Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 22, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 12, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3.pdf5.59 MB
~~ ~ ~ }.~ }, . ~~% Appr?ved;For Release 1959/09/26 : C -RDP$~ , 0608RQ602001 9 0042-3,,~` ~ ~ t ~ ' - ~ ,' ~P~ 043 ~'~ ~0~~~C~ PR~~~; earl v as i.n I'1.'.O, V. I . Lenin had denlrutded in hi:; "1}raft: Cuicic~l ine?:; I`c,r ~L?uta},c+mi~nt c,f i?V ieC. LnSt~l tlltl(.)nS" tlt:tt el I ol'LS nlltsC hl. Oladl! t0 e115Ur(' tll:lt. l: hl` nit lona.l rlel'c?nse of the Sovi.ct. repuhl ic?s i , carried out: with Che };tritest ec.onomv in c?ner};y expendiCurc? and with the` most productive input ai- Chc! work of- II1~? people`. llurin}; the years of the civil. war, in t:hc` period of l)uilclin}, up nu,dcrn military Forces pr.:ior to World War' lC, ,.ntd espc`cial.ly during.`, the (;re:tt 1'a tr.i.otic War, econunrica.i thinking and act.in}; in Chc~ ;;ovi.et nruly and Navy constiCuted nn i.mportnnt component part of mi.liCarti' activity :Ind a victory factor. In their written works and memoirs, leading Soviet mi.a itnr_y personal i_t.i.es and mi1.i.Lary scientists point out' over and over .:,i;ain how impol?t:tnL masCerY .)f econotni.cal practices by armed f.orcc`s i:; for achi.evi.n}, vil~Cory. 'Thus, (ur i.nstance, Marshal of the: Soviet i1n-ion G. lt. 7.hulcov wrote` Che foa.lowin},, in the preaml):Le of I,t lieneral nntipenko's hook enLiLl.ed "ln lift! 1'rnutry Uire.ction": "In war, the economical. use of personnel and nutterlr.tl reserves has always been and wi.Ll. at.caays he. one of the decisive prohl.ems."~ In conjlntction with t};e ,u,vances made in the scicnti.fi.c-teohnol.o?;ical Ii.ctd, ;lnd with Cite revo.l.uLion in the military sphere, there have evo.lvecl ne:w dc?nutncls on the development of economical th:inlcing and act.i.ng :i.n the mili- tai-y pl~crc~. "nny probl~>.In or mi.~i.tary devclop~nr!nL is today rat the: s:tmh time also an cr.onomic prob:lern....It i.s under.scanct:lbl.e...ChaC a nwr.c efEcc- tive utilization. of material and human resources and a care.f.u.l handl.inl; u[ weapons, equi.p:~ent, and army property can become a source oP consider- ahle additional moans for. maintaining the army and navy and for achi.evin}~ ;, further. increase in the combat r.eadlness of the troops."~' from the quantitatively and particularly also qualil-ative].y higher defense funds (ar.mamcnts, equipment, supplies), them resnl.l objectivel.,y higher C-O-N-F- I-?D-)J-N-T-I-n-L Nt; FOItI:1:~N llISSLM "'-?"~"~?-~~~-~~--XCppi'~v~~t~~o~"Ri~teas~ 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDR86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 .++i t~uKl;1t;1J l)I;iSl~;hl rlc~m,andti on onr ccc,numicnl thlnkint, and rtc~t:in); in fire mil.i.tary sphr.~rc with re~~pecl Lo ut(lirr+tiun, care, nu+infc'.nrntcc>, repcti.r wc+ric., and the use ol` c~xi;ti.nl; ur n+~w cqulpntc~nt. Ily th~~ :;,.nne Luken, thrtrc~ r.ctsult obfectlve.ly r,rer+tr.?r La:;l~: for thc~ nrilitnry-ecunnittic w:tent ralidirr's, nonconmrissioned officer:;, and of f irr~t?;;. II a Ihc,r~rc~};h ,ctrl e::~~mlrl:;:'y frrlfillmc~nl' of their pol.itiral :mcl mil-nary ciutfe;; has bcrumr? a habit for army personnel., than this at the stone Llme also iuclir.atc:; t:hc develupnn?nt c, t- cortaln personalty properties. "Sow habits nncl you wi 11 harvest r?hnrarCer," says ~ prov~~rh.~i 1'racr_ic:tl cxpc~ricncc h:t;; ~;hcnvn tlutt h:.il,lts and the automatic ways of. th i nk i n}; and ar. t I n}; i ult~~renl I hc+re i n p.l.ay :t cons i derab 1o part on the baffle I icicl. '1'h~:y arc tml l -ni};h vital l.y i;nportant, for they f;uar.d t:hr soldier a;;:tinst supcrflunu~; httrrlcns and ttnnccessary diversion, and they thereby make i c po5;; th l e For him tc, clevot:e his tuff. concentration to his to sks in combat and !:bus to f~i}~ht victoriously. Thus, for instance, a soldier who is accrrstonu~cl to displnyi~t}; r.crrect behavior. in combat does not have to Spend a lc,t of l: inu~ for del lherar. ion as to how he is to proceed, how hc? must take advant:r};~? of the term i.n, and how he tmtst make effective use of his t:ieapc,n:;. 12at:hor, he is nhlo to direct all his a~tention to the hattl.e. for purposes of clestroyin}; the enemy. In contrast t;i this, however, a soldier's inhibitory habits, such as mechanical. thinlcinf; and artinf~, lack oC dlsci.pline, and irresponsibility can have an unPavr,rnhle effect on h:is preparations for battle and nn his art.ions in combat. Suet inhibitory habits can .Lead to improper conduct in combat and ran result in noedl.essly spilt blood and in defeats. C-t,- N-l~ - I-ll-I;-N-T-I-A-I, Nt) FORIs'I:GN 1)iSSEM -- __ Approved For Release 1999/09/26:CIA-RDP$6T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-T.-D- E-N-T- I-A -1, NO rOREIGN DISSEM In their day-to-day educational work, superior officers have the primary task to develop positive, useful habits and to create those conditions which will make it possible for such habits to develop and to become re- i.nfoLced. In so doing they must at the name time overcome inhibitory and negative habits. Which Habits Must Be Developed? In answeri~~g this question, let us first of all and as a matter of prin- ciple pror_eed from the .fact that the direction to be .followed in connec- tion witl- the habits which are to be developed in the members of our army and in the collectives is prescribed by the basic documents of our party, state, and armed forces guidance organs. These include, above a11, those ways of thinking and acting which are particularly important for the ful- fillment of the military class mission, for combat readiness, and for the development of the fighting strength of the military collectives. Thus, the Nintlr Conference of Delegates calls for "the development of such soldierly qualities as an aggressive spirit, steadfastness, courage, readi- ness to serve, self-control, perseverancf, and an unshakeable will ro victory,"4 and it demands that "those ways of thinking and acting be de- veloped which the members of our army require for emerging victorious in battle."S Such ways of thinking and acting are: ---considerirr.fd an order given by one's superior to be a mandate from the workers' claF~s; --trusting one's superior and carrying out each order without contradiction; --regarding one's superior officer or subordinate as a class comrade; --always setting an example for others; --thinking tasks through scrupulously and bringing them to a successful conclusion, as well as overcoming difficulties arising in connection therewith; and not permitting any training shortcuts. Among other things, the development of these and other (important and less important) ways of thinking and acting is a process of consciousness de- velopment which must be purposefully carried out and shaped. Only such a process will produce those habits for which we are striving, "that is, habits which make us act properly not because we sat down and thought about them, but because we are used to acting in such a way, and can not act differently."6 Which Conditions Are Important For the Development of Habits? The development of habits depends on many conditions. As a rule, it never depends on dust one. In the following we will show some conditions - 16 - C-O-N-FBI-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM proyedFo.r.~Ql~ase 1.999/09/26.: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 c;~-a-N-I~- L-U-L-N-'C-:f-i1-L, NU I~Ult1.;iGN i)'1;,S}sM clhich dc?r,ertnlne C'he rlevelr,ttment c,f habits tc.+ a conviderablr' extant. 'L'hey do not nrarly Include rill ail them. Conformity of t:hc~ tc:-hr~--clc?veloped ways oC tlrin!cin}; and actin}; with Che nec~cL'; and inCer~tr:t,c of n p;trticular mc~mhc~-' of the army r; one of the nu,st. important c?.oncl.itiun;;. fmpurlnnC i.n thts connect ton is the phenomenc,n, which tirtrely i;; kna,wn cr. evc?ryc,ne, that any thinka.n} and :.tc?tini; which cor'resportds to r,n?'s; own needs and interests wtl]. become a hnhf.C ntorr quickly than anv Ihinkin;; rntcl actin}; which run;; countctr to one';; own needs and (nta~ra~:;t;;. II~~ t.~ho fa?r,is Che need always to give has best wi.].1 a ways f~i.);ht for what i;; bc?;;C. I;ut he r,lho does not: frr_:1 such a need, wal]. notice i t a hah t Co "};ct i t aver wl.th." [t is therefore nece ,sary to use exa_st- ent nrc~d;; :utc1 int c?rc?;;ts ;r;; poinCs of contact--to the extent Chrtt they arc suitnblc fur the de?vc~lopu;c?nt: arul re~inforcemenC o(` habits--;nd, i" r?allec! fr,r, Co rc~nu,ve nn~;uit:nble n~cds and i.nter.c:;t:.s and possibly to dc~ve;np ne?w unc~:; to take thc;ir piece, in order tct thereby ha>l.h aloe}; the crc~ati.on of habits which ara? pul itical ly well.-Prnmd~~~' rind which are. tiol:icl from a military poinC OI JIeW. Ct should be nutecl thaC the c?rctire previous duv~.lopmcnt of a ntemhcr ~-: t!~.~ :n-nu;d force;;, his awnrc~nc?sti, and among other things also h1.s need:; and intr,rc~sCti hove tho c.?ff,_,c?t oP n I"i]ter when he nutkes his assessmenC oP new rcquirernent:;. from the many h-its of i.nformaC.ion at hi.s disposal., a mentl?~%~r of thr army will. sclc.~cL', ae: it ware, those which co:i.nc?i.de with i.is point- of view ;tnd wi..l I then art acc?ord:~n};l.y. lie will, for the tame being, re- ject other :information becau;;e~ i.t i;; coup"er to his point of view. liahils are; rlutte depe,nc~c~nt on the c;y;;tem of values and norms ex].stin); .i.n a co ..lecti.ve ;uul, actually, i.n the l.on? run development of on]_y those habits i.s po^r;ible which are sul.table for the col.]ective and which are considered by thu coLlecti.ve to be right. ns a consequence, n mr,ml,er of the armed forces wi.l.l in most catie5 develop Chose habits of. whic}r he knows rmd which he feels that they are meeting with the approval of the collective in which he lives. On the other. hand, tlu collectiive in each case sees to it that un i.ndividual wall dcwelop habits which sc~.rve t.hc? collective and, ~'f neccasary, calls him tr rtccount. Consequences resuLCi.n); Prom such procedure, for example, are that the. educatirnt of. the' individn~t i.s .:.].ways tied to his education i.n the col.- iective and that the :;ysCcnr ~~f collective values an~l norms musC be shaped in such rr manner that soc.la List habits are bou_:d to be develored and that bour.);eois habits arc overcome, or not permitted. ilahi.ts arc not formed "over n.ight." hays of thinking and acting become habits .if, .titer havinl; repeatedly practiced them, at has become a need for a member. cif Che? armed forces to act and think in a cer.taan way and, i.f 'n so doanf;, he does not first take himself to account with respect to C-U-N-I.~ - I-U-L-N-1-T-A-L NU rOREIGN I)ISSLM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N- l~'-1-1)- L- N-'I'- :I_ -A- I, Nc~ 1~'01213IGN D'I:SSLM h.i.r; thaul;ht process or the course of his actaot~. PracticLil, ways of think- i.n}; c~nd actinf; which are to become hal~l.ts ca7..1, for. over. rued over. al;ain pLacang army personnel pat:ientay and per.severinl;].y in Si.Cuati.ons in which they must act: in accordance with the desired habit:. ll.i.sci.pJi.ned acCang becomes a habit through acting in a discip.l.ined manner. Acting, creatively ,end with a good measure of iniCiati.ve becomes a habit for L-}tosc: members uf: the army of whom this is required daily anal who are, of course, given the ~.tppropriate conditions fur accomplishinf; this. It Ls a.l.so necessary in this contt~ction to impart to axmy personnel. tltr. requirements, pra.ncip.les, and nor.!ns which are at the base of positive habits, that they understand them properly, and thal: they become a sig- nifi.cant personal experience for. them. Once this has been achieved, Chen that which they have recognized as being necessary and proper must be practiced with the utmost consistency and carried through ctt al.l events, so that it can become a positive thinkinf; and acting habit. The process of such practicinf; as Cherefore nothing else but a systematic perfectl.nf; o[ certain ways o!' Chinkinf; and act:i.nf;. A member cif the armed forces participates in this process with his whole being. Such practice must Cherefore not be understood to be simple mer_hanical. repetition, and it must be engaged in with such an understanding. Of course, i.t is also possible that there will be occasional failures in connection with the forming of habits. Failures, or giving up prematurely, make it difficult For a habit to come into being and may even prevent i.ts coming inL?o existence. One can note indications of a premature giving t.;p when hearing such remarks as "this is too strenuous," er "this takes too long for my liking," and so forth. In order to accomplish tha+_~, throul;h practice, Che formation of the positive habits which had bean planned is r.eal..ly being promoted, the following points, among others, should be kepC to mind --making army personne]. aware of the need for such practicing and of the objectives to he attained through it; ?--prop~~r. consistence, continuity, and regularity; --r_ontinua.l and comprehensive controls, critical evaluation by supervisory personnel and by r:he collective, and n.uper assistance and guidance during the course of the practicing. The example set by supervisory personnel and by t}te party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ functionaries plays an extraordinarily important role in connection with the formation of habits. According to findings in t}te sphere of developmental psychology, young people, and thus also youn# members of our. army, have a d.tstinct desire to let themselves be guided C-O-N-F--I-D-)r-N-T-I-A-L NO FOK);IGN DISSLM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 NU I~OIt1s.LCN D I ~SEM by examples and ideals. 'i'he Lc~ndc~ncy to imitate and to c,mul.ate r.?rnlnectecl with tha.s must be purposefu.ll.y ut.tlized 1:or sh,tpin); postt.tve hab.[ts. [n thLs context, tht: Ninth I)e .egates Conferc:ncc cal..ted attentir~n to t'he fnLLowIn};: "In order. to achieve fur.thc~r. progress 'In the areres of. dasct- pl~l.ne and order. we expect. of a11. nri.:I. t-ary grtper:{.or officers that they themselves waa.l. always set an c~xrlmpl.c in mi.aa.t~lr.y 1~fc~ and that they pcr- :;oniCy deeply rooted r.evo ut onar.y discipl.inc: In the.tr thinking and acting;."