TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. OCTOBER 1.975
SOVIET - IS^AELI R ELATIONS
MOSCOW MEDIA SILENT ON USSR-1SRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Moscow's silence on the 24 September private meeting in New York
between Soviet Foreign Minister Cromyko and Israeli Foreign
Minister Allon is consistent with Soviet media treatment of other
reported high-level Soviet-Israeli contacts since 10 June 1967,
when the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.*
Presumably Moscow chooses not to acknowledge such contacts to
avoid conveying the impression, particularly to Arab observers,
that it might be considering improving or even restoring Soviet-
Israeli relations. Moscow has on occasion, however, acknowledged
low-level, unofficial Soviet contacts, most recently in a brief
1 October TASS report on the conclusion of an Israeli delegation's
visit to the USSR. Gromyko, in his UN Ceneral Assembly address
this year, did not ment?on the issue of Soviet-Israeli relations,
although in his UNGA speech last year he had reiterated Brezhnev's
J,ine 1974 formulation to the effect that real progress in a
Mideast settlement would create conditions for the development
of relations with all Middle East states.
UNOFFICIAL In contrast to its reticence on high-level contacts,
CONTACTS Moscow has sometimes publicized various unofficial
contacts and exchanges of visits by low-level
delegations. However, there has been only one monitored reference
in Soviet media to the most recent visit of an Israeli delegation
to the USSR, when TASS on 1 October reported the 22 September-
1 October visit of a five-member Israeli delegation composed of
politicians and journalists. Since the period of this visit
encompassed the Gromyko-Allon meeting, Moscow may have sought to
avoid speculation that the meetings were related; a Moscow-datelined
dispatch in the British Communist Party organ, MORNING STAR, on
27 September cited an Israeli source as cautioning that the two
events should not be linked. In contrast, Israeli media--as with
pap'. Soviet-Israeli contacts--have speculated at length on possible
connections and implications of the recent meetings, generally
along lines favoring improved relations with the USSR.
* Past contacts ignored by Moscow-but reported by U.S., Israeli,
West European, Chinese, and some Arab media--include several meetings
since summer 1970 between Soviet and Israeli ambassadors in Washington
and a meeting between Gromyko and Foreign Minister Eban at the
time of the Geneva Mideast-,;eace conference in December 1973.
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In acknowledging previous low-level. meetings and delegations, Moscow
has attempted to justify them by suggesting that they illustrate
the popular appeal. of the Soviet "peace policy" and way of life;
occasionally the contacts have been placed in the context of a
Soviet-Israeli "friendship movement." Such contacts have included--in
addition to mutual visits by delegations concerned with sports,
medicine, religion, and journalism--visits to the USSR by groups of
Israeli "progressive public figures" invited btu an organization
such as the Soviet Peace Committee to "study Soviet life" and meet
with their parliamentary, journalistic, and/or academic Soviet
counterparts.
CRITICISM OF As wit-i past Soviet-Israeli contacts, Moscow's
CONTACTS recent meetings have subjected it to criticism
from Arab and Chinese sources. A Cairo radio
commentary on the 26th, for example, denounced the "duplicity" of
"rejectionist elements within the Arab homeland and outside it"
who declare one policy and pursue another, citing the secret
development of Soviet-Israeli relations as an example and referring
to the Gromyko-Allon meeting and the recent Israeli delegation
visit. Peking, too, wasted little time in charging, in a
26 September NCNA dispatch, that the Gromyko-Allon meeting was
"glaring proof" of Soviet-Israeli "collusion" against the Arabs,
pointing out the simultaneous Israeli delegation's USSR visit
and recoiling that the USSR had sent two envoys to Israel lase April.*
Although presently ignoring such criticism, Moscow has occasionally
responded defensively to past speculation in world media that
Soviet-Israeli contacts could be a harbinger of improved--or
even restored--relations and would, in any case, imply weakened
Soviet support for the Arabs. Referring to attendance by a Soviet
delegation at a 20-22 January 1972 conference of the "Israeli-Soviet
Friendship Association" in 1s1:ae1, for example, a 17 March 1.972
NEW TIMES article defended r::e against charges that it was
part of a "mythical 'Soviet Flan for rapp.ochement with Israel."'
Earlier, criticism of a 1971 irr:.eli delegation's visit to Moscow
was handled through TASS publicity for a Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
article stressing that, contrary to "hostile propaganda" by some
concerning the visit, the USSR had "not taken a single step backward"
in support of the Arab cause.
* Moscow and Peking have previously exchanged accusations about each
other's reported contacts with Israel. PEOPLE'S DAILY lambasted Moscow
in a January 1972 article for having sent a "good-will" delegation to
Israel; Moscow in turn accused Peking of "backstage intrigues" with
Tel Aviv. For details, see the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 35-36,
and 11 August 1971, pages 24-25.
