DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR'S EASTERN COAL BASINS: A WHITE ELEPHANT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000400530002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
A White Elephant?
Development of the USSR's
Eastern Coal Basins:
NGA
Review
Completed
Secret
SOV 85-10214
IA 85-10081
December 1985
COPY 4 7 5
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Directorate of Secret
A White Elephant?
Development of the USSR's
Eastern Coal Basins:
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared jointly by
25X1
25X1
of the Office of Soviet Analysis and
Economic Performance Division, SOVA,I 25X1
we c eom an may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
SOV 85-10214
IA 85-10081
December 1985
Comments and queries are
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of I December 1985
was used in this report.
A White Elephant?
Development of the USSR's
Eastern Coal Basins:
mining and in utilization.
Expanded coal use underpins the Soviet Long-Term Energy Program;
planners are counting on coal, in conjunction with nuclear power, to
provide nearly all new energy output once natural gas production levels off
in the mid-1990s. Barring unexpected infusions of additional investment
and technological breakthroughs, however, the USSR will probably have
serious difficulty even approaching its goals for coal development-both in
output and use.
The Soviets are banking on the development of selected coal basins in the
eastern USSR, but progress in overcoming technical problems related to
the transport and use of coal from these basins-Kuznetsk, Kansk-
Achinsk, and Ekibastuz-has been slow (see figure 1). The Soviets have
focused largely on their ability to surface-mine vast amounts of coal
cheaply, while underestimating the technical problems and costs related to
the use of this very low quality coal. In short, eastern coal may be a white
elephant-an energy reserve requiring research and investment funding far
out of proportion to the gains achieved by meeting planned targets for coal
In our view, the key bottlenecks to expansion of coal output and use will not
be eliminated by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives to
tighten labor discipline and improve management. The major constraint to
Moscow's coal program is slow progress in developing state-of-the-art coal-
use and energy-transfer technologies-large-capacity lignite-fired boilers,
coal-slurry pipelines, ultra-high-voltage electricity transmission systems,
and synfuel plants. Mastering these technologies will require carefully
planned, well-executed research and development and sizable capital
outlays; investment in the coal and power industries would have to increase
by one-half to provide the estimated 50 billion rubles required in the next
15 years to successfully fund the planned expansion of coal mining and use.
building sector during 1986-90 will more likely take priority.
Because of coal's enormous reserve base and because of dwindling proved
reserves of oil and eventually even of gas, we judge that the USSR will con-
tinue to emphasize coal in its long-term energy plans. However, it probably
will not devote the resources needed in the short term to get the coal
industry moving toward its ambitious goals. The immediate investment
needs of the oil and gas industries and modernization of the machine-
iii Secret
SOV 85-10214
IA 85-10081
December 1985
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Figure 1
Major Coal-Producing Basins
Soviet Union
Kans
Achins b
4;;r
kibastuz
ay(cuben
South
tia
Coal basin
Selected railroad
0 1000 Kilometers
I ' l..
0 750 Miles
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Eliminating the bottlenecks and moving coal to a fast track would involve
long leadtimes and require up-front investment during 1986-90. Not
meeting the short-term needs of the coal industry will make it very difficult
for the industry to provide its expected share of increased energy produc-
tion after 1995. In sum, we believe that coal production and utilization will
probably increase only slightly-if at all-during the coming decade,
leading to energy constraints beginning sometime in the 1990s.
A failure to expand coal output and use would probably have the following
consequences:
? An already tight balance between supply and demand for electric power
in the Urals and Kazakhstan would be upset. An increase in the
frequency and duration of power shortages during the 1990s would
probably lower the output of key metallurgical, defense production, and
agricultural facilities in these areas.
? Many power plants burning coal as their primary fuel would have to
continue using more fuel oil than planned because of low coal quality and
coal shortages. This situation would hamstring Soviet efforts to free up
additional oil for alternative uses-an important consideration in view of
declining oil output.
? Shortages of coking coal would continue to be a drag on steel production,
adversely affecting Gorbachev's economic modernization program.
? Inadequate electric power supplies would slow the pace of natural
resource exploitation along the Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad line in
eastern Siberia during the latter 1990s.
Time is running out on the opportunity to avoid these problems. Moscow
could redesign the Long-Term Energy Program and, as an alternative to
coal expansion during the latter 1990s, attempt further growth in natural
gas output and larger-than-expected increments in nuclear energy produc-
tion. To make these decisions, the Soviet leadership must focus on the
longer term issues in energy and pull itself away from the day-to-day
management that usually occupies its attention. With Gorbachev at the
helm, this may be possible.
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An energy program with greater emphasis on gas and nuclear power would
face different but still demanding problems:
? Further increases in gas output would accelerate depletion of reserves
and risk a loss in ultimate recovery, a factor that Gorbachev has already
warned against.
? The Soviet nuclear industry is even less prepared than the gas industry to
replace coal as a long-term energy supplier. Moscow is already planning
to substantially increase electricity generated by nuclear power stations
in the European USSR. Soviet industry will have to substantially
increase output of nuclear power plant components and equipment if the
existing goals are to be met. Nuclear power could not be substituted for
coal east of the Urals without even more sizable and costly additions to
component-manufacturing capacity, major redesign work, and massive
training of new personnel.
Whether or not the Soviets elect to boost coal investment enough to achieve
planned output, the coal industry's program in the coming decade will be
characterized by high costs, bottlenecks, and technical problems that will
probably require Western assistance. Coal-cleaning facilities have already
been ordered from West German and Italian firms. An Italian firm has re-
cently received a contract to provide process technology and engineering
services for a 250-km coal-slurry pipeline to transport 3 million tons of
West Siberian coal annually. For the last five years, the Soviets have been
soliciting assistance-primarily through technical information exchange
agreements-in coal liquefaction technology from Western firms.
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Changing Role of Coal in the Soviet Energy Scene
Trends in Underground Mining
Trends in Surface Mining
The Key Eastern Basins: Energy Possibilities and Exploitation Headaches
Kuznetsk Coal: Good Quality But Poor Location
Ekibastuz Coal: More Rock Than Coal?
Kansk-Achinsk Coal: Forty Percent Water
Energy Policy Choices and Implications
Prospective Investment Requirements for Coal-Based Energy
Competition With Other Energy Programs for Scarce
Investment Resources
Output Projections
Impact on the Soviet Economy
Technology Options for Soviet Coal Development
The Kuznetsk Coal Basin
The Ekibastuz Coal Basin
Ultra-High-Voltage Electricity Transmission to the Urals 31
and the European USSR
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Figure 2
USSR: Energy Production, 1970-90
Million tons standard -fuel
(percent)
? Oil
Coal
Natural gas
Nuclear
Other"
1985 b
Total: 2,199
1970
Total: 1,269
Other includes: hydro, peat, shale, and fuelwood.
Estimated.
1980
Total: 1,980
1990 plan
Total: 2,726
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Development of the USSR's
Eastern Coal Basins:
A White Elephant?
Changing Role of Coal in the Soviet Energy Scene
Coal, once the USSR's main energy source, was
overtaken by oil in the late 1960s and by gas in the
1970s (see figure 2). Soviet energy planners, however,
are counting on additional coal production, in con-
junction with nuclear power, to satisfy nearly all of
the growth in energy demand by the year 2000.' This
goal is embodied in the USSR's Long-Term Energy
Program, published in 1984. The major expansion of
coal production called for in this program will depend
on sizable increases in output at selected large surface
mines and the development of reliable, cost-efficient
means of transporting and utilizing energy from coal.
The Power Ministry is planning to construct substan-
tial new capacity in coal-fueled power stations during
1986-90 and beyond. At least 11 major coal-fired
thermal power plants and many smaller plants are in
the building or planning stages. The Soviets expect
this capacity to be partially operational or completed
by 1990. Moreover, they are planning to build five
major coal-fired mine-mouth power plants in the
Kansk-Achinsk and Ekibastuz coal basins after 1990.
Most of the electric power from these new plants is
intended for use in the Ural and Kazakhstan regions,
where the present balance between the supply and
demand for electric power is tight. The Soviets also
hope to convert some electric power plants that are
presently burning fuel oil to coal or gas use. They plan
to further refine the "saved" fuel oil to satisfy the
growing demand for lighter products such as gasoline
and diesel fuel.
Trends in Underground Mining
Growth in coal output was, until the late 1970s,
provided largely by expansion of underground mining.
This option, however, is no longer practical. Coal
' The "Draft Guidelines for Economic Development During 1986-
90 and Through 2000" also call for construction of large coal-fired
power plants. The Draft Guidelines, however, do not provide output
projections beyond 1990 and do not discuss the relative roles of the
production at most of the major basins relying on
underground mines is now essentially stagnant. From
1980 to 1984, the total annual output from under-
ground coal mines fell by about 30 million tons, to
about 418 million tons (see figure 3).
Coal production in the Donets basin the USSR's
largest producer-declined from a peak of 225 million
tons in 1976 to about 196 million tons in 1984 and
will continue to fall during the balance of the I 980s.
After more than two centuries of mining, the easily
exploitable reserves in this basin have been exhausted.
In terms of mine depth, seam thickness, and methane
concentrations, most of the Donets mines would no
longer be considered proved reserves by Western 25X1
standards. The average depth of the Donets mines in
1982 was about 605 meters-eight times as deep as
the average US coal mine. The average thickness of
Donets coal seams in 1980 was less than 1 meter-
three-fourths as thick as the seams being worked a
decade earlier and about one-half as thick as average
coal seams in the United States. Moreover, most of
the Donets mines have dangerously high concentra-
tions of methane.
Similar problems underlie declining production at
other Soviet underground coal basins. Output from
the Karaganda basin has been flat since 1980. Pro-
duction from the Moscow basin-where the mining
conditions are even more severe than in the Donets
basin-has dropped substantially since production
peaked in 1960.
