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September 10, 1975
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se 1999f09J26 : GIA-RDP86S0060$R0002001600'12-1 Trends in Corrlmunist; Media "1Q Sep 75 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE Trends in Communist Media 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 (VOL. XXVI, NO. 36) Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 This report is based 9xciusively on foreign media materials and Is published by FBIS without coordination with other US. Government components. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 000073 Automatically declassified six months from date of Issue. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/ -I C.LArRDP86T00608R000200160012-1 F FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 . MIDDLE EAST Moscow Markedly Diminishes Attention to New Sinai Accord. . . . . 1 PORTUGAL USSR Evinces Concern Over "Confusion" After Goncalves Ouster 4 Peking Sees Goncalves Resignation as Setback for Moscow . . . . . 5 U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS Arbatov Defends Detente, Rebuts Critics of Helsinki Agreement . . 7 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM French, Italian CP's Dispute Moscow on Revolutionary Strategy . . 9 SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Peking, Moscow Trade Charges Over Rights To Visit Memorials. . . 11 VIETNAM PRG's Nguyen Huu Tho Receives Foreign Envoys in Saigon. . . . . ? 13 Vietnamese, Soviet Leaders Attend Hanoi Mausoleum Ceremonies. . . 14 CAMBODIA Peking, Phnom Penh Hail Sihanouk's Return Home. . . . . . . . . . 16 KOREA Pyongyang Calls Japanese Ship Incident "Unhappy Thing". . . . . . 19 DPRK National Day Marked by Preoence of Kim 11, RPR Delegate. . . 20 CHINA Peking Leaders Appear as "Water Margin" Campaign Continues. . . 21 NOTES Cuba on U.S... Puerto Rico; Abortive Coup in Ecuador . . . . . . . 23 APPENDIX Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics Approved For Release 1999/bt~gEy%T.'ftb -RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 ci.nmw er 000073 AuI.mNIMh? E.dnaflea CONTENTS Approved For Release 1999/09/26x061#1DP86T00608R(QQgQAA#A012-1 10 SEPTEMBER 197:5 PIDDLE EAST MOSCOW MARKEDLY DIMINISHES ATTENTION TO NEW SINAI ACCORD After a short initial burst of attention to the second Sinai disengagement accord, Moscow media have lapsed into almost tote,1. silence on it. The 4 September signing of the agreement, boyco,_ted by Moscow, was reported by TASS from Geneva in a two-sentence account which noted that the agreement provided for a "limited. withdrawal" of Israeli troops "from a part" of occupied Egypt`-,in territory. Soviet media apparently have taken no note of the first session of the Egyptian and Israeli working groups in Geneva on the 9th. TASS reported only briefly and selectivel Secretary Kissinger's remarks on the Middle East in his 9 September news conference, and Moscow has thus far totally ignored Egyptian President as-Sadat's strong criticisms of Soviet policy in recent statements. In virtually the only press treatment, PRAVDA's international review on the 7th drew on Western press comment to portray the Sinai accord as falling far short of a settlement of the Arab- Israeli dispute. Scattered TASS dispatches have played up the size of Israel's military shopping list, pointing out the cost to U.S. taxpayers of "U.S. obligations on stationing 'technical specialists"' in Sinai and military and economic aid to Israel. Moscow has evidently ignored some of the stronger Arab criticisms of the accord, such as the 4 September Iraqi Bath Party statement "denouncing and condemning" the agreement, as well as various Palestinian statements. B.,t TASS called attention to the Syrian Ba'th Party statement and has cited Syrian President al-Asad as saying in a Prague speech that Israel, in signing the latest Sinai agreement, aimed at complicating the situation, dividing the Arab front, and increasing its military strength to avoid withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and recognition of Palestinian rights. Other Soviet comment, in implicit digs at Cairo, has depicted Israel as increasing its settlement activity in occupied territories, PRAVDA on the 7th asserting that the "most significant" such plan concerned Egyptian territory, and a Moscow domestic service commentary on the 9th similarly pointing to the "colonization" of Sinai. KISSINGER REMARKS Reporting Secretary Kissinger's 9 September news conference, TASS that day focused on his remarks on detente and, with respect to the Middle East, cited him only as saying that "there is a problem of conflicts, differences and tension in those areas where there is no direct CIM.10.d by 000077 AYbmMICNIYtl .I. 0 ntM d 01 Uwi Ap l0 .tl...l0.d elease 1999/09FMF'RR;NQI'RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608RO Q2dhOOIb251 confrontation between the United States and the USSR, for instance, in the Middle East. In such areas conflict may arise, as a result of the already exii_ing tension there, lack of restraint on the part of the superpowers, and other factors." In a second report on the news conference the following day, TASS omitted the reference to the Middle East and the second sentence in this quotation. The dispatch on the 10th added two further paragraphs on Kissinger's Mideast remarks, citing him as saying the Egyptian- Israeli agreement "does not solve all the issues," and that a final agreement must include the issue of borders, a solution to the Palestine problem, and also international guarantees. The second TASS account added that in this context, the Secretary had said that "the United States recognized that in a final settlement in the Middle East, the role of the Soviet Union would be important." The treatment of the Secretary's remarks in the second TASS account is more consistent with previous Soviet handling of his references to a Soviet role than the first dispatch. Thus, TASS had drawn attention to Kissnger's statement, after the January 1974 disengagement agreement, that the Soviet Union had played a constructive role at all stages in efforts for a settlement. TASS at that time had also cited the Secretary as saying the United States had kept the Soviet Union informed of its actions. Similarly, after the May 1974 Golan disengagement agreement, Moscow had pointed to "useful consultations" on the matter by Kissinger and Gromyko in Geneva.* SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS Moscow has maintained silence on President as-Sadat's increasingly strong criticisms of the Soviet Union in his 4 September speech to a joint session of the People's Assembly and the ASU Central Committee and in an interview he gave on 7 September to the Kuwaiti paper AS-SIYASAH. In his speech on the 4thh he noted that the Soviet Union had told Syria it would not attend the signing of the Sinai accord in Geneva, adding that this was a matter for the USSR, which was "free to decide" what it wanted. But at a later point as-Sadat bluntly declared ghat he regarded the stand adopted by the Soviet Union that day "as an open provocation and an attempt to disrupt" the Arab ranks. He went on to drop his fourth broad public hint since early May that the Soviet Union had been trying to subvert. Cairo's efforts for a second Sinai accord with "furtive whispering" and circulation of inaccurate reports about * Treatment of Kissinger's 22 January 1974 news conference and Soviet comment on the Golan agreement are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, page 4, and 5 June 1974, pages 1-2. 1. Xrt: ~? ~^ n? ~m ,.,. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26coit k4itIDP86T00608RQ0O2001`80O12-1 J.C) SEPTEMBER 1975 "secret" agreements Egypt allegedly had concluded. In his speech he claimed that in March "they" went "to Syria, they went to the Palestinians" and told them: "Here is the agreement between as-Sadat, the United States and Jordan; you and the Palestinians can go to hell. These are the secret clauses and the public ones." In a June Beirut AL-ANWAR interview, as-Sadat had said that this was "volunteered by a state outside this region," and in mid-May, whey. AL-I-IAWADITII chief editor al-Lawzi remarked in an interview with as-Sadat that "the Soviet sources" were the ones telling the Syrians and Palestinians about secret provisions, as-Sadat said he did not want to accuse anyone; "my relations with the Soviet Union are bad enough." Moscow may be using a circuitous route through the Beirut press to respond to Egyptian charges. Thus, the Beirut AS-SAFIR on 4 August published a "political report" of the supposedly reconstituted Egyptian Communist Party. In his AS-SIYAS.'