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USSR-ISRAEL The most recent authoritative statement of Moscow's
RELATIONS position or restoration of diplomatic relations with
Israel was made by Brezhnev in a 14 June .1974 speech
in which he said that the Soviet position on n final Midca:;t settlement
was well. known and that "progress in the field of settlement will
create the conditions for the development of our relationships with
all countries of the Near East." Subsequent Soviet comment on the
issue generally fol.lowe. Brezhncv'a formulation, as In Cromyl.o's
24 September 1974 UNGA address when he protested accusations that
Moscow's Midei&t position was "one-sided" in favor of the Acal's and
added: "Progress which is not ill.ustory but real In the matter of
a Near East settlement will create the preconditions for the Soviet
Union to develop relations with all Near East states, including
Israel."
Prior to Brezhnev's Jun'` 1974 speech, the Soviet position since
Jure 1.967 had been exemplified in such remarks as those by Kosygin
at a 5 April 1973 press conference in Stockholm, reported in the
13 April Soviet NEW TIMES. Asked whether the USSR should not have
diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as with the Arab states,
if Moscow wished to contribute to a Mideast settlement, Kosygin
replied that It would be possible "if Israel and the Arab countries
were in the same position." But he emphasized that, on the contrary,
Israel was "the aggressor in the Near East" and that the Arab states
were "struggling for the return of their native land." Under such
conditions, he said, the USSR could only condemn Israel and help
the Arabs.
Recent Soviet statements have blurred the issue of what the exact
preconditions for improved relations with Israel would be--whether
"progress" toward a settlement or the actual conclusion of a
"settlement on a just basis." A report on an Israeli Communist
Party visit to the USSR in June 1975, for example, carried
by TASS on 13 June and published in PRAVDA on the 15th, stated
that "settlement of the Near East question on a just basis will
create favorable preconditions for the development of the Soviet
Union's relations with all, without exception, states of the
Near East, including Israel."*
* Delegations of the pro-Moscow Israeli CP, led by party secretary
general Meir Vilner, have visited Moscow at least every other year--in
June 1973, December 1971 (when Vilner met with Demichev) and June 1969
(when Vilner was received by Brezhnev, after attending the international.
communist conference in Moscow that month).
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ill BFR
WARSAW PACT LINKS PROGRESS TO NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE
The seventh round of Lite VI(Jnna forco redur.tinn ttilkii ISot under way
on 26 September w.i th Moscow and Lite Eat;t E.uropennr; expressing guarded
optI.minm that Lite talks could lead to concrete: rotiu.i.ts if the Wentcrn
countricn adopted a "renlistlc" approach. While acknowledging that
Lite negotlatorn hack n difficult tank, Wnrnnw Pact c:ommentntort; have
emphasized Lite need to move ahead quickly now, suggesting that Lite
successful c.onc.luni.on of the European t5ecurlty conference in ilelulnki
has net Lite stage for progress in the achievement of military
detente. fly contrasting the ['act's "Colic 11.Latory" attitude to the
Wcnt's "Intransigence" and recalling previous Pact "concessions" to
Western proposals, comment hat; made It quite clear that the communist
countries believe Lite ball is now in the West's court, and several
commentators have openly hinted that it new Western initiative is
expected In the seventh round.
As for previous M13FR sessions, comment by Moscow and the East
European participants has been limited and on an unauthoritative
level, with Soviet leaders making only perfunctory mention of the
current round. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a brief reference to
the talks in his UN Ceneral Assembly address on 23 September, said
there must 5e an agreement that will not harm "anyone's security,"
a theme continuously expressed in communist media. Gromyko added
only that the Soviet Union would contribute "in every possible way"
to the success of the talks. Oleg Khlestov, the Soviet Union's
chief delegate to the talks, did little more than echo Gromyko
when he spoke to correspondents upon arriving in Vienna, but he did
note that there were now "new, more favorable possibilities" for
advancing the work.
The West's proposals at the Vienna talks, based on an assessment that
the Warsaw Pact has a numerical superiority in ground forces and
tanks, have evoked a Moscow counter-argument that there is an
"approxin.ate equilibrium," a historic "balance of forces" that has
prevented the outbreak of conflict for more than 25 years. Thus
Moscow has argued that NATO's proposals--calling for any asymmetrical
reduction of ground forces without taking into consideration air
forces and tactical nuclear weapons--would upset the existing balance
and give NATO a unilateral advantage. Defending the Soviet position,
Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in a broadcast in German on 23
September, recalled that "numerous" statel.;ents at various times by
"Western officials" have implied that the--e are "no disproportions"
in the balance of forces in central Europe. The radio reported
Defense Secretary Schlesinger as saying in July 1973 that the
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III tuation In Europe was "frtt.rly utnb'ic" and the United States
''would .1 ike to keep It: dolt way," and quoted West German I)eI'eone
Minister l,elhc~r as tidying at; Idle as July 1975 that there is
it state of "dynamic balance" in Europe.
