INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEMORANDUM - PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 25, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ai
25 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
SUBJECT Intelligence Alert Memorandum
Prospects for Lebanon
1. The attached memorandum indicates that the
internal conflicts in Lebanon have reachea a dangerous
level with potentially serious consequences for the region.
2. President Franjiyah's dramatic move in appointing
a predominantly military government.--Lebanon's first since
independence--is unlikely to end Lebanon 's political crisis
or calm the heightened tension among religious groups in
the country. The new government, in fact, has encountered
such opposition in Lebanon and the region that Prime Minister_
Rifai may soon be forced to resign.
3. The most hopeful. possibility is that the current
government or a successor regime will adopt a conciliatory
stance and graduall' gain wider acceptance of the May 23
cease-tire. At the moment, unfortunately, that accord is
threatened by continuing clashes in Beirut.
4. The worst possibility is that the continuing civil
unrest could degenerate into civil war, which would
threaten Lebanon's governing system,. traditional US-Lebanese-
Israeli relations, and jeopardize present efforts for a
Middle East peace settlement.
The judgments in this memorandum
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have been discussed wit:i the, appropriate anaaytical
elements of CIA, DIA, and State/INR,
25X1A9A
Colby
Attachment
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The Current Situation
Fighting between the militia of the right-wing
Phalanges Party and radical fedayeen has diminished
significantly since the announcement of a cease-fire and
the appointment of the military cabinet on May 23. For
the moment, both sides are restrained; the Phalangists
because they support the new government, the fedayeen
and Lebanese leftists because they were caught off guard
by its appointment and are considering their next move.
The new government has drawn initial strength from
the surprise that surrounded its installation, from its
law and order image, and from widespread popular uncertainty
about what it will be like to be governed by a military
cabinet. At the same time, however, it faces extremely
difficult prcblems: religious and political tensions are
at the highest level in the co,intry's history; and
opposition forces are united as seldom before.
The policies and tactics adopted by the new govern-
ment could and probably will be the deciding factor in
whether Lebanon's traditional governing system survives
the present crisis. The best hope is that it will take
a non-partisan, conciliatory approach that through
negotiations could restore at modicum of public order and
leave Lebanon much as before. At worst, it will move with
force against the fedayeen and the leftists, precipitating
civil war, destroying the system of political and religious
compromises on which the government rests, and inviting
intervention by -Syria or Israel or both. Such developments,
at a minimum, would seriously complicate general Middle
East peace negotiations. In the extreme, they could
prompt general hostilities that would Involve Svr:!.a,
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.
Strategy of the New Government
For the moment, at least, the new government has
opted for a conciliatory approach. Deputy Prime Minister
Moussa Kanaan has stressed that the government is
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"provisi(~,lial rather than military in the strict sense,."
that its sole objective is' to restore "natural conditions"
in the country, and that it will respect past agreements
between the government and the fedayeen. The cabinet
has so far avoided instituting censorship, curfews, or
any of the other trappings of military rule.
Prime Minister Nur ad-Din Rifai will attempt tc: take
advantage of the currently difficult political position
of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir
Arafat, the Phalangists' sense of victory, and the
political independence of the leader of Lebanon's
Shia Muslim community, Imam Musa Sadr, to divide the
opposition and gain grudging acceptance of his government
and extended observance of the cease-fire. If this
strategy succeeds, it will win a short-term improvement
in the security situation and--again in the short term--
justify President Franjiyah's considerable political
gamble in appointing a predominantly military government.
Even if Rifa-i is able to implement the cease-fire,
however, he is certain to face what will probably turn
out to be overwhelming political challenges. In a
display of unity, important Muslim politicians, Lebanese
leftist leaders, fedayeen spokesmen, the Syrian press,
and one dissident Christian political leader have joined
in condemning the new government. They have charged that
it threatens the country's majority Muslim population,
the Palestinians, Lebanon's National Covenant, and
Syria itself. If these opposition forces remain united,
they have a good chance of succeeding in tb~-ir announced
goal: to rorce Rifai to resign.