Trends in Surface Mining
Not surprisingly, Soviet energy planners have opted
not to seek growth of coal output through high outlays
on costly mining innovations and new capacity in
underground operations. Instead they have embraced
the goal of expanding surface mining as the most cost-
effective way to boost coal output. The share of
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Figure 3
USSR: Stagnating Coal Production, 1970-84
surface-mined output in total coal production in-
creased from roughly one-fourth in 1970 to about
two-fifths in 1984. During this period, the coal indus-
try boosted the annual output of surface mines from
167 million tons to 294 million tons. Growth of coal
production from this activity has slowed considerably
in the last decade-dropping from an average annual
rate of nearly 5 percent during the 1970s to about
2 1/2 percent.
Coal output from surface mining grew rapidly in the
1970s because of the working of new mines and
because relatively simple solutions were available for
the attendant problems in coal transportation and
consumption. Coal production from new mines in
Kazakhstan, West Siberia, and the Soviet Far East
was accommodated by relatively short hauls on exist-
ing rail systems. The coal was used in small-to-
medium-sized boilers at existing and newly built
power plants where proven technology could be
readily adapted to burn the lower quality coals from
the new surface mines.
In the 1980s, however, the Soviets began to push a
new, more complex, and costlier approach to surface
mining and coal use. The expansion of surface mining
is being concentrated at a few mines in a small
number of coal basins. Total annual output-from
both surface and underground mines-has been hov-
ering around 715 million tons, while long-term goals
call for yearly production of nearly 1 billion tons by
the year 2000. Interim goals are no less ambitious:
nearly 800 million tons by 1990 and about 900 million
tons by the mid-1990s. Virtually all of this growth is
to come from surface mines east of the Urals, with the
Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz, and Kansk-Achinsk coal mines
designated as the main producers (see figure 4).
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Figure 4
Soviet Development of Eastern Coal Basins
Major coal-producing basin
^ Selected coal mine
- - - Coal-slurry pipeline under construction
Major railroad
Transmission lines (1,150 kV or greater)
Operational
Planned or under construction
Selected transformer/ converter stations
AC/DC converter station under construction
Transformer substation under construction
Selected power plants
? Operational
o Under construction
0 390 600 Kilometers
F r ' r'
0 200 0 400 Miles
~= ro
0
CD
A .Chelyabinsk
I
~T 9
. Kustanay
Kokchetav
,;,1W "),h, an R, I~IO.t C,4
_ .~
ostochnyy
Ek,bastuz- 1 ?q 'bastuz
evernyy
Fkibastur 2 & 3 ogatyr'
Kazakhstan
South Fazahhsten p~':
!Lkib,~st:!r t7)
bastuz
uben
,Urengoy
Area
of Map
Ka rill'
Achinsky
Sarnaul
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The Key Eastern Basins: Energy
Possibilities and Exploitation Headaches
To move coal back to the forefront of energy produc-
tion and use, the Soviets must find and implement
technological solutions to two key problems:
? Low quality of the coal. Most of the USSR's coal
reserves are low in energy value, comprising lignites
(often with high moisture content) or subbituminous
coals with a high ash content. These coals require
unique approaches to mining, transportation, and
combustion.
? Distance. The major coal deposits that the Soviets
want to develop are thousands of kilometers from
the industries and population centers most in need
of the energy. Consequently, low-cost energy trans-
portation is essential to the viability of any coal-
development scheme.
There are a number of technology options Moscow
can employ, singly or in combination, at each of the
key coal basins. These include new approaches to
problems in coal mining and transportation, coal
combustion, and synthetic fuel (synfuel). We project,
however, that the Soviets will continue to concentrate
their efforts on a few technologies (some requiring
purchases from the West) and to apply a relatively
narrow selection of technologies at each coal basin
they want to expand. The chief advantage of this
strategy is to concentrate resources on the earliest
possible commercialization of a technology. But there
are two major drawbacks to the narrow focus of coal
technology development-increased risk that an inap-
propriate technology will be pushed for too long or
that a superior technology will not be given a chance.
Current Soviet planning for coal technologies calls for
widespread use of bucket-wheel excavators for high-
volume surface mining; application of coal-slurry
pipelines only to the transportation of the relatively
high-grade Kuznetsk coal; extensive use of mammoth,
mine-mouth power plants with ultra-high-voltage
(UHV) electricity transmission from the Ekibastuz
and Kansk-Achinsk power plants to distant consum-
ers; and exploitation of the synfuel alternative only at
When Consumption Becomes
a Production Constraint
Initial capacity for producing 4.5 million tons of
coal [at a mine in the Kansk-Achinsk basin] was
slated for coming on line this year and was timed to
coincide with the startup of the first 800-MW unit
of the power plant. This linkage has become a
stumblingblock to mine construction. Assembly of
the boiler still has not begun and will require about
20 months to complete.... The gigantic
coal-mining machine will inevitably be idled.
Kansk-Achinsk. Appendix A summarizes these tech-
nology options and indicates the status of each tech-
nology both in the USSR and in the West.
Development plans for each of the three key eastern
basins call for a rapid expansion of production
through the use of mining equipment that can effi-
ciently move large quantities of coal and equally large
volumes of the earth and rock overburden that covers
coal seams. This equipment often needs major adapta-
tions to local mine conditions and, moreover, requires
careful maintenance. The Soviets have not been able
to meet these requirements efficiently, and key equip-
ment regularly operates at less than 30 percent of its
intended capacity. For example, a crew leader at a
mine in the Kuznetsk basin has reported that nearly
every piece of mining equipment arriving from the
manufacturing plant requires major adjustments be-
fore operation.
Mining more coal is only part of the problem. Coal
production from Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk is
being constrained by the failure to bring the accompa-
nying power plants on line as scheduled. In both
basins, mines were developed as suppliers for mam-
moth power complexes of 4,000 to 6,400 megawatts
(MW) capacity to be linked, in turn, to distant
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demand centers via UHV transmission lines. How-
ever, power industry managers have failed-in part
because of the very low quality of the coal being
supplied-to move these coal-use technologies from
design concepts through the various stages of develop-
ment necessary for commercial application. Soviet
UHV technology is also years behind schedule. If the
USSR is to meet the presently postulated goals for
energy production from surface-mined coal, the power
industry must put these systems into commercial
operation during the 1980s and 1990s, largely without
adequate testing for working out the bugs and improv-
ing the designs.
Kuznetsk Coal: Good Quality But Poor Location
The coal output of the Kuznetsk basin has leveled off
in recent years, and we do not foresee a substantial
increase in coal production there before 1990 (see
appendix B). Press reports indicate that, because of
inadequate investment for modernizing old mines and
opening new underground mines at Kuznetsk, it will
be difficult-despite the development of new surface
mines-to raise the basin's annual production from
about 145 million tons in 1984 to 160 million tons by
1990.
After 1990, however, Kuznetsk output may increase
quickly if the Soviets continue to develop surface-
mining operations and can provide adequate transpor-
tation facilities. To prevent transportation bottle-
necks, they might resort to high-capacity, long-
distance coal-slurry pipelines. The Soviets have little
experience in building and operating coal-slurry pipe-
lines, however, and probably could not successfully
complete the pilot pipeline currently under construc-
tion without substantial Western assistance.' Western
assistance for this 250-km, $150 million pipeline may
be a precursor of sales to support a much larger
project in the late 1980s and early 1990s-a
3,000-km, $1-2 billion pipeline.
I The 70-percent-coal water-based slurry technology being sought
by the USSR requires that the coal have low ash and low inherent
moisture. We believe that this makes Kansk-Achinsk (about 40
percent inherent moisture) and Ekibastuz coals (40 percent or more
ash) unlikely candidates for a pipeline system to supply slurry for
direct burning. It may be possible, however, to use methanol rather
than water as a slurry medium for high-ash and high-moisture
coals. Soviet production of methanol is currently about 2 million
tons per year-far short of the 12-15 million tons of methanol that
Ekibastuz Coal: More Rock Than Coal?
Although Ekibastuz development is the furthest along
of the current major Soviet coal projects, it is well
behind plans (see appendix C). The long-term pros-
pects for this basin will improve considerably when
Western-manufactured coal-blending plants-pur-
chased in 1984-are put on stream and when Soviet
power-plant researchers create improved boiler de-
signs to cope with the high ash content (40 to 60
percent) of the coal. These improvements to coal
usage are, however, unlikely to make a full impact
until the 1990s.
For the foreseeable future, Ekibastuz coal output will
be closely tied to the fuel requirements of the large
power plants being built near the mines. Power-plant
constructors are now adding one 500-MW steam
turbine per year at these plants, only half the planned
rate of expansion. At this rate of construction, coal
usage can expand only 2 million tons per year. The
Soviets could more than double growth of demand for
Ekibastuz coal by the mid-1990s if they can install
technologies to simplify use of high-ash coal. The
1,150-kilovolt (kV) alternating current powerlines
nearing completion-one to the Urals and another to
the Kansk-Achinsk basin to provide electric power for
the mines and power plants under construction-will
probably provide enough capacity to accommodate
expanded electricity output from mine-mouth power
plants through the mid-1990s. After that time, howev-
er, expansion of the Ekibastuz complex will be con-
strained unless the 1,500-kV direct-current powerline
to the European USSR is operational (appendix E
discusses UHV technology in more detail). The Sovi-
ets are likely to turn to Western suppliers for some of
the components on this powerline.
Kansk-Achinsk Coal: Forty Percent Water
We believe development of the Kansk-Achinsk basin
will proceed at a much slower pace and on a much
smaller scale than originally planned (see appendix
D). The Soviets have made little progress to date in
developing 500-800-MW boiler technology to use
Kansk-Achinsk's high-moisture coal. They originally
planned to build eight to 10 large mine-mouth power
plants at Kansk-Achinsk. Recent press reports
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indicate current plans to build only two to three
plants. Because shipment of large volumes of Kansk-
Achinsk coal to the Urals and farther west is uneco-
nomical, development of the basin is necessarily tied
to the building of these large power plants and to
successful application of UHV technology for trans-
mission of the generated power.