POLI SII COMMr:NT The most det:a 1.1 ed d tncuss ion of the t;evt'nth
round and of the issues dividing the sides carp
in an arItelo by Andrze) Rayzacher, Poland's leading MIIFR commentator,
in , he 10 September issue of ZYG I E, WARSZAWY. Rayzacher described
"defint.t.ion of forces" at?; "one of the chief controver.smai. problems"--
an Issue that Is "substantive" rather than "technical.." Rayzacher
criticized NATO for It,-; "stubborn .Insistence" on the "so-called
common ccl.ling" on manpower and the two-phase asymmetrical reduction
proposal which, he alleged, would allow 11e West European NATO
countries to "increase their troops." Here, and two other times;
In ltis article, Rayzacher hinted at the Warsaw Pact's concern over
the West German military force. Ile argued that tinder the Western
plan only U.S. and Soviet forces would be reduced in an Initial
phase, with reduction of the other. NATO armed forces "to be
worked out" In some future phase. This vague scheme, Rayzacher
stressed, would leave 75 percent of NATO's forces, most significantly
the West German liundeswehr, beyond the range of any reduction obligations.
Recalling that NATO had refused to go along with any "acceptable freeze"
on manpowere while the talks were under way, the Polish commentator
pointed out that the numerical strength of the FRG armed forces
was increased :just this year to the highest level ever. However,
Rayzacher did not mention increases in the number of U.S. forces
in Europe, as did Moscow in its Radio Peace and Progress commentary
on the 23d.
SOVIET COMMENT Sparse Moscow comment has tended to be somewhat
more polemical and less substantive than Rayzacher's
article. The only Soviet press comment pegged to the new round, a
25 September IZVESTIYA article co-authored by K. Pereveshchikov
and N. Polyanov, said that "never before has such great responsibility
rested on the negotiators as it does now." Recalling the "spirit of
Helsinki" and the "good intentions" and "firm pledges" at the CSCE,
the IZVESTIYA article asserted that it was now "necessary and
possible" to continue moving forward "energetically" at Vienna.
Indicating that the West European NATO countries were the main
obstacles to a new 3reakthrough in the talks, IZVESTIYA said: "Only
the United States has declared its readiness to make specific
commitments regarding the reduction of its own troops." "Those
Western states" whose armed forces in central Europe constitute
the main part of the NATO force "stubbornly" refuse to make such
commitments, the paper continued.
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Referring to the lack of 'results in '-the previous gix .rounds of
talks and the "reckless" rhetoric of former 'NATO Chief of Staff
General Coodpaster and Defehse'Secretary - Schlesinger, "the IZVESTIYA
article questioned whether NATO really had .any real desire 'for
progress at Vienna. 't'here must be military 'detente., the article
stressed; there is simply "no'otherlway, given the present correlation
of European and world forces." And'in conclugion,'IZVESTIYA warned:
"Time does not wait. It must be retietnbered that the arms race
has its own negative logic. 'And `it'may 'prove'to*have highly dangerous
consequences in Europe.with'its numerous states, ',major. industrial
cities and densely populated regions. Only military detente can
reduce the risk of their,turning'into a worldwide thermonuclear
catastrophe."
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CASTRO DISCUSSES DOMESTIC ISSUES. U.S. RELATIONS IN CDR SPEECH
Prime Minister Fidel Castro's 29 September address on the 15th
anniversary of Cuba's chief mass organization, the committees for
Defense of the Revolution, was moderate in tone and devoted largely
to domestic issues, including the forthcoming first congress of
the Cuban Communist Party. In contrast to last year's speech, which
focused on Chilean affairs and harshly indicted U.S. "illegal, dirty
and criminal" activities in that country and elsewhere, this year's
speech did not mention Chile and dealt rather lightly with the United
States.* Castro all but ignored his old enemy, the Organization of
American States, which last year was berated for its "shameless and
prostituted" role in failing to condemn U.S. actions in Latin America.
Castro this year briefly dismissed the United States' partial lifting
of the ban on trade with Cuba as "measures that do not carry much
weight." In his only significant remarks on U.S.-Cuban relations,
he called U.S. criticism of Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence
out of order and said "there can never be improved relations if this
is to be based on renunciation of a single one of our fundamental
principles."
RELATIONS Castro has shown sensitivity to Latin leftists' charges
WITH U.S. of accommodation since the thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations
began, and he has been at pains to reaffirm his
independence and revolutionary outlook. The strident tone of his
1974 CDR anniversary speech could be partially explained by his need
to comment on the then recent revelations of U.S. Government
involvement in Chile and by President Ford's defense of such actions.
This year Castro apparently felt less press:ure to defend his revo-
lutionary credentials, but he did respond to Secretary Kissinger's
9 September criticism of Cuban support for the Puerto Rican "inde-
pendence movement." Castro rejected as unjustified "strong statements"
from the United States on this subject, noting that Cuba and Puerto
Rico had been "the last two colonies on this continent" and that "Cuban
solidarity with Puerto Rico dates back to the last century." Castro
made no specific promise of continued support for Puerto Rico, but
made it clear that he would not be pressured. He insisted that
Cubans were "more interested in the purity of their principles" than
in any economic advantages to be gained from the complete lifting of
the U.S. trade ban. He added that "we :.ill withstand a blockade with
dignity for all the time that is necessary."
