TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trendy in Communist Media
17 SEPTEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 37)
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This report is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject ti Criminal Sanctions
Class" Lad by 000U73
Automatically declassified
Lsix months from date of Issue.
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CONTENTS
SALT
RED STAR Article Attacks U.S. Cruise Missile Development. . . 1
NUCLEAR TEST BAN
Moscow Proposes New Comprehensive Test Prohibition at 11N. . . . 3
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Stapes at 71nai Accord, U.S. Policy, Egyptian Attitude . 5
CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS
PRC Scores Canceling of U.S. Mayors' Trip, Notes Other Visits . 10
Peking Comment on UN Session Milder on U.S., Harsher on USSR. . 11
PORTUGAL
Moscow Displays Uncertainty in Treating Political Situation 13
VIETNAM
PRG Statement Sets Off Campaign for Southern Economic Reforms 16
CAMBODIA
Sihanouk Feted in Phnom Penh, Holds RGNU Cabinet Meeting. . 18
KOREA
DPRK National Day Comment Stresses Kim Il-song Leadership . 20
CHINA
Top PRC Leaders Attend Agricultural Conference in Shansi. . 23
NOTES
Second Anniverpary of Chilean Coup; Peking on Angola. . . . . . 25
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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SALT
RED STAR ARTICLE ATTACKS U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMrNT
A Soviet military commentator writing in RED STAR ha.-, sharply criticized
U.S. plans to develop long-range submarine-launched r.ruise missiles,
asserting that their deployment wouiu enable the Un:4':.ed States to
circumvent the restraints of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet, irl.rerim agreement
limiting strategic offensive arms. At the same tirel.!, recent Soviet
comment on the SALT negotiations has continued to e.nvey a sense of
progress and restra:;.ned optimism that a new SALT agreement will
result from Brezhnev'3 forthcoming U.S. visit.
CRITICISM OF U.S. Reserve Captain N. Shaskolsliy, writing in the
CRUISE MISSILES 10 September TED STAR, charged directly only
that the Pentagon's "plans" for the cruise
missile indicated its desire to fuel the arms race and frustrate detente--
charges that are routine in Soviet discussions of U.S. drill:.ary programs.
But through his selection of "foreign press material" to describe the
U.S. cruise miss-'1e program, Shaskolskiy in effect argued that full
realization of the program would allow the United States to sidestep the
1972 interim agreement--which covered onlT ballistic missiles--by
allowing the deployment of strategic (cruse) 'missiles on up to 50
submarines in addition to the 44 submarines with ballistic missiles
allowed by the agreement. (A cruise missile is, in effect, an unmanned
aircraft which unlike a ballistic missile remains within the atmosphere
throughout its flight.)
Shaskolskiy clearly implied that the rekindled U.S. interest in cruise
missiles was a direct result of the limitations on ballistic missiles
set by the earlier SALT agreement. He stopped short of directly asserting
that the cruise missile program was incompatible with the 1972 agreements,
as USA Institute observer Gecrgiy Svyatov had charged in relation to the
Trident submarine program in RED STAR articles in 1972 and 1973.
Shaskolskiy's article represents the first known Soviet comment on U.S.
cruise missile development since such missiles became a SALT issue in
the wake of the November 1974 Vladivostok u.iderstanding between President
Ford and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. However, ZA RUBEZHOM, a
Moscow-based weekly survey of the foreign press, last March reprinted
a Herbert Scoville article in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR that made
similar charges. The Scoville reprint had concluded that "the development
of cruise missiles for submarines should be stopped immediately. The
United States cannot allow itself to create all. the technically feasible
types of weapons not banned under the SALT agreements."
Quoting Western sources, Shaskolskiy noted that the submarine-launched
cruise missile was designed to be compatible with conventional torpedo
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tubes and to fly at low altitudes where defense radar is less
effective. He noted further that the new missile is scheduled to
enter service in 1979, test resul t-s so far having been termed
"excellent." His article was published as part of regular series
that discusses Western weapons developrents, nominally on the basis
of foreign press sources. Contributions to this series normally
eschew politically sensitive issues. But the Shaskols?'.iy article
seems to carry implications for the current round of SALT in Geneva
where the status of cruise missiles in a final agreement must be
decided.
Shaskolskiy's arguments suggest his support for a total ban on cruise
missiles. That po::ition was implied, for example, in his stress on
the difficulties of verifying limits on such missiles if they were
incorporated in a new agreement, due to their similarity to tactical
missiles, their compatibility with conventional torpedo tubes, and a
restricted capab.lity to monitor cruise missile testing programs due
to their low altitude. MosLu normally shuns public discussion of
technical issues such as verification and, in particular, discussion
of the possibility that limits under considcration might be difficult
to verify by national technical meai.s.
ASSESSMENT OF While as usual there has been very little direct
SALT PROGRESS comment on the SALT negotiations from Moscow, Soviet
media have made use of the Ford-Brezhnev meetings
at Helsinki and the August visit to Moscow by a U.S. Congressional
dk.legation to suggest that only technical difficulties remain and to
reject the notion of "'some Western observers" that an impasse has been
reached.
In a Moscow radio roundtable discussion on 12 August, TASS General
Director Leonid Zamyatin quoted Brezhnev as having told the U.S.
congressmen that "probably two or three meetings, including one at
the foreign ministers level," would be required co resolve these
technical problems. Despite such official optimism, o:me concern about
Washington's thinking on strategic issues seeaaad evident in remarks by
CPSU Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev at an early July
Kremlin conference on the 40th anniversary of the 7th Comintern
Congress. The text of Ponomarev's speech, just published in KOMMUNIST
No. 11, 1975, reveals his complaint that some officials in the West
"have again started saying that the United States should possess
superior military potential."
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17 SEPTEMBER 1975
- 3 -
NUCLEAR TEST BAN
MOSCOW PROPOSES NEW COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROHIBITION AT UN
The new Soviet draft proposal for a comprehensive ban on nuclear
weapons tests, offered as the. USSR's yearly arms control initiative
for the UN General Assembly session that opened 16 September,
rr:iterates Moscow's known position on a total test ban and incor-
porates two relatively recent shifts in the Soviet position. The
text of the draft treaty submitted to the United Nations was
published in PRAVDA on 12 September.