.ll interview held on 7 September, as-Sadat dismissed this as "ridiculous." Egypt; he said, did not have a communist party and "this paper belongs to al-Qadhdhafi." On 7 September, AS-SAFIR published an interview with a "senior Soviet official" who reportedly asserted that the USSR would not leave the Middle East to the Americans, and that Soviet officials were reassessing the USSR's Mideast policy "with the help of the views of Arab friends." AS-SAFIR apparently was used as the vehicle in April 1974 for a Soviet rebuttal of as-Sadat charges vis-a-vis Soviet efforts to obtain as-Sadat's agreement to a cease-fire shortly after the October 1973 war began. At that time the Soviet side of the argument was presented in AS-SAFIR in a purported statement by Vladimir Vinogradov, formerly Soviet ambassador to Egypt and now Moscow's representative to the Geneva conference. To lend an apparent stamp of authenticity, the statement was reprinted the next day in the Lebanese Communist Party organ, AN-NIDA'.* The statement attributed to Vinogradov is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 3-4. It is conceivable that as-Sadat had Vinogradov in mind when he mentioned that "they" were talking to the Syrians and Palestinians in March. Arab media--but not Soviet-- reported Vinogradt,v's visit in March to Amman and to Beirut, where he had talks with PLO officials. See the 12 Match 1975 TRENDS, pages 6-7. tl...ln.d by 000077 Aut?m.OC.II, d.cln.lfl.d Appr d't' lease 1999/09/M! W P86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL F S Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00601,14WJ6j2-1 - 4 - PORTUGAL USSR EVINCES CONCERN OVER "CONFUSION" AFTER GONCALVES OUSTER Moscow has indicated its unhappiness over the changing scene in Portugal following the 5 September meeting of the ' Forces Movement (MFA) Assembly at which Gen Vasco Goncalves was ousted from the Revolutionary Council and forced to decline the position of armed forces chief of staff. Soviet media, while still repeating Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) leader Alvaro Cunhal's call for unity, have openly discussed the extent of divisions within the country and even within the MFA itself. The danger of a counter- revolution has been emphasized, Moscow radio reminding European socialists, who were meeting in London with Portuguese socialist leader Mario Soares, that "anticommunism eventually leads to the collapse of democracy as happened in Italy and Germany." TASS, in its second--but not in its first--report on Secretary Kissinger's 9 September news conference, noted without comment his remark that events in the past two weeks in Portugal "had been 'encouraging"' from the United States' viewpoint and that, "in his words, the United States was maintaining 'close cooperation' with its Western European allies concerning events in Portugal." DOMESTIC Following the removal of Goncalves, Moscow has DEVELOPMENTS professed to see a "growing struggle" in Portugal in s:ipport of the "progressive course." But PRAVDA special correspondents Yermakov and Kotov, in a dispatch on the 9th, summed up Portuguese press speculation about the possible composition of a sixth cabinet with the observation that these "guesses" confirmed President Costa Gomes' assessment that the political situation was "extremely confused." Before the MFA Assembly meeting on the 5th, Igor Fesunenko, on Moscow radio's international situation program that day, had indicated guarded disapproval of efforts under way to reorganize the MFA, turning it away from "the socialist path" and toward "the path of liberal reforms." Fesunenko noted that such efforts had "aroused bitter criticism" in the armer: forces and that the future "not only of the MFA Assembly but of the whole revolutionary process" depended upon the outcome. In a 6 September dispatch following the revamped assembly's ouster of General Goncalves, TASS reported that Goncalves' nomination had been rejected because "the conservative-minded assembly of the ground forces expressed their nonconfidence." Indirectly indicating Moscow's own displeasure, TASS noted Chat many Portuguese had condemned "the campaign organized against the Portuguese revolution and its prominent military leaders," such as Goncalves and premier-designate Azevedo. Cloahad by 00007 months from dOcle..lrl.a .1. month. frodale of ...o. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :9eR-%5Pb6T00608R0t M0j 3T: 21575 Igor Fesunenko also presented a gloomy outlook in a 7 September radio report, noting that "the political situation continues to deteriorate in Portugal." Critical of the changing nature of Portugal's military bodies, Fesunenko said that the assembly was a "reflection of the profound contradictions" within the MFA and stated that the new composition of the Revolutionary Council "omits several prominent figures," such as Goncalves, "who fought most consistently to deepen the revolutionary process." RIGHTIST Moscow, holding the Portuguese moderates responsible "THREATS" for Goncalves' downfall, has admonished them that they are "playing a risky game dangerous to themselves." In IZVESTIYA on 5 September V. Osipov noted that "there is, after all, some sense in the 'Chilean lessons' for the Portuguese Socialist Party." Osipov warned PS leaders that they were "playing into the hands of counterrevolutionary forces inside and outside Portugal" and cautioned that "if counterrevolution succeeds in getting its revenge, it will not stop at half-measures." In a similar warning inspired by PS leader Mario Soares' London meeting with five West European Socialist leaders on the 5th, Anatoliy Antonov in a 5 September foreign-language commentary told Western socialists they were wrong to "close their eyes to the fact that the visceral anti- communism of Soares has contributed much to aggravating the political crisis." Antonov asserted that in giving "unconditional. solidarity" to Soares, social democrats were forgetting that "anticommunism eventually leads to the collapse of democracy in general, as happened in Italy and Germany in the 1920's and 30's." As if to underline the rightwing threat, Moscow has reported the activities of Gen Antonio de Spinola since his return to Europe. In a dispatch in the 6 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Aleksandr Karmen reported Spinola's arrival in Paris, noting that "this is not the first time Spinola has been circling Portugal like a wolf." Karmen recalled that "the last trip coincided with the outbreak of anticommunist hysteria in Portugal" and, speculating on the significance of the current trip, Karmen observed that "he still has people he can rely on" both inside and outside the country. PEKING SEES GONCALVES RESIGNATION AS SETBACK FOR MOSCOW Peking has depicted the resignation of the Portuguese government headed by Prime Minister Vasco Dos Santos Goncalves as a significant setback for the Soviets in their attempts to penetrate Portugal. Peking's assessment was contained in two companion 8 September NCNA articles pegged to the Goncalves resignation, marking China's most extensive review of the Portuguese situation in three months. The Chinese comment followed past practice in characterizing the USSR CIn.IfI.d Oy 000077 Appro I.~. a 7d. ??