TRUCK PRODUCTION AT THE SOVIET KAMA RIVER PLANT - WESTERN TECHNOLOGY IN ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300400003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Truck Production at the
Soviet Kama River Plant
Western Technology in Action
NGA Review Completed
Secret
SOV 85-10147X
August 1985
??y 379
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Truck Production at the
Soviet Kama River Plant
Western Technology in Action
This paper was prepared by
of Soviet Analysis, with con
Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Defense Industries Division, SOYA,
Secret
Soy 85-10147X
August 1985
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Summary
Information available
as of 9 August 1985
was used in this report.
Truck Production at the
Soviet Kama River Plant-
Western Technology in Action
The Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant (KamAZ) is the centerpiece of a
major Soviet plan for modernizing transportation. It is the world's largest
truck plant and began production in 1976. The overall strategy of a 15-year
modernization plan, adopted in 1965, called for a larger and more varied
truck fleet, with KamAZ to produce heavy diesels. The plant was built
with considerable Western help, and the large purchases of foreign
equipment were widely hailed in the early 1970s as an example of
Moscow's commitment to East-West trade. By the late 1970s, however,
there was considerable controversy in the West over whether, and how
much, those technologies (and the KamAZ trucks) were contributing to
Soviet military strength-a contribution that has long since been clear.F_
The Soviets imported equipment, manufacturing technology, and engineer-
ing assistance valued at nearly $1.3 billion, including an estimated $500
million from US firms. These purchases probably enabled them to bring
KamAZ on line at least five years sooner than they could have if they had
relied exclusively on their own already strained machine-building industry.
ment and spare parts bound for KamAZ.
Reliance on Western help created some problems, however. The imports
included some of the world's most advanced manufacturing equipment-
particularly in the foundry and diesel engine lines-which KamAZ did not
absorb easily. Workers at the plant installed or used equipment improperly
and generally did not follow Western maintenance standards, while
managers had difficulty getting spare parts for some equipment. The spare
parts problem was exacerbated in 1980 and 1981, when the United
States-prompted by the crises in Afghanistan and Poland-imposed
increasingly restrictive embargoes that halted all shipments of new equip-
this embargo created short-term disruptions and
iii Secret
SOV 85-10147X
August 1985
their own industry.
delayed production, but add that the Soviets have generally acquired what
they needed from other sources-usually in Europe or Japan-or from
KamAZ has turned out about 600,000 heavy diesel-powered trucks,
including an estimated 105,000 in 1984. It was designed to manufacture
annually 150,000 trucks and 250,000 diesel engines. We estimate that
when production reaches this capacity-probably about 1990-KamAZ
will account for about 17 to 18 percent of the USSR's production of all
trucks and about half of its production of general purpose heavy trucks.
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Although KamAZ trucks cost nearly twice as much as some of the trucks
they are replacing, their larger capacity and longer operating lives, coupled
with greater reliability and ease of maintenance, make them a better
Their use of diesel fuel adds to their overall efficiency; the Soviet
claim that one of the plant's models is more than twice as fuel efficient as a
gasoline-powered truck it is replacing, even at speeds one-half greater.
Overall, Soviet economists claim that when 1.5 million trucks with
KamAZ engines have replaced the older vehicles, the fuel savings will be
roughly 10 million metric tons per year.
Besides having a wide variety of civilian and military applications in the
USSR, KamAZ trucks have been exported in large numbers. They have
been sold to Eastern Europe; to several Third World countries, including
Cuba and Nicaragua; and to a few Western countries, including Great
Britain, South Africa, France, and Finland.
KamAZ trucks have been
extensively deployed with Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military
forces, replacing or augmenting the inventory of smaller, older trucks. We
judge that the military finds these trucks particularly useful in increasing
the lift capacity of motor transport units without requiring more drivers or
fuel-at a time when the logistic requirements of the Soviet forces are
expanding. We believe that KamAZ does not produce any military vehicles
other than trucks and no engines for other military vehicles-for example,
APCs and tanks.
We estimate that the Kama River Plant delivered 45,000 to 65,000 trucks
to the Soviet armed forces between 1976 and the end of 1984
indicate that during the period
1976-81 at least 5 percent of the entire KamAZ production-that is, about
14,000 trucks-went to the military. Our estimates for 1982-84 are less
certain, but we know that deliveries to the military began to rise steeply in
1982. Analysis of production trends and KamAZ shipment facilities
suggests that, when it is producing at capacity, KamAZ will supply about
30,000 to 45,000 new trucks to the military each year. The military will
then be taking 20 to 30 percent of KamAZ output-about the share it now
takes of overall Soviet truck production.
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KamAZ and the Soviet Truck Industry
The Main Complex
Supporting Facilities 5
Record on Assimilation 8
Effect of the US Embargo 9
Estimates of Military Acquisitions 17
4. The Kama River Motor Vehicle Association: Major
Plants and Suppliers
6. Soviet Production of General Purpose Heavy Trucks, 1965-84 12
8. Deliveries of KamAZ Trucks to the Military, 1976-89
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1.
Kama Purchasing Commission Contracts With US Firms, 1970s
7
2.
Kama Purchasing Commission Contracts With West European
and Japanese Firms, 1970s
8
3.
Characteristics of KamAZ Trucks Currently Produced
15
4.
Comparison of KamAZ Trucks and Those They Are Replacing
16
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Truck Production at the
Soviet Kama River Plant-
Western Technology in Action
Soviet truck production has increased from less than
1,000 vehicles per year in the late 1920s to about
800,000 in 1984 (see figure 1). The USSR currently is
the world's third-largest truck producer, trailing the
United States and Japan.' However, the vast majority
of US and Japanese plant capacity is devoted to
pickups and other light trucks; the USSR is the
world's largest producer of medium and heavy trucks.'
Soviet trucks provide civilian transport between the
country's widely dispersed industrial and agricultural
centers, as well as support and mobility for its very
large military establishment.