The two adjustments in the Soviet position evident in the published
draft treaty are these:
+ The treaty would enter into force only after ratification by
all nuclear powers, a position that Moscow first assumed in early
1974.
-1- Provision:. for exchange of seismic data as a supplement to
national technical means of verification of the ban are incorporated
into the text of the document as binding obligations. In past
years, Moscow had said it would agree to such an exchange on a
voluntary basis subsequent to agreement on a total test ban. The
evolution in recent years from voluntary exchanges to binding
obligations was confirmed last July in the U.S.-Soviet threshold
test ban signed in Moscow, which stipulated the exchange of such
data.
There is no provisie,n for on-site inspection in the current draft.
Moscow has long argued that such inspection was unnecessary in light
of advances in the capability of national technical means, and it
has contended that U.S. insistence on on-site inspection disguised
a lack of serious U.S. interest in a total test ban. The draft
Soviet treaty specifically exempts peaceful explosions from its
provisions banning nuclear tests. Such explosions wot.ld be allowed
subject, for non-nuclear weapon states, to guidelines established
in the 1968 Treaty on Non-proliferation, and for states possessing
nuclear weapons, to procedures yet to be agreed. In the latter
case, "due consideration" would be given to recommendations of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The USSR has regularly voiced its support for a total ban on nuclear
weapons tests since the 1950's. Reacting to criticism of the
limited nature of the 1974 U.S.-Sovie` threshold ban, Brezhnev and
other officials had publicly reiterated that the Soviet Union was
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willing at any time to agree to a full ban. In recent years the
Chinese have increasingly replaced the United States as the main
target of Soviet criticism for the failure of efforts to reach
agreement on a comprehensive test ban.
Early Soviet comment on the new initiative has shed little further
light on it. Underscoring its public relations aspect, one
commentator on the 14 September Moscow domestic radio roundtable
on foreign affairs said the new initiative "testifies to the fact
that the Soviet Unior. is implementing the all-European conference's
decisions not in words but in deeds."
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B .S TRENDS
1.7 SEPTEMBER 1975
f1IDDLE E A S T
MOSCOW SNIPES AT SINAI ACCORD, U.S. POLICY, EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE
Soviet media have continued to give only scant but critical attention
to the recent Sinai disengagement agreement. Scattered routine-level
comment has again conveyed Moscow's displeasure with aspects of
the accord and the U.S. diplomatic role in negotiating it. Through
selective citation of foreign reaction, Moscow has implicitly
criticized Cairo for cooperating with Washington and for entering
into the new pact with Israel. Such criticism as has appeared in
the Soviet press has come not in the major central papers but,
initially, in the weekly NEW TIMES and subsequently in MOSKOVSKAYA
PRAVDA and RURAL LIFE. A wide-ranging critique of the accord in
the 7 September MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in effect recapitulated earlier
comment, highlighting as a "complicating element" the provision
for a U.S. presence at the Sinai early-warning stations.* A RURAL
LIFE article on the 13th warned that U.S. attempts to obtain unilateral
advantages "directly or indirectly" in the Middle East would be
incompatible with detente.
Moscow has reacted cautiously to Western press reports concerning
the existence of secret understandings among the United States,
Israel and Egypt supplementing the public agreements. Careful
to use non-Soviet sources, Moscow has publicized reported secret
Egyptian commitments, citing agreements to ease its stand in the
Arab economic boycott against firms dealing with Israel and to reduce
its anti-Israeli propaganda by stopping broadcasts to Israel and
shutting down Palestinian broadcasts from Cairo. Despite Moscow's
circumspection in criticizing Cairo and its avoidance of direct
attacks on President as-Sadat, there have been ample signs in Cairo
media that Soviet-Egyptian relations have become increasingly strained,
particularly following Moscow's refusal to attend the 4 September
signing of the Sinai accord in Geneva. And as-Sadat has been markedly
explicit recently in citing Egyptian grievances concerning Soviet
policy.
U.S. ROLE For the second time since the initialing of the Sinai
accord, TASS Deputy Director General Sergey Losev has
in effect questioned the U.S. commitment to detente in the light of
U.S. actions in the Middle East. His first such comment came in a
2 September broadcast to North American audiences, and he again
broached this idea in a 13 September RURAL LIFE article devoted largely
For Moscow's initial reaction to the Sinai disengagement agreement,
initialed by Egypt and Israel on 1 September and signed in Geneva on
4 September, see the TRENDS of 4 September, pages 1-5.
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to proclaiming the benefits of improved U.S.-Soviet relations
and warning against persons and actions opposed to detente. The
fact that Losev's comments appeared in a specialized central press
newspaper not noted for important foreign affairs articles seems
to indicate Soviet hesitancy to express such views in a more
authoritative vehicle.
The concluding section of Losev's article began by criticizing in
standard terms an alleged U.S. military buildup of its allies,
asserting that such a policy was fraught with "highly dangerous
consequences," especially in the Middle East, "which is currently
being 'injected' with massive doses of the latest American arms."
Losev then went ont to warn that
Attempts to gain unilateral advantages directly or
indirectly, including such attempts in the Near East
area, would be incompatible with the strengthening of
relations between the United States and the USSR; and
it is not superfluous to recall this principle in this
specific situation.
An article by IZVESTIYA political commentator Mikhaylov in MOSKOVSKAYA
PRAVDA on the 7th represented one of Moscow's most extensive critiques
of the accord thus far, but the article largely recapitulated previous
comment, and its appearance in the Moscow city party and soviet organ,
rather than the central press, again suggests restraint. Mikhaylov's
most notable objection to the accord was his presentation of the
talks as "obviously of a separate nature," despite the fact that the
signing of the agreement took place in Geneva "to make it look as
if the talks had taken place within the framework" of the Geneva
conference. Mikhaylov also complained that the agreement simply
"freezes" the Mideast situation, and he objected to the idea of a
U.S. presence in Sinai "replacing" the monitoring by UN mil..Ltary
observers under UN Security Council decision.
