USSR: THE FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION

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• Document Release Date: February 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR: The Food
Supply Situation
Confidential
Confidential
SOV 85-10042
March 1985
?y 498
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
USSR: The Food
Supply Situation
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Soviet Economy
Division, SOYA,
Confidential
SOV 85-10042
March 1985
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USSR: The Food
Supply Situation
Key Judgments The diet is the single most important determinant of consumer welfare in
Information available the USSR, in the perceptions of the population as well as in Soviet and
as of I January 1985 Western measures of consumption. Food availability in relation to demand,
was used in this report.
the quality of the diet, and the leadership's handling of food issues
therefore have important implications for social stability.
Although nutritional levels in the USSR have been generally adequate
during the post-World War II era, the Soviet diet has not met consumer
demand for quality foods or for greater variety. Providing more meat and
other quality foods such as dairy products and fruit has been a major focus
of Moscow's approach to consumer welfare for three decades:
? Considerable progress was made in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the
Soviet diet began to resemble more closely that of the United States and
Western Europe.
? When agricultural shortfalls checked this progress in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, consumer disappointment was keen.
? The queuing experienced by consumers and the shortages of meat, milk,
and other quality foodstuffs symbolized and heightened the sense of
stringency arising from the general economic slowdown.
? The leadership was especially worried by a rising incidence of strikes
related to food shortages in the 1980-82 period.
General Secretaries Andropov and Chernenko adopted a number of
measures to cope with the food situation. They first lent their support to the
Brezhnev Food Program because of its long-term potential. To deal with
consumer discontent in the near term, first Brezhnev and then Andropov
and Chernenko:
? Launched an apparently successful campaign to lower expectations of a
quick solution to shortages of quality foods.
? Granted special food allocations to favored enterprises to head off
discontent among workers.
? Rationed meat and other products in short supply.
Increased official support to private agriculture.
?: Purchased huge quantities of grain and foodstuffs to support higher
production and consumption of quality foods.
Confidential
SOV 85-10042
March 1985
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With the help of better harvests in 1982 and 1983, the leadership's policies
had some success in increasing food availability in 1983 and 1984.,Meat
and milk output reached new highs in 1983 and again in 1984
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queuing declined somewhat, and
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prices in the relatively free collective farm markets leveled off. Overall, per
capita consumption of food increased by 2 percent per year in 1983-84, af-
ter stagnating in 1981-82. Moreover, since 1982 we have received only two
reports of significant unrest occasioned by food. shortages.
The USSR's food problem has not disappeared, however. Rising incomes
continue to push up demand, especially for quality foods. The structure of
the Soviet food supply therefore is far from satisfying consumer prefer-
ences. In addition, planners have to take into account the erosion in the
quality of some foods (watery milk, increased spoilage of fruit and
vegetables) and the still pronounced regional differences in the extent to
which the demand for quality foods is satisfied. Finally, the leadership has
made little progress in reducing food imports-a key goal of the Food
The Food Program set goals for 1990 per capita food consumption that
would bring the availability of quality foods (with the exception of meat) to
levels approaching, or even exceeding, those in the United States in 1982.
If, however, production of these commodities grows at the average annual
rates of the 1960-83 period, only the consumption targets for eggs and milk
will be met. To meet 1990 consumption targets'for other commodities, the
Soviet Union would need to continue or boost imports of meat, vegetables,
fruit, raw sugar, vegetable oil, and fish.
The "food problem," which the late Secretary General Brezhnev termed
"the most pressing political and economic issue to be addressed in the
1981-85 period," is thus not likely-to be alleviated substantially by 1990.
But the experience of the past few years suggests that modest growth in
production and continued imports of quality foods, leadership circumspec-
tion regarding promises of improvement in consumption, and a continua-
tion of the system of distributing food at the workplace will probably
prevent food shortages from becoming the volatile issue they threatened to
become in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Moscow appears to have blunted
the potentially serious impact of food shortages with a number of measures
that are likely to remain in place for at least several years-whether or not
growth in consumption of quality food continues at its recent pace.
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Key Judgments iii
Overview of Food Supplies, 1979-84
Tauter Supplies, 1979-82
Other Ways of Coping
5
Changes in Allocation and Distribution
6
Foreign Trade as a Safety Value
8
Factors Degrading Food Quality.
10
Regional Differences
12
A.
Leadership Approaches to Food Supply Issues, 1955-75
17
1.
Selected Countries: Per Capita Consumption of Various Foods in
1981
2.
USSR: Per Capita Consumption of Selected Foods
4.
USSR: Estimated Changes in Supply of and Demand for Selected
Quality Foods
7
6.
USSR: Per Capita Consumption of Six Food Products in 1965,
1975, and 1982 in Selected Republics
14
7.
USSR: Per Capita Production and Consumption of Meat and Milk
in 1975 in Selected Republics
15
8.
USSR: Coefficient of Variation Among Republics in Per Capita
Consumption of Selected Food Products, 1965-75
15
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Table 1
Selected Countries: Per Capita Consumption
of Various Foods in 1981
Meat a
Fish
Eggs
Sugar
Potatoes
Bread and
Bread Products
USSR
53
18
14
44
105
138
United States
110
8
15
36
35
68
West Germany
98
NA
17
31
81
68
Norway
50
37
11
35
70
80
Spain
75
NA
18
27
113
76
Poland
72
7
13
33
155
128
Bulgaria
71
7
12
35
30
159
Hungary
73
NA
19
36
59
113
Czechoslovakia
87
5
19
37
79
109
a Meat is on a carcass-weight basis and includes edible offals. Meat
for Norway does not include poultry. The Soviet official meat
consumption number was adjusted to exclude slaughter fat.
Sources: Basic Statistics of the Community, Luxembourg, Euro-
stat, 1984; Food Consumption, Prices, and Expenditures, 1962-82,
USDA, Economic Research Service, 1983; Statisticheskiy ezhe-
godnik stran-chlenov soveta ekonomicheskoy vzaimopomoshchi
(Moscow: 1983).
Table 2
USSR: Per Capita Consumption of Selected Foods
Meat a 37
44 52 51 51 52 53 53 53 53 53
Milk and 251
milk products
307 316 316 321 318 319 314 305 295 309
Eggs (units) 124
159 216 209 222 232 235 239 245 249 253
Fish 12.6
15.4 16.8 18.4 17.1 17.1 16.3 17.6 17.9 18.4 17.6
Sugar 34.2
38.8 40.9 41.9 42.4 42.8 42.0 44.4 43.9 44.5 44.2
Vegetable oil 7.1
6.8 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.6
Potatoes 142
130 120 119 120 117 115 109 105 110 110
Vegetables 72
82 89 86 88 92 98 97 98 101 101
Fruit 28
35 39 39 41 41 38 38 40 42 44
Bread and 156
cereal products
149 141 141 139 140 138 138 138 137 136
a Meat is on a carcass-weight basis and includes edible offals.
Soviet official meat consumption numbers were adjusted to exclude
slaughter fat.
Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo, various years; SSSR v tsifrakh,
1983.
Confidential vi
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USSR: The Food
Supply Situation
The diet is the single most important determinant of
consumer welfare in the USSR, both in the percep-
tions of the population and in Soviet and Western
measures of Soviet consumption. Taken together, food
availability in relation to demand, the quality of the
diet, and the leadership's handling of food issues have
important implications for social stability.