* Castro's 1974 CDR speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 October,
1974, pages 18-20.
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Castro thus gave support to Cuban President Dorticos' earlier indirect
response to Kissinger's criticise, and, in a more muted fashion, to
Dorticos' reaffirmation of Cuban solidarity with Puerto Rican
independence,,* Castro's remarks on Puerto Rico were singled out
by prestigious commentrtor Guido Garcia Inclan, over Havana's
domestic service on the 29th, as the most significant part of the
prime minister's speech. Garcia Inclan reported Castro's rejection
of "recent attacks by some Yankee authorities" and pra;',sed "our
Fidel., whose honor and dignity not even the Yankees have destroyed
with their dirty tricks."
PCC PARTY Castro gave considerAble attention to the first congress
CONGRESS of the Cuban Conn unist Party, scheduled for mid-December,
noting that "beginning with the first congress, we will
be living in a new phase of the revolution." Although Cuban media
have been publicizing the forthcoming congress, Castro had not devoted
much attention to it in his 26 July Moncada barracks speech, and his
remarks in this CDR anniversary speech were among his most extensive
to date. Castro explained that the congress would "establish the
guidelines that the people, the state, the mass organizations and
the country" will follow for the next five years, and hr. promised
that "our party will be extraordinarily strengthened by the congress."
The Cuban prime minister said that as a result of the congress, "our
revolution will follow superior structures of organization"--a reference
to the institutionalization process and administrative reorganization
going on in the country, much of which is to be ratified at the party
meeting. Castro also indicated that policies to be adopted at the
congress would enhance Cuba's international prestige, telling Cubans
that "we will be having more influence in the international revo'.u-
tionpry movement and we will be helping in the path toward the
liberation of other peoples."
* Dorticos' speech at the recent "international conference of
solidarity with the independence of Puerto Rico" is discussed in the
TRENDS of 10 September 1975, page 23.
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1. OCTOBER 1975
ROMANIA - CEMA
ROMANIA ADVOCATES SOCIALIST ROLE IN WORLD ECONOMIC FORUMS
Implicitly rejecting Moscow's standard contention that CEMA insulates
its member-countries against the Jolts of world economic instability,
an article in Romania's party daily SCINTEIA on 21 September asserted
that CEMA member-countries must protect their own economics by parti-
cipating in broader international forum3 concerned with solving the
world's economic problems. Apparently aimed at justifying Romania's
own participation in economic talks outside the CEMA framework, the
article, written by Romania's international economics institute
director Costin Murgescu, is consistent with Bucharest's efforts
to identify more closely with the Third World.
Murgea"u's remarks on this subject were contained in an article
advocating that CEMA members diversify their economic relations. In
addition to favoring expansion c' bil.aterial cooperation with non-
{,EMA countries, he. disputed "certt.in theoreticians" who he said
contended that the world's economic problems should be dealt with on
a "bloc-to-bloc" basis. Murgescu declared that current international
economic problems could be solved only by "concerted actions at the
world level" and with the consensus of all states. Although he did
not identify which world organizations he had in mind, he cited the
current discussions now underway within "various international bodies"
on such issues as raw material supplie>a, food shortages, price
indexing, multilateral commercial negotiations, and the reorganization
of the international monetary system.
Murgescu stressed that the socialist countries must take part in
these talks not only to aid the world's developing countries but
also to protect their own self-interest since, in the final analysis,
world economic instability has "direct and secondary effects" on the
socialist economies. A continued absence of the socialist countries
from these talks, he asserted, could have a "negative impact on
their own development" and could "create the danger of isolating
them from the world economy." In an apparent reference to the current
participation of Western developed countries in these talks, Murgescu
also claimed that the socialis. countries' participation was imperative
to "orient" the activities of these organizations "in the ri?ht
direction," that is, toward democratization of international lations.
Murgescu drew particular attention to Romania's "untiring activity"
to enhance the "pre:7ence" of the socialist countries in the world
economy and its "nur ?ous initiatives and pronouncements." He cited
a Romanian declaration circulated at the September UN General Assembly
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seventh special session on international economic cooperation which
culled on "rill cuuntrien" to participate in cntnblinhing a "new
international economic order." In a thinly veiled criticism of
Moscow and the other orthodox CEMA member-countries, Murgencu
portrayed such activity an "the moot telling refutation" of
accusations that Romania was guilty of "narrowness" and "r tional
isolation."
