TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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IFBIS1
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
Ia
13 AUGVSr 1975
(VOL. Xxv f , O. 32)
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CONTENTS
KOREA
I)PRK Rejec:ttr U.S. Proponnl for Dinnolvinp, UN Command. . . . . .
1
VI ETNAM
DRV, I'RG I'oretgi} Minintrien Score U.S. Veto of UN Membership. .
3
Hanoi I;ptab.linhe Relcttionn With Manila, Condemn Bnngkok . . .
4
THAILAND
Thai CI' Mnrkn 10th Annivernnry of. Armed Struggle, PIWC Silent. .
7
CAMIIODIA
Phnom Penh Fi11.n New Lettdernhip Ponta, Sendn Minnion to Chinn .
9
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Continuance of USSR Military Aid Hinted; I:rictionn Pernint. . .
11
NATO
Hoaccw Seen Exercise an Violation of New CSCE Accord. . . . .
13
PORTUGAL
USSR Rape "Interference" by Went, CnUn for Unity of Left . .
15
CO) 1JNIST RELATIONS
Evidence Suggento Na hultilnteral Crimea Conference in 1975 . .
18
USSR-RO %N IA
Mopcow Hintn Concern Over Romanian Bid for Nonnlfined Status . .
19
CHINA
Cadren Urged to Strengthen Party Unity, Oppone Fectionalitztn .
21
USSR
Attach. on "Rural Towns" ."rogram Appears. Aired at PoIyannkiy . .
23
NOTE
DRV Mission to Peking. Xoncov
..PPEXD IX
Hoacov, Poking Broadcast Statiritics . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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13 AUGUST 1975
KOREA
DPRK REJECTS U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DISSOLVING UN COMMAND
An 11 August DPRK Government statement has firmly rejected a 27 June
U.S.-backed UN proposal on the Korean question no an attempt by
the United States to Justify its continued presence Iii the ROK and
perpetuate the division of Korea.* The statement placed Pyongyang a
full support behind a rival UN draft resolution put forward on
8 August by 35 nations, including China and the USSR. Responding
to a provision in the U.S. draft resolution that the UN Command
btu dissolved only on condition that alternate nrrangc ienttt he
devised for continuing the Korean armistice, the fPItK ntrttement
argued that dissolution of the UN Command necesnnrily mennn the
end of the armistice and suggested instead replacing the nrmiut:ice
with a DPRK-U.S. pence agreement. To the U.S. propose]. that U.S.
and ROK officers assume the duties of the UN Command In maintaining
the armistice, the DPRK statement responded Hint thi.u wrt,, "out of
the question," and that such a proposal war, merely aimed at
maintaining the U.S. Presence in the South. A 13 August. NODONG SINMITN
editorial supporting the government statement reiterated the contention
that dissolution of the UN Command means the end of they armistice.
Perhaps to bolster Pyongyang's image of reasonableness at the upcoming
Lima meeting of nonalincd foreign ministers and at the 1IN General
Assembly session thin fall, the language of the DPRK stntemcit wan
temperate. It omitted the standard Pyongyang references to U.S.
"imperialism" and U.S. "aggressor troops."
ARMISTICE, The It August pro-DPRK drnt:t TIN recoluticn proposed
PEACE AGREEMEI4T that the "real parties" to the nrmi.nt ic,? s1tnuld
replace that agreement with a peace agreement, but
failed to specify who those parties were. The, reference to "real
parties," however, is identical to language used by UI'RK Foreign
Minister Ho Tam In his 25 March 1974 North Korean propunni for a
U.S.-DPRK pence agreement. Moreover, the DI'HK statement of the 11th
made it clear that Pyongyang interprets the lnngunge of the resolution
to refer to just such an agreement.
Like the or..ginal 1974 North Korean proposal, the st_ntecx.tut of tho
11th suggested that a pence agreement, was necessary hccnu,e the
present armistice in "no sore than a temporary cer.se--fire agreement"
that cannot guarantee a "durable peace," adding that It cannot even
* An earlier. letr9-authoritative DI C rejection of the t1.S.-backed
proposal in t+iscunsrd in the TRIES of 30 July 1975, pngen 16-17.