At the November 1981 plenum of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Brezh-
nev referred to the food problem as "the most pressing
political and economic issue to be addressed in the
1981-85 period." -Brezhnev was alluding not to malnu-
trition but to the disparity between the generally
adequate but bland, monotonous diet and consumer
preference for a more varied and higher quality diet
(more meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables)
like that enjoyed in Western industrialized societies
and in some parts of Eastern Europe (table 1).F--]
Disappointed by. both the USSR's failure to increase
the availability of quality foods since the mid-1970s
(table 2) and the slow growth in consumer welfare in
general (figure 1), Brezhnev announced in May 1982 a
decadelong Food Program. The program focused on
upgrading and integrating the activities involved in
food production, processing, and marketing. Brezh-
nev's successors, Andropov and Chernenko, endorsed
the Food Program and took-steps to implement it. F
This paper describes the nature'and consequences of
changes in the quantity and quality of the Soviet diet
since 1965, with special reference to the 1979-82
period, when increases in the provision of highly
desired foods slowed markedly. It also discusses lead-
ership responses, particularly the allocational changes
since 1982 that have resulted in the amelioration of
certain aspects of food shortages and thereby damp- .
ened discontent. Finally, it assesses the likelihood of
reaching the goals for per capita consumption in 1990
and the extent to which such progress will relieve a
troubling and longstanding inability to provide a diet
Figure 1
USSR: Average Annual Per Capita Growth in
Total and Food Consumption, 1966-84a
Food
consumption
Consumption
of all goods
and services
-1 1966-70 76-80 82 84
a The index of consumption underlying these growth rates is constructed by
using 1970 expenditure weights and consumption indexes for I I major
categories of goods and services. Where possible, the indexes are based on
physical quantities consumed. The food consumption index, for example, is
largely based on Soviet per capita consumption data in kilograms. Where
these figures are not available, physical production data and deflated retail
sales are substituted.
Tauter Supplies, 1979-82
From late 1979 through 1980, the gap between the
demand for and supply of livestock products and some
that Soviet consumers would prefer.
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other foods appeared to be widening markedly.
consumers
increasingly had to endure long waits at food stores,
often of several hours, and that suppliers frequently
ran out of stocks before all could make their pur-
chases. The reports indicated that the phenomenon of
increased queuing was general and widespread-
occurring in most republics, in both rural and urban
areas, and in cities of all sizes. During this time,
several factors seem to have converged, all contribut-
ing in varying degrees to widening the gap between
demand and supply.
First, Soviet statistics show that the quantities of meat
and milk products recorded as sold in state and
cooperative stores changed little from 1979 to 1980
(figure 2). Total meat, milk, vegetables, potatoes, and
sunflower seed marketed by agriculture declined in
1980. Moreover, during the winter of 1979/80 and
throughout the year, procurements of meat and milk
from state and collective farms were generally lower
than those of the corresponding periods in the preced-
ing year. This decline in procurements, although
supplemented by large imports, probably led to more
erratic deliveries of meat and milk products to many
regions (figure 2).' Only egg production and consump-
tion grew steadily during this period.
While supplies of most quality foods faltered, per
capita personal disposable incomes increased sharply
in 1980, thereby increasing the demand for quality
foods (figure 2). Consumers-uneasy over reports of a
poor year for agricultural production-began to hoard
supplies, thus exacerbating pressure on available sup-
plies. As queues lengthened at state stores, consumers
increasingly turned to collective farm markets
(CFMs), where private farmers sell their surplus
production at prices that generally vary according to
supply and demand? Partly as a result of this in-
creased consumer demand, prices rose sharply in
CFMs (figure 2). In response to the excess demand for
livestock products, moreover, black-market activity
increased, which probably caused further diversions
from state store supplies.
' For the USSR as a whole, the per capita availability of meat
(including producers' own consumption and collective farm market
sales) remained the same while that of milk declined by 2 percent
from 1979 to 1980. Additional demand pressure was generatedby
income growth. Hoarding also played a role
' In state retail and cooperative stores, food prices are fixed at
relatively low levels. Despite food shortages, Soviet leaders have
maintained the longstanding official policy against raising retail
The poor agricultural performance in 1979 manifest-
ed itself during the ensuing winter and spring in ever-
lengthening queues for various quality foods. In the
spring and summer of 1980, worker discontent-at
least partly the product of food shortages-escalated
into work stoppages at some large plants. The leader-
ship responded in part by sending in special shipments
of food. By the late summer and fall of 1980, events in
Poland and the likelihood of a mediocre harvest had
heightened the leadership's anxiety. These distur-
bances were especially troublesome for some regional
party leaders, who had to contend with social tensions
generated by ethnic and cultural factors as well as the
more general consumer dissatisfaction manifested in
worker apathy and strikes.
In 1981 the situation worsened. Milk and vegetable
marketings registered another decline. Per capita milk
consumption fell, and per capita meat consumption
was slightly lower than in 1980. Queuing at retail
stores became so widespread that informal rationing
of meat and milk products was imposed in 1981. The
situation stabilized in 1982.
Improved Availability, 1983-84
By the end of 1982, production and marketing of
major farm products were recovering somewhat from
1980-81 lows. The recovery continued in 1983 and-
together with large imports of grain, meat, fruits and
vegetables, vegetable oil, and sugar-led to an upturn
in food availability in 1983. Further gains occurred in
1984. Vegetable production rose. In addition, meat
and milk output reached new highs of 16.7 million
tons and 97.6 million tons, respectively.
The degree to which increased availability from pro-
duction and imports translates into gains for the
consumer is unclear, because some of the product is
channeled into inventories and end uses other than
consumption. For example, Soviet statistics show that
per capita consumption of dairy products fell in 1982
despite a rise in milk production that would have
permitted an increase. In 1983, production gains
could have supported somewhat greater meat con-
sumption than occurred. Increases in milk fed to
animals and a rise in inventories of processed dairy
products could account partially for the discrepancy
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Figure 2
USSR: Food Supply and Demand Overview, 1977-83
State Retail and Cooperative Sales of Marketed Output From Agriculture,
Meat and Milk, 1977-83a All Sectors, 1977-83a
Million tons Million tons
Monthly Milk Procurements From State and
Collective Farms, 1978-80b
Million tons
Milk
All Union Collective Farm Market
Price Index, 1977-83a
Index: 1975=100
1001977 78 79 80 81 82 83
0 1977 78 79 80 81 82 83
Growth in Per Capita Personal Disposable
Money Income, 1977-83c
Percent
a Reported in or calculated from data in Narodnoye
Khozyaystvo, various years.
b Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, various years.
c SOYA calculation.
Milk
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Table 3
USSR: Changes in
Per Capita Consumption, 1980-83
Kilograms
for measurement). Nearly all the growth occurred in
1983 (figure 1). Per capita consumption of food
Milk
Eggs (units)
Fish
-5.0
14.0
0
0.8
1.0
6.0
-2.0
in the case of milk, while that for meat could have
resulted from efforts to rebuild depleted inventories.
Despite uncertainties as to the extent of increased
consumption, numerous reports have indicated that,
because of increased supplies in retail outlets and
collective farm markets, queuing diminished some-
what. According to a Radio Free Europe-Radio
Liberty survey of 358 recent Soviet emigrants, by the
second half of 1983 the availability of food products
had returned to the 1981 level; fruits and vegetables
showed the largest gains. The improvement appears to
have been concentrated mainly in second half 1983.
Meanwhile, prices reportedly were stable in state
stores. In 1983, however, all-union CFM prices (figure
2) declined only slightly, indicating that supply-
demand gaps for quality foods did not narrow appre-
ciably.
As a result of increased production since 1982 and
continuing high levels of food imports, some growth in
the per capita availability of meat, eggs, vegetable oil,
vegetables, and fruit has occurred (see table 3). The
per capita availability of milk and sugar in 1983,
however, was still below the 1980 level. Overall, per
capita consumption of food in 1983 was nearly 3
percent higher than in 1980 (we used 1970 food
consumption weights in established prices as the basis
probably increased by 2 percent in 1984.
In recent years, meat imports have accounted for 2 to
4 kilograms (kg) of per capita consumption. If imports
were maintained at 1983 levels and if production
targets were met, the amount of meat available to
consumers per capita (after adjustment for losses
between farm and consumer) increased by about 0.5
percent in 1984. Such an increase, however, would
still not match the demand for meat generated by
increases in purchasing power, according to our calcu-
lations. Several years of rapid growth in meat avail-
ability will be required to fulfill the demand that has
built up as a result of the stagnation in the per capita
level of meat supplies and the continued increase in
disposable money incomes.