~ f I`, for instance, a member ol- t:he army secs that the :;upcrior. of Dicers and functionaries always trilce r.egulat.:ions and orders seriously caul carr~? them out i.n an exemplary manner, that they ar.e consi.str~nt In requir.arl}; Chc.ir subur.dinates to carry them out, and are cr.eat nf; the rrnldi.ti.ons nc~cc~c,:~ary for ] ivin}; i.n accordancr_, wLth the rules, Chen tha will. help to develop chc~ hnhits of r,arryi.n); r.ut orders crud obs~>rviu}; r.cf,~~lations .i.n an cxc~mplary manner. Purination ol: positive habits i.s unthinkable without malciny; !l:i);h dcnunuls un members of our army. With the making of a ccrt-ai.n demand, thc~ process of (.hi.nking and acting on the part of army personnel is not only started off and steered into a d:ir.ection which is in accordance with the f;iven orders and service rei;ulati.ons hut, i.n addition, the desired habits arc formed and reinforced through repeated fulfillment of the demand. It i.s extremely important particuaarl.y in the case of young army personnel that, with due consideration of heir personalities, demands be made on them from the very first hour of their mil.itar.y service. Only in this manner will they get used w:i.thout great d.if:ficulty to the military service conditi.uns which, for them, are some thin); new. IL this is not clone, one should not he sur- prised if, in the case of some army personnel, habits wi.l.l evolve which arc counter to exemplary military duty performance and which i.t will then lie difficult to overcome. In actual practice it is apparent again and agaltl that eclttcal-i.ng is easier. than re-educating! When implementing the requirement for the formation of po:;itivc habits, one should, among other things, pay attention to seeing to it that reasons are given for the need to make high demands and that an awareness of them i.s dc~~eloped, so that they will then be accepted and supported; that one always uses as a point of: departure the requirements of modern combat and that the level of development of: the army personnel concerned is taken into consideration to the greatest possible extent; that the demands which are being made are not only understcud by the army personnel concerned, but that they consider them to be proper and will carry them out unques- tioningly; and that fina.l.ly, demands are made on a continuing basis and raised systematically, and that they are aimed at attainment of the optimum performance level by the army personnel concerned. A life style in tine with socialism under the severe conditions of military life is to an increasing extent becoming for us a fundamental prerequisite C--O-N-F- I-D-E-N-7'-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSLM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 l;-l)-:?-1'-? T-ll-E-N-'1'- i-A-L N~ l~~)itLT.GN DI:SSF,M for developing those creative in:Ltiatives which tod,~y arc nc- awry for the fulfillment of the military gain task."8 At the same time, the socialist life style and the sr_rvice and 1~iving c~n- ditions must never be regarded as a one-sided material and organizati.onal- technical mutter. They are, above all., also a mcit?ter of the relations and the climate existing in a collectives as we.L.l as the prevailinf; spiritual- cultural conditions, and they are thus a continuous socialist leadership concern. If, for instance, one eslabl.ishes order which is stra.ct rind in accordance with the applicable regulations and which is maintained con- tinuously from day to day, then the end result will surely be that many elements of. the military activity of army personnel will be handled with ever greater ease and more in t-he nature of a habit. The habit of t-,aving confidence in the commander and in his orders is developed c,?herever per- tinent experiences can be gathered and occurrences witnessed. What Conclusions Can Be Drawn For the Development of Habits? Supervisory personnel and the party and FDJ organizations develop in their politico-ideological work the necessary knowledge of and insight into the norms of socialist thinking and acting as laid down in the basic documents and service regulations. Army personnel learn to comprcaiend why they must act in a certain way and riot in any other way. For army personnel can develop positive habits quickly and effectively only if they have the necessary pertinent knowledge and understanding, L.e.~if they have aware- ness. Th{.s purposeful and continuous development of socialist habits under. military conditions must begin with the inception of military service. Whatever is accomplished at that juncture, will be lasting; whatever is neglected at that juncture will be difficult to make up. Through systematic practice of required socialist-type thinking and acting in the sphere of political and military activities, the ways of thinking and acting will be so reinforced that they will ultimately become auto- matic and that in this connection there develops the need for doing things in a certain way over and over again, and in no other way. T1'Zis calls for well-thought-out demands to be made on the young soldiers by way of service regulations and by way of making sure that all superior officet~ and func- tionaries proceed in a uniform manner in .implementing them. This, among other things, involves a thorough knowledge of all subordinates and, based on this, various different ways of proceeding. Adherence to the dialectics of personality and collective development en- sures tilization of the educational potentialities of the military collec- tive for the formation of positive habits. Systematic development of social- ist collective views in the unit, solidification of socialist relations its the collective, and between the collective and superior officers, inclusion of the collective in the solution of tasks and in the education of its members, and many other factors are conditions which promote the development of socialist habits. -20- C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L P'10 FOREIGN DISSEM -_--~- i~pproved-For Release 1 9 9 910 912 6 :CIA=RDP88TOflfst~Rt1902@Q~~~9-0042=3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-I~ - r:-n-E-N-'L'-'f.-A?-L IJO I~ORLIGN I)LSSEM In short: "ravorahl.e conditions for. an open, par.l-i.san atmospher.c exist wherever commanders, pollticall orp;ans, mul party orl;anizations attend to the development of 5oc.a1lst relations betwaen army personnel and within ? th~~ co.l.lectives, and wherever due attention is paid to a steady improve- ment of. the ser.va.ce rand .l.avinl; conditions of army personnel. It is there that our argumentation in political discussions falls on fertile ground, ^ it is there that: activities and consc:tous acting dev~:Lop, and it is there that the soldiers wall carry out their. difficult duties gl.adl.y and en- thusiastically."9 1. Makarenko, ~. S.: "Werlcc" /"Works"/, Vol. 5, 8crlin 1.964, p 453. Rubinstein, S. L.: "Grundlagen der. Allgemei.nen Psychologie" /"Funda- mentals of- General Psychology"/. Berlin 1962, p 685. Quoted from_Petrovski, A. W.: "A.llgemeine 1'sychologie" _/"General Psychology"/. Berlin 1975, p 179. - 4. From the report of the secretariat of the NVA political main adminis- tration to the Ninth Delegates Conference o[ the SED party organira- tions in the National People's Army and the GDR border. troops. Speaker: Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In: I?AR'I'IIARBEII'fsR, Berlin. Special Ninth Uelegates Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 33. 5. Ibidem. 6. Makarenko, A. S.; Loc. cit., p 463. 7. From the report....Loc. cit., p 43. 8. Ibidem, p 43. 9. From the concluding remarks by Comrade Willi Stoph, member of the politburo of the SED central committee and chairman of the GDK council of state. In: PARTEIARBEITER; Berlin. Special Ninth Delegates Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 94 and following pages. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-~-N-1?- I-D-I:-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN llISSEM B~.SIC IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTIONS OUTLINED East Berlin MILITAEKWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 42-48 [By Lt Col Dr A. Bendrat, political scientist] /Excerpts/ Like ideological work as a whole, political training in the armed forces aims at fulfilling the main military task. Its aims are directed unequivocally at insuring high fighting capacity and combat readi- ness, at the action and behavior oL? members of the army. What componentsy f oliticallbeandlmorallyafoundled~behaviorsoftsocialist an ideologicall p Y soldiers, such as: --unconditional execution of orders, which ioliticalliaunderstoodmands behavicr deriving from conscious, that is, p Y personally accepted, subordination to the will of the superior as that of a class comrade; --iron military discipline, which in the socialist army means behavior deriving from tt-~ soldier's moral attitude, an attitude he has adopted as a member of the working class, following the example of its best revolu- tionary fighters and, above all, the model of the Soviet Army; --struggle fir the best possible training results, which in the socialist army means behavior s~ipported by personal responsibility for the projection of socialism, which the soldier has learned and acknowledged to Ue the cause that is most just and most worth defending. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F- I-~-L-N-'1'- I-A-L NU FOREIGN Di.SSLM We could to on In L-he same vein. 'I'o base the whole behavior of the solcLlc+r or noncommissioned of:f.icc:r and al.l his concrete man-i.f%stati.~ns in mi.l:itar.y c~ervice on a class-conscious personal. decision, taken vo:l.unt-u?t:Ly out of ? ideological conviction--that is the responsabi..l.ity of :i_deological work in the armed forces and i.s its ultimate object:ive, arul thus a:Lso the ulti- mate objective of political training. 'T'hus a comprehensive and rather complicated educational and t-rai.ning task presents itself, a task wh.lch by no means can be solved instantly and from one day to the next. All. prerequisites--for example the so-cal.l.ed "preli.minary phases" of action and behavior with the ma~i.n military task in view and, above all, knowledge and lulow-how-~-are means toward the end, means from which the development of- actual behavior proceeds. The best knowledge and know-how remains socially useless unless :it results in re- quired action. hlithout the mentioned prerequi.sites, then--especially without lcno~.~~l.edge and know-how and class-related motivation--a class-conscious bchavi.or 'is unthinkable. Knowledge and I=olitical 'T'raining It goes without saying that the quality of politic~il training cannot be measured solely by taught and acquired knowledge. It is a question of teaching this knowledge in such away as to affect as much as possible they action as well as the thinking of army members. 13ut what is decisive is the realization that the content of political. training, consisting of fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology, plays the decisive -role. The teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory--that is, work with the subject matter of political training--is gaining increasing importance. The reasons for this are, among other things: First, in building socialism/communism, the part played by conscious action of our people increases, and thus the need increases for acquiring more and more knowledge especially in the field of social science. Second, our workers' and especially our youth's general and specialized education, their ideological knowledge and experience, their whole intel- lectual and cultural level increase constantly. On this basis the self- confidence and self-assurance of the individual and the collective are consolidated, and their demands increase for all types of education, es- pecially for ideological, political and moral education. Third, the adversary, primarily in the form of social democratic theories of social science, is working with sophisticated methods. To L-hwart t}rese C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I. NO FORRIGN DISSGM :Approved For Release 1999/0912F-: CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-I~- l:-ll-I:-N-'I'-7:-A-L. NO I~UIZELGN D1551.M and to unmask t-hclr dcmal;oy; ca? 1lnL:LCU111111U11a8(: rli.~:Ul'l'. rcqutr.c~s firm and app].icnble knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and of the po.l.Jc.y of our I~nrCy. L~onrr',1, the further devclopm~nt ~~f the military, nwdcrnization of the ;1ocl.al.ist armed forces and the increar.~ing :3harc uL? Lc.chrlolol;y and theory demands a higher degree of ideolog:'.ca]., political and moral. as well ah intellectual education of members ~f the armed furr.c:: in al. ]. branches i>f combclt tral.nin;. In the future, among the many components whfch, dc:terml.ne instr.uct-lon .in pol.lt~cal training and are d:lrected toward high educational. effectiveness, knowledge, lasting and concretely applicable knowledge, will further gain in importance as the basis and guide].l.ne of all. ideological work and a].l educational processes. What determines the scope of the content -~f: political training, and thus of t11e knowledge which trainees are to bye taught? If we look over the programs, we are faced with a situation of pnr~ly great differences in topics and, at. the same time, of: great differences in struc:t:ure as far as subject matter is concerned. The programs and educational materials centrally predetermine subject matter, which is based on what our society has already achieved in the field of edur.ating the young generation. Our training broup leaders need to know more About this and must show a greater personal interest in finding out at wh~e level our 1G to 18-year- old youths these days acquire a Marxist-Leninist outlook in the general po]ytechnical or expanded high school and in their professional training, what they already know and what demands they make. No one should allow himself to be guided by the derleanor of one trainee or another, for this llas led to surprises in many cases. Sociological findings and analyses show unequivocally, and one's own ex- perience confirms, that the ideological education of our youth is progressing faster than many a person supposes on the basis of dubious external criteria (haircut, interest in music and so forth). Of course, it is to be assumed that the average general and ideological educational level differs from group to group. Preliminary training and training group leaders must assess in a responsible manner what knowledge of the topic concerned must be newly acquired or consolidated by the training group and what parts can be skipped entirely under certain cir- cumstances. '['fle time available to us demands that we base political training on cert~cin prerequisites. The objective of political training in the NVA makes it C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T006?