Soviet efforts to develop synfuel technology are simi-
larly proceeding at a slow pace. Although the Soviets
have recently completed a 5-ton-per-day (coal input)
liquefaction pilot plant, the technology must still be
proved and scaled up to a commercial level.' Given
Soviet difficulties in developing some secondary oil-
refining processes-common in the West and less
sophisticated than the coal-conversion process-we
believe that the liquefaction program will progress
slowly at best. The Long-Term Energy Program,
however, indicates plans to liquefy Kansk-Achinsk
coal commercially on a large scale during the 1990s.
If the Soviets fail to develop coal-conversion technol-
ogy, output of the basin will probably be constrained
by low demand and reach about 100 million tons
rather than the planned 200 million tons in 2000.
In addition to the technological obstacles, the need for
immediate response to the decline in oil output will
further constrain Moscow's latitude in dealing with
coal development. Because there is no substitute for
oil in many critical uses, Gorbachev's energy policy
will need to ensure adequate oil supplies before it can
focus on the longer term role of coal.' We estimate,
for example, that, to keep oil output from falling
below about 11 million barrels per day by 1990,
investment in the oil industry during 1986-90 would
Successful operation of a pilot plant does not guarantee that the
process will work. Bugs encountered in scaling up the design have to
be eliminated, adjustments made, and downtimes shortened; in
general, the entire process has to be better understood and made
more predictable.
' The substitution of other fuels-specifically coal and gas for oil-
can be readily undertaken at boilers and furnaces where the
primary intent is to generate heat. For many critical products, such
as fuels, lubricants, synthetic rubber, and plastics, however, there
are few acceptable substitutes for petroleum products derived from
doubling the 1981-85 spending.
Prospective Investment Requirements
for Coal-Based Energy
Annual investment in the coal and electric power
industries would have to increase by more than 50
percent from the present level if Moscow tries to
implement its plans for coal development. We esti-
mate that investment for open-pit coal mines, mine-
mouth power plants, UHV powerlines, and a commer-
cial synfuel industry will require a total of about 50
billion rubles by the year 2000.5 This estimate is based
opment. This investment, which is equivalent to about
3.3 billion rubles per year for the balance of the
century, is about three times the current investment
rate for these projects.
Vigorous implementation of the eastern coal projects
essentially provides the only way to achieve long-term
goals for production of coal-based energy (see inset).
This course of action would result in drastic changes
in the pattern of investment allocation within the coal
and electric power industries. The Soviets currently
invest about 2.5 billion rubles a year in the coal
industry.
one-fifth of this spending is now going to the coal
basins selected for expansion. The electric power
industry is probably spending an even smaller share of
its 4.5-billion-ruble annual investment on projects
linked to eastern coal, because the bulk of its opera-
tions lies west of the Urals, particularly the expensive
commitment to nuclear power.
The largest share of new investment in coal, 27 billion
rubles, will be needed to launch a synfuel industry
based on Kansk-Achinsk coal. Investment of this
amount would probably permit the Soviets annually to
mine an additional 50 million tons of Kansk-Achinsk
coal and process it into 10 million tons of synthetic
` The 50 billion rubles is our estimate of needed new spending
during 1985-2000 to implement coal expansion. This projection
represents the sum of separate investment estimates for the planned
development at Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz, Kansk-Achinsk, and at small-
25X1
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Improvement on the Cheap?
Gorbachev is advocating managerial reforms in Sovi-
et industry to boost productivity and cut costs with-
out adding to investment outlays. Coal development
could benefit from this approach to some degree but,
in our view, the key bottlenecks to coal expansion will
not yield to a reform movement. Managerial tinker-
ing with incentives, worker training, and maintenance
programs could result in better utilization of mining
equipment and may result in delivery of cleaner coal.
Incentives for rail workers, upgraded on/off loading
facilities, and enforcement of penalties for freight
mishandling might increase the efficiency of coal
transport by rail. Nevertheless, the major constraints
to the coal program are in the coal-use and energy-
transfer categories. The Soviets need better boiler
designs, more efficient coal use, and smoothly func-
tioning UHV systems-none of which will come
easily or cheaply. These improvements will require
carefully planned and well-executed research and
development (probably involving Western technology)
and sizable capital outlays.
liquids. Another 17 billion rubles will be required to
implement plans for construction of mines and elec-
tricity production and transmission facilities at
Ekibastuz, Kansk-Achinsk, and Kuznetsk. About 3
billion rubles will be needed to put new mines into
operation at the smaller coal projects scheduled for
the Soviet Far East.6
' The 27-billion-ruble synfuel investment equates to: I billion rubles
in scale-up research for commercial-plant technology, I billion
rubles in coal-mining infrastructure to produce 50 million tons of
coal, and 25 billion rubles in synfuel plant and equipment that
could process 50 million tons of coal into 10 million tons of synfuel
products.
We estimate that 17 billion rubles will be needed during 1986-
2000 to realize plans for Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz, and Kansk-Achinsk.
According to Soviet technical journals, only 3 billion rubles of the
3,000 km long) will cost nearly 2.8 billion rubles; Ekibastuz mines,
power plants, and UHV lines will require 10 billion rubles invest-
ment; and Kansk-Achinsk mines, power plants, and UHV lines are
targeted for 7.2 billion rubles of spending.
Soviet long-range planning also envisions dozens of smaller
projects contributing to coal development-South Yakutsk, for
example. Investment at these smaller deposits will probably total 4
billion rubles by the year 2000. Over I billion rubles has already
been spent, most of this at the Neryungri Mine in the South
Another perspective on investment requirements for
coal expansion is their size relative to overall energy
investment. During 1981-85, Moscow will probably
have invested some 140 billion rubles in energy. The
nearly 50 billion rubles of new investment that we
project for eastern coal projects represents a substan-
tial increase in total energy investment, even though
this spending is likely to be stretched over the next
three five-year plans.
Competition With Other Energy Programs
for Scarce Investment Resources
To be successful during the remainder of the 1980s
and into the 1990s, the strategy of coal resurgence
must not only incorporate new technologies but also
compete with natural gas and nuclear energy in terms
of reliability and economy. The competition for in-
vestment resources will be keen as Moscow pursues
costly projects in the oil and gas sector: offshore oil
development in the Caspian and Barents Seas; sour
gas development at Astrakhan' and Karachaganak;
and development of West Siberian gasfields that are
located north of Urengoy in more hostile environ-
ments.
The Long-Term Energy Program recognizes this com-
petition in its schedule for the development of energy
sources. Natural gas has been endorsed as the fuel
that is to provide growth in total energy at least
through the mid-1990s, when gas output is expected
to level off. Coal and, to a lesser extent, nuclear power
are scheduled to meet the subsequent growth of total
energy demand in the economy, eventually surpassing
the contribution of natural gas.
Of the three major energy sources, coal is clearly the
laggard. Natural gas output is growing robustly, and
the Soviets are mustering resources to convert facili-
ties from oil and coal fuels to gas so that industrial
growth can be maintained. Electricity output at nucle-
ar plants has increased at an average annual rate of
over 20 percent since 1979, even though nuclear
energy expansion continues to be hampered by bottle-
necks in construction and component manufacturing
(see inset).
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The performance of the Soviet nuclear industry mer-
its a mixed review. While the USSR has achieved
greater success than many other countries in expand-
ing the nuclear contribution to electricity supply, the
Soviets are well behind their goals for construction
and power production at nuclear plants. During
1981-85, 15 of 22 planned reactors were put on line;
generating capacity increased by 13,820 megawatts
instead of the plan minimum of 21,320 megawatts.
Nevertheless, power output at nuclear plants has
grown from 58 billion kilowatt-hours in 1979 to 142
billion in 1984. By June 1985, the Soviets had 14
nuclear power plants (38 reactors) on line with a total
capacity of 25,312 megawatts. The current output
from these plants accounts for about 11 percent of the
USSR's electricity generation.
The key elements limiting the Soviet nuclear pro-
gram are shortfalls in component fabrication and
construction bottlenecks. The showcase component
manufacturing plant, Atommash, has failed to meet
its production goal of eight reactor systems per year;
annual output is two systems, at best. The component
manufacturing slippages have contributed to the con-
struction delays plaguing the USSR's nuclear pro-
gram. Although the Soviets recently built a nuclear
power plant and put its first reactor on line in five
years, most reactors take eight to 11 years to com-
plete.
Coal still retains some advantages over gas and
nuclear power in Soviet long-range energy policy. If
Moscow should attempt to back away from coal and
look to either gas or nuclear energy as the main long-
term supplier, a major reorganization would be need-
ed. The gas industry (both producers and pipeline
layers) would need to step up its already high-gear
operations. The current strategy of intensively devel-
oping a single gasfield so as to reach peak output
within five years after development begins would
probably be pushed aside in favor of even more rapid
expansion. This acceleration of gas development
would risk repeating the mistakes of the oil industry,
where too-rapid reserve depletion meant that ultimate
The Soviet nuclear industry is even less prepared than
the gas industry to replace coal as a long-term energy
supplier. The nuclear industry's infrastructure was set
up in the early 1970s to provide for growth in
electricity demand only in the European USSR, and it
has yet to meet these plans. Nuclear power could not
be substituted for coal east of the Urals without
sizable, costly additions to component-manufacturing
capacity, major redesign work, and massive training
of new construction and operations personnel.
Gorbachev has left some room for accelerated coal
development in his economic agenda. Coal develop-
ment may benefit from his call for modernization in
machine building, a shift in emphasis from production
volume to better quality, and the push for technical
progress in Soviet industry. Coal development stands
to gain from a large increase in machine-building
investment and the focus on technical progress, be-
cause open-pit coal mining and electricity generation
and transmission are equipment-intensive operations.
Similarly, a drive to improve product quality could
help the coal industry mobilize resources for cleaning
and upgrading more coal.
At the same time, Gorbachev has also pressed for
changes that could rule out a timely coal resurgence.
Prospects for growth of coal output probably will dim
if Gorbachev pushes energy conservation at the ex-
pense of production, if some coal development projects
are mothballed as Gorbachev has threatened to do
with assets "frozen in Siberia," and if the campaign to
retool existing enterprises draws resources from the
eastern USSR back into the western industrial heart-
land. Although eastern coal projects are not currently
victimized by these proposals, they certainly are at
risk.
