recent years have found them- selves increasingly-and collectively-at odds with the government over economic policies. Their staunchly conservative economic and social philoso- phy clashes sharply with the government's counterin- surgency strategy, which depends on increased public spending in the impoverished highlands. The govern- ment believes such spending will enable it to regain peasant loyalties, to attract Guatemalan refugees now residing in Mexico to return to their homeland, and to politically and socially integrate Guatemala's large Indian population into the national mainstream. Meanwhile, steadily deteriorating economic condi- tions during the last half of 1984, together with the government's imposition of unpopular tax adjustments in October 1984 after only perfunctory consultations with the private sector, have strained relations be- tween the government and private business. Since the beginning of 1985, the relationship has become even more contentious, and is now, in our judgment, at the point of threatening political stability. In April 1985, for example, an outpouring of criticism and the threat of a general strike by the private sector against the government's attempt to impose austerity measures forced Mejia to repeal the tax measures and fire the Ministers of Finance and Economy. Guatemala thus remains one of the least taxed countries in Latin America. Indeed, on the basis of partial economic data reported this year by the US Embassy, we believe the private sector would have to submit to unprecedented levels of taxation if the government is to sustain the momentum against the insurgents and finance programs to redress the country's social and economic ills. Because of his confrontation with the private sector earlier this year, however, we believe it unlikely Mejia will propose any new bold economic reforms-including higher taxes-through the re- mainder of his tenure, thus leaving the new civilian government the unenviable task of wrestling with the country's mounting economic problems. Labor. Guatemala's labor and peasant organizations, which flourished between 1944 and 1954, have failed to exert significant political influence since the over- throw of the Arbenz regime. Private-sector hostility and government repression-which, by the early 1980s, saw many labor and peasant leaders either killed, in exile, or operating clandestinely in antigov- ernment political and insurgent organizations-have prevented the development of strong labor and peas- ant movements. The armed forces have seen orga- nized labor-in which the left traditionally has played a strong role-as an extension of Communist subver- sion and thus pursued a policy of periodic repression of the free trade unions. As a result, the military's view of labor unions as Communist fronts often became a largely self-fulfilling prophecy, as Marxist elements-better able to function in a repressive climate-wrested control of the unions from more moderate leaders. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 The government deals with both the union and the nonunion labor force primarily through the 1947 Labor Code. Although the Code recognizes the right of workers to organize and strike-except in the public sector ?--it prohibits union participation in partisan politics. Nevertheless, a principal impedi- ment to labor organizational efforts stems from the seemingly intended inefficiency of the bureaucratic process required to certify a labor union. In 1983, the Mejia government publicly recognized the problems in the application of the Code, and a major review purportedly was begun, although no results have been announced. Some 645 trade unions are legally recog- nized by the Ministry of Labor, but, according to government statistics, only 381 were active during 1984. According to US Embassy estimates, only about 10 percent of Guatemala's 2.5 million workers are organized. The Mejia government's lifting in August 1983 of the state of siege imposed under Rios Montt has led to a gradual renewal of trade union activity despite con- tinuing obstacles, and to increased dialogue between labor and the military. The major trade union devel- opment during the past two years was the formation of the new democratic Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala (CUSG) in May 1983. Although not legally recognized by the government until No- vember of that year, the CUSG has rapidly expanded its membership. By mid-1985, it consisted of some 11 urban and rural trade union federations representing over 75 percent of the country's organized work force, according to US Embassy reporting. In addition, CUSG organizing efforts in the first quarter of 1984 accounted for 13 of the 24 new or reorganized unions that had applied for legal status. Efforts to create a more cohesive union movement by the largely centrist-oriented CUSG have been imped- ed, however, by allegations from labor's left wing that-because of its leaders' generally more concilia- tory policies-it is a "government" union, a charge that has prompted CUSG leaders to seek ways to assert their political independence. CUSG leaders, for example, initiated a vigorous public campaign earlier ' The new constitution, completed by the Constituent Assembly last May and scheduled to enter into force in January 1986, includes an article giving public-sector workers the right to strike. Open opposition by the military and other interest groups, however, caused the provision to be sufficiently weakened to accommodate this year to influence the drafting of labor-related clauses of the new constitution-winning greater rec- ognition for workers' rights from the government- and to protest rising prices. They also have held talks with several political parties, including the Christian Democrats, in an effort to barter CUSG support in the 1985 elections for more say in formulating labor- related policies. As a result, the CUSG appears to have been moderately successful in distancing itself from the government and seeking a higher profile. The left wing of Guatemala's labor movement also has been attempting to reorganize. In May 1984, seven leftist trade unions announced the formation of the Coordinating Committee of National Organiza- tions of Syndicalist Unity (CONUS). Led by the Communist federation FASGUA (Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala) in conjunction with the Marxist-dominated CNT (National Workers' Center), CONUS is a reincarnation of the National Council for Syndicalist Unity-CNUS.' Union locals affiliated with either FASGUA, CNT, or CONUS are frequently active in labor disputes such as the Coca-Cola and San Carlos University workers' strikes in 1984, but the three groups themselves seem to focus primarily on the issuance of antigovernment bulletins and manifestos outside the country. Of potentially greater significance, however, are the defections of several federations and unions formerly tied to FASGUA and CNT to more democratic CUSG affiliates, reflecting the country's general trend to- ward more politically moderate leaders and institu- tions. The Church. The Catholic Church lost much of its secular power in Guatemala as a result of the anticler- ical reforms of the mid-19th century, and the Church hierarchy generally has elected to remain on the political sidelines. In recent years, however, govern- ment repression against militant priests and lay mis- sionaries working with Indians in the insurgent- contested Western Highlands and other areas has placed the Church in an increasingly adversarial role. ' The defunct CNUS-long tainted by ties to the radical left that made it a target of rightist hit squads-has ceased to operate publicly in Guatemala, but it periodically issues press releases 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret The violent nature of government rule under the Lucas regime, aggressive counterinsurgency tactics employed by the Army during the Rios Montt era, and the failure of the conservative archbishop, Cardi- nal Mario Casariego, to protest widely perceived social injustices alienated many of the clergy from both the government and the Church. In some cases the clergy themselves became the targets of violence in the 1970s and the early 1980s. In the past, suspicions by Army officers that Church activities were subversive were reinforced by highly publicized cases of priests joining Guatemala's various insurgent factions. Even so, the US Embassy estimated in 1981 that there were no more than five priests with Guate- mala's approximately 3,000 guerrillas, but concluded, on the basis of interviews with local villagers and parishioners, that some 80 percent of the 400 priests in the countryside were generally sympathetic to the insurgents. The restoration of a government headed by a Roman Catholic after 17 months of evangelical Protestantism