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fulfill its "original function" due to "ceaoeleso vloiations" by th,b
United States. The statement did not even raise the s%ibject of a
North-Souta peace agruemente omitting the arguments Justifying a
DPRK-U.S. agreement i.notead of a DPRK-ROK treaty which had accompanied
the March 3.974 proposal.
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL Underscoring, Pyongyang's insistence on a
U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, the
DPRK aLatement streamed that the co-sponuors of the pro-1)1'RK draft
UN resolution were "extremely right" in having proposed iu their draft
"before anything clue, the problem of dissolving the UN Command and
withdrawing U.S. troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of
the United Nations." (The resolu":ion actually caller for withdrawal of
"foreign troops" under the UN flag.) Charging that the U.S. draft did
not address the question of U.S. troop withdrawal, the statement
accused the United Staten cf attempting to kQus') its troops in the
South "under the specious signboard of the dissolution of the UN
Command," a "crafty trick" to check ar, "increasingly irresistible
demand of the times" to withdraw U.S. foredo from South Korea. It
criticized, the U.S. position that U.S. forces would remain in South
Korea under the ROK?U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty even if the UN Command
was dissolved, but did not reg:eat the argument used by the DPRK UN
representative last year that "dissolution of the UN Command and
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops carrying the flag of the UN
are one indivisible question."
NORTH-SOUTH ARRANGEMtNTS The DPRK statement supported the pro-
Pyongyang draft's propoLici for North and
South Korea to cease arms reinforcement, reduce their armed forces
to an "equal level," prevent armed conflicts, and guarantee against
the use of force, adding after the last clement a condition not
included In the draft resolution--"after the withdrawal of the U.S.
Army from South Korea." The propos,nl's points on ending the North-South
military confrontation resemble those in a March 1973 DPRK f$ve-point
proposal, which called for ending arms reinforcement, cutting army
strength on each side to 100,000 or lens, halting the introduction
of war nupplies from foreign countries. withdrawing U.S. forces from
Korea, and concluding n North-South pence agreement guaranteeing the
above and barring the use of arms against each oth..+r.
PEKING, MOSCOW REACTION NCNA on the 12th carried lengthy excerpts
of the DFRK statement. The NCNA version
included the atatesaent'h references to the need for a peace treaty to
replace the armistice, but omitted passages t'ferrfng to the DPP.K'u
proposal for a peace agreement with the United States. Also omitted
from the NCNA version was the statement's claim that the dissolution
of the UN Command means the e:d of the armistice, and thtt it is
impossible to consider changing the signatories to the agreement. HoAcow's
TASS carried a very brief summary of the statement on the 11th.
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V I ETN.AM
DRV. PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES SCORE U.S. VETO OF UN MEMBERSHIP
The 11 August U.S. veto in the UN Security Council denying the
admission of North and South Vietnam to the United Nations was
promptly protested the following day in foreign ministry statements
from Hanoi and the PRG, and on the 13th in an editorial in the
DRV party paper: NUAN DAN.* The foreign ministry statements
and supporting media comment predictably charged that the U.S.
move was contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN charter and
to the wishes of a majority of -,he world's nations.
The PRG Foreign Ministry statement was harshest in its appraisal
of the U.c. action, asserting that it demonstrated the U.S.
Covornment "still maintains a hostile attitude toward the Vietnamese
people." In this same vein, the atntement stridently declared
that the PRG hoped that the UN Gen_ral Assembly would correctly
develop its role enJ "force" the United States to reconsider its
attitude.
The DRV Foreign Ministry statement was longer--including a detailed
review of action in the United Nations on the Vietnamese question-
and took a more moderate tone than the PRG protest. While not
claiming that the U.S. veto reflected Washington's hostility, the
DRV did dismiss the U.S. attempt to justify the veto no a response
linked to the Council's rejection of South Korea's bid for membership.
Thu DRV statement charged that the U.S. linkage of the Vietnam and
Korean questionq was merely part of a "scheme" to prevent North
and South Vietnam froth joining the United Nations. It used milder
language than the PRG, in noting that the issue would be discussed
in the l:oneral Assembly, stating merely that the Vietnamese requests
would be supported by the overwhelming majority of members and
that the United States would be "further isolated if it persists
in its opposition to this general trena and sticks to its unrea-
sonable attitude toward the Vietnamen.: people."
