SOME PROGRESS IN THE INTER-KOREAN DIALOGUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00590R000300400003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Some Progress in the
Inter-Korean Dialogue
Secret
EA 85-10143
July 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Some Progress in the
Inter-Korean. Dialogue
An Intelligence Assessment
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
welcome and may be directed to the
East Asian Analysis. Comments an queries are
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EA 85-10143
July 1985
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Some Progress in the
Inter-Korean Dialogue
Key Judgments North Korea's current effort to engage South Korea in economic, humani-
Information available tarian, and interparliamentary discussions appears more than a short-lived
as of 24 July 1985 tactical maneuver. We believe P'yongyang remains intent on attracting the
was used in this report.
United States into broader security discussions and sees the talks with the
South as a step to that end. North Korea also seems to have embarked on the
dialogue in a broader effort to improve P'yongyang's political, strategic, and
economic options as well.
A variety of factors are sustaining the momentum on both sides:
? P'yongyang's realignment of its position in the Sino-Soviet-North Korean
triangle has brought some solid gains, which may have given Kim 11-song
greater confidence and energy to pursue dialogue with Seoul.
? South Korea's response also shows a growing confidence on Seoul's part
despite the domestic political challenges to President Chun Doo Hwan.
Chun may indeed calculate that the dialogue will serve as a rallying point
and thereby help disarm his critics at home.
With the Summer Olympics scheduled in Seoul in 1988, South Korea does
not want to appear to be the party hindering any peace efforts, which
P'yongyang apparently senses is a factor that keeps Seoul at the table.
Given the past failure of dialogues between the North and the South,
decisionmakers on both sides are trying'to protect their positions and to
handle the twists and turns of the dialogue:
? Institutional interests, particularly the military and security forces, are
certain to object to the possible harmful effects on vigilance, security, and
division of national resources if broader exchanges occur between the two
societies.
? P'yongyang probably worries that its dealings with the South may
encourage its Communist allies to expand dealings with Seoul. South
Korea is concerned about P'yongyang scoring its own gains in the West.
Against this backdrop, we do not anticipate early or significant substantive
breakthroughs. As in the early 1970s, the current dialogue could well be
prolonged, showing only slow and limited progress.
iii Secret
EA 85-10143
July 1985
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On the other hand, it is possible that momentum in the talks could lead the
two Koreas more rapidly to substantive progress. The odds on this outcome
would improve significantly if the two sides agree to more than token
economic and humanitarian exchanges. Both Kim and Chun have proposed
summit discussions. If each senses the timing for a dramatic gesture is right,
a summit this year or early next could add that forward push.
Secret iv
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Some Progress in the
Inter-Korean Dialogue
Introduction
The inter-Korean dialogue resumed last year follow-
ing P'yongyang's provision of flood relief aid to South
Korea. We believed North Korea had reinitiated talks
with two primary ends in mind:
? North Korea seemed to have concluded that re-
sumed dialogue with Seoul would help it engage the
United States in broader security negotiations. Hav-
ing failed in its efforts to win US acceptance of its
tripartite talks proposal, P'yongyang apparently
sought to respond to the US call for progress in
inter-Korean talks and to project an image of
accommodation.
? It probably also sensed a need to take the initiative
when Sino-US discussions threatened, in its view, to
produce arrangements that could work against
North Korean interests.
South Korean officials, particularly President Chun
Doo Hwan, viewed North Korea's initiatives with an
attitude of defensiveness, borne of the fear that the
North might actually score a breakthrough to the
Status of Current
Inter-Korean Dialogue
Economic/Trade 15 November 1984 Fourth round set for 18 September. These are official
17 May and 20 June 1985 at Panmunjom. government talks.
Humanitarian (Red Cross) Preliminary contacts at Panmunjom on 20 No- Working-level contacts at Panmunjom on 15 and 19
vember 1984 and during May 1985, with formal July fail to agree on token family exchanges. Next
meeting in Seoul during 28-29 May 1985. formal meeting set for 27 August in P'yongyang.
These are semiofficial contacts.
United States. (South Korea's defensiveness is in large
part responsible for its proposals for cross-recognition,
which would bring about recognition by major powers
of the two Koreas.) Nonetheless, Seoul-well aware of
the need to appear responsive and to seize the public
relations initiative-quickly countered with proposals
of its own.