~? ase 1999/09/26ColMAER86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL S L' ll5 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : IA-RDP86TOO6(g" as Portugal's main enemy and in avoiding charges against the United States, but Peking this time was notably more sanguine that developments in Portugal would be contrary to Soviet interests than was NCNA's last review in June. The current NCNA articles portray Moscow as faced with solid opposition from the United States, West European states, and most Portuguese leaders. The first of the two NCNA articles on 8 ,September noted the total collapse of Goncalves' political standing as prime minister, member of the Portuguese revolutionary council, and as one of the three leaders in the now defunct triumvirate directorate, attributing his fall from power to his pursuit of "a policy conducive to Soviet infiltration and expansion." It portrayed widespread opposition to Goncalves' pro-Soviet slant from unnamed officers of the Portuguese armed services, from "certain military regions,' and from the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties, The longer NCNA companion piece portrayed the United States as resolutely refusing "to give an inch" against stepped-up Soviet intervention in Portugal, noting in particular that major Soviet press pronouncements in the past month about alleged Western meddling in Portugal had met with stiff countercharges of Soviet intervention from top-level U.S. leaders, including President Ford and Vic,: President Rockefeller. NCNA's discussion pointedly avoided giving any credence to Soviet charges against the United States, while citing the foreign press for details of "Soviet tampering." Thus, NCNA played up reports that the USSR maintained a "huge embassy" in Lisbon, full of "Soviet spies disguised as diplomats," many of whom had been "kicked out from Britain" and were now active in Portugal. It also alleged that Moscow has provided "huge sums of money and even arms through various channels" in promoting "pro-Moscow elements." The article went on to detail increasingly firm opposition to the USSR and to Goncalves' pro-Soviet po.Licies by Mario Snares of the Portuguese Socialist Party, the Portuguese army chief of staff, and other prominent Portuguese, as well as from West European states. It claimed that Moscow's recent efforts to "absorb Portugal" had met with "stronger and stronger dissatisfaction and opposition." Peking's last comprehensive assessment of Portuguese developments, a 14 June NCNA commentary, had been markedly less emphatic in depicting opposition to Soviet goals in Portugal. The June assessment had shown the United States and West Europe as perplexed and anxious over recent Soviet gains and lacking an effective stand against Soviet "expansionist activities." That commentary had cited only the splinter, pro--Peking Corununist Party of Portugal (Marxist-Leninist) as then resolutely resisting the Soviet advance. CIn.I/le0 by 000073 Autom.tIC.lly detl...lIi,d 211 monl.s from 0.1. of Issu.. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIAO- tTgiLO0608R0002Wl6'QU2s1 10 SEPTEMBER .1975 - 7 - U,S, -SOVIET R ELATIONS ARBATOV DEFENDS DETENTE, REBUTS CRITICS OF HELSINKI AGREEMENT A strong defense of detente and of the Soviet Union's commitment to it are the main burdens of a major article by Soviet Americano- logist Georgiy Arbatov in the 4 September issue of IZVESTIYA. Designed ostensibly to rebut Western skepticism concerning the Soviet Union's commitment to the "Basket Three" provisions of the Helsinki CSCE agreement, Arbatov both reaffirmed the Soviet commit- ment in this regard and--by way of turning the argument around-- asserted that the Soviet Union has a better record than the United States in some aspects of cultural exchange policy. Beyond this, he presented an appeal for patience and realism in assessing the results of detente, an appeal apparently designed to convince readers--in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States--that there is no alternative to "continuing the course toward detente." DETENTE COSTS Arbatov took issue, particularly, with the view, allegedly being propagated in the United States, that recent setbacks in U.S. foreign policy, such as the threats to NATO caused by the Greece-Turkey imbroglio and by the leftist revolution in Portugal, were attributable to detente. Far from blaming detente for these developments, he argued, Washington and its NATO allies should blame their own previous policies conducted during the "cold war." The true causes of such events, he suggested, are rooted in history and are thus not susceptible to political manipulation. In this connection, he reformulated an old Soviet commitment regarding the non-export of revolution. While the Soviet Union will not undertake to maintain the status quo in the world, he said, it "does not regard the policy of detente as an instrument for nudging forward" processes of social change. SOVIET CONCERN Arbatov has been a consistent advocate of improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and at the same time a frank critic of U.S. personalities and U.S. policies perceived to be inimical to U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. In recent months he has expressed what appears to be a genuine Soviet concern over the emergence of anti-detente sentiments in the United States. The selection of Arbatov to write this article suggests that Soviet authorities wished to reiterate this concern in strong terms. Arbatov was specifically critical of those in the United States he depicted as former supporters of detente who have fallen silent in recent months, intimidated by the new mood in the country in the wake of communist victories in Indochina and willing to accept a limited detente which has already diminished the CIM II.d by 000073 AYtonYllc.IIy d.cIu.IN.d .1. month. hom d.t. of I Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIAO RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T0060aRQo2 immediate military threat of world war. Arbatov asserted that such complacency was dangerous, since the two countries are at a crossroads and further steps crc necessary to avoid a regression in relations. While restating Soviet adherence to the freedom of information obligations in the Helsinki document, Arbatov made it clear the Soviet Union would not allow entry of "anti-Soviet, subversive propaganda," nor would it be deterred from its policy by Western clamor over freedom of information issues. As Arbatov put it: "Only very naive people can believe that the campaign which has now been developed will make the USSR waive its sovereign rights." Arbatov concluded on a cautio..sly optimistic note, contending that there is in fact little alternative to detente, given the priority of the task of averting nuclear war and the increasing prominence of "global" problems such as shortages of energy and food requiring international cooperation for their solution. Cln.lfI.d by 00007'. Aul.m.ll,..fIy d.cI.n10.d .l. moth. hem d.l. of Imo, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 FIDE T FBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26: GQ~A-R V 6TO0608R00J2QQ11,k%11I?4)75 Appro - 9 - INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM FRENCH, ITALIAN CP'S DISPUTE MOSCOW ON REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY Both the French and Italian communist parties, via articles in their respective newspapers, have given further replies to the controversial 6 August PRAVDA article by Konstantin Zarodov-- an article that raised questions about the long-standing Soviet policy of encouraging alliances between non-ruling communist parties and socialist parties.