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POLAND
GIEREK REGIME SCORES POOR WORK DISCIPLINE PRIOR TO CONGRESS
Followitd tltf publication on 5 September of the guidelines for the 7th
PZPR congress in December, guidelines wl;ich stressed the primacy of
"work quality," speeches by P7.1'it First Secretary Edward Glerek and
articles In TRYBUNA LUDU have frequently complained about poor work
discipline, apparently forecasting the theme of the upcoming Polish
party congress. This emphasis on "work" contrasts sharply with the
welfare orientation of the last party congress in 1971 and, coupled
with recent price increases fur meat and milk, may reflect a break-
down in the rapport between the workers and Gierek'a regime that
could lead to a renewal of the tensions which toppled the Gomulka
regime in December 1970. The new party congress guidelines stressed
orthodoxy in other aspects of policy as well, underscoring the
"key importance" of Poland's ties with the USSR, denouncing Maoism,
and calling for a new world conference of co,nmuniet parties.
The main thrust of the Gierck regime's intensified pressure on the
workers was set forth in a 23 September TRYBUNA LUDU editorial
article entitled "Quantity, Quality and Productivity." The article
was notably blunt in calling attention to problems stemming from
poor productivity, in a manner likely to further stir up worker
resentment, noting among other things that the rate of average
wage increases had exceeded the growth in productivity. It called
for intensification of "the discipline of employment and wages,"
which must be adhered to with "iron-clad strictness."
The article in effect took the line that everything conducive to
better performance, e.uch as more modern machinery and favorable
working conditions, had been provided, but chat the workers had
not lived up to their part of the bargain. Thus the article pointed
out that losses due to defective production were growing at a
rate that could not be offset by production of acceptable quality.
The article appeared to convey the threat of dace work pay as a
remedy, registering approval of the principle of monetary incentives--
a system resented during the Gomulka regime an a device for squeezing
more production out of the workers with little real monetary gain.
The article stressed that "better remuneration: better pay for a
better effort," was a principle beneficial to both the worker and
the state and was socially justified.
Poor work performance and absenteeism were attacked in a Sapocinski
article in the 17 September TRYBUNA LUDU, reprinted also in the
same day's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, GLOS PRACY and SZTANDAR
MLODYCH. The article deplored "incomplete use of the working day"
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and noted that rtbnetttpelnrn wrtn "decidedly excennive" and thnt nicknenn
nbnpntepIno wan on the I.ncrenne. It cited ntnIIntIcn to show that
worker productivity In 1975 wan worne than mat year. Thin year, It
said, more than 100 key plnntn fctll.eel to fulfil their goaln and had
it rem).lnod production nhorI:fnll of over 23.5 billion zloLyn In the
January-Augunt period, while for the name period In 1974 there were
only 130 such plnntn with it ahortfn11 of 1305 million zlotys. A
regional party paper, the Wroclaw CA7.1TA ROI30TNICZA, rtlno sounded
the alarm En an article on the 17th out''lecj "Raw StatIatien" pointing
out that total worker abaanteelam In Wroclaw Voivodahlp had increased
by 31 percent and "un,luntIlled" rtbnenteel.am by 26 peeccnt. Similarly,
a 15 September TRYIUNA LUDU editorial citln;.h lazinean, dinhonenty,
and paranlttam noted an "alarming" rlne in absenteeism Mince 1970,
including it sharp Increnne En 1975 ever last year.
GIEREK SPI'ECFIES Manifesting nwarcnesa of the dangers of worker
discontent, Gierek has couched his demands for
better work discipline and productivity in somewhat softer terms
than the party prens. Thus, in dine-jading the new congress guideline;
at the PZPR Central. Committee plenum on the 4th, the Polish leader
nebulously blamed "poor labor organization" for the fact that, deupite
the benefit of shorter working hours, absenteeism was or the rise
and machines were standing idle. Attributing continued shortages of
consumer goods in part to recession in the capitalist world ard to
the failure of agricultural production to meet increased consumer
demands, he conceded that "we recently again Increased the purchase
prices of meat, milk, and other farm produce," for the purpose of
stimulating output of these productr.. Gierek offered little comfort
to the consumer in noting that the only remedies for this situation
were improvements in production, in food processing, and "in the
shaping of consumption."
Gierek issued a direct appeal for improved work discipline, at a
youth meeting in Koszalin on the 6th. Following general criticism
of too much waste in production due to neglect or incompetence, he
called on the young workers to help boost labor productivity through
i-apiu' d punctuailty, exactitude, and a sense of duty.
Addressing party activists at Sosnowiec mine on the 19th, Gierek
reiterated his complaint at the 4 September plenum that shorter working
hours had been accompanied by increased absenteeism and idle machines.
On the potentially expl sive meat shortage, he told his audience
that his regime thad tried to improve the situation by diverting meat
earmarked for export to the home market and by importing more meat,
but Gierek was strikingly candid regarding the lack of prospects for
improvement. He predicted that meat production would not be able
to keep pace with demand and that lower-buicket workers who get wage
increases might have co spend their entire increments for the purchase
of higher-priced meat, adding that "I am afraid there might be some
more troubles here."