Nonetheless, the resumption of some progress in
raising consumption of food, and especially quality
foods, probably strikes the leadership as a consider-
able achievement even though food imports remained
high. The population, too, probably recognizes that
food supplies have improved; we have had only two
reports of strikes or civil disturbances occasioned by
food shortages in 1983 and 1984, a marked reduction
from the number received in the 1980-82 period. F_
How the Leadership Responded
Investment Policy and the Food Problem
Brezhnev's legacy to Andropov included the conse-
quences of four consecutive years of poor agricultural
performance, a new farm policy already complicated
by bureaucratic discord, a heavy resource burden,
large hard currency outlays, and sizable and growing
subsidies to maintain stable retail food prices. (See
appendix A for a discussion of farm policy under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev.) Furthermore, the need to
improve agricultural performance was but one of the
difficult and complex economic challenges Andropov
faced in an environment of slower economic growth
and keen competition for limited investment re-
sources.
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Andropov chose to support the Food Program despite
its decadelong time frame and high cost. Why he did
so is not clear. He may have calculated that the
political and economic costs of devising, obtaining_
consensus on, and implementing an alternative farm
policy would be even greater. Not the least of the
costs associated with a shift in policy might have been
disruptions in food production that would add to the
irritation of a population already far from pleased
with the irregular supply of quality foods. Finally, he
may well have been hoping for favorable weather to
complement continued investment in agriculture and
to boost production sufficiently for the regime to
claim success for the Food Program.
If the leadership maintains the commitment to the
level of investment specified in the Food Program-
Chernenko had reaffirmed his support for the Food
Program at the March 1984 All=Union Agro-
Industrial Conference and at the October 1984 special
plenum on agriculture'-and does not curtail these
allocations in favor of defense or industrial develop-
ment, little flexibility will exist for accelerating devel-
opment in other sectors of the consumer economy.
Until the Food Program pays a return in the form of a
higher and more stable level of production, significant
diversions of investment, for example, to the produc-
tion of consumer soft goods and durables and for the
expansion of services are unlikely.
Other Ways of Coping
Recognizing that the Food Program would be slow to
achieve its long-run potential, both Brezhnev and
Andropov also sought to relieve shortages by other
means. First, Moscow has consistently tried since the
early 1970s to dampen the growth of purchasing
power to match the slower growth in the availability
of consumer goods. This effort has had considerable
success. In addition, the leadership has publicly
played down consumer expectations, granted special
food allocations to factories and other worksites while
introducing rationing, given greater support to the
private agricultural sector, and imported huge quanti-
ties of grain and foodstuffs.
' The 23 October 1984 plenum on agriculture was mainly focused
on a program to increase stocks of irrigated and drained land in
agriculture to support Food Program goals.
Controlling Expectations. The Soviet leadership has
only recently addressed the problem of consumer
expectations. In discussing food issues, the leadership
began to admit problems, stopped promising quick
solutions, stressed long-term improvements, and shift-
ed some of the blame to poor worker performance. In
his generally upbeat speech at the fall 1980 party
plenum, Brezhnev publicly acknowledged shortages of
meat and milk. Soon after, at the 26th CPSU Con-
gress in February 1981, Brezhnev again fretted over
consumer problems and pinned some of the blame on
poor worker performance: "Whoever wants to live
better must work more and better," he warned. Half a
year later, at the fall 1981 plenum, he characterized
the "food problem" as the "central economic and
political problem" to be addressed in the 1981-85
period. In announcing the Food Program in May
1982, he extended the agenda to 1990.
Within three months of taking power in late 1982,
Andropov unleashed a discipline campaign that aimed
at punishing workers for absenteeism, drinking on the
job, and poor performance. Andropov's administration
gave more emphasis to tying remuneration to perfor-
mance, particularly for farmworkers. At the June
1983 plenum, he declared that growth in consumption
would be slow. In general, Andropov was careful not
to promise more than the eventual achievement of
"reasonable" consumption levels; in his one publicly
released speech on the Food Program (April 1983), he
stressed the "still slow" progress in agriculture. The
end of the speech delivered for him at the December
party plenum briefly noted that some improvements in
food availability had occurred in 1983 and that there
was "hope for a further change for the better next
year too."
Chernenko's speeches generally emphasized balance.
For example, his maiden speech as General Secretary
in early 1984 stressed continuity with Andropov's
policies; he promised no swift progress in consumer
welfare but did say that "much is being done now" to
increase the supply of quality foods. His emphasis
upon balance also appeared when, on the one hand, he
criticized the present wage and bonus system for
lacking "proper fairness," but, on the other, repeated
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Brezhnev's and Andropov's refrain-"Never forget
one simple truth: whoever wants to live better must
work more and better."
We believe that these efforts to restrain consumer
expectations, together with the Soviet populace's
grudging acceptance of the enduring realities of short-
ages and long lines, has resulted in a general lowering
of expectations. Four years of growing gaps between
supply and demand for meat, milk, butter, and many
types of fruits and vegetables have led to adjustments
in popular attitudes. Initial anger and surprise at
increased queuing and rationing have given way to
resignation and weary acceptance. Some have turned
to the black market, others have decreased their
intake of certain quality foods. In cities gardening has
increased, while in rural areas private farming has
increased somewhat. The average citizen, however,
while accepting the fact that prosperity is a long way
off, probably tends to blame the system to a greater
degree than before.
Changes in Allocation and Distribution. The Brezh-
nev leadership seemed to realize that promoting un-
realistic expectations might endanger social order.
But it clearly did not believe that greater circumspec-
tion in promises to the public would be sufficient to
end food-related unrest among workers in industrial
installations.
The leadership saw an opportunity both to raise the
prestige of trade unions and to pacify workers unhap-
py with queuing by arranging for special distributions
of food at the workplace. Although special stores for
an elite have long characterized the Soviet system,
food distribution at important factories or prestigious
institutions is a phenomenon of the middle and late
1970s. Factory managers and institute directors first
made special arrangements. with retail authorities to
provide supplies on a regular basis to ease the burden
of queuing and thus to improve morale and reduce
absenteeism. In 1980, trade unions were ordered to
help. Although we do not know the'share of-various
foods that was distributed through these channels, the
practice was so prevalent,
that every workplace in the country sold
special food packages to employees at least on major
Soviet holidays. And, in some cases, special distribu-
tion developed to the point that employees could
choose from regularly alternating lists in selecting
food packages.
In addition to putting pressure on retail supplies
available to the general public, food distribution at the
workplace competed with the special priority enjoyed
by hospitals, schools, and child-care centers. Food
supplies to such institutions were sometimes curtailed,
and complaints surfaced in the press. In some local=
ities, however, the high priority of these institutions
was maintained, according to emigre reporting. While
some general allocation rules pertain to every oblast-
for example, certain specified amounts of locally
produced foods must be delivered to all-union
stocks 5-the allocation within the oblast of the re-
mainder depends on the decisions of local party and
retail trade authorities and the relative strength of
various interests.
Food allocations to a workplace are based on the
facility's importance to the government (defense-
related industries, for example, appear to have high
priority). Within the workplace, precedence is often
given to the shopworkers-apparently on the theory
that the better educated technical and engineering
personnel are less likely to cause -trouble thane lowly
placed workers with little advancement potential.
Factory and trade union officials promote these per-
quisites for their workers, not only because they
alleviate disgruntlement and reduce absenteeism but
also because they help to attract and keep good
workers.
Under Andropov, who considered direct food alloca-
tions to be effective in heading off discontent, empha-
sis on the practice continued, but with a new twist.