* Both papers were critical of Zarodov's controversial thesis that the democratic and socialist stages of the revolution could be combined, and they rejected his invocation of Lenin's view that corlununist parties need not rely on an "arithmetical majority" in achieving power. L'HIUMANITE ARTICLE A Jacques Chambaz article in the 4 September issue of L'HUMANITE, while acknowledging the importance of assimilating Lenin's contribution, asserted that Lenin's strategy could not be reduced to a "repetition of stereotyped formulas" nor to a "collection of abstract notions." Chambaz even went so far as to ridicule Zarodov's research, re- calling that Lenin--in the same article cited by the Soviet author--had also emphasized that one must not be satisfied with "stereotypes" and that those who mistake "some committee of archivists" for "creative implementation of Marxism" shorld be scorned. Despite being a doctor of history, Zarodov appeared to believe that certain "elementary facts" were of "negligible importance," Chambaz noted. Rejecting Zarodov's most controversial conclusion that the demo- cratic and socialist stages were "interlinked and can even be solved simultaneously," Chambaz stressed that "advanced democracy" is a "necessary stage" in the development of socialism in France. Taking issue with Zarodov's contrasting of the "arithmetical majority" with the "political majority," Chambaz asserted that the PCF would never consider elections in France to be of "negligible importance." "Democracy demands that the people's decisions be respected by all under any circumstance," he stressed. Chambaz suggested that Zarodov's concept would lead straight toward rule by an "active minority." Finally, in an apparent rejection of Moscow's authority in matters of doctrine, Chambaz said that in addition to the "laws of socialism" we must take into account inter- national experience, and this cannot be done by reducing principles to "lifeless formulas" which would be appl.icable "always and everywhere." * The Zarodov article avid initial West European communist reaction to it are discussed in the 20 August TRENDS, pages 7-11. Clnfifl.d by 000073 Au'om.lkaly d.clnall.d ase 1999/09/26 SdL 86T00608R000200160012-1 CO FID T A X- Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : kDP86T0060t' *0~ii1600~1,2-1 L'UNITA ARTICLE The article in the 24 August issue of L'UNITA did not mention the Zarodov article directly, but the issues discussed left little doubt that Zarodov was the target. Like L'IIUMANITE, the L'UNITA article argued--as it had in its earlier 12 August reaction to Zarodov--that there must be a "transitional stage" between capitalism and socialism. The author of the L'UNITA article, deputy chief editor Claudio Petruccioli, acknowledged that "how to proceed to socialism" was a "very difficult question." But simply to emulate the way other countries have proceeded at other times is "absolutely out of the question" and has "no relevance" to the existing situation, he added, disputing one of the basic themes of the Zarodov article. Petruccioli went on to stress that the achievement of socialism required the "fullest development" of consent and democracy, without which there would be an "unacceptable kind of socialism"; Zarodov had said that "all and any deviations" from the revolution- ary Line must be "repulsed." Like L'HUMANITE, Petruccioli emphasized that political freedom and universal sufferage must be recognized and accepted, in contrast to Zarodov's opinion that the "will of the majorit_;" need not depend on an "arithmetical concept" or "some kind of notional referendum." Finally, in a reiteration of PCI policy, L'UNITA argued that communist parties must be able to interpret and express the aspirations of the working class and people, but in so doing must work together with other democratic pclitical organizations, be they socialist or social-democratic. Zarodov had posited the communist party as the "only" force capable of fully and correctly interpreting the wishes of the people, and thereby the communist party had to maintain "hegemony" in the revolutionary process. Further emphasi'ing the need for socialist and communist unity, and taking note of recent events in Portugal, Petruccioli suggested that "continuous dialectic" between communists and socialists was "natural" and "right," but that historical and present differences should not conceal the heed for a common commitment aimed at the furtherance of democracy and progress toward socialism. These differences, he stressed, should be minimized while remembering that the socialist and communist parties both stem from the proletariat and seek the same goal c.t trarsforming society. 000077 EmC l/l.d by .llc.117 d.clu.ltl.d 1h, hm dte of 1iCONFIDENTI Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/MNFff1KbP86T00608Q, - 11 - SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES OVER RIGHTS TO VISIT MEMORIALS Moscow and Peking have exchanged harsh polemics over. Ch.tna's refusal. to allow Soviet delegates to attend this year's 2 September V-J Day ceremonies at memorials in Chinese provincial. cities honor- ing Soviet troops who died in China in 1945. The conti :using stalemate in relations was reflected in the exchange, which evoked an official-level Chinese comment on the Soviet charges, now routine, for the first time since the Sino-Soviet border talks began In October 1969. Peking's NCNA on 7 September publicized a 29 August PRC Fore'.gn Ministry "verbal statement" setting forth the reasons China had refused to permit Soviet delegates to attend this year's 30th anniversary commemoration on 2 September, NCNA's statement came in response to a 4 September TASS report charging that the PRC Fcreign Ministry's denial of a Soviet request to send a dele- gation on the anniversary had demonstrated fundamental "disrespect" by Peking for the Soviet people. Peking media in the past have generally confined their treatment of such anniversaries to reporting the attendance at commemora- tive ceremonies of Chinese officials and Chinese representatives of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. This year's public rebuttal of the Soviet complaint may have been prompted by Moscow's publiciz- ing last April--for the first time in recent years--of a Soviet Foreign Ministry protest alleging that the Chinese had desecrated Soviet war memorials in the PRC. CURRENT EXCHANGE As has become traditional on the anniversary of the Japanese defeat, as well as on the USSR Armed Forces Anniversary each February, Soviet media reported that Chinese authorities refused permission for Soviet representatives to lay wreaths at memorials to fallen Soviet soldiers in several cities in northeast China on the 2 September anniversary. The 4 September TASS report and several radio accounts said the PRC Foreign Ministry had "rudely refused" the request of a Soviet war veterans group to visit memorials in China. Apparently it made no difference to the Chinese that this time the request came from the veterans group "through appropriate Chinese organizations," rathe':? than from tl'e Soviet Embassy in Peking, as on past anniver- saries.* * Continuing a trend of recent years, Soviet commentary on V-J Day has sharply criticized the Chinese for their alleged ingratitude for Sr; assistance during and immediately after the war, while placing tt:e usual stress on the importance of the brief Soviet campaign against Japa:pse forces on the mainland in accelerating Japanese surrender. tiny:..a n, 000073 -ths h- vm d.1 da? ... of m bw. CONFIDENTIAL sl. monlln ApproVed r e ease 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/0N,3AoE-RDP86T00690160012-1 :1.0 SEPTEMBER 1975 NCNA's 7 September account or the PRC Foreign Ministry refusal of 29 August took p iins to display Chinese concern for the memory of fallen Soviet servicemen and a continuing strong desire for friend- ship with the Soviet people, while castigating the Soviet leadership for attempting to "create pretexts" and use "anti-China maneuvers" to "incite the Soviet people against China." NCNA's account of the Ftatement used unusually blunt language to assess Sirio-Soviet friction, explaining that "it is impossible" for the Chinese to receive delegates sent from Moscow because the Soviet leaders "have massed and deployed their troops on the Sino-Soviet borders," have "continuously sent numerous spies to China through various channels to carry out subversive activities and sabotage," and are engaged in a "rabid anti-China campaign." NCNA claimed that the "Soviet renegade group" was unscrupulously exploiting the. memory of Soviet servicemen who died in the war against Japan in China in order to serve its "anti-China policies." SOVIET APRIL PROTEST The Soviet Foreign Ministry protest reported by TASS on 3 April this year had said that "Soviet representatives" placing a wreath at a memorial in the city of Man-thou-Ii in connection with the Soviet Armed Forces Anniversary in February had noted "desecration" of the memorial and notified local authorities, but to no avail. It concluded that "official Chinese authorities encourage a blasphemous attitude" by Chinese citizens toward symbols of their cooperation against the Japanese. The apparent acknowledgement that Soviet representatives had been granted permission to visit a memorial in Man-chou-li, on the Soviet border, stood