~F~A~00.200-a.10D42-3 Approved For Release 1,999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 NU l~OIil:l GN bJ ;~Sh:P1 clear th;:; wt, cannc:C and clc, nnl: wir:h to cov,~r c~vc~rythtn}!. 'I'hc~ ::elec?tic,n of thc~ rtuhject uurtCer of pulttical t:rainirt}; is cleiermine:GN DISSLM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/0~/ 6T00608R000200110042-3 C-~~= -1 b~~ N=5'~-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM The main contents of the third group of problems consists of questions of party political work with the troops. In the center of attention-- again on the basis of V. I. Lenin's ideas--are substantive and methodo- logical problems of moral-political and psychological preparation of the troops for armed struggle, with the demands of modern war as well a:! problems of ideological struggle in modern war and questions of cultura:~ education of army members being taken into account. The problems which thr- authors cover here impart to commanders and all other superiors as _ well as to party and youth officials in the NVA /National People's Army/ and the border troops of the GDR valuable knowledge and experience, which must be utilized in order to fulfill the mandate of the Eighth Party Congress of the SI;D: to develop socialist soldiers and fighting collec- tives with a view to "attaining the best possible results in combat training and in increasing combat readiness, as well as insuring the -34- C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM "wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland" and "imperialist wars" are similarly identified as types of war., despite the fact that in the two instances not unified but different classif ication crl.teria are used. It might? also be worth noting that other Soviet authors identify dust wars and unjust wars as "principal types of war."~? The reviewer undersL-ands by types of war. classes of dust wars and classes of unjust wars of a certain historical era and has expounded this concenr in several publications.2 In a 4econd group of problems, the questions of the building up of the Sovie,? ~~rmed forces and the development of Soviet military science are disc~isr~ed. The authors trace the essence of the Leninist concept of the butlding up of the socialist army and the obiactive laws on which its development are based. On the basis of the milj*-ary philosophical heri~- tlge of V. I. Lenin, the problem of the laws ei development of the so- cialist armed forces has been researched in the Soviet Union for a long time. For most readers of the book in the GDTrrectly toward the development of training in the coming - 42 - C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved ,For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T0,0608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN UISSLM training semester, w1.th the erpcricnce of the previous semester bean}; taken into account. ? 2. More influence should be exercised on the quality of the preparation of training personnel and on more regul.ar.ly conducting instructional. checks with training personnel.. The quality of personal training materia.l.s and instructions is to be increased. 3. The setting of tasks concerning the aim, content, method, organization and safeguardl.ng of the training to be conducted and of methodical in- structive training is to be personally implemented and improved by superiors, within the framework of preparing training personnel f:or their deities. The preparation for their duties must be checked. The superior must pre- pare training personnel by groups far the tralning measures to be taken. 4. In preparing training personnel in a methodical instructive manner, certain training elements are to be concretely worked out. Under the superior's guidance, training personnel alternately act :;s trainers and trainees. It should constantly be the aim to develop the noncommissioned officers' (trainers') practical abilities to lead groups, garrisons, serv- ices and detachments in combat. This trai-;ing is to be oriented toward mastery of weaponry and technology as well as toward perfectini; methodical abilities, with main emp`+asis cn training in the field. It has also proved expedient to show training films concerning the subjects of the program prior to training. This opportunity is not utilized every- where, however. Training fiJ.ms are recommended for the following subjects: Camouflage, close combat against tanks, protective measures following the employment of chemical weapons by the enemy, military transport by rail, reinforcement in combat, fuel supply in combat, rationalization of loading and unloading of supplies. Planning, Control and Reports First let us point out once more that all tasks by units of the rear serv- ices for training in other military categories and services (maneuvers, combat firing, bivouar_s, and so forth) are to lie regarded as combat train- ing and to be utilized for training soldiers and units. This is to insure, among other things, that, for instance, a cook, the driver of a fuel supply vehicle or an ambulance driver puts in the required number of hours in training categories stipulated by the training program. The hours spent in special tactical training, within the framework of set tasks, must be included in control and reports. This is especially true of work and training in the second and third semester in the field of specialized training. In control and reports concerning the results in political and combat _ training as well as in the competition for top performance /Bestenbewegun~/, -43- C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved, For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86Tg0608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-r- I.-D-I:-N-T=I -A-I. NU I~UItGIGN DISSEM the following id required, among other things: high level of staff, articulateness, checks agreeing with actual training; accomplishments, and completeness of documentation. Checks of obligations and their fulfill- ment as well as of classificatians aha'll be conducted monthly. What counts here primarily is monthly evaluation, assessment, and control o% results in the combat training control boak. Above all, this article is intended to evaluate experience and to stimulate discussion in this journal. In the discussion, additional. experience should be described, and proposals should be submitted on how and in which fields political and combat training can be organized and implemented even better. In so doing, the objective should be a further increase in combat readiness of the rear services of the army. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved, For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86TQ0608R000200110042-3 ~. ired; --measures for the monitoring of the efficacy of personal protective equip- ment, execution of tests for the functioning of protective masks, controls concerning the operational readiness of the equipment anti means of nuclear/ chemical reconnaissance, for dosage control and special measurers; --the sequence of reinforcement with nuclear/chemical equipment and means, where and in what degree reserves are to be deployed; --the means of crossing affecting sectors, actions in affected sectors, necessary protective measures, the execution of special measures with organic forces and means; --the preparation and issue of food, the control and utilization of water points, water preparation, sanitary-hygienic measures; --the control of the dosage received by personnel (dosimetrics); reports concerning dosage received; --warning signals and the type and means of thei~~ transmission and repro- duction; --the forces and means for the elimination of the consequences of enemy employment of 1`NM which have to be kept in reserve, the organization of their employment and l.eadersltip; --methods of cooperation with units of the chemical defense and their place in the approach or combat orders as well as their tasks. C-O-N-F-I-D-);-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved F~a~- Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86TOOC08R000200110042-3. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-Is-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM ' The content of these instructions is not idenL?ical in every case. It de- pends primarily on the combat mission, the preceding or anticj.pated actions of the enemy, the character of the terrain and tl~e meteorolol;ical condi- tions. T.n certain combat situations only a precise definition and updating of these instructions concerning the forces and means as well as the rime and place of. their employment is required. Specifications of the MVM protection measures are to be made depending on the situation created by the total combat picture, particularly if the enemy has employed MVM for the first time or repeatedly. In such situations it is required to reorganize the missions of the --nuclear/chemical reconnaissance (monitoring); --the actions in affected areas (sectors); --the deployment of forces and means for the elimination of the consequences of the enemy action; as well as --the execution of special measures. T.hes~ MVM protective measures are to be realized after the employment of MVM o~~ly in close coordination with a series of other measures for the restoration of the combat capability of tl~e MSB/PB units. These measures include, tong others: --the organization of the restoration of command and control, --the organization of first aid for casualties and their evacuation to the medical service installations, --the extinguishing of fires, --the specification of combat missions, --the warning of neighboring units and other units in the area, and --if necessary, the organization of the re-grouping of units, their supply with ~uipment, arms, ammunition, PUL and other logistical requirements. Following the organization of the MVM protection, staff officers are to assign the control and instructional task for these measures in the in- dividual units. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 . _ 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-o-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-C-A-T, NO FOREIGN DISSIsM TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE AFFECTS AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENSE COMMAND RisADTNESS Last Berlin MTL]TAERWiJSEN in German Jun 75 pp 98B-104B [By author's collective under the guidance of rIa~ Gen T~1 Langel /Excer.pt/ With the development of modern combat equipment, a number of changes have occurred: The combat equipment became more complicated< It attained an unprecc.dcnted destructive force; the speed and range of impor- tant combat means were increased substantially. Tn the development of the air force and air defense this ran be demonstrated with the following facts: Tt took 26 years to increase the Gpeed of aircraft from 150 to 550 km per Hour, 14 years to increase their speed from 1200 to 2000 km per hour. Tt took only a few years to build strategic rockets with an average speed that is twenty times higher than that of the strategic bombers. In the process, military equipment became constantly more complicated. Fifteen to 20 years ago equipment oY~ the average contained 700 to 800 in- dividual parts and today already 1G00 to 1500.1 From this certain conclusions can be drawn The qualitative changes in the weaponry and technical equipment of the LSK/LV that combine all the c~~-ogress attained in the field of science and technology, place the highest require- ments on the qualifications of army members in all sectors of military life. A central problem posed here is the mastery of the equipment, its effective and dependable operation. "The best combat means provide their advantages - 49 - C-0 -N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T006i78R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-'r-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM only where army members show a full mastery over their operation, their maintenance and repair, coupled with a high fighting morale, based on socialist convictions of principle. The mastery of equipment by army mem- bers represents in cltls sense a decisive component of military superiority."2 While it was possible in the past to balance one or the other component in the course of a war with an increased exertion of strength, iL- is necessary nowadays to develop all components uniformly in the preparation of troops for combat. This means: Only those troops can gain victory today who are superior to the enemy politically and ideologically as well as in their mental and physical capabilities and who dispose over modern combat equip- ment. "In a modern war the morale factor can play its decisive role not by itself, bur. only in connection with the material factor."3 The ini:e;.rclaticnsitip between man and equipment is thus being strengthened continuously. It is therefore not sufficient any longer to draw the genera]_ conclusion that the role of man and equipment is increasingly important in modern war. It is necessary to take account of new developments in this interrelationship. The Introduction of New and Complicated Combat Equipment with Ewer Greater Frequency The Air Force and Air Defense Command of the NVA dispose of modern and complicated weapons systems. To guarantee their. efficacy both individually and in combination, requires both an excellent sY.ate of c~.re and maintenance of equipment a:~d primarily a high state of training on the part of army members. Orly in this way can the tactical. and technical parameters of the equipment be fully utilized. It becomes evident in this connection that the renewal of the material-technical basis of troop units takes place in ever shorter time frames, that the number of new types of weapons is in- creasing and that the new combat equipment that is issued as a rule becomes ever more complicated. This statement is evidenced by the following in the development of weapons systems for air defense: 1. The advantages of the socialist productioT.t method are constantly being put to better use to gear combat equipment to :he needs of man. Thus certain mental and manual activities have been t,3ken ov~~+- by computers and automated equipment as, for example, automatic pilots any' guidance systems for weapons and equipment. Nevertheless the stress on the human operator does not decrease by any means. A series of factors are at work in this which result frem the construction and equipment of modern interceptor a.iLcraft of the present and ~' next generation. In this connection the following should be mentioned: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSE%i ---~Appro~red For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 .. ,. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-0 -N- F- I-D-1;-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISS>JM --the increasing speed and altitude characteristics (MIG-15/17, max speed to 1200 lcm/h, top altitude aro~,~nd 16,000 m; MIG 21, max speed around X400 km/h, max altitude around 20,000 m); --the ever more extensive cockpit equipment; --the more complicated navigational equipment of the aircraft in most flight phases; --the 3.ncrease in combat possib4.lities; based on the weaponry variations; --the increasing dependence of the separate flight phases on ground systems; --the greater requirements placed on the knowledge and skills of the air- craft commander during the occurrence of special in-flight situations. All told, the number of d:he laws of cognition, of volition)."5 C-O-N-F-1-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSiiM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N- F- I-1)- i:-N-'I'- I:-A- L NC T'OREIGAS D1'SSEM Intensifyinl; Thinkinl; and Acting in Equul Mcasur.c~ The dynamics of modern combat, the continuail. ].esseninf; of the t:i.me nvata.nhl.c for the fulfillment of. certain combat tasks, make it necessary that f:Imc sequences in the operation of combat equipment- arc continually shor.t-ened. At the same time greater precision is required of. ;army members in their actions. The composition and the characteristics of modern military equipment, thy. requirement for consciously and actively engaged sold.ter per.:;onalities, con- sidering the time limits available for training on equipment-, coupled with the requirement far complete mastery of the equipment under. the conditions of limited periods of military service--a11 this ].cads to r_r.aining method that put the accent on the equal intensification of thinking and acting. The noted military pedagogue, V. I. Lu~kov writes in this connection: "More than ever today the perfection of military mastery deper;ds nn the psychological preparation of the soldier for his task. It is known for instance that man can at most recognize 5 to 9 individual objects in a connected relationship and that the human arm can make about 5.2 movements per second without strain, but the lower arm 8, and the hand up to 11.4. The minimal reaction time to signals in quick sequence amounts to 0.25 seconds; the interval limit between signals that still allow a proper re- action amounts to 0.5 seconds. Human thought takes place at a speed of 20 to 30 operations per second. One recognizes that the human being has to operate within certain limits. If he wants to overcome these Ise must rai.sc the absolute and relative sensitivity of the sensory organs through proper exercises, to shorten the reaction time, to increase the resistance of the organism, and thu.~ to lower the duration of fatigue or to postpone fatigue."6 Investigations have disclosed that the comh>e fight against the enemy's modern a1r attack means as employed in the defense against imperialist aggresLive actions in Southeast Asia and also in the Near East of course merits proper attention. It furnishes us with Important le;zsons for the proper represenl-a~tion of the man-equipment inter- r~cti.ons . Army members are to be trained in such a way that they love the combat equipment c~ntrt,sted to them, that they are convi.t~ced of the depenclabili.ty and superiority of the Soviet equipment--this is a ba~tc task of our military-technical propaganda. ' 1'h Ls has to happen continuously within the framework of the training pro- c~ss, in combat training, during exercises and maneuvers and in daily political mass work. Our military-technical propaganda i.s based on the experiences of the Soviet Army. For their further activation we need to employ all those who gradu- ated from institutions of higher learning academies i~t the Soviet Union and also in our Republic. Tt is important to fit the theme treatment to the respective audience. In this connection a few basic principles must 1~c observed without fail.: --Army members must receive timely access to the military-technical know- ledge that pertains to their weapons system. --The suc~:essful operation of complicated military equipment requires in many cases the acquisition of knowledge in related technical fields beyond one's own. Efforts in this direction must be reinforced. --The methodological skills of the technical trainers are a decisive pre- requisite for the increase of the military knowledge and skills of. per- sonnel. In order to diffuse technical knowledge rapidly and well, the propagation of tested and of new methods is essential. Main Attenr.ion to be Devoted to the Education of Army rlember. In our training activity, all army members art to be instructed time and again that the equipment en~:rusted to us is the people's property and that C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-U-N-F-I-iI-E-N-'i-1-A-L NO FORI~IGN llISSEM i.t is to be cared for and mnintaaned. Involved ar.e :;ubstantial vaLt~es, the objectified work of thousands of workers, enE;i.ncer.y, techn.tcians and sci.entisr_s. If equipment and property are treated negligently and premature lo~~;;c~s occur, our Republic sustains a double loss: nut only is there a wa::t-e of expensively-built material means, but t-he combat value of the servicr.;-;, formations and units is lowered as well. This is why an essential duty of commanders, political workers and engi.nc~er.- ing-technical personnel requires the training of all army members to tl~e strict observance of service regulations, oper.ata.o~ial procedures and of safety regulations. In his contribution to the discussion at the 13t-h plenary session of the SED Central Committee, Colonel General Heinz Kessler stated that the standards set for the Further strengthening of discipline, the accumpl.ish- ment of an exact military order, the mastery of modern combat equiptncnt and first of all for the leadership of the ideological work will have to be more strict-. This conclusion also applies to the solution of the prob- lems listed in the present contribution. We are guided in tlii.s by t:l~e fact that the "decisive task" for the creation of. a high state of combat readiness "is the political education of each member of the armed forces, the acquisition and deepening of solid and immovable Marxist-Leninist basic convictions and of a strong class standpoint.II This must be re- flected in the relations between man and equipment. War has always been and wi.11 always be connected with unprecedented stress on the indiviriual fighter. Daring, boldness, bravery and self-sacrifice have been and will remain qualities that will decisively determine the actions of the socialist soldier personality. But today these gt~al.iti_es of themselves are not sufficient. The rapid development of Lectulology increases the specific requirements that are. placed on man to a substantial. degree. In a modern war the effect of the morale factor must tae seen in close con- nection with the commitment of modern war materiel. The higher morale that disti~lguishes the socialist fighter must express itself to a large extent in the general mastery of modern combat equipment and the maximum use of its combat qualities in the interests of gaining victory over the enemy, even under the most difficult conditions. 1. Luzkov, V. N.: "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"), Berlin, 1973, p 43. C-G-N-F-'I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEhI roved-For-Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-'N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-1. NO FOREIGN UISSEM 2. iionecker, E.: "Zuverlaeasiger Schutz des Sozialismus" ("Dependable Protection of Socialism"), Berlin, 1973, p 181. 3. Authors' Collective Led by Milovidov, A. S. and Koslow, V. G., "Das Philosophische Erbe Lenins and die Probleme des Modernen krieges" ("The Philosophical Heritage of Lenin And the Problems of Modern War"), ~~p. c,it., p 240. 4, Authot?a' Co11ecL?ive Led by Mareyev, I.S., "Die Parteipolltsche Arbeit in der Sowjetarmee and der Sow~etkriegsfloLte" ("The Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy"), op. cit., p 366. 5. Luzkov, V. N., "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"), op, cit., p 45. G. Op, cit., p 46. 7. Engelstaedter, W., in MILITAERWESEN , Berlin, 1974, p 102-104. 8. Keller, H., "Das vom Volk Geschaffene Wird 7.uverlaessig Geachtietzt" ("What Was Created by the People is Protected Dependably"), 13th Plenum Discussion, Berlin, 1974, p 113. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T006~8R000200~110042-3 _ , Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DI.SSEM CONCEPTS OF AERIAL COMBAT PRESENTrD East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 110B-113B [By Col Dr F. Beer, military scientist] /Excerpt/ How can the influence of combat characteristics on the effective- ness of t~~e interception of aerial targets 1~e taken account of in the command activity of commanders when they formulate combat decisions? This happens through the calculation and evaluation of the combat potential. By combat potential for the interception and destruction of aerial targets is under- stood the anticipated result of the combat deployment of interceptor fight=_rs in their execution of a specific combat task under actual. conditions. Com- bat potential expresses quantitatively the effectiveness of the combat de- ployment of interceptor aircraft by means of the anticipated result of their combat actions. The concept of combat potential thus is stibstantiell~~ wider than the concept of combat characteristics. It takes into account as many as possible of the characteristics and factors that have a substantial impact on the capability of interceptors to carry out combat actions. Combat experiences in Vietnam and the Near East have shown that. the resuJ.ts of aerial combat actions depend particularly on the following factors: --the status of training and of the fighting morale of the aircraft com- manders, --the determination and courage of their action, --the purposeful and consistent command and control of the fighter farces from the ground and in the air, C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM .Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 t Approved For Release 1999/Q~9~2~ 1, ~IA~~~,P~6~T~0608R000200110042-3 NO I~O;tlilGN 1)'I:SSLPt --the purpose ful.ner;r3 0l the tact.lca7 methods empa.oyed in combat, the in- tcl.l.al;ent and r;kill(?ul exp ua(:;rtlon of the advantal;es of friendly aircraft. i.n con~r.lderation of the c?omhat potential of the enemy. 'I'hi.s L., wiry ..m a::rae~~~:mcnt of the c:ornbat potential and their evaluation in t he interest of the cormn,rncler'r; decision making hroc~sses, must take Choir point of departure. always I corn t:he anticipated sLCuation. ']'hest calcrr]rr- t-tons :r].w:rys have a very soc~cifi.c content- :.rnd as a rule do nut lead Lo l;enera.l.l.y val:{.d ;tatementa, that arc appl:icahle an all kinds of. c~i.tuatlons. On the other hnr.d, there exist natur.a].ly averal;e comb;tt potential. for fi.ghtc~r aircraft which exl.>resses the probable results of combat deploy- ment for the ]ntercc:~ption and destruction of aerial. targets under typi.caJ, nvera};e conditions. 'These depend prtmari.ly on the combat characteristics of the: combat, command and security equipment, and can be calculated try the extent that the.^, c: combat charactc~r.intics arc known, u:;ir:~ m~rc or l.e:;s comp] i.cat:ed m;rthernatic;r:1. methods ;rnd can he represented in the. form of n~nnaric.nl vaaues, nomugrapFrs, tables etc. All. responsible staff. off:Icc~rs can work these out in advance and incorporate them {.nto the permanent hacic?- F;round data of their wor.k:i.n}; documents. Cr?i tur.ia of Combat Potential 'fhe conun;utdcr who makes an estimate of combat potential for the fu.l.f.illment of a specl)-lcally-ordered combat mission must answer the question in which area, how fast and o.~ith which quality or effectiveness this task can he executed. He must thus a~,se5;; three ;aspects of the combat potential. 1. the spat i.al. opportun Ltics, 2. tP~;:~ ti.me oppc~rtunit:ies and ::-. they effectiveness of the combat actions (rcau.lts of the fulti.l.lment cC the comhrit m:i.ssion). 't'hese aspects of the combat potential arc expressed quantitatively through appropriate triter. i_a of combat potential. (spatial, time and probahi.li.t-y criteria). The spatial potent..i.al of interceptor aircraft for the fu.lfil.lment of com- bat. tasks arc expressed quantitatively by sectors. Such sector;, arc' the radLus of action, L-he po;;sibl.e sectors of the combat deployment of inter- ccptor aircraft- accor.di.ng to ~_rpproach sectors, hcit,ht-s and velocil-i.e~, thr sectors of potential attack i,1 aerial combat and the potential fire ?rone:;. The r~idaus of action, nusiniug the ai.r space within which interceptor a.tr-? c~.raft have the capahilitY of intercc~pti.ng and destroyiuY enemy aircraft, i.