Cy"%" I, 00001)
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C1I1NA
NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS LOW-KEYED) NC EDITORIAL ISSUED
The celebration of the 26th anniversary of the PRC's founding
on 1 October was a lackluster affair, highlighted by an
anniversary eve reception given by Vice Premier Teng IIuiao-ping
"in the name of" the ailing Chou En-lni, who did not attend,
the first time he has failed to appear for the occasion. All
currently active Peking-based Politburo leaders have publicly
welcomed National Day except for trade union leader Ni Chih-fu,
who inexplicably dropped from public view several months ago.
Of those Politburo members not currently in Peking, party Vice
Chairman Wang Hung-wen appeared in Shanghai and Chen Hsi-lien and
Saifudin were in Sinkiang. Reports on other provincially based
Politburo members are not yet available.
In his toast at the reception, Teng noted the need to "promote
stability and unity" in order to attain the goal, announced by
Chou at the National People's Congress last January, of building
"CW.na into a powerful socialist country before thu end of the
century." Teng gave a special welcome to Cambodian Prince
Sihanouk among the many foreign guests and reaffirmed Chinese
determination to liberate Taiwan. Notably absent at the
reception were representatives of the Burmese and Indonesian
Communist parties resident in Peking, who have been routinely
noted at such receptions by NCNA in past years.
The anniversary was also marked by the usual round of parties and
cultural events in Peking's parks, but it iailed to trigger the
customary RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
joint editorial which has marked all National Day anniversaries
since 1967, except for 1971 when the Lin Piao affair caused
cancellation of most National Day events. Prior to 1967 National
Day had been greeted by separate editorials in the major Peking
newspapers. This year Peking newspapers carried only the usual
frontpage photograph of Mao, along with several quotat'.ons from
Mao's works calling for greater unity and increased production.
NCNA's 1 October review of central newspaper coverage of National
Day celebrations did, however, call public attention to a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial issued the same day to mark the 20th
anniversary of the founding of the Sinkiang Autonomous Region.
The editorial focused on the celebrations in Sinkiang to jointly
welcome the anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the
anniversary of establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
CIN *.d. ? 000011
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 CONFIDENTIAL PISIS TRENDS
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NCNA's 30 September nnmel.ist of offl.cinl.n attending the National.
Day eve recewation contained no major new rehabilitees. Former
I'LA Chief of Staff Lu Jut-ching, the fi'irnt high-level victim
of the cultural revolution, who reappenred for the first time
two months ago for Army Day, appears to have been assigned to new
official duties within the central military apparatus. Lo was
teamed, without t.tt.le, among several central military leaders
attending the reception. Lo was criticized during the cultural
revoltitt.on for peeking to place professionalism and military
technique above politics, and his rehabilitation underscores
Peking's current stress on improving military training for the PLA.
PRC STRESSES NEED FOR MATERIAL INPUTS TO AGRICULTURE
in the wake of China's national agricultural conference at Tachai,
which began on 15 September with Teng Hvino-ping and other top
leaders in attendance, PRC media have sttvssed agricultural capital
construction and mechanization as the basic means for achieving
significant production increases in the coming five-year plan.
period.* The slogan guiding the campaign calls for development
of TachaL-type counties, continuing a stress on the county as an
economic unit which has been evident during the current five-year
plan ending this year. Unit self-reliance is still the watchward
in agricultural development, although Hsiyang County deputy
secretary Wang Chin-tzu noted in a conference speech reported by
NCNA on 29 September that 17 percent of the county's mechanization
funds were gained through "state investment," indicating there is
at least some flexibility on the issue.
Discussions L,i the conference seem to indicate no major moves
toward communization will be made during the five-year plan period.
Wang noted, for instance, that ideological education on the
"communist goal" must be carried out, but stated the need to
"correctly adhere to the socialist principle of to each according
to his work." t. 26 September commentary by a PEOPLE'S DAILY
correspondent noted explicitly that all "important policies which
deal with the system of ownership and distribution must be
handled with caution. They must not be casually changed, or still
less replaced by self-designed policies."
A Kwangsi provincial broadcast on 20 September discussed in some
detail the problem of propagating communism while practicing
socialism. It noted that "some comrades" worried that propagating
communism might "violate and undermine" present economic policies.
* Initial PRC reportage on the Tachai conference is discussed in
the TRENDS of 17 September 1975, pages 23-24.
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Tlw broadcast stated that "we must think of communism while working
an socialism" and must encourage voluntary moves toward communist
norms. However, it warned against regarding "the fostering and
propagating of buds of communism as a license for immediately
changing the nocialist policies," and that premature implementation
of comn,uniam would "obstruct and sabotage the growth of communist
factors."
The Tachni conference has placed special emphasis on the role of
local party committee leadership, calling it the "key issue" in
developing Tachai-type counties. In addition to the usual
injunctions that party counittec members retain close relations
with the masses and that ideological reforms continue, the
26 September PEJPLE'S DAILY commentary directly addressed the
issue of le:_.dership instability because of ideological campaigns.
It stated that adjustments and consolidations of "a few" leading
groups were necessary in building leading groups ideologically,
but that efforts must be made to "maintain the relative stability
of cadres to a certain degree."