in contrast to a TASS report on the anniversary in February which had complained that once again USSR Embassy representatives had been refused permission to visit five cities in northeast China (not including Man-chou-li) though they had placed a wreath at the memorial in Wuhan in central China. Soviet media have on occasion in recent years acknowledged permission for Soviet representatives to visit war memorials else- where in China, such as Wuhan, but never in the northeast or on the Sino-Soviet border. Peking had responded to the April Soviet protest with a lengthy 14 April NCNA commentary attacking it as part of Moscow's continuing "groundless slander" designed to foster ant;-China feelings within the USSR so as to alleviate alleged popular discontent with Moscow's rule, and to reinforce alleged efforts by the "Brezhnev clique" prior to the May 1975 30th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany to discredit China and portray the USSR leaders as the "true successors to the anti-fascist cause." CI.t.IP.d by C0OO73 Aotom.tlc.lly d.c,n.Ifl.d .1. month. hom d.t. of IU., Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :(eP49kbTOt6T00608RO~~P bdf6'd6'12-1 l 1 Sls111FM13LR 1.975 VIETNAM PRG'S NGUYEN HUU THO RECEIVES FOREIGN ENVOYS IN SAIGON Restrictions on foreigners' travel to South Vietnam in effect since the April communist takeover apparently have now been lifted sufficiently following the DRV National Day celebrations to allow, for the first time, the entry of certain ambassadors into Saigon and visits there by low-level foreign delegations. In addition to Vietnamese communist media accounts of various "international and national" delegations traveling to Saigon after attending National Day festivities in Hanoi, the media reported the arrival in Saigon on 6 September of six ambassadors from Cuba, the Congo, Mauritania, Sweden, Mexico, and Denmark and a "representative" of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).* Subsequent reports have indicated that the ambassadors and the PLO representative presented their credentials in separate ceremonies to Nguyen Huu Tho--presumably in his capacity as president of the PRG Advisory Council--and were received by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. On a similar occasion in June 1973, on the fourth anniversary of the PRG, a large group of ambassadors from communist and Third World countries had visited northern Quang Tri Province in South Vietnam to present their credentials to Nguyen Hui Tho.** At that time, envoys front the Soviet Union and China were prominently featured at the head of the list of ambassadors participating. While the Cuban ambassador was absent from the 1973 ceremonies, the VNA report on that presentation had noted that the Cuban had already presented his credentials "in a liberated area of South Vietnam during the war" and bore the title "dean of the diplomatic corps in the RSV," an honor that undoubtedly accounts for the present Cuban ambassador being given pride of place in current reportage. Although the PRG has sent ambassadors to many of the 66 countries which have been reported to have accorded recognition, it is not * An 8 September VNA version of the recent ambassadors' trip to the South implied there had been an earlier contingent. In describ- ing their welcome in Saigon, VNA stated that "several more ambassa dors . . . have arrived in Saigon" and cited LPA as its source. An LPA account of their arrival transmitted earlier that same day made no mention of a previous group of envoys, nor have other monitored Vietnamese media. ** For a discussion of the June 1973 presentation of credentials in the South, see the TRENDS of 6 Jun-_ 1973, pages 4-6. CIn.10.d by 000077 AYIo .tc.IIy A.cIn.6.0 "'"""`' '?" ' Appr%JV , W1 111W ease 1999/09/269KCI9 ?Q86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T006V8FW6WM1 fi '12-1 - 14 - clear from accounts of the latest group's credentials presentation whether any of them will actually take up residence in the South-- although a 9 September LPA account implied as much when it declared they had arrived to "assume their posts." Of the six ambassadors named, only the Cuban is solely accredited to the PRG, the other five having the additional responsibility of also representing their countries in Hanoi. VIETNAMESE, SOVIET LEADERS ATTEND HANOI MAUSOLEUM CEREMONIES The 29 August inauguration of the recently completed Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square was the occasion for a "solemn meeting" that drew a full turnout of Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo members and the participation of a Soviet delegation headed by M.S. Solomentsev, candidate member of the CPSU Politburo. An an expression of Vietnamese gratitude for direct Soviet assistance in the construction of the monument and the preservation of Ho's remains, Solomentsev was accorded the honor of sharing the podium with VWP First Secretary Le Duan and DRV National. Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Trucng Chinh in eulogizing the late DRV President. While the Chinese were not included in the ceremonies--their National Day delegation not having arrived in Hanoi until 31 August, comparison of DRV media coverage of the Soviet and PRC delegations' activities pertaining to National Day reveals a careful effort by the Vietnamese to maintain inpartial treatment of both.* The arrival and departure of both the Soviet and Chinese delegations were attended by Premier Pham Van Dong, and the cordiality of the occasions characterized in virtually identical language by Hanoi media. Both delegations were received by Le Duan the day they arrived, and both visited DRV industrial establishments for which their respective governments had provided aid. The remarks by the head of the PRC delegation, CCP Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, at the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex were summarized only very briefly by Vietnamese media, as were those by Solomentsev at the Cam Pha central mechanical engineering plant in Quang Ninh Province. H.3noi radio's 29 August list of DRV party and government officials described as members of the "presidium" for the mausoleum inaugural ceremonies included the leaders of the South Vietnam * For a discussion of the 1 September celebration of the DRV's 30th anniversary, see the TRENDS of 4 September X975, pages 14-17. r In.111M E7 000077 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/O9/2@ P86T006081`~939921gt~1#0012-1 OQ& 1.0 S1 PTEMBE' It 1.975 delegation Pham Hung, Iluynh Tan Phat, Vo Chi Cong, and Tran Nam Trung. As usual, Pham Hung was identified as a member of the VWP Politburo and, as has been customary since his reappearance in public in mid-May,* he was listed separately from the other Politburo members. A 1 September VNA English account of wreath- laying ceremonies at the "monument of fallen heroes" in Hanoi the same day also listed top-ranking members of the Politburo, but on that occasion Pham Bung was included in the listing of the other members and ranked fourth--after Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong and before Vo Nguyen Giap--the same hierarchical position he had occupied prior to his disappearance from media mention in September 1969. The Hanoi radio account of presidium members at the mausoleum ceremonies provided the first and only known identification of a Vietnamese leader in a position on the "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord," a body originally called for by Article 12 of the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam which has received markedly reduced attention from Vietnamese communist media since August 1974. The Hanoi radio account placed Huynh Tan Phat and Vo Chi Cong in them.