Radical Arab governments, notably Iraq and Libya, are
sure to increase, their financial and military support to
Lebanese leftists and fedayeen radicals willing to
challenge Rifai. These governments alL.eady expend large
sums for subversive activities in Lebanon, and their agents
have played a major role in escalating urban violence over
the past few months. The principal Arab states join
with the Lebanese government in decrying this meddling
in Lebanon's domestic affairs, but are powerless to
stop it.
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Syrian intervention would be likely ~-o take the
form, first, of stronger political threats against
Franjiyah and the government of Lebanon. Lebanese
leaders are mindful that Lebanon and Syria were
historically joined, and that Syria has overwhelmingly
superior military capabilities. As a result, the Lebanese
are sensitive to Damascus' views on internal Lebanese
political matters.
If Syria needed to do more than threaten, it could
allow or encourage larger numbers of fedayeen forces and
arms to cross from Syria into Lebanon (as happened during
the May 1973 clasher between the feu_& ::en and the army) ,
send units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation
Army into Lebanon, or, finally, send Syrian regular
army forces across the border. The current discussions
between the Syrians and the Palestinians on closer
political and military cooperation. will be interpreted by
the Lebanese as a potential threat to them.
Damascus is now preoccupied with a host of internal
and foreign problems, and would undoubtedly prefer not to
allow events in Lebanon to deteriorate to the point that
Syrian intervention became necessary. Damascus may,
therefore, insist that the fedayeen exercise restraint.
Fedayeen leaders would honor such a request, as they are
heav,j.ly dependent on Syrian political and military support.
The majority of the Palestinians realize that cooperation
with Syria is their last hope of winning a role in Middle
East peace negotiations, or ultimately, of winning control
of any of the occupied territories.
In the--extreme event that Syria did intervene
militarily in Lebanon, the most likely immediate develop-
ment would be the resignation of the current government
and its replacement with a civilian government headed
by a Sunni Muslim acceptable to Syria. This probably
would. be sufficient to prompt a Syrian withdrawal, but
it would leave a virtually pow3rless Lebanese government
and would substantially increa-a the freedom and influence
of the fedayeen in Lebanon. Above all., it would greatly
diminish the ability of an already-weakened army and the
security services to keep order.
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Threats to the Traditional' Governing System
It is possible at any stage that civil unrest
with or
,
without Syrian intervention, could grow to the point that
either Christian or--more likely--Muslim political
groups would withdraw their support for the power-sharing
principles of the National Covenant and seek complete
power for themselves. The leaders of Lebanon's large
Sunni Muslim community have in the past felt that their
own interests were best served by supporting the National
Covenant. They are now faced with the momentous decision
of whether to stick with the known but limited advantages
of the present system or overturn the system in the
uncertain hope of winning unlimited advantage. Although
they have criticized the current military government as
fundamentally unacceptable and itself a challenge to the
Covenant, it is by no means clear that they are prepared
to risk everything to challenge it.
If the current system of government were overturned
,
however; the most likely regime to emerge would be a
leftist, Muslim-dominated government more sympathetic to
the Palestinians and the radical Arab states. A leftist
government could be dominated by such divergent figures
as former prime minister Rashid Karami, socialist
leader Kamal Jumblatt, or Shia Muslim Imam Musa Sadr.
All would be generally acceptable to the country's
several leftist and Muslim political parties, the
fedayeen, and Syria? Such government would be likely
to adopt a foreign policy ostensibly less pro-West and
pro-US than has been traditional in Lebanon.
Impact on Israel and Peace Negotiations
The rise to power in Lebanon of a radical government
sympathetic to 0vria would be seen in Tel Aviv as a major
threat to Israel's security. Such a regime would not,
at least initially, be militarily powerful, but it would
leave Israel completely surrounded by hostile Arab states,
and would permit an increase in the number of fedayeen
cross-border terrorist operations. It could, in time,
build its military forces and provide important support
to Syri..a.
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At the very least, the existence of a ' leftist
government in Lebanon would heighten the Israelis'
sense of defensiveness and increase their reluctance
to make territorial 'concessions to the Arabs. If th