TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Trends in Corrlmunist; Media "1Q Sep 75
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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
10 SEPTEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 36)
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This report is based 9xciusively on foreign media
materials and Is published by FBIS without coordination
with other US. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of Issue.
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F FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1975
.
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Markedly Diminishes Attention to New Sinai Accord. . . . . 1
PORTUGAL
USSR Evinces Concern Over "Confusion" After Goncalves Ouster 4
Peking Sees Goncalves Resignation as Setback for Moscow . . . . . 5
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Arbatov Defends Detente, Rebuts Critics of Helsinki Agreement . . 7
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
French, Italian CP's Dispute Moscow on Revolutionary Strategy . . 9
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Peking, Moscow Trade Charges Over Rights To Visit Memorials. . . 11
VIETNAM
PRG's Nguyen Huu Tho Receives Foreign Envoys in Saigon. . . . . ? 13
Vietnamese, Soviet Leaders Attend Hanoi Mausoleum Ceremonies. . . 14
CAMBODIA
Peking, Phnom Penh Hail Sihanouk's Return Home. . . . . . . . . . 16
KOREA
Pyongyang Calls Japanese Ship Incident "Unhappy Thing". . . . . . 19
DPRK National Day Marked by Preoence of Kim 11, RPR Delegate. . . 20
CHINA
Peking Leaders Appear as "Water Margin" Campaign Continues. . . 21
NOTES
Cuba on U.S... Puerto Rico; Abortive Coup in Ecuador . . . . . . . 23
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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CONTENTS
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10 SEPTEMBER 197:5
PIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW MARKEDLY DIMINISHES ATTENTION TO NEW SINAI ACCORD
After a short initial burst of attention to the second Sinai
disengagement accord, Moscow media have lapsed into almost tote,1.
silence on it. The 4 September signing of the agreement, boyco,_ted
by Moscow, was reported by TASS from Geneva in a two-sentence
account which noted that the agreement provided for a "limited.
withdrawal" of Israeli troops "from a part" of occupied Egypt`-,in
territory. Soviet media apparently have taken no note of the
first session of the Egyptian and Israeli working groups in
Geneva on the 9th. TASS reported only briefly and selectivel
Secretary Kissinger's remarks on the Middle East in his 9 September
news conference, and Moscow has thus far totally ignored Egyptian
President as-Sadat's strong criticisms of Soviet policy in recent
statements.
In virtually the only press treatment, PRAVDA's international
review on the 7th drew on Western press comment to portray the
Sinai accord as falling far short of a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute. Scattered TASS dispatches have played up the
size of Israel's military shopping list, pointing out the cost to
U.S. taxpayers of "U.S. obligations on stationing 'technical
specialists"' in Sinai and military and economic aid to Israel.
Moscow has evidently ignored some of the stronger Arab criticisms
of the accord, such as the 4 September Iraqi Bath Party statement
"denouncing and condemning" the agreement, as well as various
Palestinian statements. B.,t TASS called attention to the Syrian
Ba'th Party statement and has cited Syrian President al-Asad as
saying in a Prague speech that Israel, in signing the latest
Sinai agreement, aimed at complicating the situation, dividing
the Arab front, and increasing its military strength to avoid
withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and recognition of
Palestinian rights. Other Soviet comment, in implicit digs at
Cairo, has depicted Israel as increasing its settlement activity
in occupied territories, PRAVDA on the 7th asserting that the "most
significant" such plan concerned Egyptian territory, and a Moscow
domestic service commentary on the 9th similarly pointing to the
"colonization" of Sinai.
KISSINGER REMARKS Reporting Secretary Kissinger's 9 September
news conference, TASS that day focused on
his remarks on detente and, with respect to the Middle East,
cited him only as saying that "there is a problem of conflicts,
differences and tension in those areas where there is no direct
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confrontation between the United States and the USSR, for instance,
in the Middle East. In such areas conflict may arise, as a result
of the already exii_ing tension there, lack of restraint on the
part of the superpowers, and other factors." In a second report
on the news conference the following day, TASS omitted the
reference to the Middle East and the second sentence in this
quotation. The dispatch on the 10th added two further paragraphs
on Kissinger's Mideast remarks, citing him as saying the Egyptian-
Israeli agreement "does not solve all the issues," and that a final
agreement must include the issue of borders, a solution to the
Palestine problem, and also international guarantees. The second
TASS account added that in this context, the Secretary had said
that "the United States recognized that in a final settlement in
the Middle East, the role of the Soviet Union would be important."
The treatment of the Secretary's remarks in the second TASS account
is more consistent with previous Soviet handling of his references
to a Soviet role than the first dispatch. Thus, TASS had drawn
attention to Kissnger's statement, after the January 1974
disengagement agreement, that the Soviet Union had played a
constructive role at all stages in efforts for a settlement. TASS
at that time had also cited the Secretary as saying the United
States had kept the Soviet Union informed of its actions.
Similarly, after the May 1974 Golan disengagement agreement,
Moscow had pointed to "useful consultations" on the matter by
Kissinger and Gromyko in Geneva.*
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS Moscow has maintained silence on
President as-Sadat's increasingly
strong criticisms of the Soviet Union in his 4 September speech to
a joint session of the People's Assembly and the ASU Central
Committee and in an interview he gave on 7 September to the
Kuwaiti paper AS-SIYASAH. In his speech on the 4thh he noted that
the Soviet Union had told Syria it would not attend the signing of
the Sinai accord in Geneva, adding that this was a matter for the
USSR, which was "free to decide" what it wanted. But at a later
point as-Sadat bluntly declared ghat he regarded the stand adopted
by the Soviet Union that day "as an open provocation and an attempt
to disrupt" the Arab ranks. He went on to drop his fourth broad
public hint since early May that the Soviet Union had been trying
to subvert. Cairo's efforts for a second Sinai accord with
"furtive whispering" and circulation of inaccurate reports about
* Treatment of Kissinger's 22 January 1974 news conference and
Soviet comment on the Golan agreement are discussed in the TRENDS
of 23 January 1974, page 4, and 5 June 1974, pages 1-2.
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J.C) SEPTEMBER 1975
"secret" agreements Egypt allegedly had concluded. In his speech
he claimed that in March "they" went "to Syria, they went to the
Palestinians" and told them: "Here is the agreement between
as-Sadat, the United States and Jordan; you and the Palestinians can
go to hell. These are the secret clauses and the public ones."
In a June Beirut AL-ANWAR interview, as-Sadat had said that this
was "volunteered by a state outside this region," and in mid-May,
whey. AL-I-IAWADITII chief editor al-Lawzi remarked in an interview
with as-Sadat that "the Soviet sources" were the ones telling the
Syrians and Palestinians about secret provisions, as-Sadat said
he did not want to accuse anyone; "my relations with the Soviet
Union are bad enough."