under Rios Montt has, however, helped generate some accommodation. Mejia has carefully pursued a non- confrontational policy with Archbishop Prospero Pen- ados del Barrio, who assumed office in January 1984 following Casariego's death in June 1983. Although the Church has since publicly criticized the level of violence and challenged UN Special Rapporteur Lord Colville's finding that the human rights situation is improving, Penados generally has followed a policy of moderation and low-key activism in an effort both to encourage the democratization process and to recipro- cate for Mejia's more conciliatory approach toward Church officials. Church leaders also have expressed concern over recent Protestant inroads among the population, though they have not raised it as a major political issue since Rios Montt's ouster in August 1983. Although no religious census has been conducted in Guatemala since 1970, there was a significant surge of converts to Protestantism after the 1976 earth- quake, and by 1983 Protestants claimed over 20 percent of the total population. The Catholic hierar- chy's concern over Protestants gaining political power increased during the tenure of Rios Montt, whose Sunday "sermonettes" served only to exacerbate divi- sions within the religious community, according to publicly documented cases of animosity between the two religious sectors. Nevertheless, the strength of evangelism-represented in the current presidential campaign by PDCN candidate Serrano-is confined largely to segments of the lower classes, who exercise only minimal political power. The country's small, generally center-right Jewish community has declined from a peak of some 1,200 members in 1979 to roughly 800 in early 1984, according to the US Embassy. Although there is little anti-Semitism, the Embassy reports that Israel's role as a major arms supplier to the Guatemalan military has caused at least some Jews to shun public office for fear of guerrilla reprisals. The Guatemalan Insurgency The roots of Guatemala's insurgency can be traced to the early 1960s when disgruntled former Army offi- cers, students, and members of the Guatemalan Labor Party first joined in guerrilla warfare against the government. Although the conflict has ebbed and flowed in the intervening years, the insurgency steadi- ly intensified from 1979 to early 1982, when the guerrillas increased their ranks from less than 1,000 to probably more than 3,000 full-time combatants.' During these years, the insurgents' recruitment efforts benefited greatly from the military's indiscriminate repression under the Lucas Garcia regime. In addi- tion, the guerrillas' commitment to their struggle was bolstered by promises of increased financial and mate- rial assistance from Cuba, which was encouraged by the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and insur- gent gains in El Salvador in the early 1980s. we believe our strength estimates match credibly with the type and territorial extent of rebel operations and reflect the mounting guerrilla casualties and 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Despite these gains and the resiliency of the insurgen- cy, the inability of the major guerrilla groups- described below-to overcome widespread ideological and person lit differences has limited their effective- ness. As a consequence, decisions on military actions generally are uncoordinated-an insurgent failing that we be- lieve has helped the Guatemalan military by mid- 1985 to carve back the insurgency to what we esti- mate are about 1,500 full-time combatants, roughly half its 1982 force level. Even though the rebels are unlikely to reverse the momentum now favoring the government, we nevertheless expect that they will retain their ability to conduct urban terrorism, carry out assassinations, and sabotage economically impor- tant targets. Major Insurgent Groups. The Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), Guatemala's oldest insurgent group, was founded in 1962 as a breakaway faction of the pro- Moscow Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). Although decimated during the counterinsurgency campaign of the late 1960s, the FAR reemerged in 1977 and now operates principally in the remote northern depart- ment of El Peten. Headed by the Cuban-trained Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia, the FAR is a small but highly effective combat force of some 400 to 500 members, and it may be the only insurgent group to have grown since Rios Montt initiated the country's innovative counterinsurgency program in 1982. The resurgence in early 1985 of insurgent activity in the Las Minas Mountains area of eastern Zacapa Department is probably the work of FAR guerrillas trying to exploit the Army's thinly stretched logistic and transporta- tion lines. The government's limited presence in the Zacapa area may be an added enticement for the FAR. In similar circumstances the FAR has built what we judge-on the basis of its apparent fore- knowledge of troop movements and success in evading government sweep operations-is an excellent intelli- gence and supply network in the Peten. its continuing problems with the FAR is likely to make this guerrilla group a major counterinsurgency Perhaps the major reason behind the FAR's relative success, however, is its location within a sparsely populated and economically unimportant area and the concentration of government counterinsurgency assets elsewhere. However, the Army's growing concern over target. that four infantry battalions-one composed of units on rotation from other commands-are dedicated to the Peten this year, and that tighter security measures around Santa Elena Airbase and other military instal- lations also have been noted in recent months. The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), headed by Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, is Guatemala's largest insurgent group with an estimated 600 to 850 full- time members. Originally formed by FAR dissidents in the early 1970s, the EGP began military operations of its own in 1975 and has been one of the most effective of the insurgent factions because of its emphasis on working among Guatemala's large Indi- group's tactics are similar to those of other insurgent groups. It ambushes small Army units when it can, collects "war taxes" at makeshift roadblocks, tempo- rarily occupies small towns and farms for propaganda purposes, and periodically destroys selected economic targets, such as specialized farm machinery. The EGP emphasizes the establishment of extensive local supply networks and the creation of a part-time militia. Its operations focus largely on the northwest- ern highlands area of Huehuetenango and Quiche Departments, where it recruits among the Indian and peasant populations. In early 1982, the EGP was in de facto control of much of Huehuetenango Department, where it overran a small military garrison-the first and last such success by any insurgent group. In response, US defense attache shows that the Rios Montt government concentrated its heaviest counterinsurgency effort against EGP 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Figure 3 Insurgent Operating Areas, 1985 Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) All areas of guerrilla activity are not shown. Guerrilla control is confined to relatively small areas and is not shown. Q i. ~ North Pacific Ocean J .~ JC, Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 strongholds during the remainder of 1982. The gov- ernment's subsequent introduction of patrol bases in remote areas, civilian defense units, and model vil- lages into the highly contested area, in our judgment, has since severely disrupted the EGP's base of support by undercutting its ability to rely on the population for supplies and safehaven. The EGP has retaliated by attacking the ill-equipped and poorly trained civilian defense patrols to demonstrate that the military can- not protect their villages. The Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), led by Rodrigo Asturias Amado, is Guatemala's second-largest insurgent organization. On the basis of US Embassy reporting, we estimate that ORPA has 450 to 600 full-time combatants. Originally formed in 1971 as a splinter group of the FAR, ORPA did not begin military operations until 1979, presumably using the intervening period to establish its infrastructure and support base among the Indian population. According to this group's periodic publications and public pro- nouncements, ORPA appears to be less ideologically rigid than the other major insurgent groups. Unlike the larger EGP, ORPA also does not advocate a broad-based rural structure, preferring instead to concentrate on training and equipping its cadre. ORPA conducts its operations along the southern edge of the Western Highlands from the Mexican border in