- customary titles, but added for Tran Nam Trung the identification "vice chairman of the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord" along with his known titles as member of the VWP Central Committee, vice chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium, and PRG defense minister. Such an isolated identification would by itself seem insufficient evidence to confirm that the Vietnamese leadership has begun establishing such a council for reconciliation, which would lend an aura of Paris agreement legality to the takeover in the South. The Paris agreement had envisaged setting up such a council "immediately after the cease-fire" on the basis of consultations by the "two South Vietnamese parties" and it was to have consisted of "three equal segments." While shortly after the signing of the Paris agreement Vietnamese communist media had hinted that unilateral moves might he taken to set up the National Council,** no formal announcement of its establishment is known to have ever been publicized and ever. mention of the concept of "national concord" became notably absent from official Vietnamese communist pronounce- ments, following the initial military successes of their forces in mid-March. * See the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 1-4, for a discussion of Pham Hung's reappearance. ** For a discussion of the need for national concord as reflected in Hanoi and Front propaganda, see the TRENDS of 7 February 1973, pages 1-4. CIn.lf4d 67 000073 Aulonruc.llr d.cluWled .d wMhs from del. of I..w. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T006081ROQ42K~ $,091;-1 CAMBODIA PEKING, PHNOM PENH HAIL SIHANOUKIS RETURN HOME Prince Norodom Sihanouk, accompanied by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and a major contingent of his Peking-based official entourage, ended over five years of exile abroad on 9 September, departing China for Cambodia in the company of RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and arriving in Phnom Penh later that same day. Prior to his Peking departure, Sihanouk was treated to a series of extraordinary Chinese leadership meetings, banquets and farewell ceremonies. Initial, sparse Phnom Penh radio reportage on the prince's arrival indicated he received a warm welcome, but there has been no indication yet in communist media as to what role the prince, Penn Nouth, and the rest of the RGNU contingent formerly based in China will play in future Cambodian politics. Phnom Penh's report on the arrival indicated that representatives of the army, Front, workers and mass organizations from throughout Cambodia were in the capital, suggesting that major leadership meetings may soon be held to iron out future Cambodian policies.* PEKING SENDOFF Following his return to Peking on 4 September from DRV National Day celebrations in Hanoi, Sihanouk, along with Penn Nouth and Khieu Samphan, was treated to a round of effusive farewell. festivities. The three leaders were received at a meeting on 6 September attended by eleven full and two alternate CCP Politburo members--almost every active member in Peking at the time. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping hosted and addressed a farewell banquet that evening, which was also addressed by Sihanouk and was attended by the same PRC leaders who had attended the meeting earlier in the day, except for aging NPC Chairman Chu Te. Sihanouk in turn hosted and addressed a banquet on 8 September which drew eight full CCP Politburo members, led by Teng Hsiao-ping, who also spoke. Capping the farewells, the Chinese on the 9th staged a grand sendoff ceremony for the Cambodians, in an atmosphere of full "jubilation" marked by the rallying of "tens of thousands" of * For background, on Sihanouk': recent visits to the DPRK and the DRV preceding his departure from China, see the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, page 22, and of 27 August 1975, pages 18-19. Sihanouk did travel briefl y in the Cambodian "liberated zone" in March 1973, a trip whic h was reported only after his departure f rom Cambodia. That visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, pages 1-4. CIb.I11.d by 000070 occl.nlflb sls months from d.t. of I..u.. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :cGOPP6T00608R00P(0,~1ffi~2-1 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 people at Tienanmen and the attendance of five Politburo members at the airport.* Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan had earlier visited Premier Chou En-lai in the hospital on 26 August and Mao Tse-tung on the 27th before attending anniversary celebrations in Hanoi. Teng Hsiao-ping's speeches at the 6 and 8 September banquets treated Sihanouk's departure as marking the end of over five years of struggle and the start of a "new historical stage" for the Cambodian people. Bidding Sihanouk congratulations on his departure "on behalf of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Chairman Chu Te of the NPC Standing Committee, Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Government and people," Ting reiterated Chinese backing for Sihanouk as an '"oustanding patriot of Cambodia" and an old and "close friend" of the Chinese people. At the same time Teng showed special respect to the insurgent leaders in Cambodia led by Khieu Samphan, and duly depicted the Cambodian "people"--not Sihanouk or the RGNU--as the motive force in Cambodian development. Employing much the same language he had used in feting a RGNU delegation Led by Khieu Samphan visiting China last month, Teng pledged that China would "as always stand together" with Cambodia and "firmly support" its just cause. Sihanouk's 6 September speech, though avoiding specific reference to the USSR, clearly appealed to his Chinese audience by differentiat- ing Cambodia's view of its "true friends" such as China, from that of its "false friends" who abandoned Cambodia au times of "misfortune." Referring to the strong Chinese support which greeted his arrival in Peking on March 19, 1970--following his departure from Moscow, where he first learned of the 18 March 1970 Lon Nol coup--the prince lauded the "unparalleled nobleness" of China's consistent support while condemning "formerly friendly powers" for predicting Front defeat at the hands of the United States. Sihanouk made passing references to his current and future political role, noting on the 6th that his "patriotic mission abroad" was now "fulfilled," but adding on the 8th that he was "sure" to "be asked often to visit or revisit" the PRC on "friendly missions." Sihanouk on the 8th also reaffirmed his adherence to the egalitarian aims of consolidating "true people's democracy" in the "second stage of the Cambodian revolution," as originally outlined by the special national congress of the Front held in late April. * By comparison, DPRK President Kim I1-song's 26 April 1975 Peking departure had occasioned the turnout of five Politburo members and "5,000 people." DRV Party chief Le Duan`s 8 June 1973 Peking sendoff was marked by ten PRC Politburo members, but again only "5,000 people." Former Pakistani President Bhutto's 2 February 1972 Peking departure had occasioned a turnout of three Politburo members and "more than 100,000 people" along the departure route. Clnan.d by 000073 Automalcaly d, monib, from dot, al Inu.. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO60BROO02 OD*2- PHNOM PENH RECEPTION Phnom Penh radio reported on 9 September that Sihanouk and Penn Nouth were greeted on arrival by Deputy Prince Minister Son Sen, Information and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim, other assembled RGNU ministers and deputy ministers, and representatives of "mass organizations" and "departments" in Phnom Penh and by "an extremely vast crowd of people" with "thunderous applause and cheers." The radio reported that Son Sen made a speech "most warmly welcoming" the prince and Penn Nouth on their return, and that Sihanouk "expressed great emotion" over his welcome in an "elaborate return speech." The radio also reported on the 10th that Khieu Samphan hosted a banquet for Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the 9th in an "extremely cordial and joyful atmosphere." Khieu Samphan reportedly praised huh men "for all their patriotic activities over the past five years," and Sihanouk "stressed his joy at being able to return" to Phnom Penh in his reply. Thus far Phnom Penh has not broadcast these speeches in either excerpted or full form, and apart from the arrival and bai:quet reports it has remained silent on Sihanouk's return. The radio reported briefly on both Teng Hsiao-ping's 6 September farewell banquet for Sihanouk and on Sihanouk's 8 September banquet in Peking, in broadcasts of the 9th and 10th respectively. CI...If1.o by 000073 Autonwunn7 a.rbs.rn.d .I. month hom dM* of I..u.. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : i !ftft6T00608R00df2U0'F'60''2-1 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 K 0 R E A PYONGYANG CALLS JAPANESE SHIP INCIDENT "UNHAPPY THING" KCNA on 10 September announced that: Pyongyang on 11 September would release the Japanese fishing vessel captured by a North Korean patrol boat on the 2d. The KCNA announcement, while unattributed, employed language and format redolent of official statements and also provided Pyongyang's first detailed account of the incident. In revealing the imminent release of the ship and crew, KCNA said the DPRK was "taking into account the friendly relations between the Korean and Japanese peoples" and suggested that "such an .unhappy thing" between Korea and Japan could be avoided in the future if Japanese fishing vessels kept out of DPRK territorial waters. According to KCNA, the North Korean patrol boat did not realize at first that the intruding vessel was Japanese. The announcement blamed the Japanese fishing vessel for bringing misfortune on itself, claiming that it had intruded into DPRK waters and then attempted to flee from a DPRK patrol boat, which gave "stop signals and menacing firing several times," before finally firing at and capturing the vessel, killing two crewmen. Explaining that "we had not imagined a Japanese ship would intrude so deep" into DPRK waters, the KCNA announcement claimed that the DPRK boat thought that since the "unidentified ship," attempted to flee, it was a "U.S. or South Korean puppet spy ship." The KCNA statement was the Pyongyang media's first acknowlegement that there had been shooting or casualties in the incident, details that were omitted from the only other Pyongyang account of the clash, a terse 2 September KCNA report. That report had presaged Pyongyang's intended approach to resolving the incident when it suggested the ,entire affair was a case of mistaken identity, claiming that the !DPRK boat had sought to check an;"unidentified ship", which "turned out to be" Japanese. In a November 1973 incident when the DPRK seized another Japanese ship, the DPRK Ministry of Public Security had issued a report which did not suggest any problem of mistaken identity, but which hinted that the seized ship had been conducting espionage. A month later, "taking the goodneighborly relations between the Japanese and Korea peoples into consideration," the DPRK had released that ship and crew. eia.m.. by oooma AWon i &4E.CLHIfl.d" CON IDE I Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA DP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 Approved For Release 1999/09/262 0CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 DPRK NATIONAL DAY MARKED BY PRESENCE OF KIM LL, RPR DELEGATE The DPRK marked the 27th anniversary of the nation's 8 September founding with the trad:Lt:Lona].L'yougyang meeting, banquet, and NODONG SINMUN editorial. As usual, King 11-song did not attend the 8 September Pyongyang meeting--a return to normal practice after his unusual appearance at last year's National Day meeting. The meeting was addressed by Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. Texts of the vice presidenL's speech and of the anniversary NODONG S1:NMUN editorial were not available at this writing. The 9 September banquet hosted by Kini I1-song was addressed by Premier Kim 11, who had not appeared in public since early June and is probably in i11 health. A representative of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR)-- a Marxist-Leninist party allegedly operating in South Korea--attended both the 8 September meeting and the 9 September banquet. This was the first time since the party was formed in 1970 that an RPR representative has been noted attending DPRK National Day functions, and marked the second time this year that Pyongyang media have reported an RPR representative attending a major function in the North. (The first time was the 25 June Korean War anniversary rally in Pyongyang, which also was the first occasion since the party's founding that the RPR had been represented at the anniver- sary.) The last time a representative allegedly from South Korea was noted at DPRK National Day was in 1968, when Pyongyang radio had reported that a representative of the "South Korean revolutionary organization" gave a speech at the main Pyongyang meeting. The Soviet Union d:Ld not send a delegation to Pyongyang for this year's anniversary. China was represented by a railway delegation headed by Minister of Railways Wan Li. Soviet delegations had been sent for the anniversary in 1.973 and 1974, but not in 1971 or 1972. Chinese delegations have attended the DPRK anniversary since 1971. Last year Kim Il-song snubbed the Soviet delegation by not meeting with it, though lie did meet with the equivalent-level Chinese group. CIA-fled by 000073 Auton.I caIW d.6-ifi. t .1. month, from dale of Ww. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS '['REN S Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0002pgl? '~;r.;~, 1975 CHINA PEKING LEADERS APPEAR AS "WATER MARGIN" CAMPAIGN CONTINUES Coincident with the start of the current campaign to criticize the classical Chinese novel "'Water Margin," Chinese leaders have been unusually active, perhaps to signal that no broad leadership purges are underway. Thirteen Politburo members and alternates bid farewell to Cambodian Prince Sihanouk on 6 September. Of the top Peking-based leaders, Minister of National Defense Yeh Chien-ying has failed to appear recently, though he was listed in a 29 August NCNA account as having sent a wreath to the funeral of a Chinese official. Yeh has a history of health problems, and prior to his last appearance-- at which he presented the toast at the Peking Army Day reception on 31 July--he had been out of public view for nearly four weeks. While Yeh seems an unlikely -;andidate for purging, recent criticism of "Water Margin" hero Sung Chiang indicates that if a specific target is intended, it is probably a military figure. Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen, also a vice chairman of the party military commission, has not appeared since Army Day, but at that time he was in Shanghai and may well still be in the provinces. Two alternate Politburo members have inexplicably dropped from public view in recent months. Neither Peking trade union leader Ni Chih-fu nor Sinkiang chief Saifudin have appeared publicly in the past three months. Saifudin had previously shown up frequently in his province. Since the 4 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on "Water Margin," there have been no new major central commentaries on the campaign, but the provinces have begun to comment on the novel and other articles from RED FLAG and other journals have become available.* An article by the mass criticism groups at Peking and Tsinghua Universities in the September RED FLAG detailed the differences between two main "Water Margin" characters: Chao Kai, founder of the peasant revolt and obvious Mao symbol, and Sung Chiang, a "capitulationist" apparently symbolizing a Lin Piao-Liu Shao-chi figure who, though a successful military strategist, works to erode the peasant revolution from within. In a obvious slap at current goviet leaders who continue to verbally honor Lenin, and reflecting Mao's own concern about succession, the article revealed that Sung Chiang "covered Chao Kai's coffin with beautiful flowers" * The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and other previously available articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 September, pages 26-29. CI...IL.d by 000077 Aulom.t 8111 deeln.IN.d .i. month. hom d.1, o11..0.. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 CONFIDFN-rim.. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T0060 61 160012-1 I;I'TL'M13RR 1975 ?