Moscow may be using a circuitous route through the Beirut press
to respond to Egyptian charges. Thus, the Beirut AS-SAFIR on
4 August published a "political report" of the supposedly
reconstituted Egyptian Communist Party. In his AS-SIYAS.'.ll
interview held on 7 September, as-Sadat dismissed this as
"ridiculous." Egypt; he said, did not have a communist party
and "this paper belongs to al-Qadhdhafi." On 7 September,
AS-SAFIR published an interview with a "senior Soviet official"
who reportedly asserted that the USSR would not leave the Middle
East to the Americans, and that Soviet officials were reassessing
the USSR's Mideast policy "with the help of the views of Arab
friends." AS-SAFIR apparently was used as the vehicle in April
1974 for a Soviet rebuttal of as-Sadat charges vis-a-vis Soviet
efforts to obtain as-Sadat's agreement to a cease-fire shortly
after the October 1973 war began. At that time the Soviet side
of the argument was presented in AS-SAFIR in a purported statement
by Vladimir Vinogradov, formerly Soviet ambassador to Egypt and
now Moscow's representative to the Geneva conference. To lend an
apparent stamp of authenticity, the statement was reprinted the
next day in the Lebanese Communist Party organ, AN-NIDA'.*
The statement attributed to Vinogradov is discussed in the TRENDS
of 24 April 1974, pages 3-4. It is conceivable that as-Sadat had
Vinogradov in mind when he mentioned that "they" were talking to the
Syrians and Palestinians in March. Arab media--but not Soviet--
reported Vinogradt,v's visit in March to Amman and to Beirut, where
he had talks with PLO officials. See the 12 Match 1975 TRENDS,
pages 6-7.
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PORTUGAL
USSR EVINCES CONCERN OVER "CONFUSION" AFTER GONCALVES OUSTER
Moscow has indicated its unhappiness over the changing scene in
Portugal following the 5 September meeting of the '_.med Forces
Movement (MFA) Assembly at which Gen Vasco Goncalves was ousted
from the Revolutionary Council and forced to decline the position
of armed forces chief of staff. Soviet media, while still repeating
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) leader Alvaro Cunhal's call for
unity, have openly discussed the extent of divisions within the
country and even within the MFA itself. The danger of a counter-
revolution has been emphasized, Moscow radio reminding European
socialists, who were meeting in London with Portuguese socialist
leader Mario Soares, that "anticommunism eventually leads to the
collapse of democracy as happened in Italy and Germany." TASS,
in its second--but not in its first--report on Secretary Kissinger's
9 September news conference, noted without comment his remark that
events in the past two weeks in Portugal "had been 'encouraging"'
from the United States' viewpoint and that, "in his words, the
United States was maintaining 'close cooperation' with its Western
European allies concerning events in Portugal."
DOMESTIC Following the removal of Goncalves, Moscow has
DEVELOPMENTS professed to see a "growing struggle" in Portugal
in s:ipport of the "progressive course." But
PRAVDA special correspondents Yermakov and Kotov, in a dispatch on
the 9th, summed up Portuguese press speculation about the possible
composition of a sixth cabinet with the observation that these
"guesses" confirmed President Costa Gomes' assessment that the
political situation was "extremely confused."
Before the MFA Assembly meeting on the 5th, Igor Fesunenko, on
Moscow radio's international situation program that day, had
indicated guarded disapproval of efforts under way to reorganize
the MFA, turning it away from "the socialist path" and toward
"the path of liberal reforms." Fesunenko noted that such efforts
had "aroused bitter criticism" in the armer: forces and that the
future "not only of the MFA Assembly but of the whole revolutionary
process" depended upon the outcome. In a 6 September dispatch
following the revamped assembly's ouster of General Goncalves, TASS
reported that Goncalves' nomination had been rejected because "the
conservative-minded assembly of the ground forces expressed their
nonconfidence." Indirectly indicating Moscow's own displeasure,
TASS noted Chat many Portuguese had condemned "the campaign organized
against the Portuguese revolution and its prominent military leaders,"
such as Goncalves and premier-designate Azevedo.
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Igor Fesunenko also presented a gloomy outlook in a 7 September
radio report, noting that "the political situation continues to
deteriorate in Portugal." Critical of the changing nature of
Portugal's military bodies, Fesunenko said that the assembly was
a "reflection of the profound contradictions" within the MFA and
stated that the new composition of the Revolutionary Council
"omits several prominent figures," such as Goncalves, "who
fought most consistently to deepen the revolutionary process."
RIGHTIST Moscow, holding the Portuguese moderates responsible
"THREATS" for Goncalves' downfall, has admonished them that
they are "playing a risky game dangerous to themselves."
In IZVESTIYA on 5 September V. Osipov noted that "there is, after
all, some sense in the 'Chilean lessons' for the Portuguese Socialist
Party." Osipov warned PS leaders that they were "playing into the
hands of counterrevolutionary forces inside and outside Portugal"
and cautioned that "if counterrevolution succeeds in getting its
revenge, it will not stop at half-measures." In a similar warning
inspired by PS leader Mario Soares' London meeting with five West
European Socialist leaders on the 5th, Anatoliy Antonov in a
5 September foreign-language commentary told Western socialists they
were wrong to "close their eyes to the fact that the visceral anti-
communism of Soares has contributed much to aggravating the political
crisis." Antonov asserted that in giving "unconditional. solidarity"
to Soares, social democrats were forgetting that "anticommunism
eventually leads to the collapse of democracy in general, as happened
in Italy and Germany in the 1920's and 30's."
As if to underline the rightwing threat, Moscow has reported the
activities of Gen Antonio de Spinola since his return to Europe.
In a dispatch in the 6 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Aleksandr
Karmen reported Spinola's arrival in Paris, noting that "this is
not the first time Spinola has been circling Portugal like a wolf."
Karmen recalled that "the last trip coincided with the outbreak
of anticommunist hysteria in Portugal" and, speculating on the
significance of the current trip, Karmen observed that "he still
has people he can rely on" both inside and outside the country.
PEKING SEES GONCALVES RESIGNATION AS SETBACK FOR MOSCOW
Peking has depicted the resignation of the Portuguese government
headed by Prime Minister Vasco Dos Santos Goncalves as a significant
setback for the Soviets in their attempts to penetrate Portugal.
Peking's assessment was contained in two companion 8 September NCNA
articles pegged to the Goncalves resignation, marking China's most
extensive review of the Portuguese situation in three months. The
Chinese comment followed past practice in characterizing the USSR
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as Portugal's main enemy and in avoiding charges against the
United States, but Peking this time was notably more sanguine that
developments in Portugal would be contrary to Soviet interests than
was NCNA's last review in June. The current NCNA articles portray
Moscow as faced with solid opposition from the United States, West
European states, and most Portuguese leaders.