San Marcos Department eastward toward the slopes of the Atitlan Volcano in Solola Depart- ment-a traditional insurgent stronghold. ORPA's reliance on small, well-trained units-a fac- tor that reduces its vulnerability to penetration-thus far has allowed it to escape entrapment by the military. In contrast to 1983, however, when insurgent and military communiques alike show ORPA guerril- las were responsible for some of the most damaging attacks against the government, large-scale sweeps by the Army in San Marcos Department in mid-1984 seriously hurt this guerrilla grow PA's ability to conduct urban terrorist operations was severely damaged in early 1984 after counterterrorist raids by government security forces decimated the leadership of three other small terrorist groups and forced ORPA to withdraw its urban units to the countryside. Even so, ORPA appeared to be recovering from its rural setbacks by early 1985, when local press accounts show that it briefly occupied the important resort town of Santiago Atitlan in Solola Department and soon afterward seized another small town in San Marcos Depart- ment. The dissident faction of the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT/D) was formed in 1978 by veteran Communist Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, when the party's long- time leadership-fearing government retaliation-re- fused to join the armed revolution. Despite being the newest and smallest member of the insurgency, the PGT/D, which maintains close ties to the EGP, periodically has carried out bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings, according to communiques issued by the party. Cardoza, however, has failed to recruit noticeable numbers of new adherents to the party, probably because he has attempted to guide the PGT/D from his sanctuary in Mexico. As a result, we believe the group has now probably dwindled to only several dozen diehard followers. The orthodox Moscow-line faction of the Communist Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT/O), which has operat- ed underground since the mid-1950s, is led by Ricar- do Rosales Roman. Active membership is probably less than 200, although the party probably has some sympathy among unionized labor. Unlike the PGT/D, it has not yet openly adopted armed revolution and is not a member of the insurgent alliance. the PGT/O is attempting to outfit a small armed contingent suggests, however, that party leaders may have finally succumbed to the longtime pressures from members of the rebel alliance and their supporters in Havana, Managua, and Moscow to have them join the struggle. a small dissident group of young militants, in an action similar to the PGT/D breakaway in 1978, split with Rosales and other party leaders in January 1984-again over the issue of armed insurrection. Although the small mili- tant faction is disorganized, it could later rejoin the party if efforts to form a military arm prove success- ful. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 2.5X 1 25X1 2oA] 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Searching for Unity: The URNG. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was formally established in Havana in February 1982 and publicly proclaimed to exercise joint command and control over all Guatemalan guerrilla forces, much as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) attempts in El Salvador. Despite pressure over the years from its Cuban and Nicara- guan patrons to unify-including periodic threats of an arms cutoff-the URNG remains little more than a propaganda shell. Its members-the FAR, EGP, ORPA, and PGT/D-probably resent Havana's at- tempts to force them to stifle their strong ideological and personality differences to ensure continued Cu- ban aid. cooperation among the various insur- gent groups may be increasing. The apparent simulta- neity of insurgent attacks across several departments in early 1985, for example, suggests that some of the actions were coordinated in advance. the guerrillas also are now carrying out limited joint operations in some areas. We believe such cooperation stems largely from the rebels' dwindling ranks, increasing loss of popular support, and the need to demonstrate that they re- main a viable military threat. Outlook and Implications for the United States We anticipate no major shifts in the positions of the key political actors and groups discussed in this paper over the near term. Moreover, we expect Guatemala's policymaking process on major issues will continue to be based on broad, enduring national values that historically have colored the country's outlook toward the United States. Guatemalans believe, for example, that size, popula- tion, and relative economic and military strength entitle Guatemala to a preeminent role in Central America. Contributing to this sense of national pride is the awareness that Guatemala's military successes against leftist guerrillas have taken place without US military aid. Guatemalans also do not view themselves as having any worse a record than the Hondurans or the Salvadorans in the area of human rights. Thus, they contend that they are being victimized by a double standard, and argue that US human rights policy has discriminated against Guatemala and cre- ated an imbalance between the treatment received b their country and the The resulting "go it alone" attitude and resentment of the United States color Guatemala's policy perspective, and in our opinion, is reflected in an ambivalent willingness to cooperate with Washington, particularly among mili- tary leaders. Regardless of who wins the election, we believe that Guatemalans regard the US role in influencing their country's political fate as crucial and that they want to deal directly with Washington on a multitude of bilateral and regional issues. In this regard, we expect that centrist-oriented groups will seek moral and material support from Washington as a means of obtaining and sustaining leverage with the Guatema- lan armed forces. Although we believe that obtaining US economic and developmental assistance will be given the highest priority by the new government, virtually all of Guatemala's announced presidential candidates have at one time or another proclaimed their support for more than a however, that the renewal of such aid must be contin- gent on a continuation of the democratization process. These same leaders are quick to add, The military establishment is likely to be anxious about its future no matter what the outcome of the presidential election. We believe that many officers are deeply concerned that a DCG victory might bring reprisals against them for past abuses, or that the 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 5X1 1_1X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Army's ability to conduct its counterinsurgency pro- grams will be seriously curtailed by a civilian-led government. Still others fear any outcome-for exam- ple, a Sandoval victory-that might jeopardize US aid. The military, in our view, is overwhelmingly compelled by the need to shed its role of international pariah in order to pave the way for increased military and economic assistance. As a result, it will continue to try to adhere to its pledged neutrality in the contest, and-unless its institutional prerogatives are severely threatened-will honor the vote's outcome. While the military and the key parties are working toward a smooth transition to civilian rule, the poten- tial for violence during the presidential campaign appears greatest from groups that occupy both ex- tremes of the political spectrum. The guerrillas proba- bly are fearful that a successful election in November will brin increased levels of urther jeopardizing their prospects. As a resu t, we expect that Guatemala's various guerrilla organizations may attempt to carry out more wide- spread ambush and harassment operations designed to lower voter turnout and discredit the election. believe further that the 1984 Constituent Assembly election caused an active debate within some armed factions about whether or not to continue the armed struggle. If, as is likely, the insurgents are unable to disrupt the vote, these ideological fissures almost certainly would widen, thus further weakening the insurgency. The left's perspective is closely mirrored by many elements of the Guatemalan right, which see a victory by the left-either by force of arms or at the ballot box-as totally unacceptable. As the political opening grows and activism from all sectors increases, the potential for violent action by the right against politi- cal figures, labor leaders, university professors, and others could escalate as rightwing extremists try to limit the gains and slow the momentum of their reform-minded competitors. Such an occurrence, in our judgment, would seriously jeopardize the democ- ratization process and set back progress made by the current military regime in improving Guatemala's image at home and abroad. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Appendix A Politically Significant Organizations AD Democratic Action Small centrist party expected to back the DCG presidential candidate in coming elections. Received slightly more than Leopoldo Antonio Urutia Beltran 1 percent of the vote in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly (secretary general) election. AEG Evangelical Alliance of Guatemala Represents six different evangelical groups. Greatest number of associates are pentacostal churches; does not include the Virgilio Zapata (president) Church of the Word. Rev. Guillermo Galindo AGSAEMP General Archives and Supporting Services Presidential intelligence arm established in 1977. Monitors and of the Presidential Staff reports on internal political, subversive, and other antigovern- ment activity. Expected to be replaced, or reduced to strictly Lt. Col. Marco Antonio Gonzalez Taracena analytical functions, once a civilian president is installed. Operational aspects likely to be transferred to military intelli- gence (D-2), or reconstituted in a separate organization. ASIDE Indigenous Association of Evangelization Conference of Indian churches associated with AEG. Some 27 to 29 denominations with 800 churches reportedly in the Domingo Guitz Cuxil (director) conference. Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Founded in 1957. Umbrella organization for 14 business cham- Commercial, Industrial, and Financial bers in Guatemala. By the early 1980s, the largest organization Chambers of private-sector interests in Central America. Most powerful members are agricultural interests, which keep a low profile and Alejandro Botran (president) exert influence from behind the scenes. Most publicly outspoken Andrew Rogers (secretary general) member is the Chamber of Commerce. CACIF lost credibility through its identification with the extreme right and support for the Lucas regime. Attempted to regain credibility in 1984 by softening the government's proposed tax adjustments, but failed and later disassociated itself from the tax package. Relations with the Mejia regime in 1985 have been contentious. CEDEP Center for Political Studies Private institution set up to encourage open political dialogue. Sponsor of the 1985 presidential debates; conducts other public Marco Antonio Cuevas del Cid meetings and debates, and publishes a journal. Has approached the US National Endowment for Democracy for funds to support the Guatemalan electoral process. Originally estab- lished by DCG dissidents, but now apparently nonpartisan. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Gen. Carlos Arana Osorio (president) Mario Roberto Aguilar Arroyo (secretary general) Mario David Garcia (presidential candidate) Gustavo Anzueto Vielman Julio Lowenthal Carlos Molino Mencos Peter Miguel Lamport Kelsall (president) Peasant Committee of the High Plateau Villagers' Coordinating Committee " Trinidad Gomez Hernandez" Luis Cardoza y Aragon (head of coordinating committee) Guillermo Toriello Garrido Manuel Galich Carlos Paz Tejada Jose Miguel Barrios Ortega (secretary general) Rightist party founded in the early 1970s and controlled by a former president (1970-74), General Arana-competes with the MLN for hardline "law and order" vote. Main support is from the business community; has a more well-thought-out economic policy than other parties. Won nine seats in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election while in coalition with the MLN. Withdrew from the rightist alliance in January 1985 citing uneven distribution of positions within the coalition. MLN leader Sandoval's refusal to name Aguilar as vice president on the coalition's election ticket, together with reluctance of finan- cial backers of both parties to support the alliance, presumably contributed to the breakup. Creation of a four-member coordi- nating commission in early February by General Arana, which publicly criticized Aguilar's leadership, is likely to lead to further factionalization and undercut party electoral hopes. CAN, which advocates free market capitalism, fared well in the 1980 municipal elections, largely as a result of its organizational efforts among industrialists, some segments of the middle class, and landowners in eastern departments. Reportedly an URNG front group. Mexican based; a nongov- ernmental humanitarian organization accredited at the UN and at the European Council. Specializes in disinformation on human rights and has purportedly been nominated for the 1986 Nobel Prize, presumably the peace prize. Member of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America. Successor to the Guatemalan Commission for the Defense of Human Rights founded by journalists and academics and disbanded in 1980. Established in February 1982 by some 26 prominent Guatema- lan exiles of various political affiliations as the political arm of the URNG. Rightist. Won less than 1 percent of the vote in the July election in coalition with the FCD-5. Founded to back Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, the winner of the 1982 elections who was subsequently ousted. Members characterized as grizzled veter- ans of Guatemalan politics. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) CNT National Workers' Center Headquartered in Mexico City, an ad hoc group of some 4,000 members without legal recognition. Founded by the DCG in Miguel Angel Albizures Pedroza 1964. Marxist infiltration successfully removed the Christian (secretary general) Democratic leadership in the mid-1970s, leading to withdrawal from the hemispheric Christian Democratic Latin American Workers' Central (CLAT) in 1978. Controlled by the FAR, but the PGT has attempted to gain control through CONUS. CNUS National Council of Syndicalist Unity Marxist-Leninist umbrella trade organization established in 1976 by CNT and FASGUA. Now defunct inside Guatemala, No leaders currently identified but occasionally issues press releases through Havana on trade union conditions in the country. Replaced in May 1984 by CONUS. COCIEG Coordinating Commission of the Evangelical Protestant umbrella organization claiming to represent more Church of Guatemala than 2 million Guatemalan evangelicals. CONDECA Central American Defense Council Established in 1963 as military arm of the Organization of Central American States. Original full members were Guate- Individual country representatives mala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, with Panama and Costa Rica (usually resident defense attaches) as observers; El Salvador joined as full member a year later. The 1969 "Soccer War" between El Salvador and Honduras resulted in the latter's withdrawal. Remained largely dormant until 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, which led to Managua's withdrawal as well. Efforts by Mejia to revive CONDECA in October 1983 met with limited success at first, but efforts have since faltered. CONDECA permanent council is headquartered in Guatemala City. CONUS Coordinating Committee of National Successor to CNUS. Formed in May 1984 as a leftist umbrella Organizations of Syndicalist Unity organization for affiliates of CNT and FASGUA. Funding appears to come largely from the FAR-controlled CNT. Indi- No leaders currently identified vidual CONUS, FASGUA, or CNT locals frequently active in labor disputes, but themselves are not particularly active inside Guatemala, preferring instead to issue press bulletins and manifestos outside the country. Probably less than 3,000 mem- bers in total. CSG Trade Union Council of Guatemala Some 200 members. Small trade union federation affiliated with CUSG. Pio Rueda Ortega (secretary general) Central Organization of Federated Workers Rightist. Some 4,000 members in 1984. Democratic orientation, but not affiliated with any political party, nor with CUSG. Romeo Hernandez (secretary general) Guatemala's largest trade union federation by the mid- I970s but violently repressed after 1976. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) No leaders currently identified Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala Juan Francisco Alfaro M. (secretary general) Adolfo Hernandez C. Guatemalan Christian Democracy or Christian Democratic Party Rene de Leon Schlotter (president) Roberto Carpio Nicolle (vice president, Constituent Assembly copresident, and DCG vice-presidential nominee) Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo (secretary general) Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo (presidential candidate) Jose Ricardo Gomez Galvez Rodolfo Maldonado Secret Anti-Communist Army No leaders currently identified Rebel Armed Forces Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia Member of the EGP front group FP-3 1. Originally founded as an independent peasant trade union but was eventually taken over by the EGP. Represents roughly 75 percent of all organized workers. Com- posed of 11 federations and some 150,000 members in mid- 1985. Formed in May 1983; obtained legal recognition in November 1983. Democratic orientation that emphasizes eco- nomic unionism. Not affiliated with any political party but has held talks with several regarding support in coming election, including the DCG. Publicly pledged to work within Guatema- lan labor law but insists the Labor Ministry enforce the law and end delays that prejudice cases brought by workers against management. Leadership publicly complains there are insuffi- cient guarantees for trade union freedom for reactivation of trade unionism in Guatemala. Granted membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) earlier this year. Center-leftist party with considerable grassroots support, but leadership ranks, particularly in rural areas, decimated by death squads. Party discredited by its past support for military candidates, a tactic now refuted by its current president and leaders. Won 20 seats in July Assembly election, finishing first with more than 16 percent of vote on national list. DCG was allied with the PNR in 1982 election, when current party standard bearer Cerezo-faced with assassination threats- opted not to run. Favors agrarian reform that would force otherwise idle landholdings capable of production into use. Financial fortunes of party were revived in 1984 after family of supermarket magnate Rodolfo Paiz Andrade, who heads FUNDESA and was at one time considered a possible DCG vice-presidential candidate, announced its support. Guatemala's largest insurgent group with an estimated 600 to 850 full-time members. Badly hurt as the main target of Army counterinsurgency campaign during the early 1980s. Member of the URNG; has a higher proportion of indigenous members than the other insurgent groups. Broke away from the FAR in 1975. Established in 1976-77 and considered largely responsible for the killing of numerous political, labor, and student leaders whose names appeared on regularly published "death lists." Allegedly linked to the MLN. Probably some 400 to 500 full-time combatants. Smallest of the three main guerrilla groups but possibly the only one growing in strength. Separated from the PGT in 1962. Member of the URNG. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala No leaders currently identified Democratic Civic Front (Victor Ivan) Danilo Barrillas Rodriguez (secretary general) Jorge Gonzalez del Valle Peasant Federation of Guatemala Legally recognized trade union arm of the illegal PGT. Some 6,700 members; operates under CONUS umbrella. Affiliate of the Soviet-dominated World Confederation of Trade Unions (WCFTU). Most leaders presently in exile. Small social democratic party formed in 1983. Unofficial DCG coalition partner since January 1985. Received around 1 per- cent of the vote in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election, but what little support it has comes from urban areas. Some members suspected of involvement with insurgent groups. National peasant union federation of some 6,100 members affiliated with the CUSG. Raymundo Del Cid Del Cid (secretary general) Peasant union federation in Juitiapa Department of some 4,800 members. Affiliated with CUSG. CNUS and other Marxist-dominated trade unions were instru- mental in its formation in March 1979. Operates as a political front for the URNG with representatives in the United States. At one time, purportedly consisted of some 160 regional and national organizations, including trade unions, campesino and religious organizations, as well as university and professional groups. Ismael Barrios Rabanales (secretary general) FENATEXVCS National Federation of Commercial Textile Workers National Federation of Agricultural Workers and Peasants Nicolas Francisco Tomas (secretary general) National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities of Guatemala Small center-rightist party formed in 1983; garnered less than 1 percent of vote in July election. In coalition with the MLN since November 1984. US Embassy officers describe members as idealistic neophytes. Small CUSG federation of urban and industrial trade unions with about 500 members. Formerly associated with FASGUA but now an affiliate of CUSG. Approximately 22,600 members. Large-some 87,500 members-peasant federation organized under CUSG. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) FENOCAM National Federation of Peasant Organizations Peasant federation of some 16,500 members. Formerly affiliat- ed with FASGUA and, more recently, with CUSG. Felipe Cachupe Cornelio (secretary general) FERG Revolutionary Student Front No leaders currently identified Founded in 1979. Also referred to as FERG-U (university) and FERG-S (secondary schools), which are EGP fronts under the FP-31 umbrella organization. FESEBS Trade Union Federation of Guatemalan Bank and Insurance Employees Approximately 2,500 members. Left-of-center but non-Marxist trade union federation associated with the regional Christian Democratic Latin American Workers' Central. FGTE General Federation of Entertainment Workers A democratic trade union federation with about 2,500 members. Carmen Quezada de Bonilla (secretary general) New Force Small center-leftist party. Expected to support the DCG in the elections. FP-31 31 January Popular Front EGP front group founded in January 1980. A Marxist-Leninist terrorist umbrella organization consisting of the CUC, CDP, No leaders currently identified CR, FERG, and the NOR. See individual groups for further information. FPO Popular Front Organization Small social democratic party previously aligned with the PDCN. FRTOCC Regional Federation of Workers of the West Located in the Quezaltenango area. Its 200 members are affiliated with the CUSG. Humberto Alejandro Sarti Zuniga (secretary general) FTA Federation of Agricultural Workers Federation of agricultural workers' unions located in Chimal- tenango Department. Former CUSG affiliate of about 11,000 Magdaleno Cutzal Ichaj (secretary general) members. FTG Guatemalan Workers' Federation Member of CUSG with about 6,500 members. Formerly part of the leftist CNT. Juan Raymundo Lopez Martinez (secretary general) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) National Unity Front (or Nationalist United Front) Roberto Alejos Arzu Gabriel Giron Ortiz (secretary general) Enrique Peralta Azurdia Foundation for the Development of Guatemala Carlos Paiz Andrade (president) Jaime Camhi (executive director) Mario Priay Luis Edmundo Lopez Duran Cesar Augusto Toledo Penate Hugo Quan Ma Rightist party that, as part of the victorious PR-PID-FUN alliance, supported "official" candidate Guevara in 1982 elec- tions. Three factions emerged after the March 1982 coup, each blaming the other for its ties to Guevara. Originally inscribed in 1978 and first to register for the July 1984 vote. Longtime party figure Colonel Peralta is a former Chief of State (1963-66). Founded in 1984 to promote Guatemalan interests abroad. An outgrowth of the Guatemalan American Chamber of Commerce's public relations committee. A serious, blue-ribbon group whose small membership includes some of Guatemala's most respected and successful businessmen. Paiz family is a significant financial backer for the DCG. Leftist party with small base of support but had been gaining strength under popular leftist Colom Argueta, assassinated in 1979. Leadership deeply divided over participation in the electoral process. Considered the most left wing among those parties that participated in the 1984 election. Main support is from urban proletariat. Small group of leftist parties that includes PSD dissidents; had hoped to contest 1985 elections but failed to meet registration requirements. Expected to even- tually back the DCG. Group of Mutual Support for the Reappearance, Formed in July 1984. Receives support from the Canadian- With Their Lives, of Our Children, Spouses, based International Peace Brigades, and is a "source" for the Parents, and Siblings CDHG. Some 150 members; has met with government officials, including Mejia, prompting formation of an official investiga- Beatriz Valaquez de Estrada tive commission composed of the Attorney General and Vice Maria Choxom de Castanon Ministers of Defense and Interior. Generally believed to have Aura Farfan links with the various insurgent factions; some funding report- Nineth Montenego de Garcia edly originates with the guerrillas. So far has relied upon peaceful weekly demonstrations, an active newspaper campaign, and one highly publicized march last October to bring its complaints to the government. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Organized National Anti-Communist Movement Col. Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez Ruben Dario Chavez Rios Francisco Bonilla Padilla Dr. Hector Aragon Quinonez (president and Constituent Assembly copresident) Mario Sandoval Alarcon (secretary general and presidential candidate) Rodrigo Valladares Molina Arturo Ortiz Saenz de Tejada No leaders currently identified Movement of Popular Unity Formed in March 1984 to ensure that basic human rights are enjoyed by all Guatemalans. General ineffectiveness, however, led its first chairman-the rector of the University of San Carlos-to resign after only two months. Revival of activities noted in early 1985, including efforts to initiate an international campaign. Rightwing terrorist organization now thought to be defunct. Also called Mano Blanca or White Hand-a name occasionally used by death squads in other Latin American countries. Grew out of government-created vigilante squads during the 1966 counterinsurgency campaign. Known to have engaged in tor- ture, extortion, robbery, and other illegal activities, including abduction of the Archbishop of Guatemala in 1968. Small center-rightist party. A new group originally intended as a personal vehicle for Gordillo-a member of the triumvirate that took power following the 1982 coup, which was then displaced by Rios Montt. Received about 2 percent of the national ticket vote in the July 1984 election, but won no seats. Formally allied with PUA and FUN for 1985 elections. No discernible ideological principles. Ultrarightist party. MLN-CAN coalition won 23 seats in July election, but squabbles over financial problems and Sandovai's refusal to step aside for more moderate leaders apparently led CAN leaders to break with the party in January. Joined by lesser rightist parties in late 1984. Registered initially in 1960, MLN is heir to the National Democratic Movement, founded in 1955 by supporters of President Carlos Castillos Armas. Many current MLN leaders helped Castillo carry out the 1954 coup that toppled the Arbenz government. The MLN gained strength and importance under the government of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia (1963-66) by providing much of the regime's initial backing. Became an opposition party in 1966 after its candidate failed to gain official endorsement. No longer has the close ties to the military it previously enjoyed. ORPA splinter group which surfaced in 1982. Responsible for kidnaping daughter of Honduran President Suazo and abduc- tion of nephew of former Guatemalan President Rios Montt. Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1983 with special interest in the trade union movement. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) NOA New Anti-Communist Organization Extreme rightwing group which emerged in 1982. No leaders currently identified Revolutionary Workers' Cells Marxist-Leninist trade union organization formed in 1980. "Felipe Antonio Garcia" Member of the EGP front group FP-31. Carlos Humberto Mazariegos M. (secretary general) OCAS Peasant Organization of Social Action Confined to Quezaltenango Department. Won one seat in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. Quixtan is PNR vice- Mauricio Quixtan presidential candidate. Revolutionary Organization of the Guatemala's second-largest insurgent group with some 450 to People in Arms 600 full-time combatants. Member of the umbrella organization URNG. Less ideologically rigid than either the EGP or FAR. Rodrigo Asturias Amado Although separated from the FAR in 1971, it did not begin military activity until 1979. PDCN Democratic Party of National Cooperation Best known as an umbrella organization for several parties did not register for the July 1984 election. Formed in 1983 and Jorge Serrano Elias (presidential candidate) based in the agricultural movement, it may have some strength Nery Noel Morales Gavarrete in the rural indigenous population. Serrano, a former member of (secretary general) the now-defunct Council of State that operated under Rios Montt, is the presidential candidate for the small centrist party. PGT/D Guatemalan Labor Party, Dissident Faction Small moribund militant faction of the PGT, which separated from the party in 1978. Member of the insurgent umbrella Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar organization URNG. PGT/O Guatemalan Labor Party, Orthodox Faction Guatemala's illegal Moscow-line Communist Party. Tradition- ally has favored political rather than military tactics, but has Ricardo Rosales Roman (secretary general) been under pressure to adopt armed revolution. Small group of young militants broke with the party leaders in January 1984, but-like the PGT/D-have been ineffective. Almost entire leadership is in exile in Mexico. Probably less than 200 members and falling. PID Democratic Institutional Party Rightist party organized by conservative businessmen in mid- 1960s as the official government party. Support base small, but Jose Adan Herrera Lopez (president) includes wealthy landowners and coffee growers. In disarray Hector Humberto Rivas Garcia after March 1982 coup; many leaders fled the country, fearing (secretary general) prosecution for corruption and association with the Lucas regime. Ran alone in July Constituent Assembly election- winning five seats-but has formed coalitions in order to "win" four elections since 1970. Joined MLN-led alliance in Septem- ber 1984. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) National Renewal Party or National Renovation Party Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre (secretary general and presidential candidate) Ascisclo Valladares Molina (secretary general) Revolutionary Party Mario Fuentes Perruccini (secretary general; also PDCN vice-presidential candidate) Jose Angel Lee Duarte (former Guatemala City mayor) Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party Democratic Socialist Party Juan Alberto Fuentes (president) Dr. Mario Solorzano Martinez (secretary general; presidential candidate) Dr. Carlos Gallardo Flores Haroldo Rodas Melgar Centrist party formed in 1972 by a PR splinter group; later taken over in 1977 by MLN dissidents loyal to Maldonado. Lacks resources and organization, and has neither business nor military backing. Nonetheless, won 7 percent of the vote and five seats in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. Formerly part of the tripartite alliance formed in early January between the UCN and the PR. Maldonado-a capable leader who teamed with the DCG in the 1982 election-was to have run as vice president on the UCN-led presidential ticket, but reneged when a constitutional provision was adopted that would have precluded his seeking the presidency in the following term. Small centrist party with a narrow base of support limited mainly to Guatemala City. Centrist party with substantial popular base of support-mainly in rural areas-and good organization, but hurt by past associa- tion with military regimes. Won slightly over 7 percent of the vote and 10 seats in July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. "Old Guard" members led by Fuentes, together with other dissidents headed by Lee, gained control of the party in March 1985. Fuentes abrogated party's alignment with UCN-PNR coalition; later sided with PDCN and is that party's vice- presidential nominee for 1985 elections. Founded in 1957 by veterans of the reformist governments of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-51) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54). Current party philoso- phy is generally supportive of a strong legislature and judiciary; does not favor inclusion of the Belize border dispute in the new constitution and would disdain negotiations with insurgents. Marxist-Leninist regional organization formed in 1976 and headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica. Guatemalan branch formed in 1981; other branches located in Nicaragua, Hondu- ras, and El Salvador, which has the most active branch. Leftist party affiliated with the Socialist International. In the past, has provided support to the guerrillas, which some rank and file have joined. Went underground after assassination of leader Fuentes Mohr in 1979, and many leaders-including Solorzano and Gallardo-were in voluntary exile in Costa Rica until January 1985. Both Solorzano and Gallardo-who head competing factions-met with Chief of State Mejia during his state visit to Costa Rica in December, apparently prompting the decision to return home. Party will participate in the coming election, but ultimately is likely to endorse, or otherwise asso- ciate itself with, the DCG. As a PR breakaway which ran candidates for Congress in 1978 under a borrowed DCG label, it won three seats-as many as were allocated to the DCG. