THE PHILIPPINES: PREPARING TO TEST PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00590R000100080005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Secret
EA 85-10022
~ February 1985
Copy 313
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Office of
Office of East Asian Analysis, with contributions by
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
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Secret
EA 85-10022
February 1985
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Secret
The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Key Judgments President Marcos's insistence on keeping political institutions weak-
!,1/ormation available as including maintaining an ambiguous succession mechanism-points to a
41'15 January 1985 rocky road to new leadership if he dies or becomes incapacitated. The
was used in this report.
jockeying during his current health crisis has intensified wides read
anxiety about the soundness of the succession process.
The arguments in favor of a constitutional succession-the emergence of
independent leadership within the ruling party, General Ver's diminished
status in the military, and Acting Chief of Staff Ramos's pledge to uphold
the Constitution-might prevail in the immediate aftermath of Marcos's
death. Nonetheless, a breakdown of'the process is possible if Marcos's
inner circle determine that they cannot settle the leadership question
before the National Assembly moves ahead on election procedures.
We believe Marcos's permanent incapacitation would be more likely to
increase temptations within his inner circle to circumvent the constitutional
process. Imelda Marcos and her brother, Ambassador to the United States
Benjamin Romualdez, probably would be the prime movers in. such a
scheme, and they almost certainly would depend on General Ver to deliver
military support.
Although Marcos has not openly supported his wife's succession maneuver-
ing, we believe.recent moves on his pait are designed to pave the way for
Mrs. Marcos to succeed him, if the succession mechanism is activated
before 1987. His refusal at a ruling party caucus in January to consider
proposals to strengthen legal succession and to hold a presidential election
before 1987 suggests that he is trying to gain time to, allow Imelda Marcos
to improve her position in the ruling party and with the public.
On balance, we believe the continued strengthening of political institu-
tions-including the tightening of the succession process-will take more
time than events surrounding Marcos's health will allow. For that reason,
Secret
EA 85-10022
February 1985
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The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Mounting concern over President Marcos's medical
condition has touched off an intense round of political
posturing since last November as key groups in the
Philippines gear up for a transition to new leadership.
In particular,
debate over the prospects fora constitu-
tional succession recently has dominated the agenda
of senior officials in the military, the Cabinet, and the
ruling party. The absence of a strong legal succession
mechanism-a vice president will not be elected until
presidential elections in 1987-makes it difficult to
predict succession outcomes.' It is possible, however,
to evaluate the pressures for and against the legal
process that Marcos's demise or incapacitation would
activate.)
25X1 The Legal Setting
The Constitution calls for the Speaker of the National
Assembly-currently Nicanor Yniguez-to act as
caretaker president if Marcos dies or is officially
termed "incapacitated" before his term expires in
1987. The National Assembly under the law is to
agree on special election rules within seven days, and
the Speaker is then required to set the date for the
election within 60 days of Marcus's demise. Constitu-
tional provisions prevent the Speaker from declaring
martial law, dissolving the Assembly, and using the
power of presidential decree.~~
series of constitutional amendments ratified under
Marcus's administration give both the Prime Minister
and the interregnum President the authority to pre-
side over Cabinet meetings. Thus the staff believes
that ambiguities could prompt debate within the
National Assembly after Marcos dies or is incapaci-
tated over whether the Speaker would share presiden-
tial authority with the Prime Minister.
Concern over the issue within the National Assembly
is evident in two ruling party resolutions and two
opposition resolutions designed to clarify the succes-
sion that have been introduced recently in Assembly
sessions. Although none of these measures have been
enacted, Philippine press reports indicate that one
opposition resolution calls for the establishment of a
panel of military physicians to examine Marcos-
should he be in "seclusion" for several days-and
then report its findings to the National Assembly. The
press has also reported a ruling party resolution that
deals with the succession in the event the Speaker dies
while acting as caretaker president. ~~
It appears that only skillful political maneuvering by
Deputy Prime Minister Rono prevented some ruling
party members from forcing debate on the succession
last December during the height of Marcos's health
crisis. A strong performance by Marcos at a party
caucus in January apparently forestalled further party
debate on succession legislation. Nonetheless, we ex-
pect the opposition to keep pressing the matter in the
National Assembly, if for no other reason than to
continue focusing public attention on the weaknesses
in the existing system
Pressures Against the Constitutional Process
The key threat to the constitutional succession is that
those with the most to lose from the legal transfer of
power when Marcos dies are in the best position to
intervene.in the process. Imelda Marcos and General
Ver, in particular, are potentially the two greatest
losers in the post-Marcos period because neither has a
strong independent power base. Imelda Marcus's per-
sonal popularity has suffered in the aftermath of the
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A Chronology of New Succession Mechanisms
the vice president abolished.
