EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110042-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 90
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 12, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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~P~ 043 ~'~ ~0~~~C~ PR~~~; earl v as i.n
I'1.'.O, V. I . Lenin had denlrutded in hi:; "1}raft: Cuicic~l ine?:; I`c,r ~L?uta},c+mi~nt c,f
i?V ieC. LnSt~l tlltl(.)nS" tlt:tt el I ol'LS nlltsC hl. Oladl! t0 e115Ur(' tll:lt. l: hl` nit lona.l
rlel'c?nse of the Sovi.ct. repuhl ic?s i , carried out: with Che };tritest ec.onomv
in c?ner};y expendiCurc? and with the` most productive input ai- Chc! work of-
II1~? people`. llurin}; the years of the civil. war, in t:hc` period of l)uilclin},
up nu,dcrn military Forces pr.:ior to World War' lC, ,.ntd espc`cial.ly during.`,
the (;re:tt 1'a tr.i.otic War, econunrica.i thinking and act.in}; in Chc~ ;;ovi.et
nruly and Navy constiCuted nn i.mportnnt component part of mi.liCarti' activity
:Ind a victory factor.
In their written works and memoirs, leading Soviet mi.a itnr_y personal i_t.i.es
and mi1.i.Lary scientists point out' over and over .:,i;ain how impol?t:tnL masCerY
.)f econotni.cal practices by armed f.orcc`s i:; for achi.evi.n}, vil~Cory. 'Thus,
(ur i.nstance, Marshal of the: Soviet i1n-ion G. lt. 7.hulcov wrote` Che foa.lowin},,
in the preaml):Le of I,t lieneral nntipenko's hook enLiLl.ed "ln lift! 1'rnutry
Uire.ction": "In war, the economical. use of personnel and nutterlr.tl reserves
has always been and wi.Ll. at.caays he. one of the decisive prohl.ems."~
In conjlntction with t};e ,u,vances made in the scicnti.fi.c-teohnol.o?;ical Ii.ctd,
;lnd with Cite revo.l.uLion in the military sphere, there have evo.lvecl ne:w
dc?nutncls on the development of economical th:inlcing and act.i.ng :i.n the mili-
tai-y pl~crc~. "nny probl~>.In or mi.~i.tary devclop~nr!nL is today rat the: s:tmh
time also an cr.onomic prob:lern....It i.s under.scanct:lbl.e...ChaC a nwr.c efEcc-
tive utilization. of material and human resources and a care.f.u.l handl.inl;
u[ weapons, equi.p:~ent, and army property can become a source oP consider-
ahle additional moans for. maintaining the army and navy and for achi.evin}~
;, further. increase in the combat r.eadlness of the troops."~'
from the quantitatively and particularly also qualil-ative].y higher defense
funds (ar.mamcnts, equipment, supplies), them resnl.l objectivel.,y higher
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rlc~m,andti on onr ccc,numicnl thlnkint, and rtc~t:in); in fire mil.i.tary sphr.~rc with
re~~pecl Lo ut(lirr+tiun, care, nu+infc'.nrntcc>, repcti.r wc+ric., and the use ol`
c~xi;ti.nl; ur n+~w cqulpntc~nt. Ily th~~ :;,.nne Luken, thrtrc~ r.ctsult obfectlve.ly
r,rer+tr.?r La:;l~: for thc~ nrilitnry-ecunnittic w:tent ralidirr's, nonconmrissioned officer:;, and
of f irr~t?;;.
II a Ihc,r~rc~};h ,ctrl e::~~mlrl:;:'y frrlfillmc~nl' of their pol.itiral :mcl mil-nary
ciutfe;; has bcrumr? a habit for army personnel., than this at the stone Llme
also iuclir.atc:; t:hc develupnn?nt c, t- cortaln personalty properties. "Sow
habits nncl you wi 11 harvest r?hnrarCer," says ~ prov~~rh.~i
1'racr_ic:tl cxpc~ricncc h:t;; ~;hcnvn tlutt h:.il,lts and the automatic ways of.
th i nk i n}; and ar. t I n}; i ult~~renl I hc+re i n p.l.ay :t cons i derab 1o part on the baffle
I icicl. '1'h~:y arc tml l -ni};h vital l.y i;nportant, for they f;uar.d t:hr soldier
a;;:tinst supcrflunu~; httrrlcns and ttnnccessary diversion, and they thereby
make i c po5;; th l e For him tc, clevot:e his tuff. concentration to his to sks in
combat and !:bus to f~i}~ht victoriously. Thus, for instance, a soldier who
is accrrstonu~cl to displnyi~t}; r.crrect behavior. in combat does not have to
Spend a lc,t of l: inu~ for del lherar. ion as to how he is to proceed, how hc?
must take advant:r};~? of the term i.n, and how he tmtst make effective use of
his t:ieapc,n:;. 12at:hor, he is nhlo to direct all his a~tention to the hattl.e.
for purposes of clestroyin}; the enemy.
In contrast t;i this, however, a soldier's inhibitory habits, such as
mechanical. thinlcinf; and artinf~, lack oC dlsci.pline, and irresponsibility
can have an unPavr,rnhle effect on h:is preparations for battle and nn his
art.ions in combat. Suet inhibitory habits can .Lead to improper conduct
in combat and ran result in noedl.essly spilt blood and in defeats.
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In their day-to-day educational work, superior officers have the primary
task to develop positive, useful habits and to create those conditions
which will make it possible for such habits to develop and to become re-
i.nfoLced. In so doing they must at the name time overcome inhibitory
and negative habits.
Which Habits Must Be Developed?
In answeri~~g this question, let us first of all and as a matter of prin-
ciple pror_eed from the .fact that the direction to be .followed in connec-
tion witl- the habits which are to be developed in the members of our army
and in the collectives is prescribed by the basic documents of our party,
state, and armed forces guidance organs. These include, above a11, those
ways of thinking and acting which are particularly important for the ful-
fillment of the military class mission, for combat readiness, and for the
development of the fighting strength of the military collectives. Thus,
the Nintlr Conference of Delegates calls for "the development of such
soldierly qualities as an aggressive spirit, steadfastness, courage, readi-
ness to serve, self-control, perseverancf, and an unshakeable will ro
victory,"4 and it demands that "those ways of thinking and acting be de-
veloped which the members of our army require for emerging victorious in
battle."S
Such ways of thinking and acting are:
---considerirr.fd an order given by one's superior to be a mandate from the
workers' claF~s;
--trusting one's superior and carrying out each order without contradiction;
--regarding one's superior officer or subordinate as a class comrade;
--always setting an example for others;
--thinking tasks through scrupulously and bringing them to a successful
conclusion, as well as overcoming difficulties arising in connection
therewith; and not permitting any training shortcuts.
Among other things, the development of these and other (important and less
important) ways of thinking and acting is a process of consciousness de-
velopment which must be purposefully carried out and shaped. Only such
a process will produce those habits for which we are striving, "that is,
habits which make us act properly not because we sat down and thought
about them, but because we are used to acting in such a way, and can not
act differently."6
Which Conditions Are Important For the Development of Habits?
The development of habits depends on many conditions. As a rule, it
never depends on dust one. In the following we will show some conditions
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clhich dc?r,ertnlne C'he rlevelr,ttment c,f habits tc.+ a conviderablr' extant. 'L'hey
do not nrarly Include rill ail them.
Conformity of t:hc~ tc:-hr~--clc?veloped ways oC tlrin!cin}; and actin}; with Che
nec~cL'; and inCer~tr:t,c of n p;trticular mc~mhc~-' of the army r; one of the nu,st.
important c?.oncl.itiun;;. fmpurlnnC i.n thts connect ton is the phenomenc,n,
which tirtrely i;; kna,wn cr. evc?ryc,ne, that any thinka.n} and :.tc?tini; which
cor'resportds to r,n?'s; own needs and interests wtl]. become a hnhf.C ntorr
quickly than anv Ihinkin;; rntcl actin}; which run;; countctr to one';; own needs
and (nta~ra~:;t;;. II~~ t.~ho fa?r,is Che need always to give has best wi.].1 a ways
f~i.);ht for what i;; bc?;;C. I;ut he r,lho does not: frr_:1 such a need, wal]. notice
i t a hah t Co "};ct i t aver wl.th." [t is therefore nece ,sary to use exa_st-
ent nrc~d;; :utc1 int c?rc?;;ts ;r;; poinCs of contact--to the extent Chrtt they arc
suitnblc fur the de?vc~lopu;c?nt: arul re~inforcemenC o(` habits--;nd, i" r?allec!
fr,r, Co rc~nu,ve nn~;uit:nble n~cds and i.nter.c:;t:.s and possibly to dc~ve;np
ne?w unc~:; to take thc;ir piece, in order tct thereby ha>l.h aloe}; the crc~ati.on
of habits which ara? pul itical ly well.-Prnmd~~~' rind which are. tiol:icl from a
military poinC OI JIeW.
Ct should be nutecl thaC the c?rctire previous duv~.lopmcnt of a ntemhcr ~-: t!~.~
:n-nu;d force;;, his awnrc~nc?sti, and among other things also h1.s need:; and
intr,rc~sCti hove tho c.?ff,_,c?t oP n I"i]ter when he nutkes his assessmenC oP new
rcquirernent:;. from the many h-its of i.nformaC.ion at hi.s disposal., a mentl?~%~r
of thr army will. sclc.~cL', ae: it ware, those which co:i.nc?i.de with i.is point-
of view ;tnd wi..l I then art acc?ord:~n};l.y. lie will, for the tame being, re-
ject other :information becau;;e~ i.t i;; coup"er to his point of view.
liahils are; rlutte depe,nc~c~nt on the c;y;;tem of values and norms ex].stin); .i.n
a co ..lecti.ve ;uul, actually, i.n the l.on? run development of on]_y those
habits i.s po^r;ible which are sul.table for the col.]ective and which are
considered by thu coLlecti.ve to be right.
ns a consequence, n mr,ml,er of the armed forces wi.l.l in most catie5 develop
Chose habits of. whic}r he knows rmd which he feels that they are meeting
with the approval of the collective in which he lives. On the other. hand,
tlu collectiive in each case sees to it that un i.ndividual wall dcwelop
habits which sc~.rve t.hc? collective and, ~'f neccasary, calls him tr rtccount.
Consequences resuLCi.n); Prom such procedure, for example, are that the.
educatirnt of. the' individn~t i.s .:.].ways tied to his education i.n the col.-
iective and that the :;ysCcnr ~~f collective values an~l norms musC be shaped
in such rr manner that soc.la List habits are bou_:d to be develored and that
bour.);eois habits arc overcome, or not permitted.
ilahi.ts arc not formed "over n.ight." hays of thinking and acting become
habits .if, .titer havinl; repeatedly practiced them, at has become a need
for a member. cif Che? armed forces to act and think in a cer.taan way and,
i.f 'n so doanf;, he does not first take himself to account with respect to
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h.i.r; thaul;ht process or the course of his actaot~. PracticLil, ways of think-
i.n}; c~nd actinf; which are to become hal~l.ts ca7..1, for. over. rued over. al;ain
pLacang army personnel pat:ientay and per.severinl;].y in Si.Cuati.ons in which
they must act: in accordance with the desired habit:. ll.i.sci.pJi.ned acCang
becomes a habit through acting in a discip.l.ined manner. Acting, creatively
,end with a good measure of iniCiati.ve becomes a habit for L-}tosc: members
uf: the army of whom this is required daily anal who are, of course, given
the ~.tppropriate conditions fur accomplishinf; this.