Both the ARV and FRG foreign ministry statements affirmed that the
two Vietnamese governments follow a policy of developing friendly
relations with all countries. Only the DkV statement, however,
went on to reiterate its standard offer to ncrmalize relations
with the United States on the hasis of U.S. respect for Vietnamese
sovereignty and unity and implemen.,ation of Article 21 of the Psr is
agreement on U.S. postwar assistance to Vietnam.
* Initial Vietnamese reports on the applications for DRV and PRG
admission to the United Nations are discussed in the TRENDS of
23 July 1975, page 13.
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Prior to the Security Council vote, the possibility of a U.S. veto
had been discussed at length in a 5 August NIIAN DAN commentary,
which cited "foreign sources" as indicating that Washington might
create obstacles to the Vietnamese membership applications by
demanding consideration of a package deal including the ROK request
for membership. The article had denounced this proposal no
"unjustifiable," asserting that partitioned countries can be
admitted to the United Nations only when they apply simultaneously,
and citing the case of the admission of the two German states In
1973.
HANOI ESTABLISHES RELATIONS WITH MANILA, CONDEMNS BANGKOK
The establishment of diplomatic relations between North Vietnam
and the Philippines, formalized in a 7 August communique, is being
touted by Hanoi aq a model for normalization of its relations with
other neighboring countries. Hanoi media have particularly pointed
out the lessons the Philippine example holds for Thailand, in an
apparent attempt to pressure Bangkok to accommodate itself to
Hanoi's demands in advance of the DRV-Thai talks on relations which
Bangkok media have said would take place in Hanoi this month.
RELATIONS WITH Hanoi media announced on 3 August that it
THE PHILIPPINES Philippine delegation headed by Ambassador
Mangilr, had arrived in Hanoi on the 4th to
discuss normalizing relations, had held talks with Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, and signed a joint communique
establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level on
7 August. DRV Vico Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Ouy Trinh
received the delegation on f:.c 7th and attended the signing ceremony.
Unlike other recent pro forma communiques on Hanoi's establishment
of :elationu with foreign countries, the joint DRV-Phillppine
communique spelled out three principles for relations and included
specific assurances from Manila.* The principles, which evidently
will be the standard declaratory basis for Hanoi's relations with
all its Southeast Asian neighbors, were identical to those proposed
by Foreign Minister Trinh in a 25 January 1975 letter to Bangkok
advocating normalization of DRV-Thai relations.**
* Other recent cocusunique on diplomatic relations with the DRV
include onto with Portugal on 1 July, New Zealand on 26 June, Burma
on 28 May, Mocambique on 19 May, and Nepal on 15 Hay.
** Foreign Minister Tiinh's 25 January )-Etter i,i discussed in the
FBIS SPEi:IAL REPORT No. 309, 20 March 1975, "North Vietnamese Relations
With Thailand: Evolution of DRV Policy Since the Paris Peace Agreement."
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The three principles included a pledge to respect the national
rights of each country and refrain from detrimental acts of inter-
ference in each other's internal affairs. In addition, both sides
promised Lo refrain from letting their countries be used by a foreign
country to carry on aggression in the area, and Manila specifically
stated that it would not allow the United States to use Philippine
territory against the people of Indochina. Dealing with postwar
issues, the Philippine Government also "reaffirmed" that all
material removed from South Vietnam by evacuating Vietnamese was
the property of the FRG and that no evacuated Vietnamese remained
in the Philippines other than those married to Philippine citizens.
An 11 August article in the North Vietnamese party paper NIIAN DAN,
carried by Hanoi Radio and VNA, underlined Hanoi's Intention to
+iso the DRV-Philippine communique as the pattern for future
agreements with Southeast Asian countries on the Ln,:~z:*nalization of
relations. NIIAN DAN described the communique's principles as
"necessary and correct" for relations "between neighboring countries
as well as among all nations," and it asserted that the Vietnamese
"people" desire normal relations with other Southeast Asian states
"in the same manner as with the Republic of the Philippines."
Focusing on Thailand, the paper maintained that the DRV had "sho+.m
our willingness for such a relationship with the Thai government"
but that, despite repeated declarations from Bangkok that it
desired to normalize relations with the DRV, the "Bangkok admini-
stration han not matched its words with deeds." The article criticized
Bangkok's refusal to recognize the PRG's claim to the military
equipment evacuated to Thailand, and repeated complaints that
Thailand was still heaping the United States in "other --riminal
acts" in the region. It charged tat the "facts" did not match
Thai Prime Minister Wiukrit Pramot's policy of "peace and friend-
ship," and labeled the lack of normalized relations between the
DRV and Thailand a "regrettable situation" for which the "Bangkok
administration must bear full responsibility."