Moscow has continued to promote an impression of U.S. domestic unease
over the new Sinai accord. TASS reviewed a PRAVDA international review
article by S. Vishnevskiy on the 14th, for example, which claimed that
U.S. public and congressional opinion has become concerned over recent
Mideast events, including Israel's prospective military buildup
following the recent U.S. decision to lift its suspension of new
weapons supplies and "plans for placing American experts in the
Sinai, etc." According to TASS, the article contrasted these develop-
ments with the approach it said was favored by "many sober-minded
Americans," one of "realism ant circumspection" toward "difficult
international problems" which takes into account "the mutual interests
of all the sides concerned."
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A short TASS account of President Ford's 16 September press con-
ference noted that it was devoted "chiefly" to U.S.-Israeli
relations and the Mideast situation. The dispatch reported the
President as saying, with regard to press reports of U.S. promises
of F-16 fighter bombers and Pershing missiles to Israel, that the
United States "did not give any firm promise" in this regard,
but that these types of arms were included in the shopping list
and would be discussed with Israeli. representatives. As to
whether the United States was moving toward concluding a security
treaty with Israel, TASS reported President Ford as saying he
would not use this term, and would simply reiterate that the United
States had always supplied Israel with considerable quantities of
military equipment and intended to do so in the future.
CRITICISM To convey thinly veiled criticism of Cairo for signing
OF CAIRO the Sinai accord, Moscow has sought to press the point
that Egypt has entered into "secret understandings"
with Israel and the United States, attributing such reports to non-
Soviet sources.
1- Moscow's treatment of Egypt's 11 September suspension of broadcast
privileges for the Voice of Palestine in Cairo is illustrative. By
citing Palestinian and Western sources, and ignoring Egyptian justi-
fications, Moscow implied its support for the Palestinian-Syrian
argument that Egypt had betrayed the Palestinians in agreeing
secretly to end propaganda against. Israel. Soviet reportage on this
issue has blurred the distinction between, on the one hand, Cairo's
suspension of Voice of Palestine broadcasts because of what Cairo
considered. unacceptable Palestinian criticisms related to the Sinai
accord and, on the other, Cairo's reported agreement to reduce its
own propaganda broadcasts against Israel as a nonpublic supplement
to that accord.
4- Moscow has also transparently, if indirectly, swiped at Cairo in
comment emphasizing the value of the Arab economic boycott of foreign
companies dealing with Israel. An Arabic-language commentary on
29 August by A. Zlatorunskiy criticized the anticipated Sinai accord
for "certain political aspects," referring to New York TIMES and
REUTER accounts of reported Egyptian agreement to ease the economic
boycott of U.S. and possibly European firms. A commentary in Arabic
on 8 September, pegged to a recent meeting of the Arab boycott
organization, stressed that the boycott was "among the important
steps" hindering Western-Israeli cooperation and had caused Israel
difficulties in obtaining certain raw materials from regular Western
suppliers. The broadcast approvingly presented, as the opinion of
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the boycott organization, the view that "it is necessary for
the Arabs to continue to use the boycott weapon in the struggle
against the a;g:essors."*
1- A third theme of Soviet comment, U.S. military aid to Israel,
also at times seems implicitly critical of. Egypt for having been
duped as to Israel's ultimate intentions. A Moscow domestic service
commentary by V. Aleksandrov on the lOch charged that Israel, "under
the guise of peace talks," was concurrently seeking additional U.S.
aid to enable it to "dictate conditions to the Arabs" and "blatantly
challenge UN decisions." TASS on the 8th took note of Drew Middleton's
6 September New York TIMES article on Israel's arms procurement
list, emphasizing the large quantities and sophisticated nature of
the planned purchases. Tying the military aid to the Sinai accord,
TASS asserted without amplification that the changes he accord would
bring in the Arab-Israeli` military situation encouraged Israel to
build up its military forces.
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN Moscow has continued to take no direct notice of
RELATIONS President as-Sadat's continuing public complaints
against the Soviet Union, but has responded in low
key to paraphrases of his remarks in the Cairo press. A Moscow radio
commentary in Arabic by A. Timoshkin on the 15th, for example, feigned
surprise that "articles in some Cairo papers" would "mislead their
readers regarding Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East." As one
example, Timoshkin ostensibly took issue with AL-AKHBAR for alleging
that the USSR benefited from Arab disunity--a charge made on 4 September
by as-Sadat in a speech to a joint session of the People's Assembly
and ASU Central Committee.**
Soviet annoyance over charges that the USSR has tried to obstruct
a Mideast peace settlement was registered recently at the low level
of Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress, which in an Arabic
Egypt has exhibited sensitivity to charges that Cairo is no
longer seriously committed to the Arab boycott. Egyptian Foreign
Minister Fahmi, in a statement published on the 12th by Cairo's
AL-AHRAM, emphasized that Egypt remained committed to the principle
of the boycott and denied that any Egyptian document pledged Egypt
to lift the boycott from any organization or company.
** Moscow in the past has transparently responded to as-Sadat's
criticisms through the device of answering press replays of his
statements; see, for example, the TRENDS of 23 July 1975, pages 3-6.
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broadcast on the 13th defended Soviet Mideast policy and denounced
"imperialist propaganda" that the USSR wished "to increase tension
in the area in order to strengthen its influence." The broadcast
took indirect note of Egyptian media, adding that "naturally Arab
reaction does not fail to join in this campaign," which the broad-
cast said intensified after the recent Sinai accord.
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- 1O -
CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS
PRC SCORES CANCELING nc U.S. MAYORS' TRIP, NOTES OTHER VISITS
Peking bzs responded belatedly and at. a low level to the U.S. announce-
ment on 8 September canceling the scheduled visit to China by a U.S.
mayors delegat-+,on because the Chinese had refused to admit one
delegation member, the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico. China's
response was conveyed by a 1.6 September NCNA report giving the text
of "observations" by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs,
the host organization for the mayors' visit. These "observations"
discreetly avoided mentioning U.S. officials and reaffirmed China's
continued desire to promote Sino-U.S. exchanges under terms of the
February 1972 Shanghai communique. Peking's intent to continue
such exchanges also was reflected in recent Chinese coverage of the
first PRC trade delegation to travel to the United States and of the
closing of the Chinese archeological exhibit's 8-month U.S. tour.