It Ls a.l.so necessary in this contt~ction to impart to axmy personnel. tltr.
requirements, pra.ncip.les, and nor.!ns which are at the base of positive
habits, that they understand them properly, and thal: they become a sig-
nifi.cant personal experience for. them. Once this has been achieved, Chen
that which they have recognized as being necessary and proper must be
practiced with the utmost consistency and carried through ctt al.l events,
so that it can become a positive thinkinf; and acting habit.
The process of such practicinf; as Cherefore nothing else but a systematic
perfectl.nf; o[ certain ways o!' Chinkinf; and act:i.nf;. A member cif the armed
forces participates in this process with his whole being. Such practice
must Cherefore not be understood to be simple mer_hanical. repetition, and
it must be engaged in with such an understanding.
Of course, i.t is also possible that there will be occasional failures in
connection with the forming of habits. Failures, or giving up prematurely,
make it difficult For a habit to come into being and may even prevent i.ts
coming inL?o existence. One can note indications of a premature giving
t.;p when hearing such remarks as "this is too strenuous," er "this takes
too long for my liking," and so forth. In order to accomplish tha+_~, throul;h
practice, Che formation of the positive habits which had bean planned is
r.eal..ly being promoted, the following points, among others, should be kepC
to mind
--making army personne]. aware of the need for such practicing and of the
objectives to he attained through it;
?--prop~~r. consistence, continuity, and regularity;
--r_ontinua.l and comprehensive controls, critical evaluation by supervisory
personnel and by r:he collective, and n.uper assistance and guidance during
the course of the practicing.
The example set by supervisory personnel and by t}te party and FDJ /Free
German Youth/ functionaries plays an extraordinarily important role in
connection with the formation of habits. According to findings in t}te
sphere of developmental psychology, young people, and thus also youn#
members of our. army, have a d.tstinct desire to let themselves be guided
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NU I~OIt1s.LCN D I ~SEM
by examples and ideals. 'i'he Lc~ndc~ncy to imitate and to c,mul.ate r.?rnlnectecl
with tha.s must be purposefu.ll.y ut.tlized 1:or sh,tpin); postt.tve hab.[ts.
[n thLs context, tht: Ninth I)e .egates Conferc:ncc cal..ted attentir~n to t'he
fnLLowIn};: "In order. to achieve fur.thc~r. progress 'In the areres of. dasct-
pl~l.ne and order. we expect. of a11. nri.:I. t-ary grtper:{.or officers that they
themselves waa.l. always set an c~xrlmpl.c in mi.aa.t~lr.y 1~fc~ and that they pcr-
:;oniCy deeply rooted r.evo ut onar.y discipl.inc: In the.tr thinking and acting;."~
f I`, for instance, a member ol- t:he army secs that the :;upcrior. of Dicers and
functionaries always trilce r.egulat.:ions and orders seriously caul carr~? them
out i.n an exemplary manner, that they ar.e consi.str~nt In requir.arl}; Chc.ir
subur.dinates to carry them out, and are cr.eat nf; the rrnldi.ti.ons nc~cc~c,:~ary
for ] ivin}; i.n accordancr_, wLth the rules, Chen tha will. help to develop chc~
hnhits of r,arryi.n); r.ut orders crud obs~>rviu}; r.cf,~~lations .i.n an cxc~mplary
manner.
Purination ol: positive habits i.s unthinkable without malciny; !l:i);h dcnunuls un
members of our army. With the making of a ccrt-ai.n demand, thc~ process of
(.hi.nking and acting on the part of army personnel is not only started off
and steered into a d:ir.ection which is in accordance with the f;iven orders
and service rei;ulati.ons hut, i.n addition, the desired habits arc formed
and reinforced through repeated fulfillment of the demand. It i.s extremely
important particuaarl.y in the case of young army personnel that, with due
consideration of heir personalities, demands be made on them from the
very first hour of their mil.itar.y service. Only in this manner will they
get used w:i.thout great d.if:ficulty to the military service conditi.uns which,
for them, are some thin); new. IL this is not clone, one should not he sur-
prised if, in the case of some army personnel, habits wi.l.l evolve which
arc counter to exemplary military duty performance and which i.t will then
lie difficult to overcome. In actual practice it is apparent again and
agaltl that eclttcal-i.ng is easier. than re-educating!
When implementing the requirement for the formation of po:;itivc habits,
one should, among other things, pay attention to seeing to it that reasons
are given for the need to make high demands and that an awareness of them
i.s dc~~eloped, so that they will then be accepted and supported; that one
always uses as a point of: departure the requirements of modern combat and
that the level of development of: the army personnel concerned is taken
into consideration to the greatest possible extent; that the demands which
are being made are not only understcud by the army personnel concerned,
but that they consider them to be proper and will carry them out unques-
tioningly; and that fina.l.ly, demands are made on a continuing basis and
raised systematically, and that they are aimed at attainment of the
optimum performance level by the army personnel concerned.
A life style in tine with socialism under the severe conditions of military
life is to an increasing extent becoming for us a fundamental prerequisite
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for developing those creative in:Ltiatives which tod,~y arc nc- awry for
the fulfillment of the military gain task."8
At the same time, the socialist life style and the sr_rvice and 1~iving c~n-
ditions must never be regarded as a one-sided material and organizati.onal-
technical mutter. They are, above all., also a mcit?ter of the relations and
the climate existing in a collectives as we.L.l as the prevailinf; spiritual-
cultural conditions, and they are thus a continuous socialist leadership
concern. If, for instance, one eslabl.ishes order which is stra.ct rind in
accordance with the applicable regulations and which is maintained con-
tinuously from day to day, then the end result will surely be that many
elements of. the military activity of army personnel will be handled with
ever greater ease and more in t-he nature of a habit. The habit of t-,aving
confidence in the commander and in his orders is developed c,?herever per-
tinent experiences can be gathered and occurrences witnessed.
What Conclusions Can Be Drawn For the Development of Habits?
Supervisory personnel and the party and FDJ organizations develop in their
politico-ideological work the necessary knowledge of and insight into the
norms of socialist thinking and acting as laid down in the basic documents
and service regulations. Army personnel learn to comprcaiend why they must
act in a certain way and riot in any other way. For army personnel can
develop positive habits quickly and effectively only if they have the
necessary pertinent knowledge and understanding, L.e.~if they have aware-
ness. Th{.s purposeful and continuous development of socialist habits
under. military conditions must begin with the inception of military service.
Whatever is accomplished at that juncture, will be lasting; whatever is
neglected at that juncture will be difficult to make up.
Through systematic practice of required socialist-type thinking and acting
in the sphere of political and military activities, the ways of thinking
and acting will be so reinforced that they will ultimately become auto-
matic and that in this connection there develops the need for doing things
in a certain way over and over again, and in no other way. T1'Zis calls for
well-thought-out demands to be made on the young soldiers by way of service
regulations and by way of making sure that all superior officet~ and func-
tionaries proceed in a uniform manner in .implementing them. This, among
other things, involves a thorough knowledge of all subordinates and, based
on this, various different ways of proceeding.
Adherence to the dialectics of personality and collective development en-
sures tilization of the educational potentialities of the military collec-
tive for the formation of positive habits. Systematic development of social-
ist collective views in the unit, solidification of socialist relations its
the collective, and between the collective and superior officers, inclusion
of the collective in the solution of tasks and in the education of its
members, and many other factors are conditions which promote the development
of socialist habits.
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In short: "ravorahl.e conditions for. an open, par.l-i.san atmospher.c exist
wherever commanders, pollticall orp;ans, mul party orl;anizations attend to
the development of 5oc.a1lst relations betwaen army personnel and within
? th~~ co.l.lectives, and wherever due attention is paid to a steady improve-
ment of. the ser.va.ce rand .l.avinl; conditions of army personnel. It is there
that our argumentation in political discussions falls on fertile ground,
^ it is there that: activities and consc:tous acting dev~:Lop, and it is there
that the soldiers wall carry out their. difficult duties gl.adl.y and en-
thusiastically."9
1. Makarenko, ~. S.: "Werlcc" /"Works"/, Vol. 5, 8crlin 1.964, p 453.
Rubinstein, S. L.: "Grundlagen der. Allgemei.nen Psychologie" /"Funda-
mentals of- General Psychology"/. Berlin 1962, p 685.
Quoted from_Petrovski, A. W.: "A.llgemeine 1'sychologie" _/"General
Psychology"/. Berlin 1975, p 179. -
4. From the report of the secretariat of the NVA political main adminis-
tration to the Ninth Delegates Conference o[ the SED party organira-
tions in the National People's Army and the GDR border. troops. Speaker:
Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In: I?AR'I'IIARBEII'fsR, Berlin. Special
Ninth Uelegates Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 33.
5. Ibidem.
6. Makarenko, A. S.; Loc. cit., p 463.
7. From the report....Loc. cit., p 43.
8. Ibidem, p 43.
9. From the concluding remarks by Comrade Willi Stoph, member of the
politburo of the SED central committee and chairman of the GDK council
of state. In: PARTEIARBEITER; Berlin. Special Ninth Delegates
Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 94 and following pages.
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B~.SIC IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTIONS OUTLINED
East Berlin MILITAEKWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 42-48
[By Lt Col Dr A. Bendrat, political scientist]
/Excerpts/ Like ideological work as a whole, political training in the
armed forces aims at fulfilling the main military task. Its aims are
directed unequivocally at insuring high fighting capacity and combat readi-
ness, at the action and behavior oL? members of the army.
What componentsy f oliticallbeandlmorallyafoundled~behaviorsoftsocialist
an ideologicall p Y
soldiers, such as:
--unconditional execution of orders, which ioliticalliaunderstoodmands
behavicr deriving from conscious, that is, p Y
personally accepted, subordination to the will of the superior as that
of a class comrade;
--iron military discipline, which in the socialist army means behavior
deriving from tt-~ soldier's moral attitude, an attitude he has adopted as
a member of the working class, following the example of its best revolu-
tionary fighters and, above all, the model of the Soviet Army;
--struggle fir the best possible training results, which in the socialist
army means behavior s~ipported by personal responsibility for the projection
of socialism, which the soldier has learned and acknowledged to Ue the
cause that is most just and most worth defending.
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We could to on In L-he same vein. 'I'o base the whole behavior of the solcLlc+r
or noncommissioned of:f.icc:r and al.l his concrete man-i.f%stati.~ns in mi.l:itar.y
c~ervice on a class-conscious personal. decision, taken vo:l.unt-u?t:Ly out of
? ideological conviction--that is the responsabi..l.ity of :i_deological work
in the armed forces and i.s its ultimate object:ive, arul thus a:Lso the ulti-
mate objective of political training.
'T'hus a comprehensive and rather complicated educational and t-rai.ning task
presents itself, a task wh.lch by no means can be solved instantly and
from one day to the next. All. prerequisites--for example the so-cal.l.ed
"preli.minary phases" of action and behavior with the ma~i.n military task
in view and, above all, knowledge and lulow-how-~-are means toward the end,
means from which the development of- actual behavior proceeds. The best
knowledge and know-how remains socially useless unless :it results in re-
quired action.
hlithout the mentioned prerequi.sites, then--especially without lcno~.~~l.edge
and know-how and class-related motivation--a class-conscious bchavi.or 'is
unthinkable.
Knowledge and I=olitical 'T'raining
It goes without saying that the quality of politic~il training cannot be
measured solely by taught and acquired knowledge. It is a question of
teaching this knowledge in such away as to affect as much as possible they
action as well as the thinking of army members. 13ut what is decisive is
the realization that the content of political. training, consisting of
fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology, plays the decisive
-role.
The teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory--that is, work with the subject
matter of political training--is gaining increasing importance. The
reasons for this are, among other things:
First, in building socialism/communism, the part played by conscious
action of our people increases, and thus the need increases for acquiring
more and more knowledge especially in the field of social science.