Soviet truck production surged in the 1930s, and
again in the 1950s, and the 1970s-each time after
large acquisitions of foreign plant and equipment. The
most recent surge was the result of a 15-year trans-
portation modernization plan adopted in 1965. Its
centerpiece is the Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant
(KamAZ), built with considerable Western help dur-
ing the 1970s at Naberezhnnye Chelny (now Brezh-
nev). The plant is the world's largest truck manufac-
turing facility and is also the center of a production
association that includes component producers located
throughout the Soviet Union.' It covers about 48
square kilometers, roughly twice the size of the
District of Colombia (see figure 2); it comprises
production facilities totaling about 2.2 million square
meters; and, when production is at capacity, it will
employ 80,000 workers.' The plant's planned capacity
is 150,000 trucks and 250,000 diesel engines annually.
Figure 1
Total Soviet Truck Production,
1965-84
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1965 70 75 80 85
KamAZ
production
The figures for total Soviet truck production are from various
editions of Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR, except for 1982, which is
from Soviet open-source literature, and 1983-84, which are
estimates The figures for
KamAZ production from 1976 to 1981 are also from Soviet press
reports, and the figures for 1982-84 are estimates.
States and about 3.9 million in Japan.
' In this paper the cargo capacity tonnage classes are light (less than
2 metric tons), medium (2 to 5 mt), and heavy (over 5 mt). These are
the definitions commonly used in the USSR and differ from those
used in the United States.
' A production association is a group of plants organized to support
the production of certain equipment or goods. One plant in each
association-usually the plant where the main product is made or
assembled-serves as the lead plant. All major Soviet motor vehicle
' Production floorspace does not include administrative, engineer-
ing, or storage areas. A reported figure for number of employees in
1983 of 120,000 probably includes the construction crews still
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Total Soviet
truck
production
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Within the transportation modernization program as
a whole, KamAZ represents a decision to provide not
only a larger but also a more balanced inventory of
trucks, better tailored to user needs (see figure 3).
Before it was built, the Soviets concentrated on long
production runs of medium trucks, and most of the
civilian and military truck inventory is still made up
of medium vehicles produced at the Moscow (ZIL),
Gorkiy (GAZ) and Ural (UrAZ) truck plants. Accord-
ing to their writings, the Soviets wanted to realize
economies of scale in production, accepting the lower
efficiency of medium trucks in intracity and in high-
density, long-haul transport. KamAZ alleviates the
shortage of heavy trucks, and companion measures
were taken to increase the production of light trucks
and vans at other motor vehicle plants.
The KamAZ plant is noteworthy not only for its size
but also for its prominence in Western deliberations
on export controls. Western participation in its con-
struction and fitting out was approved in the early
1970s as a premier example of the Soviet commitment
to East-West trade. Later KamAZ began to be
viewed in the West as a prime example of Soviet
acquisition of modern Western manufacturing tech-
nology; this created considerable controversy over
whether that technology would be applied to the
production of (a) special-purpose trucks to be used
predominantly by the military and (b) general purpose
trucks with wide dual military and civilian uses. Since
1981 the United States, prompted by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's actions during
the Solidarity trade union crisis in Poland, has embar-
goed sales to the Soviet Union of any goods for which
KamAZ is designated as the end user.
Almost 20 years have passed since the Soviets made
the decision to undertake this gigantic project. In this
paper we look at the KamAZ experience with the
following questions in mind:
? How has the KamAZ building program progressed?
? What has been the role of Western technology?
? What was the effect of the US embargo?
? How many trucks has KamAZ produced, and what
is the outlook for production in the future?
? To what extent has KamAZ production helped the
Soviet military?
Preparations for the construction of the Kama River
Plant began as soon as the 1965 transportation mod-
ernization program was adopted. The plant was de-
signed as part of a regional development project in a
remote area, which meant that the Soviets had to
create an infrastructure from a "green field" site-a
new city, including housing, municipal services, and
industrial transportation support facilities. Construc-
tion at the main plant complex in Brezhnev-found-
ries, forge shops, a final assembly plant, an engine
assembly plant, a frame and press plant, a tool shop,
and machine shops-has been continuous since 1969.
Truck production began in 1976. The plant was still
plant for the inaugural ceremony.
The Main Complex
According to Soviet open literature, the first stage of
construction was completed in about 1980. The plant
then contained all its major components, including the
truck assembly line, with a capacity for 75,000 trucks,
and the engine assembly line, with a capacity for
115,000 engines. At that time, the plant had about 1.9
million square meters of production floorspace, but
parts of several buildings, including the assembly
building, were not fully equipped.
The second stage of construction was planned to bring
KamAZ up to targeted capacity (150,000 trucks per
year) by the end of 1985. Some of it has been
completed, and some is still under way:
? During 1980-85 the Soviets have increased produc-
tion floorspace by 15 percent by completing a fourth
foundry, a forging shop, and a machine shop. Ac-
cording to Soviet press reports, the new iron foundry
(about one-third the size of the first one) will be
devoted to casting spare parts for the plant, and the
machine shop will produce electric motors and
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Figure 3. Why the KamAZ Truck? Left, the medium ZIL-130
(5,000 kg); right, the heavy KamAZ-5320 (8.000 kg); bottom, the
KamAZ fills a capacity niche, and its growing numbers alleviate a
shortage of heavy trucks. Soviet truck fleets have been dominated
by medium trucks like the ZIL-130, with capacities ranging from 2
to 5 tons. The Soviets have produced heavy trucks (like the KrAZ-
258) with capacities greater than 5 tons, but in smaller numbers
than medium ones. For example, in 1975-the year before KamAZ
began operating-they produced about 500,000 medium trucks
and only about 83,000 general purpose heavy trucks. When
KamAZ is operating at capacity, it alone will produce nearly twice
as many heavy trucks as the whole Soviet industry produced in
In view of the weakness of the Soviet road network, KamAZ
vehicles were designed for a much less burdensome axle load than
other Soviet heavy trucks. Heavy trucks decrease the burden on
the Soviet rail network-which still transports the vast majority of
Soviet cargo-by taking over much of the short-haul freight
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generators for the whole Soviet automotive industry.
In the truck assembly building, a second assembly
line became operational in 1981.
? Construction under way in 1985 will increase pro-
duction floorspace by an additional 8 percent, to
over 2.4 million square meters. New facilities will
include a second machine shop (to manufacture
electric motors and generators) and an addition to a
forge-machine shop. Expansion of the power plant is
also under way; this will probably accommodate the
additional power requirements of both the truck
plant and the current housing expansion in Brezh-
nev.