Backing for investment allocations that would enable
coal to become the prime Soviet energy source some-
time after the mid-1990s will be hindered by coal's
reputation for unreliability. During 1981-85, declin-
ing coal quality caused major problems for the electric
power and metallurgical industries, the main coal
recovery was sacrificed to boost current output.
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users. Many power plants had to supplement coal
firing with oil or natural gas (or substitute these for
coal entirely), because the energy value of the coal
being supplied to them had dropped. At a large
number of power plants, the poor coal quality caused
breakdowns of key equipment, forcing the plants to
shut down for repairs. In the metallurgical industries,
steel production was particularly hard hit by coal
shortfalls and quality deterioration. Backers of the
coal strategy can argue that new technology in mine-
mouth power plants and, eventually, synfuel develop-
ment will improve the quality of energy derived from
coal. The promised improvements lie in the future,
however, while the reliability of natural gas and
electricity from nuclear power plants is a present and
continuing reality.
The competition among energy suppliers for new
resources is likely to reach an important turning point
by 1990. At this juncture, Soviet energy policy mak-
ers will need to make critical resource commitments
among the coal, natural gas, and nuclear options that
will largely determine the shape of the USSR's energy
supply after 2000. The leadtimes for major project
completion in all the energy industries dictate that
large new programs be started 10 to 15 years in
advance of needs. The remainder of the 1980s will
therefore be a trial period for eastern coal develop-
ment, a time when schemes for large-scale surface
mining and mine-mouth power generation must prove
themselves viable or risk losing out in the bidding for
resources.
Moscow could put the coal industry in a substantially
better position to achieve growth if it were willing to
boost the resources going to coal projects. We have
estimated the likely range of coal output in the next
two decades by considering the two basic policy
choices: favoring coal expansion or forgoing coal
expansion (see table). In the first case, we projected
that Moscow would favor coal expansion by:
? Actively acquiring Western assistance in most of the
key technologies: coal combustion, UHV transmis-
sion, slurry transportation, and synfuels (see inset).
Table 1
USSR: Coal Output Projections,
1985-2000
Million metric tons
of raw coal a
78
49
Moscow favors coal
expansion
Underground mines
411
375
340
305
Surface mines
310
340
420
500
54
62
80
100
76
86
105
130
Kansk-Achinsk
41
Moscow forgoes coal
expansion a
Total
721
700
705
705
Underground mines
411
375
340
305
Surface mines
310
325
365
400
Of which:
Kuznetsk
54
60
67
72
Ekibastuz
76
86
96
106
Kansk-Achinsk
41
48
54
60
a Gross output of run-of-the-mine coal.
b Based on Soviet Long-Term Energy Program
Indicates likely outcome if Moscow makes a substantial resource
commitment to coal projects and resolves technical problems.
a Indicates likely outcome if Moscow continues to hold back on
resource increases to coal projects.
? Substantially increasing investment allocations to
the coal projects.
If goals to expand coal output are pursued aggressive-
ly, production at surface mines could be increased by
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A Role for Western Technology?
If the USSR decides to make the commitment neces-
sary to expand coal output, we believe that Western
equipment and technology will play a growing role in
the effort and could become major factors affecting
the speed and magnitude of Soviet coal development.
The inadequacy and slow development of the USSR's
coal technology and equipment have been increasing-
ly criticized by Soviet energy experts in press and
industry journals. Some of these specialists have
gone further and noted that Western approaches to
the commercialization of coal technology, such as
coal liquefaction, are superior to those of the USSR.
Western coal expertise could be employed in four
areas: mining, transportation, combustion, and coal
liquefaction. Currently, the Soviets are making only
limited use of Western mining equipment and are
negotiating for a small-scale application of slurry
transportation technology. In the key technologies of
UHV electricity transmission (energy transportation)
and coal combustion, Moscow thus far has relied on
domestic capabilities.
The best Western source of UHV technology is the
Swedish firm ASEA (see appendix E). Swedish exper-
tise, particularly in the critical area of component
manufacture, has been incorporated in half of the
direct-current UHV transmission lines in operation
worldwide. Many other Western countries have dem-
onstrated technical competence in selected aspects of
UHV transmission, but ASEA is clearly the world
leader.
=ASEA to be at least five years ahead of US
manufacturers. If the Soviets turn to Western suppli-
ers for much of their UHV technology needs, pur-
chases could amount to several hundred million
dollars by the 1990s.
Moscow is beginning to purchase the coal-slurry
technology that it hopes will ease the long-distance
transportation burden and may even simplify coal
combustion. Consortiums that include firms from the
major West European countries, Japan, and the
United States are biddingfor initial contracts worth
$100-200 million. An Italian firm will be supplying
most of the process technology and engineering ser-
vices. If this technology proves viable in the USSR,
follow-on sales of components for high-volume slurry
lines could range up to $2 billion. Among the possi-
bilities discussed by Soviet slurry specialists are
export pipeline projects based on the use of compen-
sation deals to facilitate technology purchases. Al-
though such lines would not be feasible until the
1990s, they probably will be advanced by Moscow in
negotiations for coal-slurry technology.
800 million tons by the end of the century.
The USSR's coal output would stagnate at the cur-
rent level of about 700 million tons if Moscow were to
forgo coal expansion and favor other energy sources.
In this case foreign technology would still be impor-
tant to the solution of some problems (such as slurry
transportation of Kuznetsk coal), but application of
Western know-how to the full range of technological
constraints would be unnecessary.
Indications that Gorbachev has decided on and gained
consensus for a substantial resource commitment to
eastern coal could include:
? A 1986-90 economic plan that favors coal over oil
and gas in terms of increased investments.
? Negotiations in earnest with Western firms on
technologies for coal combustion, transportation,
and synfuels.
? Identification of coal development as a beneficiary of
the upcoming industrial modernization drive.
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Because of coal's enormous reserve base and because
of dwindling reserves of oil and eventually even of gas,
we judge that the USSR will continue to emphasize
coal in its long-term energy plans but will probably
not devote the resources needed in the short term to
get the coal industry moving again. The immediate
needs of the oil and gas industries and plans to
modernize the machine-building sector during 1986-
90 will require substantial investment. The nature of
the bottlenecks holding down coal production will not
yield to easy, short-term solutions. Eliminating the
bottlenecks and moving coal to a fast track will
require long leadtimes and large investment up front.
If Gorbachev ignores the needs of the coal industry in
the short term, coal production will likely continue to
stagnate (or increase only slightly during 1986-90)
and the coal industry will probably not be ready to
provide nearly all of the growth in energy production
after 1995.
Less-than-planned growth in coal output during 1985-
2000, which seems likely, would adversely affect the
Soviet economy in the following ways:
? Stagnant coal output would upset an already tight
balance between supply and demand for electric
power in the Urals and Kazakhstan. An increase in
the frequency and duration of power shortages
(brownouts and blackouts) during the 1990s would
probably have adverse consequences for the output
of key metallurgical, defense production, and agri-
cultural facilities in these areas.
? Many power plants burning coal as their primary
fuel would have to continue using more fuel oil than
planned because of low coal quality and coal short-
ages. This situation would hamstring Soviet efforts
to free up additional oil for alternative uses-an
important consideration in view of declining oil
output.
? Shortages of coking coal would continue to hold
down steel production, adversely affecting Gorba-
chev's economic modernization program.'
? If the Soviets decide to accelerate development of
natural resources (iron ore, copper, phosphate, tim-
ber) along the Baikal-Amur Mainline railroad
(BAM), inadequate electric power supplies would
curtail the pace of exploitation during the latter
1990s-particularly for the more power-intensive
industries.
' The Soviets, however, could turn to the West for solutions to the
coking coal crunch. Imported state-of-the-art steel production
technologies that do not require coking coal or imports of coking
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Appendix A
Technology Options for
Soviet Coal Development
Status of Soviet and
Western Technology
High-volume Nominally all coals,
surface-mining but geology of cer-
equipment tain basins limits ef-
fectiveness.
Coal-slurry pipe- Transportation of
lines good-quality coal,
such as Kuznetsk.
Coal-methanol- Transportation of all
slurry pipelines coals.
Exotic pipelines: Transportation of all
carbon dioxide coals.
slurry, pneumatic
capsule
UHV electricity Large power trans-
transmission at fers over mediuim-
1,150 kV AC to-long distances
(4,000 MV up to
1,500 km) from
mine-mouth power
plants in Ekibastuz.
Least costly approach to
large-scale production.
Lowers transportation costs,
eases rail bottlenecks. Ad-
vanced slurry combustion
technology could improve
boiler operations.
Potential advantages over
water slurry: low-tempera-
ture operation, increased en-
ergy value of coal, methanol
medium valuable for subse-
quent uses. Particularly
good for lignite transport.
Reduces or eliminates prob-
lems of slurry-medium dis-
posal. Could work well for
lignite coal or for arid parts
of Kazakhstan (Ekibastuz)
where water slurries are
ruled out.
Lowers cost, cuts losses on
long-distance transmission.
Can improve quality of elec-
tricity supply to users.
Capital-intensive; demands Technology is not very
superior mine planning, im- sophisticated, but Soviets
plementation, and mainte- must import large volume of
nance to maximize equip- equipment from East
ment utilization. Germany.
Present technologies cannot Soviet technology at low lev-
handle low-quality coals el, especially for direct-
such as those of Ekibastuz burning systems. In West,
and Kansk-Achinsk. technology for 50-percent
slurry system proven com-
mercially; 70-percent (di-
rect-burning) slurry system
developed but untested on a
commercial scale.
Sizable investment in devel- Major engineering hurdles
opment and facilities con- in dealing with corrosive ef-
struction, including large in- fects of methanol and with
crease in methanol output. properties of coal-methanol
slurries in transportation,
storage, and combustion
must still be resolved. Little
worldwide experience. Pos-
sibility of synthesizing
methanol from coal (late
1990s at the earliest).
Will require a sizable re- Soviets have done only lab
search effort, large invest- tests. A US firm is market-
ments. Major technical hur- ing a carbon dioxide slurry
dles. technology for use by 1990.
Requires electrical compo- No field experience in
nents of superior quality and USSR or in other countries.
often of new design. Soviets will probably com-
plete construction of a
1,150-kV AC line by 1990.