One area in which there seems to be some uncertainty as to
priorities is agricultural capital construction. For example,
Kirin Province on 11 September noted the need to carry out both
short and long-term capital construction projects, with "stress
laid on efforts for this autumn and winter." Kiangsi radio on
21 September also stated that water conservation priority must be
given to small projects, not "big and modern" ones. On the other
hand, by 21 September Kirin radio was stating that "priority
should be given to major projects," though it still noted the
need for speed. The later Kirin broadcast, summarizing findings
of a provincial conference, stressed making concerted efforts on
large projects one by one and espoused strong leadership, high
quality, and the need to budget "sufficient. funds and materials."
There also seems to be some confusion over whether any personnel
may be diverted to capital construction before the end of the
harvest season. The Hupeh provincial radio on 26 September stated
categorically that before completion of autumn farm work "we must
not divert the labor force to capital construction on a big scale."
A KIANGSI DAILY editorial on 21 September had seemed somewhat less
adamant in stating that, even before the harvest, areas "should
arrange some labor power to carry out farmland capital
construction," and in demanding that year-round teams be set up
for capital construction.
While leaving no doubt that agriculture was the most important
factor in China's economic development, recent reports have
continued to pay attention to the concept of a balanced economy,
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with industrial growth spurred by agricultural output. The
26 September PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary stated that agricultural
development determines the speed of national economic development
an a whole, and it noted the goal of Tachni conference participants
to "achieve an overall modernization in agriculture, industry,
national defense and science and technology." The commentary
quoted a delegate from Liaoning as saying that to achieve
modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense and
science and technology, agriculture was most important. The
delegate allegedly criticized Liaoning's past tendency to stress
industry rather than agriculture. Similarly, a Fukien broadcast
on 24 September declared that "only when agriculture has been
developed" can "we accelerate the pace of the modernization of
our industry, national defense, and science and technology."
The reassurances that agricultural development will aid develop-
ment in other sectors may be necessitated by misgivings felt by
those in other sectors that they are being neglected. Extensive
capital construction and diversion of even more industrial
resources to agricultural mechanization implies that, until the
completion of "basic" mechanization scheduled for 1980, resources
will be scarce for full modernization in other areas. The
inclusion of national defense among those sectors dependent on
agriculture is an indication that recent efforts to better prepare
the PLA for battle must still take a back seat to agriculture,
perhaps to the discomfiture of some army leaders.
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NOTES
MOSCOW ON OPEC PRICE HIKE: Consistent with Moscow's traditional
support for higher oil prices, an unattributed Arabic-language
commentary broadcast on the 28th voiced approval of the decision
by the OPEC ministers at the 24-27 September Vienna meeting to
increase crude oil prices by 10 per cent. The commentary--the
only monitored Moscow comment thus far on the price hike--
portrayed the ininistn_rs' agreement as "defending the sovereignty
and independence" of the oil-producing countries. The commentary
made no direct reference to the heated dispute among the OPEC
ministers over the size of the price increase, but it did label
the agreed-upon increase as "extremely modest" and "motivated by
the hope" that the West would adopt a more flexible stance at
the Paris energy talks to be resumed 13 October. The commentary
portrayed the West as continuing to ignore the interests of the
oil-producing countries and "again attempting to blackmail and
intimidate" them. Thus, the commentary asserted that "Washington"
had warned OPEC that a price hike would "harm relations between
the United States and the black gold exporters"--an implicit
reference to Secretary Kissinger's 16 September remark that
another price increase would severely damage U.S. efforts to
establish new relations with the oil producers.
MOSCOW ON SPANISH EXECUTIONS: Soviet media promptly reported the
27 September execution of five Spaniards convicted of killing
policemen or civil guards, rounding up the wave of West European
and other protests and adding condemnation of their own in routine-
level comment and denunciations by Soviet public organizations.
The "Francoist murderers" and "butchers of the Spanish people"
were denounced in statements by Soviet youth and women's organi-
zations, according to TASS on the 29th, and a dispatch the next
day added protests against the "monstrous crime of the Franco
regime" by a Soviet peace committee and the Soviet jurists
association. A similar flurry of media comment and public
organizations' statements had assailed the December 1970 trial
of Basque "patriotic democrats." Commenting cn the present
executions, PRAVDA on the 30th predicted that the day was not
far off when the "sinister dictatorship" would be swept away.
As for Western reaction, IZVESTIYA political commentator
Vladimir Lapskiy, in an article reported by TASS on the 29th,
observed that "even those Western circles" which had shown
indulgence toward Madrid in the past few years had displayed
indignation, and it was hard to find a "bo,.rgeois paper" which
did not condemn the Spanish regime for the "reprisals." Moscow
has only indirectly noted Washington's cautious reaction,
expressed in the White House spokesman's remark on the 29th
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that this was a Spanish internal matter, unconnected to the current
U.S.-Spanish base negotiations, and that President Ford had
"expressed regret at the cycle of violence." TASS political
commentator Vladimir Goncharov remarked on the 30th that "those
circles" which had been trying to bring Spain into NATO were now
keeping silent, aware that "such attempts at the moment could
completely compromise the bloc which is advertised as the
"stronghold of Western democracy."