The first of the two NCNA articles on 8 ,September noted the total
collapse of Goncalves' political standing as prime minister, member
of the Portuguese revolutionary council, and as one of the three
leaders in the now defunct triumvirate directorate, attributing
his fall from power to his pursuit of "a policy conducive to Soviet
infiltration and expansion." It portrayed widespread opposition to
Goncalves' pro-Soviet slant from unnamed officers of the Portuguese
armed services, from "certain military regions,' and from the
Socialist and Popular Democratic parties,
The longer NCNA companion piece portrayed the United States as
resolutely refusing "to give an inch" against stepped-up Soviet
intervention in Portugal, noting in particular that major Soviet
press pronouncements in the past month about alleged Western
meddling in Portugal had met with stiff countercharges of Soviet
intervention from top-level U.S. leaders, including President Ford
and Vic,: President Rockefeller. NCNA's discussion pointedly avoided
giving any credence to Soviet charges against the United States,
while citing the foreign press for details of "Soviet tampering."
Thus, NCNA played up reports that the USSR maintained a "huge
embassy" in Lisbon, full of "Soviet spies disguised as diplomats,"
many of whom had been "kicked out from Britain" and were now
active in Portugal. It also alleged that Moscow has provided
"huge sums of money and even arms through various channels" in
promoting "pro-Moscow elements."
The article went on to detail increasingly firm opposition to the
USSR and to Goncalves' pro-Soviet po.Licies by Mario Snares of the
Portuguese Socialist Party, the Portuguese army chief of staff, and
other prominent Portuguese, as well as from West European states.
It claimed that Moscow's recent efforts to "absorb Portugal" had
met with "stronger and stronger dissatisfaction and opposition."
Peking's last comprehensive assessment of Portuguese developments,
a 14 June NCNA commentary, had been markedly less emphatic in
depicting opposition to Soviet goals in Portugal. The June assessment
had shown the United States and West Europe as perplexed and anxious
over recent Soviet gains and lacking an effective stand against
Soviet "expansionist activities." That commentary had cited only the
splinter, pro--Peking Corununist Party of Portugal (Marxist-Leninist)
as then resolutely resisting the Soviet advance.
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10 SEPTEMBER .1975
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U,S, -SOVIET R ELATIONS
ARBATOV DEFENDS DETENTE, REBUTS CRITICS OF HELSINKI AGREEMENT
A strong defense of detente and of the Soviet Union's commitment
to it are the main burdens of a major article by Soviet Americano-
logist Georgiy Arbatov in the 4 September issue of IZVESTIYA.
Designed ostensibly to rebut Western skepticism concerning the
Soviet Union's commitment to the "Basket Three" provisions of the
Helsinki CSCE agreement, Arbatov both reaffirmed the Soviet commit-
ment in this regard and--by way of turning the argument around--
asserted that the Soviet Union has a better record than the United
States in some aspects of cultural exchange policy. Beyond this,
he presented an appeal for patience and realism in assessing the
results of detente, an appeal apparently designed to convince
readers--in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States--that
there is no alternative to "continuing the course toward detente."
DETENTE COSTS Arbatov took issue, particularly, with the view,
allegedly being propagated in the United States,
that recent setbacks in U.S. foreign policy, such as the threats
to NATO caused by the Greece-Turkey imbroglio and by the leftist
revolution in Portugal, were attributable to detente. Far from
blaming detente for these developments, he argued, Washington and
its NATO allies should blame their own previous policies conducted
during the "cold war." The true causes of such events, he suggested,
are rooted in history and are thus not susceptible to political
manipulation. In this connection, he reformulated an old Soviet
commitment regarding the non-export of revolution. While the
Soviet Union will not undertake to maintain the status quo in the
world, he said, it "does not regard the policy of detente as an
instrument for nudging forward" processes of social change.
SOVIET CONCERN Arbatov has been a consistent advocate of improved
relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States and at the same time a frank critic of U.S. personalities
and U.S. policies perceived to be inimical to U.S.-Soviet rapprochement.
In recent months he has expressed what appears to be a genuine
Soviet concern over the emergence of anti-detente sentiments in the
United States. The selection of Arbatov to write this article
suggests that Soviet authorities wished to reiterate this concern
in strong terms. Arbatov was specifically critical of those in
the United States he depicted as former supporters of detente who
have fallen silent in recent months, intimidated by the new mood
in the country in the wake of communist victories in Indochina and
willing to accept a limited detente which has already diminished the
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immediate military threat of world war. Arbatov asserted that such
complacency was dangerous, since the two countries are at a
crossroads and further steps crc necessary to avoid a regression
in relations.
While restating Soviet adherence to the freedom of information
obligations in the Helsinki document, Arbatov made it clear the
Soviet Union would not allow entry of "anti-Soviet, subversive
propaganda," nor would it be deterred from its policy by Western
clamor over freedom of information issues. As Arbatov put it:
"Only very naive people can believe that the campaign which has
now been developed will make the USSR waive its sovereign rights."
Arbatov concluded on a cautio..sly optimistic note, contending that
there is in fact little alternative to detente, given the priority
of the task of averting nuclear war and the increasing prominence
of "global" problems such as shortages of energy and food requiring
international cooperation for their solution.
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
FRENCH, ITALIAN CP'S DISPUTE MOSCOW ON REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
Both the French and Italian communist parties, via articles in
their respective newspapers, have given further replies to the
controversial 6 August PRAVDA article by Konstantin Zarodov--
an article that raised questions about the long-standing Soviet
policy of encouraging alliances between non-ruling communist
parties and socialist parties.* Both papers were critical of
Zarodov's controversial thesis that the democratic and socialist
stages of the revolution could be combined, and they rejected
his invocation of Lenin's view that corlununist parties need not
rely on an "arithmetical majority" in achieving power.
L'HIUMANITE ARTICLE A Jacques Chambaz article in the 4 September
issue of L'HUMANITE, while acknowledging
the importance of assimilating Lenin's contribution, asserted
that Lenin's strategy could not be reduced to a "repetition of
stereotyped formulas" nor to a "collection of abstract notions."
Chambaz even went so far as to ridicule Zarodov's research, re-
calling that Lenin--in the same article cited by the Soviet
author--had also emphasized that one must not be satisfied with
"stereotypes" and that those who mistake "some committee of
archivists" for "creative implementation of Marxism" shorld be
scorned. Despite being a doctor of history, Zarodov appeared
to believe that certain "elementary facts" were of "negligible
importance," Chambaz noted.
Rejecting Zarodov's most controversial conclusion that the demo-
cratic and socialist stages were "interlinked and can even be
solved simultaneously," Chambaz stressed that "advanced democracy"
is a "necessary stage" in the development of socialism in France.