Peking's reaction to the mayors' visit cancellation--coming over a
week after the National Committee for U.S.-China relations, the
sponsoring group on the U.S. side, had issued its press release--recalls
Peking's low-key response on 2 April this year, after the State Department
had announced cancellation six days earlier of a Chinese entertainment
troupe's scheduled U.S. tour because the Chinese insisted on including
a song regarding the "liberation" of Taiwan in the troupe's repertoire.*
At that time Peking's reaction came in an NCNA report of an "interview"
with the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries and the spokesman of the foreign ministry's information
department. The language in the current response duplicates that of
the 2 April complaint, accusing the U.S. side of "unreasonably" demanding
Chinese concessions, of putting forth "groundless" charges, and of going
against the "spirit" of the Shanghai communique, and it similarly
concludes with stress on Peking's desire to continue Sino-U.S. exchanges.
The "observations" on the mayoral visit cancellation claimed that
because of the "special situation in Puerto Rico," it would be
"inappropriate" and "inconvenient" to welcome the San Juan mayor,
adding that Peking had sought to substitute him with someone else.**
* Peking's reaction ^t that time is discussed in the TRENDS of
2 April 1975, pages 17-18.
** Though maintaining a low posture on the issue, Peking publicly
characterizes Puerto Rico as under U.S. "colonial rule" and favorably
notes the Putrto Rican people's "struggle" for independence--a position
most recently set forth in a 28 July 1975 NCNA review of the economic
situation on the island.
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it claimed that the U.S. "unreasonably clung to iLr; own idea,"
announced the cancellation "one-si.ded:Iy," and made groundless charges
about which the Chinese "cannot but express our regret." it went on
to rebut as a "pretext for sel.C-)usta.f i.ctlLion" the 11.5. posi.tio.r
that Chinese refusal. of the San Juan mayor had introduced a political
element into such non-government exchange;; out of keeping with the
spirit of the Shanghai communique. The Chinese pointedly kept open
the invitation to the mayors;, however, exiressing conviction that if
the U.S. side acted appropriately, the visit "will ultimately take
place and other exchanges between China and the United States will
proceed smoothly."
OTHER CONTACTS, Peking has continued to give favorable coverage
VISITS IN U.S. to the current visit by a PRC trade delegation
to the United States, with NCNA on the 10th
reporting tine group's visit with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger
on 8 September. NCNA noted that President Ford "welcomed" the
delegation and asked them to convey his regards Lo Chairman Mao and
Chou En-lai. This coverage was less effusive than NCNA treatment of
meetings by former President Nixon with visiting Chinese gymnasts in
July 1974 and with PRC journalists in May 1973, when NCNA had quoted
selected excerpts from the former President's formal statements on
those occasions. But President Ford did not make a formal statement
upon receiving the Chinese delegates, as Nixon had done.
Peking at the same time has sustained its extraordinary coverage of
the recently completed U.S. tour by the PRC archeological exhibit.
NCNA on 29 August reported a 27 August reception in San Francisco at
which PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Ilua recalled the Nixon trip to
China and the Shanghai conununique and lauded the "step-by- tep" develop-
ment of Sino-U.S. exchanges. The report also cited U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Richardson's reference to Secretary Kissinger's
view that "normalization of relations" with the PRC was a "permanent
and essential element" in U.S. foreign policy. NCNA on 1 September
similarly played up the exhibit's success as symptomatic of the
"irresistible historical trend" in Sino-American friendship, and the
agency on the 12th disclosed that on 10 September PRC museun?.officials
had received U.S. officials aeclDmpanying the relics exhibit back to
China.
PEKING COMMENT ON UN SESSION MILLER ON U.S., HARSHER ON USSR
Peking media treatment of the major U.S. and Soviet atements at the
7th UN General Assembly special session in New York has showered less
invective on the United States and more on the Soviet Union tl.an did
comparable Chinese coverage of the April 1974 6th UNGA special session.
The Peking media's increasingly differentiated treatment of the two
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superpowers conforms with the keynote Chinese address at this year's
session, which waF; softer on the United States and more explicit in
depicting the USSR as the main l.nternntl.onal economic exploiter than
was the major Chinese ;ddress at the April 1974 meeting.*
Peking's only commen'- thus far on Secretary Kissinger's message to
this year.', special session was contained in two paragraphs of a
2 September NCNA review of speeches the previous clay. The review noted
critically that Kissinger had stressed the "worn-out tune of
'interdependence" and was "attacking" oil-producing countries.
Last April NCNA devoted four paragraphs to criticizing the Secretary's
speech, stating that he not only "attacked" the oil producers but
"threatened" the Third World and "groundlessly attributed" inflation
to the increased price of international oil. NCNA this year also
markedly reduces: from last year its coverage of UN delegates' and other
foreign statements rebutting Kissinger's message.
In contrast, Peking's criticism of the USSR was both: more extensive and
more authoritati,re than !ts treatment of Gromyko's speech at last year's
session. Accompanying the usual NCNA comment, a signed 13 September
PEOPLE'S DAILY article harshly refuted the Soviet address this year by
UN Ambassador Malik. The ar.yacle gave a lengthy diatribe against Soviet
economic policies, referring to the Soviets as "bloodsuckers, speculators,
unfeeling creditors and merchants of death," and adding emphatically
that "the old-line impccrtalists would be inferior in comparison with
the Kremlin, as the latter has not only applied their traditional methods
of exploiting the developing countries but perfected them." Debunking
Malik's claim of a "coincidence of views" between th;a USSR and the
developing Third World states on economic issues, PEOPLE'S DAILY
complained that the USSR, in its "plunder and fraud," has used such
propaganda "as a pernicious supplement to rifle shots and leather whips."
* The 2 September 1975 UN address by PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li
Chiang is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 24-25.
PRC coverage of the April 1974 UNGA special session is discussed in
the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.
