PEKING'S 'DUAL-TRACK' POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200150004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOIAB3B1
FOIAB3B1 y--Ira Waal
PEKING'S "DUAL-TRACK" POLICY It' SOUtHEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS
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22 AUGUST 1975
NO3310
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PEKING'S "DUAL-TRACK" POLICY IN SOUTflEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS
C 0 N1'ENTS
I. State Relations Improved, Insurgent Support Maintained . . 1
IT. Superpower Rivalry Influences Peking's Regional Goals . . . 2
III. Peking Relations With Various States in Area . . . . . . , 4
Malaysia . . 4
Philippines 6
Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Burma . . . . . . 8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singapore, Indonesia 8
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PEKING'S "DUAL-TRACK" POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS
SUMMARY
Peking has achieved significant success over the past four years in
normalizing China's relations with several noncommunist Southeast
Asian neighbors by a series of adroit political and economic initia-
tives designed to break down longstanding regional suspicions of
China. Peking has pursued a dual-track policy, cultivating normal
relations with local governments while continuing to lend muted
support to insurgent parties within the same countries. In recent
months Peking has adjusted its public position as to what constitutes
the chief external threat to peace in the region, shifting its
focus away from the United States and efforts to secure a reduced
U.S. presence in the region.--as that has actually occurred in
Indochina--and centering on the Soviet Union as the main strategic
danger to the region.
China's initial break '.trough in its revived Asian diplomacy was the
normalization of Sino-B iese relations du?:ing Prime Minister Ne
Win's August 1971 visit to China. Peking subsequently established
formal diplomatic relations with Mal. is in May 1974, the
Philippines in June 1975, and Thailand in July 1975. The establish-
ment c5T such relations has thus fa not endangered Peking's opposi-
tion assets in the area--the Maoist communist parties that are
leading armed insurgencies against several Southeast Asian govern-
ments. Peking has managed this by publicly muting its own
relationship with the insurgents, while China-based clandestine
radios have continued to serve as outlets for hardline ideology
and propaganda attacks on the local governments.
The spring 1975 communist military victories in Indochina and the
ensuing U.S. military withdrawals in Southeast Asia caused several
noncommunist states there to reassess their foreign policies and
speed up their normalization of relations with China. But these
developments do not seem to have noticeably altered Peking's
pace or affected the substance of its long-range, "step-by-step"
measures to enhance China's influence. The focus of Chinese media
attention to external threats against the region, however, has
shifted markedly. In the past Peking sought to extend its influence
largely at U.S. expense, encouraging neighboring states to work
against U.S. policy in Indochina and to force a reduction of the
U.S. presence. Now, Peking portrays the Soviet Union as the main
strategic danger in the region and promotes good Southeast Asian
relations with China, regional solidarity, and a continued U.S.
military presence in the area as useful bulwarks against alleged
Soviet ambitions.
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PEKING'S "DUAL-TRACK" POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS
STA.-,E RELATIONS IMPROVED, INSURGENT SUPPORT MAINTAINED
"The Chinese people consistently support the just
struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed
peoples. This is our internationalist duty."
"We hold, at the same time, that the soc:Lal system
of a country can only be ch?3sen and decided by its
own people and cannot he imposed by other couitries.
Countries with different social systems can develop
state relations on the basis of the five principles
of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in
each other's internal affai'-s, equality and mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence."
This passage from Premier Chou En-lai's 28 May 1974 banquet spee-h
for visiting Malaysian Prime Minister Razak underscores the two
basic tenets in Ch'na's dual-track propaganda approach to noncommu-
nist Southeast Asian states over the past five years. On the one
hand, the Chinese have maintained support for pro-Peking
insurgencies led'by Maoist parties which speak against existing
regimes in the name cF "oppressed" peoples in the area. On the
other, the Chinese leaders at the same time have developed a
steadily growing effort to improve and normalize state relations
with Southeast Asian governments on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful coexistence.
Since the early 1970's, the Chinese have gradually moderated
propaganda support in their own name for the small and generally
ineffective communist-led insurgencies in Southeast Asia that
previously had been the focal point of Chinese foreign policy there.