Taking issue with Zarodov's contrasting of the "arithmetical
majority" with the "political majority," Chambaz asserted that the
PCF would never consider elections in France to be of "negligible
importance." "Democracy demands that the people's decisions be
respected by all under any circumstance," he stressed. Chambaz
suggested that Zarodov's concept would lead straight toward rule
by an "active minority." Finally, in an apparent rejection of
Moscow's authority in matters of doctrine, Chambaz said that in
addition to the "laws of socialism" we must take into account inter-
national experience, and this cannot be done by reducing principles
to "lifeless formulas" which would be appl.icable "always and everywhere."
* The Zarodov article avid initial West European communist reaction
to it are discussed in the 20 August TRENDS, pages 7-11.
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L'UNITA ARTICLE The article in the 24 August issue of L'UNITA
did not mention the Zarodov article directly,
but the issues discussed left little doubt that Zarodov was the
target.
Like L'IIUMANITE, the L'UNITA article argued--as it had in its
earlier 12 August reaction to Zarodov--that there must be a
"transitional stage" between capitalism and socialism. The author
of the L'UNITA article, deputy chief editor Claudio Petruccioli,
acknowledged that "how to proceed to socialism" was a "very difficult
question." But simply to emulate the way other countries have
proceeded at other times is "absolutely out of the question" and
has "no relevance" to the existing situation, he added, disputing
one of the basic themes of the Zarodov article.
Petruccioli went on to stress that the achievement of socialism
required the "fullest development" of consent and democracy,
without which there would be an "unacceptable kind of socialism";
Zarodov had said that "all and any deviations" from the revolution-
ary Line must be "repulsed." Like L'HUMANITE, Petruccioli emphasized
that political freedom and universal sufferage must be recognized
and accepted, in contrast to Zarodov's opinion that the "will of
the majorit_;" need not depend on an "arithmetical concept" or "some
kind of notional referendum." Finally, in a reiteration of PCI
policy, L'UNITA argued that communist parties must be able to
interpret and express the aspirations of the working class and
people, but in so doing must work together with other democratic
pclitical organizations, be they socialist or social-democratic.
Zarodov had posited the communist party as the "only" force capable
of fully and correctly interpreting the wishes of the people, and
thereby the communist party had to maintain "hegemony" in the
revolutionary process.
Further emphasi'ing the need for socialist and communist unity,
and taking note of recent events in Portugal, Petruccioli suggested
that "continuous dialectic" between communists and socialists was
"natural" and "right," but that historical and present differences
should not conceal the heed for a common commitment aimed at the
furtherance of democracy and progress toward socialism. These
differences, he stressed, should be minimized while remembering
that the socialist and communist parties both stem from the
proletariat and seek the same goal c.t trarsforming society.
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SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS
PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES OVER RIGHTS TO VISIT MEMORIALS
Moscow and Peking have exchanged harsh polemics over. Ch.tna's
refusal. to allow Soviet delegates to attend this year's 2 September
V-J Day ceremonies at memorials in Chinese provincial. cities honor-
ing Soviet troops who died in China in 1945. The conti :using
stalemate in relations was reflected in the exchange, which evoked
an official-level Chinese comment on the Soviet charges, now routine,
for the first time since the Sino-Soviet border talks began In
October 1969. Peking's NCNA on 7 September publicized a 29 August
PRC Fore'.gn Ministry "verbal statement" setting forth the reasons
China had refused to permit Soviet delegates to attend this year's
30th anniversary commemoration on 2 September, NCNA's statement
came in response to a 4 September TASS report charging that the
PRC Fcreign Ministry's denial of a Soviet request to send a dele-
gation on the anniversary had demonstrated fundamental "disrespect"
by Peking for the Soviet people.
Peking media in the past have generally confined their treatment
of such anniversaries to reporting the attendance at commemora-
tive ceremonies of Chinese officials and Chinese representatives of
the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. This year's public rebuttal
of the Soviet complaint may have been prompted by Moscow's publiciz-
ing last April--for the first time in recent years--of a Soviet
Foreign Ministry protest alleging that the Chinese had desecrated
Soviet war memorials in the PRC.
CURRENT EXCHANGE As has become traditional on the anniversary
of the Japanese defeat, as well as on the USSR
Armed Forces Anniversary each February, Soviet media reported that
Chinese authorities refused permission for Soviet representatives
to lay wreaths at memorials to fallen Soviet soldiers in several
cities in northeast China on the 2 September anniversary. The
4 September TASS report and several radio accounts said the PRC
Foreign Ministry had "rudely refused" the request of a Soviet war
veterans group to visit memorials in China. Apparently it made
no difference to the Chinese that this time the request came from
the veterans group "through appropriate Chinese organizations,"
rathe':? than from tl'e Soviet Embassy in Peking, as on past anniver-
saries.*
* Continuing a trend of recent years, Soviet commentary on V-J Day
has sharply criticized the Chinese for their alleged ingratitude for
Sr;vi.et assistance during and immediately after the war, while placing
tt:e usual stress on the importance of the brief Soviet campaign against
Japa:pse forces on the mainland in accelerating Japanese surrender.
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NCNA's 7 September account or the PRC Foreign Ministry refusal of
29 August took p iins to display Chinese concern for the memory of
fallen Soviet servicemen and a continuing strong desire for friend-
ship with the Soviet people, while castigating the Soviet leadership
for attempting to "create pretexts" and use "anti-China maneuvers"
to "incite the Soviet people against China." NCNA's account of the
Ftatement used unusually blunt language to assess Sirio-Soviet
friction, explaining that "it is impossible" for the Chinese to
receive delegates sent from Moscow because the Soviet leaders
"have massed and deployed their troops on the Sino-Soviet borders,"
have "continuously sent numerous spies to China through various
channels to carry out subversive activities and sabotage," and
are engaged in a "rabid anti-China campaign." NCNA claimed that
the "Soviet renegade group" was unscrupulously exploiting the. memory
of Soviet servicemen who died in the war against Japan in China
in order to serve its "anti-China policies."
SOVIET APRIL PROTEST The Soviet Foreign Ministry protest
reported by TASS on 3 April this year had
said that "Soviet representatives" placing a wreath at a memorial
in the city of Man-thou-Ii in connection with the Soviet Armed
Forces Anniversary in February had noted "desecration" of the
memorial and notified local authorities, but to no avail. It
concluded that "official Chinese authorities encourage a blasphemous
attitude" by Chinese citizens toward symbols of their cooperation
against the Japanese. The apparent acknowledgement that Soviet
representatives had been granted permission to visit a memorial in
Man-chou-li, on the Soviet border, stood in contrast to a TASS
report on the anniversary in February which had complained that
once again USSR Embassy representatives had been refused permission
to visit five cities in northeast China (not including Man-chou-li)
though they had placed a wreath at the memorial in Wuhan in central
China. Soviet media have on occasion in recent years acknowledged
permission for Soviet representatives to visit war memorials else-
where in China, such as Wuhan, but never in the northeast or on
the Sino-Soviet border.
