INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEMORANDUM - PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2005
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 25, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4.pdf403.86 KB
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Approved T 1RdM4AQQfi70R .( }rN1g1Rl ,$?l"MRQQgNQW005-4 Ai 25 May 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs) SUBJECT Intelligence Alert Memorandum Prospects for Lebanon 1. The attached memorandum indicates that the internal conflicts in Lebanon have reachea a dangerous level with potentially serious consequences for the region. 2. President Franjiyah's dramatic move in appointing a predominantly military government.--Lebanon's first since independence--is unlikely to end Lebanon 's political crisis or calm the heightened tension among religious groups in the country. The new government, in fact, has encountered such opposition in Lebanon and the region that Prime Minister_ Rifai may soon be forced to resign. 3. The most hopeful. possibility is that the current government or a successor regime will adopt a conciliatory stance and graduall' gain wider acceptance of the May 23 cease-tire. At the moment, unfortunately, that accord is threatened by continuing clashes in Beirut. 4. The worst possibility is that the continuing civil unrest could degenerate into civil war, which would threaten Lebanon's governing system,. traditional US-Lebanese- Israeli relations, and jeopardize present efforts for a Middle East peace settlement. The judgments in this memorandum Approved For Release 2 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 have been discussed wit:i the, appropriate anaaytical elements of CIA, DIA, and State/INR, 25X1A9A Colby Attachment Approved For Release 200 00608R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 2MVIYr- i DP86T00608R000200020005-4 The Current Situation Fighting between the militia of the right-wing Phalanges Party and radical fedayeen has diminished significantly since the announcement of a cease-fire and the appointment of the military cabinet on May 23. For the moment, both sides are restrained; the Phalangists because they support the new government, the fedayeen and Lebanese leftists because they were caught off guard by its appointment and are considering their next move. The new government has drawn initial strength from the surprise that surrounded its installation, from its law and order image, and from widespread popular uncertainty about what it will be like to be governed by a military cabinet. At the same time, however, it faces extremely difficult prcblems: religious and political tensions are at the highest level in the co,intry's history; and opposition forces are united as seldom before. The policies and tactics adopted by the new govern- ment could and probably will be the deciding factor in whether Lebanon's traditional governing system survives the present crisis. The best hope is that it will take a non-partisan, conciliatory approach that through negotiations could restore at modicum of public order and leave Lebanon much as before. At worst, it will move with force against the fedayeen and the leftists, precipitating civil war, destroying the system of political and religious compromises on which the government rests, and inviting intervention by -Syria or Israel or both. Such developments, at a minimum, would seriously complicate general Middle East peace negotiations. In the extreme, they could prompt general hostilities that would Involve Svr:!.a, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Strategy of the New Government For the moment, at least, the new government has opted for a conciliatory approach. Deputy Prime Minister Moussa Kanaan has stressed that the government is CONFIDENTIAL Approved For ReleaseG2605/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00600R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 CONFIDENTIAL "provisi(~,lial rather than military in the strict sense,." that its sole objective is' to restore "natural conditions" in the country, and that it will respect past agreements between the government and the fedayeen. The cabinet has so far avoided instituting censorship, curfews, or any of the other trappings of military rule. Prime Minister Nur ad-Din Rifai will attempt tc: take advantage of the currently difficult political position of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat, the Phalangists' sense of victory, and the political independence of the leader of Lebanon's Shia Muslim community, Imam Musa Sadr, to divide the opposition and gain grudging acceptance of his government and extended observance of the cease-fire. If this strategy succeeds, it will win a short-term improvement in the security situation and--again in the short term-- justify President Franjiyah's considerable political gamble in appointing a predominantly military government. Even if Rifa-i is able to implement the cease-fire, however, he is certain to face what will probably turn out to be overwhelming political challenges. In a display of unity, important Muslim politicians, Lebanese leftist leaders, fedayeen spokesmen, the Syrian press, and one dissident Christian political leader have joined in condemning the new government. They have charged that it threatens the country's majority Muslim population, the Palestinians, Lebanon's National Covenant, and Syria itself. If these opposition forces remain united, they have a good chance of succeeding in tb~-ir announced goal: to rorce Rifai to resign. Radical Arab governments, notably Iraq and Libya, are sure to increase, their financial and military support to Lebanese leftists and fedayeen radicals willing to challenge Rifai. These governments alL.eady expend large sums for subversive activities in Lebanon, and their agents have played a major role in escalating urban violence over the past few months. The principal Arab states join with the Lebanese government in decrying this meddling in Lebanon's domestic affairs, but are powerless to stop it. Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 2@ M, I ,NO DP86T00608R000200020005-4 Syrian intervention would be likely ~-o take the form, first, of stronger political threats against Franjiyah and the government of Lebanon. Lebanese leaders are mindful that Lebanon and Syria were historically joined, and that Syria has overwhelmingly superior military capabilities. As a result, the Lebanese are sensitive to Damascus' views on internal Lebanese political matters. If Syria needed to do more than threaten, it could allow or encourage larger numbers of fedayeen forces and arms to cross from Syria into Lebanon (as happened during the May 1973 clasher between the feu_& ::en and the army) , send units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army into Lebanon, or, finally, send Syrian regular army forces across the border. The current discussions between the Syrians and the Palestinians on closer political and military cooperation. will be interpreted by the Lebanese as a potential threat to them. Damascus is now preoccupied with a host of internal and foreign problems, and would undoubtedly prefer not to allow events in Lebanon to deteriorate to the point that Syrian intervention became necessary. Damascus may, therefore, insist that the fedayeen exercise restraint. Fedayeen leaders would honor such a request, as they are heav,j.ly dependent on Syrian political and military support. The majority of the Palestinians realize that cooperation with Syria is their last hope of winning a role in Middle East peace negotiations, or ultimately, of winning control of any of the occupied territories. In the--extreme event that Syria did intervene militarily in Lebanon, the most likely immediate develop- ment would be the resignation of the current government and its replacement with a civilian government headed by a Sunni Muslim acceptable to Syria. This probably would. be sufficient to prompt a Syrian withdrawal, but it would leave a virtually pow3rless Lebanese government and would substantially increa-a the freedom and influence of the fedayeen in Lebanon. Above all., it would greatly diminish the ability of an already-weakened army and the security services to keep order. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 20 IT%+2 6ICAI-~bP86T00608R000200020005-4 Threats to the Traditional' Governing System It is possible at any stage that civil unrest with or , without Syrian intervention, could grow to the point that either Christian or--more likely--Muslim political groups would withdraw their support for the power-sharing principles of the National Covenant and seek complete power for themselves. The leaders of Lebanon's large Sunni Muslim community have in the past felt that their own interests were best served by supporting the National Covenant. They are now faced with the momentous decision of whether to stick with the known but limited advantages of the present system or overturn the system in the uncertain hope of winning unlimited advantage. Although they have criticized the current military government as fundamentally unacceptable and itself a challenge to the Covenant, it is by no means clear that they are prepared to risk everything to challenge it. If the current system of government were overturned , however; the most likely regime to emerge would be a leftist, Muslim-dominated government more sympathetic to the Palestinians and the radical Arab states. A leftist government could be dominated by such divergent figures as former prime minister Rashid Karami, socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, or Shia Muslim Imam Musa Sadr. All would be generally acceptable to the country's several leftist and Muslim political parties, the fedayeen, and Syria? Such government would be likely to adopt a foreign policy ostensibly less pro-West and pro-US than has been traditional in Lebanon. Impact on Israel and Peace Negotiations The rise to power in Lebanon of a radical government sympathetic to 0vria would be seen in Tel Aviv as a major threat to Israel's security. Such a regime would not, at least initially, be militarily powerful, but it would leave Israel completely surrounded by hostile Arab states, and would permit an increase in the number of fedayeen cross-border terrorist operations. It could, in time, build its military forces and provide important support to Syri..a. CONFIDENTIAL 5 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020005-4 Approved For Release 200.E?-U l? ]j P86T00608R000200020005-4 At the very least, the existence of a ' leftist government in Lebanon would heighten the Israelis' sense of defensiveness and increase their reluctance to make territorial 'concessions to the Arabs. If th