~, determined espc~cial.l.y by thc~ fol_Locoi.nl; c.omb:~t r'~aracter. istics: NO I~OAI~IGN UISSI.M Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 ,, Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM --the flight range and flight duration of the interceptor aircraft- or its radius of Lactical action; --the height at which the interceptor and its weaponry is commi.ted. The possible zones of the combat deployment are expressed by L-he altitude/ velocity diagrams of friendly and enemy aircraft and other characteristics. The zones of possible attack and possible fire, that i.s to say the maximum and minimum possible target distances as well as the range of the aircrafr_ depending on the direction, represent the influence of tl~e combat character- istics of the weapons system and the on-board radar instrumentation range of the interceptor aircraft on its combat deployment. The time horizon of the interceptor aircraft for the accomplishment of combat tasks is indicated quantitatively by various time values that characterize the combat readiness of the aircraft for combat deployment as well as the duration cf thy- interception process and its various phases. The criteria of combat readiness as a rule are norm times, for instance time of transition from one degree of operational readiness to a higher one, elapsed time to takeoff by the interceptor after receipt of the scramb.l.e order and elapsed time to attainment of the approach flight path. These criteria are influenced significantly by the maintenance condition, the takeoff conditions, the acceleration capability and other combat character.- i.stics of the aircraft. The efficacy of the combat deployment. of the interceptor aircraft illustrates the degree, extent or quality with which the combat task is accomplished. Si~.ice the combat deployment for the interception and destruction of aerial ta,:gets frequently talces place under similar cona~::ions anti tiier.efore has a certain mass character, its efficacy is expressed by means of probability criteria which are frequently described as effectiveness criteria. The proper effectiveness criterium must be determined in relation to the in- dividual combat mission and the conditions of the engagement. The following typical variations may occur in case of combat deployment for the inter- ception and destruction of- aerial targets: Table 1. Variants of Combat Deployment Engagement Conditions Combat Mission Effectiveness Criterium 1. A single aerial target Interception and Destruction Probability seeks to penetrate the Destruction of the of the aerial target air defense system serial target C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I- ' -'. NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608fa90~0-299x-40042-3--- ---~--~-- Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Table 1 (continued) 2? A group of aerial Interception and targets seek to pene- destruction of the trace the air. defense greatest possible system number of targets Interception and destruction of all targets Interception and destruction of a specificali~ ordered number of targets 3. The enemy overflies Interception and the air defense destruction of the corridor or sector greatest number of as a target of oppor- targets in the tunity sector or corridor Engagement of all targets Mathematical expectation of the number of targets destroyed Probability that all targc::s are intercepted and destroyed. Probability of inter? ception and destruction of at least the ordered number of targets. Mathematical expectation of the number of destroyed targets in the pertinent sector (corridor). Probability that all radar guide tracks are engaged and that a target can overfly the sector (corridor) with impunity. The Interception Probability Irrespective of which effectiveness criterium the commander selects ,`or the calculation and assessment of the combat potential, its determination ,nust take into account the effectiveness of the individual interceptor aircraft in the interception of an aerial target. This is characterized by the so- called interception probability of the aerial target. The interception probability expresses the influence of the combat charac- teristics of the aircraft and of its weapons system as well as of its command and control equipment on the result of the interception (aerial target destroyed or not destroyed). It takes into consideration all phases of the interception process, particularly the two main phases: the guiding of the interceptor aircraft towards the target and the aerial engagement. In the first main phase the interceptor is guided by ground means to such close proximity of the aerial Target that the aircraft commander can get a fix on the target and subsequently commence the aerial engagement. The - 61 - C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM `---------- - -A .Fox..~g.~e 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D->;-N-T-I-A-L NO FC~TZ>;IGN DISSEM combat potential in this phase is determined from the point of view of effectiveness by the probability of the successful conduct of the inter- ceptor aircraft to the aerial target by ground means, which depends on the combat characteristics of the fighter ground to air control means and o~i the different combat characteristics of the aircraft particularly on its maneuverability during banking maneuvers. During the engagement phase the aircraft commander of the interceptor air- craft independently approaches the aerial target after he has a fix on it and commences the attack. He places himself in a good firing position, launches the rockets or opens fire and destroys the target. The effective- ness of this phase is characterized by the destruction probability of the aerial target in the course of an aerial engagement. This depends in particular on the combat characteristics of the on-board guidance system and the weapons system besides the different tactical/technical charac- teristics of the interceptor aircraft. The determination of the interception vrobability of aerial targets through the commitment of modern Interceptor aircraft under different conditions is the most difficult part of the methology in the computation and assess- ment of the combat potential inasmuch as complicated inter-relationships exist between its component parts and the combat characteristics /of the aircraft/. This probability can be computed according to the following formula in a most general way. PA = Ph x Pq x kz . PA--Interception probability of tl.e aerial target, Ph--Probability of successful approach, P~ -Destruction probability of the aerial target in an engagement, kz--Dependability (survival probability) of the elements of the interception system. The criteria of combat opportunities are determined in the practical work of the commanders and staffs according to special computing methods that are standard for all sectors. The methodology of the operational/tactical computations is illustrated in special instructions. In the case of the combat deployment of interceptor aircraft, these are primarily naviga*.ional/ tactical and engineering/navigational computations. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 ,. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-0-N-1?-I-I)-E-N-'1-I-A-L NO I~CRLIGN ll1:SSEM Il.lustrutaon 1. Mel-.hodoio};y of Computation and Assessment of Combat OpportuniLic~~ o.C tlic Int.-crceptor Aircraft ur/ren ;rha~a:.o:r.lrn .1r3 r~blU."y,J l~'! ~ ?rU~rl q ~/~, 3f r mtC/'f3 f fy'~Onr3 Jr1 ct'n r 7 ~_r . _ ~~. __ _ ___ LP's': Jr e" f;.~. ~--~. ~. :. ... ..f~' ..r'id Cr'~c': r~r~_ 9 ~ __-'r,;~~Q__ .r_!`t~f _-_ ~r~ ~r?..;Ld :[! .,f,,,., .,1 .,r ^ ~~ ... ~ ~nr;u::yr,JJrv(1 b~gn,tN ~Nc?'. ~u(R~orrn) ~-al 4J1 1. wombat I'otentia]. of: the Interceptor Ai.rc.raft 2. Probable Result. of thc~ Combat Deployment according to Com- putati~ns 3. Assessment 4. Required Result of the combat deployment acr_.erding to combat mission 5. Criteria of Combat ]'otenti.al 6. Spatial Critcri.a 7. Time Criteria 8. Probability Criteria 9. ParLi.al Criteria 10. Tnfluence Values (C13aracteristics, i'actors) C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN I)ISSEM --~~eved-For Release-'I-939~A9~2~-~: -CIA RDP--~6-'x.0.0.6-O.S.RU00200.110042-3 __ ..._._._.~__._.__.___ Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Illustration 2. Criteria of Combat Opportunities of the Interceptor 1 Qdumlithe KritlriM ~rllr~G! AiderrM ~i~rw^'~oiu~ sstorl l r''o^r'~rsoo.-nun9 Key: 1. Spatial Criteria 2. Time Criteria 3. Probability Criteria 4. zone of action 5. approach sectors 6. tactical action radius 7. Flight-Velocity Sectoxs 8. sector of possible attacks (firing) :rr"~ sc^r?rnrcr..r,: urs .arrJr? i~~S~oti if Jhr'; y r~..r /?r?'ll ~,. ...r o?s~,;.e~; urs 7 /,; n,;~p~ ?~S 9. norm time of combat readiness 10. duration of combat sortie 11. preparation time for repeat start 12. duration of air alert patrols 13. combat tension 14. probability of approach 15. destruction probability 16. dependability of the inter- ception system ].. Wentzel, J. S.: Berlin, 1966. "Operationsforschung" ("Operational Research" 2. Authors' Collective: 1972. "Militaerlexicon" ("Military Lexicon"), Berlin, 3. Durov, V. P.: "Der Gaf~chtseinsatz and die Wirksamkeit von Abfangjagdfluzeugen ("Combat Commitment and the Effectiveness of Interceptor Aircraft"), Moscow, 1972. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved for~Release 1999/09/26-:--CIA-RDP86T00608ROII02D01.1.0.042-3_ Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : ClA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D_E_N-T-I-A-L NO I~'OREIGN DISSEM INFORMATION PROVIDED ON SPECIALIZED TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONNP:L East Berlin MIi.,ITAERWESLN in German Jun 75 pp 114B-117B [By Lt Col J. Knie] /Text/ The education and training of pilots, who must master aircraft as a weapon under all circumstances, is in the center of the combat training of the air force. The report of the SED Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress states in this connection: "The increase in the battle strength and combat readiness of the Nstional Pe~ple'~ Army requires class- conscious combatants, whe master socialist military science on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and modern means of leadership, ,sri,~~ment, and technology, This poses increasing requirements on education and training."1 One of the most important requirements on military quali;`icatian :s con- formity between theoretical knowledge and practical skills. Higli military qualific;;~ion demands in a comprehensive sense: a unity of very good political, general military, and specialized knowledge which is based on firm class consciousness. Effective education and training must therefore make sure that all training potentials are being converted into l..~owledge, skills, and capabilities on a scientific basis. What matters in this respect is to convey only such knowledge, skills, and capabilities, wt-icli are a necessary requirement for the fulfillment of co;ni;at tasks. W}iat is required therefore is a meaningful conveyance of knowledge, which is li.mil-ed by the concrete tasks and concentrated on the essential. The conveyance of unusable knowledge is a waste of training time and a loss of combat potential. A constant optimal development of specialized and advanced trai-~,ing ensures a continuous increase of the training level of pilots and has thereby a decisive influence on combat readiness. A lack of tlleoret.ical knowledge contributes to the causes of flight accidents and L-he accidents C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NU FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999//09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-T-D-I:-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DTSSEM themselves. This results in a high responsibility of: all commanders, which can be expressed in the following principles: 1. Education probl.~ms and education questions permeate all spheres of society. 2. Education questions as leadership problems must play an essential. role in the command process and the work of every comm~.nder. Educational ideas are an essential component of command deliberations. 3. Determination and concrete preparation of tiie math substantive aspects and material consequences of education is part of the permanent planned work of every commander and of every command. The annual plan of specialized training must reflect the training level of the pilots and the tasks of the regiment, ~.ndicat~e material consequences, and contain plan positions which can be accounted for in terms of content and materially. Goals of Specialized and /advanced Training The goal consists in the development of specialized knowledge, capabilities, and skills required for the successful execution. of combat training and for actual combat. --constant perfecting of knowledge dealing with the tactics of combat events with full utilization of the technical sad tactical application ~~al~acities of the weapons systems; --systematic increase of the training level and performance classifi~~ation of pilot~e; --exact execution of the flight assignment without flight accidents or creating conditions for flight accidents; --retraining of pilots for new weapons syster!s and their preparation for combat action in the shortest possible time. Specialized training and advanced training must be constantly developed as an active and creative process. It must take account of the complexity of pilot training. Building on the basis of constantly provided basic knowledge, specialized training and advanced training has the purpose of developing oFerational procedures enabling pilots to carry out complex flight rassignments undEr all conditions of a tactical air situation. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved. For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000~200110042-3 Approved For Release 1 ~~~~_~,~~~F~~P~~T00608R000200110042-3 No roliElGN ulssEri Modern weapons systems oi' our. air force require for full uti.lizution of their combat capnci tics a syr;ternat i.c acquisitic~t of usable knowledge, capabilities, and skil..l.r,. 'ChiK must therefore be one of the training priori t lcs.. Content, form, and methodoloT;y must be oriented to this priority. The y~,oa.T is therefore not ortJy the conveyance of new knowledge Lot .also the fi.r.mi.nT; up :tad retention of knowledge already acquired. Only salable knowledge can he applir~rl in practice. 