Peking had responded to the April Soviet protest with a lengthy
14 April NCNA commentary attacking it as part of Moscow's continuing
"groundless slander" designed to foster ant;-China feelings within
the USSR so as to alleviate alleged popular discontent with Moscow's
rule, and to reinforce alleged efforts by the "Brezhnev clique"
prior to the May 1975 30th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi
Germany to discredit China and portray the USSR leaders as the
"true successors to the anti-fascist cause."
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VIETNAM
PRG'S NGUYEN HUU THO RECEIVES FOREIGN ENVOYS IN SAIGON
Restrictions on foreigners' travel to South Vietnam in effect since
the April communist takeover apparently have now been lifted
sufficiently following the DRV National Day celebrations to allow,
for the first time, the entry of certain ambassadors into Saigon
and visits there by low-level foreign delegations. In addition to
Vietnamese communist media accounts of various "international and
national" delegations traveling to Saigon after attending National
Day festivities in Hanoi, the media reported the arrival in Saigon
on 6 September of six ambassadors from Cuba, the Congo, Mauritania,
Sweden, Mexico, and Denmark and a "representative" of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO).*
Subsequent reports have indicated that the ambassadors and the PLO
representative presented their credentials in separate ceremonies
to Nguyen Huu Tho--presumably in his capacity as president of the
PRG Advisory Council--and were received by PRG President Huynh
Tan Phat. On a similar occasion in June 1973, on the fourth
anniversary of the PRG, a large group of ambassadors from communist
and Third World countries had visited northern Quang Tri Province
in South Vietnam to present their credentials to Nguyen Hui Tho.**
At that time, envoys front the Soviet Union and China were prominently
featured at the head of the list of ambassadors participating.
While the Cuban ambassador was absent from the 1973 ceremonies,
the VNA report on that presentation had noted that the Cuban had
already presented his credentials "in a liberated area of South
Vietnam during the war" and bore the title "dean of the diplomatic
corps in the RSV," an honor that undoubtedly accounts for the
present Cuban ambassador being given pride of place in current
reportage.
Although the PRG has sent ambassadors to many of the 66 countries
which have been reported to have accorded recognition, it is not
* An 8 September VNA version of the recent ambassadors' trip to
the South implied there had been an earlier contingent. In describ-
ing their welcome in Saigon, VNA stated that "several more ambassa
dors . . . have arrived in Saigon" and cited LPA as its source. An
LPA account of their arrival transmitted earlier that same day made
no mention of a previous group of envoys, nor have other monitored
Vietnamese media.
** For a discussion of the June 1973 presentation of credentials
in the South, see the TRENDS of 6 Jun-_ 1973, pages 4-6.
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clear from accounts of the latest group's credentials presentation
whether any of them will actually take up residence in the South--
although a 9 September LPA account implied as much when it
declared they had arrived to "assume their posts." Of the six
ambassadors named, only the Cuban is solely accredited to the PRG,
the other five having the additional responsibility of also
representing their countries in Hanoi.
VIETNAMESE, SOVIET LEADERS ATTEND HANOI MAUSOLEUM CEREMONIES
The 29 August inauguration of the recently completed Ho Chi Minh
Mausoleum in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square was the occasion for a
"solemn meeting" that drew a full turnout of Vietnam Workers
Party (VWP) Politburo members and the participation of a Soviet
delegation headed by M.S. Solomentsev, candidate member of the
CPSU Politburo.
An an expression of Vietnamese gratitude for direct Soviet
assistance in the construction of the monument and the preservation
of Ho's remains, Solomentsev was accorded the honor of sharing the
podium with VWP First Secretary Le Duan and DRV National. Assembly
Standing Committee Chairman Trucng Chinh in eulogizing the late
DRV President. While the Chinese were not included in the
ceremonies--their National Day delegation not having arrived in
Hanoi until 31 August, comparison of DRV media coverage of the
Soviet and PRC delegations' activities pertaining to National Day
reveals a careful effort by the Vietnamese to maintain inpartial
treatment of both.*
The arrival and departure of both the Soviet and Chinese delegations
were attended by Premier Pham Van Dong, and the cordiality of the
occasions characterized in virtually identical language by Hanoi
media. Both delegations were received by Le Duan the day they
arrived, and both visited DRV industrial establishments for which
their respective governments had provided aid. The remarks by the
head of the PRC delegation, CCP Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, at
the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex were summarized only very
briefly by Vietnamese media, as were those by Solomentsev at the
Cam Pha central mechanical engineering plant in Quang Ninh Province.
H.3noi radio's 29 August list of DRV party and government officials
described as members of the "presidium" for the mausoleum
inaugural ceremonies included the leaders of the South Vietnam
* For a discussion of the 1 September celebration of the DRV's
30th anniversary, see the TRENDS of 4 September X975, pages 14-17.
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1.0 S1 PTEMBE' It 1.975
delegation Pham Hung, Iluynh Tan Phat, Vo Chi Cong, and Tran Nam
Trung. As usual, Pham Hung was identified as a member of the VWP
Politburo and, as has been customary since his reappearance in
public in mid-May,* he was listed separately from the other
Politburo members. A 1 September VNA English account of wreath-
laying ceremonies at the "monument of fallen heroes" in Hanoi the
same day also listed top-ranking members of the Politburo, but
on that occasion Pham Bung was included in the listing of the
other members and ranked fourth--after Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and
Pham Van Dong and before Vo Nguyen Giap--the same hierarchical
position he had occupied prior to his disappearance from media
mention in September 1969.
The Hanoi radio account of presidium members at the mausoleum
ceremonies provided the first and only known identification of a
Vietnamese leader in a position on the "National Council of
National Reconciliation and Concord," a body originally called for
by Article 12 of the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam which
has received markedly reduced attention from Vietnamese communist
media since August 1974. The Hanoi radio account placed Huynh Tan
Phat and Vo Chi Cong in them.- customary titles, but added for
Tran Nam Trung the identification "vice chairman of the National
Council for National Reconciliation and Concord" along with his
known titles as member of the VWP Central Committee, vice chairman
of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium, and PRG defense minister.
Such an isolated identification would by itself seem insufficient
evidence to confirm that the Vietnamese leadership has begun
establishing such a council for reconciliation, which would
lend an aura of Paris agreement legality to the takeover in the
South.