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Technology Options for
Soviet Coal Development (continued)
UHV electricity Large power trans-
transmission at fers over long dis-
1,500 kV DC tances (6,000 MW
up to 2,500 km).
Generation at mine-
mouth power plants
in Ekibastuz, Kansk-
Achinsk.
UHV electricity Large power trans-
transmission fers from central Si-
above 2,000 kV beria to European
USSR (1,000 MW
up to 5,000 km).
Coal and oil mix- Combustion of all
tures used as coals.
boiler fuel
Coal blending/ Processing of all
cleaning plants coals.
Coal use in Combustion of all
small-to- coals.
medium-size
power plant boil-
ers (up to 500
MW)
Fluidized-bed Most coal-fueled
combustion boilers.
Magnetohydro- Potential for major
dynamics, coal efficiency gains in
fueled coal combustion.
Lowers cost, cuts losses on
long-distance transmission,
even when compared to
UHV-AC systems. Can im-
prove quality of electricity.
Could be used to directly
link the major demand cen-
ters in European USSR
with mine-mouth power
plants in Siberia.
Simplifies use of poor-quali-
ty coals. Cuts potential oil
use by 40 to 50 percent.
Reduces share of noncom-
bustibles, pollutants, im-
proves efficiency of coal us-
age.
Combustion systems "more
forgiving" of poor-quality
coals. Smaller initial invest-
ment, shorter construction
times.
Increase fuel-use efficiency,
flexibility to burn coals of
varying quality, reduced
emissions, a solid waste that
is easier to dispose of and
potentially lower plant in-
vestment.
Applications for power
plants could provide lower
cost electricity with reduced
environmental impact.
Major investment required.
High-technology electrical
components needed. Costly
transformer stations pre-
clude servicing multiple de-
mand centers.
Very substantial investment
in R&D and test facilities
required.
Although this technology
sharply cuts growth in oil
use, oil consumption will
still increase. Adds to fuel
supply complexities.
Boosts cost of coal. Limited
application to high-ash or
lignite coals, such as Eki-
bastuz or Kansk-Achinsk.
If widely applied because of
poor economies of scale, to-
tal investment is likely to be
greater than with large
plants. Currently not receiv-
ing backing by power plant
design bureaus or Gosplan
energy experts.
Must compete with proven
conventional boiler technol-
ogy. Requires development
of support industries to sup-
ply "bed" materials.
Very substantial investment
in R&D and test facilities
required.
Status of Soviet and
Western Technology
Soviet construction of a
1,500-kV AC line was halt-
ed in 1982. Some reports
that construction may re-
sume. Swedish expertise,
particularly in the critical
UHV-DC thyristor technol-
ogy, is the world's best.
Research only just started
on the necessary compo-
nents. A major investment
commitment.
Technology currently
available.
Technology not very compli-
cated, but Soviets apparent-
ly must import Western
plants for high-quality
equipment.
Technology currently
available.
Soviets have done little re-
search. Western develop-
ment has yielded workable
small-to-medium size appli-
cation but is stalled in the
scale-up to power plant boil-
er size.
Coal pyrolysis Lignite coals, such as
yielding synethtic Kansk-Achinsk.
liquids and semi-
coke.
The semicoke product can
be transported easily.
Required breakthroughs in
high-technology work on
plasmas, high-temperature
metallurgy, cryogenics.
The pyrolysis process has
low liquid yield; semicoke
has poor combustion char-
acteristics, high nitrogen
(pollutant), and cannot be
used as a substitute for met-
allurgical coal.
Soviets currently operating
commercial demonstration
plant. Western technology
based on pyrolysis of many
different inputs (coal, oil,
shale, tar sands) widely
available.
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(continued)
Thermocoal Lignite coals with
high moisture con-
tent.
Direct liquefac- Processes work best
tion of coal with good-quality
coal, but most coals
could eventually be
used. Soviet effort
directed primarily at
Kansk-Achinsk ba-
sin.
Nearly doubles heating val-
ue, from 3,500 to 6,400 kilo-
calories per kilogram.
The product, a synthetic gas
of low-to-medium energy
value, can be used directly
in boilers or as a feedstock
for further processing into
petrochemicals.
Can yield a variety of valu-
able synthetic liquid, petro-
leum, and petrochemical
products for domestic use or
for export.
Thermocoal must be
transported in semiclosed
railroad cars and covered
with an oil-based emulsion.
Railroad transport of large
volume of solid product still
required.
Competes with the much
lower cost natural gas. Ex-
isting processes work poorly
with low-quality coals.
Investment is the largest
constraint-about 5 billion
rubles for a facility to pro-
cess 3 million tons per year
of synthetic liquids. A major
commitment in research re-
sources, particularly top en-
gineering personnel, is need-
ed.
Status of Soviet and
Western Technology
Soviets probably operating
small pilot plant. Press re-
ports indicate that designs
have been completed for
100- to 300-ton-per-day
facilities.
Soviet technology at the
R&D stage. No known Sovi-
et facility. Western technol-
ogy proven at commercial-
demonstration plants (200 to
600 tons per day of coal
input).
Soviet technology at low
level. Inefficient, 5-ton-per-
day plant started operating
in 1984. Western technol-
ogy proven at commercial-
demonstration plants (200 to
600 tons per day).
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Appendix B
Increased output from the Kuznetsk coal basin proba-
bly will be necessary to offset production declines at
several coal basins in the European USSR. Kuznetsk
coal will be particularly important as a replacement
for coal from the Donets basin, the principal producer
of Soviet high-grade steam and coking coal. Accord-
ing to Soviet press reports, the Kuznetsk coal basin
already provides about one-third of the coking coal
produced in the USSR. The Soviet media repeatedly
emphasize that more Kuznetsk coking coal needs to
be delivered to the Ukraine and Moscow regions.
Kuznetsk coal would also be an acceptable substitute
for Donets steam coal: it has a relatively high heating
value of about 5,500 kilocalories per kilogram
(kcal/kg), a low sulfur content (about 0.5 percent), and
a low ash content (15 to 20 percent).
in the basin. Soviet press reports
11indicate that the Bachatskiy surface mine is being
expanded and two new surface mines-Talda and
Urop-Karakhan-are being developed. The Soviets
estimate ultimate annual potential output from these
mines at about 120 million tons of coal per year.
We believe, however, that inadequate railroad capaci-
ty will be a major obstacle to expanded production at
the Kuznetsk basin during the late 1980s and 1990s.
A Soviet technical journal recently indicated that the
"realization of increased output from the Kuznetsk
basin is closely connected with a resolution of the
transport problem." A 1983 Soviet press report also
complained that an imbalance between coal produc-
tion and available transportation was constraining
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The Kuznetsk coal basin has the reserve base to
sustain increased production over the long term.
Soviet technical journals report that the basin has
over 117 billion tons of economically exploitable
reserves. Moreover, the reserve base for strip-mining
operations is reportedly adequate to support produc-
tion at the target rate for at least 70 years. Operation
of surface mines is much more productive and less
labor intensive than underground mining.
Despite the relatively high quality and vast abun-
dance of Kuznetsk coal and the reported emphasis on
using it to offset declines in the availability of Donets
coal, output in the Kuznetsk basin has been lagging
since 1975. After reaching 149 million tons a year in
1979, output fell to 144 million tons in 1981 and then
rose slightly to an estimated 147 million tons in 1983.
We attribute sluggish production at Kuznetsk primar-
ily to labor shortages, delays in the commissioning of
new mines, and transportation bottlenecks.
Press reports indicate that in 1982 the Soviets-
concerned over production shortfalls-advanced the
timetable for the startup of construction of new mines
coal production in the Siberian coal basins.
Of the three major railroads that run from the
Kuznetsk basin to the Ural region and to the central
portion of the European USSR, only two-the Trans-
Siberian and South Siberian Railroads-are used for
hauling coal. The Central Siberian Railroad was built
for haulage of agricultural products and lacks the
necessary heavy-duty track and roadbed required for
coal transport. A recent Soviet technical journal
reports that increased production at Kuznetsk will
require either the construction of special railroads for
coal haulage or "reconstruction" of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad. (Some segments of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad are presently in need of major
repair.) Moreover, increasing the frequency of trains
and running longer unit trains with heavier loads
would also require replacing the 65-kg/m (131 lb/yd)
rail with 75-kg/m (151 lb/yd) rail.
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Even if track is improved, the capacity available for
transshipment of coal on the Trans-Siberian Railroad
could decline because of competition for transporta-
tion services as new industries are established farther
to the east near the BAM. The Trans-Siberian Rail-
road is the only heavy-duty railroad providing a direct
connection between the BAM and the central regions
of the USSR. Although resource development will
probably be slow, Moscow has indicated a willingness
to push forward with development of timber, iron ore,
phosphate, copper, and asbestos deposits in the re-
gions flanking the BAM.
A Place for Coal-Slurry Pipelines?
Coal-slurry pipelines are a practical alternative to
railroad bottlenecks. According to Soviet coal-indus-
try journals, the capital investment required for a
coal-slurry pipeline to transport coal from the Kuz-
netsk basin to the Urals would be only about 50
percent of that needed to finance construction of a
new railroad. In addition, Soviet estimates indicate
that operating costs for a 2,000-km, 25-million-ton-
per-year coal-slurry pipeline would be about 6 rubles
per ton compared with 10.5 rubles per ton for trans-
port of Kuznetsk coal by rail. Because most of the
coal-slurry pipeline system would be automated, its
operation would require only about 5 to 10 percent of
the personnel required for railroad operation and
maintenance. The use of slurry pipelines would also
substantially alleviate shortages of railcars for hauling
coal from other deposits and ease the strain on
railroad traffic capacity. Soviet press statements indi-
cate that the use of a coal-slurry pipeline to transport
3 million tons annually would supplant the daily
dispatch of two railroad unit trains of about 80
railcars each.