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Leonel Sisniega Otero (presidential candidate) Luis Alfonso Lopez Danilo Roca Barillas National Centrist Union or Union of the National Center Jorge Carpio Nicolle (presidential candidate) Ramiro de Leon Carpio (secretary general and vice-presidential nominee) Antonio Arenales Forno Roberto Castaneda Peniche (assassinated in August 1985; successor not identified) Extreme rightwing party formed in 1983 by former MLN Vice President Sisniega-a perennial coup plotter against Rios Montt. Gained one seat in the Constituent Assembly with just over 3 percent of the national list vote. Draws members from both the MLN and CAN; has not succeeded in identifying itself separate and distinct from the MLN. Funds come mainly from the private agrarian sector. Advertising proclaims its opposition to both "conservatism" and "Communism," while claiming it stands for justice-and "justice knows no extremes." Affiliate of FTI. Part of the democratic trade union movement, a strong advocate of economic unionism. With some 3,700 members, the strongest local labor union in Guatemala and within the CUSG. New centrist party founded in 1983 by former DCG member Jorge Carpio in order to advance his own presidential candida- cy. Main support comes from urban middle class. Finished second in both percentage of votes-13.7 percent-and number of seats-21-won in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. Until the collapse of the UCN's coalition with the PR and PNR earlier this year, Carpio-as the alliance's presiden- tial candidate-had been considered by many as the favorite in the 1985 elections. Formed in November 1984. Represents more than 20 agricul- tural and livestock-raising associations, including the Guatema- lan Chamber of Agriculture, the general association of agricul- turalists, and all of its unions and related associations. Insurgent umbrella organization formed in 1982 under Cuban pressure. Largely a propaganda front composed of representa- tives from the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGT/D. Central campus in Guatemala City with seven regional campus- es and a total student body of nearly 50,000 in 1984. Faculty and administrative staff number an additional 10,000. Academ- ic freedom respected by government and political climate on campus has improved with less dogma and more learning. Student and faculty nevertheless continue to be object of kidnapings, other political violence. PGT traditionally involved in campus politics via both students' and workers' unions. Recent student protests over autonomy and budget issues were the most vocal in recent times though police did not interfere. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Iq Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Appendix C Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations AECB Asociacion de Estudiantes de Ciencias Basicas Association of Basic Sciences Students AEG a Alianza Evangelica de Guatemala Evangelical Alliance of Guatemala AEU Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios Association of University Students AEUO Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios de Occidente Association of University Students of the West AGA Asociacion Guatemalteca de Agricultura Guatemalan Agricultural Association AGSAEMP a Archivo General y Servicios de Apoyo del Estado Mayor Presidencia General Archives and Supporting Services of the Presi- dential Staff AGUAPA Asociacion Guatemalteca de Productores de Algodon Guatemalan Association of Cotton Producers AIRG Asociacion Independiente de Radiodifusores Guatemaltecas Independent Association of Guatemalan Radiobroad- casting Stations ANACAFE Asociacion Nacional del Cafe National Association of Coffee APAE Asociacion de Productores de Aceites Eseuciales Association of Essential Oils Producers APG Asociacion de Periodistas de Guatemala Association of Guatemalan Journalists APROFAM Asociacion por Bienestar de la Familia Family Welfare Association ARD Action Radical Democrata Democratic Radical Action ARN Accion Radical Nacionalista Nationalist Radical Action ASCIN Asociacion Social Cristiana de Integracion Revolucionaria Social Christian Association for Revolutionary Integration ASIDE a Asociacion Indigena de Evangelizacion Association of Indigenous Evangelization ASIDES Asociacion de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales Association of Investigation and Social Studies ATAGUA Asociacion de Tecnicos Azucareros de Guatemala Association of Guatemalan Sugar Technicians BANDEGUA Compania de Desarrollo Bananero Guatemala, Ltda. Guatemalan Banana Development Company, Ltd. BANDESA Banco Nacional de Desarrollo National Development Bank CACIF a Comite Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Chambers CADEG Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala CAN a Central Authentica Nacionalista National Authentic Central CC a Camara de Comercio Chamber of Commerce CCDA a Comite Campesino del Altiplano Peasant Committee of the High Plateau CCL Comite Clandestino Local Local Clandestine Committee CDAG Confederacion Deportiva Antonoma de Guatemala Autonomous Athletic Confederation of Guatemala Note: Footnote at end of table. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued) CDAP Centro para el Desarrollo CDHG a Comision de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala CDP a Coordinadora de Pobladores "Trinidad Gomez Hernandez" CEDEP a Centro de Estudias Politicos CGP or GPC a Comision Guatemalteca para la Paz CGUP a Comite Guatemalteco de Unidad Patriotica CND a Coordinadora Nacional Democratica CNT a Central Nacional de Trabajadores CNUS a Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical COCIEG a Comision Coordinadora de la Iglesia Evangelica de Guatemala CONAP Consejo Nacional de la Publicidad CONDECA a Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana CONSIGUA Confederacion Sindical de Guatemala CONTRAGUA Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala CONUS Coordinadora de Organizaciones Nacionales de Unidad Sindical CORFINA Corporacion Financiera Nacional COSDEGUA Confederacion de Sacerdotes Diocesanos de Guatemala CR a Cristianos Revolucionarios "Vicente Menchu" CSG a Consejo Sindical de Guatemala CSG Confederacion Sindical Guatemalteca CSU Consejo Superior Universitario CTF a Central de Trabajadores Federados CUC a Comite de Unidad Campesina CUCO Comite de Unidad Civica Organizado CUSG a Confederacion de Unidad Sindical Guatemalteca CUU Club de Unidad Universitaria DCG (or PDC) a Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (or Partido Democratico Cristiano) EGP a Ejercito Guerrillero del Pueblo (or de los Pobres) ESA a Ejercito Segredo Anti-Comunista EXIMBAL Exploraciones y Explotaciones Mineras Izabal, S.A. FAN Frente de Avance Nacional FANO Frente Aranista Nacional Obrera FAR a Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes FAR-PGT Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios-Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo FASGUA a FCD a Federacion Autonoma Sindical de Guatemala Frente Civico Democratico Public Administration Development Center Guatemalan Human Rights Commission Villagers' Coordinating Committee "Trinidad Gomez Hernandez" Center for Political Studies Guatemalan Peace Commission Guatemalan Committee for Patriotic Unity National Democratic Coordinator National Workers' Center National Council of Syndicalist Unity Coordinating Commission of the Evangelical Church of Guatemala National Council for Publicity Central American Defense Council Trade Union Confederation of Guatemala Confederation of Guatemalan Workers Coordinating Committee of National Organizations of Syndicalist Unity National Financial Corporation Confederation of Guatemalan Diocesan Priests Revolutionary Christians "Vicente Menchu" Trade Union Council of Guatemala Guatemalan Trade Union Federation University Higher Council Central Confederation of Federated Workers Committee of Peasant Unity Organized Civil Unity Committee Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala University Unity Club Guatemalan Christian Democracy (or Christian Democratic Party) Guerrilla Army of the Poor (or of the People) Secret Anti-Communist Army Izabal Mining Exploration and Exploitation, Inc. National Advancement Front National Pro-Arana Workers Front Rebel Armed Forces Revolutionary Armed Forces-Guatemalan Labor Party Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala Democratic Civic Front Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued) FCI a Federacion Campesina Independiente FDCR a Frente Democratico Contra la Repression FDG Frente Democratico Guatemalteco FECETRAG a Federacion Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala FEG Federacion de Educadores de Guatemala FEGUA Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Guatemala FENATEXVCS a Federacion Nacional de Obreros en la Industria Textil