The Paris agreement had envisaged setting up such a council
"immediately after the cease-fire" on the basis of consultations
by the "two South Vietnamese parties" and it was to have consisted
of "three equal segments." While shortly after the signing of the
Paris agreement Vietnamese communist media had hinted that unilateral
moves might he taken to set up the National Council,** no formal
announcement of its establishment is known to have ever been
publicized and ever. mention of the concept of "national concord"
became notably absent from official Vietnamese communist pronounce-
ments, following the initial military successes of their forces in
mid-March.
* See the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 1-4, for a discussion of
Pham Hung's reappearance.
** For a discussion of the need for national concord as reflected
in Hanoi and Front propaganda, see the TRENDS of 7 February 1973,
pages 1-4.
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CAMBODIA
PEKING, PHNOM PENH HAIL SIHANOUKIS RETURN HOME
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, accompanied by RGNU Prime Minister Penn
Nouth and a major contingent of his Peking-based official entourage,
ended over five years of exile abroad on 9 September, departing
China for Cambodia in the company of RGNU Deputy Prime Minister
Khieu Samphan and arriving in Phnom Penh later that same day.
Prior to his Peking departure, Sihanouk was treated to a series
of extraordinary Chinese leadership meetings, banquets and farewell
ceremonies. Initial, sparse Phnom Penh radio reportage on the
prince's arrival indicated he received a warm welcome, but there
has been no indication yet in communist media as to what role the
prince, Penn Nouth, and the rest of the RGNU contingent formerly
based in China will play in future Cambodian politics. Phnom
Penh's report on the arrival indicated that representatives of
the army, Front, workers and mass organizations from throughout
Cambodia were in the capital, suggesting that major leadership
meetings may soon be held to iron out future Cambodian policies.*
PEKING SENDOFF Following his return to Peking on 4 September
from DRV National Day celebrations in Hanoi,
Sihanouk, along with Penn Nouth and Khieu Samphan, was treated to
a round of effusive farewell. festivities. The three leaders were
received at a meeting on 6 September attended by eleven full and
two alternate CCP Politburo members--almost every active member in
Peking at the time. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping hosted and
addressed a farewell banquet that evening, which was also addressed
by Sihanouk and was attended by the same PRC leaders who had attended
the meeting earlier in the day, except for aging NPC Chairman Chu Te.
Sihanouk in turn hosted and addressed a banquet on 8 September which
drew eight full CCP Politburo members, led by Teng Hsiao-ping, who
also spoke. Capping the farewells, the Chinese on the 9th staged
a grand sendoff ceremony for the Cambodians, in an atmosphere of
full "jubilation" marked by the rallying of "tens of thousands" of
* For background, on Sihanouk': recent visits to the DPRK and the
DRV preceding his departure from China, see the TRENDS of
4 September 1975, page 22,
and of 27 August 1975, pages
18-19.
Sihanouk did travel briefl
y in the Cambodian "liberated
zone"
in March 1973, a trip whic
h was reported only after his
departure f
rom Cambodia.
That visit is discussed in the TRENDS
of 11 April 1973, pages 1-4.
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10 SEPTEMBER 1975
people at Tienanmen and the attendance of five Politburo members
at the airport.* Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan had
earlier visited Premier Chou En-lai in the hospital on 26 August
and Mao Tse-tung on the 27th before attending anniversary
celebrations in Hanoi.
Teng Hsiao-ping's speeches at the 6 and 8 September banquets
treated Sihanouk's departure as marking the end of over five years
of struggle and the start of a "new historical stage" for the
Cambodian people. Bidding Sihanouk congratulations on his
departure "on behalf of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Chairman Chu Te
of the NPC Standing Committee, Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese
Government and people," Ting reiterated Chinese backing for Sihanouk
as an '"oustanding patriot of Cambodia" and an old and "close
friend" of the Chinese people. At the same time Teng showed
special respect to the insurgent leaders in Cambodia led by
Khieu Samphan, and duly depicted the Cambodian "people"--not
Sihanouk or the RGNU--as the motive force in Cambodian development.
Employing much the same language he had used in feting a RGNU
delegation Led by Khieu Samphan visiting China last month, Teng
pledged that China would "as always stand together" with Cambodia
and "firmly support" its just cause.
Sihanouk's 6 September speech, though avoiding specific reference
to the USSR, clearly appealed to his Chinese audience by differentiat-
ing Cambodia's view of its "true friends" such as China, from that
of its "false friends" who abandoned Cambodia au times of "misfortune."
Referring to the strong Chinese support which greeted his arrival in
Peking on March 19, 1970--following his departure from Moscow, where
he first learned of the 18 March 1970 Lon Nol coup--the prince
lauded the "unparalleled nobleness" of China's consistent support
while condemning "formerly friendly powers" for predicting Front
defeat at the hands of the United States. Sihanouk made passing
references to his current and future political role, noting on the
6th that his "patriotic mission abroad" was now "fulfilled," but
adding on the 8th that he was "sure" to "be asked often to visit or
revisit" the PRC on "friendly missions." Sihanouk on the 8th also
reaffirmed his adherence to the egalitarian aims of consolidating
"true people's democracy" in the "second stage of the Cambodian
revolution," as originally outlined by the special national congress
of the Front held in late April.
* By comparison, DPRK President Kim I1-song's 26 April 1975 Peking
departure had occasioned the turnout of five Politburo members and
"5,000 people." DRV Party chief Le Duan`s 8 June 1973 Peking sendoff
was marked by ten PRC Politburo members, but again only "5,000 people."
Former Pakistani President Bhutto's 2 February 1972 Peking departure
had occasioned a turnout of three Politburo members and "more than
100,000 people" along the departure route.
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PHNOM PENH RECEPTION Phnom Penh radio reported on 9 September
that Sihanouk and Penn Nouth were greeted
on arrival by Deputy Prince Minister Son Sen, Information and
Propaganda Minister Hu Nim, other assembled RGNU ministers and
deputy ministers, and representatives of "mass organizations"
and "departments" in Phnom Penh and by "an extremely vast crowd
of people" with "thunderous applause and cheers." The radio
reported that Son Sen made a speech "most warmly welcoming" the
prince and Penn Nouth on their return, and that Sihanouk "expressed
great emotion" over his welcome in an "elaborate return speech."
The radio also reported on the 10th that Khieu Samphan hosted a
banquet for Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the 9th in an "extremely
cordial and joyful atmosphere." Khieu Samphan reportedly praised
huh men "for all their patriotic activities over the past five
years," and Sihanouk "stressed his joy at being able to return"
to Phnom Penh in his reply.
Thus far Phnom Penh has not broadcast these speeches in either
excerpted or full form, and apart from the arrival and bai:quet
reports it has remained silent on Sihanouk's return. The radio
reported briefly on both Teng Hsiao-ping's 6 September farewell
banquet for Sihanouk and on Sihanouk's 8 September banquet in
Peking, in broadcasts of the 9th and 10th respectively.