The Soviets face new technological challenges in the
construction and operation of long-distance, large-
capacity coal-slurry pipelines. Thus far they are only
operating two short (10 to 15 km) coal-slurry pipelines
in the Kuznetsk basin. One transports coal to a power
plant at Belovo and another to a metallurgical plant at
Kuznetskiy. For these pipelines, the coal-to-water
ratios are 1:7 and 1:12, respectively, and the "particle
size" for the coal is in the range of 50 to 100
millimeters (mm). For the long-distance, large-capaci-
ty pipelines, in contrast, the particle size of the coal
must be very small-well below 1 mm-and the
concentration of solids in the slurry mixture is usually
50 percent or greater
During 1986-90, the USSR plans to build a 250-km,
3-million-ton-per-year coal-slurry pipeline-a proto-
type line with a coal-to-water ratio of 65 to 70
percent-from the Belovo mine in the Kuznetsk re-
gion to a power plant under construction at Novosi-
birs
Although the Soviets have been working on develop-
ing coal-slurry technology since 1978, they lack neces-
sary expertise and experience in all three major
aspects of systems that supply slurry for direct-
burning-creating, moving, and burning the coal
slurry. Direct-burning technology is state of the art,
and long-distance transport of a 70-percent slurry has
not been demonstrated anywhere on a commercial
scale (see table)
According to a Soviet technical journal, the Ministry
of Heavy Machinery is making only halfhearted
attempts to develop reciprocating, positive-displace-
ment pumps suitable for coal-slurry pipelines. More-
over, in 1984 the Ministry proposed serial production
of a coal-slurry pump despite testing results that
the USSR is probably not capable of building reliable
coal-slurry pumps with seals that can withstand the
abrasiveness of coal slurry over the long term. The
USSR is currently negotiating to obtain licenses for
the manufacture of coal-slurry pumps designed by
firms in West Germany and the Netherlands.
the USSR proba-
bly cannot manufacture ball mills capable of grinding
coal to the proper particle-size distribution!
" The operational parameters of the pipeline and pumps are based
on the flow characteristics of the slurry, which are ultimately
determined by the coal-to-water ratio and particle-size distribution.
A slurry pipeline operating in the United States was plugged twice
(in one case the length of the plug was about 12 meters) by a slurry
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We believe that substantial Western assistance will be
necessary for successful development of the pilot
project. In August, the USSR contracted the Italian
firm Snamprogetti SpA to provide process technology
and engineering services for creating the coal slurry
for the Belovo-Novosibirsk pipeline. Some press re-
ports indicate that a US firm has been contracted to
provide assistance in construction of the pipeline and
pump stations. We estimate that the value of the
equipment and technology orders to Western firms
annual cost for the chemical additives for the Belovo-
Novosibirsk coal-slurry pipeline would be about $20
million.
The cold winter temperatures in Siberia will have to
be taken into account but probably will not impede 25X1
will be about $100-200 million.
the USSR is also negotiating with West-
ern firms for the construction of a plant to produce
the required chemical additives.' If the Soviets were to
purchase the chemicals rather than build a plant, the
v Because 70-percent coal slurries travel at relatively slow speeds,
chemical additives although they account for only I percent of the
pipeline operation. A coal-slurry pipeline in the
United States operates regularly during the winter
with air temperatures often below zero degrees Fahr-
burying the pipe 2 meters will probably be 25X1
adequate protection against cold tem eratures and
freezing. prevention of 25X1
freezing could require special precautions at the
slurry-preparation facility, pumping stations, and 25X1
power plant-especially if a prolonged shutdown oc-
curs. 25X1
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Table 2
Conventional Versus Direct-Burning
Coal-Water Slurries
Conventional Direct-Burning
(50 percent coal) (70 percent coal)
Technology is proven on a Technology is unproven for long-
commercial scale. distance pipelines. Potential prob-
lems with settling of larger parti-
cles, degradation of the chemical
additive, and wear of burner
nozzles.
Capital cost is about the Capital cost is about the same as
same as for direct-burning for conventional system.
system.
Low operating cost. Operating costs are nearly twice as
high as for conventional system be-
cause of cost for chemical
additives.
Requires dewatering.
Little volume control.
Does not require dewatering.
Substantial volume control.
in a slump and coal-slurry pipeline technology is still
unproved on such a scale, we believe that the USSR
would not build these pipelines until the 1990s at the
earliest.
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Variations in terrain elevation should pose no major
obstacle to operation of the Belovo-Novosibirsk coal-
slurry pipeline. A profile of the route indicates that
the pipeline will traverse relatively flat terrain. Some
of the steepest gradients are about 2 degrees. In
contrast, the steepest gradient for a coal-slurry pipe-
line operating in the United States is about 18
degrees. The US pipeline traverses generally rough
terrain, some of which is mountainous.
The Soviet press has reported plans to build coal-
slurry pipelines with capacities of about 15-25 million
tons per year. Eventually, the Soviets probably hope
to use slurry lines to supply coal to a variety of
the USSR may build a coal-slurry
pipeline to the Black Sea and export the product to
Western Europe. The slurry would be shipped by
tanker almost like a liquid. Because energy prices are
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Appendix C
The Ekibastuz Coal Basin
The Soviets estimate that economically exploitable
coal reserves at Ekibastuz and the nearby Maykuben
deposits amount to about 15 billion tons, nearly 9
billion tons of which have been confirmed through
exploration. Given the ultimate annual output
planned for Ekibastuz-Maykuben-150-170 million
tons-the proven reserves would last for at least 50
years. Statements by coal industry officials indicate
that they do not expect Ekibastuz-Maykuben output
to reach this level until the mid-1990s at the earliest.
The success of the effort to double output in the
Ekibastuz region in the next decade would require
improvements in both the production and operation of
mining equipment and in combustion equipment.
Moscow plans to eliminate bottlenecks in the produc-
tion of surface-mining machinery when an equipment
plant in Krasnoyarsk comes on stream. At projected
capacity, this equipment manufacturing plant is sup-
posed to provide for the planned surface-mine expan-
sion at Ekibastuz and in Siberia. The Krasnoyarsk
plant, however, is just starting operation of the first of
many production lines. Imported equipment will con-
tinue to be necessary for mine operation, at least
through the 1980s. At present, for example, one-third
of Ekibastuz output depends on East German excava-
tors.
The Ekibastuz coal basin has two operating mines,
Bogatyr' and Severnyy. These mines produced about
50 million tons and 24 million tons of coal, respective-
ly, in 1984. Soviet plans for 1990 call for expansion at
Severnyy and construction of a new mine, Vostoch-
nyy. Ekibastuz coal output is to increase to 105-115
million tons annually when these plans are imple-
mented. overburden
removal was still at an early stage at Vostochnyy, and
the mine is several years from achieving initial pro-
duction goals.
Bogatyr'
In June 1983 imagery, we saw a 13-million-ton-per-
year East German bucket-wheel excavator being as-
sembled. According to the Soviet press, this excavator
will be the last one delivered to Bogatyr'. There are 11
similar excavators already in service.
the excavators were idle, apparently because of a lack
of railcars for loading. Railcar shortages are a con-
stant problem, according to press reports of com-
plaints by the crews operating the excavators.
The bottleneck in the rail transport of coal appears to
be in the failure to unload coal at its destination. 25X1
excessive numbers of fully load- 25X1
ed coq cars standing in the marshaling yards and at
the Ekibastuz Gres 1 power plant.'? According to the
Soviet press, power plants burning Ekibastuz coal
operate so erratically that they cannot use existing
allotments and frequently cancel or delay additional
orders. The coal, therefore, remains in the railcars,
backing up the rail system.
Severnyy
In June 1982 there were nine bucket-wheel excavators
at Severnyy; none were added in 1983. In their mining
journals, the Soviets have discussed a program to 25X1
modernize the Severnyy mine. This would probably
entail additional excavating equipment. In June 1983,
however, no new excavators were being assembled,
several bucket-wheel excavators were idle. Mining
activity at that time was limited to overburden remov-
al by power shovels he 25X1
producing area of this mine has changed little since
1978.
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Vostochnyy
This mine is the newest in the Ekibastuz basin and
apparently is still limited to small-scale coal produc-
tion. In early 1984 the Soviets reported that Vostoch-
nyy's first stage would produce 7.5 million tons in
1985 and that bucket-wheel excavators had begun to
arrive. however, no bucket-
wheel excavators were seen. Mining activity was
confined to a very small section of the coal seam
where five power shovels removed overburden.
Utilizing Ekibastuz Coal
The Soviets classify Ekibastuz coal as a high-ash,
subbituminous fuel. This coal is a problem fuel for
consumers: the ash content (noncombustible matter)
can range from 40 percent to nearly 60 percent, and
the energy value is only about 3,500 kcal/kg. The
marked contrast between the high ash content of
Ekibastuz coal delivered to power-plant customers
and the inherent ash content contained in the coal
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seams (averaging about 40 percent) suggests that
mining operations are slipshod or that mining tech-
niques are not sufficiently discriminating. The high
ash level is undesirable because it accelerates wear on
coal-handling equipment such as pulverizers, in-
creases the chance that equipment failure will force
power-plant boiler shutdown, and adds to the trans-
portation burden of railroads and conveyor systems.
The low heat content of Ekibastuz coal (about half
that of the highest quality Soviet coal) means that the
entire combustion system of the consuming plant
must be larger and more durable than a system of
equivalent capacity at a plant fueled with a better
coal. These requirements boost the investment cost for
new plants and lengthen their construction time.
Ekibastuz coal is used solely as a boiler fuel, primarily
in power plants. The Soviets plan to concentrate
Ekibastuz coal usage through the early I990s at five
4,000-MW power plants, four of which are being built
close to the mines. The fifth plant is sited in southern
Kazakhstan. The boilers at these plants are to be
specially configured to deal with the technical proper-
ties of Ekibastuz coal.
The first 4,000-MW power plant, Ekibastuz Gres 1
was finished during 1984
he construction sites of the other four
plants in the series shows that one plant located
adjacent to Gres 1 and the plant in southern Kazakh-
stan are still several years from the completion of
initial generating units and that work on the remain-
ing two plants has only just started. At the planned
operating rate, each of the five plants in the series
would use nearly 16 million tons of coal annually to
produce about 24 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity.