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.1.7 SEPTEMBER 1.975
PORTUGAL
MOSCOW DISPLAYS UNCERTAINTY IN TREATING POLITICAL SITUATION
Moscow has seemed indecisive as to what tack to take vis-a-vis the
various forces involved in efforts, to form a new government in
Portugal, and has shown a tendency to fall back on Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP) StaL:.,aents. Thus Soviet media have reported
PCP assertions of the need for "compromise" among forces attempting
to form the sixth provisional government to be headed by premier-
designate Pinheiro de Azevedo. Moscow has also given warmer treatment
to the PCP's erstwhile chief enemy--the Socialist Party (PS)--since
PS leader Mario Soares' statement to the effect that the possibility
of a coup from the right was an immediate threat. The PS' principal
ally, the center-left Popular Democratic Party (PPD), has, however,
been criticized by Moscow and the PCP for. "anticommunist" statements
and an uncooperative attitude. While the PPD has been labeled a
"rightwing social democratic party" which is "outside the revolutionary
process," PCP leader Alvaro r,inhal nevertheless has been quoted by
Moscow as saying that PCP members may participate in a government with
members of the PPD. Moscow reported without comment Azevedo's remark
that communists, socialists, and popular democrats had "reached
agreement" on a "co-w,n political program for the future government."
Moscow has also continued to criticize Western interference in
Portuguese affairs, currently giving emphasis to ITT and other "foreign
monopolies" whose CIA connections and "economic blackmail" have been
called reminiscent of the pressure exerted against Chile before the
1973 coup.
DOMESTIC SITUATION Moscow has continued to stress Alvaro Cunhal's
call for a dialog of progressive forces, with
Albert Grigoryants noting, on Moscow radio's 14 September observers'
roundtable program, that "broad discussions among all forces interested
in the revolutionary process" would be helpful. And Soviet media have
emphasized the PCP's willingness to compromise so that a new government
can be formed. Thus, in an 11 September PRAVDA article, correspondents
Yermakov and Kotov reported Cunhal's statement that "the way out of the
impasse can be fcund only on the basis of a compromise" because "no
single political formation, including the MFA," could solve the
problem alone. In keeping with this seemingly conciliatory approach,
Moscow has toned dowc! its blasts at the Portuguese Sccialists,
especially since Soares' remark--in a L'EUROPEO interview replayed by
Lisbon domestic service on the 13th--to the effect that a coup led by
fascists, rather than communists, now seemed the "most likely threat"
to Portugal.
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1.7 SEPTEMBER 1975
However, Moscow has stepped up its criticism of the socialist-allied
PPD, roundtable observer Cr.igoryants noting that the formation of
the new government "was delayed bccau^e of the position taken by the
leaders of the Popular Democratic Party." Connecting the PPD with
plans being made by "reactionary circles," Grigoryants asserted that
"counterrevolution is abandoning all camouflage" in its efforts to
reverse the revolutionary process. TASS on the 12th noted Cunhal's
statement that, while "the Socialist Party began to recognize the
presence of a real threat of fascism," the PPD failed to see the
danger and, "on the contrary, went to a direct collusion with the
fascists."
Although PRAVDA on the 11th reported the PCP as saying that the PPD
was "outside the revolutionary process" and therefore unfit to
participate in the government, other Moscow comment has shown an
ambivalent attitude possibly because of an awareness that the PPD
almost certainly will participate in the sixth government when formed.
Thus TASS on the 12th reported Cunhal's refusal to enter into a
"government, based on the principle of a classic party coalition,"
but went on to quote him as saying that PCP members could participate,
as individuals, in a government composed of members of other parties
"or even members of the People's Democratic Party." Having given
cautious approval to premier-designate Azevedo, Moscow reported
Azevedo's 13 September television address in which he stated that an
agreement had been reached between the communists, socialists and
popular democrats on a common political program.
Soviet commentators, seemingly unsure of the line to take, have
offered contradictory explanations for the removal of Azevedo's
predecessor; Vasco Goncalves.* KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA claimed on
9 September that "Goncalves' decision to refuse the post offered to
him was by no means the result of pressure from the right" but was
"an active step in the direction of further uniting the revolutionary
wing." A 13 September IZVESTIYA article, however, admitted that
Goncalves "made his exit under pressure from rightists" and that
his departure was seen by the Portuguese press as "a temporary
concession on the part of the leftwing forces."
FOREIGN MONOPOLIES ITT's announcement of a suspension of financial
support for its Portuguese subsidiaries sparked
a series of comments on Western economic pressure, typified by Rudolf
Puchkov's 13 September PRAVDA article accusing "foreign monopolies"
of conducting a "deliberate policy of economic blackmail." Puchkov
* Moscow's initial reaction to the downfall of Goncalves is discussed
in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, pages 4-5.
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observed that "foreign. commentators" had pointed out that "monopoly
capital employed similar tactics against the progressive regime in
Chile," a connection underscored in a 12 September Moscow radio
English-language commentary. The broadcast noted that "ITT
subsidized Pinochet and his supporters who prepared the fascist coup
in Chile," and that, not surprisingly, "ex-CIA agents have been
flocking to ITT L-o meet growing demands for personnel."
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VIETNAM
PRG STATEMENT SETS OFF CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTHERN ECONOMIC REFORMS
Vietnamese communist leaders have launched what appears to be a major
campaign to revamp South Vietnam's economy by eliminating big
entrepreneurs who flourished under the former government and replacir,
them with structures suitable for the "advance toward socialism"
announced by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in his 1. September DRV National
Day speech. The basic blueprint for the present mass campaign is a
highly authoritative 10 September Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)
statement, the first such government statement issued since the end
of the war.* The statement lays down a 14-point program indicating the
regime's intention to deal harshly with the ills besetting the South's
postwar economy, and in a manner apparently designed to bring it into
conformity with its socialist model in the North.
The PRIG statement, titled "on some policies on the restoration and
development of industry and trade and the elimination of comprador
bourgeois monopolists," and attendant publicity make it plain that a
vigorous government crackdown is now underway to punish severely South
Vietnamese businessmen who have been accused of "disrupting the market"
and "undermining the revolution" through such alleged practices as
speculation, smuggling, and hoarding, as well as allegedly maintaining
contacts with "foreign spies and CIA agents."