't'heory is the basis for any kind of activity. Every success in the aar must he prepared on the T;round. Development of Content The content of specialized t:rai.ninT and :ulvanced training is determined 1>y: weapons and c~quipmcnt, fate f:indingt+ of socialist military science, the requirements of. bassi.c aviation principles, the results of research in aviation medicine, the concrete tasks for the respective training year, and the trait~ine l.e.vel. of p.T1.ot.s. The following training specialties are included: tactical and technical. training, aviation theory, and navil;at3on traininT; and advanced training, as well as training in special- ized fields. Tactical training, is the nucleus of spec:ialized Traininf; a;~d advanced tr~tini.ng. Tt rr~atc~s the theoretical preconditions for. the conduct of :ai.r combat under di.ffcrent conditimis of a tactical air. situation. The fol.l~wi.ng prine.tples must be considered i.n tactical training: --the entire tactical training must be related to practice; --it must be a component of daily combat tra:ininp,; --tacti^al. findings moat determine the content of combat training exercises. 'Che following is bei.nT; taught in tacti.ca:l. training: --the functions of p lots in the duty system, the tasks during transition to a higher level of combat readiness, --defense against violators of the. air space, --regulation of cooperation with other service branches and neighbors, ---the experience ar.~i results of real combat actions in order to develop ski.11 and shrewdness, in air combat, --combat against ground and sea targets with the different weapons variants, C-O-N-r- I- D- E- N-1'- i-A-I, ND FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T0060$R000200110042-3 ~.' piFaY6'thF~.4c.m:irdli~ks~-1. ...._,,...::.u~a/~^t'i,~. e.:~u.:.t:~ ~...,...... .r ~...._ ? ....~. ...s . ......,.a ,~a.,_..._.L,..~;~u.z~.~s..v:~:e.~...edA....... ..,e.~ .~....,. ~. _i..~..~.._. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 c-o-N-F-I-n-E-rl-'r-I-n-L NO FCRI'sIGN nISSIsM Tactical training must always be a means for an encl and a basis f:or combat- relnted training. 'there should be no tactical principles of combat fiction which arc not being considered in combat training. Training, in aviation t:~eory deals with the immediate aerodynamic problems of flight practice. Victory in air combat depends decisively on maximal utilization of the combat characteristics of the aircraft. Practical aero- dynamics is therefore nn important training branch. Modern aircraft, which expand especia:~ly the range of altitude end speed and effect overall quali- tative changes of aerodynamic characteristics, demand of the oilots con- stantly applicable knowledge of practical aerodynamics. 'rhi.s requires also comparisons with the technology of the adversary in order to determine, on hand of a comparison of aerodynamic behavior of the aircraft, advantages and disadvantages and tactical rules for combat act.ton. Training Priorities There arc three priorities in the development; of specialized training and advanced training. The first priority, which is also the main priority, comprises the firming up and retention of basic knowledge required for every pilot. Tliis complex must be based on the requirements for graduates of the officers academy and contain classification requirements. We are dealing here with the specialized knowledge which is actually and immediately required by pilots for the execution of their combat assignments. It must remain on a con- stant level during life entire active service period of the pilot. The recognition that usable knowledge must be constantly repeated since the things that have been learned start to be forgotten after about 3 months, makes it necessary to pay great attention to the matter of retention of knowledge. Retention of knowledge is primarily repetition. However one frequently hears the following: "We have gone through this instruction three times already." This is an example of the selection of a wrong method. Too much of what is still known had been repeated. The partici- pants in the instruction had not been forced to collaborate and their mental potential was not completely used. They felt bored, and the in- struction had failed. The methuds for repetition course must be funda- mentally different from the original learning of a subject matter. Many options are available far this. They range from seminar to test and from consultation to exchange of ex- perience and direct instruction in technology, where theoretical factors are combined with practical assignments. The second priority is the constant conveyance of new knowledge. Planning of this priority is an extremely important task. Its content and extent cannot be uniform in all regiments, but depends considerably on the train- ing level of the pilots. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-~T-I-n-L NO FOREIGN DISSF.tvl Approved. For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-I)- E-N-T-T-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM This priority also includes the organized study of V5 /classified,/ material and open literature published by the LSK/LV (Air Force and Air D~f:ense Command). Organized study does not dust mean the perus;il. of several ar.t:i.clcs .i.n a certain area and at a certain kime. Organized study mr-.ans that stUdieA proceed according to predeterm.tned priorities, that the in- structor. has familiarized himself with the problems in advance, and that the rtub~ect matter is discusctc,cl in common. The third priority comprises the assessment of the pilots' knowledge. According to flight operations regulations, an annua]. test in the di.ffere.nt: specialties of advanced specialized training i.s required. This complex i.s regulated by issuance of orders. However, regardless of these tests, c~ar.h instruction course must be started or. closed with on~~ or several control. questions. It is the pt.rrpose of these control questions to as- certai.n whether the pilots have sure command of the rcquisi.te knowledf;c and skills and are in ra posi.tion of. using them in practicu ro great ;:rdvantagc . }lints for the Conduct of Instruction In principle, every superior has to train his subordinates. It is incor.- r.ect that a pilot concucts this trainin}; because he has a good Icnocaledgcr of the respective specialized field. This does not mean that such officers should not be included in the preparation of instruction but the service regulations for commanders and their deputies and for the chiefs of the services prescribe who is responsible for a specific course of instruction. In order t~ obtain high quality, the following steps must be obsc.rv~d without fail i.n the preparations of instruction: ].. Clar.i.f:ication of the progression of instrur.tion; 2. Specification ot- goals in accordance with concrete conditions, estab- l.islunent of partial goals; 3. Grouping of the suU~ect matter into a logical sequence with a con- current check on one's own knowledge and perf.ect:ing of this knowledge, where required; 4. Coordination of content with other specialized areas; S. Utili^.ation of the educational potential of ehc collective by way of setting high requirements and by critical assessment of performances; 6. Allocating the time availab.l.e for instruction by determining how much time i~ required for specific didactic functions such as introduction, conveyance, consolidation, and control; C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86TA060$R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-r-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L N(! FOREIGN DISSEM 7. Planning of reserve rime and preparation of reserve subject matcri.al.. The superior will have to control the conclusion of the preparations and to confirm the outline of the instruction course. 1. "Bericht des 7.entralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitap, der Sozialistischen Einheitapartei Deutschlands." Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich Honecker (Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Party Congress. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker), Berlin 1971, p 69. C;-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO rOREIGN DISSEM Approved, For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-1-D- I.- N-'i'- l:-A-L NO FORCIGN D1.55GT1 BUILD-1JP Or FRG NAVY SCURED Last Berlin MILITAGRIJIsSEN in German Jun 75 pp 105C-109C ~13y Cape Dr K. Baerwinkel] /'Text/ With DM 46.4 bil.lic~n, according to NATO data, the FRG naval arma- ment budl;et for 1975 has reached a new record, which makes it clear that the matr'.rial bases of the FRG's imperialist polfc; of aggression are being expanded. Further increases are planned for the ntxt few years. 1'he struggle against imperialism requires us to keep in view its activities of. material preparation fora new world war, Increasingly manifested also in naval armament, to unmask them publicly and to take them into account in our military activity. 'I'hc Connection Between the Operational Concept, Armament Planning and the New Command Structure of. the I'RG Navy 'Che war aims, the operational concept deriving from them, armament planninf; and the structure of the FRG Navy are closely connected. The war aims form the basis of armament plans, for the buildup and structure of the armed forces. Conversely, a gi.vei~ state of development of. the material preparaY.i.ons for war promotes the f~.irther shaping of the war aims. In this, the influential armament conceTas have an extremely stimulatint; effect on the way armament production and the war. aims develop, in L-he :Interest of achieving hi.ph armament profits. The influence which the military industrial complex also exercises in naval mat~ci-;, in the FRC constitutes a concr.rte danger for. peace and must not be ~.mdrrestimntc].I 'I'hc discovery of these connections puts us :in an even better position to unmask the war a:Ims against socia].istn, veiled by the myth of an existing C-O-N-F-I-D-G-N-I'-1-A-L ND FORI"SIGN DISS)JM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F- I-D-E-N-'r- ]:-n- I~ NO FOREIGN DISSC;ht threat. 'rhe "new navy concept" for the 1?RC Navy was ~Lssucd in ].971./72. The preparatory work had been accomplished by the "Basis Study of flu Navy Concept," which was to replace the Wegner study of 1962 by taking "al.l. current facts" into account. i3y "current facts" was not meant the turning away from aggressive war. policy as a result o:' government practice followed by the SPD/FDP r.oal.ition, but continuation of this policy, with adjustment to the changed condil:ions of the international balance of strength.2 The basic ideas of the "new concept" were confirmed by Vice Admiral ICuehnle, the former inspector. of the FRG Navy (rel-ired since 1 April 1975), when he said: "It proceeds from the premise that file Baltic. Seal the North Sea and the maritime areas an between form a strategic entity." 'Chis "concept" includes the effort of the Bonn naval leadership to con- stantly extend i.ts operational area by utilizing NA'I'0 stratef;y anci to fulfill even better its "combat mission east of Bornholm " At the same time, there is a focusing on the so~-called "coping w:Lth ~r:Lses," about which Kuehnle has the following to say: "By its presence, by appearing on the high seas and by being able to operate in multinational. unit:, a navy is especially well suited for demonstrating interest in behalf of national power.... This configuration...obviously lcacls to conclusions regarding the type of means of. naval war."4 This is propaganda for a political-militar concept which ccntinues the aggressive aims directed al;ainst the socialist states. In this connection, specific possibilities are emphasized of the FRG Navy--by making use of the high seas--engaging in provocations at any time, and even in times of_ pe,ace, occupying favor- able positions against the socialist states. The ?3o:tn militarists demand the further buildup of the Federal Navy through a comprehensive armament program, extending to the mid-eighties, oriented toward the equipment of modern combat units. Thanks to sizable results in past F1tG Navy arma- ment, the leadership of the FRG Navy can depend on an arm with fighting capacity, ever ready for attack, politically and militarily, and, according to its own data, comprising about 300 ships and 200 planes at the beginning; of 1975. According to Western data, for arms and equipment alone, an average par year of DM 560 million was spent for the FRG Navy from 1957 to 1969, and for the period 1970-1974 the amount of money appropriated increased markedly, with a planned yearly average of DM 725 million. In the future, too, the material for further armament development in the FRG Navy are to be increased substantially. Among other things, in the armament budget for 1975, for research, development and testing DM 11 million are openly allocated for patrol boats, DM 8 million for frigates, DM 17 m:!_17_ion for the air-to-ship missile Kormoran, DM 13 million for naval gui-.led-missile systems, as well as DM 580 million for procurement.5 C-O-N-F- I-D-E-N-Z- I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D->;-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Tl~c myth of an existing threat continues to be used as a rationale for tl~e "new naval concept," with Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and southern Norway, as well as the "sealanes, and thus imports," allegedly being threatened milltnrily by the socialist states. Even the energy and oil crisis, a result- of. Imperialist policy, is used to support the demand for. a Strang military presence to protect. the sealanes and the oil-drilling installations in the North Sea. At the same time, the myth of an existing ~ threat, attuned cleverly and with every refinement to the various layers of: tlir l,opul.at:ton, r.ontradicts the assertion in Bonn that the Federal Armed Forces do not require the image of nn enemy. The FRG naval leader- ship does everything possible to incite members of the Federal Navy with even l;reater effect to anticommunism, to manipulate them in the interest of imperialism, to corrupt them even more effectively and thus to get them ready for war against socialism.6 Also to be interpreted as further preparations for war is the fact that the Federal Navy conducted l0 naval exercises in 1973 and that in 1974 altogether 35 exercises with NATO units ware planned. These increased activities confirm our estimate that the ~iggressi.ve character of imperialism has not changed in any way. The "new naval concept" also includes the "Revision .;f the Naval Command Str.