Second, our workers' and especially our youth's general and specialized
education, their ideological knowledge and experience, their whole intel-
lectual and cultural level increase constantly. On this basis the self-
confidence and self-assurance of the individual and the collective are
consolidated, and their demands increase for all types of education, es-
pecially for ideological, political and moral education.
Third, the adversary, primarily in the form of social democratic theories
of social science, is working with sophisticated methods. To L-hwart t}rese
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and to unmask t-hclr dcmal;oy; ca? 1lnL:LCU111111U11a8(: rli.~:Ul'l'. rcqutr.c~s firm and
app].icnble knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and of the po.l.Jc.y of our I~nrCy.
L~onrr',1, the further devclopm~nt ~~f the military, nwdcrnization of the
;1ocl.al.ist armed forces and the increar.~ing :3harc uL? Lc.chrlolol;y and theory
demands a higher degree of ideolog:'.ca]., political and moral. as well ah
intellectual education of members ~f the armed furr.c:: in al. ]. branches
i>f combclt tral.nin;.
In the future, among the many components whfch, dc:terml.ne instr.uct-lon .in
pol.lt~cal training and are d:lrected toward high educational. effectiveness,
knowledge, lasting and concretely applicable knowledge, will further gain
in importance as the basis and guide].l.ne of all. ideological work and a].l
educational processes.
What determines the scope of the content -~f: political training, and thus
of t11e knowledge which trainees are to bye taught?
If we look over the programs, we are faced with a situation of pnr~ly
great differences in topics and, at. the same time, of: great differences
in struc:t:ure as far as subject matter is concerned.
The programs and educational materials centrally predetermine subject
matter, which is based on what our society has already achieved in the
field of edur.ating the young generation.
Our training broup leaders need to know more About this and must show a
greater personal interest in finding out at wh~e level our 1G to 18-year-
old youths these days acquire a Marxist-Leninist outlook in the general
po]ytechnical or expanded high school and in their professional training,
what they already know and what demands they make. No one should allow
himself to be guided by the derleanor of one trainee or another, for this
llas led to surprises in many cases.
Sociological findings and analyses show unequivocally, and one's own ex-
perience confirms, that the ideological education of our youth is progressing
faster than many a person supposes on the basis of dubious external criteria
(haircut, interest in music and so forth).
Of course, it is to be assumed that the average general and ideological
educational level differs from group to group. Preliminary training and
training group leaders must assess in a responsible manner what knowledge
of the topic concerned must be newly acquired or consolidated by the
training group and what parts can be skipped entirely under certain cir-
cumstances.
'['fle time available to us demands that we base political training on cert~cin
prerequisites. The objective of political training in the NVA makes it
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clear th;:; wt, cannc:C and clc, nnl: wir:h to cov,~r c~vc~rythtn}!. 'I'hc~ ::elec?tic,n
of thc~ rtuhject uurtCer of pulttical t:rainirt}; is cleiermine:GN DISSLM
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The main contents of the third group of problems consists of questions
of party political work with the troops. In the center of attention--
again on the basis of V. I. Lenin's ideas--are substantive and methodo-
logical problems of moral-political and psychological preparation of
the troops for armed struggle, with the demands of modern war as well a:!
problems of ideological struggle in modern war and questions of cultura:~
education of army members being taken into account. The problems which
thr- authors cover here impart to commanders and all other superiors as _
well as to party and youth officials in the NVA /National People's Army/
and the border troops of the GDR valuable knowledge and experience, which
must be utilized in order to fulfill the mandate of the Eighth Party
Congress of the SI;D: to develop socialist soldiers and fighting collec-
tives with a view to "attaining the best possible results in combat
training and in increasing combat readiness, as well as insuring the
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"wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland" and "imperialist wars"
are similarly identified as types of war., despite the fact that in the
two instances not unified but different classif ication crl.teria are used.
It might? also be worth noting that other Soviet authors identify dust
wars and unjust wars as "principal types of war."~?
The reviewer undersL-ands by types of war. classes of dust wars and classes
of unjust wars of a certain historical era and has expounded this concenr
in several publications.2
In a 4econd group of problems, the questions of the building up of the
Sovie,? ~~rmed forces and the development of Soviet military science are
disc~isr~ed. The authors trace the essence of the Leninist concept of the
butlding up of the socialist army and the obiactive laws on which its
development are based. On the basis of the milj*-ary philosophical heri~-
tlge of V. I. Lenin, the problem of the laws ei development of the so-
cialist armed forces has been researched in the Soviet Union for a long
time. For most readers of the book in the GDTrrectly toward the development of training in the coming
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training semester, w1.th the erpcricnce of the previous semester bean};
taken into account.
? 2. More influence should be exercised on the quality of the preparation
of training personnel and on more regul.ar.ly conducting instructional.
checks with training personnel.. The quality of personal training materia.l.s
and instructions is to be increased.
3. The setting of tasks concerning the aim, content, method, organization
and safeguardl.ng of the training to be conducted and of methodical in-
structive training is to be personally implemented and improved by superiors,
within the framework of preparing training personnel f:or their deities.
The preparation for their duties must be checked. The superior must pre-
pare training personnel by groups far the tralning measures to be taken.
4. In preparing training personnel in a methodical instructive manner,
certain training elements are to be concretely worked out. Under the
superior's guidance, training personnel alternately act :;s trainers and
trainees. It should constantly be the aim to develop the noncommissioned
officers' (trainers') practical abilities to lead groups, garrisons, serv-
ices and detachments in combat. This trai-;ing is to be oriented toward
mastery of weaponry and technology as well as toward perfectini; methodical
abilities, with main emp`+asis cn training in the field.
It has also proved expedient to show training films concerning the subjects
of the program prior to training. This opportunity is not utilized every-
where, however. Training fiJ.ms are recommended for the following subjects:
Camouflage, close combat against tanks, protective measures following the
employment of chemical weapons by the enemy, military transport by rail,
reinforcement in combat, fuel supply in combat, rationalization of loading
and unloading of supplies.
Planning, Control and Reports
First let us point out once more that all tasks by units of the rear serv-
ices for training in other military categories and services (maneuvers,
combat firing, bivouar_s, and so forth) are to lie regarded as combat train-
ing and to be utilized for training soldiers and units. This is to insure,
among other things, that, for instance, a cook, the driver of a fuel supply
vehicle or an ambulance driver puts in the required number of hours in
training categories stipulated by the training program. The hours spent
in special tactical training, within the framework of set tasks, must be
included in control and reports. This is especially true of work and
training in the second and third semester in the field of specialized
training.
In control and reports concerning the results in political and combat _
training as well as in the competition for top performance /Bestenbewegun~/,
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the following id required, among other things: high level of staff,
articulateness, checks agreeing with actual training; accomplishments, and
completeness of documentation. Checks of obligations and their fulfill-
ment as well as of classificatians aha'll be conducted monthly. What
counts here primarily is monthly evaluation, assessment, and control o%
results in the combat training control boak.
Above all, this article is intended to evaluate experience and to stimulate
discussion in this journal. In the discussion, additional. experience
should be described, and proposals should be submitted on how and in which
fields political and combat training can be organized and implemented even
better. In so doing, the objective should be a further increase in combat
readiness of the rear services of the army.
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ired;
--measures for the monitoring of the efficacy of personal protective equip-
ment, execution of tests for the functioning of protective masks, controls
concerning the operational readiness of the equipment anti means of nuclear/
chemical reconnaissance, for dosage control and special measurers;
--the sequence of reinforcement with nuclear/chemical equipment and means,
where and in what degree reserves are to be deployed;
--the means of crossing affecting sectors, actions in affected sectors,
necessary protective measures, the execution of special measures with
organic forces and means;
--the preparation and issue of food, the control and utilization of water
points, water preparation, sanitary-hygienic measures;
--the control of the dosage received by personnel (dosimetrics); reports
concerning dosage received;
--warning signals and the type and means of thei~~ transmission and repro-
duction;
--the forces and means for the elimination of the consequences of enemy
employment of 1`NM which have to be kept in reserve, the organization of
their employment and l.eadersltip;
--methods of cooperation with units of the chemical defense and their place
in the approach or combat orders as well as their tasks.
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The content of these instructions is not idenL?ical in every case. It de-
pends primarily on the combat mission, the preceding or anticj.pated actions
of the enemy, the character of the terrain and tl~e meteorolol;ical condi-
tions.
T.n certain combat situations only a precise definition and updating of
these instructions concerning the forces and means as well as the rime and
place of. their employment is required.
Specifications of the MVM protection measures are to be made depending on
the situation created by the total combat picture, particularly if the
enemy has employed MVM for the first time or repeatedly. In such situations
it is required to reorganize the missions of the
--nuclear/chemical reconnaissance (monitoring);
--the actions in affected areas (sectors);
--the deployment of forces and means for the elimination of the consequences
of the enemy action; as well as
--the execution of special measures.
T.hes~ MVM protective measures are to be realized after the employment of
MVM o~~ly in close coordination with a series of other measures for the
restoration of the combat capability of tl~e MSB/PB units. These measures
include, tong others:
--the organization of the restoration of command and control,
--the organization of first aid for casualties and their evacuation to the
medical service installations,
--the extinguishing of fires,
--the specification of combat missions,
--the warning of neighboring units and other units in the area, and
--if necessary, the organization of the re-grouping of units, their supply
with ~uipment, arms, ammunition, PUL and other logistical requirements.
Following the organization of the MVM protection, staff officers are to
assign the control and instructional task for these measures in the in-
dividual units.
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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE AFFECTS AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENSE COMMAND RisADTNESS
Last Berlin MTL]TAERWiJSEN in German Jun 75 pp 98B-104B
[By author's collective under the guidance of rIa~ Gen T~1 Langel
/Excer.pt/ With the development of modern combat equipment, a number of
changes have occurred: The combat equipment became more complicated< It
attained an unprecc.dcnted destructive force; the speed and range of impor-
tant combat means were increased substantially.
Tn the development of the air force and air defense this ran be demonstrated
with the following facts:
Tt took 26 years to increase the Gpeed of aircraft from 150 to 550 km per
Hour, 14 years to increase their speed from 1200 to 2000 km per hour.
Tt took only a few years to build strategic rockets with an average speed
that is twenty times higher than that of the strategic bombers.
In the process, military equipment became constantly more complicated.
Fifteen to 20 years ago equipment oY~ the average contained 700 to 800 in-
dividual parts and today already 1G00 to 1500.1
From this certain conclusions can be drawn The qualitative changes in the
weaponry and technical equipment of the LSK/LV that combine all the c~~-ogress
attained in the field of science and technology, place the highest require-
ments on the qualifications of army members in all sectors of military life.
A central problem posed here is the mastery of the equipment, its effective
and dependable operation. "The best combat means provide their advantages
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only where army members show a full mastery over their operation, their
maintenance and repair, coupled with a high fighting morale, based on
socialist convictions of principle. The mastery of equipment by army mem-
bers represents in cltls sense a decisive component of military superiority."2
While it was possible in the past to balance one or the other component in
the course of a war with an increased exertion of strength, iL- is necessary
nowadays to develop all components uniformly in the preparation of troops
for combat. This means: Only those troops can gain victory today who are
superior to the enemy politically and ideologically as well as in their
mental and physical capabilities and who dispose over modern combat equip-
ment. "In a modern war the morale factor can play its decisive role not
by itself, bur. only in connection with the material factor."3
The ini:e;.rclaticnsitip between man and equipment is thus being strengthened
continuously. It is therefore not sufficient any longer to draw the genera]_
conclusion that the role of man and equipment is increasingly important in
modern war. It is necessary to take account of new developments in this
interrelationship.