In an apparent effort by the regime to enlist popular support for its
policy of making scapegoats of the "comprador bourgeoisie" and to link
their "crimes" with the South's economic problems, the media have been
publicizing lists of those arrested and their crimes. These indicate
that the illegal activities for which they have been charged mainly
involved consumer goods, such as monosodium glutamate seasoning, rice,
textiles, and bicycle parts--products whose price manipulation would
directly affect the livelihood of the average person. As evidence of
the beneficial results from the government's policy of punishing these
"comprador bourgeoisie," a 14 September VNA report noted that prices of
"many commodities" in Saigon's Chinese section of Cholon had dropped
"20 to 50 percent" following issuance of the P:tG statement.
Media reports of government attempts to curtail illegal business operations
have made a number of references to Chinese being detained. According to
a 21 September Liberation Radio account, "many of those arrested are of
Chinese ^:igin, and some are foreigners." The same broadcast openly
* The last PRG statement, issued on 26 April, is discussed in the
TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 1-3.
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1.7 SEPTEMBER 1975
- 17 -
charged them with "exploiting Vietnamese . . . and Vietnamese
compatriots of Chinese origin." An earlier Liberation Radio broadcast
on the 10th, in reporting the arrests of "ringleaders" who had
reportedly "speculated" in monosodium glutamate, claimed that one
of them had "closely colluded with . . . Taiwan Kuomintang special
service agents." An earlier instance of Vietnamese communist media
focusing partictl/Lr attention on the Chinese was a 12 July Liberation
Press Agency (LPA) report on people returning to the countryside from
the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Noting that more than 1.25,000 people had
gone to the rural areas since 10 May, the LPA report pointed out that
some "5,000 Chinese residents in Saigon" had received farm tools for
their use in Binh Phuoc Province.
Premier Pham Van Dong ind?cated in his 1 September DRV Nat:t.onal Day
remarks that South Vietnam now would be included--along with the
North--in Vietnam's "advance toward socialism." Without further
elaboration, Dong noted the existence of a "nationwide plan" that was
to be the basis for "new developmental steps" in the South.* While
the 10 September PRG statement could not be construed as a nationwide
plan, it could represent some of the "developmental steps" to which
the Premier was alluding.
The 10 September issue of the Saigon newspaper GIAI PHONG (Liberation),
in an editorial on the campaign, cited the National Day speeches of
both Pham Van Dong and NFLSV Central Committee Presidium Chairman
Nguyen Huu Tho** in urging "socialist reforms, socialist construction,
[and] socialist industrialization" throughout the country. The same
newspaper's editorial the next day asserted that these same steps were
"being gradually carried out throughout the country." The editorial of
the 11th also detailed the various "economic segments" expected to have
a "parallel existence" during South Vietnam's "new stage of the revolution."
The editorial said there would be: "the state economic segment belonging
to the entire people, the cooperative economic segment belonging to various
collectives, the capitalist and private economic segment, the joint
state-private economic segment, and the small-organization economic
segment belonging to peasants and handicraftsmen engaged in private
business."
Hanoi's 14 September NHAN DAN also carried editorial comment on the PRG
statement and on the need to "make the building of socialism throughout
the country an irreversible trend." According to the NHAN DAN editorial,
the comprador bourgeoisie is "the sole exploiting class remaining in the
South," and as such it constitutes "a tremendous obstacle on the path of
advance of the South" that is "absolutely necessary to eliminate."
* See the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 14-17, for a discussion of
Pham Van Dong's National Day speech.
** Tho's National Day remarks at the Saigon rally are also discussed in
the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 14-17.
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CA1B0D I A
Phnom Penh's effusive welcoming ceremonies for Cambodian "head of
state" Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth following their
9 September return to Cambodia have stressed the two leaders' con-
tributions while on their. "mission abroad" toward the April 1975
victory, at the same time hailing their return to work "shoulder
to shoulder" with leaders in Cambodia on the couatr.y's future
policies.
Sihanouk statements since his arrival. in Phnom Penh have stressed
his support for the egalitarian domestic policies set forth at
the April 1975 special Cambodian congress conducted in his absence,*
and have explicitly lauded the "people's democratic revolution"
currently underway in Cambodia. The prince presided over a
10 September RGNU cabinet meeting at which he reportedly voiced
his "great satisfaction" over reports on the current military,
economic and social policies in the country. The meetings and
welcoming festivities have occasioned appearances by numerous
Cambodian leaders, but the Phnom Penh media reportage on these
has not yet provided any clear evidence of the leadership ranking
below the level of deputy prime minister.**
Following a grand welcoming ceremony at Phnom Penh's Pochentong
airport on 9 September addressed by Prince Sihanouk and RGNU
Deputy Prime Minister Son Seu, the prince was feted at a banquet
that evening hosted and addressed by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu
Samphan. On 10 September Sihanouk met with several RGNU and NUFC
officials and later held a me.-.zing of the "entire RGNU cabinet"
to hear and approve reports on the current domestic situation. On
the 12th Sihanouk was honored and spoke at a Phnom Penh rally
which was also addressed by RGNU information and Propaganda Minister
Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, and representatives of the Cambodian armed
forces, people, and women. Also on the 12th Sihanouk viewed a military
parade in his honor and heard an address by Son Sen on military
affairs. Atmospherics throughout these festivities were uniformly
described as "warm" and "intimate."
* The 25-27 April 1975 special Cambodian national congress is
discussed in the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 5-6.
** Initial Phnom Penis coverage of Sihanouk's arrival is discussed
in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, pages 16-18.
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17 SEPTEMBER 1975
Son Sen's 9 September welcoming speech and Khieu Samphan's speeches
on the 9th and 12th gave balanced credit for the April. insurgent
victory to the contributions of insurgent armed forces, on the
one hand, and to Sihanouk and "all patriotic personalities" who
worked in the international arena on the other. Both leaders also
hailed Sihanouk's return to join "the forces of great unity" to
work "shoulder to shoulder and hand in hand" in the future. Neither
Sihanouk nor his hosts referred explicitly to now standard Phnom
Penh praise for the paramount leadership role in the liberation
struggle and postwar development of the Cambodian "revolutionary
organization"--a presumed euphemism for the Cambodian Communist
Party. Concurrent Phnom Penh editorial comment, however. has
duly referred to the organization as the ultimwte inspiration for
the regime's policies and practices.