North Korea has, in fact, sustained the dialogue
despite several incidents that, in the past, have provid-
ed a pretext for breaking contact with Seoul. Such
recent events have included the Team Spirit Exercise,
the sit-in at the USIS Center in Seoul, and President
Chun's subsequent crackdown on dissident students
(see table for status of various talks)
Recent comments by a North Korean diplomat over-
seas also contribute to our conviction that P'yongyang
is in for the long haul. The official asserted that
P'yongyang will still suspend sessions during the
Team Spirit Exercise held every spring, but his
comments suggest North Korea envisages talks with
Seoul continuing at least into next year. His remarks
on the question of a reunification constitution. First
preliminary meeting held on 23 July in Panmunjom;
second scheduled for 25 September.
Three sessions during spring 1984 on issue of Seoul urging revival, but talks suspended since North
fielding joint team for sporting events. Korean boycott of 1984 Summer Olympics.
Both sides publicly stipulate prior progress at lower
levels.
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were made in the context of a broader recitation of
P'yongyang's interest in strengthening its ties to the
outside world, particularly the West.
Behind the Momentum
Events this spring may be building leadership confi-
dence in both Koreas, and account in part for the
progress registered so far. In the North, Kim 11-song's
efforts to realign the Sino-Soviet-North Korean tri-
angle have registered solid gains:
? For the first time in over a decade, the Soviets have
delivered a significant new weapons system-six
MIG-23s were transferred in May-which should
assuage some of Kim's insecurities over the planned
transfer of US F-16 fighters to the South beginning
early next year. We anticipate the MIGs will even-
tually total a full regiment of 40.
? Moscow also has given Kim's domestic agenda a
boost by inviting heir apparent Kim Chong-il to
visit, and P'yongyang may benefit from increased
Soviet economic assistance for Korea's next
seven-year plan.
South Korea's handling of the talks also indicates
growing leadership confidence in Seoul, even while
President Chun is being more openly challenged on
the domestic political front:
? Chun's visit to Washington in late April reassured
him on the strength of ties to the United States.
? His desire to chalk up a success in the foreign policy
area may be growing despite domestic problems.
Chun may calculate the dialogue will produce a
"rally round the flag" effect that will help disarm
his critics.
Beyond these essentially domestic considerations, we
believe that a broader process, focused more on
international considerations, is also at work. The
comments made by the North Korean official cited
above suggest P'yongyang's initiatives toward South
Korea should be viewed in the context of a range of
North Korean steps to improve its political, strategic,
and economic options.
South Korea, mindful that it is hosting the 1986
Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics, is loath to
take any steps that would suggest publicly it is
hindering peace efforts. Consequently, it feels some-
what "trapped" into responding to the North. This
was evident in Seoul's participation in the interparlia-
mentary talks that began on 23 July. Seoul, via the
National Assembly, took nearly two months to reply
to P'yongyang's April call for exchanges. A South
Korean Government planning paper prepared in mid-
June argued that this forum would allow North
Korean exploitation of differences between the opposi-
tion and government, but it concluded that there was
little hope of avoiding talks.
We believe that North Korea, assessing Seoul's moti-
vations, has concluded that it has a special "window
of opportunity" now that will keep the South Koreans
talking at almost any cost.
The Negative Costs
Notwithstanding the inducements to keep talking,
there are signs both sides are developing positions to
preserve their options in handling the evolving dia-
logue. For example, media in both P'yongyang and
Seoul continue to focus on the other's domestic and
foreign policy developments in such a way as to cast
doubt on intentions
On both sides, entrenched institutionalized interests-
especially the military/ security forces-are certain to
register concern over the possible harmful effects of
broader exchanges between the two societies. We
believe that elements of the South Korean leadership
fear bilateral exchanges will undercut Seoul's long-
standing justification for its authoritarian approach to
domestic dissent-the threat from the North. If the
dialogue casts P'yongyang in a more benign light,
"the threat" will lose its usefulness as a justification
for control. The North, meanwhile, has to be wary of
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weakening its control over the populace, a develop-
ment that could accompany any large-scale family
exchanges with the South.