The Introduction of New and Complicated Combat Equipment with Ewer Greater
Frequency
The Air Force and Air Defense Command of the NVA dispose of modern and
complicated weapons systems. To guarantee their. efficacy both individually
and in combination, requires both an excellent sY.ate of c~.re and maintenance
of equipment a:~d primarily a high state of training on the part of army
members. Orly in this way can the tactical. and technical parameters of the
equipment be fully utilized. It becomes evident in this connection that
the renewal of the material-technical basis of troop units takes place in
ever shorter time frames, that the number of new types of weapons is in-
creasing and that the new combat equipment that is issued as a rule becomes
ever more complicated.
This statement is evidenced by the following in the development of weapons
systems for air defense:
1. The advantages of the socialist productioT.t method are constantly being
put to better use to gear combat equipment to :he needs of man. Thus
certain mental and manual activities have been t,3ken ov~~+- by computers and
automated equipment as, for example, automatic pilots any' guidance systems
for weapons and equipment. Nevertheless the stress on the human operator
does not decrease by any means. A series of factors are at work in this
which result frem the construction and equipment of modern interceptor
a.iLcraft of the present and ~' next generation. In this connection the
following should be mentioned:
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--the increasing speed and altitude characteristics (MIG-15/17, max speed
to 1200 lcm/h, top altitude aro~,~nd 16,000 m; MIG 21, max speed around
X400 km/h, max altitude around 20,000 m);
--the ever more extensive cockpit equipment;
--the more complicated navigational equipment of the aircraft in most flight
phases;
--the 3.ncrease in combat possib4.lities; based on the weaponry variations;
--the increasing dependence of the separate flight phases on ground systems;
--the greater requirements placed on the knowledge and skills of the air-
craft commander during the occurrence of special in-flight situations.
All told, the number of d:he laws of cognition, of volition)."5
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Intensifyinl; Thinkinl; and Acting in Equul Mcasur.c~
The dynamics of modern combat, the continuail. ].esseninf; of the t:i.me nvata.nhl.c
for the fulfillment of. certain combat tasks, make it necessary that f:Imc
sequences in the operation of combat equipment- arc continually shor.t-ened.
At the same time greater precision is required of. ;army members in their
actions.
The composition and the characteristics of modern military equipment, thy.
requirement for consciously and actively engaged sold.ter per.:;onalities, con-
sidering the time limits available for training on equipment-, coupled with
the requirement far complete mastery of the equipment under. the conditions
of limited periods of military service--a11 this ].cads to r_r.aining method
that put the accent on the equal intensification of thinking and acting.
The noted military pedagogue, V. I. Lu~kov writes in this connection:
"More than ever today the perfection of military mastery deper;ds nn the
psychological preparation of the soldier for his task. It is known for
instance that man can at most recognize 5 to 9 individual objects in a
connected relationship and that the human arm can make about 5.2 movements
per second without strain, but the lower arm 8, and the hand up to 11.4.
The minimal reaction time to signals in quick sequence amounts to 0.25
seconds; the interval limit between signals that still allow a proper re-
action amounts to 0.5 seconds. Human thought takes place at a speed of
20 to 30 operations per second. One recognizes that the human being has to
operate within certain limits. If he wants to overcome these Ise must rai.sc
the absolute and relative sensitivity of the sensory organs through proper
exercises, to shorten the reaction time, to increase the resistance of
the organism, and thu.~ to lower the duration of fatigue or to postpone
fatigue."6
Investigations have disclosed that the comh>e fight against the enemy's modern a1r attack means as employed in the
defense against imperialist aggresLive actions in Southeast Asia and also
in the Near East of course merits proper attention. It furnishes us with
Important le;zsons for the proper represenl-a~tion of the man-equipment inter-
r~cti.ons .
Army members are to be trained in such a way that they love the combat
equipment c~ntrt,sted to them, that they are convi.t~ced of the depenclabili.ty
and superiority of the Soviet equipment--this is a ba~tc task of our
military-technical propaganda. '
1'h Ls has to happen continuously within the framework of the training pro-
c~ss, in combat training, during exercises and maneuvers and in daily
political mass work.
Our military-technical propaganda i.s based on the experiences of the Soviet
Army. For their further activation we need to employ all those who gradu-
ated from institutions of higher learning academies i~t the Soviet Union
and also in our Republic. Tt is important to fit the theme treatment to
the respective audience. In this connection a few basic principles must
1~c observed without fail.:
--Army members must receive timely access to the military-technical know-
ledge that pertains to their weapons system.
--The suc~:essful operation of complicated military equipment requires in
many cases the acquisition of knowledge in related technical fields beyond
one's own. Efforts in this direction must be reinforced.
--The methodological skills of the technical trainers are a decisive pre-
requisite for the increase of the military knowledge and skills of. per-
sonnel. In order to diffuse technical knowledge rapidly and well, the
propagation of tested and of new methods is essential.
Main Attenr.ion to be Devoted to the Education of Army rlember.
In our training activity, all army members art to be instructed time and
again that the equipment en~:rusted to us is the people's property and that
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i.t is to be cared for and mnintaaned. Involved ar.e :;ubstantial vaLt~es,
the objectified work of thousands of workers, enE;i.ncer.y, techn.tcians and
sci.entisr_s.
If equipment and property are treated negligently and premature lo~~;;c~s
occur, our Republic sustains a double loss: nut only is there a wa::t-e of
expensively-built material means, but t-he combat value of the servicr.;-;,
formations and units is lowered as well.
This is why an essential duty of commanders, political workers and engi.nc~er.-
ing-technical personnel requires the training of all army members to tl~e
strict observance of service regulations, oper.ata.o~ial procedures and of
safety regulations.
In his contribution to the discussion at the 13t-h plenary session of the
SED Central Committee, Colonel General Heinz Kessler stated that the
standards set for the Further strengthening of discipline, the accumpl.ish-
ment of an exact military order, the mastery of modern combat equiptncnt
and first of all for the leadership of the ideological work will have to
be more strict-. This conclusion also applies to the solution of the prob-
lems listed in the present contribution. We are guided in tlii.s by t:l~e
fact that the "decisive task" for the creation of. a high state of combat
readiness "is the political education of each member of the armed forces,
the acquisition and deepening of solid and immovable Marxist-Leninist
basic convictions and of a strong class standpoint.II This must be re-
flected in the relations between man and equipment.
War has always been and wi.11 always be connected with unprecedented stress
on the indiviriual fighter. Daring, boldness, bravery and self-sacrifice
have been and will remain qualities that will decisively determine the
actions of the socialist soldier personality. But today these gt~al.iti_es
of themselves are not sufficient. The rapid development of Lectulology
increases the specific requirements that are. placed on man to a substantial.
degree.
In a modern war the effect of the morale factor must tae seen in close con-
nection with the commitment of modern war materiel. The higher morale
that disti~lguishes the socialist fighter must express itself to a large
extent in the general mastery of modern combat equipment and the maximum
use of its combat qualities in the interests of gaining victory over the
enemy, even under the most difficult conditions.
1. Luzkov, V. N.: "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"),
Berlin, 1973, p 43.
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2. iionecker, E.: "Zuverlaeasiger Schutz des Sozialismus" ("Dependable
Protection of Socialism"), Berlin, 1973, p 181.
3. Authors' Collective Led by Milovidov, A. S. and Koslow, V. G., "Das
Philosophische Erbe Lenins and die Probleme des Modernen krieges"
("The Philosophical Heritage of Lenin And the Problems of Modern
War"), ~~p. c,it., p 240.
4, Authot?a' Co11ecL?ive Led by Mareyev, I.S., "Die Parteipolltsche Arbeit
in der Sowjetarmee and der Sow~etkriegsfloLte" ("The Party-Political
Work in the Soviet Army and Navy"), op. cit., p 366.
5. Luzkov, V. N., "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"),
op, cit., p 45.
G. Op, cit., p 46.
7. Engelstaedter, W., in MILITAERWESEN , Berlin, 1974, p 102-104.
8. Keller, H., "Das vom Volk Geschaffene Wird 7.uverlaessig Geachtietzt"
("What Was Created by the People is Protected Dependably"), 13th
Plenum Discussion, Berlin, 1974, p 113.
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CONCEPTS OF AERIAL COMBAT PRESENTrD
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 110B-113B
[By Col Dr F. Beer, military scientist]
/Excerpt/ How can the influence of combat characteristics on the effective-
ness of t~~e interception of aerial targets 1~e taken account of in the command
activity of commanders when they formulate combat decisions? This happens
through the calculation and evaluation of the combat potential. By combat
potential for the interception and destruction of aerial targets is under-
stood the anticipated result of the combat deployment of interceptor fight=_rs
in their execution of a specific combat task under actual. conditions. Com-
bat potential expresses quantitatively the effectiveness of the combat de-
ployment of interceptor aircraft by means of the anticipated result of
their combat actions. The concept of combat potential thus is stibstantiell~~
wider than the concept of combat characteristics. It takes into account as
many as possible of the characteristics and factors that have a substantial
impact on the capability of interceptors to carry out combat actions.
Combat experiences in Vietnam and the Near East have shown that. the resuJ.ts
of aerial combat actions depend particularly on the following factors:
--the status of training and of the fighting morale of the aircraft com-
manders,
--the determination and courage of their action,
--the purposeful and consistent command and control of the fighter farces
from the ground and in the air,
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--the purpose ful.ner;r3 0l the tact.lca7 methods empa.oyed in combat, the in-
tcl.l.al;ent and r;kill(?ul exp ua(:;rtlon of the advantal;es of friendly aircraft.
i.n con~r.lderation of the c?omhat potential of the enemy.
'I'hi.s L., wiry ..m a::rae~~~:mcnt of the c:ornbat potential and their evaluation in
t he interest of the cormn,rncler'r; decision making hroc~sses, must take Choir
point of departure. always I corn t:he anticipated sLCuation. ']'hest calcrr]rr-
t-tons :r].w:rys have a very soc~cifi.c content- :.rnd as a rule do nut lead Lo
l;enera.l.l.y val:{.d ;tatementa, that arc appl:icahle an all kinds of. c~i.tuatlons.
On the other hnr.d, there exist natur.a].ly averal;e comb;tt potential. for
fi.ghtc~r aircraft which exl.>resses the probable results of combat deploy-
ment for the ]ntercc:~ption and destruction of aerial. targets under typi.caJ,
nvera};e conditions. 'These depend prtmari.ly on the combat characteristics
of the: combat, command and security equipment, and can be calculated try
the extent that the.^, c: combat charactc~r.intics arc known, u:;ir:~ m~rc or l.e:;s
comp] i.cat:ed m;rthernatic;r:1. methods ;rnd can he represented in the. form of
n~nnaric.nl vaaues, nomugrapFrs, tables etc. All. responsible staff. off:Icc~rs
can work these out in advance and incorporate them {.nto the permanent hacic?-
F;round data of their wor.k:i.n}; documents.
Cr?i tur.ia of Combat Potential
'fhe conun;utdcr who makes an estimate of combat potential for the fu.l.f.illment
of a specl)-lcally-ordered combat mission must answer the question in which
area, how fast and o.~ith which quality or effectiveness this task can he
executed. He must thus a~,se5;; three ;aspects of the combat potential.
1. the spat i.al. opportun Ltics,
2. tP~;:~ ti.me oppc~rtunit:ies and
::-. they effectiveness of the combat actions (rcau.lts of the fulti.l.lment
cC the comhrit m:i.ssion).
't'hese aspects of the combat potential arc expressed quantitatively through
appropriate triter. i_a of combat potential. (spatial, time and probahi.li.t-y
criteria).
The spatial potent..i.al of interceptor aircraft for the fu.lfil.lment of com-
bat. tasks arc expressed quantitatively by sectors. Such sector;, arc' the
radLus of action, L-he po;;sibl.e sectors of the combat deployment of inter-
ccptor aircraft- accor.di.ng to ~_rpproach sectors, hcit,ht-s and velocil-i.e~, thr
sectors of potential attack i,1 aerial combat and the potential fire ?rone:;.