Sihanouk and P'nn Nouth received due protocol prominence at all
welcoming events, followed by Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, the latter
newly appointed deputy prime minister for national defense affairs.
Phnom Penh failed to give a specific protocol order to lower-level
officials, even though it repeatedly noted that "members of the
entire RGNU" along with the NUFC Politburo and leaders of the CPNLAF
were present at gatherings for Sihanouk. Hu Nim enjoyed prominence
in moderating both the 9 September ceremony at the airport and
the 12 September rally. He also read the cabinet report on the
"situation of the people and production" at the 10 September cabinet
meeting. Interior Minister Hou Yuon, who traditionally has ranked
on a level with Hu Nim, has not appeared nor been referred to in
radio broadcasts since before the April victory. Present among
officials meeting with Sihanouk on 10 September was Touch Kim,
hitherto unknown and now referred to as chairman of the NUFC commit-
tee of Phnom Penh, a position previously assigned to Chey Chum.
Ieng Sary, recently appointed deputy prime minister for foreign
affairs, was abroad, touring Latin .America following attendance at
the nonalined meeting in Lima.
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KOREA
DPRK NATIONAL DAY COMMENT STRESSES KIM IL-SONG LEADERSHIP
M
~-IPQig1i-0
The DPRK marked its 27th anniversary or. 9 September with the tradi-
tional Pyongyang meeting, banquet, and NODONG SINMUN editorial.
Neither the 9 September editorial nor speeches by Vice President
Kim Tong-kyu at the 8 September meeting and by Premier Kim I1 at
the banquet the following day broke any new substantive ground.
Unlike past years, however, Kim Tong-kyu's speech and the NODONG
SINMUN editorial noted the need to follow Kim Il-song's leadership
from "generation to generation," a theme discussed at length in
the September 1974 issue of the party journal KULLOJA but not
raised in other 1974 anniversary pronouncements. Missing from
current anniversary comment was last year's heightened concern with
'domestic economic and political tasks and the emphasis then placed
on support for the "party center."
Kim Tong-kyu reiterated standard Pyongyang support for the "struggle"
of the South Korean people. Kim noted--as did the speaker at the
1974 anniversary meeting--that the struggle was experiencing
"meandering," but he predicted that "in the not too distant future"
the South Korean people would "overthrow the colonial fascist rule"
of the United States and the government of South Korean President
Pak Chong-hui. Kim called on South Korean "revolutionaries" to
combine "various forms and methods of struggle" to establish a "true
popular government" in the South.*
In line with standard DPRK propaganda, Kim accused the United States
and the ROK of i.creasing tension in Korea and demanded that U.S.
troops withdraw immediately from the South. Kim refrained from
harsh criticism of the Japanese role in Korea, calling on the
"Japanese authorities" to avoid hampering Korea's reunification at
the least, if they could not aid it. He stated that Japan should
immediately renounce its "hostile policy" toward the DPRK, and
cautioned that "we will always maintain a close watch on the move-
ments of th- Japanese authorities."
PEKING Peking's treatment of this year's DPRK anniversary was
very similar to that in 1974, though it gave marginally
less attention to the United State's role in Korea. As last year,
Li Hsien-nien led the PRC delegation to the DPRK ambassador's
* A representative of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification--a
Marxist-Leninist party allegedly operating in South Korea--was listed
as attending both the meeting and the banquet for the first time.
Details are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September, page 20.
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1.7 SEPTEMBER 1975
anniversary reception. While last year. NCNA had reported brief
remarks by the PRC foreign minister about the DPRK's success in
the "struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and interference,"
this year the 9 September NCNA report on the reception merely
noted toasts to Chinese-Korean solidarity. The Chinese leaders'
greeting message to DPRK leaders--monitored this year, as last,
only on ?eking radio's Korean-language service--returned to the
language of the 1973 message, dropping last year's stated support
for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Peking's
message this year also dropped the 1974 reference to the North's
"reasonable propositions" for reunification, noting instead that
by upholding its "just stand" for reunification, the North had
successfully opposed the "two Koreas scheme of L';S. imperialism
and the Pak Chong-hui clique."
The traditional PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary demanded
that the "so-called UN Forces Command must be dissolved and U.S.
troops must withdraw from South Korea totally." Last yeai.'s
anniversary editorial had been somewhat harsher, calling for with-
drawal of U.S. "aggressor" troops. Also omitted this time was
last year's demand that the United States cease "interfering in
the internal affairs of Korea." Instead, this year's editorial
charged that the Pak Chong-hui "puppet clique" had aggravated tension
in Korea, trampled on the North-South joint statement, and engaged
in fascist suppression "under the support and connivance of U.S.
imperialism." PEOPLE'S DAILY also noted Chinese sponsorship of
a draft resolution on the Korean question in the United Nations,
congratulated the DPRK for being admitted to the nonalined grc?ip,
and closed with strong expressions of DPRK-PRC solidarity.
MOSCOW Soviet treatment of the DPRK anniversary indicated no
thaw in the frosty state of Soviet-DPRK relations.
Although the rank of Soviet represento_ives at the DPRK charges's
Moscow reception and the Soviet-sponsored anniversary meeting in
Moscow was slightly higher than last year, these functions were
again reported only briefly in Soviet media. The Soviet leaders'
message of greetings was fully reported, but it offered only
perfunctory support for Korean reunification and made no reference
either to Northern proposals for reunification or to presence of
foreign troops in Korea. The Soviet message noted that by pro-
clamation of the DPRK in 1948, the Korean people had exercised the
right to independent development "within the framework of their
own state," a phrase which has not appeared in previous Soviet
messages on the anniversary. Pyongyang apparently took umbrage
at this phrase, possibly interpreting it as a hint at the existence
of two Korean states, and dropped it from its own KCNA English-
language and Pyongyang radio Korean-language versions of the message.