The retail trade network was ordered to locate most
new stores at or near factories and farms, and the
emphasis upon workplace siting carried over into
other consumer-oriented facilities as well.
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Table 4
USSR: Estimated Changes in Supply of
and Demand for Selected Quality Foods a
Based on Based on
Soviet Plans c CIA Estimates d
a For all calculations, it was assumed that the income elasticity of
demand for these products is one. (If elasticity were exactly one,
consumers' spending on these products would increase by the same
percentage as their incomes. If it were greater than one, spending
on these products would be rising at a faster rate than income.)
Expenditures in state retail, the cooperative system, and collective
farm markets are included in these calculations.
b Takes into account actual price changes in meat and milk
products in 1976-82.
c Assumes that consumption is at planned levels, prices do not
change, and incomes grow as planned through 1985 and at rates
slightly lower in 1986-90 than in 1981-85.
d Assumes that consumption depends on domestic output that grows
at average annual rates of the 1960-83 period, prices do not change,
and incomes grow as planned through 1985 and at rates slightly
lower in 1986-90 than in 1981-85.
Including products derived from meat (for example, sausage,
canned meat) and milk (for example, cheese, butter, ice cream).
Another channel for providing food benefits to em-
ployees at the workplace is the cafeteria system,
which provides hot meals at low cost during the meal
break. The 11th Five-Year Plan, released in the fall of
1980, called for major expansion of this system, and
the Food Program asked every ministry to establish a
system of "industrial subsidiary farms"-factory-run,
usually small-scale crop and livestock operations-to
provide food to factory kitchens. Although such oper-
ations are highly inefficient by Western farming
standards, the Brezhnev and Andropov leaderships
seemed to think the benefits of providing additional
food to workers worth the costs.' These farms in-
creased from about 13,000 in early 1981 to 20,000 in
early 1984; they account for between 2 and 3 percent
of total meat output and about 0.5 percent of milk
output.'
Food distribution at the workplace is likely to become
a long-term feature of Soviet life. Oblast and rayon
retail trade officials routinely set aside specified
shares. of their food supplies for designated work-
places. The process will be further institutionalized by
The costs include the material assistance from local farms and
labor for livestock raising. The labor component of cost may be
offset to some degree because idle labor can be put to use on the
factory farm during slack periods in a plant's activity.0
'Survey of World Broadcasts, 27 January 1984; Planovoye
khozyaystvo, No. 11, 1982; Sovetskaya torgovlya, 10 March 1983.
construction of new retail outlets at large factories
and enterprises! The workplace allocation system will
become part of the already complex distribution
system that provides more supplies on a per capita
basis to cities designated "Hero Cities" for their
suffering in World War II, to areas having priority
development projects such as the Baikal-Amur Main-
line Railroad, and to certain cities frequented by
tourists. Informal rationing of quality foods in the
state retail system is likely to continue for at least
several years because pressures of excess demand will
remain high. Income growth is likely to keep pace
with, if not surpass, growth in quality food supplies
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demand gaps (table 4). Consequently, incentives for
factories to retain their special channels will remain.
Greater Support to the Private Agricultural Sector. In
early 1981 Brezhnev issued a decree-reaffirmed in
the 1982 Food Program-ordering state and collec-
tive farm managers to provide more assistance to
' Small convenience stores run by the Workers Supply Department
of the Ministry of Trade have long existed. Initially, their mission
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private farmers. Performance in the private agricul-
tural sector improved marginally in 1981 and 1983,
and private livestock herds increased. Although the
private sector's need for more resources remains
acute, some progress in supplying needed inputs has
occurred. The climate of encouragement is likely, to
endure for some time because the leadership recog-
nizes the large contribution that the private sector
makes to gross. agricultural output-approximately
one-fourth.
Foreign.Trade as a Safety Valve. After 1978 a series
of below-plan grain harvests, erratic production of
other crops, inadequate forage for livestock, and
stagnating production of most livestock products led
the USSR to increase sharply its net imports of
agricultural products, particularly grain and meat.
Without these imports, the per capita availability of
farm products after 1978 would have receded to levels
near those of the 1970-72 period (figure 3).
Although Moscow probably regarded reliance on in-
creased imports of grain and foods as temporary, the
continuing problems in the agricultural sector have
made imports of grain and foods an important compo-
nent in the USSR's longer term growth strategy. The
share of net imports'in the per capita availability of
net farm product grew from 1 percent in 1970 to 12
percent in 198-1 and 1982.' Unless very large and
unlikely gains in production of grain and several other
agricultural products occur in the remainder of the
1980s, Moscow will not be able to cut these imports
and still obtain planned growth in consumption of
Figure 3
USSR: Per Capita Availability. of
Farm Products, 1970=84
I I I I I I i ~i i i i i
3001970 75 80 84 Estimated
meat and several other quality foods.
Approaching the issue from another point of view, we
estimate that 13 percent of the per capita daily caloric
intake in 1981 originated from the net imports of
processed foods and livestock feeds.1? In 1970, the
share was less than I percent.-This increase does not
mean that the intake of basic food energy depends=on
' It is estimated that the share of imported processed foods in Soviet
state retail sales in 1981 was 12 percent, up from.4. percent in.1970.
In the United States, the share of retail food expenditures originat-
ing from imported foods amounts to 15 percent and reflects demand
for products that cannot be produced in a temperate climate (coffee,
tea, cocoa, spices, bananas), together with some foods that are
produced'more efficiently abroad (sugar, some dairy products,
grass-fed beef, some fruits, vegetables, edible oils, and beverages).
The share would be higher if there were not import restrictions on
selected foods such as sugar and meat. Economic Report of the
10 One Western economist has calculated that. the share of calories
from imports in per capita daily caloric consumption in..!981, was
nearly 20 percent. His estimate was made on the assumption that
most imported grain was used to produce flour for human consump-
tion. We believe, however, that, because the-USSR produces far
more grain than it needs for human consumption,, the imported,
grain has been used-directly or indirectly-to augment livestock
feed supplies and that grain imports were thus consumed in the
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imports; rather it' indicates a shift in the structure of
the, diet-away from starchy staples toward more
expensive and high-quality foods. If the Soviets were
to cease importing meat, fruit, and vegetables, as well
as the grain and soybeans to produce additional meat
and milk, the lost calories could be replaced from
domestically produced starches.
The overall improvement in supplies has not displaced
the food situation as a front-rank policy issue in the
USSR. Although there was some turnaround in 1983-
84, planners still must struggle to maintain balance
between consumer purchasing power and the avail-
ability of particular foods. They are also anxious to
reduce food imports. Moreover, the government must
contend with an erosion in the quality of some foods
and substantial continuing differences in regional
consumption levels.
Supply and Consumer Preferences .
Although more than adequate in calories, the struc-
ture of. the food supply still does not conform to
consumer preferences. Consumers would eat more
meat, milk and milk products, fruits, and vegetables if
these were available in greater quantity.". A wider
assortment within major categories of foods would
also give consumers greater satisfaction. Choices are
frequently extremely limited. For example, when .
stores offer fresh. fruit, the fruit is most often apples;
the offerings on vegetable counters often include only
cabbage, carrots, and onions. Distortions even appear
within some general categories of foods for which
supply is adequate (such as bread and bread products);
rye bread, for example, is not produced in. sufficient
quantity to satisfy consumer demand, given the offi-
cially fixed differential'between prices for rye bread,
and the relatively more expensive wheat-based breads.
Meanwhile, growth in per capita disposable incomes
has continued. It was 30 percent higher in 1982 than
in 1975, but per capita availability of meat remained
" For example, family budget surveys recently conducted by Soviet
economists show that preferred annual per capita meat consump-
tion is 88 kg, while the present level is 56 to 58 kg. Sovetskaya
at its 1975 level and that of milk (fluid milk and other
dairy-based products) was lower than in 1975. Per.
capita availability of fruit and vegetables improved in
1982 .after decreasing in 1980 and 1981 from earlier
peak levels. The result-as noted earlier-has been
off-and-on queuing and rationing for these quality
products.