~icture" issued in 1973, introduced in stages during a period of about 2 years and comprising three areas of command: 1. The Naval Command (in Gluecksburg) with preponderantly operational to&ks, iu which all operational units and installations, including the supply fleet and the amphibian transport group, are combined. L. The Naval Office (in Wilhelmshaven) with tasks in the fields of trai.r_:.ng, armament and naval medical service as well as the posts and installations assigned to them. 3. The Naval Support Command (in Wilhelmshaven), in which all ongoing support tasks (supply of materiel, system maintenance, transports, and so forth) are combined. This new installation was inaugurated on 1 October 1974. Through the restructuring of the FRG Navy a "heightening of the presence of the naval. forces" is to be achieved. The operational units are to be suppl.i.ed better and restra;.ned less from the aggressive tasks intended for them. At the same time, the new seeucture is to make possible tighter and mere flexible organization, thereby attaining "greater economy and rationalization of operations." The intention here is to tackle the in- creasing operational costs, which, at the expense of investment in physical assets, reached 70.9 percent in the Federal Armed Forces in 1972. The yearly cost of operating the destroyer squadron of the "Fletcher" type w;~s given as i1M 26.1 million in 196#3 and is reported to have risen to nM 31.1 million in 1972.7 These and similar arguments above all serve C-U-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM ---~.Approv~d..For Release 19.99.1.Q~1,~6 _:.CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM to attain even greater allocations for armament. The prominent attempts in public to reduce coats and to operate more economically must not be allowed to conceal the fact that the "new command structure" is primarily aimed at further ad~uatment to the requirements of modern r?s~? and at more careful consideration of problems arising from weaponry deve].c;pments. New paths are to be found for further arming of the FRG Navy in the interest of increasing the aggressive power of the navy. Sights Set Mainly on Intensification of Armament Also in the realm of FRG naval armament, an increasing intensification of armament is to be noted. This is a phenomenon arising primarily from the rapid development of war technology and the increasing "moral obso- lescence" of weapon systems. This process must be viewed in the context of the war policy of the system of imperialist domination and especially of the activities of the armament monopolies. t^here is no such thing as automatic development of war tech- nology. The intensification of armament is viewed as follows by the military of the FRG Navy: "The cost of all weapons systems, and to a very special degree the cost of the big weapons system constituted by the warship, will escalate in such a way that the number of vessels to be manufact?ared and to be maintained w{1.1 decrease more and more. Since conversely the combat value of the individual vessel increases continually owing to docking insL-allations, combat data processing, automation and far-reaching more accurate and highly effactiv~ weapons systems..., the total effectiveness to a large extent remains constant in the end."8 These ideas deriving from the technical development of modern weapons fir_i ex- pression in armament planning. The aims, recognizable in the context of the "naval concept," to expand modern weapons systems are tied in with long-term projects for supplementary construction, changes in armament and modernization directed toward substantially raising the combat value of units. More than in the past, when the quantitative development of naval forces was in the foreground, it will in future be a question of paying attention to the processes of intensification of FRG naval arr~~a- ment. It is wrong in statements about the aggressiveness of the Federal Navy to be content with presenting the amount of FRG naval forces ai-d to compare it with the data of the preceding year. The increasing intensi- fication of armament is apparent from the projects announced by the Bonn naval leadership for the seventies and eighties, aimed at further expanding a "modern, highly maneuverable, flexible navy." Cn the basis of Western data, let me point out a faw of these projects: 1. Modernization of the destroyer of the "Hamburg" type by eliminating the third 100 mm tower and including "Exocet" launchers. Further modernization of the three missile destroyers of the "Luet,jens" type up t_o L?he weapons system "Standard Missile lb," ,^rimarily to increase their range. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM .Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T0~~08R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-i-D-);-N-T-I-A-L NO FCRLIGN DISSCM The destroyers of the "Fletcher" type, hailing still from World War II, are removed. Starting about 1979/80, they, as well as the destroyers of the "Hamburg" type and the frigates of the "Cologne" type, are to be substituted by the planned newly built NATO frigate type "122," a ship of shout 2,500 tons equipped with ship-to-ship and antiaircraft missiles as well as helicopters. )right NATO countries (The United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium) are participating in this project. The increasing intensification of armament through modern weapons systems and equipping of destroyers is reflected, among other things, in increasing prices of new construction. If a destroyer of the "Hamburg" type still cost DM 105 million, a destroyer of the "Luetjens" type costs as much as DM 207 million. Despite a comparatively high mass production of about 80 ships, the price of the planned Frigate 122 is already estimated at DM 250 million. 2. Tlie 10 patrol boats of the "Zobel" type have been modernized and equipped with central firing guidance and wire-guided torpedoes. Toward the end of the seventies, these ships are to be replaced by Type 162 hydrofoil craft. 'Phis is something the FRG, the United States and Italy have developed, with the model "Tucumeari" already having been exhibited to NATO military leaders. The "Jaguar" type patrol boats are to be re- placed by 30 type 143 and 1.48 missile launching patrol boats, most of which have already been delivered. The construction of 20 ships of the type 148 alone a.s estimated to cost more than DM orie billion. 3. In the past few years, the FRG Navy has received 18 type 20G modern submarines, which means it has 24 new submarines all told. These are equipped with eight torpedo tubes, largely of nonmagnetic material and intended especially for use in shallow waters endangered by depth charl;es. On the occasion of the inauguration of the first type 206 ships in 1973, the acting inspector of the FRG Navy, Rear Admiral Von Schroeter, described this weapons system as "the most modern a~~d capable of its kind in the world."9 For the future, with the ratio;sale of an alleged "threat at the flanks to reinforcements in the southern North Sea," fast antisubmarine submarines have been announced, which are said to be indispei. ;able. At the end of December 1974, the FRG and Norway concluded an agr~~ment con- cerning the joint development of the type 210 submarine. The process of intensification in submarine construction is apparent, among other things, if one considers that the cost of type 206 submarine;, -ire given ati more that- DM 400 million. 4. Mine-detecting forces are being modernized by converting to fast mine- sweepers, and are being "made more efficient" in their armament, especially through remote-controlled sweeping equipment. At the same time, heli- copters a.re being tested for mine-sweeping. C-O-N-F-I-D-G-N-T-?I-~-L NO FOR);IGN llISSRN .? -........~....._..,._........__..______. ._.._ ...r__..__.w....~.......~,_._...... Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA=I~~$'~1'tT0~U8'R'0~02D~'1'004?2=3"'??""""'"' `~~ Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L ? NO FOREIGN DISSEM 5. The naval aviation squadron is to be modernized with the type "F-104 G" by the end of the seventies. After that, a switch is planned to the multi- purpose MRCA fightEr plane? which is expected to perform well "if deployed at sea." Meanwhile, E beginning has been made with deliveries of the "Sea King" combat helicopter, meant to further heighten the FRG Navy's combat strength. The navy commander, Vice Admiral I?Iartwig, has been full of praise for the intensification of the FRG naval armament, with an anti-Soviet thrust: "In the eighties modernization will enable the FRG Navy to never again occupy a backward position technologically vis-a-vis the East."10 Such utterances reveal the traditional aggressive spirit of imperialist German naval militarism, which continues despite the defeats in the world wars. The allied Baltic navies of the Warsaw Pact will not fail to counter these declared ob3ectives appropriately. Increbaing Armament Integration For political, economic and military reasons, the FRG military is demanding increased integration of armament within NATO. In connection with the visit of the NATO Military Committee to the FRG i.n September 1974, FRG Secretary of State Berkhan called for more effective cooperation in the armament sector in order to smoothen "the way to European political union." FRG Minister of Defense Leber, at the last Brussels conference of NATO defense ministers, went so far as to state his readiness, in the interest of quicker standardization, to buy the second-best weapons system if as many nations ag possible share it.ll The former chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Steinhoff, too, became an active advocate of the "necessity of West European defense coop?-rltion" when he criticized the NATO naval forces for having 100 differen:.? ship categories above the size of destroyers, 3fi different fire-guidance radar instruments and 40 different largo-caliber naval artillery pieces. Each country re- quires its own suppliers, he stated.12 In a similar vein, an FRG naval officer declared: "The high cost of modern "weapons systems...is acceptable only if ~:here is correspondingly high production. Much more than hereto- fore, this forces the treaty partners to cooperate wherever possible and, if required, to divide tasks among themselves."13 If one sums up these demands, made from different points of view, it is clear that armament integration is advocated for political reasons, mili- tary reasons and reasons of the armament industry. T}iese are activities we have to reckon with despite the existing contradictions between the NATO partners. The development of NATO projects must be seen as part of the trend toward international armament concerns in the naval area, es- pecially in the highly monopolized supply industry, such as the electrical and electronic industry, the missile industry and engine construction. It has to be considered here that, according to Western data, about C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM 60 percent of the cost of maintaining modern warships is taken up by electronics and armament alone. Nor can skeptical points of view funda- mentally change the increasing armament integration--such as have been expressed, for insta:ice, by Admiral of the Fleet Fuchs, retired, who commented on the prospects of the determinations made in the Eurogroup as follows: "In the area of naval farces, the road is likely to be especially steep and rocky. National egotisms in the technical and eco- nomic areas as well as differences as to ideas of. employment are erecting considerable obstacles h~re....Hopes for an armament pool are still very remote." At tl~e same time, Fuchs makes himself the advocate of the national interests of armament industry, saying: "Civilian technology has always been decisively fertilized by the production of arms. If these are pur- chased abroad there is great danger of technological desiccation in one's own country."~4 Such utterances reveal the different interests of the armament industry regarding armament integration. In the end, these forces pursue no other aim than likewise to make armament integration prevail, and thus to increase their own share in the market. The strategy is to increase production and sales at the expense of one's partners, in the interest of incrF?ased profit. The anticipated new projects in the field of armament integration will lead to a further increase of the com- bat strength of the NATO naval forces and to a buildup of the position of the FRG Navy within NATO. From the point of view of material war preparations, the trends of FRG naval armament underline the evaluation by the Minister for National De- fense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, given before the graduates of the military academies in 1974: "We harbor no illusions of any kind about the fact that the armed forces of the United States, the FRG and NATO as a whole confront us as a military machine with the most modern weapons and to a large extent ready for war--the mast dangerous and strongest imperialism has ever produced."15 For members of the People's Navy, this results in the class mission to continue to constantly increase combat readiness, in order to insure fulfillment of the main military task set by the Eighth Party Congress of the SED in our area of responsibility. FOOTNOTES 1. Schubert, H.: In MILITAERWESEN , Edition C, Berlin, Nov 1973, p 98 ff. 2. Henze, K.: In MILITAERWESEN , Edition C, Berlin, Jan 1974, p 104 ff. 3. In HANSA (Hamburg), Issue 2, 1974, p 75. 4. Ibid. 5. WEHRPOLITISCHE INFORMATIONEN of 21 Nov 1974. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM 6. Cf Varner, W.: In PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, Special Issue 1, 1974, p 32. 7. Feck, H.: In WEHRKUNDE, Munich, Jul 1973, p 366. 8. Feck, H.: In KOEHLERS FLOTTENKALENDER, 1975, p 194. 9. In tIANSA, Hamburg, Issue 14, 1973, p 1347. 10. Pressegespraech. In MARINE, Wi1he]..mshaven, Issue 3, 1974, p 1. 11. SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 12 December 1974. 