1972
Marcos declares martial law under provisions of the
1935 Constitution, citing danger of a violent over-
throw of the government by Communist rebels. Parti-
san political activity is suspended and the o.~ce of
by decree tithe legislature is deadlocked.
1978
Interim National Assembly begins to junction in
parliamentary system; Marcos retains power to rule
25X1 1981
Martial law is lifted; Marcos retains authoritative
powers, including the power to legislate by decree. An
executive committee is created in case Marcos dies or
is incapacitated. Cesar Virata-as newly appointed
Prime Minister-heads the committee; Marcos also
names nine others, including Imelda Marcos, Defense
Minister Enrile, and Deputy Prime Minister Rono.
Plebiscite ratthes constitutional amendments, includ-
ing tran.~fer of authority from Prime Minister to
President; President can now be elected to indefinite
number of six-year terms.
dential incapacitation.
Marcos adds three more representatives to the execu-
tive committee; National Assembly passes procedural
rules for the executive committee and de,~nes presi-
1983
Marcos's health crisis in August sparks intense suc-
cession jockeying; opposition members, businessmen,
and the church calllor the abolishment of the
executive committee and the restoration of the o.~ice
Aquino assassination, and many ruling party mem-.
bers began viewing her as a political liability when she
failed to deliver Manila's vote in the National Assem-
bly election last May. General Ver's position has also
steadily eroded since the assassination, and this de-
cline has accelerated since the release of the Agrava
of the vice president. Marcos reluctantly abolishes
the executive committee and declares that the Prime
Minister will succeed tf the President dies or is
incapacitated. This does not sati.FJy most critics,
including several KBL leaders, who continue to call
for a consititutional amendment clarifying the suc-
cession. The Interim National Assembly-with its
overwhelming ruling party majority passes a consti-
tutional amendment that revives the o.~ice of the vice
president in 1987 and establishes the current succes-
sion arrangement.
1984
Plebiscite ratifies the new succession mechanism,
which provides for the Speaker of the National
Assembly to act as caretaker president tf Marcos
dies. New National Assembly is elected in May with
an increase in opposition representation from 12 to 60
out of a total 01183 elected seats. Marcos's health
crisis in November sparks new round of succession
anxiety. Several bills further clarifying the succes-
sion process are introduced in the Assembly.
1985
Succession still dominates the political scene as
Marcos's health remains in question. Ruling party
sponsors a resolution that would synchronize provin-
cial, local, and presidential elections, but Marcos
declares that provincial elections in 1986 and presi-
dential elections in 1987 will be held on schedule.
1986
Provincial elections will test ruling party discipline.
1987
Marcos's presidential term ends and new elections
are scheduled.
Board's majority report last October, which implicat-
ed Ver and other military officers in the Aquino
assassination.
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Nonetheless, both continue to command political and
military assets that would allow them to intervene as a
succession scenario plays itself out. Imelda Marcos's
tight control over information on Marcos's health and
of access to the President, for example, give her an
inside track: She has also assumed several highly
visible official duties during Marcos's convalescence,
which has improved her political standing within the
ruling party considerably in recent weeks, according
to the US Embassy. Some ruling party officials are
almost certainly interpreting her new prominence as
having the backing of the President, but we have no
evidence to indicate this is the case. We believe that
she is stepping into the leadership vacuum created by
the President's illness to stake out her claim to the
ruling party's nomination if Marcos dies suddenly.
ruling party officials.
In addition, the Assembly Speaker has longstanding
political ties to~ Mrs. Marcos and may be willing to
manipulate the constitutional provisions to her advan-
tage. She would also be able to rely on the consider-
able political and financial resources of her brother,
Ambassador to the United States Benjamin Romual-
dez. Behind the scenes, Romualdez reportedly has
been quietly lobbying the case for her candidacy with
procedures.Z
General Ver's tenure as Chief of the Armed Forces
since 1981 has allowed him to weave a network of
political alliances among senior officers that-al-
though weakening-might still afford him the clout to
alter the outcome of a succession contest. He almost
certainly would be urged by other inner circle mem-
bers-including Imelda Marco's or presidential crony
Eduardo `Cojuangco=to defend their interests if the
leadership~questioii is'not settled before the National
Assembly`moves' ahead?with deciding on election
Ver, with the help of Imelda Marcos, has been
engaged in an extensive media campaign to refurbish
his image in what appears to be a bid to return as
success to his privileged relationship with Marcos whom he has
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Armed Forces Chief of Staff.