The actual output rate at Gres 1, however, is substan-
tially lower. Soviet press reports complained that units
at this plant have operated at only one-half to two-
thirds of capacity during the four years since the
initial 500-MW unit went on line.
major problems have
affected plant operations-four of the seven units
completed by that time were shut down.
23
Moscow is attempting to improve Ekibastuz power
plant performance through action on two fronts, coal
blending and boiler upgrading. Coal blending would
help operations by eliminating boiler breakdowns
caused by the arrival of exceptionally poor-quality
coal. Blending plants will mix better quality coal with
poorer quality coal to assure apredictable, albeit low-
quality, boiler fuel. 25X1
In the late I970s the Soviets tried to build a plant
(based on their own designs) to blend or clean Ekibas-
tuz coal. this plant was 25X1
abandoned before construction was completed. Mos-
cow now hopes that coal-blending plants from West
Germany and Italy will do the job. Two have already
been purchased, and eight are under negotiation. 25X1
Successful operation of these Western-manufactured
plants could sharply improve power plant perfor-
-
mance.
The boiler upgrading work is aimed at improving
equipment so that coal with an ash content of up to 51
percent can be handled without stoppages. This re-
search is, however, still at an early stage according to
a September 1984 article in a Soviet power-equipment 25X1
journal. Given the usual Soviet lags between research
and development and introduction on a commercial
scale, this new technology may not be available until
the mid-1990s. It is likely, therefore, that the new
technology will not be available until the third or
fourth Ekibastuz Gres power plant is built. Alterna-
tively, the Soviets may elect to delay construction of
the latter two power stations until they have a boiler
technology appropriately matched to the coal being
delivered.
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Appendix D
The Kansk-Achinsk Coal Basin
Kansk-Achinsk is the largest coal basin in the Soviet
Union. According to Soviet coal-industry journals, the
basin contains about 600 billion tons of lignite, of
which 140 billion tons are stated to be recoverable by
surface-mining methods. Because of the basin's enor-
mous reserve base, Soviet energy planners have con-
sidered it a major potential source for electric power
to the western regions of the USSR.
The high moisture content of Kansk-Achinsk coal
(about 40 percent), low heating value (3,300 kcal/kg),
and variable physical and chemical characteristics,
however, make its direct shipment by railroad to
power plants in the western USSR uneconomical.
Kansk-Achinsk coal is subject to spontaneous com-
bustion in storage and transit and tends to freeze
together in cold weather, making it difficult to handle.
The USSR decided to step up development of the
Kansk-Achinsk basin in the late 1970s. Annual out-
put has increased from 28 million tons in 1975 to an
estimated 45 million tons in 1984.
four mines in the basin are currently
producing. the Irsha-Borodino mine, the largest, ac-
counting for about half of the basin's total output;
Nazarovo 1 and 2; and the Berezovskoye mine, which
is in the early stages of development.
The Soviet press reports plans to produce about 70
million tons of lignite from the Kansk-Achinsk basin
in 1990 and to increase output to 170-200 million tons
per year by 2000. To attain the latter rate of output,
the Soviets plan to develop two new surface mines,
Irsha-Borodino 2 and Uryup 1. Eventually they plan
to increase annual output from the basin to 350
million tons by developing three additional mines-
Berezovskoye 2 and Itatskiy 1 and 2.
What To Do With the Coal?
The low energy content and physical properties of the
coal limit the economically effective radius for rail
shipment to 1,500 km-400 km short of major
demand centers in the Urals and 2,000 to 3,000 km
short of the central regions of the European USSR.
Proposed solutions for rapid development of the
Kansk-Achinsk basin have involved two general
approaches:
? Extracting the energy content of the coal in power
plants near the mines and transmitting the electric-
ity to the western USSR over very-high-capacity, 25X1
UHV powerlines.
? Upgrading the coal quality through processing in
facilities near the mines and transporting the result-
ing semicoke, thermocoal, or liquid fuel to the
western USSR.
The first approach, which began to be stressed in the
mid-1970s, has received the lion's share of attention
and funding thus far. 25X1
Status of Power Plant Construction
According to recent Soviet press reports, the Soviets
plan to build two or three large, coal-fired, mine-
mouth power plants at Kansk-Achinsk by 1995. Each
power plant, which will reportedly be equipped with
eight 800-MW units (boiler plus steam turbine-gener-
ator set), could sustain a demand for about 25 million
tons of Kansk-Achinsk coal annually. These plants,
however, are far behind schedule and are beset with
many unresolved problems.
The first plant is currently under construction at
Berezovskoye. Construction has been slow and
plagued with delays On the basis of
progress in the construction o t e smokestack and the
pace of boiler construction at other large Soviet power
plants, we estimate that the first 800-MW generating
set at Berezovskoye could begin operation in 1987-
four years behind schedule-if everything goes well.
In view of the construction history at Berezovskoye,
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probably not become fully operational until 1988-89.
The 800-MW unit is essentially a prototype unit that
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has not been field-tested. At least two to three years
probably will be required to discover and correct
problems before the unit can operate satisfactorily.
There is at least a possibility that the Soviet-designed
800-MW unit may never operate satisfactorily and
that Moscow may have to scale back plans for
burning Kansk-Achinsk coal at large, mine-mouth
power plants:
? The Soviets have never successfully operated an
800-MW coal-fired boiler{
late 1960s and early 1970s were later converted to
burn fuel oil." A major problem with the 800-MW
coal-fired unit was that the high combustion tem-
perature caused melted ash (slag) to build up on the
inside surfaces of the boiler, eventually forcing a
shutdown.
? Soviet attempts to burn Kansk-Achinsk coal in a
500-MW boiler at Nazarovo ended in failure. Press
reports indicate that the unit was down a total of
" Although the Soviets commissioned eight 800-MW generating
sets between 1975 and 1982, all were designed to operate on fuel oil
or natural gas.
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three years during the first five ars of operation.
he 500-MW unit
was later replaced with a much smaller unit using
indicate that plants to produce 5 million tons of
synthetic liquids per annum would cost about
$4-6 billion per plant. The production costs-includ-
different combustion technology.
The construction history at Berezovskoye, the lack of
a successful prototype, Soviet press reports alluding to
unresolved technical problems, and the fact that the
Soviets are now attempting to develop a new type of
combustion technology for Kansk-Achinsk coal all
strongly suggest that the power plant may not operate
satisfactorily when completed.
A pilot boiler that reportedly will be used at Kansk-
Achinsk is currently under development. The boiler-
which uses swirl-combustion technology to fire at a
lower temperature than the boilers being installed at
Berezovskoye-does not melt the ash and consequent-
ly avoids most of the slag buildup problem. This
technology also permits a substantial reduction in the
boiler's size and, probably, a reduction in investment
cost. The commercial-demonstration units have ca-
pacities ranging from 50 to 100 MW. Scaling up the
new design will, however, present considerable engi-
neering problems that must be solved before the
technology can become a major factor in development
of the Kansk-Achinsk basin.
Development of Synfuel Technology
Although the USSR has conducted coal synfuel re-
search since the early 1950s, the Soviets-like West-
ern energy experts-probably began to view synfuels
as a realistic option only in the 1970s. We believe that
the recognition of increasing oil production costs and
the slowing growth in Soviet oil production has led to
increased interest and funding for USSR synfuel
research. The Soviet coal synfuel effort is directed
primarily at the potential for liquefying Kansk-
Achinsk coal. The coals at Ekibastuz (too high in ash
content) and Kuznetsk (good in quality and needed for
other uses) are currently not being viewed by the
Soviets as candidates for synfuel projects.
Although liquefaction technology has been successful-
ly developed in the West, this technology has been
temporarily shelved due to the currently low price of
crude oil relative to the high costs of constructing and
operating a liquefaction facility. Western estimates
ing capital charges-are estimated at roughly $40 to 25X1
$50 per barrel.
Soviet Progress in Coal Liquefaction
Earlier Soviet plans called for the large-scale produc-
tion of either semicoke or thermocoal.t2 In 1983 the
USSR completed construction (begun in 1976) of a
commercial-demonstration facility at Krasnoyarsk
that uses pyrolysis to process up to 1.2 million tons of 25X1
Kansk-Achinsk coal per year and produce about
400,000 tons of semicoke, 54,000 tons of synthetic oil,
and 120 million cubic meters of gas. Earlier media
reports indicated plans to build three large-scale
commercial pyrolysis facilities, each with an annual
processing capacity of 25-50 million tons (input).
We believe that the Soviets have substantially scaled
down their plans for using pyrolysis.
the research funds for the pyrolysis
process were cut off in 1979. The Long-Term Energy
Program, which was circulated early in 1984, indi-
cates plans to produce semicoke only on a limited
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basis, from those Kansk-Achinsk coals that cause the 25X1
worst boiler fouling when burned-about 8 to 9
percent of the basin's reserves. Soviet media reporting
during the last few years discussing prospects for the
Kansk-Achinsk basin hardly mentions pyrolysis and
instead emphasizes plans for liquefaction.
Our analysis of Soviet statements on future synfuel
research suggests that the Soviets are abandoning
plans for using pyrolysis on a large scale because the
liquid yield is only about 5 percent-which, according
to a Soviet technical journal, makes high-volume
" In the production of semicoke by pyrolysis, coal is heated in the
absence of air to about 550 degrees Celsius, and some synthetic
liquids are produced. In the production of thermocoal, the moisture
is simply removed by heating the coal to about 450 degrees Celsius; 25X1
most of the volatile matter that contributes to better combustion
remains. Although no synthetic liquids are produced, the heating
value of Kansk-Achinsk coal is increased from about 3,300 kilocal-
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production of synthetic liquids "practically impos-
sible." The Soviet press reported in 1983 that a
scientific committee on synfuels, subordinate to the
State Committee on Science and Technology, con-
cluded that pyrolysis cannot be used as a basis for
processing Kansk-Achinsk coal into synfuels. The
Soviets would still be left with the task of transporting
a large volume of the solid product (semicoke) long
distances in special, closed railroad cars or covered
with an oil-based liquid to prevent absorption of water
from rain or snow. There is some evidence to suggest
that the semicoke requires high combustion tempera-
tures (which causes the ash content to fuse into slag on
the boiler walls) because most of the hydrogen and the
volatile matter have been driven off in processing. In
addition, Soviet press reports indicate that the semi-
coke contains a high percentage of nitrogen oxides-
suspected to be a major contributor to formation of
acid rain.