- 22 -- , then proceeded to "comp.l.ctely revise the line which used to be upheld by Chao Kai." Sung Clriun? us,lc ?cij Howes' by accepting clemency from the emperor and abort Inf' the peasant revolt which he had led. "Water Marg:irr" as a Leaching material by "negative example," the al-tic-le warned that "this man Sung Chiang should not be trusted" because. he undermined the revolutionary cause "from the tns:ide." An article by a Peking iron and steel worker that appeared in KWANGMINC DAILY on 30 August criticized Sung Chiang in "Water Margin" for having made fun of Iluang Chao, an earlier peasant leader of an unsuccessful revolt. The article noted tha. Huang was a true revolutionary who styled himself a "heaven-storming marshal" and was not afraid of the imperial anger and punishment, unlike Sung Chiang, who curried imperial favor. Huang Chao was one of several Chinese peasant heroes singled out for praise in a series of pamphlets issued by Peking last summer for the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign, and an article in the August 1975 CHIIIA PICTORIAL also praised HuL:ng. The latter article noted that he "was fond of books," a reference that makes it highly unlikely that Huang's image of a marshal storming heaven is meant to symbolize Lin Piao's struggle against Mao. One constant criticism of Lin during the anti-Lin campaign was that he never read books. The imperial figure in this campaign seems to represent reaction and revisionism, while. Mao is represented by true peasant leaders such as Chao Kai. Provincial radios generally waited until after release of the 4 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, which contained new Mao instructions on the camp,i,11, before originating comment attacking the novel. Subsequent provincial comment has focused on Sung Chiang's altering of Chao Kai's "peasant r.'olutionary line," with several broadcasts stressing the long-teen need to guard against "capitulation- ists" like Liu Shao-chi and. 7Lb11 Piao, who were "just like Sung Chiang." The long-range ideological objectives of the developing campaign were underscored in a 5 September Nanchang broadcast which urged widespread criticism of the novel in order to help the masses to "recognJ:.e- capit,.rlationists" and to "adhere to Chair- man Mao's revolutionary I:Jne both at present and in the future, in this century and the next." A specific concern for insuring continuation of Peking's current line on the Soviet Union through any future post-Mao period has also been indicated in the provincial attacks on "Water Margin." Charging that "the main theme of the book is to peddle cap.LuJaLionism," a Nanchang broadcast on 7 September speci.j'.l:aJ.:ly denounced Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi for seeking "a protective nuclear umbrella from Soviet revisionism and capitulating to Soviet-imperialism." by OOOO71 1lulonul1e.11y necl.alllea fl. month. Iron oI I\.Y. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release I 999/09/26c I'IfiR tWP86TOO6O8ROOO2ODt8N12-1 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 NOTES CUBA ON U.S., PUERTO RICO: Speaking at a 5-8 September "inter- national conference of solidarity with the independence of Puerto Rico" in Havana, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos rejected the idea that Cuba's "unyielding duty of solidarity" with Puerto Rico might legitimately be considered "a significant impediment to U.S.-Cuban relations." Dorticos stated that the Cuban Government "starts from the premise that Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation subjugated by colonial domination and is not a domestic problem of the United States," and he added that the "integrity of our revolutionary firmness unites us forever to the cause of Puerto Rico." Dorticos echoed 28 August remarks in Lima by Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa to the effect that Puerto Rico's freedom was "swindled by the United States" and that "the cause of the independence of Puerto Rico is also our cause." Puerto Rican independence has long been a standard Havana theme, used both as a demonstration of Cuban solidarity with fellow Latins and as an example of U.S. "aggression." Thus, Roa's and Dorticos' statements are consistent with the regime's apparent determination to continue verbal support for "anti-imperialist" movements while cautiously encouraging improved relations with the United States. Havana has not as yet taken note of Secretary Kissinger's criticism ".n his 9 September news conference of Cuban sponsorship of the Puerto Rican conference as "an unfriendly act and a severe setback" to U.S.-Cuban relations. Havana media have given customary treatment of the conference itself, reporting the many charges of U.7. "enslaving and inhumane" exploitation and condemna- tion o` the "farcical" referendum that established Puerto Rico's "associated free state" relationship with the United States. The media have not reported any statements during the conference by Prime Minister Fidel Castro, who presided over the closing session at which Dorticos spoke. Although the conference was held under the nominal sponsorship of the Soviet-backed World Peace Council, Moscow generally does not emphasize the Puerto Ric.-In issue and gave only minimal attention to the conference. ABORTIVE COUP IN ECUADOR: Moscow's as.;essment of the attempted overthrow of Ecuador's military government headed by General Rodriguez Lara on 1 September, has drawn a sharp distinction between that abortive "coup d'etat hatched by imperialist forces and home reaction" in Ecuador and the 29 August ouster of President Velasco in neighboring Peru. Thus, commentator Viktor Shragin asserted on Moscow radio's 5 September International. Situation program that the two coups were "different in character," because while "Peru has changed its president but not its policy," 1 CI.u111.0 br 000073 ~ulom.11c.1ty d.cbul0.d IN montho from dNe of hue. CONFIC!NTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160012-1 CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00606K &%0V1'2-1 -244- the Ecuadorean effort sought to reverse the nationalist trend in that country. Shragin noted that General Gonzalez, leader of the attempt in Ecuador, had stated that he was supported by "all the bourgeois political parties." And Shragin implied foreign support as well by noting that some time ago "Texaco and Gulf began a secret war" against the Rodriguez government, which had limited the activities of "foreign monopolies" since coming to power in 1972. Characteristically less subtle in placing the blame, a 3 September commentary on Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress said that "it can't be any clearer" that the oil company directors were "preparing developments in the same way as the ITT Company prepared for the fascist coup in Chile." Although Havana has not commented on the coup, it has reported the events, with sources loyal to the Quito regime being cited to indicate Cuba's support. A 2 September Havana international service dispatch, for example, noted that Ecuador's principal labor organization had "labeled the squashed military rebellion 'fascist"' and that the Communist Party of Ecuador had "expressed support for Rodriguez Lara's government." CInUM? by oouo7a A Release 1999/(d da6DEIQ1ArG-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1 FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1975 APPENDIX MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1975 Moscow (2495 items) Pekin 923 i g ( tems) UNGA 7th Special Session ' (2%) 5% DRV National Day (1%) 15% Finland s President (--) 5% UNGA 7th Special (--) 13% Kekkonen in USSR China (6%) 5% Session [Cambodia's Ieng (--) 3%] Portugal (8%) 4% Sary, Sarin Chhak V-J Day 30th Anniversary (--) 4% at UN DRV National Day (5%) 4% [PRC Foreign Trade v'-) 3%] Egyptian-Israeli Di (--) 3% MiniLter Li Chiang sengagement Agreement Nonalined Foreign (2%) 1% Speech Nonalined Foreign Mints- (9%) 4% Ministers Conference, Lima ters Conference, Lima V-J Day 30th Anniver- (--) 3% sary Bangladesh (1%) 3% These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, sp?ecti, press article or editorial, govern- ment or pasty statement, or diplomatic note, Items of extensive reportage are counted as cormentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in term: of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some :nay have been covered in prior issues: in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. ow- Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1