~~Irs. Marcos was behind a recent study
conducted by the Presidential Management Staff to
determine the implications of Ver's immediate return
as Chief of the armed forces. She also reportedly has
said that Ver is the only military leader capable of
effectively running the armed forces, although a
variety of reporting suggests that Ver is widely per-
ceived in the military as a political general and is not
given high marks for his professional competence.'
In our judgment, the legal succession mechanism
would have extensive support in the event of Marcos's
death. For one thing, the military has traditionally
kept its distance in political affairs.
Ion balance, the officer corps
would be unlikely to oppose a legal successor unless
peace and order in Manila were seriously threatened.
Much of the support for the Constitution would come
from Marcos's own ruling party-the KBL. Marcos's
death would place initial control of the government in
the hands of the party, which, through its majority in
the National Assembly, would determine the proce-
dures for the special election. The commission that
oversees elections (COMELEC), moreover, is a ruling
party creation-thus increasing the opportunity for
manipulating election results. This suggests that pres-
. sures for extraconstitutional measures initially would
not be great, provided that those at the helm of the
party determine that they can control the election.
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Imelda Marcos
Still harbors presidential ambitions ...likely to rely on General Ver's support in
a bid for power and continues to advance Ver's political "rehabilitation"...close
ties to the current Assembly Speaker, Nicanor Yniguez ...can also rely on the
considerable financial support of her brother, Ambassador to the United States
Benjamin Romualdez.
General Ver
Remains on leave from post as Armed Forces Chief of Stu/j"... likely to support
Mrs. Marcos's bid for the presidency, especially i/' Marcos designates her his
successor ...almost certainly wants to be reinstated as Armed Forces Chiel ii~
Imelda Marcos succeeds the President.
Defense Minister Enrile
Several recent actions-including widespread media campaign-underscore his
presidential ambitions ...recent harsh exchange during ruling party caucus with
Imelda Marcos over the growth of the Communist insurgency interpreted by
ruling party members as a direct challenge ...longstanding relationship with
agricultural magnate Eduardo Cojuangco may provide substantial.f~nancial
resources in a campaign bid ...also reportedly on good terms with Acting Armed
Forces Chief Fidel Ramos.
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since assuming chief of st~"position.
Acting Chief of Staff Ramos
Has pledged to uphold the Constitition in a succession contest ...has not publicly
come out in support of any potential candidate ...longstanding animosity toward
Imelda Marcos ...has been working closely and reportedly smoothly with Enrile
likely to succeed.
Deputy Prime Minister Rono
Marcos's right-hand man and shrewd player in the ruling party ...has shown no
inclination to support Imelda Marcos or Enrile but would be a valuable ally for
either contender ...probably would back whomever he perceives to be the most
succession contest occur.
Eduardo Cojuangco
Principal member of Marcos's inner circle and one of the cronies ...immensely
wealthy with substantial.financial and political resources ...more likely to be a
kingmaker than king... recently reported to be allied with Enrile should a
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Aquino-who could be pitted against the presidential
candidate from the ruling party.' ~~ 25X1
25X1
Several key KBL members who we believe will
emerge as presidential candidates are Defense Minis-
ter Enrile, Deputy Prime Minister Rono, and Foreign
Minister Tolentino-each of whom has much to gain
from the constitutional process. Rono is reportedly
well respected within the party, as is Tolentino, and
both will probably receive support from party king-
pins. Enrile is not as
popular. Recently, however, he has reportedly been
mending fences within the party and taken a lower
profile in the National Assembly in an effort to make
himself a more palatable presidential candidate. In
addition, Enrile recently has made himself available
to US officials-including talking to Embassy offi-
cials about the growing Communist insurgency-
probably in an effort to garner US support for his
candidacy. We believe that members within this
group will seek to build alliances from ruling party
factions, and perhaps will begin seeking support from
within the business community, the church, and the
opposition leaders ac-
knowledge their unity is fragile and they have avoided
trying to agree on a single candidate. For example,
leaders of UNIDO-the country's largest opposition
coalition-are reportedly refusing to endorse the
"fast-track" plan and are formulating their own presi-
moderate opposition.
Other advocates of an orderly succession would in-
clude members of the moderate opposition, who will
view Marcos's demise as their first real opportunity to
share power since the declaration of martial law in
1972. Most opposition leaders reportedly are con-
vinced that the succession mechanism, however im-
perfect, will probably prevail, and they have begun
contingency planning in the event of Marcos's death.