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K 0 R E A
PYONGYANG CALLS JAPANESE SHIP INCIDENT "UNHAPPY THING"
KCNA on 10 September announced that: Pyongyang on 11 September would
release the Japanese fishing vessel captured by a North Korean
patrol boat on the 2d. The KCNA announcement, while unattributed,
employed language and format redolent of official statements and
also provided Pyongyang's first detailed account of the incident.
In revealing the imminent release of the ship and crew, KCNA said
the DPRK was "taking into account the friendly relations between
the Korean and Japanese peoples" and suggested that "such an
.unhappy thing" between Korea and Japan could be avoided in the
future if Japanese fishing vessels kept out of DPRK territorial
waters. According to KCNA, the North Korean patrol boat did not
realize at first that the intruding vessel was Japanese.
The announcement blamed the Japanese fishing vessel for bringing
misfortune on itself, claiming that it had intruded into DPRK
waters and then attempted to flee from a DPRK patrol boat, which
gave "stop signals and menacing firing several times," before
finally firing at and capturing the vessel, killing two crewmen.
Explaining that "we had not imagined a Japanese ship would intrude
so deep" into DPRK waters, the KCNA announcement claimed that the
DPRK boat thought that since the "unidentified ship," attempted
to flee, it was a "U.S. or South Korean puppet spy ship."
The KCNA statement was the Pyongyang media's first acknowlegement
that there had been shooting or casualties in the incident, details
that were omitted from the only other Pyongyang account of the clash,
a terse 2 September KCNA report. That report had presaged Pyongyang's
intended approach to resolving the incident when it suggested the
,entire affair was a case of mistaken identity, claiming that the
!DPRK boat had sought to check an;"unidentified ship", which "turned
out to be" Japanese.
In a November 1973 incident when the DPRK seized another Japanese
ship, the DPRK Ministry of Public Security had issued a report
which did not suggest any problem of mistaken identity, but which
hinted that the seized ship had been conducting espionage. A
month later, "taking the goodneighborly relations between the
Japanese and Korea peoples into consideration," the DPRK had
released that ship and crew.
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DPRK NATIONAL DAY MARKED BY PRESENCE OF KIM LL, RPR DELEGATE
The DPRK marked the 27th anniversary of the nation's 8 September
founding with the trad:Lt:Lona].L'yougyang meeting, banquet, and NODONG
SINMUN editorial. As usual, King 11-song did not attend the
8 September Pyongyang meeting--a return to normal practice after
his unusual appearance at last year's National Day meeting. The
meeting was addressed by Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. Texts of
the vice presidenL's speech and of the anniversary NODONG S1:NMUN editorial
were not available at this writing. The 9 September banquet
hosted by Kini I1-song was addressed by Premier Kim 11, who had
not appeared in public since early June and is probably in i11
health.
A representative of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (RPR)--
a Marxist-Leninist party allegedly operating in South Korea--attended
both the 8 September meeting and the 9 September banquet. This was
the first time since the party was formed in 1970 that an RPR
representative has been noted attending DPRK National Day functions,
and marked the second time this year that Pyongyang media have
reported an RPR representative attending a major function in the
North. (The first time was the 25 June Korean War anniversary
rally in Pyongyang, which also was the first occasion since the
party's founding that the RPR had been represented at the anniver-
sary.) The last time a representative allegedly from South Korea
was noted at DPRK National Day was in 1968, when Pyongyang radio
had reported that a representative of the "South Korean revolutionary
organization" gave a speech at the main Pyongyang meeting.
The Soviet Union d:Ld not send a delegation to Pyongyang for this
year's anniversary. China was represented by a railway delegation
headed by Minister of Railways Wan Li. Soviet delegations had
been sent for the anniversary in 1.973 and 1974, but not in 1971 or
1972. Chinese delegations have attended the DPRK anniversary since
1971. Last year Kim Il-song snubbed the Soviet delegation by not
meeting with it, though lie did meet with the equivalent-level
Chinese group.
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CHINA
PEKING LEADERS APPEAR AS "WATER MARGIN" CAMPAIGN CONTINUES
Coincident with the start of the current campaign to criticize the
classical Chinese novel "'Water Margin," Chinese leaders have been
unusually active, perhaps to signal that no broad leadership purges
are underway.
Thirteen Politburo members and alternates bid farewell to Cambodian
Prince Sihanouk on 6 September. Of the top Peking-based leaders,
Minister of National Defense Yeh Chien-ying has failed to appear
recently, though he was listed in a 29 August NCNA account as
having sent a wreath to the funeral of a Chinese official. Yeh
has a history of health problems, and prior to his last appearance--
at which he presented the toast at the Peking Army Day reception
on 31 July--he had been out of public view for nearly four weeks.
While Yeh seems an unlikely -;andidate for purging, recent criticism
of "Water Margin" hero Sung Chiang indicates that if a specific
target is intended, it is probably a military figure. Vice Chairman
Wang Hung-wen, also a vice chairman of the party military commission,
has not appeared since Army Day, but at that time he was in Shanghai
and may well still be in the provinces. Two alternate Politburo
members have inexplicably dropped from public view in recent months.
Neither Peking trade union leader Ni Chih-fu nor Sinkiang chief
Saifudin have appeared publicly in the past three months. Saifudin
had previously shown up frequently in his province.
Since the 4 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on "Water Margin,"
there have been no new major central commentaries on the campaign,
but the provinces have begun to comment on the novel and other
articles from RED FLAG and other journals have become available.*
An article by the mass criticism groups at Peking and Tsinghua
Universities in the September RED FLAG detailed the differences
between two main "Water Margin" characters: Chao Kai, founder of
the peasant revolt and obvious Mao symbol, and Sung Chiang, a
"capitulationist" apparently symbolizing a Lin Piao-Liu Shao-chi
figure who, though a successful military strategist, works to
erode the peasant revolution from within. In a obvious slap at
current goviet leaders who continue to verbally honor Lenin, and
reflecting Mao's own concern about succession, the article revealed
that Sung Chiang "covered Chao Kai's coffin with beautiful flowers"
* The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and other previously available
articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 September, pages 26-29.
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?- 22
--
,..ad then proceeded to "comp.l.ctely revise the line which used to
be upheld by Chao Kai." Sung Clriun?
us,lc ?cij Howes' by accepting
clemency from the emperor and abort Inf' the peasant revolt which
he had led. Character.i.r.ing "Water Marg:irr" as a Leaching material
by "negative example," the al-tic-le warned that "this man Sung
Chiang should not be trusted" because. he undermined the revolutionary
cause "from the tns:ide."