Although official policy insists on stable food prices
(and posted retail prices have not been raised in this
period), higher average prices paid for quality foods in
certain categories have narrowed the gaps between
supply and demand.12 The rise in average prices paid
by consumers reflects several factors, including a shift
in the assortment of purchases toward higher priced
items. An increase in the share of goods purchased
through cooperative marketing channels and hidden
price increases implemented in introducing-new pro-
cessed food products have also led to higher average
prices. The average price for a kilogram of meat or
meat product sold in the retail and cooperative mar-
keting networks increased 17 percent between 1975
and 1982; the average price of a kilogram of milk or
milk product increased by 3 percent. Our estimated
changes in supply-demand gaps'for some quality
goods for the 1976-82 period show that inflation in
prices of quality foods helped to narrow the gap
between consumer demand for and supplies of meat
and milk products (see table 4).
Losses or diversions in the chain of production, end
use, storage, distribution, and packaging have kept
the per capita availability of various foodstuffs below
attainable levels and have contributed to imbalances
between supply and demand. Some examples of diver-
sion follow:
? Although the USSR produces. more milk per capita
than most countries, a relatively large share, more
than 10 percent, is fed to young animals. In 1982,
" One result of stable prices for foodstuffs has been a large increase
in state subsidies to cover the difference between the'cost of
producing and marketing meat and dairy products and the cost to
consumers at retail. These subsidies amounted to more than 40
billion rubles in 1983, almost precisely as much as was invested in
agriculture and its supporting industries.
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milk fed to animals was equivalent to over 40 kg of
whole milk per capita."
? An even larger share of the fruit and berry crop is
diverted to production of wine and other alcoholic
beverages." The share of domestic production of
fruits and berries used for industrially produced
wines and champagnes has been between 30 and 40
percent in the years since 1965; in 1981, fruits and
berries used for alcoholic beverages (some 37 per-
cent of domestic production) amounted to the equiv-
alent of over 20 kg per capita. (Per capita consump-
tion of fruits and berries in fresh equivalent that
year was 40 kg.)
The gap between supply and demand for many foods
could be narrowed-especially the seasonal varia-
tions-if waste and losses were reduced. According to
the figures of the State Planning Committee (Gos-
plan), losses of vegetables (including potatoes) during
storage, procurement, and transportation to retail
outlets amount to 15 to 20 percent of the gross
production of those crops; losses of fruits, 15 to 18
percent. Other Soviet sources put the losses for meat
and milk at 10 percent of gross output." Losses result
from many factors, including the lack of packaging
materials for both retailing and shipping, faulty trans-
port equipment and increasingly long hauls, poor
roads, and insufficient storage facilities and refrigera-
tion equipment. (An unknown, but probably substan-
tial, part of the loss written off to spoilage is due to
theft.)
According to our calculations, only 8 percent of the
per capita consumption of fruits and vegetables (in-
cluding potatoes) in the Soviet Union is in processed
" As a result of feeding whole milk and the returned industrial
byproducts of milk to animals, in 1981 the average calf consumed
252 kg of whole milk and 423 kg of skim milk, buttermilk, and
whey (Planovoye khozyaystvo, Nos. 3 and 8, 1983; Voprosy
ekonomiki, No. 6, 1983). Feeding norms require certain amounts of
whole milk.or milk substitute in rations for young animals, but
" Official Soviet statistics on consumption of fruits and berries do
not include amounts used. for production of alcoholic beverages.
Official policy in recent years has been to shift consumption of
alcoholic beverages away from hard liquor to wine and beer. In
addition, the procurement price structure encourages farms to
produce fruits and berries more suitable for wine making than for
fresh consumption.
form (canned, frozen, or dehydrated).16 In the United
States, by contrast, about 30 percent of the per capita
consumption of fruits; vegetables, and potatoes is in
processed form." Because early varieties are a small
share of total production in the USSR, only 3 percent
of the potatoes and 8 percent of the other vegetables
are procured by state marketing organizations before
July. Gluts of these products then occur from late
summer through the fall, followed by shortages in the
winter and spring." The selection of seasonal fruits
and vegetables in retail outlets is narrow. Although
the food industry's output of processed fruits and
vegetables has increased substantially since the mid-
1960s, most of the growth occurred in the 1966-70
period; growth declined sharply in the following
years.19 Per capita consumption of processed fruits
and vegetables, including potatoes, is now twice as
high as in 1965 but nevertheless remains low in
comparison with that of other developed countries.
Factors Degrading Food Quality
Shortages of quality foods have been aggravated by
the deteriorating quality of some individual food-
stuffs. Low quality, particularly of perishables sold
through state stores, has always been a problem, but
in recent years the quality of certain foods seems to
have slipped further.'a For example, food industry
officials claim that the fruit and vegetable canning
industry has experienced problems with product quali-
ty largely because the quality of vegetables and fruit
delivered to it has declined. They say that 20 percent
of the vegetables and 40 percent of the fruits' received
in the 1976-80 period were substandard. Efficiency
" This figure does not include fruits, grapes, berries, or other
materials used in wine or alcohol production. According to our
calculations, about 15 to 17 percent of the processed fruits and
" Data derived from Food Consumption (Washington, DC:,US
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1983), No.
" Zakupki sel'skokhozyaystvennykh produktov, No. 7, 1983.
" Output of processed fruits and vegetables in 1982, however,
showed strong growth.
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has dropped because more raw material has been
needed to compensate for spoiled produce.21
The recent erosion in the quality of some foods
originated largely in the agricultural sector. For ex-
ample, as the average weight of animals sold to the
state for slaughter dropped, the proportion of bone to
meat in the animal carcass rose. Because little bone is
discarded during the trimming process, consumers
receive relatively more bone in their meat purchases.
From 1978 to 1982, the average liveweight of cattle
sold to the state for slaughter dropped from 361 kg to
340 kg, that of pigs from 105 to 100, and that of sheep
and goats from 38 to 35. In 1983 and the first few
months of 1984, however, the liveweights of cattle and
pigs sold to the state increased, although cattle
weights did not reach the peak of early 1979. F_
In addition, complaints about watery milk have be-
come increasingly common. Soviet statistics show that
the fat content of milk sold to the state has declined.
Reports appearing in the Soviet press have asserted
that farm workers and retail clerks dilute milk to
meet output and sales targets.22 The fat content of
butter has fallen even more sharply, indicating that
more butter has been produced from less milk. Indus-
trially produced-butter (over 90 percent of the total
output) includes a growing share of varieties with low-
fat, high-water content; the share rose from roughly
50 percent in 1974 to 90 percent in 1979. Although
perhaps desirable for cardiovascular health, low-fat
butter may have a less satisfactory texture and taste.21
The quality of-tea is also deteriorating according to
CPSU Secretary Shevardnadze of the Georgian Sovi-
et- Socialist Republic, where most of the USSR's tea is
grown'
" Sanitary conditions in Soviet wholesale and retail trade are poor
in comparison with those in the United States and Western Europe.
Although state standards'are high, equipment for proper storage
often is lacking. Bribery of health inspectors is common, and fines,
even when assessed, are low-10 rubles per violation. Part of the
problem results from.the shortage of packaging. Although the food-
processing industry is required to produce clean products, it must
often ship them in bulk in the holds of ships or in unclean railroad
freight cars. Debris, such as dirt and stones, often turns up in retail
supplies of rice, flour,.and salt.
"Kadry sel'skogo khozyaystva, No. 2, 1982.