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Soviet media comment on the anniversary included at least two
radio commentaries, a 6 September IZVESTIYA item devoted mainly
to detailing agricultural developments in the DPRK, and a brief
7 September RED STAR article. RED STAR noted Soviet insistence
on the "unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops" from South
Korea, as well as Soviet support for the DPRK's "constructive
proposals" aimed at liquidating tension and fostering Korean
reunification. The article also noted DPRK support for a UN
draft resolution on the Korean question, but failed to mention
Soviet sponsorship of the resolution. Both RED STAR and a
9 September Moscow radio commentary cited an old Kim Il-song
quotation paying homage to the decisive role-of the Soviet Union
in Korea's liberation and thus the existence of the DPRK. As
usual, Soviet comment also called attention to Soviet economic
aid to the DPRK. The 9 September radio commentary tried to
link Korean reunification with a pro-Soviet policy, claiming that
the achievement of Korean reunification could become part of
practical action on the proposal for collective security in Asia,"
a Soviet-sponsored proposal.
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N I L FBIS TRENDS
17 SEPTEMBER 1975
CHINA
TOP PRC I.EADERS ATTEND AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE IN SHANSI
NCNA on 15 September announced the opening that da+y in Shansi Province
of a "national conference" on learning from Tachaiin agriculture,
convened by the PRC Statn Council with "the cordial attention of
Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee." The conference,
apparently designed to discuss and disseminate agricultural policies
for China's next five-year plan period starting in January, marks
the largest publicized gathering of CCP Politburo members outside
Peking since the cultural revolution. The opening meeting was
addressed by Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiang Ching, and long-time
Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei. Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who had just
returned to Peking from Tibet on 13 September, announced the opening
of the congress, Other Politburo members and alternates at the
conference were Yao Wen-yuan, Chen Hsi-lien, and Wu Ku9i-hsien. Four
ministers of the State Council., it :eluding the minister of culture,
also were listed in attendance.
Thus far NCNA has released no details of Chiang Ching's "important speech"
and has only noted that Teng conveyed central greetings in his "important
speech" and that he was greeted by "outbursts of stormy applause."
The available NCNA summary of Chen's speech highlighted the dual
goals of achieving "farm mechanization in the main by 1980" and of
further expanding the number of Tachai-type counties. Chen noted
the need to implement various concrete measures, including soil
improvement, water control and industrial support for agriculture, and
he also stressed the necessity of ideological unity. He credited the
anti-Lin Piao and Confucius movement, and "par~i.cularly" the movement
to study the dictatorship of the proletariat (but not the current
"Water Margin" campaign), as factors in spreading the Tachai experience.
Chen's reference to the dictatorship campaign, which at its outset this
year seemed to involve controversy over the extent to which "bourgeois
rights" would be allowed in production, payment and marketing, serves
as a reminder that the "Tachai experience" deals not only with
production but also with ideological line.
The presence at the meeting of Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and the
minister of culture, none of whom have any known agricultural duties,
clearly indicates that the meeting will serve to popularize Tachai's
ideological achievements as well as its production reccrds.
NCNA's account of the session indicated that the meeting would not
formulate any basic policies, but that rather participants would
exchange experiences and popularize the conference line. The meeting
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was attended by 3,700 delegates, and it seem:; doubtful that the
attending Politburo members would present anything but a united
front before such a gathering. The show of leadership unity in the
context of a discussion of rational economic measures may serve to
quiet peasant fears of a sudden change in agricultural policies.*
The meeting also serves to put a mass imprint on the five-year
plan's agricultural . goals. Chen stated that a "number of important
measures regarding production" would be discussed at the conference,
and within central guidelines the conference may have some discretion
on specific measures. The last five-year plan for agriculture seems
to have been discussed also at a similar conference in 1970, which was
not publicized until later.
The holding of a national conference on agriculture appears to
represent a renewed effort by Peking to speed general economic
development by focusing on the key role played by agriculture. NCNA
on 16 September, for example, lauded Kwangsi for achieving "rapid
growth in agriculture and in its light and heavy industry." Endorsing
the line that "it is agriculture that decides the scale and speed of
industrial development," NCNA argued that "only a developed agriculture
can supply industry with the food, manpower and raw materials it
reqLlres, as well as with an expanding market for its products and
funds for further growth." NCNA praised local Kwangsi party units
for learning from Tachai and for giving first place to "agriculture
and steadily expanding light and heavy industry on the basis of
agricultural development." As a result of following the Tachai
example, "Kwangsi not only meets its own needs in grain but also
provides large amounts to the state."
The conference report's emphasis on agricultural mechanization and
Chen's stated goal of basically achieving such mechanization by 1980
reflect Mao's longstanding concern with the problem. Agricultural
mechanization was a major issue in the dispute with Liu Shao-chi.
This emphasis on agriculture and agricultural equipment indicates that
for the next five years at least PRC economic priorities will remain in
the order of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry. The
significant increase in priority apparently accorded agricultural
equipment also implies resource constraints in other sectors, possibly
including the military.
* The image of a united leadership was also strengthened by NCNA's
identification of Wang Chien as Shansi first party secretary, up from
secretary, replacing Hsien Chen-hua, who has long been in political
trouble.
CI..el,led by 000073
A .u,um.llt.llede'. I~,^ Release 1999/0199126 CI9_RDP86T00608R000200160013-0
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NOTES
SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF CHILEAN COUP: Soviet media gave pro r-)rma
attention to the second anniversary of Lhe 11. September 1973 coup
In Chile which toppled Marxist president Salvadore Allende, in
marked contrast to the treatment of the first anniversary. Last
year, up to 12 percent of Moscow radio comment was devoted to
Chile from 9 to 22 September--a period which coincided with
President Ford's press conference statements on U.S. involvement
in Chile prior to the coup. This year only 3 percent of Moscow's
comment for 8-14 September dealt with Chile. This year's comment,
beamed primarily to Latin tmerica, featured letters, statements
and other expressions of support for the Chileans from a variety
of sources in connection with a "week of international solidarity"
with the Chilean people. TASS reported on "big meetings of
solidarity" said to have been held 1-i "various" Soviet cities and
PRAVD., marked the oc, sion with an L rticle or. the 12th by Vladimir
Chernyshev summing up the solidarity week. As reported by TASS,
Chernyshev noted that the Soviet people condemned the "arbitrary
rule of Pinochet's military-f