As China emerged from the internal chaos and diplomatic isolation
caus(d by the cultural revolution, and as the situation in Southeast
Asia became more fluid when the U.S. military withdrawal from the
area accelerated, Peking gradually placed more emphasis on
improving bilateral relations with noncommunist Southeast Asian
governments heretofore alienated from China. Peking opted for a
long-term, gradual political and economic strategy designed to
reassure neighboring states suspicious of Chinese intentions. The
Chinese have employed a series of "people-to-people" contacts,
trade deals, unofficial leadership meetings, and formal political
consultations with their noncommunist neighbors in order to
cultivate feelings of good will or at least reduced suspicion
concerning China.
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Part of Peking's effort to reassure the Southeast Asian states has
been reflected in a gradual reduction of open and direct
propaganda support for Southeast Asian insurgencies, but with
continued reliance on three PRC-based clandestine radio stations,
broadcasting in the name of the Maoist communist parties of
Thailand, Malaya., and Burma, to carry the major load of pr,opaganda
support to the antigovernment insurgencies. Thus, while Peking's
own media have reduced criticism of Southeast Asian regimes and
support for insurgencies, the.,j stations--the Voice of the People
of Thailand (VOPT), the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR), and
the Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB)--have carried a daily fare
of antigovernment propaganda advocating popular armed struggle
against existing authorities. They also have departed from
Peking's own media line in sharply criticizing the foreign and
domestic policies of Southeast Asian governments.
The Peking media no longer attack Southeast Asian leaders by name.
The Chinese h.;ve also markedly reduced their former practice of
replaying reports from the clandestine stations on insurgent battle
successes. Peking's infrequent references to the communist parties
and to their clandestine radios occur main'y on ceremonial occasions,
such as the commemoration of major anniversaries. Maoist party
delegates residing in Pek'n g no longer receive high-level Chinese
leadership attention, and they are virtually ignored in PRC media
.reportage.
In thi past, sparse Chinese coverage of the Southeast Asian
insurgencies has highlighted the importance of the Maoist strategy
of armed struggle in the countryside to surround and ultimately
annihilate the en..my in the cities. Recent reportage, however,
has also acknowledged the more volatile situation in Southeast
Asian cities by encouraging the development of "mass movements"
in urban areas.
SUPERPOWER RIVALRY INFLUENCES PEKING'S REGIONAL 'GOALS
While the pace and elements of Peking's dual-track policy toward
individual Southeast Asian countries have remained relatively
constant over the past half decade, the Chin.cse have carefully
adjusted their strategy to protect PRC interests in the changing
situation in the region as a whole. In the early 1970's the
Chinese effort centered on expanding Chinese and allied influence
in the area and encouraging rapid U.S. withdrawal. Peking harshly
rebuked such states as Thailand for their continued support for
U.S. bases used in the Indochina wars. It scathingly attacked
SEATO, U.S. bilateral defense pacts, and U.S. naval activities
in the area. The Chinese expressed sharp criticism and suspicion
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of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeing them as thinly disguised efforts by
pro-West bourgeois states to block Chinese and other communist
expansion.
Peking's concern included suspicion of Malaysia's proposal for a
Southeast Asian zone of peace and neutrality, which China viewed
as a possible effort to build a Southeast Asian diplomatic order
blocking Chinese influence. Peking at the same time was on record
as vocally supporting Overseas Chinese rights in the area and had
attacked local authorities over instances of alleged discrimination
against. Chinese minorities.
The developing Sino-U.S. rapprochement following former President
Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, the continuing U.S. military
withdrawals from areas throughout China's periphery in East and
Southeast Asia, and growing Chinese concern abo't allegedly
enhanced So?7iet ambitions in Asia have sharply changed the focus
of Peking's strategy in Southeast Asia. The Chinese now see the
Soviet Union as the main danger in the area, and Chinese leaders
recently have repeatedly warned visiting Southeast Asian
dignitaries that in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina,
they must guard against "letting the tiger in through the back
door while repelling the wolf through the front gate."