Opposition representatives from the United National-
ist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), PDP-Laban,
and the Liberal Party are reportedly attempting to
agree on a "fast-track" slate of contenders-including
Salvador Laurel, Eva Estrada Kalaw, and Butz
' Party discipline has steadily eroded since the assassination of
Benigno Aquino and the KBL's poor showing in National Assembly
election in May 1984. Nonetheless, no further reporting on the
composition of two factions is available at this time, but we suspect
that they reflect support for Imelda Marcos or Defense Minister
Enrile, both of whom have been actively engaged in campaigns to
dential candidate selection process.
some opposition members are con- 25X1
sidering alliances with ruling party members,
including an Enrile-Ramon Mitra (PDP-LABAN)
presidential ticket.
According to the US Embassy, members of the
business community are also planning for the succes-
sion. The Embassy says that leading businessmen-
including Jaime Ongpin, brother of Minister of Indus-
try and Trade Roberto Ongpin-are playing a key
role in organizing opposition efforts to unify in the
event that Marcos is unable to complete his term in
office. In addition to participating in the "fast-track"
plan, businessmen figured prominently in the selection
of a "convenor group" composed of Jaime Ongpin,
Cory Aquino-widow of Benigno Aquino-and for-
mer senator Lorenzo Tanada to oversee the selection
of potential opposition candidates if special elections
are called.
Although the Communist Party of the Philippines
does not appear to be currently engaging in contingen-
cy planning, Marcos's deteriorating health may soon
force party leaders to reassess their long-term strate-
gY
party strategy in Manila is to concentrate on organi=
zation building, including the penetration of legal
opposition, labor, and student groups.
however, ahigh-ranking party official
is already concerned that the Communist Party is
losing political ground to the moderate opposition.
he party has no influence with
members of the "convenor group" and therefore will
not be in a position to weigh in on the selection of a
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~/'Marcos Leaves the Country
Some Philippine observers have speculated that Mar-
cos will leave the countrylor medical treatment if his
health continues to deteriorate. The political climate
in Manila, however, would make the political costs of
such a move extraordinarily high. We believe the
ruling party, the opposition, and the military would
interpret his decision as an admission that he is
desperately ill and no longer capable oje,~`ectively
running the government. In our judgment, Marcos
probably would leave some letter ojinstruction with
military and ruling party leaders in an ejjort _to
maintain peace and order in his absence, and such a
letter may already exist, although we have no evi-
dence suggesting this. Nonetheless, opposition leader
Aquilino Pimentel claimed in the local press last
November that Marcos had arranged jor a military
junta to act as caretaker government while he sought
medical treatment In any case,
it is unlikely that Marcos would depart without
trying in some manner to protect hislamily and his
political power base.
If Marcos's caretaker arrangement consisted oja
coalition of independent KBL and military leaders
such as Acting ChiejojSt~`'Ramos, we believe it
might satisfy opposition leaders and help quell the
anxiety that would almost certainly arisejollowing
his departure. In this case, the government probably
would continue to junction in his absence. We believe
any attempt by Marcos to designate General Ver or
Imelda Marcos as sole caretaker-a less likely possi-
bility because ojtheir declining popularity-would
meet with strong opposition from the National
Assembly.
On the other hand, an extended absence on Marcos's
part would eventually set into motion opposition and
ruling party calls in the National Assembly jor
clarification ojthe succession process, including a
determination ojMarcos's incapacitation. Under
these circumstances, we believe the political climate
in Manila would become increasingly tenuous and
could result in military intervention. 25X1
Regardless of what instruction Marcos .leaves if he
seeks medical treatment outside the Philippines, it is
likely to involve a direct rolelor the military.
Although it is impossible to predict whether military
leaders would be inclined to support the constitution-
al process under these circumstances, they may be
more likely to act ij'they believe that they hold a
presidential mandate to do so.
presidential candidate. In addition, the party official
is worried that, over the longer run, participation of
the moderate opposition in the electoral process may
revitalize the political center in the Philippines, re-
versing gains made by the left during Marcos's
tenure.
If Marcos Is Incapacitated
The picture will be more complicated-and prospects
for the Constitution less promising-if Marcos is
incapacitated. Only a declaration of Marcos's inca-
pacitation by the first family or a formal determina-
tion by the National Assembly that Marcos is unfit to
rule will trip the legal succession mechanism. Imelda
Marcos, therefore, would be strongly tempted to hide
Marcos's medical condition in order to gain time and
maneuvering room for a succession struggle. Conceal-
ing the seriousness of Marcos's incapacitation under
such circumstances would work to the disadvantage of
other inner circle members.