" The share of low-fat milk and cheese in industrial processing is
For several years, complaints in the Soviet .press have
indicated that the quality of bread and other baked
goods has declined. Consumers are particularly sensi-
tive to changes in bread quality. According to a recent
article in the authoritative party journal Kommunist,
"Alarming symptoms revealing the.low quality of the
bread baked in many republics and oblasts have
appeared." Food industry officials blame the falling
gluten content of the available wheat. According to a
deputy minister of the food industry, in 1981 almost
half of the flour delivered to the baking industry was
substandard.23
In many respects, the Soviet food processing industry
lags far behind its Western counterparts in the appli-
cation of food technology. The output of frozen
vegetables (freezing preserves appearance and nutri-
ents better than canning, fermenting, or drying)
amounts to 4,000 tons a year for the entire USSR-
about 0.01 kg per capita-and the annual output of
industrially processed potatoes is only'about 135,000
tons-or about half a kilogram per capita.26
Quality may improve as the agricultural sector recov-
ers from four years of poor weather and as it absorbs
improvements in agricultural technology and infra-
structure. Food processing (including more packaging)
is likely to continue to increase slowly and; over time,
to improve the quality of food that reaches consumers.
Positive Influences on Food Quality
The Soviets are well aware of their problems with
food quality. In addition to investing in storage and
transportation, the Food Program calls for a substan-
tial re-equipping of the food-processing industry in the
1980s. Large increases in the output of processed
baby foods, enriched-food products, and canned and
frozen foods are planned.27
" Nedelya, 21-27 June 1982, p. 6. Flour delivered from the milling
industry varies so much in quality that most baking enterprises
have to frequently test the flour quality and conduct trial bakes,
I Ekonomika-i organizatsiya promyshlennogoproizvodstva, No.
10, 1981. US per capita yearly consumption of frozen vegetables
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Improvements in food processing already have led to
greater nutritional quality in some food products.
Consumers have gradually been provided a greater
amount and wider variety.of industrially processed
foods. From, 1965 to 1981 per capita consumption of
industrially processed fruits and vegetables rose from
9.7 kg to 19.8 kg; of cheese, from. 1.4 kg to 2.5 kg; of
vegetable oil, from 7.1 kg to 9 kg; and of sausage,.
from 7 kg to 11.51g. A greater assortment of bakery
products, cheeses, and canned goods is now produced.
Most of the meager progress in improving quality is
due to food enrichment, but much remains to be done.
In most developed countries, processed foods have
been enriched routinely for many years. Food enrich-
ment in the USSR, however, is a recent develop-
ment28 Only a tiny share of industrially processed
milk, for example, is fortified with vitamin D.29 If
consumers are to increase their intake of nutrients
without increasing what already appears to be a
relatively high intake of calories, more foods rich in
protein, fiber, vitamins, and minerals must be provid-
ed.
Vitamin fortification has generally proceeded at a .
snail's pace. For example, a joint party-state resolu-
tion issued in 1960 and a USSR Ministry of Health
directive issued in 1972 ordered the fortification of
flour and some other foods with several vitamins. By
late 1981, however, so little had been done that an all-
union conference on nutrition sponsored by the presid-
ium of the Academy of Medical Sciences concluded a
new decree was needed. The conference report sug-
gested mandatory fortification of flour, sugar, milk,
and fruit juices. It noted that fortification is ham-
pered by the insufficient industrial production of
vitamins and vitamin preparations and by the absence
of an authoritative organ to organize and coordinate
the various organizations and departments involved.30
Examples of improvements in the nutritional content
of foods being offered to the population include the
following:
? Whey, a byproduct of milk processing, is added to
about two-thirds of he bread and bakery products,
" Voprosy pitaniya, Nos. 4 and 6, 1982.
" Molochnaya promyshlennost, No. 5, 1980.
providing calcium and vitamin A." In certain pro-
portions, whey might somewhat increase amounts of
iron and B vitamins, the substances used to enrich
flour in the United States.
? The food industry now produces small amounts of
edible vegetable protein for use as additives in
processed meats, baked goods, and other products.32
In recent years the USSR has been importing. small
quantities of soy protein for use as a food extender
and enricher. (Imports of soybeans and soybean
meal are used as animal feed.) The Ministry of the
Meat and Dairy Industry is planning to increase the
share of soy protein extender in sausage.33
? In 1981, 4 percent of margarine output was fortified
with vitamins A, D, and E; in 1982, 10 percent.
Low-calorie table margarine, which contains 40- to
60-percent fat instead of the standard 82 percent, is
taking a growing share of margarine production.34
? Although serious problems continue in infant nutri-
tion (see appendix B, "Infant Nutrition-A `Food
Problem' "), the construction of plants to produce
infant formula has helped to relieve the problem of
supplies. Special products for children intolerant of
lactose have been developed and are in production?5
Regional Differences
The availability of various food products and per
capita daily caloric levels vary substantially among
regions in the USSR (see tables 5 and 6). The Ukraine
and Belorussia have the highest caloric levels, while
the Central Asian republics trail well below the .
average levels for the USSR. The differences can be
attributed to preference (which varies among ethnic
groups), to climate (caloric requirements tend to be.
somewhat. less for southern regions), to -age structure
(per capita daily caloric requirements are less in
groups with higher proportions of infants and chil-
dren), as well as to regional differences in incomes and
Torgovlya i bytovoye obsluzhivaniye, Tsena kleba, Znaniye,
K Maslozhirovaya promyshlennost, Nos. 1 and 6, 1983.E
" Vestnik Academi meditsinskikh nauk SSSR, No. 11, 1982
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Table 5
USSR: Per Capita Daily Caloric
Intake in 1975, by Republic
USSR average
3,221
Ukraine
3,517
Belorussia
3,472
Latvia
3,363
Moldavia
3,308
3,276
Georgia
3,234
Russian (RSFSR)
3,231
Lithuania
3,205
Kazakh
2,963
Armenia
2,938
Azerbaijan
2,854
Tajik
2,754
Uzbek
2,644
Turkmen
2,612
Kirghiz
2,599
available, limited data suggest that regional dispari-
ties have not narrowed since the. mid-1970s.36
agricultural production. Without the existing redistri-
bution of foodstuffs between regions, the differences
in consumption would be much wider. For example,
per capita consumption of meat in Estonia in 1975
was 80 kg, and per capita production was 115 kg,
while in Uzbek per capita consumption of meat was
31 kg, and per capita production, 18 kg (see table 7).
Some reduction of regional disparities occurred in the
1965-75 period (see table 8)-especially in the con-
sumption of meat and milk. But even after these years
of relatively good growth in agricultural output and in
per capita consumption of quality foods, the range in
food availability between the most prosperous and
least prosperous republics was striking (see table 7).
Although more recent comprehensive data are not
Both the Andropov and Chernenko leaderships indi-
cated awareness that ethnic differences and national-
ist aspirations are prime sources of potential domestic
political tension. Both realized that regional inferior-
ity in consumption levels can contribute to ethnic
grievances. However, Moscow is also aware that
further redistribution away from high consumption
regions to improve the welfare of others is likely to
cause considerable irritation among those losing sup-
plies of quality foods and other highly desired con-
sumer goods.
posed in the Food Program.
Development of the Soviet farm sector will depend
strongly on weather conditions and how vigorously the
leadership implements the Food Program. Our base-
line projection of average annual growth in net farm
output of 2.0 to 2.5 percent in the 1980s assumes
weather conditions approximating the 1960-83 aver-
age and substantial implementation of changes pro-
but still represents a marked improvement."
If production of various agricultural commodities
rises at the average annual rates implied by our
baseline projection and the pattern of use of these
commodities-both for food and for other uses-does
not change, per capita consumption of quality foods
will improve. Even without imports to supplement
supplies available for consumption, more meat, dairy
products, vegetables, and fruit should be available per
capita in 1990 (see table 9). The projected availability
is considerably short of goals for vegetables and fruit
M Per capita consumption of meat in the USSR as a whole, for
example, stagnated from the mid-1970s through 1982, but in the
Belorussian, Russian, and Estonian republics per capita consump-
tion of meat increased, suggesting that for meat, at least, republic
differences have widened.