Our analysis of construction progress indicates that
the second-stage expansion will not be completed until
at least 1987, roughly two years later than originally
planned. Operation of the second assembly line at
rated capacity should be feasible shortly thereafter; it
took about five years for the first line to reach
capacity.
Expansion of capacity has been delayed by a host of
factors. Western businessmen and the Soviet press
have reported instances of poor coordination between
construction of buildings, delivery of equipment, and
installation of the equipment. Another cause of delay,
suggested by several KamAZ workers in a 1979 letter
to Pravda, may be that high-level interest in KamAZ
is waning. The workers felt this was reflected by
inadequate financing and shortages of material and
labor. All delays were probably aggravated by the
remoteness of KamAZ. On the whole, however-and
by the standards of Soviet construction perfor-
mance-we believe the overall delay has not been
unduly long.
Supporting Facilities
The Kama River Plant is the main element of a
production association that also includes service facili-
ties and component suppliers (see figure 4). According
to Soviet press reports, an engine repair plant at
Brezhnev began partial operation in early 1985, with
the capacity to overhaul 20,000 diesel engines annual-
ly. When this repair plant is completed-we estimate
in the late 1980s at the earliest-it will be able to
repair 40,000 engines a year. Soviet media sources
indicate that, when the number of KamAZ engines in
the nation's fleet of vehicles reaches the goal of 1.5
million, the USSR will need five such plants-each 25X1
with a capacity to repair 50,000 diesel engines per
year.'
Satellite plants have been added to the KamAZ
association since the early 1970s. Most of them supply
components to the main facility in Brezhnev. Accord-
ing to Soviet open literature, about 70 percent of the
parts going into a KamAZ truck are made at the
Kama River Plant, and the rest come from component
and spare parts plants. Major plants in the KamAZ
association include the:
? Kostroma Automobile Spare Parts Plant.
? Balakovo Industrial Rubber Products Plant.
? Panevezhis Motor Vehicle Compressor Plant.
? Zainsk Wheel Plant.
? Roslavl' Brake Plant.
? Yaroslavl' Diesel Engine Plant.
? Shadrinsk Truck Radiator Plant.
Construction of some of these associated plants was
slower than planned, which meant that they were
unable to meet scheduled deliveries to KamAZ.
Shortfalls of this kind probably contributed to
KamAZ's failure to reach its truck production targets
in the late 1970s.
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There is some evidence that the central planners may There are also many enterprises that supply KamAZ
invest further resources in KamAZ to increase its but are not part of its production association.' Support
annual truck production capacity beyond 150,000. In
' It is unusual in the Soviet motor vehicle industry to have entire
plants dedicated to the after-delivery maintenance of specific parts.
Motor vehicle depots and service shops would normally provide
maintenance for an entire truck; but overhauling a KamAZ engine
being installed. Analysis of the KamAZ truck assem-
bly building indicates that its space could accommo-
date a third line, at least as long as each of the
original two lines, but we cannot confirm that installa-
tion is under way.
requires tools and equipment that they probably do not have.
6 Outside enterprises that support the Kama River Plant include the
Dimitrograd Bearing Plant, the Nizhnekamsk Petrochemical and
Tire Plant, and the Magnitogorsk and Karaganda Metallurgical
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Figure 4
The Kama River Motor Vehicle Association: Major Plants and Suppliers
uuunIuypau \ vv rant
Balakovo Bearing Magnitogorsk
supplier
Industrial rubber Metallurgical supplier
4D products plant S o v i e t U n i o n
Karaganda
~
4 Trailer Metallurgical
assembly plant __ supplier
,
Stavropol'
w.s
/motor vehicle
compressor plant
BrakeYaroslavl~ ~~i Automobile spare parts plant
I &; plant Kostroma
MOSCOW Kama River Motor
Roslavl' 4ft Vehicle Plant Dump truck
assembly plant
Petrochemical
grezhnev
and tire su~opliereftekamsk Shadrinsk
ahneka-m`fs c'
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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from suppliers has been spotty since construction in
Brezhnev began, and this problem continues to inter-
fere with production at the plant. According to the
general director of KamAZ, numerous materials
needed by the association have not been delivered, and
those that are often do not meet specifications or
requirements. In a recent 12-month period KamAZ
fined suppliers over 3 million rubles for not meeting
the deadlines or providing the quantities specified in
contracts. In addition, it has begun to produce parts
that were not in its original plan-for example, oil
pumps and piston rings.
Still other outside enterprises modify KamAZ-
produced chassis or produce support equipment. An
association plant in Neftekamsk assembles dump
trucks on KamAZ chassis, and plants in Krasnoyarsk
and Stavropol' manufacture trailers for KamAZ
trucks. About 160 civil technical centers throughout
the Soviet Union supply spare parts and repair
KamAZ vehicles, and plans call for at least another
60 centers to be operating by 1986. The military
operates its own truck maintenance facilities.F___1
Use of Western Technology
In the mid-1960s, when Soviet officials began imple-
menting the modernization program, they talked to
several Western automotive manufacturers about pro-
viding overall management of the KamAZ construc-
tion project (as well as equipping the plant). They
reached tentative management agreements with US
companies-first with the Ford Motor Co. and then
with the Mack Truck Corp.-but neither was ever
signed. The Soviets decided to manage the project
themselves, but they continued to rely on Western
suppliers for most of the plant equipment. To buy
Western goods, the Kama Purchasing Commission
was established in the early 1970s, and offices were
opened in Paris and New York. By the mid-1970s, we
estimate the commission had negotiated contracts
worth nearly $1.3 billion,' including about $500 mil-
lion with US firms (see tables 1 and 2).
' Dollar amounts are those in the contracts and represent their
current-year values; that is, price changes over time are not
Table 1
Kama Purchasing Commission Contracts
With US Firms, 1970s a
Furnaces and foundry
equipment
42.6
C. E. Cast Equipment
Mechanized foundry lines
34.5
Holcroft & Company
Foundry equipment
19.9
Ingersoll-Rand Equipment
Engine line
finishing equipment
19.2
National Engineering
Company
Foundry equipment
15.4
LaSalle Machine Tool
Metalcutting machine tools
12.4
Cleveland Crane and
Engineering
Materials handling
equipment
10.4
Gleason Works
Axle production equipment
10.1
Carborundum Company
Foundry equipment
10.0
Subtotal
174.5
Other contracts (estimated)
330.0
Total contracts (estimated)
504.5
a Dollars are expressed in their current year values; that is, price 25X1
changes over time are not accounted for.