We believe the political climate in Manila would
become increasingly unstable as anxiety about the
true status of Marcos's health mounted. If violence
erupted under these circumstances, the military could
choose to intervene to maintain order. Widespread
civil unrest, we believe, would almost certainly force
the military to assume the role of principal power
broker, even if it were disinclined to do so.
We cannot rule out the possibility that Mrs. Marcos
would try to seize power if she determined that she
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could not win support from the ruling party. In such a
power play, she would almost certainly call on Gener-
al Ver for support. General Ramos is more likely to be
responsive to the wishes of both opposition leaders and
ruling party officials such as Prime Minister Virata.
The longstanding enmity between Ramos and Imelda
Marcos-she reportedly favored Army Chief Ramas
over Ramos for the Acting Chief of Staff position-
makes it unlikely that he would be influenced by her.
chances to succeed him.
All considered, we believe Marcos is content to keep
the succession mechanism weak. His refusal to allow
the ruling party to introduce clarifying legislation
during its caucus in January underscores his desire to
ensure .that the leadership question in the Philippines
remains unsettled. In our judgment, Marcos may
hope that a mechanism that is open to manipulation
will enable Imelda Marcos to effect a dynastic succes-
sion. He almost certainly is aware of her unpopularity
with party leaders and probably believes that an
ambiguous succession mechanism will improve her
succession.
We also believe that Marcos had the succession in
mind when he announced at the ruling party caucus in
January that provincial elections-scheduled for
1986-and presidential elections-scheduled for
1987-would be held as planned. His current health
crisis has sparked widespread speculation among rul-
ing party and opposition leaders alike that presidential
elections would be called in mid-1985. A decision by
Marcos to hold an early presidential election would, of
course, lend credence to the speculation that he is
seriously ill, a condition the Malacanang Palace has
consistently denied. In any case, the opposition is
convinced that early elections will still be called,
despite the President's announcement. According to
the US Embassy, the opposition interprets Marcos's
announcement as an attempt to lull them into believ-
ing that they have plenty of time to prepare for the
25X1 For his part, Marcos probably hopes that, by adhering
to the current schedule for elections, Mrs. Marcos will
have time to boost her political standing and garner
more support within the ruling party for her candida-
cy. Among other things, he may believe that she will
be able to capitalize on an upswing in the economy by
1987.6 Furthermore, we believe that Marcos's state-
ment on the election schedule is designed to forestall
further succession maneuvering within the party. He
almost,certainly hopes that the announcement, and
his announced candidacy for 1987, will stem growing
factionalism within the ruling party-but we do not
believe this tactic will work. Provincial elections next
year, in any case, will force the ruling party to get
ready for elections, thus preparing it for an early
presidential election, should one be necessary.
Can a Leadership Crisis Be Avoided?
One of the leading factors in support of the constitu-
tional succession mechanism is that several key actors
who would be involved have recently moved to bolster
its prospects. The Speaker, for example, has met with
key military leaders, including Ver and Ramos, to
solicit pledges to uphold the Constitution during a
succession. He received such pledges from both men,
with General Ramos publicly stating that the military
will uphold the Constitution. In any case, General
Ver's continued unsettled status weakens the chances
of military intervention in a constitutional succession
contest. Although Ver loyalists control key commands
in Manila, it is not clear that these ties would
automatically translate into support for an extracon-
stitutional bid for power. Furthermore,
b Based on an econometric model that simulates the effects of the
Philippines' recent debt rescheduling, we believe that the economic
outlook through 1986 is bleak. Our analysis indicates that national
output will decline by 2 percent this year, and the economy will
grow no more than 2 percent in 1986 because of financial austerity
measures required by the IMF. A nascent economic recovery could
be under way by the 1987 presidential election if the country's
political problems ease, favorable economic conditions prevail
abroad, and the Philippines continues reforms pledged to its foreign
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In addition, much institution building has taken place
over the past year, probably more than most observers
of the Philippines had expected after nearly a decade
of martial law. The new National Assembly is a far
more vigorous body than its predecessor, and both
ruling party and opposition performances have stirred
memories of the open-and, according to many crit-
ics, freewheeling-premartial law congress. At the
same time, several recent actions of the Supreme
Court and the legal proceedings that have accompa-
nied the release of the Agrava Board's majority
findings point to a more independent judiciary.
On balance, however, the continued strengthening of
political institutions-including the tightening of the
succession process-will take more time than events
surrounding Marcos's health will probably allow. For
that reason, we believe that a chaotic succession
contest is probable. The levers that were built into the
current Constitution, including a weak succession
mechanism, afford room for large-scale manipulation
of the system. The military's potentially conflicting
role in domestic politics, moreover, makes it probable
that pressures to short-circuit the constitutional proc-
ess will be high.
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