MOSCOW ON NATO MANEUVERS: A Moscow television feature in early
September carried an unusually positive reference to NATO advance
notification of this autumn's maneuvers in West Europe, but its
impact was later blurred by Soviet press criticism of the NATO
maneuvers. The remark was made by Soviet radio and television
commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin, participating in a 9 September
panel discussion of the European security conference with TASS
Director General Zamyatin and IZVESTIY A Chief Editor Tolkunov.
In the television discussion--just now available--Druzhinin,
responding to remarks by Tolkunov on the Helsinki CSCE document,
said: "The measures on mutual trust that you dealt with and
which are a part of one of the document's chapters have already
produced concrete results. A few days ago the United States,
the FRG and Canada informed the Soviet Union three weeks in
advance that military exercises by NATO forces would be held in
the FRG next month. They did so of their own free will,
voluntarily. Could one imagine under the conditions of the cold
war that lasted so many years the powers resorting to such an
act of good will? Would they have been able to compose a clause
on trust that is now part of the Helsinki document? Of course
not." The remark preceded negative assessments in the .?-)viet
press--PRAVDA on the 15th and IZVESTIYA on the 23d of September--
which acknowledged that NATO's advance notification was
theoretically in keeping with "confidence-building" provisions of
the Helsinki accord but nevertheless charged that the maneuvers,
coming so soon after the July CSCE summit, were not in keeping
wiht the "spirit" of Helsinki. (Negative Soviet press reaction
to the maneuvers was discussed in the 24 September 1975 TRENDS.)
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DIRK I CONOMY: i'yon};yan}; ;usnau iced on 22 Sc ptember that the I)1'RK
had 1prefiilfillecl the six-year economic plan (begun In .1971) more
than a year ahead of ;sc hrdu.le rutd, more importantly, he:I'or(? the
JOt:h nunivernary of the Korean Work er';s Party on 10 October. A
report: by the I)I'IZK's cent:ral stn t.1SLical board carried by K(;NA
on the 22d claimed the plan had been fulfilled in "grow output
value" one year and four months early In industry. Figures in
the report show that goals in tsteeL, iron and cement have not
yet been mot, but the report said large Ls for steel and cement
would be fulfilled in terms of "production capacity" by 10 October.
A 23 September congratulatory message from the party central
committee, central people's committee, and administr.ition council
and other IPRK comment portrayed the achievement as having laid
a foundation for attaining the "ten perspective goals of economic
construction," goals the party's 8th plenum in February 1.974 had
said were to he attained "in the years of thy, next perspective
plan." Current comment did not allude to a new economic plan,
and a 24 September KCNA report noted only that the "ten
perspective goals" were to be met "in the coming few years."
SOUTH VIETNAM PRICE CONTROLS: Citing the need to "struggle
against speculation and manipulation of prices" in South Vietnam,
the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) on 22 September
issued two new regulations requiring the posting of prices for
"all" types of goods and services and establishing a PRG
commodity and service price list. The 22 September pr.icelist
regulations--broadcast by Saigon radio on the 24th--follow in the
wake of a high-level PRG statement of the 10th launching a mass
campaign directed against the influence of South Vietnam's
entrepreneurs who remained behind after the communist takeover,
and the PRC announcement on the 22d requiring conversion of
former GVN currency to new banknotes issued by the National Bank
of Vietnam. The latest regulations called for prices to be
posted by "all state-run and joint state-private business
organizations, trading cooperatives, and private individuals" and
included such diverse items as rice, gasoline, fertilizers,
cigarettes, newspapers, and steel rods used in construction. As
a possible adjunct to the economic crackdown, South Vietnam
authorities have accelerated the drive to return city dwellers to
their "native places" in the countryside. Hanoi radio cn the 29th
reported that as of mid-September, 191,623 compatriots had been
returned from the Saigon-Gia Dinh area.
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 SEPTEMBER 1975
Moscow (2767 items)
Peking (811 items)
UNGA 30th Session
(5%)
8%
DRV Party-Goverment
(--)
16%*
[Gromyko Speech
(?--)
4%]
Delegation in PRC
USSR Stakhanovite
(--)
7%
[DRV-PRC Economic
(--)
3%]
Movement 40th Anni-
versary
Agreement
Korea
(--)
9%
[Brezhnev Recep-
4%]
[CCP Delegation
(--)
8%]
tion
China
(7%)
6%
in DPRK
UNGA 30th Session
(3%)
9%
U.S. Astronauts in
(--)
4%
[Chiao Kuan-hua
(--)
3%]
USSR
Gromyko in Canada
Speech
Tachai National Agricul-
(3%)
3%
tural Conference
These statistics are based on the volcecost commentary output oL the Moscow and
Peking dory estic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern.
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment d?.:;;ing the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting *aith DRV
delegation.
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