An article by a Peking iron and steel worker that appeared in
KWANGMINC DAILY on 30 August criticized Sung Chiang in "Water Margin"
for having made fun of Iluang Chao, an earlier peasant leader of
an unsuccessful revolt. The article noted tha. Huang was a true
revolutionary who styled himself a "heaven-storming marshal" and
was not afraid of the imperial anger and punishment, unlike Sung
Chiang, who curried imperial favor. Huang Chao was one of
several Chinese peasant heroes singled out for praise in a series
of pamphlets issued by Peking last summer for the anti-Lin and
Confucius campaign, and an article in the August 1975 CHIIIA
PICTORIAL also praised HuL:ng. The latter article noted that he
"was fond of books," a reference that makes it highly unlikely
that Huang's image of a marshal storming heaven is meant to
symbolize Lin Piao's struggle against Mao. One constant criticism
of Lin during the anti-Lin campaign was that he never read books.
The imperial figure in this campaign seems to represent reaction
and revisionism, while. Mao is represented by true peasant leaders
such as Chao Kai.
Provincial radios generally waited until after release of the
4 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, which contained new Mao
instructions on the camp,i,11, before originating comment attacking
the novel. Subsequent provincial comment has focused on Sung Chiang's
altering of Chao Kai's "peasant r.'olutionary line," with several
broadcasts stressing the long-teen need to guard against "capitulation-
ists" like Liu Shao-chi and. 7Lb11 Piao, who were "just like Sung
Chiang." The long-range ideological objectives of the developing
campaign were underscored in a 5 September Nanchang broadcast
which urged widespread criticism of the novel in order to help
the masses to "recognJ:.e- capit,.rlationists" and to "adhere to Chair-
man Mao's revolutionary I:Jne both at present and in the future,
in this century and the next." A specific concern for insuring
continuation of Peking's current line on the Soviet Union through
any future post-Mao period has also been indicated in the provincial
attacks on "Water Margin." Charging that "the main theme of the
book is to peddle cap.LuJaLionism," a Nanchang broadcast on
7 September speci.j'.l:aJ.:ly denounced Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi for
seeking "a protective nuclear umbrella from Soviet revisionism
and capitulating to Soviet-imperialism."
Clu.nl.d by OOOO71
1lulonul1e.11y necl.alllea
fl. month. Iron J.lc oI I\.Y.
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10 SEPTEMBER 1975
NOTES
CUBA ON U.S., PUERTO RICO: Speaking at a 5-8 September "inter-
national conference of solidarity with the independence of Puerto
Rico" in Havana, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos rejected the
idea that Cuba's "unyielding duty of solidarity" with Puerto Rico
might legitimately be considered "a significant impediment to
U.S.-Cuban relations." Dorticos stated that the Cuban Government
"starts from the premise that Puerto Rico is a Latin American
nation subjugated by colonial domination and is not a domestic
problem of the United States," and he added that the "integrity
of our revolutionary firmness unites us forever to the cause of
Puerto Rico." Dorticos echoed 28 August remarks in Lima by
Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa to the effect that Puerto Rico's
freedom was "swindled by the United States" and that "the cause
of the independence of Puerto Rico is also our cause." Puerto
Rican independence has long been a standard Havana theme, used
both as a demonstration of Cuban solidarity with fellow Latins
and as an example of U.S. "aggression." Thus, Roa's and Dorticos'
statements are consistent with the regime's apparent determination
to continue verbal support for "anti-imperialist" movements while
cautiously encouraging improved relations with the United States.
Havana has not as yet taken note of Secretary Kissinger's
criticism ".n his 9 September news conference of Cuban sponsorship
of the Puerto Rican conference as "an unfriendly act and a
severe setback" to U.S.-Cuban relations. Havana media have given
customary treatment of the conference itself, reporting the many
charges of U.7. "enslaving and inhumane" exploitation and condemna-
tion o` the "farcical" referendum that established Puerto Rico's
"associated free state" relationship with the United States.
The media have not reported any statements during the conference
by Prime Minister Fidel Castro, who presided over the closing
session at which Dorticos spoke. Although the conference was held
under the nominal sponsorship of the Soviet-backed World Peace
Council, Moscow generally does not emphasize the Puerto Ric.-In
issue and gave only minimal attention to the conference.
ABORTIVE COUP IN ECUADOR: Moscow's as.;essment of the attempted
overthrow of Ecuador's military government headed by General
Rodriguez Lara on 1 September, has drawn a sharp distinction
between that abortive "coup d'etat hatched by imperialist forces
and home reaction" in Ecuador and the 29 August ouster of
President Velasco in neighboring Peru. Thus, commentator Viktor
Shragin asserted on Moscow radio's 5 September International.
Situation program that the two coups were "different in character,"
because while "Peru has changed its president but not its policy,"
1 CI.u111.0 br 000073
~ulom.11c.1ty d.cbul0.d
IN montho from dNe of hue.
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-244-
the Ecuadorean effort sought to reverse the nationalist trend in
that country. Shragin noted that General Gonzalez, leader of the
attempt in Ecuador, had stated that he was supported by "all the
bourgeois political parties." And Shragin implied foreign support
as well by noting that some time ago "Texaco and Gulf began a
secret war" against the Rodriguez government, which had limited
the activities of "foreign monopolies" since coming to power in 1972.
Characteristically less subtle in placing the blame, a 3 September
commentary on Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress said that "it can't be any clearer" that the oil company
directors were "preparing developments in the same way as the ITT
Company prepared for the fascist coup in Chile." Although Havana
has not commented on the coup, it has reported the events, with
sources loyal to the Quito regime being cited to indicate Cuba's
support. A 2 September Havana international service dispatch,
for example, noted that Ecuador's principal labor organization
had "labeled the squashed military rebellion 'fascist"' and that
the Communist Party of Ecuador had "expressed support for
Rodriguez Lara's government."
CInUM? by
oouo7a
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FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1975
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1975
Moscow (2495 items)
Pekin
923 i
g (
tems)
UNGA 7th Special Session
'
(2%)
5%
DRV National Day
(1%)
15%
Finland
s President
(--)
5%
UNGA 7th Special
(--)
13%
Kekkonen in USSR
China
(6%)
5%
Session
[Cambodia's Ieng
(--)
3%]
Portugal
(8%)
4%
Sary, Sarin Chhak
V-J Day 30th Anniversary
(--)
4%
at UN
DRV National Day
(5%)
4%
[PRC Foreign Trade v'-) 3%]
Egyptian-Israeli
Di
(--)
3%
MiniLter Li Chiang
sengagement Agreement
Nonalined Foreign
(2%)
1%
Speech
Nonalined Foreign Mints-
(9%)
4%
Ministers Conference,
Lima
ters Conference, Lima
V-J Day 30th Anniver-
(--)
3%
sary
Bangladesh
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, sp?ecti, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or pasty statement, or diplomatic note, Items of extensive reportage are
counted as cormentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in term: of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some :nay have been covered in prior issues:
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
ow-
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