Moreover, North Korea probably senses a very real
danger that its dealings with the South may encour-
age significantly expanded Communist dealings with
Seoul. Indeed, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kapitsa in late June told US officials that progress in
the inter-Korean dialogue might encourage Moscow
to broaden contacts with South Korea.
Prospects
For the moment, however, we are more impressed by
factors likely to keep the dialogue going. In particular,
given what we now view as North Korea's broad-
based interest in strengthening its external relations
on a variety of fronts, we believe that it will overlook
frustrations that a few years ago might have caused it
to abandon the dialogue.
Even so, we do not necessarily anticipate early or
significant substantive breakthroughs. In all probabil-
ity North and South will behave in months to come in
a manner similar to that of the 1970s. That is, a
prolonged dialogue, showing only limited signs of solid
progress, could ensue. If both Koreas come to focus
more on the risks than the opportunities inherent in
the dialogue, we could well see:
? Progress diffused among several different dialogue
tracks, with shifting emphasis on first one and then
another forum.
? Working-level contacts sapping forward momen-
tum. There is almost infinite scope for disagreement
over the logistics of various exchanges to say noth-
ing of substantive issues. Both the Red Cross and
political contacts in the 1970s degenerated into
unproductive but lengthy working-level rounds that
continued several years after formal, substantive
meetings ground to a halt in 1973.
It remains possible, however, that, while remaining
poles apart on strategic issues such as peace treaties,
nonaggression pacts, multiparty talks, and confedera-
tion, the building momentum of the talks could lead
the two Koreas into some real substantive progress.
The odds on this outcome would improve significantly 25X1
should a long series of proposals and counterproposals
lead to a Kim-Chun summit this year or early next.
To date, the two Koreas have declared their readiness,
via the Red Cross humanitarian talks, to initiate
exchange visits of separated family members late this
summer the South 25X1
will stack their delegation with security officers, and
we anticipate that P'yongyang will do likewise. Ex-
changes of cultural troupes could also occur at an
early date. Progress has not been claimed in the
economic talks, where the North has made broad
proposals and the South, specific suggestions. We
continue to believe, however, that the proposals tabled
in this forum-such as the opening of officially
monitored trade-carry fewer political risks than 25X1
many humanitarian exchange proposals.
25X1
Specific issues for discussion have not been identified
for the summit, but we believe that the Asian habit of
associating such meetings with the mutual granting of
concessions or "presents" would weigh heavily in the
calculations of both Seoul and P'yongyang. Substan-
tive issues on which progress has not yet been
achieved but which are relatively noncontroversial,
such as trade, might present the best opportunities for
progress.
Room for maneuver and compromise is also conspicu-
ous in the sports area. Three sessions were held in
early 1984 on fielding joint teams at major meets.
North Korea abruptly canceled the talks when it
withdrew from the Los Angeles Summer Olympics.
So far P'yongyang has not responded to Seoul's
subsequent calls to resume these talks. We believe,
however, that North Korea will need to come to grips
with the inevitability of the 1988 Summer Olympics
being held in Seoul (as well as that of broad participa-
tion by the Communist Bloc). P'yongyang may well
conclude that its best option lies in fielding a joint
team and/or pushing to host some events itself.
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Implications for the United States
The unfolding dialogue presents opportunities for
reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and for
probing for meaningful North Korean policy changes.
North Korea's policy of dialogue may well invite
greater Western attention to P'yongyang, which
would sorely test Seoul's own willingness to adopt
more creative and risky approaches to the dialogue.
Coordinating flexible responses to the process-in
Washington, Seoul, and Western capitals-presents
challenges to US policymakers.
Because one of P'yongyang's goals in resuming talks
with the South is to engage the United States in
broader discussions, North Korea will be looking for
positive signs of Washington's acknowledgment of the
process. P'yongyang's reaction to President Reagan's
speech on 8 July-identifying North Korea as a state
associated with terrorism-has been relatively low-
key.
North Korea nonetheless may infer from these re-
marks that the United States is indifferent to progress
in the North-South dialogue. That, in turn, could
limit North Korean flexibility. But we believe the
growing signs that the North sees broader goals-
beyond engaging the United States-served by the
dialogue argue for continued effort.
25X1 t
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