del Vestido Comercio y Similares FENATRAAC a Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y Campesinos FENCAIG a Federacion Nacional de Comunidades Agricolas e Indigenas de Guatemala FENOCAM a Federacion Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas FENSIL a Federacion Nacional Sindical Libre de Esquintla FESC Frente Estudiantil Social Cristiano Independent Peasant Federation Democratic Front Against Repression Guatemalan Democratic Front Central Federation of Guatemalan Workers Federation of Guatemalan Educators Guatemalan National Railways National Federation of Commercial Textile Workers National Federation of Agricultural Workers and Peasants National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous Communities of Guatemala National Federation of Peasant Organizations Free National Unions Federation of Esquintla Social Christian Student Front FESEBS a Federacion Sindical de Empleados Bancarios y de Seguros Trade Union Federation of Guatemalan Bank and Insur- de Guatemala ance Employees FERG a Frente Estudiante Revolutionario "Robin Garcia" Revolutionary Student Front "Robin Garcia" FFS Frente Federativo Sindical Federated Trade Union Front FGATE Fundacion Guatemalteca-Americana de Television Educativa Guatemalan-American Educational Television Foundation FGTE a Federacion General de Trabajadores del Espectaculo de Guatemala FLOMERCA Flota Mercante Gran Centroamericana Greater Central American Merchant Fleet FMG Federacion Magisterial Guatemalteca Federation of Guatemalan Teachers FMN Frente Nacional Magisterial National Teachers Front FOSA a Frente Organizado de Sindicatos de Amatitlan Organized Front of Amatitlan Unions FP-31 a Frente Popular 31 de Enero 31 January Popular Front FPO a Fuerza Popular Organizada Popular Front Organization FRE Frente Revolucionario Estudiantil Student Revolutionary Front FREU Frente Revolucionariol Estudiantil Universitario University Student Revolutionary Front FRTOCC a Federacion Regional de Trabajadores de Occidente Regional Federation of Workers of the West FRU Frente Revolucionario Universitario University Revolutionary Front FTA a Federacion de Trabajadores Agricolas Federation of Agricultural Workers FTG a Federacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala Guatemalan Workers' Federation FTI a Federacion de Trabajadores de Izabal Izabal Workers' Federation Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued) FTQ e Federacion de Trabajadores de Quezaltenango FTR s Federacion de Trabajadores de Retalhuleu FUEGO Frente Unido del Estudiantado FUEP Frente Universitario Estudiantil Progresista FUMN Frente Unido del Magisterio Nacional FUN a Frente Unido Nacionalista FUNA Frente Unido Nacional Anticomunista FUNDESA a Fundacion para el Desarrollo de Guatemala FUR a Frente Unido de la Revolucion FUS a Federacion de Unidad Sindical FYDEP Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo Economico del Peten GPC or CGP a Comision Guatemalteca para la Paz GUATEL Empresa Guatemalteca de Telecommunicaciones ICTA Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola IGE Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio IGSS Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social Quezaltenango Workers' Federation Retalhuleu Workers' Federation University Revolutionary Front Progressive University Student Front National Teachers United Front Nationlist United Front Anti-Communist National United Front Foundation for the Development of Guatemala United Revolutionary Front Federation of Labor Unity National Enterprise for the Economic Promotion and Development of the Peten Group of Mutual Support for the Reappearance, With Their Lives, of Our Children, Spouses, Parents, and Siblings Guatemalan Peace Commission Guatemalan Telecommunications Enterprise Agriculture Service and Technology Institute Guatemalan Church in Exile Guatemalan Social Security Institute INAD Instituto Nacional de Administracion para el Desarrollo National Institute of Administration Development INAFOR Instituto Nacional Forestal INDECA Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola INEN Instituto Nacional de Energia Nuclear INFOM Instituto de Fomento Municipal INFOP Instituto de Fomento de la Produccion INGUAT Instituto Guatemalteco de Turismo INSIVUMEH Instituto Nacional de Sismologia, Vulcanologia, Meteorologia e Hidrologia INTA Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria INTECAP Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad INVA Instituto Nacional de Vivienda JPT a Juventud Patriotica del Trabajo MANO a Movimiento Anticomunist Nacional Organizado National Institute of Agricultural Marketing National Institute of Nuclear Energy Municipal Development Institute Production Development Institute Guatemalan Institute of Tourism National Institute of Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology, and Hydrology National Institute of Agrarian Reform Technical Institute for Training and Productivity National Institute of Housing Patriotic Labor Youth Organized National Anti-Communist Movement Guatemalan Cooperativist Movement Independent Peasant Movement Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued) MUP a Movimiento de Unidad Popular Movement of Popular Unity NGR Nuevas Generaciones Revolucionarias New Revolutionary Generations NOA a Nueva Organizacion Anticomunista New Anti-Communist Organization NOR a Nucleos de Obreros Revolucionarios Revolutionary Workers' Cells "Felipe Antonio Garcia" "Felipe Antonio Garcia" OCAS a Organizacion Campesina de Accion Social Peasant Organization of Social Action ODECABE Organizacion Deportive Centroamericana y del Caribe Central American and Caribbean Sports Organization ONAM Oficina Nacional de la Mujer National Women's Office ORPA a Organizacion Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms OSOS Organizacion Secreta de Oficials Secret Organization of Officers PARN Partido de Accion y Reconstruccion Nacional National Action and Reconstruction Party PNR a Partido Nacional Renovador National Renewal Party (or National Renovation Party) PP Partido Populista Populist Party PRAM Partido Revolucionario Abril y May April-May Revolutionary Party PRI Partido Revolucionario Independiente Independent Revolutionary Party PRO Partido Revolucionario Ortodoxo Orthodox Revolutionary Party PRUN Partido Republicano de Unidad Nacional National Unity Republican Party PSD a Partido Socialista Democratica Democratic Socialist Party PSG Partido Social Guatemalteco Guatemalan Socialist Party PUA a Partido Unido Anticomunista United Anti-Communist Party PUCO Partido Unificacion de Campesinos y Obreros Workers and Peasants Unification Party PUD a Partido Unificacion Democratica Democratic Unification Party SITRABI a Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal Banana Workers' Union of Izabal STEGAC Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Coca-Cola Bottlers' Union of Guatemala Guatemalteca UCN a Union de Centro Nacional National Centrist Union (or Union of the National Center) UCU Union Cultural Universitaria University Cultural Union UEI Union de Estudiantes Independientes Independent Students Union UNAGRO a Union de Agricola Nacional National Agricultural Union UNEPAR Unidad Ejecutoria de Acueductos Executive Unit of Rural Aqueducts Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued) UNITEGUA Union de Transportistas Terrestres de Guatemala UPG Union Patriotica Guatemalteca URD Union Revolucionaria Democratica URG Union de Radioperiodicos de Guatemala URNG a Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca USAC a Universidad de San Carlos Union of Land Transportation Workers of Guatemala Guatemalan Patriotic Union Democratic Revolutionary Union Union of Radio News Shows of Guatemala Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union University of San Carlos Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/30: CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7 Table 2 A Guide to Key Political Groups Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Chambers CAN National Authentic Central Rightist CNT National Workers' Center Leftist CTF Central Confederation of Federated Workers Rightist CUSG Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala Centrist or center-leftist DCG Christian Democratic Party Center-leftist EGP Guerrilla Army of the Poor Extreme leftist FAR Rebel Armed Forces Extreme leftist FASGUA Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala Leftist FUN National Unity Front Rightist FUR United Revolutionary Front Leftist MLN National Liberation Movement Rightist or extreme rightist ORPA Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms Extreme leftist PDCN Democratic Party of National Cooperation Centrist or center-leftist PGT Guatemalan Labor Party Extreme leftist PUA UCN Sanitized Copy 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