Soviet writings indicate that the planners had (and
continue to have) high expectations for the Western
production technologies used at KamAZ. They
equipped it to be the most modern motor vehicle plant
in the Soviet Union. For example:
? The KamAZ foundries (supplied by Swindell-
Dressler) are extremely sophisticated. Designed to
be highly automated, these foundries are the only
ones of their kind in the Soviet Union.
? The original engine assembly line was provided by
Ingersoll-Rand. Its size, production rate, and sophis-
ticated automation made it the only one of its kind
in the world.
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Table 2
Kama Purchasing Commission Contracts
With West European and Japanese
Firms, 1970s a
Design and installation of
engine plant
250.0
Liebherr & Huller
(Germany)
Design and equipment for
transmission plant
171.8
Fata SPA (Italy)
Molding machinery and
conveyor equipment
42.3
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Ltd. (Japan)
Drysys Equipment
(France)
Metal finishing and
painting equipment
20.0
Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industries Co.
(Japan)
Press lines
20.0
Rheinstahl A. G.
(W. Germany)
Forging equipment and
lines for crankshaft
16.3
Svenska Flaefabriken
(Sweden)
Gas filtering equipment
13.5
Subtotal
582.9
Other contracts (estimated)
175.0
Total contracts (estimated)
757.9
a Dollars are expressed in their current year values; that is, price
changes over time are not accounted for.
? In the KamAZ truck assembly lines the chassis are
mounted on flatcars, a technique that avoids the
usual problem of changing line specifications when
different chassis are to be assembled. This unusual
method allows considerable flexibility in assembling
different models at the same time.
Most of the Kama River Plant's facilities are
equipped with advanced Western machine tools, and
the truck and engine assembly areas have large,
automated transfer lines and material handling equip-
ment. Most of the plant's operations were designed to
be computer controlled-many, like the foundry area,
with a central IBM 370. The Soviets thus acquired
equipment more technically advanced than their own
machine-building industry could have provided, and
they avoided further strain on that already hard-
pressed industry.
Record on Assimilation
We judge that extensive reliance on Western equip-
ment and engineering assistance enabled the Soviets
to bring KamAZ on line at least five years earlier
than they could have if they had relied exclusively on
their own industry. Nevertheless, KamAZ has had
considerable difficulty in assimilating Western tech-
nology. On some parts of the project, the Soviet
technicians and construction engineers asked Western
engineers to change the plans and specifications-or
altered them themselves. According to
Soviet literature, KamAZ workers have
not always taken the trouble to follow the Western
engineering specifications, and they have had difficul-
ty using some of the Western equipment. The Soviets
have also put equipment to uses different from those it
was designed for.
Soviets split in two a line designed to produce one type
of brakeshoe and began producing two different types.
This overstressed the equipment, and the line broke
down in 1979 after only three years of operation.
Improper installation or maintenance can cause a
great deal of waste.
US fire protection systems for s
computer rooms were delivered to the USSR in 1978
but were left out in the weather until October 1979,
when US technicians came to install them. The tops
of the crates had been smashed, and water had
damaged the machines to the point that 80 percent of
the electrical components had to be reordered. The
Western technicians assembled one system and had it
installed, but the room it was installed in was not
suitable for testing, and so the system had not been
tested properly when the technicians left.
as of April 1980 no further work had
been done on any of the other systems, and they are
presumably inoperable.
It is not uncommon for the Soviets to have difficulty
of this kind with Western plants and equipment, so we
cannot be certain that performance at KamAZ is
worse than usual. The acquisition of complete West-
ern production lines probably helped the plant's per-
formance; if the Soviets had bought separate Western
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components and tried to integrate them piecemeal
into Soviet production lines, their difficulties would
probably have been even greater. We believe, howev-
er, that the advantage of buying a complete line was
more than offset by several other factors:
? Mismanagement of the entire project.
? The sophistication and complexity of the technol-
ogy.
? The Soviet penchant for modifying Western
equipment.
? The poorly developed infrastructure of the remote
site.
Overall-and especially considering Moscow's enor-
mous expenditures-we consider Soviet performance
in assimilating Western technology to have been
worse at KamAZ than at other major projects, includ-
ing the Volga passenger car plant built by Fiat and
various large chemical and metallurgical complexes
built by other European companies.
Effect of the US Embargo
In 1981 the United States imposed an embargo that
halted all shipments of new equipment and spare parts
that were designated for KamAZ.
We believe the embargo created short-term disrup-
tions at KamAZ and delayed some production. Gen-
erally, however, the Soviets appear to have been
successful in obtaining supplies and equipment else-
where-usually from Western Europe or Japan; and
they have manufactured some of the needed equip-
ment themselves. For example:
the US em-
bargo on computer parts had little effect on the
operation of the IBM 370 in the foundry. Parts for it
were readily available from Western Europe during
the early 1980s.
? When the US supplier of parts for foundry blasting
machines would not sell spares, the Soviets arranged
to buy them from West European firms.
ture an engine assembly line to replace the one that
a US firm had been barred from selling to them.
the Soviets purchased another com-
plete engine assembly line from Fiat of Italy.
KamAZ managers also have resorted to the common
Soviet industrial practice of cannibalizing unused
equipment and using the parts to maintain operations.
For example, they had not been using all of the
imported computer systems and could scavenge from
unused units to repair the systems that were running.
Future Support
The Soviets still purchase some Western equipment 25X1
for KamAZ, but levels of support provided by West-
ern firms are substantially lower in 1985 than they 25X1
were in the late 1970s. According to Soviet media
nearly all of the equipment installed in the
plant's second phase is of Soviet origin. Participation
by Western firms is currently limited almost entirely
to providing spare parts, technical support, and main-
tenance services.
We believe that the Soviets will continue to rely on
Western firms for equipment and assistance, albeit at
a level considerably lower than it was during the
initial construction and equipping of the plant. The
maintenance of equipment requires recurrent visits by
Western engineers. The Soviets will continue to buy
spare parts and certain compatible replacement equip-
ment from Western firms. In addition, for some
things they probably find it more cost effective to turn
to the West than to task domestic designers and
manufacturers.