" The projections for potatoes and bread and cereal products have
not been reduced to account for the substitution of quality foods for
staples that would occur. Because of this substitution (which we are
unable to allocate to specific products), the total caloric intake in
1990 will be less than that implied by summation of calorie
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Table 6
USSR: Per Capita Consumption 'of
Six Food Products in 1965, 1975, and 1982
in Selected Republics a
Meat
(including
slaughter fat)
Milk
Eggs
(units)
Vegetable
Oil
Sugar
Vegetables
(excluding
potatoes)
1975
42
392
125
1.9
28
110
Azerbaijan
1965
23
168
77
2.4
29
40
1975
32
290
122
1.9
38
56
1982
33
246
148
3.2
39
72
Belorussia
1965
45
299
119
4.2
26
68
1975
62
385
260
5.7
40
75
1982
64
369
307
7.5
44
80
Estonia
1965
63
406
16
4.6
40
69
1975
80
442
258
8.2
41
79
1982
81.
443
305
9.6
45
80
Georgia
1965
28
183
69
2.8
29
48.
1975
42
286
109
3.8
38
.63.
Kazakh
1960 b
38
206
75
4.3
26
40
1975
56
270
178
6.1
35
80
Latvia
1975
- 77
484
239
6.7
44
73
1965
61
396
169
3.6
32
70
1975 G.
80
449
234
5.0
37
84
Russian (RSFSR)
1975.. .
.47 .
.154
75
5.9
26
, 89
1965
41
245
124
7.8
36
102
1975
60
335
210
8.5
45
118
1982,
59
308
253
10.3
52-
123:
a 1982 data for Armenia; Georgia; Kazakh, Latvia, Lithuania, and
b Statistics for 1965 not available.
c 1974 data used for all but meat and milk.
Source: Various republic statistical handbooks.
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Table'7
USSR: Per Capita Production and Consumption
of Meat and Milk in 1975 in Selected Republics
137
97
Uzbek
18
123
165
Azerbaijan
19
105
290
Tajik
23
106
150
Table 8
USSR: Coefficient of Variation a Among
Republics in Per Capita Consumption of
Selected Food Products, 1965-75 b
Milk
.367
.303
.263
Eggs
.353
.388
.348
Vegetable oil
.386
.411
.396
Sugar
.194
.177
.155
Vegetables
.227
.220
.210
a The coefficient of variation is a measure of dispersion that relates
the standard-deviation and the mean by expressing the standard
deviation as a percentage of the mean. Thus, a decrease over time in
the coefficient of.variation means that regional differences
decreased.
b Data derived from table 6; complete data were available for 11 of
the 15 republics.
Despite the projected improvement in availability of
quality foods from domestic output, the consumption
targets for 1990 as set out in the Food Program,
however, could be only partly met from domestic
sources. Without continued imports of meat, vegeta-
bles, fruit, sugar, and vegetable oil, the structure of
per capita consumption, under these assumptions re-
garding growth and end use, would be that shown in
the third column of table 9.38 The USSR would be
able to supply milk and eggs in planned amounts from
domestic production. But domestic production would
need to be supplemented by imports to meet 1990
targets for meat, vegetables, fruit, sugar, vegetable
" If the Soviets reach their 1990 per capita consumption goals, per
capita consumption of meat would be 60 percent of the 1982 US
level; sugar and other sweeteners, 75 percent; eggs, fruit, and
vegetables, about 100 percent; milk (fluid milk equivalent), 130
percent; flour and cereal products, about 200 percent; fish, 250
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Table 9
USSR: Per Capita Consumption in 1983 and 1990
1990 Goals a
1990 Projection
(without imports)
1990 Projection
(with imports) b
Meat (including slaughter fat)
58
70
63 to 64
66 to 67
Milk
309
330 to 340
338
338 c
Eggs (units)
253
260 to 266
292
292 c
Fish
17.6
19
18 d
19
9.6
110
101
44
a The total caloric intake that would result from a diet conforming
to the indicated goals would be unrealistically high, because it
would fail to reflect the substitution of quality foods for staples-
bread and cereals and potatoes-that would occur. The official
1990 per capita consumption goals appear to embody an effort to
reassure the consumer that the supply of staple foods will be
adequate.
b We have assumed for illustrative purposes that imports will be at
1982-83 levels.
e Because the 1990 projection (without imports) exceeds midpoint of
the 1990 goal, we have assumed that there will be no imports.
d Based on 1990 gross fish catch targets. We could not assume
continuation of the growth rates of the 1960-83 period because of
unfavorable changes in ocean fishing conditions.
e Because significantly more grain and potatoes are now produced
than are required to meet 1990 targets for human consumption, we
have assumed that the supply in 1990 would permit consumption at
planned levels without imports. We are unable to predict how
consumption of these products would fall because of increased
consumption of quality foods. Thus the amounts shown represent an
upper bound rather than a best estimate of 1990 consumption.
oil, and fish (in small amounts)." The per capita
consumption provided by our baseline. projection of
growth in farm output probably would be considered
adequate by the leadership. The Soviets will probably
continue to import meat, vegetable oil, fruits, and
vegetables at levels similar to those of the recent past.
Leadership decisions on levels of imports will be
affected, however, by the popular mood, hard curren-
cy needs, the international political situation, and
other domestic projects and programs requiring im-
ports.
If net farm output for the rest of the decade grows at
a faster rate then we project-in the most optimistic
case 2.5 to 3.0 percent per year-the leadership may
choose to reduce imports of selected foodstuffs but
probably not by sizable amounts. If net farm output
growth is less than we project-in the worst case 0 to
" For all commodities, except sugar, imports at 1982-83 levels
would be insufficient to bring total supplies to levels that would
permit 1990 consumption targets to be met. In the case of sugar,
0.5 percent per year-the leadership has positioned ?
itself to cope, using rationing and special distribution
systems already in place. Under such a scenario,
ground gained in 1983-84 could be lost, putting per
capita consumption back to 1982 levels. Rather than
permit such a drop, Moscow would probably step up
food imports to sustain current consumption levels. In
addition, the leadership might choose to increase farm
investment somewhat to foster higher growth.
The USSR's food problem is not likely to be solved by
1990. But the modest growth in per capita consump-
tion (table 9) that we project-along with continued
imports of some quality foods, the leadership's reluc-
tance to promise much more than. reasonably can be
delivered, and a continuation of the system of allocat-
ing food at the workplace-will probably prevent food
shortages from becoming the volatile issue they
threatened to become in the late 1970s and early
1980s.
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Appendix A
Leadership Approaches to
Food Supply Issues, 1955-75.
Khrushchev
When Khrushchev came to power in 1955, the Soviet
diet was adequate in the most basic sense, providing
sufficient calories to the population at large. Famine
caused by domestic policy and production failures had
not occurred since the 1930s, and widespread hunger
had last been experienced during World War II and
its aftermath. The structure of the bland, monotonous
diet was heavily overweighted with starchy staples-
potatoes, bread, and cereal products.
Recognizing the desirability of a more plentiful and
varied diet throughout the year, the successive post-
Stalin leaderships have singled out diet as the focal
point of consumer welfare programs. The share of
investment going to agriculture was pushed up sub-
tantially under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Neither
leadership, however, expected that it would take so
long to provide a diet meeting consumer preferences.
Although the Soviet diet today contains a substantial-
ly higher proportion of quality foods than it did in the
early 1960s and more closely resembles food con-
sumption of the United States and Western Europe,
progress has not been steady and occasionally ground
has even been lost. This erratic progress, together with
the leadership's unrealistic promises of rapid improve-
ment, played havoc with consumer expectations. Peri-
ods of headway and growing satisfaction with the food
supply have been abruptly punctuated by shortages
and disappointment.