The r~idaus of action, nusiniug the ai.r space within which interceptor a.tr-?
c~.raft have the capahilitY of intercc~pti.ng and destroyiuY enemy aircraft, i.~,
determined espc~cial.l.y by thc~ fol_Locoi.nl; c.omb:~t r'~aracter. istics:
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--the flight range and flight duration of the interceptor aircraft- or its
radius of Lactical action;
--the height at which the interceptor and its weaponry is commi.ted.
The possible zones of the combat deployment are expressed by L-he altitude/
velocity diagrams of friendly and enemy aircraft and other characteristics.
The zones of possible attack and possible fire, that i.s to say the maximum
and minimum possible target distances as well as the range of the aircrafr_
depending on the direction, represent the influence of tl~e combat character-
istics of the weapons system and the on-board radar instrumentation range
of the interceptor aircraft on its combat deployment.
The time horizon of the interceptor aircraft for the accomplishment of
combat tasks is indicated quantitatively by various time values that
characterize the combat readiness of the aircraft for combat deployment as
well as the duration cf thy- interception process and its various phases.
The criteria of combat readiness as a rule are norm times, for instance
time of transition from one degree of operational readiness to a higher
one, elapsed time to takeoff by the interceptor after receipt of the scramb.l.e
order and elapsed time to attainment of the approach flight path. These
criteria are influenced significantly by the maintenance condition, the
takeoff conditions, the acceleration capability and other combat character.-
i.stics of the aircraft.
The efficacy of the combat deployment. of the interceptor aircraft illustrates
the degree, extent or quality with which the combat task is accomplished.
Si~.ice the combat deployment for the interception and destruction of aerial
ta,:gets frequently talces place under similar cona~::ions anti tiier.efore has
a certain mass character, its efficacy is expressed by means of probability
criteria which are frequently described as effectiveness criteria. The
proper effectiveness criterium must be determined in relation to the in-
dividual combat mission and the conditions of the engagement. The following
typical variations may occur in case of combat deployment for the inter-
ception and destruction of- aerial targets:
Table 1. Variants of Combat Deployment
Engagement
Conditions Combat Mission Effectiveness Criterium
1. A single aerial target Interception and Destruction Probability
seeks to penetrate the Destruction of the of the aerial target
air defense system serial target
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Table 1 (continued)
2? A group of aerial Interception and
targets seek to pene- destruction of the
trace the air. defense greatest possible
system number of targets
Interception and
destruction of
all targets
Interception and
destruction of
a specificali~
ordered number of
targets
3. The enemy overflies Interception and
the air defense destruction of the
corridor or sector greatest number of
as a target of oppor- targets in the
tunity sector or corridor
Engagement of all
targets
Mathematical expectation
of the number of
targets destroyed
Probability that all
targc::s are intercepted
and destroyed.
Probability of inter?
ception and destruction
of at least the ordered
number of targets.
Mathematical expectation
of the number of
destroyed targets in
the pertinent sector
(corridor).
Probability that all
radar guide tracks are
engaged and that a
target can overfly the
sector (corridor) with
impunity.
The Interception Probability
Irrespective of which effectiveness criterium the commander selects ,`or the
calculation and assessment of the combat potential, its determination ,nust
take into account the effectiveness of the individual interceptor aircraft
in the interception of an aerial target. This is characterized by the so-
called interception probability of the aerial target.
The interception probability expresses the influence of the combat charac-
teristics of the aircraft and of its weapons system as well as of its
command and control equipment on the result of the interception (aerial
target destroyed or not destroyed). It takes into consideration all
phases of the interception process, particularly the two main phases: the
guiding of the interceptor aircraft towards the target and the aerial
engagement.
In the first main phase the interceptor is guided by ground means to such
close proximity of the aerial Target that the aircraft commander can get a
fix on the target and subsequently commence the aerial engagement. The
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combat potential in this phase is determined from the point of view of
effectiveness by the probability of the successful conduct of the inter-
ceptor aircraft to the aerial target by ground means, which depends on the
combat characteristics of the fighter ground to air control means and o~i
the different combat characteristics of the aircraft particularly on its
maneuverability during banking maneuvers.
During the engagement phase the aircraft commander of the interceptor air-
craft independently approaches the aerial target after he has a fix on it
and commences the attack. He places himself in a good firing position,
launches the rockets or opens fire and destroys the target. The effective-
ness of this phase is characterized by the destruction probability of the
aerial target in the course of an aerial engagement. This depends in
particular on the combat characteristics of the on-board guidance system
and the weapons system besides the different tactical/technical charac-
teristics of the interceptor aircraft.
The determination of the interception vrobability of aerial targets through
the commitment of modern Interceptor aircraft under different conditions
is the most difficult part of the methology in the computation and assess-
ment of the combat potential inasmuch as complicated inter-relationships
exist between its component parts and the combat characteristics /of the
aircraft/. This probability can be computed according to the following
formula in a most general way.
PA = Ph x Pq x kz .
PA--Interception probability of tl.e aerial target,
Ph--Probability of successful approach,
P~ -Destruction probability of the aerial target in an engagement,
kz--Dependability (survival probability) of the elements of the interception
system.
The criteria of combat opportunities are determined in the practical work
of the commanders and staffs according to special computing methods that
are standard for all sectors. The methodology of the operational/tactical
computations is illustrated in special instructions. In the case of the
combat deployment of interceptor aircraft, these are primarily naviga*.ional/
tactical and engineering/navigational computations.
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Il.lustrutaon 1. Mel-.hodoio};y of Computation and Assessment of Combat
OpportuniLic~~ o.C tlic Int.-crceptor Aircraft
ur/ren ;rha~a:.o:r.lrn
.1r3 r~blU."y,J l~'! ~ ?rU~rl
q
~/~, 3f r mtC/'f3 f fy'~Onr3 Jr1 ct'n r 7 ~_r . _ ~~. __ _ ___ LP's': Jr e" f;.~. ~--~. ~. :. ...
..f~' ..r'id Cr'~c': r~r~_ 9 ~ __-'r,;~~Q__ .r_!`t~f _-_ ~r~ ~r?..;Ld :[!
.,f,,,., .,1 .,r
^
~~
...
~ ~nr;u::yr,JJrv(1 b~gn,tN ~Nc?'. ~u(R~orrn)
~-al 4J1
1. wombat I'otentia]. of: the Interceptor Ai.rc.raft
2. Probable Result. of thc~ Combat Deployment according to Com-
putati~ns
3. Assessment
4. Required Result of the combat deployment acr_.erding to combat
mission
5. Criteria of Combat ]'otenti.al
6. Spatial Critcri.a
7. Time Criteria
8. Probability Criteria
9. ParLi.al Criteria
10. Tnfluence Values (C13aracteristics, i'actors)
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Illustration 2. Criteria of Combat Opportunities of the Interceptor
1
Qdumlithe KritlriM
~rllr~G! AiderrM
~i~rw^'~oiu~ sstorl
l
r''o^r'~rsoo.-nun9
Key:
1. Spatial Criteria
2. Time Criteria
3. Probability Criteria
4. zone of action
5. approach sectors
6. tactical action radius
7. Flight-Velocity Sectoxs
8. sector of possible attacks
(firing)
:rr"~ sc^r?rnrcr..r,: urs
.arrJr? i~~S~oti
if Jhr'; y r~..r /?r?'ll ~,.
...r o?s~,;.e~; urs
7 /,; n,;~p~ ?~S
9. norm time of combat readiness
10. duration of combat sortie
11. preparation time for repeat start
12. duration of air alert patrols
13. combat tension
14. probability of approach
15. destruction probability
16. dependability of the inter-
ception system
].. Wentzel, J. S.:
Berlin, 1966.
"Operationsforschung" ("Operational Research"
2. Authors' Collective:
1972.
"Militaerlexicon" ("Military Lexicon"), Berlin,
3. Durov, V. P.: "Der Gaf~chtseinsatz and die Wirksamkeit von
Abfangjagdfluzeugen ("Combat Commitment and the Effectiveness of
Interceptor Aircraft"), Moscow, 1972.
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INFORMATION PROVIDED ON SPECIALIZED TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONNP:L
East Berlin MIi.,ITAERWESLN in German Jun 75 pp 114B-117B
[By Lt Col J. Knie]
/Text/ The education and training of pilots, who must master aircraft as
a weapon under all circumstances, is in the center of the combat training
of the air force. The report of the SED Central Committee to the Eighth
Party Congress states in this connection: "The increase in the battle
strength and combat readiness of the Nstional Pe~ple'~ Army requires class-
conscious combatants, whe master socialist military science on the basis
of Marxist-Leninist theory and modern means of leadership, ,sri,~~ment, and
technology, This poses increasing requirements on education and training."1
One of the most important requirements on military quali;`icatian :s con-
formity between theoretical knowledge and practical skills. Higli military
qualific;;~ion demands in a comprehensive sense: a unity of very good
political, general military, and specialized knowledge which is based on
firm class consciousness. Effective education and training must therefore
make sure that all training potentials are being converted into l..~owledge,
skills, and capabilities on a scientific basis. What matters in this
respect is to convey only such knowledge, skills, and capabilities, wt-icli
are a necessary requirement for the fulfillment of co;ni;at tasks. W}iat is
required therefore is a meaningful conveyance of knowledge, which is li.mil-ed
by the concrete tasks and concentrated on the essential. The conveyance
of unusable knowledge is a waste of training time and a loss of combat
potential. A constant optimal development of specialized and advanced
trai-~,ing ensures a continuous increase of the training level of pilots and
has thereby a decisive influence on combat readiness. A lack of tlleoret.ical
knowledge contributes to the causes of flight accidents and L-he accidents
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themselves. This results in a high responsibility of: all commanders,
which can be expressed in the following principles:
1. Education probl.~ms and education questions permeate all spheres of
society.
2. Education questions as leadership problems must play an essential. role
in the command process and the work of every comm~.nder. Educational ideas
are an essential component of command deliberations.
3. Determination and concrete preparation of tiie math substantive aspects
and material consequences of education is part of the permanent planned
work of every commander and of every command.
The annual plan of specialized training must reflect the training level of
the pilots and the tasks of the regiment, ~.ndicat~e material consequences,
and contain plan positions which can be accounted for in terms of content
and materially.
Goals of Specialized and /advanced Training
The goal consists in the development of specialized knowledge, capabilities,
and skills required for the successful execution. of combat training and
for actual combat.
--constant perfecting of knowledge dealing with the tactics of combat events
with full utilization of the technical sad tactical application ~~al~acities
of the weapons systems;
--systematic increase of the training level and performance classifi~~ation
of pilot~e;
--exact execution of the flight assignment without flight accidents or
creating conditions for flight accidents;
--retraining of pilots for new weapons syster!s and their preparation for
combat action in the shortest possible time.
Specialized training and advanced training must be constantly developed
as an active and creative process. It must take account of the complexity
of pilot training. Building on the basis of constantly provided basic
knowledge, specialized training and advanced training has the purpose of
developing oFerational procedures enabling pilots to carry out complex
flight rassignments undEr all conditions of a tactical air situation.
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Modern weapons systems oi' our. air force require for full uti.lizution of
their combat capnci tics a syr;ternat i.c acquisitic~t of usable knowledge,
capabilities, and skil..l.r,. 'ChiK must therefore be one of the training
priori t lcs.. Content, form, and methodoloT;y must be oriented to this
priority. The y~,oa.T is therefore not ortJy the conveyance of new knowledge
Lot .also the fi.r.mi.nT; up :tad retention of knowledge already acquired. Only
salable knowledge can he applir~rl in practice. 't'heory is the basis for any
kind of activity. Every success in the aar must he prepared on the T;round.