Despite their problems, the Soviets have gained valu-
able experience in using the advanced production
equipment and processes embodied in the Western
technology at KamAZ. Soviet officials have publicly
called for the diffusion of KamAZ technology to other
plants, but we do not know how successful this
campaign has been. Most of all, KamAZ production
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technology has given the Soviets experience in mass-
producing high-quality components and trucks-ex-
perience that they probably already have applied to
other vehicles.
Although Western equipment installed at KamAZ
was highly advanced for the early 1970s, it largely
predates the dramatic gains in automation that have
characterized Western (and especially Japanese) in-
dustry over the last decade. For example, Western
equipment included no true robots or flexible manu-
facturing centers controlled by computers. KamAZ's
large work force of about 80,000 indicates it is still
quite labor intensive by Western standards. The chal-
lenge for Western firms stemmed mainly from
KamAZ's size-many times larger than a typical
Western truck plant-which required design of much
unique plant and equipment.
Nevertheless, in recent years the plant has been
receiving newer or more advanced equipment both
from the West and from Eastern Europe. In the early
1980s, for example, 15 small Hungarian computers
were installed in the engine assembly area for auto-
matic testing and adjustment; and, according to a
Soviet trade journal, more than 400 Bulgarian robots
are operating at KamAZ. In addition, Avtopromim-
port (the Soviet automotive industry importing agen-
cy) has since the late 1970s purchased hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of advanced Western produc-
tion equipment and technology. These include indus-
trial robots, computer numerically controlled (CNC)
machine tools, and flexible manufacturing systems.
Some of this equipment probably has been installed at
KamAZ; this is suggested by the plant's continued
expansion, the Soviet desire for continued moderniza-
tion of all automotive plants, and the fact that some of
this equipment is probably compatible with other
KamAZ technology.
Production at KamAZ, Current and Projected
In the early 1970s the Soviets expected KamAZ to
reach its planned annual capacity of 150,000 trucks
and 250,000 diesel engines by the late 1970s to early
1980s.
production, in fact, has risen much more slowly
than expected-from about 5,000 trucks and 10,000
Figure 5
KamAZ Truck Production,
1976-85
engines in 1976 to about 105,000 trucks and 150,000
engines in 1984 (see figure 5). We estimate that
115,000 KamAZ trucks will be produced in 1985.
Slippage in the original goal for bringing KamAZ on
line has been caused by a combination of the usual
Soviet industrial problems, including construction
lags, supply shortages, poor inventory control, and
poorly trained and unmotivated workers.
we believe the plant will
probably reach projected capacity somewhere near
1990-in the late 1980s or early 1990s.
Productivity
Soviet literature indicates that the planners expected
the average worker at KamAZ to produce at least 50
percent more than his counterpart at the Volga
Automobile Plant (VAZ, the Fiat-constructed turnkey
plant that began producing cars in 1973). VAZ labor
productivity, in turn, was about one-third higher in
the mid-1970s than that at the premier Soviet-
equipped plant, the ZIL truck plant in Moscow.
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We do not know how well KamAZ is meeting its
productivity goals, but
of efficiency that it is intended to be. Reportedly the
buildings are cluttered and the equipment poorly
maintained. Worker morale is said to be low, causing
abuse, vandalism, and a lackadaisical attitude toward
the job. For example:
ture fell from 120 per day in 1977 to 80 during parts
of 1978. The decline reportedly was due partly to ill-
treatment of factory equipment by workers and the
resulting breakdowns and partly to delays in the
receipt of materials. To counteract the slowdown,
plant managers added more shifts during parts of
1978.
the USSR purchased 86 automatic riveting ma-
chines, worth about $3.2 million, for KamAZ. As a
result of abuse, vandalism, and theft of parts by
KamAZ workers, most of these machines were
inoperable within two years.
? Of the 16 automatic forges purchased for KamAZ,
seven were installed by US technicians in February
1977, with the remainder expected to be installed by
the Soviets and operational by about midyear.
installed. In addition,) Ithe unskilled
Soviet operators were able to obtain only one-half of
the expected output from the machines that were
working.
Personnel turnover at the main plant in Brezhnev has
been high (about 15 percent annually), despite special
incentives and bonuses. In 1979 employment at the
plant reached about 80,000-but, during the four
years 1976-79, 39,000 workers had come to KamAZ
and gone. One of the major reasons given was the
acute housing problem in Brezhnev.
Truck Production
Numbers. About 600,000 KamAZ trucks were manu-
factured from 1976 to May 1985 (see figure 6).
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Production figures are provided by the Soviet media
and estimates
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mance.
In 1984, according to our estimates, KamAZ manu-
factured about 13 percent of all the Soviet Union's
trucks (heavy, medium, and light) and about 47
percent of its general purpose heavy trucks (those with
over 5 tons capacity). When the plant reaches its
originally planned capacity, it will account for about
17 to 18 percent of all Soviet truck production.
According to Soviet press reports
about 10 percent of all the KamAZ trucks
produced so far have been exported. They have gone
to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and proba-
bly other East European countries; Nicaragua and
Cuba; and Great Britain, South Africa, France, and
Finland.
Models. KamAZ production consists almost entirely
of three basic models (see figure 7 and table 3). Two
highway trucks, the KamAZ-5320 and the KamAZ-
5410, entered production in 1976. A variant of the
KamAZ-5320, with greater mobility, was first pro-
duced in 1981. We believe this variant, the KamAZ-
4310, was designed primarily for the military, al-
though the Soviets said the major users would be
agriculture and industries in remote areas. Variants of
the basic truck models incorporate several features
that make them especially suitable for military appli-
cation. In all, KamAZ makes 15 to 20 configurations
of its three basic models, including dump trucks and
prime movers, for use in the military and in the
civilian economy.
KamAZ trucks are built to Soviet designs prepared by
the Kriger Design Bureau, which is a part of the ZIL
production association.
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The estimates of annual production illustrated in
figure 5 are based on the following information and
analytical assumptions:
? Production .figures (202,000) for the five-year period
1976-80 are provided in Soviet open literature.