OTHER COht'tNT The outpouring of North Vietnamese comment
ON TRAIL/ND critical of the Thai Government that began in
mid-July continuei4 unabated.* The latest
official DRV pronouncement was an 8 August foreign ministry
spokesman's statement "reaffirming" the DRV's position that air-
craft and ships evacuated to Thailand by fleeing South Vietnamese
personnel were "the property of the South Vietnamese people" and
must be "rightfully returned" to the PRC. Hanoi had previously
* For a discussion of recent DRV criticism of Thailand, see the
TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pp. 19-2].
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issued a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on this same iaaue
on 31 July, in support of & 25 July PRG note to Thailand demanding
a full accounting of the evacuated material and its return to the PRG.
The 8 August statement was apparently prompted by Thai Foreign
Minister Chatchal Chunhawan's 31 July remark that the entire
problem of the contested property should be turned over to an
international court for adjudication. The DRV spokesman rejected
Chunhawan's proposal,, assailed the "devious, unreasonable rationale
of the Thai authorities" that the United States retained legal
title to the property, and demanded that Thailand raturnthe planes
and ships "to create favorable conditions for the normalization
of relations" between the two eountrios.
Hanoi's mistrust of the Bangkok government was also reflected in
North Vietnamese comment on the 7 August 10th anniversary of the
outbreak of the armed uprising by Thai "patriotic armed forces."
Commentaries in NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI MAN DAN on
the 7th combined standard expressions of support for the achieve-
ments of the Thai insurgents over the past ton years with the
observation that the present regime had not yet "abandoned its
sinister schemes" and in matters of foreign policy "says one
thing and means quite another." Despite this criticism, the paper
directed its strongest condemnations generally at Thai "reaction--
ariea," rather than at the Bangkok administration, and it reaffirmed
that the Vietnamese people "keenly desire" the improvement of
DRV-Thai relations. The army paper concentrated more attention
than NIIAN DAN on the exploits of the Thai struggle but it noted,
unlike last year, that the Thai revolutio"ary struggle "remains
complicated and will have to overcome considerable difficulties."
An article on the PRG anniversary and aid agreements with the
Soviet Union and China that appeared in the TRENDS of 18 June 1975
erroneously stated on page 22 that Moscow had not previously
announced an aid agreement with the PRG for 1975. The first Soviet
agreement with the PRG for economic Aid for 1975 was announced
by TASS on 10 December 1974 and reported in the TRENDS of 11 December
1974, page 7.
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THAILAND
THAI CP MARKS 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMED STRUGGLE, PRC SILENT
The PRC-based clandestine radio of the Thai Communist Party, the
Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), marked the 10th anniversary
of the 7 August 1965 start of Thai CP armed insurrection with
a 6 August statement by the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces
(PLAF) hailing the Thai, situation as "developing in favor of the
revolution as never before." The statement stridently reaffirmed
tho Thai CP's stress on the primacy of rural armed struggle
coordinated with mass movements in urban areas, while harshly
attacking the Khukrit government for resorting to tactics Of
"suppression and deception" against increasing popular unrest.
Last year, and on the last quinquennial anniversary in 1970, VOPT
editorials had been issued on the occasion. Last year's
anniversary editorial, the first following the fall of the Thanom
administration, had been the first to highlight urban as well
as rural struggle and to sound an optimistic note on the insurgents'
prospects.
The Thai PLAF statement cited as a principal factor in the favorable
situation in Thailand the communist victories in Indochina which
have "changed the balance of power between the revolutionary
and the reactionary forces in Southeast Asia in favor of people's
revolution." Those victories, the statement asserted, proved the
correctness of the Thai CP's longstanding reliance on armed
struggle in the countryoide to encircle the cities as the primary
path to power. The statement claimed that Thai CP-guided guerrilla
warfare has now spread to more than 30 of Thailand's 72 provinces.