Recent Peking comment is replete with charges against Soviet
military maneuvers, spying efforts, and economic advances in
Southeast Asia. By contrast, the United States is criticized only
mildly, and some Chinese reportage has even played up favorably
U.S. and foreign statements on Washington's resolve to stay in the
area and protect it against Soviet advances. Thus, Peking has
dropped criticism of SEATO and has recently treated favorably
U.S. defense commitments under terms of the ANZUS pact, while at
the same time it scathingly denounces what it regards as the true
Soviet intentions behind Moscow's proposed Asian collective
security arrangement. A 16 June 1975 Peking domestic radio
commentary on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region following the
U.S. setbacks in Cambodia and Vietnam noted approvingly that the
United States was "reluctant to abandon its interests in this
region." The commentary acknowledged Assistant Secretary of State
Habib's spring 1975 tour of Southeast Asia, viewing it as evidence
of U.S. determination to maintain its position as an "Asian and
Pacific country" and to play "its deserved and responsible
role for the sake of the interests of the United States and this
region." The commentary at the same time portrayed the Soviet
Union as the principal menace to Southeast Asian independence,
trying hard "to replace the United States and dominate Asia."
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Peking's altered goals have also brought about a shift in the
Chinese line on ASEAN, which Peking now depicts as a useful frame-
work for regional stability that will free the region of big-power
influence, particularly Soviet. The Chinese media now report
regularly on periodic ASEAN meetings, favorably noting progress
of the member countries toward regional political and economic
cooperation and independence from outside powers. Peking now
applauds the ASEAN-backed zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast
Asia as a useful means to freeze the USSR out of the region. The
Chinese have also formally renounced past broad claims to be the
protector of overseas Chinese interests, and for two years Peking
media are not known to have criticized Southeast Asian governments
for alleged suppression of Overseas Chinese.
The anti-Soviet emphasis in Peking's present regional objectives
was recently pointed up by Peking's efforts to include the so-called
"antihegemony" clause in joint communiques with Southeast Asian
leaders. The clause pledges the signing countries to oppose "any
attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony
or create spheres of influence in any part of the world." This
clause has been included in Chinese communiques normalizing
relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and has been
roundly criticized by Moscow as a thinly veiled anti-Soviet PRC
scheme in Asia. In the case of the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty,
Moscow has even formally protested to Tokyo against inclusion of
the clause. By contrast, the United States has twice formally
endorsed the clause in communiques with the Chinese. The United
States was the first country ever to employ the clause in a joint
communique with Peking, during former President Nixon's February
1972 China trip. Recent Chinese reportage has been unusually
explicit in underlining Peking's intentions regarding the
antihegemony clause. NCNA reports in July 1975 carried Thai
press comment depicting the use of the clause in the 1 July joint
communique establishing Sino-Thai relations as a further link in
the PRC-fostered "antihegemony front" designed to create the
"surest guarantee" for Southeast Asia in the face of "intensified
Soviet expansion."
PEKING RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS STATES IN AREA
MALAYSIA Peking's establishment of'formal diplomatic relations
with Malaysia in a joint communique signed during
Prime Minister Razak's May 1974 visit to China was Peking's first
such diplomatic breakthrough in Southeast Asia in almost two
decades. It set a pattern that was followed in establishing
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relations with the Philippines and Thailand this year.* Peking
gave a high-level welcome to the Malaysian Prime Minister,
including meetings with Mao and Chou En-lai, and it endeavored in
the joint communique and in Chinese leaders' banquet speeches
to reassure the Malaysian visitors about Chinese intentions toward
the pro-Peking insurgency and the large overseas Chinese population
in Malaysia.
Peking media had smoothed the way for the visit by dropping past
critical references to Malaysian leaders, praising some of Kuala
Lumpur's actions in foreign affairs and domestic policy, and
reducing customary Chinese media replays of antigovernment news
reports from the clandestine VOMR. Since the establishment of
relations Peking has replayed only five reports from the VOMR.
These dealt with anniversary and ceremonial occasions and avoided
reference to Malaysian affairs. Peking has also ceased entirely
the practice--common before Razak's visit--of periodically replaying
VOMR reports on the Malayan insurgents' battle victories.
In line with the persisting Chinese dual-track approach, however,
NCNA publicized the 29 April 1975 CCP greetings message marking
the Malayan CP's 45th anniversary, a step which drew criticism from
the Razak government despite the relative mildness of the Chinese
message. The CCP's last such publicized message, on the Malayan
party's 40th anniversary, had extended "warmest fraternal greetings"
to the Malayan communists, attacked the Kuala Lumpur leaders by
name, and cited Peking's "internationalist duty" to support the
insurgents. By contrast, the 1)75 message extended only "warm
fraternal greetings," avoided reference to Malaysian Government
leaders, and noted only that the CCP and MCP have always supported
and encouraged each other; it did not mention any Chinese "duty"
to support the MCP.