? Our estimate for 1981 (75,000 trucks) is based on a
daily production rate reported in Pravda in August
of that year
(The calculation of an annual production
rate from daily rates is necessarily imprecise, be-
cause daily rates can fluctuate, depending on mate-
rial shortages, equipment problems, and other fac-
tors. Therefore we give estimates of annual
production as a range-the possible high and the
possible low production. We believe KamAZ has
operated between 275 and 300 days per year.)
? Our estimate (85,000) for 1982 is based on a daily
bly line made its first significant contribution to
overall KamAZ production in 1982.
? Our estimate for 1983 (95,000) is based on
a reported Soviet production
goal of 90,000 for that year, and our general
knowledge of the plant.
? The estimate for 1984 (about 105,000 trucks) is
based on our judgment that the plant is overcoming
problems and gradually increasing production and
on a Soviet press report that at least 500,000 trucks
had been produced by April 1984 and about
550,000 by early December 1984. This figure is
consistent with our other estimates.
? The estimate for 1985 (about 38,000 through early
May 1985 and about 115,000 for the year) is based
on a total provided in a Moscow television broad-
cast, which said that KamAZ had produced a total
of 600,000 trucks by May 1985.
Figure 6
Soviet Production of General
Purpose Heavy Trucks, 1965-84
Total general
purpose
- heavy truck
production
- KamAZ
production
1 1 1~ ~ 1~~~ 1
0 1965 70 75 80 85
General purpose heavy trucks include those from KamAZ, the
Ural Truck Plant in Miass, the Kremenchug, Kutaisi, and Minsk
Truck Plants, and two models from the Likhachev Truck Plant in
Moscow. These plants supply almost all military trucks. (Heavy
mining trucks are not included in these calculations.)
KamAZ trucks are designed to be simpler and cheap-
er to service than other Soviet medium and heavy
trucks; a KamAZ is supposed to cover a maximum of
300,000 kilometers before major overhaul and to have
a maximum service life of 400,000 to 500,000 km.
Trucks replaced, like the ZIL-130, have a service life
of 350,000 km. Some drivers have complained, howev-
er, that the KamAZ diesel engine is underpowered
and that the cooling system is inadequate.
Prospects. New truck models are planned for
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KamAZ trucks look like heavy US interstate com-
mon carriers but are actually quite different. For
example, they are designed to operate on a broad
range of road surfaces and conditions, because only
about 40 percent of Soviet roads are paved with
asphalt or cement. All the current KamAZ models
are three-axle trucks designed with the weaker roads
and bridges in mind, and they impose a load of no
more than six tons per axle. This allows them to be
used on nearly the entire network of Soviet public
highways. In addition, KamAZ trucks are designed
to operate under extreme climatic conditions (-40C to
+50C). They have three-seat cabs with good noise
insulation, an efficient heating and ventilating sys-
tem, and power-assisted steering, and they have an
improved braking system. Some have a sleeping
compartment for long-distance hauls.
KamAZ trucks are used in a variety of work. In the
construction industry the general purpose KamAZ
vehicles haul men and material, while special-
purpose construction models include dump trucks,
tanker trucks, and cement mixers. A special-purpose
variant of the KamAZ-5320 designed for agriculture
has a stake bed that can tip to either side. Several
variations of the KamAZ-5410 tractor truck have
been designed for use with trailers for long-distance
hauling. The KamAZ-4310-the primary military
model-has been built in open and closed cargo
versions and as a tractor truck, and it could be used
as a mounting platform for multiple rocket launchers
and as a prime mover for artillery. KamAZ trucks
have also been built in a tanker version for military
petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) units.
in 1981 the Soviets were planning to
expand KamAZ production facilities to build a new
line of vehicles. The new trucks were described as
having a capacity of 15 metric tons and cruising on
highways at speeds above 100 km/hr. In an interview
published in the December 1984 issue of the Soviet
journal Molodoy Kommunist, the general director of
KamAZ implied that in a few years the plant would
produce a two-axle tractor with the same load capaci-
ty as the KamAZ-5410 three-axle tractor-trailer
Soviet Truck Design:
Heightened-Mobility Variants
Soviet truck designs are greatly influenced by the
rough roads and harsh climates within the Soviet
Union. The Soviets generally build both highway
(limited-mobility) and off -highway (heightened-
mobility) trucks from the same design. The highway
models are primarily for the civilian sector, the
heightened-mobility models primarily for the mili-
tary. Examples of highway trucks are the KamAZ-
5320 and the KamAZ-5410, whose off-highway coun-
terparts are the KamAZ-4310 and the KamAZ-4410.
The military variants usually have all-wheel drive,
winches, reinforced frames, locking differentials, all-
terrain tires, heavy-duty generators, hermetically
sealed assemblies and electrical equipment for deep
fording, and tire inflation and deflation systems
controlled by the driver from the cab. These features
allow the trucks to operate year round on a variety of
terrains.
The military uses limited-mobility trucks for logistic
support in rear areas on paved roads and highways.
These models are normally produced several years
before the military variants. As a result, the military
trucks have fewer defects and cost less than the
vehicles produced earlier.
the final assembly buildings.
(19 metric tons). The existence of a new model was
confirmed a two-
axle vehicle longer than any of the currently produced
KamAZ trucks was sighted in the storage area beside
KamAZ's capability to reach its planned annual
capacity of 150,000 trucks will in part be determined
by production of this new two-axle vehicle, which we
believe will not be put into series production before
1986. If it is produced on existing assembly lines,
operations will be disrupted by the necessary retool-
ing. If the plant is installing a third line, however, and
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the new truck is produced on it, there will be relatively
little overall disruption, and planned annual produc-
tion will probably be reached even sooner than the
date (roughly 1990) we have projected.
We believe that when the two lines at KamAZ are
operating at planned capacity, the plant could pro-
duce trucks at an annual rate of more than the
planned 150,000, at least for short periods.
the final assembly area of
the plant operates with two shifts working five and a
half days a week. If it were converted to a six- or
seven-day, three-shift schedule-and if labor short-
ages and inventory and supply bottlenecks did not
interfere-production could rise to an annual rate of
175,000 to 200,000 trucks. A surge of this kind could
reflect a decision in Moscow to at least temporarily
increase capacity-in the event of industrial mobiliza-
tion, for example, or to compensate for production
problems at other Soviet truck plants. But we believe
this rate would be difficult to sustain.