The statement again endorsed the complementary role of political
struggles in the cities, offering support for "any struggle of
the people which is a just struggle" and pledging to "cooperate
seriously with the people of all strata." It urged in conclusion
that the PLAF take advantage of the situation to "continuously
take the offensive in fighting" and "use all possible means" to
assist popular struggles under the "ultimate leadership" of the
Thai CP.
The PLAF statement sustained the VOPT's harshly polemical treatment
of the Khukrit government, a tactic which has not been moderated
des;4te Khukrit's early July trip to Peking to establish relations
with China. The statement bitterly accused the Khukrit government
of attempting to stall popular pressure for the purge of U.S.
influence in Thailand by means of tricks, deceit, and suppression
and of stirring up border incidents with Thailand's Indochinese
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neighbors. It averred that Khukrit had established relations with
China only as a result of persistent popular pressure and claimed
that he was now using the establishment of relations to deceive
the people and "sabotage their revolutionary struggle." The
statement also maintained that the Khukrit government has supported
the formation of "fascist organizations" to suppress popular
dissent and has employed "remnant reactionaries who have been
driven out of Indochina" in counterinsurgency operations. "There
is no change in the Khukrit government's reactionary nature," the
statement concluded, and the Thai people "cannot pin any hoped on
this government."*
PEKING Peking media are not known to have mentioned the Thai
insurrection anniversary this year. Last year Peking
had marked the ninth anniversary of the Thai armed struggle
by replaying both the VOPT editorial marking the occasion and
a VOPT report of Thai PLAT battle successes. In 1973 Peking did
not mark the event at all. Peking had replayed VOPT battle
reports periodically up until Khukrit's trip to Peking, but has
thus far not resumed the practice. Peking's only replay of VOPT
material since the Khukrit trip was on 24 July, when NCNA carried a
22 July VOPT attack on Soviet attempts to gain influence in Thailand,
a theme which has appeared with increasing frequzncy over the
VOPT radio,
* VOPT's initial reaction to Khukrit's trip to Peking and to the
establishment of relations between Bangkok and Peking is discussed
in the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, page 23. Both the Voice of the
People of Burma and the Voice of the Malayan Revolution had softened
polemics as the governments which they oppose had moved to establish
relations with China.
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13 AUGUST 1975
CAMBODIA
PHNOM PENH FILLS NEW LEADERSHIP POSTS, SENDS MISSION TO CHINA
Demonstrating a greater willingness to discuss the emerging
Cambodian leadership, P1iom Penh radio has announced the appoint-
mont of two new deputy prime ministers and has for the first time
acknowledged that Prince Norodom Sihanouk is in North Korea.
At the same time, NCNA reported on 13 August that a delegation
headed by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan would arrive in
China on the 15th for an official friendly visit.* This will be
the first public trip abroad by a leader from Cambodia since
the communist takeover last April.
On 13 August Phnom Penh radio broadcast an "RGNU press communique"
which announced the appointment of Ieng Sary as "douty prime
minster for foreign affairs attached to the Prime Minister's
office" and of Son Sen as "deputy prime minister for national
defense affairs attached to the Prime Minister's Office." The
communique, dated 12 August and issued in the name of the "Deputy
Prime Minister's Office," stated that the appointments were made
"at the RGNU's proposal" to handle "the increasing affairs of the
Royal Government" and were approved by Samdech Chief of State
and Front (NUFC) Chairman Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn
Nouth.
The 12 August RGNU press communique did not specify the relation-
ship of the newly appointed deputy prime ministers to the only
other RGNU deputy prime minister, Khieu Samphan, who has held the
position since 1970. However, the 13 August Peking NCNA dispatch
announcing that Khieu Samphan would lead an RGNU-NUFC delegation
to Peking on 15 August named "Deputy Prime Minister" Ieng Sary
as its deputy leader, suggesting that Samphat; still will function
publicly au the top leader in the in-country RGNU hierarchy.
The RGNU press communique stated that all other RGNU cabinet positions
remain unchanged, and Samphan presumably retains his position as
RGNU defense minister. Phnom Penh radio referred to him au defense
minister as recently as 3 August, when it broadcast his 1 August
* Khieu Samphan's last official visit to Peking, from 20 to 27 May
1974, capped an extended tour of Asian, European, and African
countries. His visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 30-May 1974,
pages 10-12.