12. EUROPA-ARCHIV of 25 Jul 1974. 13. Feck, H.: Ibid., p 195. 14. In 7'RUPPENPRAXIS, Cologne, Issue 10, p 806. 15. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, Edition A of 12 October 1974. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 ~~ Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F~~I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SHIP SL;CURIZY MEASURES PROMOTED East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Juz- 75 pp 115C-118C [Ey Comdr R. Gerstaecker, instructor] /Text/ A prerequisi~e for fulfilling sea combat tasks is to qualify all crews for maintaining the staying and fighting pourer of their ship/boat in the face of any type of damage resulting from enemy action, wreckage or heavy weather. Ship security is of great significance also in modern naval combat. This can be demonstrated irrefutably and convincingly with many examples f rom the history of naval war. This article is intended to contribute to facilitating tt~e understanding of the role and significance of ship security and to integrate it correctly in overall training. Ship security is closely tied to the terms of "staying and fighting power." By staying power of a ship is m~:ant the ability of ship and crew to cope with damage from combat or wreckage by maintaining or restoring the combat qualities of the ship. Staying power depends on the construction of the ship and on the daily fulfillment of a combination. of administrative and technical tasks by the crew. Factors contributing to determining the staying power of a ship are: --unsinkability; C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 r,-o-N-F-I-D-E-N-'r~- I-A-h NO FORLIGN DISSrM --safety from fire and explouions; --b;:aying power of equipment and weaponry. By fighting power of a ship is meant the ability of the ship, owing to itF tactical and technical qualities, to deal the enemy annihiliating blows, to withstand his blows and, at the same time, as far as possible to main- tain one's own staying power. The fighting power of a ship depends on: --constr~.,ction of the hull; --the complex of armament and technical equipment; --the state of training; --the moral-political state of the crew Aims and Tasks of. Ship Security Training The aim of ship security training consists in enabling all members of the crew under great physical and psychological burdens--especially in difficult hydrometereological conditions and under the effect of water, fire, smoke and quick changes in ship stability--to fulfill combat tasks, and to tnain- tain the staying and fighting power of the ship under the most difficult conditions. To equate ship security with "countering leaks and firQ," as one can hear and read it now and then, is not permissible. It is a very limited way of looking at things, for countering leaks and fire is but one of many *_asks of. ship security. Apart from the countering ?eaks and fire, thE~ tasks of ship security in- clude: --maintaining the staying power of armament and technology; --eliminating damage to equ:pment and armament; --maintaining reserve floating capacity; --restoring normal stability by compensating for out-of-trim and heel positions; --maintaining and installing shipboard communications and memns of communi- cations; --strengthening waterproof ship construction; C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-?A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T~00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 NO I~ORrTGN T).ISSLM --preventing or 1Lmitini; the spread of. watrr in the ship; --:;ecur3.nt~ ship scal.s; --1.mplement~ing salvagr. operations, comb:Lned with first aid, CransporL of wounded, as well. as dcactivat.aon, disl.nfection and poison control; --.insur:Ini; air supply and regr.tl.ata.on of teugterature; --employing of sttlp`s divers rind carriers of compressed air equipment, '[his last doer not rlai.m to be complete, but it doubtlessly permits :;tat~~- ments about the role. and significr.tncc of ship .;ccurity. rurthcrrnorc, i.t outlines tlu~ scope of tsr;lc; of ::hip seruritY and underlines the require- ment of en ].i.stin}; all mernhers of the crew in ship secur..ity training. I'ositlon of 5hl.p ;ecr~rity 'Cratuing in (lvera.ll 'I'rrtl.ning I'roceccllnt; from the tasks oi: ship security, from its Signil'ic;mce for ship rind crow and from the ro.l.e of everyone on hard Ln shap secur:'.ty, onc~ can riy;hl.].y say that shap security training i.s a principal branch of training. i.n rtssigninl, roles in Ship security, i.t is a rule that rho r.rews of hatttc, .tat-.ions are responsible for ship security at their battle :;tati~~n5. Al_l. members of t:h~ c:rew, whet-het- offl.cer:;, midshipmen. petty oL?fic~crc; cr seamen, ar.e inr?o].ved in ^h.Lpbr~ard shap security. This cannot bc~ otherwise, for ship recur. i t:y groups ].ef.f Cu fond }fur themselves simply cannot nu:el al 1 the demands made: .ln rel;ar.d to :;h.f}, ;;ecuri.tp in modern naval combat. lJhal is required are we]_1-organised, mutually attuned and pract[~:c~c1 ar~,tc~n:; crl the ent i.rc crew. Given be:loca is art example from the history of naval. w:trfar.r. in Idorlci h4tr II which !s intcnd~.d to under] ine thc~ ;;it;nlf icancc~ of, :hip security. On L.1 September :L941, during L-Ite hern.ic clef:ense of Odessa, the Soviet destroyer 13e~;hnshchadnyy was al:taclccd by "l7_ enrmy p.l.anes. 'I'wc~ :u~t?ta1. b~nnbs hit tt-e bow, damming it baday. CI. was therefore necessary to cut the bow of the destroyer. Despite thiG complex damage, the ship carts maintained rtf loot :and could be towed awry. Having been restored, fire destroyer re- cc:iv~~~' mother hit by a bomb, t,lrich wr.nt through the upper cleclc and the dotabl.e bottom. Water and furl uiJ. penetrated into the boilerrnom, and a i_re broke out. The trim t?eached 1.75 meters, the hem.' 1.4 degrees, '1'h~. s:ftuati-on seemed hopeless. 'i'he crew, circumGpect and ready for sacrifice., Poug}it for i.t:; shi.p, hp4'oti~r,r, aided only by emergency_(flash.l i.y;ht) .Light ing. Under the direc?tirn~ of the GA-V /expansion unknown/ crnnmander, thr ~;h{p, which had been helicvc~d lost, was savcci because al.l possibi.l.atics cif ~;hil~ security' were cttil.ir,e~], 'I'cy ?JO P'ORI~' CCN D ISS13P1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N- F- I- D- I's- N-'f- I-A-L NO FOIZLIGN DISSL'M cope with ship security in such complex conditions, wt.th such clnmal;e, pre- supposes political-ideological maturity, high morale and--aprir.t from coura};c and determination, apart from exccllenl- coordi.nati.on and tight leadership-- solid training. It is therefore necessary to enlist a.~l members of the crew a.n ship security training and to take advantage of every opportunity for complex comb-at-r.e- lated training. This includes not only pertinent teaching and conducting trai.ninl; in the shop security room but training on shipboard, an port rind while cruising on the high seas. Measures to Maintain Staying Power It appears appropriate to deal in more detail with staying power., because it is t-he main factor which determines the fighting power oi' ~hc ship. Unsinkability The ability of the ship to remain capable of staying afloat and to keep iLS stability in the face of damage to the hull and of floouing of one or more departments is called Unsinkability. The Unsinkability of a ship is influenced by: --waterproof seals and s;..lidity of the hull; --reserve capability of staying afloat; --stability; --equipment with means and systems to fight leaks and fire; --state of training of the crew. Safety From Fire and Explosions The suitability of a ship for preventing the start and spreading of Fires and explosions on board through constructive measure and tecl~i-ical equip- ment is called safety from fire and explositions. In t11is res`ect, crews are to observe the following fire safety measures: Fire safety measures while handling open fires: By open fire we understand smoking on board, welding equipment and sol.deri.ng irons in operation, as well as burning candles and torches. Open fires a1-e forbidden in ammunition storage areas, in fuel bunker:, near fuel linos, in dye and boatswain holds, in storage areas :ind in the immediate vicinity C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-+N-T-I-A--L *:0 FOREIGN DISSEM of enaily flammable materials. All necessary work with open fires on shipboard therefore requires permission. Before work is started, the following fire safety measures are ro be observed. ' The person responsible checks the area in which the work with open fire i.s to be undertaken, as well as the adjoining areas. At the place of work, and in adjoining areas, posts with fire-fighting equipment are to be established. The work area is t~ be well aired. The GA-V commander checks the fire protection measures that have been taken. When the work is completed, the areas are to be checked once mire. Fare safety measures tc+ prevent fire and explosions in ammunition storage areas: 1'he most important fire safely measure is careful, systematic checking of temperature and humidity. When the temperature in storage areas exceeds 30 degrees centigrade, the room is L'o be cooleu b;.' ventilators. If this is insufficient and the temperature exceeds 35 degrees centigrade, the cargo must be sprinkled.. If this is insufficient to prevent a fire, the cargo is to be flooded. Fire safety measures in storing fuels and lubricants: Fuels and 'lubricants can evaporate at normal temperatures. A concentration of fuel and lubricant vapors of more than 1 percent in the air constitutes an explosive mixture. Fuel and lubricants vapors settle in the lower parts of rooms, can concentrate there and car. a;cplode 3,f open fires are improperly handled. Therefore, fuels and lubricants are to be kept only in closed containers. Easily flammable spi]led liquids are to be removed immediately. Temperature and airing are factors which have an effect on secure storing of liquid fuels. Fire protection measures to prevent spontaneous combustion: ~, Spontaneous combustion is a process in which a material starts to burn without being affected by an externs.: source of heat. Wood shavings, as well as rope, wool waste, tarpaulin saturated with oil or. damp with oil, tend to initiate spontaneous combustion. Therefore, all C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Aanroved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 199~9/~~2i6_~ ~I~_~I~P18~T100608R000200110042-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM security measures concerning the stori!:g of. These materials arc to he observed consistently. The following steps need to be observed: --easily flammable materials are to be stored dry and safe from fire; --storage rooms are to be aired regularly in order. to rivoid high tcmper.a- tures; --easily flammable materLals are to be checked constantly and must not he stored together with dyes and solvents; --fire-extinguishing mat:crials are always to be ready f.or use. Staying Power of Equipment and Weaponry By staying power of equipment and weaponry is meant their capacity to main- tain tactical-technical qualities or regaim tham in case of damage. These elements of staying power are insured through manifold constructive measures when the ship is planned and 'bui.it, through the quality of means of fighting leaks and fires and of means for protecting the ship from various types of arms. Effective, too, are administrative-technical measures directed t~~ward keeping the hull in flawless, hermetically shut condition and ~~~~;ar.?d insuring the readiness for use of armaments, equip- ment and means of ship security. Not least, the state ~ training of tl~e crew in ship security has an effect on the elements of staying power. One could make further detailed remarks about the elements of saying power and subdivide them, but this would exceed the purpose of this article. It is, however, necessary to take a closer look at the element of unsinlc- ability. \ The Struggle for the Unsinkability of the Ship The aim of the struggle for unsinkability consists in preventing the loss of the si:~ip through. combat damage or wreckage anal, as f.ar as possible, restor ng its scaworthine.ss and fighting power. This requires that the crew initiate lmmed,iate measures in case of combat damage or wreckage with a view to maintaining the stayin}; and fighting power of the ship. Here one is to proceed as follow:: Determini~ig damage:, fire and incursion of water: ~n case of: violent motions, shocks, detonations or other effects on the ship, the crew without awaiting f~~rther orders, immediately checks the depart- ments and .areas .in order to determine incursion c,f water and technological damage, f any. If there is incursion of water and/or damage, this is to be reported instrint.ly to the command of the combat sector, and first measures are to be taken in the ?, uggle for unsinksbility. First measures are: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3 Approved For Release 1999/Q~/~2{~ i; CJI/~=R, [~P,~3~T~Q608R000200110042-3 NO I'URE'iGN llISS)rM --sc~a.l.inf; off. yaks; --shor.inl; up hul.kheads, door;; and hatchways; ? --caulkini; pipes; --shutting off installatio~,s and equipment. 'a,l I, .lml.ting the: sprcadi.ny; of ~aater :In the ship and restorini; waterproof. seals: Limiti.nl; the sprnadini; of water is decisive in the fight fora the unsink- abilaty of the ship. On the result of this struggle often depends the fate of crew and ship. The foll.owang ac*-r~ons are requir.od: --CrArn.ing un piirnpital; equipment; --caulking of leaks and tears in the hull; --rcinforci.ng bulkheads, hatchway:; and doors. 'i'he caulking of leaks occurs a.l.ong with the pumping out of the room of thc~ d(~par.tmenC. AL the same t~i.me, all deformed and damai,ed waterproof bull toads and covers must be l?el.llf(1rCCd. Where waiter has come i.n, all damaged rand eu.dangered instrillations rind equipment ar.e to be shut down. After this, the waterproof sealing of Lhr ship is to be restored. t-care it is required to close and checl: doors, hatchways, manholes, ventilators and vents as well as to ti};hten catclir:; and vents. insuring t~ac: cruising and maneuvering abl.l.i.ty of thc:~ ship and Lhc: readi- nc:s~; of F~mht~yment of weapons: The cruising and manEUVer..ing ability of the ship