The Soviets may have pushed forward initially with
pyrolysis because development of this technology
probably would not have been dependent on Western
assistance. The USSR has equipped the Krasnoyarsk
facility almost totally with Soviet equipment and
probably would not have needed Western assistance
to build commercial-scale pyrolysis plants. Pyrolysis is
a relatively simple process, essentially similar to the
production of coke from coal but at a lower tempera-
ture.
The Soviets have probably also scaled back their plans
for thermocoal production and are still uncertain
about the utility of the process. No synthetic liquids
are produced and the transport of a solid product is
required. In 1975, a Soviet coal journal reported that
a "simple and reliable" design for a 312-ton-per-hour
thermocoal facility was completed. Construction of
this plant has yet to begin. Indeed, in 1982 the Soviet
press reported that the designing of a thermocoal
plant to process 100 tons per hour was proceeding
slowly because of "insufficient interest in the con-
cerned ministries." Although TASS has again report-
ed that a thermocoal facility (to process 100 tons per
hour of Kansk-Achinsk coal) has been "devised," no
date or time frame was given for construction-nor
even an indication that construction was planned.
Figure 8
Liquid Yields From Synfuel Processes
Analysis of recent press reports, Soviet technical
journals, and the Long-Term Energy Program indi-
cates that the USSR believes that direct-conversion
(liquefaction) is a better alternative to semicoke and
thermocoal. At a mine near Moscow, the Soviets are
currently operating a 5-ton-per-day (input) direct-
conversion pilot plant-the ST-5 facility. This plant
produces 1 ton of synthetic liquids per day. Construc-
tion of the plant began in 1981 but was not completed
until 1984. The plant reportedly uses an improved
version of the Bergius conversion process-a technol-
ogy pirated from Germany at the end of World War
II. The Soviet media report plans to build a 75-ton-
per-day (input) liquefaction facility at the Berezov-
skoye mine in West Siberia if the process proves
25X1
25X1
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Figure 9
Basic Liquefaction Process
Alternative method for
supplying H2 to the
liquefaction reactor.
Technology already
developed by Soviets.
Technology available at
ST-5 facility that will
probably be difficult for the
USSR to scale up for
commercial-size plant.
Technology probably not
yet developed by Soviets.
I3ydrotreater
According to the Long-Term Energy Program, during
1986-90 the Soviets will attempt to develop and
perfect coal liquefaction technology suitable for large-
scale production of synthetic liquids. Commercial
direct-conversion facilities are to be built during the
1990s. We believe that substantial Western assistance
in technology and equipment would be required to
meet this goal.
no real experimental base
existed in the USSR to support major West Siberian
synfuel projects. The Soviet liquefaction process has a
low yield-about 30 percent-of synthetic liquids,
whereas the yield for most Western technologies is
about 40 to 50 percent on a dry, ash-free basis (see
figure 8). The Soviets' dissatisfaction with their pro-
gress is evidenced by their attempts during the past
several years to solicit assistance in coal-conversion
technology-primarily through technical information
Liquefact'on
Ireactori
exchange agreements-from West German, Japa-
nese, Italian, and US firms. The Soviets have tried
several times to license US technology.
Soviet capability to scale up the liquefaction reactor,
which is essentially a type of hydrocracker, is doubt-
ful. Soviet industry has been unable to build a reliable
hydrocracker-a sophisticated secondary oil-refining
unit that breaks down heavy fuel oils into lighter, 25X1
more valuable products. Soviet press reports also
indicate that the USSR still has not developed the
technology to build a reliable gasifier (using oxygen)
to provide hydrogen for the process (see figure 9).
f--"-1
Atmotphcric
ddptitl tion
Liquid
products
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Most of the proven technology in direct conversion
with pilot-plant operating capacities greater than 5
tons per day is of US origin. The US processes-EDS
and H-coal-can work with a variety of coals, and the
technology has been successfully tested with lignite-
grade coals. The West German firms Ruhrkohle and
Veba operate the only significant direct-conversion
facility located outside the United States. Because the
technology used by the West German firms cannot
process coal with a moisture content greater than 14
percent, it is not adaptable to Kansk-Achinsk coals,
which have a moisture content ranging from 32 to 45
percent. Ruhrkohle, however, is also a sponsor of the
two US processes and, as a sponsor, has rights to the
marketing of the technology.
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Appendix E
Ultra-High-Voltage Electricity
Transmission to the Urals
and the European USSR
A technical challenge presented in the development of
the USSR's eastern coal basins-notably Ekibastuz
and Kansk-Achinsk-is the economical transfer of
large amounts of coal-derived energy over long dis-
tances. Soviet planners view the Ekibastuz energy
complex as a source of electricity not only for the
rapidly growing demand in Kazakhstan but also for
Central Asia, West Siberia, the Urals, and parts of
the European USSR. The complex of Ekibastuz
power plants, which will include the five large Gres
plants and some smaller plants now on the drawing
boards, will have a capacity of nearly 40 million kW
and generate 220 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) annu-
ally. Consumers in Kazakhstan are scheduled ulti-
mately to receive 100 billion kWh; 80 billion kWh is
slated for other areas of Central Asia and parts of
West Siberia; and 40 billion kWh is to be distributed
to the Urals and farther West.
Ultra-high-voltage (UHV) electricity transmission
provides-in theory-an efficient solution to the ener-
gy-transfer problem. Mine-mouth power plants can be
linked via UHV transmission lines to distant consum-
ers, eliminating congestion of rail lines and providing
a highly usable form of energy. The UHV transmis-
sion systems needed at Kansk-Achinsk and Ekibastuz,
however, call for technical development that equals or
exceeds that in use anywhere in the world. Current
goals call for connecting Ekibastuz with substations in
the Urals, using 1,150 kilovolts (kV) alternating cur-
rent and with Tambov, south of Moscow, using 1,500
Moscow has given a higher priority to the work on the
1,500-km Ekibastuz-Urals 1,150-kV transmission line
because segments can be put into service incremental-
ly. The western section leading to the Urals is under
construction and will connect a transformer substa-
tion at Ekibastuz with substations at Kokchetav,
Kustanay, and Chelyabinsk. Transmission-line towers
have been erected and conductor cable has been
strung between Ekibastuz and Kokchetav and be-
tween Kokchetav and Kustanay. According to the
Soviet media, the Ekibastuz-Kustana ortion of the
line is energized at 500 kV We 25X1
estimate that the entire line, with appropriate trans-
formers and switching equipment for full-capacity
operation, will not reach Chelyabinsk until the late
1980s. Another 1,150-kV line to West Siberia is likely
to be finished shortly thereafter.
The Soviets have held up construction of transformer
substations on the eastern segment of the 1,150-kV
line from Ekibastuz to Itatskiy, near Kansk-Achinsk.
This transmission line was designed for both short-
term and long-term applications. It will be used
initially to supply electricity from Ekibastuz power
plants to the constructors of the Kansk-Achinsk power
plants. Eventually, when several of the large power-
generating units at Kansk-Achinsk are brought on
line, the direction of power flow can be reversed and
tied in to the Urals demand center using transformer
and switching connections at Ekibastuz.
The 1,500-kV direct-current transmission line is the
UHV option that would give the Soviets the capability
to move electricity the longest distances. Plans for this
line call for transmission of p
km from Ekibastuz to Tamboo 25X1
that most of t e wor on t e line 25>25X1
ceased after June 1982-reportedly because of fund-
ing cuts.
UHV Applications
UHV electricity transmission (where line potentials
reach 800,000 volts or more) was developed primarily
to meet two needs of electric power networks: large
transfers of power and minimal losses over long
distances. Designs for UHV systems must take into
account other factors such as reliability, stability,
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controllability, environmental impact, and safety-
requirements that are common to power systems of all
voltages. Transmission at higher voltages is advanta-
geous because the electrical transmission capability of
a powerline increases approximately as the square of
voltage, while total cost increases at a lower rate. In
addition, the line losses per unit of power-generating
capacity (which increase as a function of distance) are
usually smaller with higher voltages.
UHV Operations
Most UHV systems, in operation or proposed, use
alternating-current (AC) technology. In a UHV-AC
system, electricity generated at one or more power
plants travels over powerlines to a substation where
transformers step up the voltage to the designated
UHV level. The electricity at the stepped-up voltage
is sent to another UHV substation near consumers;
transformers then step down the voltage and pass the
energy on to users over the existing power-distribution
network. The UHV transformer substations can con-
tain a number of medium-to-high-technology compo-
nents: high-voltage switchgear, compensators to en-
sure synchronous operations, and equipment that
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permits automatic or remote control during normal
functions or emergencies. Power systems using UHV-
AC technology can be built incrementally by adding
power lines and substations as electricity demand or
generating capacity increases.
While UHV-AC technology can be applied to most
long-distance, large power transfers, in some circum-
stances UHV direct-current (DC) transmission can be
advantageous. UHV-DC transmission has smaller line
losses. An overall project is cheaper to build because
the technology requires only two conductors per cir-
cuit instead of the three needed in AC transmission.
Moreover, a UHV-DC transmission line can improve
the reliability and stability of a power system because
it can be more readily isolated from electrical distur-
UHV-DC transmission, however, has drawbacks. A
principal disadvantage of DC transmission results
from the cost and complexity of the rectifier-inversion
equipment needed to change the current from AC to
DC and back again to AC so that it can be distributed
to customers. UHV-DC transmission has been applied
in the West where it is desirable to transfer a large
amount of power to a single distant demand center. In
these applications, the cost of the line is held down
because only one set of rectifier-inversion equipment
is needed. As a consequence of these equipment
considerations, UHV-DC transmission lines are not
tapped along their route, and the whole line plus
terminal converter stations must be operational before
any power can be transferred.
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