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13 AUGUST 1975
- 10 -
grectingn message to PRC Defense Minister Yoh Chien-ying on the
48th annivernnry of the Chinese PLA. Khiou Samphan's position as
commander in chief of Front armed forces (CPNLAF)--a post he
received in June 1.971--has not been mentioned by Phnom Penh media
since 22 April 1975, when he issued a congratulatory message to
the CPNLAI' on their victory; but the 13 August NCNA dispatch
announcing the Peking trip identified him in that role.
Ieng Sary has been identified in Front media in the past as "special
adviser to the offic.C of RGNU deputy prime minister," and was last
mentioned by Phnom Penh radio In a 12 March 1975 report on his
meeting with PKC Premier Chou Eti.'-lai in Peking. His appointment
an deputy prime minister of Foreign affairs may indicate that
Cambodian foreign policy will be handled increasingly from Phnom
Penh, rather than from the RGNU ForeiGa Minister's Office, which
is still in Peking.* San Son is rarely referred to in Front media
and Ines not been mentioned at a71 this year. He has previously
been identified ae chief of the general staff of the CPNLAF, and a
tourn of NCNA correspondents visiting the Cambodian liberated zone
in late March this year referred to him as the frontline commander
of opter.tions near Phnom Penh.
Phnom Fenh radio's first acknowledgement of Sihanouk's presence
in the DARK came in a report in the 10 August "weekly international
news feature"'which cited a speech made by the prince at a film
showing in Pyongyang on 5 August. The radio noted that Sihanouk
was making a "cordial, friendly visit" to tbe, DPRK but did not
report that he had been there since 19 May. Previously the
Cambodian radio had referred to the prince and mentioned some of
his activities without alluding to his whereabouts, even though
North Korean developments were sometimes discussed in the same
broadcast.
* On 4 July, for example, NCNA reported that on 26 June a spokes-
man for the RGNU Foreign Ministry in Peking had issued a statement
seconding a 24 June DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement oi.
U.S. "nuclear blackmail" in Korea. The statement was never reported
by Phnom Penh radio.
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SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS,
CONTINUANCE OF USSP MILITARY AID HINTU): FRICTIONS PERSIST
Despite signs of persistent strains in Soviet-Egyptian relat.tons,
both Moscow and Cairo have recently sug,ested that Soviet military
assistance to Egypt will continue.
On 7 August Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress asserted that the USSR "will continua to cooperate with
the Arab countries, including Egypt, in all fields, including
defense, in the interests of establishing peace and. Justice in
the region." Two days later Egypt's President as-Sadat told a
visiting delegation of U.S. Congressmen, as reported by Cairo's
MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 10th, that "95 percent of my
weapons are still Russian." As-Sadat intimated that he expected
Moscow to continue its arms supplies to Egypt, despite politically
motivated disruptions of deliveries in the past. He conveyed
this idea in explaining that whereas no "advisers agreement" with
Moscow has been in effect since his expulsion of Soviet advisers
in July 1,972, "when the Soviets send me arms, they will undoubtedly
sand some trainers with them to train my men. Then they will go
back home. That is what is currently taking place; no more, no
less."
The seemingly conciliatory notes in Soviet-Egyptian relations
were nevertheless sounded against the background of other signs
of continuing discord in Soviet-Egyptian relations. As-Sadat
in his 9 August meeting with the U.S. Congressional delegation,
for example, also stated that the "misunderstanding" which had
developed between Cairo and Moscow in recent years "continues up
to this minute," and that he might at some poa.nt request U.S.
weapons.
Moscow and Cairo apparently could not reach agreement during recent
high-level talks in Moscow concerning Egypt'> request for a revi3ic??
in the schedule and terms of its debt repayments for past Scvi.et
military and economic assistance. The issue has been a constant
source of friction since the October 1973 Mideast war and was
discussed at length during the 22 July-2 August Moscow visit of
an Egyptian delegation led by Finance Minister A. Isma'il. Soviet
media gave meager and uninforinattae attention to this visit, out
Cairo media covered it in detail, implying at the end of the
talks that Moscow remained undecided on easing the terms of the
debt repayments and reporting that talks would resume at a future
date.
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expreano4 tPattit)app "tce give a nwv inn to raypt. a ~+vttt fti~ f
.Sii.Oi) rJ lic)n," noting that a 1)rovioux+ A 4t)iA)) loan 1,17 tho
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