Adding a third truck assembly line at KamAZ,
however, would permit higher production with normal
operation. Soviet media indicate that the first two
lines already can support the rated capacity of
150,000 trucks per year.
Engine Production
Three models of diesel engines arc produced at
KamAZ-the V-8 YaMZ-740 (210 HP), the V-8
YaMZ-7401 (180 HP), and the V-10 YaMZ-741 (260
HP).8 We judge that the V-8s account for most of the
production. Each model is used in one or more
KamAZ trucks, and both V-8 models are used in
other Soviet trucks (the UrAZ-4320, for example) and
in passenger buses.
which designed and produced the first KamAZ engines.
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Table 3
Characteristics of KamAZ
Trucks Currently Produced
Load capacity (kg)
8,000
5,000
with trailer
11,500
19,000
7,000
Weight (empty, kg)
6,800
8,770
6,445
8,410
Wheelbase (mm) b
3,690/1,320
4,160/1,320
2,840/1,320
3,340/1,320
Length (mm)
8,295
4,600
6,140
7,610
Height (cab) (mm)
2,630
2,630
2,630
2,800
Engine model
YaMZ-740
YaMZ-740
YaMZ-740 c
YaMZ-740
Horsepower d
210
210
210
210
Fuel consumption, loaded
(liters per 100 km)
22
26
a The models presented here are the basic type for each of the three
"families" illustrated in figure 7. Each family has several variants;
the only one shown is the 5510, a variant of the KamAZ-5320.
b The first number is the wheelbase length from the first to the last
wheel, the second is the distance between the rear wheels.
c The KamAZ plant produces several engine models, all of them
diesel; these are discussed under "Engine Production." The V-8
KamAZ-740 has 210 horsepower. The KamAZ-741 10-cylinder
engine, which is rated at 260 horsepower, is used in some variants
of the KamAZ-5410, such as the KamAZ-54102 tractor truck.
d The horsepower ratings presented here follow Soviet state stan-
dards; an engine with equivalent power would have a slightly higher
rating if it was rated according to standards used in the United
States.
Sources: The Billion Dollar Beginning, Chase World Information;
Jane's Military Vehicles and Ground Support Equipment 1984; US
Department of the Army, Foreign Material Catalog, TB-381-5-
22A.
Since KamAZ began producing engines in 1976, some
reports have alluded to production of 12-cylinder
diesel engines for military armored vehicles. While
reports indicate that castings of 12-cylinder engines
have been made (probably in experimental molds), we
believe series or even batch production of these en-
gines probably has not begun.
the casting equipment used at
KamAZ was designed for the production of 8- and 10-
cylinder engine blocks, and converting it to the casting
of 12-cylinder types would be difficult. In addition,
although the YaMZ engines currently produced at
KamAZ have sufficient horsepower to be used in
armored vehicles, they were not designed for that use.
The engines generally used in Soviet armored vehicles
are specially designed and are relatively compact,
powerful, and light-as opposed to the larger, less
powerful, and heavier engines used for trucks.
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trailer works, which in 1981-82 produced about
20,000 trailers annually for KamAZ trucks, is in-
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per year when it reaches capacity. The Soviet press
reports that the Stavropol' trailer works manufac-
tured about 100,000 trailers, also for KamAZ vehi-
cles, annually in 1983-84.
KamAZ vehicles have been delivered to a wide variety
of civilian and military users. These general purpose
trucks can be applied to almost any task requiring
medium-to-heavy hauling capacity. Their high utility
and high quality have made them much in demand.
Patterns of use of KamAZ trucks have been mainly
influenced by the phasing into production of different
truck models. During 1976-80, the plant produced
only the limited-mobility KamAZ-5320 and -5410,
suitable for highway travel and mostly civilian uses.
The introduction of the heightened-mobility KamAZ-
4310 in 1981 opened up new military and off-road
civilian applications.
Civilian
KamAZ trucks have been delivered to the so-called
common carrier fleets under the control of the various
USSR republics, to industrial ministries and plants,
and to agricultural organizations. We cannot accu-
rately estimate deliveries to the different users, but
the Soviet policy of increasing the importance of the
centrally controlled common carrier fleets suggests
that in the civilian economy they have first call on
KamAZ trucks. Moreover, the Soviets have empha-
sized the centralization of control in areas where
KamAZ vehicles are expected to play a large role,
such as long-distance hauling and the movement of
construction material.
The ruggedness and reliability of KamAZ vehicles
reportedly make them especially valuable in harsh
climates-for example, in the construction of the
Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway in Siberia-in
the agricultural sector, and in areas where the roads
are unpaved.
KamAZ trucks are considerably more costly to build
than the trucks they are replacing, but they could
provide overall savings for the purchasers if they are
Table 4
Comparison of KamAZ Trucks and
Those They Are Replacing a
KamAZ UrAZ-
ZIL-130
5320
377
Entered series production (year)
1976
1965
1964
Power drive
6x4
6x4
4x2
Maximum payload (metric tons)
8.0
7.5
5.0
Maximum cruising speed (km/hr)
85
75
90
Total service life (km)
450,000
150,000
350,000
Service life (metric tons)
3,600,000
1,125,000
1,750,000
KamAZ- UrAZ-
ZIL-131
4310
375
Entered series production (year)
1981
1961
1966
Power drive
6x6
6x6
6x6
Maximum payload (metric tons)
5.0
4.5
3.5
Maximum cruising speed (km/hr)
80
75
80
Total service life (km)
300,000
175,000
300,000
Service life (metric tons)
1,500,000
787,500
1,050,000
a The service life given for each model is based on Soviet-claimed
standards for the most recently upgraded version of that model; it
probably is not reached by most individual vehicles.
operated efficiently (see table 4). The larger KamAZ
capacity and longer operating lifetime should more
than offset higher unit cost (which
cost of the models they replace).