Development of Content
The content of specialized t:rai.ninT and :ulvanced training is determined
1>y: weapons and c~quipmcnt, fate f:indingt+ of socialist military science,
the requirements of. bassi.c aviation principles, the results of research
in aviation medicine, the concrete tasks for the respective training year,
and the trait~ine l.e.vel. of p.T1.ot.s. The following training specialties
are included: tactical and technical. training, aviation theory, and
navil;at3on traininT; and advanced training, as well as training in special-
ized fields.
Tactical training, is the nucleus of spec:ialized Traininf; a;~d advanced
tr~tini.ng. Tt rr~atc~s the theoretical preconditions for. the conduct of
:ai.r combat under di.ffcrent conditimis of a tactical air. situation. The
fol.l~wi.ng prine.tples must be considered i.n tactical training:
--the entire tactical training must be related to practice;
--it must be a component of daily combat tra:ininp,;
--tacti^al. findings moat determine the content of combat training exercises.
'Che following is bei.nT; taught in tacti.ca:l. training:
--the functions of p lots in the duty system, the tasks during transition
to a higher level of combat readiness,
--defense against violators of the. air space,
--regulation of cooperation with other service branches and neighbors,
---the experience ar.~i results of real combat actions in order to develop
ski.11 and shrewdness, in air combat,
--combat against ground and sea targets with the different weapons variants,
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Tactical training must always be a means for an encl and a basis f:or combat-
relnted training. 'there should be no tactical principles of combat fiction
which arc not being considered in combat training.
Training, in aviation t:~eory deals with the immediate aerodynamic problems
of flight practice. Victory in air combat depends decisively on maximal
utilization of the combat characteristics of the aircraft. Practical aero-
dynamics is therefore nn important training branch. Modern aircraft, which
expand especia:~ly the range of altitude end speed and effect overall quali-
tative changes of aerodynamic characteristics, demand of the oilots con-
stantly applicable knowledge of practical aerodynamics. 'rhi.s requires
also comparisons with the technology of the adversary in order to determine,
on hand of a comparison of aerodynamic behavior of the aircraft, advantages
and disadvantages and tactical rules for combat act.ton.
Training Priorities
There arc three priorities in the development; of specialized training and
advanced training.
The first priority, which is also the main priority, comprises the firming
up and retention of basic knowledge required for every pilot. Tliis complex
must be based on the requirements for graduates of the officers academy
and contain classification requirements. We are dealing here with the
specialized knowledge which is actually and immediately required by pilots
for the execution of their combat assignments. It must remain on a con-
stant level during life entire active service period of the pilot. The
recognition that usable knowledge must be constantly repeated since the
things that have been learned start to be forgotten after about 3 months,
makes it necessary to pay great attention to the matter of retention of
knowledge. Retention of knowledge is primarily repetition. However one
frequently hears the following: "We have gone through this instruction
three times already." This is an example of the selection of a wrong
method. Too much of what is still known had been repeated. The partici-
pants in the instruction had not been forced to collaborate and their
mental potential was not completely used. They felt bored, and the in-
struction had failed. The methuds for repetition course must be funda-
mentally different from the original learning of a subject matter. Many
options are available far this.
They range from seminar to test and from consultation to exchange of ex-
perience and direct instruction in technology, where theoretical factors
are combined with practical assignments.
The second priority is the constant conveyance of new knowledge. Planning
of this priority is an extremely important task. Its content and extent
cannot be uniform in all regiments, but depends considerably on the train-
ing level of the pilots.
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This priority also includes the organized study of V5 /classified,/ material
and open literature published by the LSK/LV (Air Force and Air D~f:ense
Command). Organized study does not dust mean the perus;il. of several
ar.t:i.clcs .i.n a certain area and at a certain kime. Organized study mr-.ans
that stUdieA proceed according to predeterm.tned priorities, that the in-
structor. has familiarized himself with the problems in advance, and that
the rtub~ect matter is discusctc,cl in common.
The third priority comprises the assessment of the pilots' knowledge.
According to flight operations regulations, an annua]. test in the di.ffere.nt:
specialties of advanced specialized training i.s required. This complex
i.s regulated by issuance of orders. However, regardless of these tests,
c~ar.h instruction course must be started or. closed with on~~ or several
control. questions. It is the pt.rrpose of these control questions to as-
certai.n whether the pilots have sure command of the rcquisi.te knowledf;c
and skills and are in ra posi.tion of. using them in practicu ro great
;:rdvantagc .
}lints for the Conduct of Instruction
In principle, every superior has to train his subordinates. It is incor.-
r.ect that a pilot concucts this trainin}; because he has a good Icnocaledgcr
of the respective specialized field. This does not mean that such officers
should not be included in the preparation of instruction but the service
regulations for commanders and their deputies and for the chiefs of the
services prescribe who is responsible for a specific course of instruction.
In order t~ obtain high quality, the following steps must be obsc.rv~d
without fail i.n the preparations of instruction:
].. Clar.i.f:ication of the progression of instrur.tion;
2. Specification ot- goals in accordance with concrete conditions, estab-
l.islunent of partial goals;
3. Grouping of the suU~ect matter into a logical sequence with a con-
current check on one's own knowledge and perf.ect:ing of this knowledge,
where required;
4. Coordination of content with other specialized areas;
S. Utili^.ation of the educational potential of ehc collective by way of
setting high requirements and by critical assessment of performances;
6. Allocating the time availab.l.e for instruction by determining how much
time i~ required for specific didactic functions such as introduction,
conveyance, consolidation, and control;
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7. Planning of reserve rime and preparation of reserve subject matcri.al..
The superior will have to control the conclusion of the preparations and
to confirm the outline of the instruction course.
1. "Bericht des 7.entralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitap, der Sozialistischen
Einheitapartei Deutschlands." Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich
Honecker (Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Party
Congress. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker), Berlin 1971, p 69.
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BUILD-1JP Or FRG NAVY SCURED
Last Berlin MILITAGRIJIsSEN in German Jun 75 pp 105C-109C
~13y Cape Dr K. Baerwinkel]
/'Text/ With DM 46.4 bil.lic~n, according to NATO data, the FRG naval arma-
ment budl;et for 1975 has reached a new record, which makes it clear that
the matr'.rial bases of the FRG's imperialist polfc; of aggression are being
expanded. Further increases are planned for the ntxt few years. 1'he
struggle against imperialism requires us to keep in view its activities
of. material preparation fora new world war, Increasingly manifested also
in naval armament, to unmask them publicly and to take them into account
in our military activity.
'I'hc Connection Between the Operational Concept, Armament Planning and the
New Command Structure of. the I'RG Navy
'Che war aims, the operational concept deriving from them, armament planninf;
and the structure of the FRG Navy are closely connected. The war aims
form the basis of armament plans, for the buildup and structure of the
armed forces. Conversely, a gi.vei~ state of development of. the material
preparaY.i.ons for war promotes the f~.irther shaping of the war aims. In
this, the influential armament conceTas have an extremely stimulatint;
effect on the way armament production and the war. aims develop, in L-he
:Interest of achieving hi.ph armament profits. The influence which the
military industrial complex also exercises in naval mat~ci-;, in the FRC
constitutes a concr.rte danger for. peace and must not be ~.mdrrestimntc].I
'I'hc discovery of these connections puts us :in an even better position to
unmask the war a:Ims against socia].istn, veiled by the myth of an existing
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threat. 'rhe "new navy concept" for the 1?RC Navy was ~Lssucd in ].971./72.
The preparatory work had been accomplished by the "Basis Study of flu Navy
Concept," which was to replace the Wegner study of 1962 by taking "al.l.
current facts" into account.
i3y "current facts" was not meant the turning away from aggressive war.
policy as a result o:' government practice followed by the SPD/FDP r.oal.ition,
but continuation of this policy, with adjustment to the changed condil:ions
of the international balance of strength.2 The basic ideas of the "new
concept" were confirmed by Vice Admiral ICuehnle, the former inspector. of
the FRG Navy (rel-ired since 1 April 1975), when he said: "It proceeds
from the premise that file Baltic. Seal the North Sea and the maritime areas
an between form a strategic entity."
'Chis "concept" includes the effort of the Bonn naval leadership to con-
stantly extend i.ts operational area by utilizing NA'I'0 stratef;y anci to
fulfill even better its "combat mission east of Bornholm " At the same
time, there is a focusing on the so~-called "coping w:Lth ~r:Lses," about
which Kuehnle has the following to say: "By its presence, by appearing
on the high seas and by being able to operate in multinational. unit:, a
navy is especially well suited for demonstrating interest in behalf of
national power.... This configuration...obviously lcacls to conclusions
regarding the type of means of. naval war."4 This is propaganda for a
political-militar concept which ccntinues the aggressive aims directed
al;ainst the socialist states. In this connection, specific possibilities
are emphasized of the FRG Navy--by making use of the high seas--engaging
in provocations at any time, and even in times of_ pe,ace, occupying favor-
able positions against the socialist states. The ?3o:tn militarists demand
the further buildup of the Federal Navy through a comprehensive armament
program, extending to the mid-eighties, oriented toward the equipment
of modern combat units. Thanks to sizable results in past F1tG Navy arma-
ment, the leadership of the FRG Navy can depend on an arm with fighting
capacity, ever ready for attack, politically and militarily, and, according
to its own data, comprising about 300 ships and 200 planes at the beginning;
of 1975.
According to Western data, for arms and equipment alone, an average par
year of DM 560 million was spent for the FRG Navy from 1957 to 1969, and
for the period 1970-1974 the amount of money appropriated increased
markedly, with a planned yearly average of DM 725 million. In the future,
too, the material for further armament development in the FRG Navy are to
be increased substantially. Among other things, in the armament budget
for 1975, for research, development and testing DM 11 million are openly
allocated for patrol boats, DM 8 million for frigates, DM 17 m:!_17_ion for
the air-to-ship missile Kormoran, DM 13 million for naval gui-.led-missile
systems, as well as DM 580 million for procurement.5
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Tl~c myth of an existing threat continues to be used as a rationale for
tl~e "new naval concept," with Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and southern
Norway, as well as the "sealanes, and thus imports," allegedly being
threatened milltnrily by the socialist states. Even the energy and oil
crisis, a result- of. Imperialist policy, is used to support the demand for.
a Strang military presence to protect. the sealanes and the oil-drilling
installations in the North Sea. At the same time, the myth of an existing
~ threat, attuned cleverly and with every refinement to the various layers
of: tlir l,opul.at:ton, r.ontradicts the assertion in Bonn that the Federal
Armed Forces do not require the image of nn enemy. The FRG naval leader-
ship does everything possible to incite members of the Federal Navy with
even l;reater effect to anticommunism, to manipulate them in the interest
of imperialism, to corrupt them even more effectively and thus to get
them ready for war against socialism.6 Also to be interpreted as further
preparations for war is the fact that the Federal Navy conducted l0 naval
exercises in 1973 and that in 1974 altogether 35 exercises with NATO units
ware planned. These increased activities confirm our estimate that the
~iggressi.ve character of imperialism has not changed in any way.
The "new naval concept" also includes the "Revision .;f the Naval Command
Str.~icture" issued in 1973, introduced in stages during a period of about
2 years and comprising three areas of command:
1. The Naval Command (in Gluecksburg) with preponderantly operational
to&ks, iu which all operational units and installations, including the
supply fleet and the amphibian transport group, are combined.
L. The Naval Office (in Wilhelmshaven) with tasks in the fields of
trai.r_:.ng, armament and naval medical service as well as the posts and
installations assigned to them.