Peking also continues on occasion to refer to the "Communist Party
of North Kalimantan," operating at the head of a small insurgency
in Eastern Malaysia. It last mentioned the party in an NCNA
report of a condolence message the party sent on the April 1975
death of PRC Politburo Standing Committee Member Tung Pi-wu.
VOMR broadcasts moderated their invective against Razak prior to
his China visit, but resumed it soon after his return. VOMR has
argued, for instance, that Razak undertook the establishment of
relations with Peking with ulterior motives, in a vain attempt to
* While the Burmese visit preceded the Malaysian visit, Burma and
Peking had already established relations in the early 1950's, and
had generally enjoyed friendly relations until the Chinese cultural
revolution.
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ease pressing problems at home and abroad--a notable departure from
Chinese leaders' public praise of Razak for coming to China. The
clandestine radio has continued to focus on news of guerrilla
battle successes and to stress the primacy of Maoist armed struggle,
but over the past two years it has given increased attention to urban
mass movements in order to capitalize on recent signs of increasing
unrest in Malaysian cities. The broadcasts have also stressed the
maintenance of MCP unity and orthodoxy and have denounced vaguely
defined "splittist tendencies" following a public break from the
party by a group of Marxist insurgents in the fall of 1974.
The VOMR broadcasts daily to both Malay- and Mandarin-speaking
audiences in Malaysia and Singapore and originates new programs
every two or three days. The station augmented its Chinese-
language programming on 20 April 1975 by adding broadcasts in
southern Chinese dialects. VOMR has continued its longstanding
role as a clearinghouse for broadcasting material intended for
both Indonesian and Philippine listeners by occasionally replaying
statements by the pro-Peking Indonesian Communist Party(PKI) and
the Philippine CP. VOMR broadcasts also include material originally
transmitted by the other two PRC-based clandestine stations, as
well as international news following the general PRC line.
PHILIPPINES Peking's warm reception for President Marcos,
leading to the signing of a joint communique
establishing Sino-Philippine diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975,
was preceded by an unusually cordial and high-level welcome in
September 1974 for Mrs. Marcos, who was received by Mao and
personally escorted by Mao's wife, Politburo member Chiang Ching.
Such high-level leadership attention has been accompanied by
unusual moderation of'Chinese propaganda on Philippine policies.
For instance, NCNA has carried no criticism of Philippine affairs
since a 26 September 1972 report mildly rebuking "Marcos
authorities" over the declaration of martial law in the Philippines.
Peking has also not criticized the presence of large U.S. bases
in the Philippines, in contrast to its continued complaints about
U.S. bases in Thailand. Recent Chinese reportage has centered on
reports of "friendly" contacts between visiting Philippine
delegates and PRC leaders, with NCNA reporting taking special
pains to note that Chinese leaders have asked the visitors to
convey the PRC leaders' personal regards to President Marcos and
other Philippine dignitaries.
Chinese media continue to refer to the anti-Marcos Philippine CP
on ceremonial occasions, though the party has traditionally
received less Chinese propaganda attention than the other
Southeast Asian parties. Fov example, the Peking media marked the
Philippine CP's 5th anniversary on 26 December 1973 with a lengthy,
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belated NCNA replay of the party's anniversary statement, but Peking
did not report the usual Chinese party greetings on such a quinquen-
nial date. In another instance, Peking recently deleted NCNA replays
of Philippine CP statements from its broadcasts in Tagalog beamed to
the Philippines. Thus, NCNA's last reference to the Philippine CP,
a 2 February 1975 report on a Philippine CP message on the PRC's
January 1975 National People's Congress, was excluded from Peking's
Tagalog broadcasts. There is no PRC-based clandestine station that
beams to the Philippines in the name of the insurgents, but the
Philippine party's pronouncements calling for a strategy of armed
struggle to overthrow the Marcos authorities have been carried
periodically by the VOMR.