Brezhnev's Legacy
Brezhnev's agricultural policies, followed since the
March 1965 plenum on agriculture, focused on im-
proving the technical underpinnings of agriculture
and promoting a more effective use of inputs through
better material incentives for the farmworker. These
policies essentially conformed to the prescription of
the September 1953 plenum on agriculture, which
was orchestrated by Khrushchev and which marked a
turning point in agricultural policy. Khrushchev had
Long-Term'Changes in Food Availability and
the Nutrient Content of the Soviet Food Supply
Since 1965, per capita supplies of meat and vegeta-
bles (not including potatoes) have risen by 40 percent;
milk and milk products, by 23 percent; fish, by 40 25X1
percent; fruit, by 55 percent; sugar, by 30 percent; and
the mid-1970s.
equivalent to consumption because large losses occur
during processing, distribution, and meal prepara-
tion. Such losses are somewhat larger in the USSR
than in the United States; thus equivalence in per
capita supplies does not imply exact equivalence in
consumption. As these foods became more available,
consumers reduced their consumption of bread and
cereal products by 13 percent and potatoes by 23
percent. Most of these adjustments had occurred by
The nutrient content of the Soviet food supply there-
fore changed appreciably between 1965 and 1981.
The per capita level of supply of food energy (calories)
increased by 6 percent and nearly equals the US level.
The per capita level of carbohydrate dropped 2
percent, while that of protein increased 8 percent and
nearly equals that of the United States. The per
capita daily level of fat rose by 26 percent-a sharp
increase. The levels of some vitamins and minerals in
the food supply have also increased. Even more .
important from the consumer's point of view, the
share in the consumption of protein contributed by
animal products has risen, from about one-third in
1965 to nearly one-half in 1981. This share, however,
is still well below that in the US food supply-nearly
70 percent in 1981.
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called for substantially larger investment, sharp in-
creases in state purchase prices for farm output, and
greater production of fertilizer and agricultural equip-
ment. Under Brezhnev's leadership, investment in
agriculture and its supporting industries rose to one-
third of total investment in the Soviet economy.4?
Brezhnev shared Khrushchev's perception that the
Soviet people were unwilling to postpone consumption
gains:: He also believed that providing an ample
supply of the quality foods they desired would foster
commitment to the Soviet'system and spur workers'
productivity.
Under Brezhnev, measures were taken in the early
1970s to, increase the output of livestock products.
These efforts may well have reflected the lessons of
the December 1970 unrest in Poland'over bread-and-
butter issues. When harvests failed to meet planned
levels "in 1972 and 1975, the leadership decided to
purchase sizable amounts of grain abroad to support
the livestock herds. Even with grain imports, however,
feed supplies were inadequate in 1975, and distress
slaughter of herds was widespread.
Despite disappointing setbacks in grain harvests (in
1972 and 1975) and livestock output (in 1973 and
1976), rapid progress in supplying quality foods was
made under Brezhnev from 1963 to 1974. This pro-
gress, however, led to much optimism over what was
to come. Production of crops and livestock products
during the 1965-75 period grew considerably more
rapidly than the population. But the distress slaugh-
tering in 1975 prevented further gains in meat output
until' 1978.
10 In addition to direct investment in farm machinery, equipment,
and construction, this measure of "agricultural investment" in-
cludes allocations to ministries providing goods and services to
agriculture-such as fertilizer, pesticides; machinery, mixed feed,
repair services, roads, storage, and transportation facilities-the
Ministry of Procurement and ministries managing off-farm food
processing.
The Brezhnev leadership during the late 1970s persis-
tently emphasized the link between consumer welfare
and productivity. The Polish crisis in 1980-coming
the year after a particularly disappointing perfor-
mance in Soviet agriculture and a sharp widening of
the gap between supply and demand for quality
foods-worried the leadership. During the spring and
summer of 1980, Soviet workers in some large indus-
trial installations went'on strike, partly because of
food shortages.
Thus, in the late Brezhnev years, the leadership again
had to contend with the consequences of its failure to
provide the Soviet populace with a quality diet. The
Brezhnev Food Program (1982) was intended to re-
duce the costly dependence on imports of feeds and
food, upgrade the quality and variety of the diet, and
reduce the impact of weather on output. To bring
about these results, the Food Program was to main-
tain the high level of investment in agriculture,
increase procurement prices for farm products, im-
prove the quality of rural life, and promote an upgrad-
ing and integration of activities among the broad
range of entities engaged in and supporting food
production.
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Appendix B
Infant Nutrition
A "Food Problem"
Soviet health authorities have targeted the diets of
infants and young children for improvement. Infant
mortality climbed from a low of 22.9 per thousand in
1971 to 27.9 per thousand in 1974, after which year
the Soviets stopped reporting a figure." The Soviets
have attributed the increase to a number of factors:
past statistical underreporting, the increased inci-
dence of alcoholism and smoking among women,
increased environmental pollution, poor prenatal care,
the effects on subsequent pregnancies of a high
average number of abortions among Soviet women,
the increasing number of young mothers, and poor
nutrition.
At the General Session of the USSR Academy of
Medicine in early 1982, Minister of Health S. P.
Burenkov called for expansion of preventive care for
infants and children and pointed out that "a crucial
factor in reducing the disease rate among children is
the provision of a proper diet and breast-feeding in
particular. Unfortunately, inadequate attention is be-
ing paid to the problems of insufficient infant formula
supply and to publicizing the values of breast-
feeding." 42 Because formula is often unavailable as a
result of production, packaging, transport, and distri-
bution problems and because many mothers return to
work soon after childbirth, Soviet mothers often feed
their infants cow's milk or reconstituted powdered
milk-neither of which satisfies the vitamin D re-
quirements of infants."
" Infant mortality is defined as the number of deaths in children
under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births. The Soviet definition of
infant mortality excludes certain categories of infant deaths that
Western demographers estimate account for 14 percent of infant
mortality. Even so, the infant mortality rate for the USSR by this
definition was an estimated 31.1 per thousand in 1976, the latest
year for which a reliable estimate is available. The US infant
mortality rate, more broadly defined, was 15.2 in 1976.
decree provides for additional paid leave for mothers so that they
can care for their infants until they reach the age of 1 year. The
decree is intended to bolster declining birth rates and probably
reflects the recognition that infants placed in day-care facilities are
more likely to contract infectious diseases than infants cared for at
home, particularly breast-fed infants.
" The problem is compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union
does not add vitamins to most of its processed milk and milk
The 1977 party-state decree on the improvement of
medical care ordered that the production and variety
of children's foods be "expanded considerably." How-
ever, the followup 1982 party-state decree, "On Addi-
tional Measures for Improving the Health Care of the
Population," complained that "the production of spe-
cial food for children is growing at a slow rate." Plans
call for the annual production of 9,500 tons of dry
infant formula and 100,000 tons of concentrated and
liquid formula by 1985.'? Production capacity proba-
bly does not exceed 50,000 tons a year; in 1982 it was
36,000 tons.45 If we assume that the combined figure
of 110,000 tons represents the Soviet estimate of
requirements, then one-third as much infant formula
is produced as is needed. An additional plant, which
has a capacity of 6,500 tons a year, is under construc-
tion, and special assembly lines to produce infant
formula at dairy plants are planned. Even so, the
USSR probably cannot meet its 1985 goals for pro-
duction of infant formula.
Although a Soviet public health official recently
denied the existence of "aggravated" rickets among
Soviet children, she did admit that the disease in its
early form exists." Soviet medical research literature
indicates that, in the 1970s, rickets (caused by vitamin
D deficiency) and nutritional anemia (sometimes in
serious form) were occurring in Soviet children.47F-
1983, p. 2.
" Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 18 September 1982.
" "Letters to the Editor," Wall Street Journal, 14 March 1983, in
response to Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970s by
Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, (Washington DC: US
Bureau of the Census, September 1980) No. 74, and to "Why Are
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