KamAZ trucks also afford substantial operating effi-
ciencies. Diesel-powered KamAZ trucks are substan-
tially more fuel efficient than equivalent gasoline-
powered models, and diesel fuel is cheaper. For
example, the diesel KamAZ-5320 can haul 8 metric
tons at a cruising speed of about 60 kilometers per
hour using about 22 liters of fuel per 100 km. The
gasoline-powered UrAZ-377, capable of hauling 7.5
tons at only about 40 KPH, uses about 45 liters of fuel
per 100 km.9
' Fuel consumption is calculated for a loaded truck; actual fuel
consumption rates depend on the load weight and other travel
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ns-
By the early 1980s the military was acquiring
port accounts for about 60 percent of all the gasoline,
diesel, and other light fuels used in the USSR. In
1980, civilian vehicles
consumed about 52 million metric tons of gasoline
and nearly 11 million mt of diesel fuel. According to
Soviet plans, when the nationwide fleet of vehicles
contains 1.5 million with KamAZ engines-in the
mid-1990s-the whole fleet will use about 10 million
mt of fuel per year less than it would have used with
the older engines.
In addition to their capacity and fuel economy, the
newer KamAZ trucks appear to be more reliable and
more easily maintained than the models they are
replacing. They can apparently be driven about 50
percent farther between routine checkups and about
25 percent farther between major overhauls. This
affords substantial potential savings in drivers and
maintenance personnel.
Military
KamAZ trucks have been deployed extensively with
the Soviet and, to a lesser extent, the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact and other allied military forces. They
are replacing or augmenting the military inventory of
smaller, older trucks, particularly the UrAZ-375 and
-377 and ZIL-130 and -131 models. In the services, as
in the civilian sector, their increased effectiveness
probably more than offsets their higher cost.
The most important benefit provided by KamAZ
trucks is to increase the lift capacity of motor trans-
port units. The 8-ton KamAZ-5320 trucks give the
unit a lift capacity about 60 percent greater than that
of the 5-ton trucks they are replacing, without in-
creasing the unit's requirements for drivers, fuel, and
maintenance resources. Units using the 5-ton
KamAZ-4310 maintain their lift capacity if they
replace older 5-ton trucks or increase it if they replace
3.5-ton to 4.5-ton trucks. This increased lift capacity
is being provided at a time when the logistic require-
ments of the Soviet forces are expanding. The growing
proportion of diesel trucks in the military truck fleet is
particularly helpful to rear service units, which are
already set up to provide diesel fuel for most armored
vehicles.
KamAZ trucks in large numbers.
Soviet military motor transport units, for example,
in East Germany in 1983 reveals that of trucks in use
(excluding those in storage), about 65 percent-nearly
3,000-were KamAZ models. This 65 percent ac-
counted for about 47,000 metric tons of lift-almost
75 percent of the unit's transport capacity."
r-amAZ trucks are being deployed
in greater numbers in frontline areas in Warsaw Pact
forces, increasing the mobility of ground force units.
Estimates of Military Acquisitions
We estimate that from 45,000 to 65,000 KamAZ
trucks were delivered to the Soviet armed forces
between 1976 and the end of 1984. The paragraphs
that follow present the individual estimates on which
this total is based, as well as the evidence and the
methods employed.
indicates that during 1976-81 about
14,000 trucks-at least 5 percent of total KamAZ
production-went to the military. All of those trucks
were limited-mobility KamAZ-5320s and -5410s,
used mainly for rear service logistic support.
Deliveries to the military began to rise steeply in
1982. We base this conclusion on increased sightings
and on our judgment (discussed under "Truck Produc-
tion") that most of the increased number of trucks
produced after 1982 were the KamAZ-4310 produced
on the plant's second line. This pattern is typical for
the acquisition of general purpose trucks. The military
first acquires limited quantities of the civilian variant;
then, when the military variant goes into series pro-
duction (normally three to five years later), deliveries
of trucks from that particular plant increase.
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For 1982, we estimate that KamAZ delivered about
8,500 trucks to the military. This figure is derived
from:
? Our calculation,
that total 1982 production was 85,000 trucks (figure
5).
? About 5 percent of all vehicles produced each year
in the limited-mobility KamAZ-5320 and -5410
series are delivered to the military. This assumption
is based on our estimates of previous deliveries of
these trucks and a belief that the percentage has not
changed.
? All production above 75,000 per year comes off the
second assembly line; this assumption is supported
by estimates of the line's capacity. We believe that
all of the heightened-mobility KamAZ-4310s are
produced on the second line, and we assume that 60
to 90 percent of the vehicles from this line are
4310s.
? Of the 4310s produced, 55 to 75 percent are deliv-
ered to the military. We base this assumption on the
fact that most of the heightened-mobility variants of
other general purpose trucks have been delivered to
the military.
By assigning a range of low and high values to these
judgments, we calculate that about 31,000 to 53,000
KamAZ trucks were delivered to the military during
1982-84.
Using the same assumptions, we estimate that an
additional 17,000 to 32,000 will be delivered in 1985
(see figure 8). This will amount to 15 to 27 percent
of the total production that we estimated for the
KamAZ plant.
the KamAZ rail transship-
ment yard validates the order of magnitude of our
estimates of KamAZ deliveries to the military. About
10 percent of the yard is separately secured, and in
Figure 8
Estimated Deliveries of KamAZ
Trucks to the Military, 1976-89
85
`Phase-in of second
assembly line
Estimates are year-end totals.
76-84 Based on production estimates.
85-89 Projected production.
306167 7-85
early 1985 it contained about 15 to 20 percent of the
trucks in the yard. The secured area contained only
KamAZ-4310s and tractor trucks that we believe are
KamAZ-44 1 Os-a 6x6 variant of the 4310. All trucks
in this area were of the same color tone, probably olive
drab." Other KamAZ models also go to the military,
but they apparently are stored outside this special
area
Production trends, plus analysis of the transshipment
yard, suggest that when the plant is operating at
capacity KamAZ will supply 30,000 to 45,000 trucks
to the military each year. This would include a
" Olive drab normally indicates military vehicles. We believe a
small number of civilian trucks are painted olive drab, but these are
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majority of the 50,000 KamAZ-4310s that we esti-
mate will be produced each year, several thousand
KamAZ-5320s, some KamAZ-5410s, and probably
some of the "new" two-axle KamAZ trucks. Under
these steady-state conditions, KamAZ would deliver
about 20 to 30 percent of its output to the armed
forces. This is roughly the same share as prevailing in
the Soviet truck industry as a whole.12
we estimated that 20
to 25 percent of total Soviet truck production between 1970 and
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