THAILAND China's reception for visiting Thai Prime Minister
Khukrit Pramot in late June and early July this year
was on a par with its treatment accorded the Malaysian and Philippine
leaders. Following the major thaw in bilateral relations during the
visit of a Thai sports delegation to China in September 1972, Peking
stopped criticizing Bangkok authorities by name and reduced coverage
of Thai CP activity. For instance, the December 1972 CCP message on
the Thai party's 30th anniversary was--most unusually--not even
reported in Chinese media. The text of the greetings, carried by
the VOPT, was also notably milder than the CCP message of the last
Thai quinquennial date. However, the October 1973 collapse of the
.military regime in Bangkok and the succession to power of a series
of weak civilian cabinets prompted a revival of Chinese criticism
designed to pressure Bangkok to speed the normalization of relations.
During that period, Peking stepped up replays of VOPT reports on the
insurgents' battle successes and it began to publicize antigovernment
strikes and mass demonstrations in urban areas. Following Khukrit's
moves to normalize relations in early 1975, Peking sharply reduced
anti-Bangkok regime coverage and now refers to the VOPT and the Thai
party generally only on ceremonial dates. NCNA's last known replay
of a VOPT battle report was on 13 May 1975.
NCNA continues on occasion to replay reports of Thai popular
demonstrations against U.S. military bases, intelligence activities,
and business enterprises in Thailand, most recently taking note of
the popular Thai outcry against the use of the bases during the
April 1975 Mayaguez incident. However, the Chinese in recent months
have given more attention to encouraging Thai resistance to Soviet
strategic and economic penetration. For instance, a 15 May 1975
NCNA report applauded Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's
rejection of Moscow's Asian collective security system during a
12 May meeting with PRAVDA editor Ivan Schedrov. In July, a series
of NCNA reports on Thai press reaction to the establishment of
relations with Peking were also unusually blunt in warning of Soviet
ambitions.
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VOP'T originates new programs daily and has continued to produce a
considerable volume of extremely harsh invective against the Bangkok
authorities. Though emphasizing the Thai CF's strategy giving
primacy to rural. armed struggle, the broadcasts have acknowledged
the success of student demonstrations and urban strikes in bringing
down recent Thai administrations by giving more attention to
encouraging such mass movements as an auxiliary to the Thai CP-1 ed
armed struggle. VCPT has claimed to see little difference between
the recent civilian administrations and past military governments,
viewing them as representatives of the same exploitative social
classes and determined to crush the armed insurgency.
BURW Peking media attention. to Burma since the August 1971
visit of Ne Win to China has consisted primarily of
periodic reports on a variety of diplomatic, economic and other
bilateral contacts, characterized by Peking as taking place in
"warm" and "friendly" surroundings. As with its treatment of Thai
internal affairs, Peking has reported on recent mass demonstrations
in Burma, though avoiding any direct criticism of the government.
(Peking has not reported antigovernment demonstrations elsewhere
in Southeast Asia in recent years.) Peking has never referred to
the clandestine VOPB, but Chinese media do periodically mention
the Burmese CP. NCNA on 20 May 1975 reported a CCP condolence
message on the killing of two Burmese CP leaders by the Burmese
army in March, and it also replayed the text of a 16 May Burmese BCP
statement on the deaths which contained references to the "Ne Win-San
Yu military clique" normally deleted by Peking. Peking continues to
note the presence of Burmese CP leaders resident in Peking every May
Day and PRC National Day, and the CCP message on the Burmese party's
last quinquennial anniversary in August 1974 was duly reported by
NCNA.
SINGAPORE, The latest developments in Peking's relations with
INDONESIA Singapore came during the 13-21 March visit to Peking
of Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam. The foreign
minister was feted by PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and received
on 16 March by Choi! En-lai. A 14 March Peking broadcast in Malay
pegged to the visit noted that Chinese relations with Singapore had
"improved in the last few years." Peking media have continued to
avoid critical references to Singapore's internal affairs and have
reported favorably its stand on the Malacca Strait. Singapore
remains the target of daily VOMR broadcasts, which continue harsh
attacks on the "Lee Kuan-yew clique" and criticism on a variety of
social and economic issues.
Peking's gradualist approach to Indonesia has been designed to allay
the strong residual Indonesian fears and suspicions stemming from
the abortive 1965 coup. Reports on Indonesian internal affairs are
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