3. The Naval Support Command (in Wilhelmshaven), in which all ongoing
support tasks (supply of materiel, system maintenance, transports, and
so forth) are combined. This new installation was inaugurated on
1 October 1974.
Through the restructuring of the FRG Navy a "heightening of the presence
of the naval. forces" is to be achieved. The operational units are to be
suppl.i.ed better and restra;.ned less from the aggressive tasks intended
for them. At the same time, the new seeucture is to make possible tighter
and mere flexible organization, thereby attaining "greater economy and
rationalization of operations." The intention here is to tackle the in-
creasing operational costs, which, at the expense of investment in physical
assets, reached 70.9 percent in the Federal Armed Forces in 1972. The
yearly cost of operating the destroyer squadron of the "Fletcher" type
w;~s given as i1M 26.1 million in 196#3 and is reported to have risen to
nM 31.1 million in 1972.7 These and similar arguments above all serve
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to attain even greater allocations for armament. The prominent attempts
in public to reduce coats and to operate more economically must not be
allowed to conceal the fact that the "new command structure" is primarily
aimed at further ad~uatment to the requirements of modern r?s~? and at more
careful consideration of problems arising from weaponry deve].c;pments. New
paths are to be found for further arming of the FRG Navy in the interest
of increasing the aggressive power of the navy.
Sights Set Mainly on Intensification of Armament
Also in the realm of FRG naval armament, an increasing intensification of
armament is to be noted. This is a phenomenon arising primarily from
the rapid development of war technology and the increasing "moral obso-
lescence" of weapon systems.
This process must be viewed in the context of the war policy of the system
of imperialist domination and especially of the activities of the armament
monopolies. t^here is no such thing as automatic development of war tech-
nology. The intensification of armament is viewed as follows by the
military of the FRG Navy: "The cost of all weapons systems, and to a
very special degree the cost of the big weapons system constituted by the
warship, will escalate in such a way that the number of vessels to be
manufact?ared and to be maintained w{1.1 decrease more and more. Since
conversely the combat value of the individual vessel increases continually
owing to docking insL-allations, combat data processing, automation and
far-reaching more accurate and highly effactiv~ weapons systems..., the
total effectiveness to a large extent remains constant in the end."8 These
ideas deriving from the technical development of modern weapons fir_i ex-
pression in armament planning. The aims, recognizable in the context of
the "naval concept," to expand modern weapons systems are tied in with
long-term projects for supplementary construction, changes in armament
and modernization directed toward substantially raising the combat value
of units. More than in the past, when the quantitative development of
naval forces was in the foreground, it will in future be a question of
paying attention to the processes of intensification of FRG naval arr~~a-
ment. It is wrong in statements about the aggressiveness of the Federal
Navy to be content with presenting the amount of FRG naval forces ai-d to
compare it with the data of the preceding year. The increasing intensi-
fication of armament is apparent from the projects announced by the Bonn
naval leadership for the seventies and eighties, aimed at further expanding
a "modern, highly maneuverable, flexible navy." Cn the basis of Western
data, let me point out a faw of these projects:
1. Modernization of the destroyer of the "Hamburg" type by eliminating
the third 100 mm tower and including "Exocet" launchers.
Further modernization of the three missile destroyers of the "Luet,jens"
type up t_o L?he weapons system "Standard Missile lb," ,^rimarily to increase
their range.
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The destroyers of the "Fletcher" type, hailing still from World War II,
are removed. Starting about 1979/80, they, as well as the destroyers of
the "Hamburg" type and the frigates of the "Cologne" type, are to be
substituted by the planned newly built NATO frigate type "122," a ship of
shout 2,500 tons equipped with ship-to-ship and antiaircraft missiles as
well as helicopters. )right NATO countries (The United States, Great
Britain, the FRG, France, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium)
are participating in this project.
The increasing intensification of armament through modern weapons systems
and equipping of destroyers is reflected, among other things, in increasing
prices of new construction. If a destroyer of the "Hamburg" type still
cost DM 105 million, a destroyer of the "Luetjens" type costs as much as
DM 207 million. Despite a comparatively high mass production of about 80
ships, the price of the planned Frigate 122 is already estimated at
DM 250 million.
2. Tlie 10 patrol boats of the "Zobel" type have been modernized and
equipped with central firing guidance and wire-guided torpedoes. Toward
the end of the seventies, these ships are to be replaced by Type 162
hydrofoil craft. 'Phis is something the FRG, the United States and Italy
have developed, with the model "Tucumeari" already having been exhibited
to NATO military leaders. The "Jaguar" type patrol boats are to be re-
placed by 30 type 143 and 1.48 missile launching patrol boats, most of
which have already been delivered. The construction of 20 ships of the
type 148 alone a.s estimated to cost more than DM orie billion.
3. In the past few years, the FRG Navy has received 18 type 20G modern
submarines, which means it has 24 new submarines all told. These are
equipped with eight torpedo tubes, largely of nonmagnetic material and
intended especially for use in shallow waters endangered by depth charl;es.
On the occasion of the inauguration of the first type 206 ships in 1973,
the acting inspector of the FRG Navy, Rear Admiral Von Schroeter, described
this weapons system as "the most modern a~~d capable of its kind in the
world."9 For the future, with the ratio;sale of an alleged "threat at the
flanks to reinforcements in the southern North Sea," fast antisubmarine
submarines have been announced, which are said to be indispei. ;able. At
the end of December 1974, the FRG and Norway concluded an agr~~ment con-
cerning the joint development of the type 210 submarine. The process of
intensification in submarine construction is apparent, among other things,
if one considers that the cost of type 206 submarine;, -ire given ati more
that- DM 400 million.
4. Mine-detecting forces are being modernized by converting to fast mine-
sweepers, and are being "made more efficient" in their armament, especially
through remote-controlled sweeping equipment. At the same time, heli-
copters a.re being tested for mine-sweeping.
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5. The naval aviation squadron is to be modernized with the type "F-104 G"
by the end of the seventies. After that, a switch is planned to the multi-
purpose MRCA fightEr plane? which is expected to perform well "if deployed
at sea." Meanwhile, E beginning has been made with deliveries of the
"Sea King" combat helicopter, meant to further heighten the FRG Navy's
combat strength.
The navy commander, Vice Admiral I?Iartwig, has been full of praise for the
intensification of the FRG naval armament, with an anti-Soviet thrust:
"In the eighties modernization will enable the FRG Navy to never again
occupy a backward position technologically vis-a-vis the East."10 Such
utterances reveal the traditional aggressive spirit of imperialist German
naval militarism, which continues despite the defeats in the world wars.
The allied Baltic navies of the Warsaw Pact will not fail to counter
these declared ob3ectives appropriately.
Increbaing Armament Integration
For political, economic and military reasons, the FRG military is demanding
increased integration of armament within NATO. In connection with the
visit of the NATO Military Committee to the FRG i.n September 1974, FRG
Secretary of State Berkhan called for more effective cooperation in the
armament sector in order to smoothen "the way to European political union."
FRG Minister of Defense Leber, at the last Brussels conference of NATO
defense ministers, went so far as to state his readiness, in the interest
of quicker standardization, to buy the second-best weapons system if as
many nations ag possible share it.ll The former chairman of the NATO
Military Committee General Steinhoff, too, became an active advocate of
the "necessity of West European defense coop?-rltion" when he criticized
the NATO naval forces for having 100 differen:.? ship categories above
the size of destroyers, 3fi different fire-guidance radar instruments
and 40 different largo-caliber naval artillery pieces. Each country re-
quires its own suppliers, he stated.12 In a similar vein, an FRG naval
officer declared: "The high cost of modern "weapons systems...is acceptable
only if ~:here is correspondingly high production. Much more than hereto-
fore, this forces the treaty partners to cooperate wherever possible and,
if required, to divide tasks among themselves."13
If one sums up these demands, made from different points of view, it is
clear that armament integration is advocated for political reasons, mili-
tary reasons and reasons of the armament industry. T}iese are activities
we have to reckon with despite the existing contradictions between the
NATO partners. The development of NATO projects must be seen as part of
the trend toward international armament concerns in the naval area, es-
pecially in the highly monopolized supply industry, such as the electrical
and electronic industry, the missile industry and engine construction.
It has to be considered here that, according to Western data, about
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60 percent of the cost of maintaining modern warships is taken up by
electronics and armament alone. Nor can skeptical points of view funda-
mentally change the increasing armament integration--such as have been
expressed, for insta:ice, by Admiral of the Fleet Fuchs, retired, who
commented on the prospects of the determinations made in the Eurogroup
as follows: "In the area of naval farces, the road is likely to be
especially steep and rocky. National egotisms in the technical and eco-
nomic areas as well as differences as to ideas of. employment are erecting
considerable obstacles h~re....Hopes for an armament pool are still very
remote." At tl~e same time, Fuchs makes himself the advocate of the national
interests of armament industry, saying: "Civilian technology has always
been decisively fertilized by the production of arms. If these are pur-
chased abroad there is great danger of technological desiccation in one's
own country."~4 Such utterances reveal the different interests of the
armament industry regarding armament integration. In the end, these
forces pursue no other aim than likewise to make armament integration
prevail, and thus to increase their own share in the market. The strategy
is to increase production and sales at the expense of one's partners, in
the interest of incrF?ased profit. The anticipated new projects in the
field of armament integration will lead to a further increase of the com-
bat strength of the NATO naval forces and to a buildup of the position of
the FRG Navy within NATO.
From the point of view of material war preparations, the trends of FRG
naval armament underline the evaluation by the Minister for National De-
fense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, given before the graduates of the military
academies in 1974: "We harbor no illusions of any kind about the fact
that the armed forces of the United States, the FRG and NATO as a whole
confront us as a military machine with the most modern weapons and to a
large extent ready for war--the mast dangerous and strongest imperialism
has ever produced."15 For members of the People's Navy, this results in
the class mission to continue to constantly increase combat readiness,
in order to insure fulfillment of the main military task set by the Eighth
Party Congress of the SED in our area of responsibility.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Schubert, H.: In MILITAERWESEN , Edition C, Berlin, Nov 1973, p 98 ff.
2.
Henze, K.: In MILITAERWESEN , Edition C, Berlin, Jan 1974, p
104 ff.
3.
In HANSA (Hamburg), Issue 2, 1974, p 75.
4.
Ibid.
5.
WEHRPOLITISCHE INFORMATIONEN of 21 Nov 1974.
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6. Cf Varner, W.: In PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, Special Issue 1, 1974,
p 32.
7. Feck, H.: In WEHRKUNDE, Munich, Jul 1973, p 366.
8. Feck, H.: In KOEHLERS FLOTTENKALENDER, 1975, p 194.
9. In tIANSA, Hamburg, Issue 14, 1973, p 1347.
10. Pressegespraech. In MARINE, Wi1he]..mshaven, Issue 3, 1974, p 1.
11. SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 12 December 1974.
12. EUROPA-ARCHIV of 25 Jul 1974.
13. Feck, H.: Ibid., p 195.
14. In 7'RUPPENPRAXIS, Cologne, Issue 10, p 806.
15. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, Edition A of 12 October 1974.
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SHIP SL;CURIZY MEASURES PROMOTED
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Juz- 75 pp 115C-118C
[Ey Comdr R. Gerstaecker, instructor]
/Text/ A prerequisi~e for fulfilling sea combat tasks is to qualify all
crews for maintaining the staying and fighting pourer of their ship/boat
in the face of any type of damage resulting from enemy action, wreckage
or heavy weather.
Ship security is of great significance also in modern naval combat. This
can be demonstrated irrefutably and convincingly with many examples f rom
the history of naval war.
This article is intended to contribute to facilitating tt~e understanding
of the role and significance of ship security and to integrate it correctly
in overall training.
Ship security is closely tied to the terms of "staying and fighting power."
By staying power of a ship is m~:ant the ability of ship and crew to cope
with damage from combat or wreckage by maintaining or restoring the combat
qualities of the ship. Staying power depends on the construction of the
ship and on the daily fulfillment of a combination. of administrative and
technical tasks by the crew.
Factors contributing to determining the staying power of a ship are:
--unsinkability;
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--safety from fire and explouions;
--b;:aying power of equipment and weaponry.
By fighting power of a ship is meant the ability of the ship, owing to itF
tactical and technical qualities, to deal the enemy annihiliating blows,
to withstand his blows and, at the same time, as far as possible to main-
tain one's own staying power.
The fighting power of a ship depends on:
--constr~.,ction of the hull;
--the complex of armament and technical equipment;
--the state of training;
--the moral-political state of the crew
Aims and Tasks of. Ship Security Training
The aim of ship security training consists in enabling all members of the
crew under great physical and psychological burdens--especially in difficult
hydrometereological conditions and under the effect of water, fire, smoke
and quick changes in ship stability--to fulfill combat tasks, and to tnain-
tain the staying and fighting power of the ship under the most difficult
conditions. To equate ship security with "countering leaks and firQ," as
one can hear and read it now and then, is not permissible. It is a very
limited way of looking at things, for countering leaks and fire is but one
of many *_asks of. ship security.
Apart from the countering ?eaks and fire, thE~ tasks of ship security in-
clude:
--maintaining the staying power of armament and technology;
--eliminating damage to equ:pment and armament;
--maintaining reserve floating capacity;
--restoring normal stability by compensating for out-of-trim and heel
positions;
--maintaining and installing shipboard communications and memns of communi-
cations;
--strengthening waterproof ship construction;
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--preventing or 1Lmitini; the spread of. watrr in the ship;
--:;ecur3.nt~ ship scal.s;
--1.mplement~ing salvagr. operations, comb:Lned with first aid, CransporL of
wounded, as well. as dcactivat.aon, disl.nfection and poison control;
--.insur:Ini; air supply and regr.tl.ata.on of teugterature;
--employing of sttlp`s divers rind carriers of compressed air equipment,
'[his last doer not rlai.m to be complete, but it doubtlessly permits :;tat~~-
ments about the role. and significr.tncc of ship .;ccurity. rurthcrrnorc, i.t
outlines tlu~ scope of tsr;lc; of ::hip seruritY and underlines the require-
ment of en ].i.stin}; all mernhers of the crew in ship secur..ity training.
I'ositlon of 5hl.p ;ecr~rity 'Cratuing in (lvera.ll 'I'rrtl.ning
I'roceccllnt; from the tasks oi: ship security, from its Signil'ic;mce for ship
rind crow and from the ro.l.e of everyone on hard Ln shap secur:'.ty, onc~ can
riy;hl.].y say that shap security training i.s a principal branch of training.
i.n rtssigninl, roles in Ship security, i.t is a rule that rho r.rews of hatttc,
.tat-.ions are responsible for ship security at their battle :;tati~~n5.
Al_l. members of t:h~ c:rew, whet-het- offl.cer:;, midshipmen. petty oL?fic~crc; cr
seamen, ar.e inr?o].ved in ^h.Lpbr~ard shap security. This cannot bc~ otherwise,
for ship recur. i t:y groups ].ef.f Cu fond }fur themselves simply cannot nu:el al 1
the demands made: .ln rel;ar.d to :;h.f}, ;;ecuri.tp in modern naval combat. lJhal
is required are we]_1-organised, mutually attuned and pract[~:c~c1 ar~,tc~n:; crl
the ent i.rc crew. Given be:loca is art example from the history of naval.
w:trfar.r. in Idorlci h4tr II which !s intcnd~.d to under] ine thc~ ;;it;nlf icancc~ of,
:hip security.
On L.1 September :L941, during L-Ite hern.ic clef:ense of Odessa,
the Soviet
destroyer 13e~;hnshchadnyy was al:taclccd by "l7_ enrmy p.l.anes. 'I'wc~ :u~t?ta1. b~nnbs
hit tt-e bow, damming it baday. CI. was therefore necessary to cut the bow
of the destroyer. Despite thiG complex damage, the ship carts maintained
rtf loot :and could be towed awry. Having been restored, fire destroyer re-
cc:iv~~~' mother hit by a bomb, t,lrich wr.nt through the upper cleclc and the
dotabl.e bottom. Water and furl uiJ. penetrated into the boilerrnom, and a
i_re broke out. The trim t?eached 1.75 meters, the hem.' 1.4 degrees, '1'h~.
s:ftuati-on seemed hopeless.
'i'he crew, circumGpect and ready for sacrifice., Poug}it for i.t:; shi.p, hp4'oti~r,r,
aided only by emergency_(flash.l i.y;ht) .Light ing. Under the direc?tirn~ of the
GA-V /expansion unknown/ crnnmander, thr ~;h{p, which had been helicvc~d lost,
was savcci because al.l possibi.l.atics cif ~;hil~ security' were cttil.ir,e~], 'I'cy
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cope with ship security in such complex conditions, wt.th such clnmal;e, pre-
supposes political-ideological maturity, high morale and--aprir.t from coura};c
and determination, apart from exccllenl- coordi.nati.on and tight leadership--
solid training.
It is therefore necessary to enlist a.~l members of the crew a.n ship security
training and to take advantage of every opportunity for complex comb-at-r.e-
lated training. This includes not only pertinent teaching and conducting
trai.ninl; in the shop security room but training on shipboard, an port rind
while cruising on the high seas.
Measures to Maintain Staying Power
It appears appropriate to deal in more detail with staying power., because
it is t-he main factor which determines the fighting power oi' ~hc ship.
Unsinkability
The ability of the ship to remain capable of staying afloat and to keep
iLS stability in the face of damage to the hull and of floouing of one or
more departments is called Unsinkability. The Unsinkability of a ship is
influenced by:
--waterproof seals and s;..lidity of the hull;
--reserve capability of staying afloat;
--stability;
--equipment with means and systems to fight leaks and fire;
--state of training of the crew.
Safety From Fire and Explosions
The suitability of a ship for preventing the start and spreading of Fires
and explosions on board through constructive measure and tecl~i-ical equip-
ment is called safety from fire and explositions.
In t11is res`ect, crews are to observe the following fire safety measures:
Fire safety measures while handling open fires:
By open fire we understand smoking on board, welding equipment and sol.deri.ng
irons in operation, as well as burning candles and torches. Open fires a1-e
forbidden in ammunition storage areas, in fuel bunker:, near fuel linos,
in dye and boatswain holds, in storage areas :ind in the immediate vicinity
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of enaily flammable materials. All necessary work with open fires on
shipboard therefore requires permission. Before work is started, the
following fire safety measures are ro be observed.
' The person responsible checks the area in which the work with open fire
i.s to be undertaken, as well as the adjoining areas.
At the place of work, and in adjoining areas, posts with fire-fighting
equipment are to be established.
The work area is t~ be well aired.
The GA-V commander checks the fire protection measures that have been taken.
When the work is completed, the areas are to be checked once mire.
Fare safety measures tc+ prevent fire and explosions in ammunition storage
areas:
1'he most important fire safely measure is careful, systematic checking of
temperature and humidity. When the temperature in storage areas exceeds
30 degrees centigrade, the room is L'o be cooleu b;.' ventilators. If this
is insufficient and the temperature exceeds 35 degrees centigrade, the
cargo must be sprinkled.. If this is insufficient to prevent a fire, the
cargo is to be flooded.
Fire safety measures in storing fuels and lubricants:
Fuels and 'lubricants can evaporate at normal temperatures. A concentration
of fuel and lubricant vapors of more than 1 percent in the air constitutes
an explosive mixture. Fuel and lubricants vapors settle in the lower
parts of rooms, can concentrate there and car. a;cplode 3,f open fires are
improperly handled. Therefore, fuels and lubricants are to be kept only
in closed containers. Easily flammable spi]led liquids are to be removed
immediately. Temperature and airing are factors which have an effect on
secure storing of liquid fuels.
Fire protection measures to prevent spontaneous combustion:
~, Spontaneous combustion is a process in which a material starts to burn
without being affected by an externs.: source of heat.
Wood shavings, as well as rope, wool waste, tarpaulin saturated with oil
or. damp with oil, tend to initiate spontaneous combustion. Therefore, all
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security measures concerning the stori!:g of. These materials arc to he
observed consistently. The following steps need to be observed:
--easily flammable materials are to be stored dry and safe from fire;
--storage rooms are to be aired regularly in order. to rivoid high tcmper.a-
tures;
--easily flammable materLals are to be checked constantly and must not he
stored together with dyes and solvents;
--fire-extinguishing mat:crials are always to be ready f.or use.
Staying Power of Equipment and Weaponry
By staying power of equipment and weaponry is meant their capacity to main-
tain tactical-technical qualities or regaim tham in case of damage.
These elements of staying power are insured through manifold constructive
measures when the ship is planned and 'bui.it, through the quality of means
of fighting leaks and fires and of means for protecting the ship from
various types of arms. Effective, too, are administrative-technical
measures directed t~~ward keeping the hull in flawless, hermetically shut
condition and ~~~~;ar.?d insuring the readiness for use of armaments, equip-
ment and means of ship security. Not least, the state ~ training of tl~e
crew in ship security has an effect on the elements of staying power.
One could make further detailed remarks about the elements of saying
power and subdivide them, but this would exceed the purpose of this article.
It is, however, necessary to take a closer look at the element of unsinlc-
ability. \
The Struggle for the Unsinkability of the Ship
The aim of the struggle for unsinkability consists in preventing the loss
of the si:~ip through. combat damage or wreckage anal, as f.ar as possible,
restor ng its scaworthine.ss and fighting power. This requires that the
crew initiate lmmed,iate measures in case of combat damage or wreckage
with a view to maintaining the stayin}; and fighting power of the ship.
Here one is to proceed as follow::
Determini~ig damage:, fire and incursion of water:
~n case of: violent motions, shocks, detonations or other effects on the ship,
the crew without awaiting f~~rther orders, immediately checks the depart-
ments and .areas .in order to determine incursion c,f water and technological
damage, f any. If there is incursion of water and/or damage, this is to
be reported instrint.ly to the command of the combat sector, and first
measures are to be taken in the ?, uggle for unsinksbility. First measures
are:
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--sc~a.l.inf; off. yaks;
--shor.inl; up hul.kheads, door;; and hatchways;
? --caulkini; pipes;
--shutting off installatio~,s and equipment.
'a,l
I, .lml.ting the: sprcadi.ny; of ~aater :In the ship and restorini; waterproof. seals:
Limiti.nl; the sprnadini; of water is decisive in the fight fora the unsink-
abilaty of the ship. On the result of this struggle often depends the
fate of crew and ship. The foll.owang ac*-r~ons are requir.od:
--CrArn.ing un piirnpital; equipment;
--caulking of leaks and tears in the hull;
--rcinforci.ng bulkheads, hatchway:; and doors.
'i'he caulking of leaks occurs a.l.ong with the pumping out of the room of thc~
d(~par.tmenC. AL the same t~i.me, all deformed and damai,ed waterproof bull
toads and covers must be l?el.llf(1rCCd.
Where waiter has come i.n, all damaged rand eu.dangered instrillations rind
equipment ar.e to be shut down. After this, the waterproof sealing of Lhr
ship is to be restored. t-care it is required to close and checl: doors,
hatchways, manholes, ventilators and vents as well as to ti};hten catclir:;
and vents.
insuring t~ac: cruising and maneuvering abl.l.i.ty of thc:~ ship and Lhc: readi-
nc:s~; of F~mht~yment of weapons:
The cruising and manEUVer..ing ability of the ship